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2022 Michigan Topicality
Substantially Increase › 1NC/2NC---Topic Specific › Subs = Military

“Substantial” in the context of security cooperation means affecting political interaction, diplomatic support, capacity building, and military cooperation

Grønning 18 [Bjørn Elias Mikalsen; Researcher and Professor at the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies (Norwegian Defence University College) and Norwegian University of Science and Technology (NTNU); 2018; The Pacific Review; “Japan's security cooperation with the Philippines and Vietnam”; https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09512748.2017.1397730]

Replacing the National Defense Program Guideline (NDPG) as the capstone document of its security policy, Japan issued its first National Security Strategy (NSS) in December 2013. ‘In order to overcome national security challenges and achieve national security objectives,’ the document notes, ‘Japan needs to expand and deepen cooperative relationships with other countries […]’ (National Security Council of Japan, 2013, p. 14). This statement codifies a recent trend in Tokyo’s foreign policy, namely a push to diversify its bilateral security ties, long the exclusive purview of the Japan–US alliance. Japan’s increasingly comprehensive and substantial security cooperation with the Philippines and Vietnam are two notable examples. These are the topic of this article, which seeks answers to questions such as these: What are the characteristics of Japan’s maturing security relationships with the Philippines and Vietnam? What factors have driven and enabled their recent emergence, and what promotes and constrains their further development? What, finally, do they suggest about Japan’s future direction as a security actor in the region and beyond?

The article argues that Japan’s security cooperation with the Philippines and Vietnam has their six basic characteristics in common: the ‘Strategic Partnership’ diplomatic superstructure, regularization of strategic dialogues, increasing frequency of high-level political interaction, diplomatic support in territorial disputes with China, aid-based maritime capacity building, and increasingly substantial military cooperation. The article moreover argues that Japan’s substantiation of these non-US security bilaterals is fundamentally driven by the contemporary power shift in East Asia and the strategic challenge with which China’s emerging maritime power and behavior presents Japan. It has been pursued under American auspices and further invited by Japanese nationalism and security legislative reforms. Notwithstanding these incentives to further substantiate the two security bilaterals, Japan faces considerable domestic and geo-strategic constraints and counterincentives. For this reason, the article concludes that we are to expect further substantiation, but limited military significance, from the Japan’s ‘Strategic Partnerships’ with the Philippines and Vietnam.

2022 Michigan Topicality
Substantially Increase › 1NC/2NC---Topic Specific › Subs = Military

“Substantial” means affecting defense trade, military capabilities, and cooperation

Nylen et al. 22 [Alexendria Nylen; Civil-Military Program Coordinator at Brown University CHRHS; Archibald Henry; Policy Coordinator at InterAction; Fiona Campbell; Student Researcher at Brown University CHRHS; Lauren Woods; Director at Security Assistance Monitor; Sarah Haviland; former Protection of Civilians Intern at InterAction; 5/2022; The Case of Nigeria and the Nigerian Armed Forces (NAF); https://watson.brown.edu/chrhs/files/chrhs/imce/partnerships/Civ-Mil/Nigeria-May-2022-Factsheet.pdf]

The U.S. security partnership with Nigeria is substantial, with more than $232 million in security assistance, $593 million in foreign military sales, and $305 million in direct commercial sales over the last 20 years.3 This partnership is part of a larger U.S. military presence throughout Africa in response to rising attacks by militant groups that have made West Africa and other parts of the continent key focus areas of U.S. counterterrorism goals. Nigeria is part of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF)4, the Global Coalition to Defeat Daesh/ISIS, and the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP). According to the U.S. government, joint security efforts with Nigeria are focused on counterterrorism efforts against the armed groups Jammatul Ahlis Sunnah lid Daawa wal Jihad (JAS)—commonly known as “Boko Haram”—and the Islamic State’s West Africa Province (ISWAP), increasing defense trade, promoting cooperation on maritime and border security, and strengthening military professionalization and governance of the security sector.

2022 Michigan Topicality
Substantially Increase › 1NC/2NC---Topic Specific › Subs = Military

“Substantial” means affecting support for all military services and branches

NATO 22 [North Atlantic Treaty Organization; 2/2022; “The Substantial NATO-Georgia Package”; https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2022/2/pdf/Air-Maritime-Domains-georgia.pdf]

The Substantial NATO-Georgia Package (SNGP) aims to strengthen Georgia’s ability to defend itself and advance its preparations for NATO membership. The package is composed of 16 defence and related security capacity building initiatives. It involves support for all military services and branches, advice and liaison at all levels (strategic, operational, tactical), capacity-building and training activities, and multinational exercises. As of early 2022, all NATO members and two partner countries have provided support to the implementation of the package in the form of expertise and resources.

2022 Michigan Topicality
Substantially Increase › 1NC/2NC---General › Subs = Across the Board

“Substantially means across the board

Brian Anderson 5, Becky Collins, Barbara Van Haren & Nissan Bar-Lev, WCASS Research / Special Projects Committee* Report on: A Conceptual Framework for Developing a 504 School District Policy,

A substantial limitation is a significant restriction as to the condition, manner, or duration under which an individual can perform a particular major life activity as compared to the condition, manner, or duration under which the average person in the general population can perform that same major life activity.¶ The 504 regulation does not define substantial limitation, and the regulation gives discretion to schools to decide what substantial limitation is. The key here is to be consistent internally and to be consistent with pertinent court decisions.¶ The issue “Does it substantially limit the major life activity?” was clarified by the US Supreme Court decision on January 8th, 2002 , “Toyota v. Williams”. In this labor related case, the Supreme Court noted that to meet the “substantially limit” definition, the disability must occur across the board in multiple environments, not only in one environment or one setting. The implications for school related 504 eligibility decisions are clear: The disability in question must be manifested in all facets of the student’s life, not only in school.

2022 Michigan Topicality
Substantially Increase › 1NC/2NC---General › Subs = 33-40% Increase f/baseline

“Substantial” means 33 percent

Maples 7 (Larry, “Pitfalls in Preserving Net Operating Losses”, The CPA Journal, 3-1, Lexis)

If a new loss corporation has substantial nonbusiness assets, the value of the old loss corporation must be reduced by the amount of the nonbusiness assets less liabilities attributable to those assets. "Substantial" is defined as one-third of total assets. This is a difficult provision to interpret. IRC section 382(1)(4) provides that a value reduction in the old loss corporation is required if, just after an ownership change, the new loss corporation has substantial nonbusiness assets. This language seems odd because the purpose of IRC section 382 is to prevent loss trafficking, so it would seem that the asset test ought to apply to the old loss corporation.

2022 Michigan Topicality
Substantially Increase › 1NC/2NC---General › Subs = 33-40% Increase f/baseline

“Substantial” means 40% --- strict quantification avoids vagueness

Schwartz 4 (Arthur, Lawyer – Schwartz + Goldberg, 2002 U.S. Briefs 1609, Lexis)

In the opinion below, the Tenth Circuit suggested that a percentage figure would be a way to avoid vagueness issues. (Pet. App., at 13-14) Indeed, one of the Amici supporting the City in this case, the American Planning Association, produced a publication that actually makes a recommendation of a percentage figure that should be adopted by municipalities in establishing zoning  [*37]  regulations for adult businesses. n8 The APA's well researched report recommended that the terms "substantial" and "significant" be quantified at 40 percent for floor space or inventory of a business in the definition of adult business. n9 (Resp. Br. App., at 15-16)

2022 Michigan Topicality
Substantially Increase › 1NC/2NC---General › Subs = Needs a Baseline

“Substantial” must be measured relative to baseline numbers to the overall category

Small Business Administration, 10 (“A Guide for Government Agencies How to Comply with the Regulatory Flexibility Act,” June, http://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/rfaguide.pdf

Legislative history of “substantial number.” To affect a substantial number, a proposed regulation must certainly have an impact on at least one small entity. At the other end of the range, legislative history would not require agencies “to find that an overwhelming percentage [more than half] of small [entities] would be affected” before requiring an IRFA. 63 Legislative history also says that the term “substantial” is intended to mean a substantial number of entities within a particular economic or other activity. 64 The intent of the RFA, therefore, was not to require that agencies find that a large number of the entire universe of small entities would be affected by a rule. Quantification of “substantial” may be industry- or rule-specific. However, it is very important that agencies use the broadest category, “more than just a few,” when initially reviewing a regulation before making the decision to certify or do an initial regulatory flexibility analysis. The goal at this stage of the process is to ensure that the broadest possible impacts are fully considered. The interpretation of the term “substantial number” is not likely to be five small firms in an industry with more than 1,000 small firms. On the other hand, it is important to recognize that five small firms in an industry with only 20 small firms would be a substantial number. Depending on the rule, the substantiality of the number of small businesses affected should be determined on an industry-specific basis and/or on the number of small businesses overall. For example, the Internal Revenue Service, when changing the tax deposit rules, would examine the entire universe of small businesses to see how many would be affected. On the other hand, a change by the Food and Drug Administration in the regulation of meat irradiators might affect only 15 firms, but that would be the entire industry.

2022 Michigan Topicality
Substantially Increase › 2NC---50%

Legal experts agree

Davignon v. Clemmey 1 (Davignon v. Clemmey, 176 F. Supp. 2d 77, Lexis)

The court begins the lodestar calculation by looking at the contemporaneous billing records for each person who worked on the plaintiff's case. The absence of detailed contemporaneous time records, except in extraordinary circumstances, will call for a substantial reduction in any award or, in egregious cases, disallowance. What is a "substantial reduction"? Fifty percent is a favorite among judges.  

2022 Michigan Topicality
Substantially Increase › 2NC---50%

Less than 50% is insubstantial

Brown 94 (Mark R., Professor of Law – Stetson University College of Law, “The Demise of Constitutional Prospectivity: New Life for Owen?”, Iowa Law Review, January, 79 Iowa L. Rev. 273, Lexis)

n241 I am assuming here that "foreseeable" means "probable," as in "more probable than not." This appears to be a safe assumption given the proliferance of cases granting immunity to officials who offend the Constitution. If this definition is correct, deterrence only works and liability should only attach if one's conduct, viewed ex ante, is more likely illegal than legal: the risk of illegality must be more than fifty percent. In other words, one cannot face deterrence, and liability will not attach, if the risk of illegality is less than fifty percent. (When viewed in this fashion, one might perceive a risk of illegality but still not be deterrable because the risk is not substantial, i.e., not greater than fifty percent.). Lawful conduct, of course, need not be probably lawful. That is what risk is about. Situations might arise where the objective risk is that conduct is unlawful, but ex post it is lawful. Lest judicial reasoning be completely askew, a fairly strong correlation exists, however, between action that is ex ante probably lawful and that which is lawful ex post in the courts. If this is not true, then courts are reaching objectively improbable conclusions, and the whole idea of reliance is illusory.

2022 Michigan Topicality
Substantially Increase › 1NC---50%

Interpretation: Substantially increase means greater than 50%

Brown 94 (Mark R., Professor of Law – Stetson University College of Law, “The Demise of Constitutional Prospectivity: New Life for Owen?”, Iowa Law Review, January, 79 Iowa L. Rev. 273, Lexis)

n241 I am assuming here that "foreseeable" means "probable," as in "more probable than not." This appears to be a safe assumption given the proliferance of cases granting immunity to officials who offend the Constitution. If this definition is correct, deterrence only works and liability should only attach if one's conduct, viewed ex ante, is more likely illegal than legal: the risk of illegality must be more than fifty percent. In other words, one cannot face deterrence, and liability will not attach, if the risk of illegality is less than fifty percent. (When viewed in this fashion, one might perceive a risk of illegality but still not be deterrable because the risk is not substantial, i.e., not greater than fifty percent.). Lawful conduct, of course, need not be probably lawful. That is what risk is about. Situations might arise where the objective risk is that conduct is unlawful, but ex post it is lawful. Lest judicial reasoning be completely askew, a fairly strong correlation exists, however, between action that is ex ante probably lawful and that which is lawful ex post in the courts. If this is not true, then courts are reaching objectively improbable conclusions, and the whole idea of reliance is illusory.

2022 Michigan Topicality
Increase › 2AC---Pre-Existing

CI: Increase means to increase the objective of security cooperation, not an already existing program – Madrid Summit proves

James Coker, 22 (7/4/22; reporter for Infosecurity Magazine, MA in Journalism; “NATO to Develop Rapid Cyber Response Capabilities”; Infosecurity Magazine ) //LVL

NATO has announced plans to develop virtual rapid response capabilities “to respond to significant malicious cyber activities.” The plans were unveiled in a declaration published following the NATO Summit in Madrid, Spain, last week. The latest summit took on extra significance in light of the Russian invasion of Ukraine earlier this year, amid fears of the conflict spilling beyond the current borders into NATO territory. Referring to the war, the declaration read: “We, the Heads of State and Government of the North Atlantic Alliance, have gathered in Madrid as war has returned to the European continent. We face a critical time for our security and international peace and stability.” Among other areas, the declaration outlined an agreement between member countries “on a voluntary basis and using national assets, to build and exercise a virtual rapid response cyber capability.” The military alliance acknowledged that “we are confronted by cyber, space and hybrid and other asymmetric threats, and by the malicious use of emerging and disruptive technologies.”

2022 Michigan Topicality
Increase › 2NC---Pre-Existing › XT Increase=expansion

Increase is to grow in quantity

Merriam Webster Dictionary, 22 (Last updated: 7/4/22; “Increase”; Merriam Webster Dictionary ; Accessed 7/11/22) //LVL

INCREASE, ENLARGE, AUGMENT, MULTIPLY mean to make or become greater. INCREASE used intransitively implies progressive growth in size, amount, or intensity.

2022 Michigan Topicality
Increase › 2NC---Pre-Existing

US Code describes security programs as activities that contribute to existing coalitions

Legal Information Institute (“10 U.S. Code § 333 - Foreign security forces: authority to build capacity” Cornell Law School Legal Information Institute ; Accessed 7/10/22) //LVL

(a)Authority.—The Secretary of Defense is authorized to conduct or support a program or programs to provide training and equipment to the national security forces of one or more foreign countries for the purpose of building the capacity of such forces to conduct one or more of the following:

(1)Counterterrorism operations.

2022 Michigan Topicality
Resolved › 2NC---Impact

Vote neg on presumption – the plan will be intentionally misinterpreted by forces of inertia

Crabble 88 – Honorable Justice, Professor of Law @ West Indies

(The Honorable Mr. Justice V.C.R.A.C. Crabbe, Visiting Professor of Law & Director, Legislative Drafting Programme, Faculty of Law, University of the West Indies, Barbados, Statute Law Review 2, Summer)

And advocates would always argue as to where a comma or a semi-colon should be placed. This is done because a particular interpretation favours a particular presentation of a particular line of argument. It cannot be otherwise. Out of the anvil of argument justice, as far as humanly possible, is done. And the legislative draftsman, nonetheless will have to use punctuation marks in drafting the law. The less room he leaves for argument the better. And we cannot ignore the observation of Stephen J., that although Acts of Parliament “may be easy to understand, people continually try to misunderstand.” The legislative draftsman must, therefore not only “attain to a degree of precision which a person reading in good faith can understand, but it is necessary to attain if possible to a degree of precision which a person reading in bad faith cannot misunderstand. It is all the better if he cannot pretend to misunderstand it.”34

2022 Michigan Topicality
Resolved › 2NC---Impact

Strong negative presumption – even if they intended for the plan to be read a certain way, the judge should not apply sloppily worded laws, anything else is unconstitutional and prohibitive to clear DA and counterplan links

Burstyn 11 – JD, not the Copeland winner

J(oseph Burstyn, JD “Void for Vagueness Doctrine,” 2011, http://law.jrank.org/pages/11152/Void-Vagueness-Doctrine.html)

Third, the void for vagueness doctrine discourages judges from attempting to apply sloppily worded laws. Like the rest of society, judges often labor without success when interpreting poorly worded legislation. In particular cases, courts may attempt to narrowly construe a vague statute so that it applies only to a finite set of circumstances. For example, some courts will permit prosecution under a vague law if the government can demonstrate that the defendant acted with a SPECIFIC INTENT to commit an offense, which means that the defendant must have acted wilfully, knowingly, or deliberately. By reading a specific intent requirement into a vaguely worded law, courts attempt to insulate innocent behavior from criminal sanction. However, such judicial constructions are not always possible. Ultimately, a confusing law that cannot be cured by a narrow judicial interpretation will not be submitted to a jury for consideration but will be struck down as an unconstitutional violation of the Due Process Clauses.

2022 Michigan Topicality
Resolved › 2NC---Impact

Jurisdiction: vagueness means that you vote negative even if the violation is minor

Shannon 2 – Professor of Law

(Bradley Scott, Associate Professor of Law, ARTICLE: ACTION IS AN ACTION IS AN ACTION IS AN ACTION, Washington Law Review, January, 2002, 77 Wash. L. Rev. 65, pg. ln)

The first answer to this question is, why should we not care? If proper terminology (of whatever type) is readily available and comprehendible, why should one not want to use it? Does one really need a reason for not misusing any word, technical or otherwise? In other words, though many misuses of Rules terminology might not seem to cause serious problems, surely that is not an argument in favor of a disregard of proper Rules terminology, particularly where the cost of using proper terminology is negligible. n79 The second answer to the question why we should care about the use of proper Rules terminology goes to the cost of using improper terminology even in seemingly trivial contexts. Understanding legal concepts is difficult enough without the confusion created when an inappropriate term is used to represent those concepts. And this is true regardless of how minor the misuse. In some sense, every misuse of legal language impedes the understanding - and, consequently, the progress - of the law. There are at least two additional reasons, somewhat unique to the law, why one should always strive to use proper Rules terminology. The first reason relates to the nature of the Rules as law (or, as some prefer, a source of law). Many bodies of professional terminology might be considered in some way authoritative, in that reliance thereon not only is widespread, it is almost viewed as compulsory. n80 But the Rules [*86] essentially are of the same character as a federal statute. n81 And despite the fact that there is often no direct penalty for the misuse or disregard of Rules terminology, n82 the Rules, by their nature, nonetheless command respect and, in some sense, obeisance. n83 Another reason for using proper legal terminology goes to persuasion. As most good attorneys know, using proper procedural terminology is almost as important as using the Rules themselves properly, as the use of proper terminology enhances the perceived credibility and competence of the proponent, and helps convey the image of the proponent as the giver of the truth. n84 Though this is probably true of every profession, the [*87] stature of argument, and thus of persuasion, in legal discourse magnifies its importance in the law. n85

2022 Michigan Topicality
Resolved › 1NC---Resolved

---Jurisdiction – if you don’t know definitely what the plan does, you can’t vote for it

Burstyn 11 – JD, not the Copeland winner

(Joseph Burstyn, JD “Void for Vagueness Doctrine,” 2011, http://law.jrank.org/pages/11152/Void-Vagueness-Doctrine.html)

If a person of ordinary intelligence cannot determine what persons are regulated, what conduct is prohibited, or what punishment may be imposed under a particular law, then the law will be deemed unconstitutionally vague. The U.S. Supreme Court has said that no one may be required at peril of life, liberty, or property to speculate as to the meaning of a penal law. Everyone is entitled to know what the government commands or forbids. The void for vagueness doctrine advances four underlying policies. First, the doctrine encourages the government to clearly distinguish conduct that is lawful from that which is unlawful. Under the Due Process Clauses, individuals must be given adequate notice of their legal obligations so they can govern their behavior accordingly. When individuals are left uncertain by the wording of an imprecise statute, the law becomes a standardless trap for the unwary.

2022 Michigan Topicality
T - TACTICS › 1NC

Critical resistance to NATO and international relations requires a tactic, the aff at best is a strategy with no tactic to actualize change

Knox 12 (Dr. Robert Knox is a senior lecturer at the University of Liverpool - School of Law & Social Justice and received his PHD at London School of Economics & Political Science, “Strategy and Tactics”, , 12/23/12)

In a 1990 interview in !e Postcolonial Critic, Gayatri Spivak described how she related her theoretical positions to her more ‘political’ interventions. She argued that although – theoretically and intellectually – she was opposed to ‘universalism’ or ‘essentialism’, it was necessary to make a ‘strategic choice’2 when intervening politically. !is strategic choice involved recognising that since the language of universalism or essentialism was the language in which political debates were conducted, one had to adopt this language in order to make an intervention. !us, she ‘spoke of universality because universality was in the air from the other side in the talk of female discourse ... and since I believe that one shouldn’t throw away things but use them, strategically ... perhaps here was an item which could be used as a universal signi#er’.3 !is position – that anti-essentialists should not simply discard essentialism, but must instead deploy essentialist arguments in concrete political contexts – has come to be known as ‘strategic essentialism’.4 Yet although such a position has an evident attraction, one can immediately imagine several problems with it. !e #rst problem is when one should use essentialism and when one should not. Spivak’s argument simply seems to be that there are some times that essentialism should be used and other times when it should not, what is lacking is any broader criterion as to its use or non-use. !e second problem is that of legitimation. Is it really the case that we should always engage in debates purely on the terms that we #nd them? In so doing, do we not risk winning the particular argument, whilst at the same time legitimating those broader structures that we wish to undermine? !e combination of these two arguments points to the third objection we can raise. If one uses essentialism whenever it is e$ective to do so, having no concern as to whether one’s behaviour is legitimating that very language, in what sense is one’s behaviour di$erent from anyone else’s? In other words, does strategic essentialism, in this sense, not simply collapse into essentialism? !ese problems stem from the fact that, notwithstanding its characterisation, Spivak’s position is not one of strategic essentialism at all. Although her position clearly is one that pays attention to the pragmatic dimensions of political interventions, these dimensions are con#ned purely to the short term. Whilst she gives an account of how immediate arguments might be won, she gives no consideration of how to recon"gure the terms of these arguments, thus undermining essentialism itself. At best, her position is one of tactical essentialism, paying little or no attention to the deeper or longer term aspects of the critique of essentialism. !is is not simply a matter of semantics. In con"ating strategy and tactics – a distinction that will be explored more fully below – Spivak completely subsumes the former into the latter, with the essential outcome that all matters of ‘e$ectiveness’ are reduced to purely short term considerations. What relevance does this have for international law? Whilst international law has always been a central feature of international politics, it is only in recent years that it has become a regular feature in the news media, and a more important part of ‘everyday’ political life. This has been particularly evident in the centrality that international law has come to assume in the construction and contestation of foreign policy.5 !ere have been various moments that were especially important in this process: beginning perhaps with Kosovo and culminating in the War on Terror and the 2003 Iraq war. Most recently, debates around the killing of Bin Laden and the NATO intervention in Libya have been conducted in fiercely juridical terms.6 For those scholars and practitioners of international law who identify themselves as part of the left this has raised considerable problems. The main question has been how to intervene in these debates in a distinctively left or critical fashion. This is linked to the more general question of how – or even whether – the left can utilise international law in such a way as to advance the interests of the oppressed and exploited.7 It is here that the above considerations on Spivak become relevant. As will be argued below, Spivak’s strategic essentialism is a sophisticated articulation of the basic logic that underpins a great deal of critical thinking on how to intervene in these debates. These accounts rely on the idea that a ‘strategic’ intervention has to be made into the existing debates, whilst focusing almost exclusively on short term, tactical considerations. Thus, strategy has become systematically confused with tactics, resulting in its exclusion from theoretical discourse. Those same problems identified in Spivak’s approach continually resurface in critical legal scholarship. This article seeks to challenge the above position and construct an alternative account of how critical international lawyers might intervene politically. To this end, Section 2 of this article brie"y reconstructs the distinction between strategy and tactics. In Section 2.1 this is achieved through examining the original context in which this distinction was articulated, that of military theory. Section 2.2 turns to a slightly di$erent sphere – that of political theory – and attempts to see how the originally military distinction has been understood in political terms. Section 3 examines how the distinction can illuminate the attempts of critical legal scholars to intervene in political debates. In section 3.1 an attempt is made to imagine what a strategic objective for critical legal theory might look like, through examining the theoretical commonalities of some of its participants. !is is followed by section 3.2 which uses the letter written by several academics against the Iraq war as a lens to examine how critical scholars have understood the relationship between strategy and tactics. Here it will be argued that these writings have fallen into the trap outlined above – confusing strategy with tactics – and ultimately end up collapsing into liberalism. Section 3.3 argues that one of the central elements of this position is that it erects a rigid dichotomy between ‘liberal legalism’ and ‘legal nihilism’, in which liberal legalism cannot help but seem attractive. Section 4 examines a number of writers in the Marxist tradition, arguing that their understanding of strategy allowed them to bridge the divide between liberal legalism and legal nihilism. Finally, in section 5, the article puts forward a speci#cally legal conception of the relationship between strategy and tactics, developing a position of ‘principled opportunism’. 2. !e Anatomy of a Distinction 2.1. Politics as War Although today strategy is perhaps seen as synonymous with the world of business, it has its origins in what we might call military science, and continues to be a central term in the contemporary military world. Indeed many of those who used the terms ‘strategy’ or ‘tactics’ in describing politics were in"uenced directly by these military theorists.8 Accordingly, before turning to the political usage of the term, it is wise to begin with how these military theorists have dealt with these notions. Carl von Clausewitz, one of the most in"uential exponents of modern military theory, de#ned strategy as: [T]he use of the engagement to attain the object of the war ... It must therefore give an aim to the whole military action. !is aim must be in accord with the object of the war. In other words, strategy develops the plan of the war, and to the aforesaid aim links the series of acts which are to lead to it; that is, it plans the separate campaigns and arranges the engagements to be fought in each of them.9 Strategy is – in essence – how it is that one would #ght and win a war: connecting the various individual battles together so as to achieve this broader objective. In contradistinction to this is tactics, which is concerned with smaller and shorter term matters. Tactics are concerned with how to win the individual battles and engagements of which the war is composed.10 If we wish to translate this metaphor into more general terms, we might say that strategy concerns the manner in which we achieve and eventually fulfil our long term aims or objectives, whereas tactics concerns the methods through which we achieve our shorter term aims or objectives. !e obvious conclusion here, and one that will be important to bear in mind throughout this article, is that when we talk of ‘pragmatism’ or ‘effectiveness’ it need not be referring to only the immediate situation. As will be explored more fully below, any tactical intervention will also have strategic consequences. !is means that when thinking about e$ectiveness, it is necessary to understand the inherent relation between strategy and tactics.11 In so doing, the distinction allows us to consider how effective particular (seemingly ‘short term’) interventions might be in the longer term. The very obvious difficulty here is that in practical terms it may be quite dif- #cult to distinguish between the long term and the short term. !is is particularly true in the case of political interventions. More than this, however, temporality does not quite capture the distinction between a ‘battle’ and a ‘war’. Although it is clear that there are temporal di$erences between the two, there could be innumerable examples of long battles or short wars. Instead, the difference between a battle and a war (and therefore between tactics and strategy) seems to turn on a structural distinction, lying in the particular aims and objectives of the different types of engagement. Whilst the task of a battle is generally simply to defeat a given enemy militarily, the task of a war will be more complex, involving the disposition of forces, decisions about whether some battles should even be fought (or whether some ought to simply be lost) and complex political and diplomatic aspects.12 Of course this difference in kind generally does correspond to a distinction between the long and the short term, but this does not represent the ‘essence’ of the problem. As such, whilst temporality remains an important part of the distinction, it cannot be the sole factor underlying it. 2.2. Organic and Conjunctural Accordingly, it is not the case that the particular way in which the distinction operates in military terms can be directly mapped onto the political and legal sphere. !is is especially true given that war is – to quote Clausewitz again – ‘the continuation of policy by other means’13. Despite this, there is a common thread running between military and political theory on this subject, with political thinkers sharing a similar understanding of strategy as operating in the ‘long term’. In order to understand how this has been ‘translated’, it is useful to turn to Antonio Gramsci’s distinction between organic and conjunctural moments and the type of ‘criticism’ that both entail: [I]n studying a structure, it is necessary to distinguish between organic movements (relatively permanent) from movements which may be termed “conjunctural” (and which appear as occasional, immediate, almost accidental). Conjunctural phenomena too depend on organic movements to be sure, but they do not have any very far-reaching historical significance; they give rise to a political criticism of a minor, day-to-day character, which has as its subject top political leaders and personalities with direct governmental responsibilities. Organic phenomena on the other hand give rise to socio-historical criticism, whose subject is wider social groupings – beyond the public #gures and beyond the top leaders.14 Gramsci articulated this distinction – in part – in order to understand the logic of strategic and tactical interventions in the political sphere.15 In this account, strategy is related to organic phenomena, that is to say those relationships which are relatively permanent, and serve as the basic or fundamental structure of the field in which the intervention is made. In terms of Marxist political economy, the prime example of such a phenomenon would be the mode of production (for instance feudalism or capitalism) and the relations of production of which it is composed. Strategic questions are those that are addressed at critiquing and overturning these relationships. Accordingly, we might say that strategic interventions are ‘revolutionary’,16 inasmuch as they address critiquing or abolishing the basic logic of the system. Moreover, since they address relationships that operate at a broader and less immediate level than other struggles, strategic decisions are likely to be informed in a greater sense by ‘theory’ (hence Gramsci’s reference to ‘socio-historic’ criticism) as it becomes more important to understand and unpack the logic of the system. However, these considerations remain ‘prudential’ or ‘pragmatic’ inasmuch as they aim at #nding the most e$ective methods to achieve a goal. !e di$erence is simply that this goal is related to structural or systemic issues. By contrast tactics are concerned with conjunctural moments, that is to say those which are not structural in a direct sense. Tactics address those transitory conflicts and battles that occur in the political sphere, which could be a whole range of different issues: from an individual election, to a particular protest and so on. Consequently, there is a sense in which, in contrast to strategy, tactics would be more concerned with ‘reform’ than with revolution,17 since tactics deals with those occurrences which do not directly call the system into question. Of course, tactics and strategy do not exist in rigid isolation from each other. this is because – as above – any given act which has to be reckoned with ‘tactically’ will at the same time make up the broader pattern of engagements to which strategy directs our attention. Equally, there are situations in which the very ‘dayto-day’ issues may take on an immediately structural character, meaning tactical decisions will be immediately strategic. However, these ‘revolutionary’ situations are in fact extremely rare, occurring only in extraordinary historical conjunctures. For the majority of time the distinction between strategy and tactics is a necessary one because the critique of the basic structural logic of the system is not identical with every day struggles within it, and the critique of this structure is not one that has an immediate appeal to the majority of people. !us, to go back to an earlier point, the distinction between strategy and tactics could be said to be a consequence of advancing a ‘revolutionary’ critique in nonrevolutionary times. !is is where the issue of temporality returns, for whilst the distinction between strategy and tactics is a structural one, in non-revolutionary times it will almost always assume a temporal form. If the overturning of the social structure is not immediately on the cards, it must become a long term goal, whereas conjunctural issues necessarily operate in the shorter term. Since the strategy and tactics distinction only makes sense in non-revolutionary times, it follows that it will almost always appear in a temporal form. To put it simply, we might say strategy concerns #nding methods to achieve long term, systemic aims, whereas tactics concerns #nding methods to achieve short term, conjunctural aims.

B.     Violation – their advocacy statement doesn't defend an exportable action to reform status quo NATO security cooperation, [and they don’t provide a strategy that we can use post-round to achieve complete decol and achieve native sovereignty]

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Aff Answers › Defense Autonomy INB › 2AC --- No Impact – EU Soft Power

Soft power is impossible

Wunsch 19—(post-doctoral researcher in the European Politics Group at the Center for Comparative and International Studies). Natasha Wunsch. Sept 7 2019, "The European Union in Times of Crisis: Internal Challenges and a Changing Global Order", European Consortium for Political Research, )

Since 2009, the EU appears to be operating in a context of permanent crises. Internally, it is grappling with the crisis of the Eurozone and economic governance, the migration crisis, the negotiations surrounding Brexit, and a creeping but no less dangerous challenge to democracy as the core of the Union’s shared values. The manifestations of these crises have been so prolonged and recurring that they raise the question whether they represent systemic flaws that call into question the long-term prospects of European integration. This question has been posed with relation to European economic and eurozone governance, but is equally relevant when it comes to Eurosceptic trends among EU citizens and the rise of populist and nationalist governments that explicitly challenge core institutions and values of the Union. Brexit negotiations and the enduring difficulties in finding a workable form of future cooperation with the UK after the deadline for leaving the Union further illustrate how some of the core tenets of the EU’s order, including the free movement of people in the internal market, are coming under pressure. At the same time, the EU faces a multitude of external challenges. These range from the strained transatlantic relationship due to the increasingly isolationist stance of the United States, the rise of a stronger China, and an increasingly assertive Russia. The EU’s ability to bring positive change to its neighbourhood is challenged by the enduring instability and outright political crises in the countries of the Eastern Partnership and those that experienced the Arab Spring. These multiple crises challenge the EU’s emphasis on soft power as its privileged mode of engagement with third countries and risk fostering ever deeper Euroscepticism among the EU’s citizens.