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2022 Michigan Counterplan
Aff Answers › Solvency › 2AC – Solvency – Generic

Squo solves EU autonomy---E12 and NORDEFCO.

Retter et al 21, 1) Lucia Retter is a research leader at RAND Europe and co-directs RAND Europe's Centre for Defence Economics and Acquisition, M.A. in international relations and international economics, The Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS); B.A. in modern and medieval languages, University of Cambridge, 2) Stephanie Pezard is a senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation, Ph.D. in political science, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva; M.A. in history, French Institute of Political Science, Paris (Sciences Po); M.A. in political science, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva; B.A. in history, French Institute of Political Science, Paris (Sciences Po) 3) Stephen J. Flanagan is an adjunct senior fellow at the RAND Corporation. Ph.D. in international relations, Fletcher School, Tufts University; A.B. in political science, Columbia University 4) Gene Germanovich is an international defense researcher and currently serves as the acting international portfolio lead for the RAND National Security Research Division. B.S. in international affairs, Georgia Tech; M.A. in security studies, Georgetown University 5) Sarah Grand-Clement; publisher, 6) Pauline Paillé is an analyst at RAND Europe working in the area of defence and security. M.A. in international relations, Sciences Po Bordeaux (“European Strategic Autonomy in Defence: Transatlantic visions and implications for NATO, US and EU relations”, RAND Europe, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA1319-1.html) //CHC-DS ‍

In addition to these overarching EU initiatives, a number of separate bi- and multi-lateral groupings and frameworks have also emerged in the last 10 to 15 years, aiming to unite like-minded nations in pursuit of greater defence integration. This trend further confirms that EU member states and partners recognise that, individually, their defence capabilities are insufficient to independently deliver most, if not all, defence missions and that collaboration and harmonisation are necessary. Under the leadership of French President Macron, for example, the European Intervention Initiative (EI2) was launched in 2018 to be an agile, nonbinding, voluntary forum, among the most capable European governments willing to employ their military forces, complementary both to the EU (including PESCO) and NATO.88 The EI2 seeks to deepen cooperation in four areas: intelligence sharing and strategic foresight, planning and scenario development, support to operations and lessons learned.89 In practice, the initiative consists of meetings between the militaries of participating member states and periodically at the ministerial level.90 In Northern Europe, for example, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden take part in the Nordic Defence Cooperation (NORDEFCO), a political and military framework that establishes cooperation in five areas: capabilities, armament, human resources and education, training and exercises as well as operations. The aim of NORDEFCO is to increase interoperability between those five members, develop a common understanding in these areas and optimise the use of their resources based on their common strategic culture.91 In addition, members of the Northern Group, including 12 countries bordering on the Baltic or North Sea, have been working to deepen regional defence and security cooperation including on information sharing, exercises and military mobility.92

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Aff Answers › Solvency › 2AC – Solvency – Generic

Only the US can do security cooperation with NATO on AI---EU is far behind on funding, adoption, and private investment.

Christie 22, Senior Research Fellow for the Finnish Institute of International Affairs, Research in the areas of International Affairs and International Security, with a particular focus on: Geoeconomics, Economic Statecraft, Defence Economics, Defence Innovation, Artificial Intelligence, NATO, Great Power Competition., (Edward Hunter, “Defence cooperation in artificial intelligence: Bridging the transatlantic gap for a stronger Europe” in European View, Volume 21(1), Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/17816858221089372) //CHC-DS ‍

Before proceeding, it is worth spelling out the extent to which European security is dependent on NATO and in particular on the US. Of the EU’s 27 member states, 21 are members of NATO. These countries account for about 93% of the population1 of the EU. Within NATO, those Allies that are also EU members only account for about 20% of total defence expenditure across the Alliance, while the US alone accounts for about 70% of the same total.2 Beyond these aggregate indicators, it is furthermore the case that the US is considerably ahead of the EU in terms of practical adoption of AI. For illustration, in 2020 US private-sector investment in AI was around $23.6 billion, but was only $2 billion in the EU, implying a ratio of 12 to 1 in favour of the US (Zhang et al. 2021, 96). Scientific output indicators offer a more nuanced picture. In 2019, the EU accounted for 16.4% of the world’s peer-reviewed AI publications, ahead of the US with 14.6%, while China occupied the top spot with 22.4% (Zhang et al. 2021, 20). On the other hand, if one measures research output in terms of publications on the Arxiv database, the US is ahead of the EU (Zhang et al. 2021, 33) by a ratio of almost two to one, which is nonetheless much less than the large gap in private investment mentioned above. That the EU performs similarly to the US in terms of scientific research, but far less well in terms of investment and commercialisation of new digital technologies, is an old problem which has proven very difficult to address, whether at national or EU level (Baroudy et al. 2020).

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Aff Answers › Solvency › 2AC – Solvency – Generic

Creating EU strategic autonomy trades off with security cooperation AND causes hot internal debates that divide the EU.

Puglierin 21, Dr Jana Puglierin is Head of the Alfred von Oppenheim Center for European Policy Studies. From September 2013 to December 2015 she was a program officer at the DGAP’s Future Forum Berlin (Berliner Forum Zukunft). Prior to this she was an advisor on disarmament, arms control, and non-proliferation at the German Bundestag, where she also worked on matters relating to German and European foreign and security policy., (Jana, “Strategic Partnerships and EU Security and Defence” in “Achieving Strategic Sovereignty for the EU”, European Parliament, ) //CHC-DS ‍

3.1.2 Reconciling Strategic Sovereignty and the Transatlantic Relationship The idea that the EU must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to military crises goes back to the 1998 St. Malo Declaration. Since then, the question of what constitutes an acceptable balance between a more independent European security and defence policy and transatlantic security cooperation in NATO has been hotly disputed on both sides of the Atlantic. The fear of upsetting the US and jeopardising the American security commitment to Europe was a good reason for many European member states to keep EU defence efforts to a minimum. However, the election of Donald Trump as US president has decisively changed the parameters of the debate. The US’ strong footprint in European security could no longer be taken for granted. For many Europeans, this was a wake-up moment that brought the need for greater autonomy from the US back into focus. At the same time, the very notion of ‘strategic autonomy’ became toxic. While Europeans insisted that strategic autonomy was not synonymous with a Europe ‘going it alone’, Washington, but also some EU member states, especially in Central and Eastern Europe, perceived it as an attempt for de-coupling and hence as a threat. On this account, German defence minister Annegret KrampKarrenbauer spoke on behalf of many Europeans when she sent her message to the incoming Biden administration in November 2020: ‘The idea of strategic autonomy for Europe goes too far if it is taken to mean that we could guarantee security, stability and prosperity in Europe without NATO and without the US’. 36 The related dispute between her and French President Emmanuel Macron has once again shown that Europeans themselves have not yet agreed on how far Europe should be able to act independently of the United States.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Aff Answers › Solvency › 2AC – Solvency – Generic

It fails – duplicity, internal divisions, and empirics.

ND 22 [New Direction, 05-22-2022, "Why an EU Army is a bad idea – We don’t need a political bloc of the unwilling", https://newdirection.online/the-european-journal/article/why_an_eu_army_is_a_bad_idea_we_dont_need_a_political_bloc_of_the_unwilling, DOA: 6-23-2022 //ArchanSen]

You might argue that it can only be a good thing if the Europeans step up their defence arrangements. But this has little to do with increasing military muscle. It is not the answer to the plea by successive US presidents for the Europeans to do more on defence. NATO is well established, well proven and credible. 27 of its 30 member countries are European, including 21 that also happen to be EU countries. So why create another structure?

Any EU force would have to draw on the same limited military resources and would be a duplicative, divisive distraction. EU ambitions already intrude into NATO where coordination structures between the two organisations have now been set up, in spite of the fact that their membership is largely the same. The EU wants to become the European leg of NATO – so where would that leave key non-EU European members of NATO such as the UK, Norway and Turkey? In any case, the EU countries can’t even agree among themselves. Many pay lip service to the idea of CSDP while refusing to participate in any meaningful way. Even the arch-federalist European Parliament, in its most recent report on EU defence, noted that “in over 15 years of existence EU battlegroups have never been used, in particular due to the lack of political consensus among Member States and the complexity of implementation and funding…”

2022 Michigan Counterplan
EU CP › EU Autonomy INB › Impacts --- EU k Africa/Latin America War

Latin American conflict goes nuclear---draws in Russia and China

Dr. R. Evan Ellis 16. Research professor of Latin American Studies at the U.S. Army War College (USAWC) Strategic Studies Institute (SSI), with a focus on the region’s relationships with China and other non-Western Hemisphere actors, as well as transnational organized crime and populism in the region, Ph.D. in political science with a specialization in comparative politics. 12-09-16. "Strategic Insights: Thinking Strategically About Latin America and the Caribbean", Strategic Studies Institute, http://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/index.cfm/articles/Thinking-Strategically-About-Latin-America-Caribbean/2016/12/09

As noted previously, there is arguably no region (including Asia) upon which the United States is more dependent for its prosperity and security, and with which it is more closely tied through bonds of family, than Latin America and the Caribbean. In terms of trade and investment, from manufacturers to the food Americans put on the table, there is no region for which disruption of commerce with the United States could do more damage to our economy and the everyday lives of Americans. Reciprocally, the region’s proximity to the United States makes it a logical and attractive business partner; there is not another region of the world for which prosperity, healthy infrastructure, and institutions could contribute more to a win-win commercial relationship with the United States. With respect to security, the United States is blessed by the absence of neighbors that pose a direct military threat to the nation, are experiencing conditions of chaos, or permit U.S. adversaries to operate from their territory. Yet, if these fortunate conditions were to change, the resulting threat to U.S. national security could force a significant reorientation of U.S. security initiatives away from its foreign engagements to address the emergent threat closer to home. To use a military analogy, Latin America and the Caribbean is, for the United States, an “unoccupied high ground.” The fact that the United States does not fully leverage the opportunities offered by Latin America, nor suffers a significant immediate security threat from the region, does not make it any less strategic. The Challenge of Transnational Organized Crime in the Region. The activities of transnational organized crime in Latin America and the Caribbean, often characterized as the principle security issue in the region, is more of a strategic challenge to the United States than is commonly understood. On the one hand, the activities of groups such as the Maras in the Northern Triangle and warring cartels in Mexico generate violence and destroy economic opportunity in ways that generate refugee flows toward the United States. Indeed, the 2014 crisis of child migrants from Central America obliged the Obama administration to request an additional $3.7 billion to respond to the situation, eclipsing the $979 million previously spent on the region under the Central America Regional Security Initiative since 2008.2 In addition, the money used to enable transnational criminal activities corrupts institutions, undermining governance, and expanding criminal networks that can be used by terrorist organizations to raise and launder money, smuggle persons and materiel through the region, as well as creating spaces in which they can hide, train, plan operations, and recruit fighters for their global activities. Such threats are magnified further where anti-U.S. governments, such as the “Bolivarian Socialist” government of Venezuela, tolerate and possibly even facilitate the activities of such groups, permitting, for example, the entry of Iranian paramilitary Qods forces into the region through the country.3 The Need for U.S. Scenario Planning to Include the Potential Use of the Region by U.S. Adversaries to Conduct Actions Against the United States. Military professionals in the United States have the responsibility for planning how to fight the nation’s wars if called upon to do so by their elected leaders. In today’s globally interconnected world, it is highly unlikely that a U.S. “near-peer competitor,” such as China or Russia, would allow the United States to engage with them in such a conflict (however undesirable) entirely as an “away game.” U.S. defense planners must expect that in such a conflict, the adversary would employ its full global range of assets, capabilities, and options, including: relationships and access agreements with foreign militaries (however benign) in all parts of the world, knowledge of, and the potential for, staging activities leveraging their commercial operations near the United States, as well as information technology infrastructure built by the adversary’s companies there. Potential U.S. adversaries such as Russia and China may be expected to leverage such assets and relationships in Latin America and the Caribbean, in addition to other regions, in order to undermine U.S. coalition formation in the run-up to a conflict, to conduct operations in the region during the conflict to disrupt the U.S. economy and financial system, and potentially to conduct military operations from Latin America and the Caribbean to attack U.S. deployment and sustainment flows, and to put the U.S. homeland at risk, thus forcing the diversion of U.S. forces from other theaters. While Russia and China have not currently established formal military bases in the region that could be used against the United States, their familiarity with Latin American armed forces through regular military-to-military engagement, their knowledge of regional infrastructure such as ports, airports, and commercial logistics systems, means that they could achieve a functional military capability in the region rapidly in the months leading up to the conflict, if U.S. adversaries in Latin America permitted them to do so.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
EU CP › EU Autonomy INB › Impacts --- EU k Africa/Latin America War

Africa instability escalates

Walter Mead 13. James Clarke Chace Professor of Foreign Affairs and Humanities, Bard College. “Peace in The Congo? Why the World Should Care.” The American Interest. 12-15-2013.

One of the biggest questions of the 21st century is whether this destructive dynamic can be contained, or whether the demand for ethnic, cultural and/or religious homogeneity will continue to convulse world politics, drive new generations of conflict, and create millions more victims. The Congo conflict is a disturbing piece of evidence suggesting that, in Africa at least, there is potential for this kind of conflict. The Congo war (and the long Hutu-Tutsi conflict in neighboring countries) is not, unfortunately alone. The secession of South Sudan from Sudan proper, the wars in what remains of that unhappy country, the secession of Eritrea from Ethiopia and the rise of Christian-Muslim tension right across Africa (where religious conflict often is fed by and intensifies “tribal”—in Europe we would say “ethnic” or “national”—conflicts) are strong indications that the potential for huge and destructive conflict across Africa is very real.

But one must look beyond Africa. The Middle East of course is aflame in religious and ethnic conflict. The old British Raj including India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Burma and Sri Lanka offers countless examples of ethnic and religious conflict that sometimes is contained, and sometimes boils to the surface in horrendous acts of violence.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
EU CP › EU Autonomy INB › Impacts --- EU k Africa/Latin America War

East Asian, African and Latin American conflict coming now---only EU can solve

Seán O Regan 16, Master’s Degree in Commerce and Government from the University College Cork, Postgraduate Diploma in Conflict and Dispute Resolution from Trinity College, Dublin, Higher Diploma in Accounting, Business, Accounting, Tax, and Law from Dublin City University, “Conflict Resolution Revisited: Peaceful Resolution, Mediation and Responsibility to Protect”, All Azimuth: A Journal of Foreign Policy and Peace, Volume 5, Issue 1, January, p. 70-73

Thus, there is a well-rehearsed commitment to the principle of peace and by implication the peaceful resolution of disputes. The bipolar world order established after the Second World War made a mockery of this commitment. The term conflict prevention in this era meant containing the potential for nuclear war between the major blocs. The ideological struggle between those blocs was carried into conflict all over the globe, notably in East Asia (Korea and Vietnam), Africa (the Congo and Angola) and Latin America (Chile and Nicaragua). The international community’s response was generally to insert peacekeeping forces between parties in conflict without necessarily dealing with the root causes of the conflict. Many such conflicts ended with the collapse of the Soviet Union, but long-suppressed animosities between the constituent republics of that Union and its client states erupted. The international community’s failure to deal with the ethnic/sectarian conflicts in the Caucasus and South Eastern Europe on the one hand and the Rwanda genocide on the other impelled discussion of conflict prevention from academia to foreign policy formation. While the UN and the OSCE had long-standing commitments to conflict prevention, exercise of all possible options was in practice limited by international politics. When it became clear that, as Smith12 put it, the balance of terror of the Cold War would not be replaced by peace and security, the issue of conflict prevention became prominent for the international community.

3. Current Conflict Resolution Practice

2022 Michigan Counterplan
EU CP › EU Autonomy INB › Impacts --- EU Indep k Heg/Trans Wars

That goes nuclear

Talmadge 18, Associate Professor of Security Studies at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University (Caitlin Talmadge, 10-15-2018, "Beijing’s Nuclear Option: Why a U.S.-Chinese War Could Spiral Out of Control," Foreign Affairs, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2018-10-15/beijings-nuclear-option)

As China’s power has grown in recent years, so, too, has the risk of war with the United States. Under President Xi Jinping, China has increased its political and economic pressure on Taiwan and built military installations on coral reefs in the South China Sea, fueling Washington’s fears that Chinese expansionism will threaten U.S. allies and influence in the region. U.S. destroyers have transited the Taiwan Strait, to loud protests from Beijing. American policymakers have wondered aloud whether they should send an aircraft carrier through the strait as well. Chinese fighter jets have intercepted U.S. aircraft in the skies above the South China Sea. Meanwhile, U.S. President Donald Trump has brought long-simmering economic disputes to a rolling boil. A war between the two countries remains unlikely, but the prospect of a military confrontation—resulting, for example, from a Chinese campaign against Taiwan—no longer seems as implausible as it once did. And the odds of such a confrontation going nuclear are higher than most policymakers and analysts think. Members of China’s strategic com­munity tend to dismiss such concerns. Likewise, U.S. studies of a potential war with China often exclude nuclear weapons from the analysis entirely, treating them as basically irrelevant to the course of a conflict. Asked about the issue in 2015, Dennis Blair, the former commander of U.S. forces in the Indo-Pacific, estimated the likelihood of a U.S.-Chinese nuclear crisis as “somewhere between nil and zero.” This assurance is misguided. If deployed against China, the Pentagon’s preferred style of conventional warfare would be a potential recipe for nuclear escalation. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States’ signature approach to war has been simple: punch deep into enemy territory in order to rapidly knock out the opponent’s key military assets at minimal cost. But the Pentagon developed this formula in wars against Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and Serbia, none of which was a nuclear power. China, by contrast, not only has nuclear weapons; it has also intermingled them with its conventional military forces, making it difficult to attack one without attacking the other. This means that a major U.S. military campaign targeting China’s conventional forces would likely also threaten its nuclear arsenal. Faced with such a threat, Chinese leaders could decide to use their nuclear weapons while they were still able to.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
EU CP › EU Autonomy INB › Impacts --- EU Autonomy k India Rels

Uniquely go nuclear

Mastro 8/26/18 (Oriana Skylar Mastro is an assistant professor of security studies at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University and a Jeane Kirkpatrick Scholar at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI)., "Can India Help the United States Against China?" https://www.lawfareblog.com/can-india-help-united-states-against-china)

Second, the need to show military superiority to domestic audiences likely extends to any encounters with Indian forces. This could create some dangerous incentives for China to escalate in a crisis in an attempt to convey its superior military might instead of attempting to defuse the issue and offer off ramps. These escalation pressures create a unique degree of crisis instability in which China may be tempted to resort to force instead of relying on diplomatic means to resolve the issue. Even if China does not want to fight a war with India, displays and maneuvering of military forces to convey a strong message to India to back down could have the opposite effect. The two-month military standoff at Doklam, sparked by the Chinese military’s attempts to extend a road through territory disputed by China and Bhutan, demonstrate some of these problematic escalatory dynamics.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
EU CP › EU Autonomy INB › Impacts --- EU Autonomy k India Rels

Indian ocean wars escalate

Gamage 17 (Rajni Gamage is a senior analyst with the Maritime Security Programme at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore., 11/5/17, “Why the Indian Ocean Must Not Become Like the South China Sea”, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/why-the-indian-ocean-must-not-become-the-south-china-sea-23028?page=0%2C2)

Rising Strategic Uncertainty in the Indian Ocean The pursuit of contesting regional orders by major powers has engendered a strategic environment of uncertainty and mistrust in the Indo-Pacific. As geopolitical developments at land and sea feed off one another, the maritime domain has been marked as the latest theater of war. These dynamics have been most evident in the East and South China Seas, where the complexity of issues at hand is telling. A case in point is China’s construction of military facilities on artificial islands proximate to disputed maritime areas, against a backdrop of contesting interpretations of international law. As regional and extra-regional states face a rising China on all fronts, a climate of strategic anxiety prevails in anticipation of its potential impact on the existing rules-based international order. Such anxieties inevitably spill over into the Indian Ocean Region and manifest in ways unique to that part of the world. A rising India with aspirations to global-power status finds its regional dominance challenged by China’s two-ocean strategy and Belt and Road Initiative. In the maritime realm, India’s response comprises internal naval and port modernization, and increased naval engagements and exercises with neighboring littorals and external powers that have major stakes in the region. This has not, however, had any noticeable effects in tempering regional anxieties. Heavy maritime traffic in increasingly congested regional waters operate alongside this tense backdrop. The risk that various surface vessels could collide—whether naval or commercial—and the risk of submarine accidents is on the rise. A number of regional and extra-regional states have forward-deployed their navies in the Indian Ocean, independently or as part of various task forces. There have already been several maritime accidents involving warships and air crashes in the Persian Gulf and the northern Arabian Sea between regional and extra-regional navies—some of which escalated politically. The Iranian Navy, for instance, has confronted its smaller neighbors and the U.S. Navy by conducting high-speed naval maneuvers and missile firings, and it has used drones to shadow U.S. naval assets. Late last year, an Indian submarine attempted to enter into waters close to Gwadar Port and was reportedly repelled by the Pakistan Navy. Miscommunications and misperceptions are likely to result from such incidents and could escalate very fast to negative political and military expressions. It is against this setting that a code of conduct (COC) for the Indian Ocean was first proposed.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
EU CP › EU Autonomy INB › Impacts --- EU Autonomy k India Rels

Solves every global problem—the EU focusing solely on domestic affairs instead of international security will sacrifice European soft power—prevents Indian ocean war

EBR 19 (European Business Review, “The case for an enhanced EU-India cooperation”, https://www.europeanbusinessreview.eu/page.asp?pid=3350)

The European Union is at a strategic crossroads. After the confirmation in the European Parliament, the next European Commission will have to change gears and refuse to be consumed by small stakes. It is not enough to embrace “strategic autonomy” or to talk about a “geopolitical” Commission, the time has come for the EU to deliver by showcasing relevance, decisiveness and even creativity. Given that the negotiation of the next European budget will be more of a headache, the strategic minds of the Union have started to put more emphasis on how the EU can turn the increasingly prominent great power competition to its advantage. As it looks for a “big win” in the coming year, the EU could make of its strategic partnership and relation with India a key piece of its global game. Yes, there will be in 2020 another big stake, with the China-EU summit, to be organized under the German EU Presidency, but this does not preclude Brussels and Delhi to walk the talk from sharing a similar worldview to building up a more concrete partnership.

With the exception of France (who, by the way, views India as a strategic partner), the EU has been slow to react to the trade war between United States and China and to the weakening of the rules-based international order. Caught off guard, the EU is seeking to regain the lost ground and to be influential beyond its immediate neighborhood. Although some have argued that the Union should first deal with the economic and political reverberations of Brexit, that an internal consolidation is mandatory before enlargement to the Western Balkans or that a “global strategy” is too much of a task, others have rightly pointed out that the international realignments, especially the unilateralism of a Trumpian United States and the rise of a perhaps overconfident China, risk to transform the very context in which the Union operates.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
EU CP › EU Autonomy INB › Impacts --- EU Autonomy k India Rels

EU strategic autonomy requires a willingness to engage —Key to EU-India relations

Lannoo 19 (Karel Lannoo is the Chief Executive Officer and Stefania Benaglia is Associate Researcher at CEPS. CEPS Commentaries offer concise, policy-oriented insights into topical issues in European affairs., “Could the EU and India jointly shape the world?”, https://www.ceps.eu/could-the-eu-and-india-jointly-shape-the-world/)

For the EU-India strategic partnership to reach its full potential, the EU needs to act as one in its foreign policy relations. The EU needs to convince its members of the added value of being the main – if not the sole – interlocutor for India, and demonstrate the limitations of bilateral relations. To persuade India of the benefits of dealing with the EU as a collective actor, the EU should leverage its soft power. The EU is finally beginning to grasp the importance of strong and coordinated public diplomacy and efforts to restructure and intensify it are ongoing. However, now is the time to define clear objectives and strategies to obtain them. Member states need to allow the EU the necessary strategic autonomy for it to take the lead in coordinating their actions in India. Moreover, for the EU to defend multilateralism, it needs to live up to it, which means some painful changes for its members in giving up their primacy at the table of multilateral organisations such as the IMF or the UN. Meanwhile, beyond the imminent appointment of a military attaché to the EU mission in India, the EU needs to shed its reluctance as a global security actor and work together with India on security cooperation. The Indian administration barely considers the EU as an actor, focusing its attention more on individual member states (notably UK, Germany and France, and, more recently and to a lesser degree, the Eastern countries). India turns these bilateral relations to its advantage in striking deals on better terms, playing on the occasionally prickly competition between member states. The strongest competitors of EU Members for tapping into Indian potential are Russia, the US, and China. Without robust and coordinated EU engagement, bilateral relations between EU member states and India may survive, but they will not thrive. There is, for example, no de-facto European chamber of commerce in India, only some national chambers. For the relationship to be deepened, both sides will need to take significant steps. The EU has to prove its added value, but the Indian government also has to act. India’s external trade position is still in its infancy. Its trade and regulatory environment remains relatively restrictive, with discriminatory and diverging standards. Its central government has limited powers, possibly even less than the EU. Many competences remain with its 29 states, which restricts its capacity for outreach. India has also a very limited external presence, with less than 1,000 diplomats abroad – similar in number to those of the Netherlands with a population of just 1% that of India.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
EU CP › EU Autonomy INB › Impacts --- EU Power k Soft Power

EU power solves multilat through unique soft power benefits but returning to strength is key

EEAS 9/9/20 (European Union delegation in Iraq, Delegation represents the European Union in Iraq and, as a diplomatic mission, works closely with the 13 Member State Embassies that are represented in Baghdad as well as their Missions in Erbil, Kurdistan Region. It ensures the tasks of the EU Presidency both in Baghdad and Erbil. The Delegation is the permanent and principal interlocutor of the EU vis-à-vis local authorities, the international community and all other stakeholders for all matters related to EU external action. Acting in close cooperation with all EU Member State diplomatic missions, the Delegation strives to ensure the unity, consistency and effectiveness of EU external action in Iraq. It ensures the follow-up of bilateral relations in the political, economic, trade, energy and development areas.“Building Global Europe”, https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/iraq/84888/building-global-europe_en)

Multilateralism in crisis The world has become more multipolar but multilateralism has weakened, as evidenced by the growing paralysis of the United Nations Security Council, the deep crisis of the World Trade Organization, or more recently that of the World Health Organization. And this precisely at a time when global problems, especially the climate crisis or health issues, are becoming more and more critical. Amid this increasing competition, not only do the classic tools of power play a role, but soft power itself is increasingly used as a weapon: think of films and other cultural products, the capacity to build social networks or the ability to attract talent. Trade, technology, data, information are now instruments of political competition. “Europeans feel they live in an increasingly dangerous and unpredictable world. They need to be reassured that we can provide a meaningful and robust European answer. “ Europeans feel they live in an increasingly dangerous and unpredictable world. They need to be reassured that we can provide a meaningful and robust European answer. If the EU does not become also a real world power, in terms of both hard and soft power, it will be at the mercy of other international actors. And this will affect all fields of our lives: communication, economy, environment, security. Even our democracies and individual rights and liberties would be in danger. Europe needs to act more united. To avoid this fate, Europe must strengthen its traditional levers, look for new ones and take new and visible initiatives to enhance its global posture. Europe needs at first to act in a more united way. And frankly, the EU is the only platform enabling European democracies to promote and defend their interests effectively. In the past, we have sometimes allowed others to paralyse us by dividing us, for example with regard to our relations with China or Russia. We must stop seeing Europe as a collection of national interests and instead define and defend together the common European interest. This is in particular the aim of the work undertaken with the European defence ministers around the “Strategic Compass” concept, to jointly define the threats and challenges that Europe will have to face. “Strategic autonomy” is about defending our interests and values by acting multilaterally whenever we can, but being ready to act autonomously whenever we must.” We need to strengthen our capacities to act autonomously. The concept of “Strategic autonomy” is not about protectionism but about having the capacity to defend our interests and values by acting multilaterally whenever we can, but being ready to act autonomously whenever we must. We have more levers that we think To achieve this, we have more levers of influence than we ourselves often believe. Our internal market is still one of the most important in the world and no external player can afford to neglect it. The European Union has one of the strongest “soft power” toolboxes, with powerful trade and competition policies, significant aid volumes and the new possibilities offered by our investment screening mechanisms. We must use it to its full potential, taking a holistic approach and overcoming silos. The COVID-19 pandemic has exposed the fragility of existing global value chains and Europe’s vulnerability in that regard. Re-localisation and economic sovereignty have become dominant themes everywhere in Europe As I expressed earlier with Commissioner Thierry Breton, we need to link closely our industrial and research policy with our foreign policy. “Re-localisation and economic sovereignty have become dominant themes. We need to link closely our industrial and research policy with our foreign policy”. We are the most important norm setter worldwide –as Anu Bradford convincingly sketches in her recent book “The Brussels Effect” - but we cannot maintain this position if we are not also a technological leader: we need to close the gap between our regulatory capacity and our technological ambitions. We need to protect key technological sectors from falling under excessive control by a third party and to ensure the security of vital sectors such as digital, energy, raw materials and health. We must protect our critical infrastructure (from energy to space), and our digital autonomy and security (international digital rules/standards, cybersecurity). We should also leverage the renewed political priorities of the EU Next generation instrument on digital or environmental issues in the context of the programming of our assistance and other external policies. The principle of reciprocity is key Relations with foreign partners must be evaluated according to the principle of reciprocity. This must become the rule, not the exception, while of course bearing in mind the need to take into account different levels of development and overall strategic interests. The rules that we impose on European companies, particularly with regard to subsidies, must also apply to non-European companies that want to enter our market. “Where necessary, we should be ready to adopt a more robust and strategic approach as we have done for instance with China.” Where necessary, we should be ready to adopt a more robust and strategic approach as we have done for instance with China. We have worked to build our relationship with China on more reciprocity and a level playing field in trade, investment and beyond. By highlighting our political differences, we have achieved that Beijing has to take Europe more seriously. In parallel, we need to continue giving full priority to our very troubled neighbourhood both to the East and the South, and to Africa. Our partners’ stability and prosperity are crucial for the EU’s own security and strategic interests. We have also to strengthen our common action in the field of security and defence and foster the EU’s capacity to act as a global security provider. “The EU has a strong stake in maintaining and developing a rules-based international order within the framework of an effective multilateralism.” The EU has a strong stake in maintaining and developing a rules-based international order within the framework of an effective multilateralism – even if others are clearly trying to weaken it. The joint Communication on Multilateralism that we are planning for next year will set out what the EU can do to counter this trend. Over the years, the EU has been quite successful on the climate issue but we must also contribute more actively to reform what needs to be changed, for example in the WHO and WTO. “As EU we can and should do more to develop a level playing field when it comes to social and human rights.” As EU we can and should do more to develop a level playing field when it comes to social and human rights, through enhanced so-called “due diligence” requirements for economic operators in their procurement chain. We must strengthen our trade policy to ensure that the commitments made by our partners with regard to social and environmental standards are fully respected. We must also reflect on the implications of a carbon border tax without which the Green Deal would lead either to carbon leakage or to competitive disadvantage. And of course we must continue to lead the global fight against tax havens.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
EU CP › EU Autonomy INB › Impacts --- Euro Power k LL

Solves global hotspot escalation.

Weinstein 14 – Kenneth R. Weinstein, President and Chief Executive Officer of Hudson Institute, “Why the US Needs Europe”, Aspen Institute, http://www.aspeninstitutece.org/en/article/1-2014-why-the-us-needs-europe/

This crisis notwithstanding, the U.S. needs closer engagement with Europe on crucial defense and foreign policy matters. The U.S. under President Obama may be turning inward; but the fact remains: Europe is vital and irreplaceable to us.

History and culture bind the U.S. and Europe together; Europe discovered us, shaped our thinking, and forms of government. But there is more than just cultural affinity that unites us. There is a deep moral scope to the alliance. It was, after all, in the West that concepts such as limited government, individual rights, freedom of worship, free markets, and equal rights for women arose. The moral basis of our alliance embodied in these concepts was critical to our heroic joint efforts leading the fierce external opposition to totalitarianism that helped bring down the Iron Curtain.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
EU CP › EU Autonomy INB › Internals --- U.S. Lead kills EU

US-led NATO makes EU influence impossible---only the cp makes them a credible actor

Hugo Klijn 11. Senior research fellow at the Security and Conflict Programme of the Institute for International Relations 'Clingendael' in The Hague. “Chapter 15. Europe’s Virtual Security Debate and a New Transatlantic Relationship”. Nato’s Retirement? Essays in Honour of Peter Volten. https://www.peacepalacelibrary.nl/ebooks/files/334997151.pdf

Of course, it makes sense for countries to ally themselves with the world’s foremost power, and only for that reason NATO will continue to exist for some time to come. But increasingly, the de facto EU-US-NATO triangle is becoming untenable. On the one hand, sustaining US-led NATO as Europe’s primary security forum at the end of the day runs counter to EU ambitions in the field of foreign and security policy. On the other hand it ties Europe to a more global US security agenda that, deep down, it does not subscribe to and that it is certainly not willing to shoulder financially. Finally, as long as Europe remains a function of US security policy, this will put a curb on its ability to forge comprehensive partnerships with third parties. Revamping the Transatlantic Relationship The transatlantic relationship, North America’s partnership with Europe, is still the world’s most vital economic, strategic and political bond, and will remain so for the foreseeable future. The question is, however, whether NATO should remain its ultimate embodiment, or whether this relationship should be remodelled and based on a broad and new strategic EU-US partnership, including provisions on security and defence such as a mutual assistance clause. Such a recalibrated partnership would leave room for differences in approach and be more informal in nature, while not necessarily always involving all 27 EU members, but still important when crises erupt. We have seen examples of this kind of cooperation on Iran, with the EU3 teaming up with the US, and the Middle East, where the EU sits next to the USA, the UN and Russia in the Quartet: both cases that do not allow for direct NATO involvement. Good Old NATO Critics will maintain that we cannot do without NATO’s unique capabilities, in terms of joint planning and interoperability. No other organization but NATO can conduct an operation like ISAF, the argument runs. But in many respects ISAF is a revealing operation. What we really see in Afghanistan is an able and willing coalition that runs the demanding southern and eastern regional commands, and a host of other countries doing something else in the more benign provinces. Out of ISAF’s 46 contributors, non-NATO member Australia seamlessly joins combat operations in the South, while NATO member Germany is carrying out its national stabilization operation in the north, steered by the Bundestag rather than by NATO. None of these countries would be able to sustain their operations without US enablers. So it is rather the US, and not necessarily NATO, which is pivotal within ISAF. Trading NATO for the EU-USA does not mean doing away with the acquis atlantique, but it would mean doing away with a top-heavy alliance that served its purpose well but increasingly stirs unease in Europe, while becoming less relevant to Washington – even if the newest US National Security Strategy routinely speaks of NATO as the pre-eminent security alliance in the world today. NATO, or Europe, is nowhere as central in US security thinking as many Europeans like to believe. When 9/11 occurred, invoking the alliance’s Article 5 only came as an afterthought. Paradoxically, this trend may be reinforced under a less traditionally inclined president Obama, no matter how enthusiastically his inauguration was celebrated in Europe. Moreover, building a new relationship with the USA which is more balanced than it is now would likely stimulate Europe to further boost its post-Second World War integration process. Third Parties Last but not least, a new transatlantic partnership more firmly based on both participants’ autonomy would enable the EU, but also the USA, to review their relations with third parties. Take, for example, Russia. Among other reasons, the EU-Russia relationship, important because of the density of trade, investment and energy links but marred by endless negotiations on a new strategic agreement, is held back because of Moscow’s frustration that it cannot discuss security with the EU, which tends to refer to NATO instead. As long as Europe labels NATO as its primary security organization, Moscow is likely to regard the EU’s neighbourhood policies as affiliated with the alliance’s enlargement agenda, given the expressed synergies between these two ‘EuroAtlantic organizations’. More broadly speaking, the outside world will look at Europe as a more serious interlocutor as it depends less on US security guarantees. Sticking to the Russia example, the US, lacking the economic dimension in its relationship with Moscow, is perfectly capable of concluding deals on strategic issues, such as the recent START agreement on nuclear arsenals. But many, not all, of the bilateral irritants concern Europe and are NATO related. It is probably no coincidence that Russian compliance with START has been made dependent on missile defence developments in Europe.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
EU CP › EU Autonomy INB › ---EU multilat

EU multilateralism is possible even in US disagreement---ICC, Kyoto, and Iran nuclear agreement prove.

Alcaro 21, Research Coordinator and Head of the Global Actors Programme, International Affairs Institute (IAI), Rome., (Jana, “Strategic Partnerships and EU Security and Defence” in “European Strategic Sovereignty and Multilateralism: Lessons from the Iran Nuclear Dea”, European Parliament, ) //CHC-DS ‍

Specifically, multilateralism performs three functions that serve European sovereignty. The first is that it anchors interstate interactions in accepted, and at times binding, norms, rules and practices. The EU and its member states have an interest in ensuring that such norms, rules and practices continue to reflect values they share, including individual rights, democracy, secularism, non-discriminatory trade and free markets. Second, multilateralism is about cooperatively addressing transnational challenges, like climate change, pandemics or the myriad risks emanating from regional crises, which affect European citizens, economy and security. Third, multilateralism reduces the room for power politics to shape international affairs, an outcome that favours a collective polity with very limited military projection capacity such as the EU. 47 Admittedly, strengthening multilateral norms, institutions and practices in a world increasingly characterised by multipolar competition – and with the US oscillating between support and disengagement – is a tall order. It is not impossible though, nor an absolute novelty for the EU and its member states. In the early 2000s, for instance, the Union managed to bring forward the multilateral agendas on international justice (ICC) and climate (Kyoto Protocol) in the face of opposition from Washington. Another, arguably more illustrative, example of the European potential to promote multilateralism is the pursuit of the nuclear agreement with Iran and the defence of it after the US pull-out. The purpose of this chapter is to analyse the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) between Iran and a group of six powers, namely the US, China, Russia and the E3 of France, Germany and the UK, as well as the HR/VP in representation of the EU (together labelled the E3/EU+3).48 The case of the ‘Iran Nuclear Deal’ can help us ascertain what contribution it has made to multilateralism, and what role the EU played in bringing about its agreement. In particular, the case of the JCPOA is illustrative of the way in which the EU requires multilateral frameworks and partnerships in order to wield influence in international relations. Lessons from the Iran Nuclear Deal can be used more broadly for the way the EU can play a more effective role in global affairs.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
EU CP › EU Autonomy INB › 1NC/2NC --- Defense Autonomy

EU strategic autonomy solves multilateralism, which solves econ, climate, and tech---US foreign policy swings undermine it.

Alcaro 21, Research Coordinator and Head of the Global Actors Programme, International Affairs Institute (IAI), Rome., (Jana, “Strategic Partnerships and EU Security and Defence” in “European Strategic Sovereignty and Multilateralism: Lessons from the Iran Nuclear Dea”, European Parliament, ) //CHC-DS ‍

The notion that the EU and its member states should pursue greater autonomy in international affairs has gained increasing salience in intra-EU debates. In 2016, the EU Global Strategy elevated the attainment of a higher degree of autonomy in security and defence to a strategic imperative.37 In 2018, the Juncker Commission38 embraced a view of strategic autonomy that extended to other policy areas, such as the economy and trade, climate and energy, as well as digital and technology regulations. Strategic autonomy has remained since a dominating theme in official EU discourse, as attested to (amongst others) by the selfdepiction as ‘geopolitical’ of the Von der Leyen Commission39 and the HR/VP Josep Borrell’s call on the EU to embrace power.40 While increasingly salient, strategic autonomy has also been controversial. Detractors dismiss it as a misleading notion that creates the illusion of an EU capable of achieving independence from the US, which remains the ultimate security guarantor of several (most) EU member states.41 While understandable, such concerns are misplaced. Autonomy is not about independence. It is about reducing the vulnerability of the EU and its member states to the political use of asymmetric interdependencies by other countries, starting with systemic rivals but including also allies. Examples include Russia’s leveraging its energy supplies, China using access to its market to force technology transfers, and the US weaponising financial interdependencies through extraterritorial sanctions.42 It is not by chance that autonomy has become increasingly tied to the notion of ‘European sovereignty’.43 This connection does not stem from a (non-existent) demand to confer statehood on the EU, but points to the strengthening of the Union as the best way to enable EU member states to act according to their own norms and laws. In these terms, greater autonomy of the EU is tantamount to a stronger defence of the sovereign rights of its member states. Partly, the demand for stronger autonomy results from the evolution of the EU into an ever more integrated polity, endowed with more competencies and correspondingly greater ambitions. Arguably more important, however, has been the emerging multipolarity of international politics. The latter is usually ascribed to the growing economic prowess of such countries as China, which seek to promote their own models of governance of global issues. Yet, an equally decisive factor has been the difficulty of US policymakers to forge an enduring consensus on how the US should conduct itself in international affairs. The ever-wilder oscillations of America’s foreign policy have emboldened its rivals and disoriented its allies. Critically, US foreign policy swings have eventually resulted in a diminished commitment to the system of multilateral institutions, treaties and regimes that the US itself did the most to create in the decades after World War II.44 This trend peaked during the Trump years, when the US deliberately pursued a policy of contestation (of the World Trade Organisation and the International Criminal Court, to mention just a few) and disengagement (a partial list of international arrangements the US left under Trump include the Paris Accord on climate, the World Health Organisation, the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces and Open Skies treaties, as well as the Iran nuclear deal). As the US distanced itself from multilateral institutions, China made efforts to increase its sway within them, targeting in particular technical agencies such as the International Standards Organisation and the International Telecommunication Union to bring global technology standards closer to Chinese ones.45 Seen from the EU, this is a vicious cycle in which multilateral institutions are simultaneously undermined from without (by the US) and within (by China). The outcome may be a dysfunctional multilateral order or one that more closely reflects China’s model of authoritarian capitalism. 46 Either outcome would negatively affect the EU and its member states’ security and prosperity, as it would reduce European influence in existing multilateral institutions. The strengthening and expansion of the latter are therefore essential in making the EU and its member states capable of navigating the agitated waters of a more competitive international system. The ability of EU member states to live by their own laws and rules is thus inextricably linked to multilateralism.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
EU CP › China INB › Block – A2: Chips Act Solves

Short-term relief like the Chips Act fail---overcapacity, inconsistency, and competitor reactions. Only long-term coordination solves.

Poiters and Weil 22, *Research Fellow for Bruegel. Niclas' research interests include international trade, international macroeconomics and the digital economy. He is working on topics on e-commerce in trade as well as European trade policy in global trade wars. He holds a Ph.D. in Economics from Universitat de Barcelona, a M.Sc. in economics from the Universität Bonn, and a B.Sc. from Universität Mannheim. During his Ph.D. he was a visiting scholar at Northwestern University. ** Pauline works at Bruegel as a Research Analyst. She holds a bachelor in Political Science and a master’s degree in International Trade and Finance from Sciences Po Lille. She also studied an MSc in Political Economy of Europe at the London School of Economics., (Niclas and Pauline, “Is the EU Chips Act the right approach?”, Bruegel, June 2, .) //CHC-DS ‍

Though global demand for chips will undoubtedly increase in the coming years, the current shortages have prompted governments and firms to invest in fabrication, making overcapacity in the future not unlikely. For instance, prices for some types of memory chip, which best fit the definition of a commodity, are expected to decline by 16% in 2022 as supply growth outstrips demand. The chips industry is subject to boom-and-bursts cycles. The Commission has not clarified which market failure the Chips Act is supposed to address with massive government support, or how obtaining an (at best) modest market share in cutting-edge logic chips would actually increase EU geostrategic leverage. On supply management, implementing emergency measures would not fit the reality of supply and demand dynamics in the high-end chips sector. The chips that would be produced by an EU ‘first-of-a-kind’ facility are not commodities that can be reallocated. High-end logic chips are produced by foundries according to customer specifications, which vary between industries and buyers, and the manufacturing of such chips can take up to 26 weeks. A request to divert production would be inconsistent with an industry that cannot swiftly adapt production lines – as confirmed by the 2021 shortages.

Governments currently make up 1% of global demand for chips. If the Commission were to act as a buyer, it would have to choose to which companies to allocate the scarce supplies, while making the situation worse for everyone else. This problem can be much better solved by firms reviewing the trade-off between lean inventories and supply sustainability. The private sector should adapt to the risks on global value chains witnessed during the pandemic – it is starting to do so. Such measures raise risks of adverse economic implications and political messaging. Protectionist measures in a sector in which the EU is currently dependent on imports could create a precedent which would be to the detriment of the EU if copied by other players. Chip shortages were not the result of export bans but of a multitude of economic factors. Where export control measures have been introduced in the chips sector, it has been because of geopolitical rivalries and has not targeted the EU. While the rationale for EU export controls – economic activity or national security – remains unclear, their signalling is clearly protectionist. The EU has more to lose than others from ‘beggar-thy-neighbour’ policies in the industry.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
EU CP › China INB › Block – Solves European Economy

US-China rivalry is centering on Europe---European tech sovereignty is key to check the resulting disinfo, democratic collapse, and crisis instability.

Shapiro 20, Jeremy Shapiro is the research director of the European Council on Foreign Relations. His areas of focus include US foreign policy and transatlantic relations., (Jeremy, “Introduction: Europe’s digital sovereignty” in “Europe’s digital sovereignty: From rulemaker to superpower in the age of US-China rivalry”, European Council on Foreign Relations, ) //CHC-DS ‍

Technological developments naturally focus our attention on change. But, in this whirl of dynamism, many less stirring, but no less critical, pockets of continuity often go unnoticed. Technology can engender rapid changes, but, as many of the contributors emphasise, several aspects of the struggle for digital sovereignty have already been with us for several years and we can expect that they will continue to shape that struggle for many years to come. The first concerns the continuation of the bipolar competition between the United States and China that is undermining international cooperation, particularly on technology issues. Nearly all the essays underline that this conflict will likely persist, and indeed that US-Chinese relations, particularly on technology issues, will continue to deteriorate. As both Fran Burwell and Janka Oertel show, the pandemic has exacerbated existing divisions between the US and China. Most of the authors see their burgeoning conflict as framing the European struggle for digital sovereignty. Europe remains digitally dependent on both the US and China in a variety of domains, from chat platforms to telecommunications equipment. Competition between the US and China means that both sides increasingly see the European market as a critical battleground in the larger struggle to establish their global technological and industrial dominance. Europe, in Oertel’s words, is already “caught in the crossfire”. As recent political debates within Europe on issues as diverse as 5G technology and internet regulation demonstrate, US-Chinese rivalry is starting to impinge on practically every technological issue.

The second area of continuity concerns the capacity of digital tools, particularly social media, to spread disinformation and undermine democratic institutions. As José Ignacio Torreblanca points outs, the coronavirus crisis has only highlighted the degree to which both foreign and domestic actors can use a combination of digital technology and social psychology to pursue a variety of political agendas, including disrupting democratic processes and exacerbating domestic political polarisation. The growing awareness of this problem has not yet lessened its prevalence and we should expect conflict within societies over how to regulate digital content. The fact that, in Europe, the dominant social media companies are American means that the struggle to regulate them will have geopolitical consequences.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
EU CP › China INB › Block – Impact – Supply Shocks

China holds 89% of materials for semiconductors---overreliance risks global shocks.

Chitkara 22, Hirsh Chitkara is a reporter at Protocol focused on the intersection of politics, technology and society. Before joining Protocol, he helped write a daily newsletter at Insider that covered all things Big Tech., (Hirsh, “The great onshoring: Inside the transcontinental chip race”, Protocol, May 20, https://www.protocol.com/policy/us-eu-semiconductors-ttc-onshoring) //CHC-DS ‍

“Some people felt like it would be mostly to talk about disputes with the Europeans over how to regulate the tech sector,” Padilla said. But after Russia invaded Ukraine, “people on both sides of the Atlantic got reminded that the U.S.-European relationship is the essential partnership — economically, politically and now militarily — in the world.” Those officials clearly felt a shared sense of urgency to onshore semiconductor manufacturing. At the TTC, they agreed to collaborate more closely on supply chain transparency and subsidy programs. The strong language contained in those clauses affirmed their commitment to an already aggressive onshoring strategy. The meeting also revealed the centrality of semiconductor manufacturing to U.S.-centric military objectives. For chip manufacturers, that means free-flowing subsidies for now, but at the cost of a potential overcapacity problem in the longer term.

National security “freak out” “You have to understand that these fabrication facilities, they are not being propped up because of pure economics concerns. They’re being propped up because of national security — people freaking out, really, that’s what it is,” Adi Rao, a PhD candidate in The Department of Government at Cornell, explained to Protocol. “The level of urgency that we’re seeing from government leaders in the U.S., Europe and Japan is driven mostly by the national security concern,” echoed Padilla. The pandemic-related supply chain crunch helped government officials realize their economies were entirely too dependent on Taiwan for semiconductors, he said. “Every government meeting I have, almost the first thing an official says is, ‘We cannot rely on just Taiwan for chips.’”