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2022 Michigan Counterplan
EU CP › EU Leadership INB › Block – UQ – EU Tech k Power

Russia, China, and the US are all outcompeting the EU. Revitalized strategy is key.

Ringhof and Torreblanca 22 [Julian Ringhof, José Ignacio Torreblanca, 5-17-2022, "The geopolitics of technology: How the EU can become a global player", ECFR, https://ecfr.eu/publication/the-geopolitics-of-technology-how-the-eu-can-become-a-global-player/, DOA: 6-20-2022 //ArchanSen]

Today’s major powers engage in comprehensive global technology politics. The weaponisation, mastering, and control of digital technologies is the new ‘Great Game’. These power dynamics are helping shape technological spheres of influence. Countries in Latin America and the Caribbean, Africa, and the Indo-Pacific – but also in central Eastern Europe and the Balkans – have fallen or may soon fall under Chinese or Russian technological influence or dominance. China is luring countries into technological dependencies to undermine their political sovereignty through its Digital Silk Road (DSR) initiative. Beijing also shields its own citizens from foreign influence with its ‘great firewall’ and develops industrial strategies to secure its technological autonomy from the West. It uses digital disinformation to influence public opinion in other countries, mounts cyberattacks and cyberespionage to strengthen its industrial base, strategically deploys attractively-priced 5G technologies abroad to gain control of telecom networks, and tries to impose its technical standards through international organisations.

Together with Russia, China is attempting to ingrain authoritarian values into the global cyberspace. Russia is also leveraging and restricting mass media and social networks to protect its interests, shielding its population from democratic temptations, and waging an information war against the West and its allies with the aim of undermining citizens’ faith in democracy.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
EU CP › EU Leadership INB › Block – UQ – EU-US Coop Falling Now

The relationship is collapsing – only a revival on tech can solve.

Csernatoni 21 [, PhD in International Relations from Central European University, 2021. “The Technology Challenge in the Transatlantic Relationship” DOA: 6/20/2022 //ArchanSen]

In this article the transatlantic relationship is defined as the overall set of relations between the US and the EU, relations that are maintained via engagements in institutions such as NATO (Smith 2018, 539). This relationship has been intimately linked to the ebbs and flows of two interconnected structural changes. First, since the end of the Cold War era, systemic changes in the international arena have seen successive US administrations and European leaders alternate between fully embracing shared views and interests, with limited disagreement on certain issues, and episodes of acute discord and crisis. To name a few points of disagreement, the US-led invasion of Iraq; nuclear strategy; and international development, monetary and trade policies have caused many furrowed brows in both European capitals and Washington. These issues all arose long before the US strategic pivot towards Asia, disagreements over China, the lingering effects of former President Donald J. Trump’s transactional approach to foreign policy, data privacy and the recent responses to the novel coronavirus pandemic.

Second, structural changes in the EU integration project and the increasing supranationalisation of the EU’s defence policy have also had powerful repercussions. The growing role of the European Commission in defence technological and industrial matters and the launch of the European Defence Fund, an unprecedented funding scheme financed directly from the EU budget to support homegrown European collaborative defence research and development (Håkansson 2021), have raised concerns across the Atlantic. In recent years, a new momentum in EU defence integration has taken shape around the concept of European strategic autonomy, coupled with pragmatic policy steps and initiatives prioritising European sovereignty in defence industrial areas, as well as technological and digital matters (Csernatoni 2021b). This growing supranationalisation has been partly triggered by the combination of former President Trump’s vitriolic stance towards the EU and NATO, the EU losing its strongest transatlantic link with the UK’s departure, and the evolving international technological rivalry between the US and China. Such challenges have called for a critical reappraisal of European autonomy and dependency in key technological areas, from defence, emerging and disruptive technologies (EDTs), and the digital domain, to space. Conversely, EU talk and action to spend more on military and technological power have provoked fears that European defence and technological cooperation will lead to industrial rivalry with the US or a duplication of NATO’s efforts.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
EU CP › EU Leadership INB › Block – A/O – LL

Multiple scenarios for extinction

Markley 16 (Stephen, Journalist for Paste Magazine, “Is France the Final Domino for the European Union?”, Paste Magazine, December 15, 2016, https://www.pastemagazine.com/articles/2016/12/is-france-the-final-domino-for-the-european-union.html)

For many Americans reading this, there is no doubt a sense of remove from the relevance of the European project. Think of it this way: for centuries Europe was the Middle East of the world. It was a war-hungry, dysfunctional, violent, chaotic piece of the globe that could barely go a decade without a barbaric, usually pointless blood-letting conflict. Since World War II and the economic and political integration that brought former nation-state rivals into mutually beneficial coexistence, the continent has been a region of remarkable prosperity and stability. Keep in mind, this has never happened before in human history: a set of political leaders and their constituents voluntarily chose to cede elements of sovereignty in order to form a better, stronger union. The United States and Great Britain, often mentioned as democratic ideals, were two empires won by violent conquest in which wealthy elites only begrudgingly allowed democracy to sift down to the most impoverished and brutalized citizens.

The parochial movements of the last five to ten years—from the EU’s troubles to the Scottish independence vote to the surge of American nationalism that brought us such phenomenon as the go-it-alone war in Iraq and now Donald Trump—have different roots and causes but they do share a common thread. We live in an increasingly complex and interdependent world where the greatest threats to peace, individual well-being, and human flourishing are largely transnational. Climate change, infectious disease, nuclear proliferation, financial crisis, cyber insecurity—these are all borderless phenomenon that do not care if their victims are French, British, American, or Syrian. Their worst consequences do not care about our flags, languages, religions, or skin colors. And yet at a time when transnational peril necessitates a greater need for cooperation, tolerance, and unity, Western liberal democracies are taking a hard turn into fragmentation, arrogance, self-pity, and denial. The break-up of the European Union brought on by a wave of selfish, quasi-authoritarian nationalism would be a staggering blow to the economic and political security of what remains of the increasingly precarious free world.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
EU CP › EU Leadership INB › Block – A/O – China Tech

Chinese tech leadership leads to nuclear war

Kroenig, professor of government, writes in 2018, Deputy Director for Strategy, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security Associate Professor of Government and Foreign Service, Georgetown University (Matthew, Nov 12, 2018, “Will disruptive technology cause nuclear war?” BAS, )

Recently, analysts have argued that emerging technologies with military applications may undermine nuclear stability (see here, here, and here), but the logic of these arguments is debatable and overlooks a more straightforward reason why new technology might cause nuclear conflict: by upending the existing balance of power among nuclear-armed states. This latter concern is more probable and dangerous and demands an immediate policy response. For more than 70 years, the world has avoided major power conflict, and many attribute this era of peace to nuclear weapons. In situations of mutually assured destruction (MAD), neither side has an incentive to start a conflict because doing so will only result in its own annihilation. The key to this model of deterrence is the maintenance of secure second-strike capabilities—the ability to absorb an enemy nuclear attack and respond with a devastating counterattack. Recently analysts have begun to worry, however, that new strategic military technologies may make it possible for a state to conduct a successful first strike on an enemy. For example, Chinese colleagues have complained to me in Track II dialogues that the United States may decide to launch a sophisticated cyberattack against Chinese nuclear command and control, essentially turning off China’s nuclear forces. Then, Washington will follow up with a massive strike with conventional cruise and hypersonic missiles to destroy China’s nuclear weapons. Finally, if any Chinese forces happen to survive, the United States can simply mop up China’s ragged retaliatory strike with advanced missile defenses. China will be disarmed and US nuclear weapons will still be sitting on the shelf, untouched. If the United States, or any other state acquires such a first-strike capability, then the logic of MAD would be undermined. Washington may be tempted to launch a nuclear first strike. Or China may choose instead to use its nuclear weapons early in a conflict before they can be wiped out—the so-called “use ‘em or lose ‘em” problem. According to this logic, therefore, the appropriate policy response would be to ban outright or control any new weapon systems that might threaten second-strike capabilities. This way of thinking about new technology and stability, however, is open to question. Would any US president truly decide to launch a massive, bolt-out-of-the-blue nuclear attack because he or she thought s/he could get away with it? And why does it make sense for the country in the inferior position, in this case China, to intentionally start a nuclear war that it will almost certainly lose? More important, this conceptualization of how new technology affects stability is too narrow, focused exclusively on how new military technologies might be used against nuclear forces directly. Rather, we should think more broadly about how new technology might affect global politics, and, for this, it is helpful to turn to scholarly international relations theory. The dominant theory of the causes of war in the academy is the “bargaining model of war.” This theory identifies rapid shifts in the balance of power as a primary cause of conflict. International politics often presents states with conflicts that they can settle through peaceful bargaining, but when bargaining breaks down, war results. Shifts in the balance of power are problematic because they undermine effective bargaining. After all, why agree to a deal today if your bargaining position will be stronger tomorrow? And, a clear understanding of the military balance of power can contribute to peace. (Why start a war you are likely to lose?) But shifts in the balance of power muddy understandings of which states have the advantage. You may see where this is going. New technologies threaten to create potentially destabilizing shifts in the balance of power. For decades, stability in Europe and Asia has been supported by US military power. In recent years, however, the balance of power in Asia has begun to shift, as China has increased its military capabilities. Already, Beijing has become more assertive in the region, claiming contested territory in the South China Sea. And the results of Russia’s military modernization have been on full display in its ongoing intervention in Ukraine. Moreover, China may have the lead over the United States in emerging technologies that could be decisive for the future of military acquisitions and warfare, including 3D printing, hypersonic missiles, quantum computing, 5G wireless connectivity, and artificial intelligence (AI). And Russian President Vladimir Putin is building new unmanned vehicles while ominously declaring, “Whoever leads in AI will rule the world.” If China or Russia are able to incorporate new technologies into their militaries before the United States, then this could lead to the kind of rapid shift in the balance of power that often causes war. If Beijing believes emerging technologies provide it with a newfound, local military advantage over the United States, for example, it may be more willing than previously to initiate conflict over Taiwan. And if Putin thinks new tech has strengthened his hand, he may be more tempted to launch a Ukraine-style invasion of a NATO member. Either scenario could bring these nuclear powers into direct conflict with the United States, and once nuclear armed states are at war, there is an inherent risk of nuclear conflict through limited nuclear war strategies, nuclear brinkmanship, or simple accident or inadvertent escalation. This framing of the problem leads to a different set of policy implications. The concern is not simply technologies that threaten to undermine nuclear second-strike capabilities directly, but, rather, any technologies that can result in a meaningful shift in the broader balance of power. And the solution is not to preserve second-strike capabilities, but to preserve prevailing power balances more broadly. When it comes to new technology, this means that the United States should seek to maintain an innovation edge. Washington should also work with other states, including its nuclear-armed rivals, to develop a new set of arms control and nonproliferation agreements and export controls to deny these newer and potentially destabilizing technologies to potentially hostile states. These are no easy tasks, but the consequences of Washington losing the race for technological superiority to its autocratic challengers just might mean nuclear Armageddon.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
EU CP › EU Leadership INB › Block – A/O – China Tech

EU tech autonomy is key to check back against Chinese tech supremacy.

Larsen 20 (Henrik B. L. Larsen, PhD and a Senior Researcher at the Center for Security Studies (CSS) at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology, “Europe’s Awakening to China’s Tech Dominance,“ Harvard International Review, October 2020, https://hir.harvard.edu/europe-awakening-china-tech-dominance/)//JRD

The EU must be a tech superpower in its own right with a far larger number of large companies . The tech industry operates in an oligopolized world market with a handful of suppliers. Europe in most technologies faces a choice between either China or the United States. An exception is 5G where Europe has its own technological superstars, Nokia and Ericsson (the United States, by contrast, has no significant 5G market competitor). The increasing number of country decisions to discard Huawei already gives the two companies a strong foundation on the European home markets.

The EU must come to the realization that the only way to make European tech companies able to compete globally is to allow them to grow into global champions that can innovate at scale. China’s mercantilist methods and proactive promotion of its national tech champions compel a revision of the EU’s original focus to create the best possible conditions for competition on the internal market. It was arguably a strategic mistake when the European Commission  between a German and a French rail manufacturing company (Siemens/Alstom), a manifestation for the EU’s laggardness in prioritizing global competitiveness. The European Commission's decision is especially disconcerting when taking into account the risk of global dominance of Chinese state-owned or state-subsidized enterprises as well as China’s restriction of foreign access to its own domestic market. China-like subsidies can hardly come into question. However, Europe’s consolidated aerospace industry with Airbus stands out as a successful example of the use of infrastructure support, beneficial loans, and the advancement of research and development to gain global competitiveness.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
EU CP › EU Leadership INB › Block – A/O – Democracy

Democracy is collapsing now – EU tech leadership solves.

Ringhof and Torreblanca 22 [Julian Ringhof, José Ignacio Torreblanca, 5-17-2022, "The geopolitics of technology: How the EU can become a global player", ECFR, https://ecfr.eu/publication/the-geopolitics-of-technology-how-the-eu-can-become-a-global-player/, DOA: 6-20-2022 //ArchanSen]

The future of the EU also depends on its capacity to sustain democracy and democratic institutions, both at home and abroad. However, for 15 consecutive years, democracy has been in decline around the world, both in the number and in the quality of democracies. Coincident with this decline, both born-again and long-standing authoritarian regimes are growing stronger and more challenging. Misuse of digital technologies has contributed to these trends. This not only serves to undermine democracies by fuelling political polarisation and providing the tools for foreign influence operations, but it also helps authoritarian governments cement their grip on their citizens. Countering these trends is not only a moral necessity for the EU but also essential to securing its global interests.

The vision behind EU digital policy should thus be to secure and promote both its economic power base and its political model, at home and globally. To achieve this vision, the EU needs to act strategically. Acting strategically means that in designing its means and ends, the union needs to understand what other countries and powers are doing and how it plans to compete and cooperate with them. China and Russia have started a process of decoupling from the West, to which they seek to attract other countries. The rules-based order is being replaced by a power-based order. Geoeconomics (or sheer mercantilism) is back. States are using economic and technological interdependencies to impose their views and secure their geopolitical interests. It is a new world order – and in that world, technology becomes a key element of power, sovereignty, and survival.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
EU CP › EU Leadership INB › Block – A/O – NoKo

Nuclear war

Timothy Graves 17, Master’s Degree in Creative Writing from Birkbeck, University of London, “Is The World On The Brink Of Nuclear Armageddon?”, Huffington Post, http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/timothy-graves/nuclear-armageddon_b_14789678.html

Since Donald Trump’s presidential inauguration last month, sales of dystopian fiction have soared. Novels that have flown off the shelf, or recently made it into Amazon’s top ten best-selling books chart, include George Orwell’s 1984, Margaret Atwood’s The Handmaid’s Tale and Huxley’s Brave New World. The resurgent interest in fiction that depicts a bleak totalitarian and authoritarian society reflects the fact that we are now living in a much more volatile and dangerous world. I do not think it is scaremongering to say that in recent years humanity has faced a number of catastrophic or even existential threats. From climate change and the rise in international terrorism to the prevalence of biological and chemical weapons, our capacity for warfare and destruction, and what the poet Robert Burns called ‘man’s inhumanity to man’, is self-evident.

But I believe the most pressing and immediate threat is that posed by the arsenals of nuclear weapons that have been stockpiled by the nuclear-armed states of the world who take false refuge in the Mutually Assured Destruction doctrine (MAD). In light of President Trump’s comments about nuclear weapons, last month atomic scientists in Chicago moved the hands on the Doomsday Clock to the closest it has been to midnight for sixty four years. Midnight represents global nuclear war.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
EU CP › EU Leadership INB › Block – A/O – NoKo

EU leadership prevents a North Korean arms race and escalation.

Boris Toucas 17, Visiting Fellow with the Europe Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, “North Korea: The European Union Could Help Break the Diplomatic Stalemate”, Beyond Parallel – CSIS Blog, 1/5/2017, https://beyondparallel.csis.org/north-korea-the-european-union-could-help-break-the-diplomatic-stalemate/

North Korea’s continued progress on its nuclear and missile programs remains one of the most significant challenges to the international community. This is why the adoption of a new UN Security Council resolution that closes an important sanctions loophole and imposes closer scrutiny of North Korea’s diplomatic activities sends a strong, if late, message of unity and international resolve. But what comes next? There are a variety of options: Diplomatic normalization? This could trigger a regional arms race. Military intervention? This could plunge Northeast Asia into chaos. Unfortunately, prospects for negotiations are bleak, and unofficial discussions between North Korea and the United States are unlikely to succeed as in previous rounds.

World peace cannot be safeguarded without the making of creative efforts proportionate to the dangers which threaten it. —Schuman Declaration, May 9, 1950

2022 Michigan Counterplan
EU CP › EU Unilat Solvency › Block – Solvency – A2: Trade Impact Turn

No trade relations link---EU-US defense integration and strengthened defense market check.

De Maio 21, Giovanna De Maio was a nonresident fellow in the Center on the United States and Europe at Brookings. She is currently a visiting fellow with George Washington University’s Institute for European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies. With a background on Russia and international security, as well as on Italy’s relations with Russia, EU and United States, De Maio’s research analyzes transatlantic relations vis-à-vis the challenges posed by the rise of China and Russia, with a particular focus on NATO and EU. At Brookings, she has extensively worked on Italian foreign policy and on the European Union. She holds a doctorate in international studies from the University of Naples and prior to joining Brookings, she was a Transatlantic Postdoctoral Fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the United States in Washington, D.C. and at the French Institute of International Affairs in Paris., (Giovanna, “OPPORTUNITIES TO DEEPEN NATO-EU COOPERATION”, December, Brookings Institute, ) //CHC-DS 🐱‍👤

In the United States, several commentators point out that a more integrated procurement system at the European level will negatively impact U.S.-EU trade relations in the defense industry.72 Although some economic losses for the United States are indeed possible, there are ways to contain them and of course an EU with a stronger defense would make a more reliable partner for the United States. In fact, the U.S. and EU are currently discussing administrative agreements with the EDA to allow the United States to participate in PESCO projects. Through a franker dialogue, the two sides of the Atlantic could strengthen the defense market without resorting to protectionist stances on either side. This is particularly relevant considering the strong ties between the U.S. and EU defense industries; they both could benefit from deeper cooperation and exchanges on the technological level, and from free and fair competition in the trans-Atlantic defense market based on common rules and standards.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
EU CP › EU Unilat Solvency › Block – Solvency – A2: Overlap Deficit

No impact to overlap and the plan links too.

Bergmann et. al. 21, *Max Bergmann is the director of the Europe Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Prior to joining CSIS he was a senior fellow at the Center for American Progress, where he focused on Europe, Russia, and U.S. security cooperation. ** James Lamond is a Non-resident Senior Fellow with the Democratic Resilience Program at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA). Previously, he was the Managing Director of the Moscow Project and a Resident Fellow at the Center for American Progress (CAP), where he covered trans-Atlantic relations, the European Union, U.S.-Russia relations, and countering malign foreign interference. Lamond previously served as the Director of Research and Policy at the National Security Network, where he led a team of analysts examining a wide range of national security and foreign policy issues. *** Siena Cicarelli is a research and program associate for National Security and International Policy at American Progress. Prior to joining American Progress, she worked for the National Democratic Institute on their Central and Eastern Europe team, where she focused on strengthening political parties in the Western Balkans. She previously interned at the U.S. Department of State in the Bureau of European Affairs., (Max, James Lamond, and Siena Cicarelli, “The Case for EU Defense: A New Way Forward for Trans-Atlantic Security Relations”, Center for American Progress, ) //CHC-DS ‍

Yet U.S. policy has consistently opposed EU defense efforts since the late 1990s, arguing that EU defense efforts would undermine NATO. State Department officials’ oft-repeated claim, virtually unchanged over the past three decades, is that an EU defense structure would “duplicate” NATO, making the treaty organization obsolete. Democratic and Republican administrations have repeated the mantra “no duplication” so often that it has become U.S. policy doctrine.5 But rarely, if ever, is the concern about possible duplication actually unpacked and assessed.

This report rejects the notion that NATO and EU defense are incompatible and at odds. Supporting EU defense does not mean choosing the EU over NATO. This is a false choice and a faulty premise. The EU and NATO are not opposing organizations. They are, in fact, fundamentally tethered. Implicit in U.S. opposition is a fear of a powerful EU that could supplant NATO and become a thorn in America’s side. But the EU is not divorced from the 21 NATO member states that make up the EU. If the EU and United States became rivals, then NATO would itself be obsolete, as it would be divided against itself. Such fanciful scenarios would not be the result of the EU developing a defense capacity but the result of a massive diplomatic breakdown. Such a breakdown is highly unlikely, and U.S. foreign policy should be doing everything possible to avoid this scenario.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
EU CP › EU Unilat Solvency › Block – Solvency – A2: GMOs hurt cred

GMOs ban provides opportunity to cooperate, AND proves NATO says yes.

Giddings 22, L. Val Giddings is a senior fellow at the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation (ITIF). Giddings joined ITIF after nearly three decades of experience in science and regulatory policy relating to biotechnology innovations in agriculture and biomedicine. He works with ITIF to bring intellectual leadership to the examination of the constraints inhibiting innovations in these areas and devising remedies to those constraints., (Val, “Prospects for Transatlantic Cooperation in Biotech Policy—A US Perspective”, Information Technology and Innovation Forum, March 11, https://itif.org/publications/2022/03/11/prospects-transatlantic-cooperation-biotech-policy-us-perspective/) //CHC-DS ‍

Many scientists in the EU (and around the world) knew from the beginning that this was the wrong approach, yet the EU pushed its model internationally, with aggressive diplomacy, leading to emulation by many countries in the developing world, with equally unhappy results to those seen in Europe.11 But a growing number of scientists, policymakers, and even “green” NGOs that had originally opposed GMOs, now recognize the counterproductive results of this approach and are working to avoid repeating the same mistakes with gene editing. This shines a spotlight on the most important and potentially fruitful opportunity for transatlantic cooperation in biotechnology: the revival of science-based regulatory regimes in which the degree of regulatory oversight is proportional to the hazards involved, and regulation that enables, rather than discourages the safe development of innovative products. A return to and reaffirmation of these first principles would provide fertile ground for cooperation and coordination globally. Regulatory reform (everywhere, not just in the EU and its emulators, though the need is greatest there) provides fertile ground for transatlantic cooperation and coordination. We have robust models of proven approaches.12 Without such cooperation, other progress in developing and deploying innovative solutions through biotechnology will be impeded or foregone.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
EU CP › EU Unilat Solvency › Block – Solvency – OCOs

It solves – empirics proves.

ECA 19 [European Court of Auditors, March 2019. “Challenges to effective EU cybersecurity policy. A briefing paper.” DOA:6/24/2022, //ArchanSen]

In recent years, as cyberspace has become increasingly militarized 22 and weaponized 23, it has come to be seen as the fifth domain of warfare 24. Cyber defence shields cyberspace systems, networks and critical infrastructure against attack by military and other means. A Cyber Defence Policy Framework was adopted in 2014 and updated in 2018 25. The 2018 updates identifies six priorities, including the development of cyber defence capabilities, as well as the protection of the EU Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) communication and information networks. Cyber defence also forms part of the Permanent Structured Cooperation Framework (PESCO) and EU-NATO cooperation.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
EU CP › EU Unilat Solvency › Block – Solvency – Ethical AI

EU guidelines on AI regulation maximize ethical guidance and competition

Smuha ’19 – Natalie A., Legal scholar and philosopher at the KU Leuven Faculty of Law, where she examines legal, ethical and philosophical questions around Artificial Intelligence (AI) and other digital technologies., (“The EU Approach to Ethics Guidelines for Trustworthy Artificial Intelligence”, Computer Law Review International Vol. 20; iss. 4; pp. 97 – 106.) – sel

1. The Revival of AI Ethics It is becoming ever more clear that, contrary to the hope some may hold, AI systems are not a miracle solution to all our problems. Rather, much like any type of technology, they represent a double-edged sword that can be used both in a beneficial and in a harming way. To offer but a few examples; AI systems can be used to help us achieving more objective decisionmaking, yet they can also perpetuate and even exacerbate unfair biases. AI systems can be used to offer us more personalised and qualitative services, yet they can also hamper our decisional autonomy. And while AI systems can be used to enhance our security, they can also be deployed as a means of illegitimate surveillance and stifle our freedom. The multifaceted impact that AI systems (along with other modern ICTs) have on our lives – which is not only ethical, but also legal, social, economical, political, cultural and psychological in nature – enables those systems to shift more than one paradigm in our society. The transformative force they exert on the world may not be as brisk and theatrical as some movies portray, but is rather expected to generate changes in more slow and subtle ways, which nevertheless have the potential to alter our habits, processes and lives profoundly. Governments and policy-makers around the world are starting to wake up to these important concerns. Besides adopting national strategies to boost the development and uptake of AI systems to reap their benefits, they are also assessing the technology’s potentially harmful impact and exploring which policy measures are best suited to address it. This occurs not only at national, but also at European level. Indeed, given that the concerns raised by AI do not stop at national borders, coordinated action is needed to tackle them. 2. Europe’s Response In April 2018, following an invitation by the European Council to put forward a European approach to AI5 , the European Commission presented its strategy for AI in the Commission Communication “Artificial Intelligence for Europe”.6 The strategy evolves around three pillars, aiming to tackle AI’s challenges and opportunities through a holistic approach: (1) boosting investments in AI, (2) preparing for socio-economic changes and (3) ensuring an adequate ethical and legal framework. At the same time, the strategy emphasised the need for coordination with Member States, so as to leverage joint efforts and maximise the impact of individual states’ action. This resulted in the adoption of a second Communication in December 2018, containing a Coordinated Plan on AI that sets out around 70 actions that Member States and the Commission have committed to undertake in order to implement the European strategy. 7 To ensure continuity of action, the Plan will be updated on an annual basis. Both of the Commission’s Communications stressed the need to assess the adequacy of existing legal rules to protect individuals from potential adverse effects of AI systems, and to establish ethical guidance to ensure that the development, deployment and use of AI systems do not occur at the expense of fundamental rights and European values. It is against this background that in June 2018 the High-Level Expert Group on Artificial Intelligence (AI HLEG) was established. Bearing in mind the holistic approach of the European strategy, the AI HLEG was tasked with the preparation of two deliverables: (1) AI Ethics Guidelines and (2) AI Policy and Investment Recommendations.8 The documents are meant to complement each other. While the Guidelines provide guidance to AI practitioners9 on how they can bring their AI systems in line with ethical principles (on top of any legal obligations they already have), the Recommendations are addressed to European institutions and Member States, offering them advice on which policy measures to adopt in order to ensure Europe’s competitiveness in AI as well as an adequate regulatory framework, beyond ethical guidance. On 8 April 2019, the AI HLEG published its Ethics Guidelines for Trustworthy AI. On the same day, the Commission adopted its third Communication on AI within a year, in which it welcomed the work of the AI HLEG and expressed its support for the ethical framework it put forward. 10 This paper focuses on the creation of the AI HLEG “Ethics Guidelines for Trustworthy AI”, starting with a contextualisation of their aim and purpose (II). Next, some insights on their drafting process are provided, which spanned not only expert group deliberations, but also over 500 comments received through an open consultation (III). Particular attention is devoted to the questions on the respective role played by ethics and law (IV.), and to the challenges that had to be overcome throughout the drafting process (V). Subsequently, the Guidelines’ next steps are set out (VI), and their relevance against a background of international AI policy-making is examined (VII). Finally, some concluding remarks are offered (VIII).

2022 Michigan Counterplan
EU CP › EU Unilat Solvency › Block – Solvency – AI Logistics

Don’t need NATO --- existing alliances can access

Konaev and Chahal ‘21

(Margarita Konaev Margarita Konaev is a research fellow with CSET, where Husanjot Chahal is a research analyst, Husanjot Chahal, “The Path of Least Resistance,” pg online @ //um-ef)

While there are notable technical, bureaucratic, and political barriers to multinational cooperation in AI, especially for military purposes, AI applications for logistics and sustainment represent both a promising and critical area for collaboration between the United States and its allies. There are many ways allies can work together in this space, including by developing joint standards for data sharing, investing in collaborative R&D programs, advancing multinational public-private partnerships, and integrating AIenabled logistics and sustainment technologies into joint military exercises. Depending on allies’ interests and capabilities, these efforts can take place within existing alliances, on a bilateral basis, or through a new and separate consortium dedicated specifically to cooperation on AI-enabled logistics and sustainment technologies. Working together with allies on this set of AI technologies will help advance shared security interests, promote interoperability, and ultimately, pave the path toward the ethical and responsible use of AI in military systems and missions

2022 Michigan Counterplan
EU CP › EU Unilat Solvency › Block – Solvency – AI Logistics

The EU needs to establish a clear framework to support AI logistics

Franke ’20 – Ulrike, policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations in London, where she works on emerging technologies in warfare.,(“Europe needs a plan for AI in the military realm”, 2/20, ) – sel

In Europe, 2019 was the year of artificial intelligence (AI). Governments put together expert groups, organized public debates and published national strategies designed to grapple with the possible implications of AI in areas such as health care, the labor market and transportation. European countries developed training programs, allocated investment and made plans for research cooperation. In 2020, the challenge for governments will be to show that they can fulfill their promises by translating ideas into effective policies. But despite attempts to coordinate these efforts – most notably that of the European Commission, which called upon member states to maximize cooperation through the publication of AI strategies – there is one AI-relevant area in which Europe lacks coherence, and which generally receives too little attention. In fact, an analysis of official documents from various European countries suggests fundamental differences that may be difficult to bridge. This area is the use of AI in the military realm. Despite a marked growth of work on the economic and societal consequences of the increasing use of AI in various areas of life, the use of AI in the military is largely absent from the public discourse in most European countries. In Germany in particular, officials seem uncomfortable discussing the subject, unless the focus is on whether and how to ban “killer robots,” or AI-enabled lethal autonomous weapon systems (LAWS). In other countries – most notably France, but also the UK – there is more expert work on the topic, but this does not translate into a broader societal debate. Similarly, the academic discourse on AI in the military focuses on developments in the United States and China, and tends to overlook Europe. This neglect is not helpful. It means that little information is available about European thinking on AI in the military, and that there is scant discussion of how European armed forces plan to use AI. Yet the fact remains that European companies are already developing AI-enabled military systems. It would be a bad idea for Europe to try to sit this development out – or to approach it with an exclusively national focus. While no one can predict exactly how revolutionary it will be, AI is likely to have a considerable impact on how militaries operate, and on how wars are waged. As Europeans discuss plans for strategic sovereignty – both in the military and in the technology sector – military AI, which is relevant to both areas, deserves more attention. One of the problems of the European, particularly German, debate on AI-enabled military systems is the focus on LAWS. These systems can carry out the critical functions of a targeting cycle in a military operation, including the selection and engagement of targets, without human intervention. The potential use of LAWS comes with a range of legal, ethical and political problems that are rightly being discussed in the United Nations. But while concern over LAWS, and work toward regulating them, is to be praised, European policymakers should not forget that military AI goes beyond killer robots. AI is, for example, famously good at working with big data to identify and categorize images and texts. In a military context, AI can help sift through massive amounts of video footage, such as feeds recorded by drones. Or it can examine photographs to single out changes from one picture to the next – a useful function to indicate the presence of an explosive device hidden in the time between the photos were taken. Other intelligence-relevant AI applications include image and face recognition, translation, image geolocation and more. AI can also support military logistics through predictive maintenance based on the analysis of various sensory inputs. AI-enabled weapons are also likely to be deployed in cyberspace where it allows actors to both find and patch up cyber vulnerabilities. Due to cyberspace’s relative lack of physical limitations, and given that fewer organizational changes are required for it, AI-enabled weapons could be introduced comparatively quickly into the cyber realm. In many areas, AI can make processes faster, more efficient and cheaper. Such efficiency gains are important, especially for cash-strapped militaries. But technologies are truly groundbreaking only if they provide new capabilities or allow for tactics that go beyond what already exists. Artificial intelligence might be able to provide this in the areas of swarming and autonomous vehicles – including, but not limited to, LAWS. Swarming refers to the combination of many systems – such as drones, unmanned boats or tanks – that can act independently but in a coordinated manner. Military swarms could provide new capabilities, such as flying sensor networks, flying minefields or coordinated and automated waves of attacks that deny the enemy a massed formation to fight. Given these extensive areas of application and, judging from past efforts to predict the impact of technologies, there is a good chance the most important changes to warfare caused by AI are not featured in the list above, Europe cannot afford to disregard these developments. Of the big three European states – Germany, France and the UK – France has shown the most interest in military AI. Defense was designated as a priority AI sector for industrial policy in the French 2018 national AI strategy. In 2019, France became the first European state to publish a military AI strategy. The country’s approach to AI is clearly geopolitical and driven by concerns over Europe and France becoming tech colonies of the United States and China. The UK has published neither an overarching national nor a military AI strategy, but a range of documents, most notably from the Defence Science and Technology Laboratory (DSTL), and the Defence Ministry’s in-house think-tank, DCDC. However, these publications appear to primarily target the expert community. Among the big three, Germany is the outlier. In its 2018 national AI strategy, the military, security and geopolitical elements of AI are notably absent. Defense is mentioned only in one sentence, which implicitly shifts all responsibility for this area to the ministry of defense. As this ministry traditionally publishes few doctrinal or strategy documents, it is unlikely that a German military AI strategy will see the light of day. More importantly, the German political realm, spearheaded by the foreign ministry, seems to have taken the decision to deal with military AI primarily from an arms control angle. As a consequence, the German expert community focuses mostly on AI arms control and disarmament. Given the extent to which this angle dominates the debate, and how different it is from the French approach, it poses questions for joint French-German projects like the new Future Combat Air System fighter jet, which will rely heavily on AI elements. Given the changes expected to be caused by AI in the military realm and given the level of attention paid to the issue in other countries – most notably the US, China and Russia – as well as European yearnings for strategic sovereignty, Europeans should pay closer attention to military AI. It is counterproductive to let valid concerns about LAWS marginalize the debate on all military AI.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
EU CP › EU Unilat Solvency › Block – Solvency – Cyber – Generic

The EU has a solid structure to set norms on cybersecurity and disinformation.

De Maio 21, Giovanna De Maio was a nonresident fellow in the Center on the United States and Europe at Brookings. She is currently a visiting fellow with George Washington University’s Institute for European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies. With a background on Russia and international security, as well as on Italy’s relations with Russia, EU and United States, De Maio’s research analyzes transatlantic relations vis-à-vis the challenges posed by the rise of China and Russia, with a particular focus on NATO and EU. At Brookings, she has extensively worked on Italian foreign policy and on the European Union. She holds a doctorate in international studies from the University of Naples and prior to joining Brookings, she was a Transatlantic Postdoctoral Fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the United States in Washington, D.C. and at the French Institute of International Affairs in Paris., (Giovanna, “OPPORTUNITIES TO DEEPEN NATO-EU COOPERATION”, December, Brookings Institute, ) //CHC-DS 🐱‍👤

Sharpened cooperation on disinformation and cyber The countering of disinformation is one key area where the European Union offers added value to international security. Since 2014 — and particularly following the disinformation operations carried out by Russia-sponsored media during the Brexit referendum and the U.S. presidential elections in 2016 as well as the French presidential elections in 2017 — the EU has set up a solid structure to monitor, detect, and counter disinformation. The EU was the first to establish a dedicated task force, the EU StratCom, within the European External Action Service (EEAS) to combat disinformation in the Eastern Partnership countries (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine). Subsequently, the European Commission established ground rules for online platforms and the advertising and social media industries, including a Code of Practice on Disinformation and guidelines on accountability obligations.60 The EU also has set up important monitoring activities, such as the Digital Media Observatory and the COVID-19 monitoring and reporting program, to function as a European hub for fact-checkers. A crucial part of these efforts is included in the Action Plan Against Disinformation that sets up a Rapid Alert System to facilitate information sharing and a unified response across the European institutions.61 Compared to the EU, NATO’s approach to combatting disinformation is less robust and limited in scope. NATO has set up tracking and monitoring activities — which offer fact-checking findings and counternarratives, including in the Russian language — but it has mostly relied on its Public Diplomacy Division which only monitors NATO-related material. For example, during the first few months after the outbreak of COVID-19, the division set up a section on its website called “NATO-Russia: Setting the record straight”; the website addresses the top five myths circulated by Russian propaganda regarding NATO’s connection with and reaction to the spread of COVID-19.62 Also established by NATO — but operationally independent — the StratCom Center of Excellence (COE) in Riga, Latvia brings together civilian and military stakeholders to conduct research on the use of modern technologies and to develop virtual tools for analyses, research, and decisionmaking. Hence, the center has produced valuable material for NATO’s Public Diplomacy Division. In addition, the StratCom COE has worked with the EEAS StratCom task force to train EU staff on how to respond to simulated disinformation attacks and responses. More recently, in 2019, the EU and NATO started exchanging information through the inclusion of NATO’s international staff in the EU Rapid Alert System, as well as through dialogues, staff and information exchanges and training exercises, including briefings between the EEAS StratCom and NATO Public Diplomacy Division.63 These are important efforts that highlight NATO and the EU’s openness to dialogue and mutual learning experiences. But they are nowhere near enough to keep up with the network of disinformation, where techniques are rapidly evolving and taking advantage of artificial intelligence. While China and Russia are reinforcing each other’s narratives through multiple channels, the effects of malign foreign influence in the disinformation domain are now being compounded by homegrown disinformation networks using the same pattern of exploiting people’s fear and vulnerability. Evidence of this occurring includes the spread of anti-vaccination propaganda as well as antidemocratic propaganda (which helped spur the assault on the U.S. Capitol in January 2021).64 Given the growing vulnerabilities in the trans-Atlantic space, NATO and the EU should join forces and expand their activity from countering disinformation to a preventing effort. The EU can add value in increasing the involvement of the private sector, and NATO can add value in using its intelligence capabilities in the counterterrorism domain to identify troll factories and disinformation sources. More broadly on cyber, despite advancements in their own jurisdictions, the paths of NATO and the EU have not crossed much yet. The two organizations have a different approach to cyber issues: While the EU aims to develop resilience against cyber threats, NATO has a broader and forward-looking approach that aims to prevent cyberattacks and to use cyber as an offensive tool to tackle threats and create deterrence.65 For example, the EU is seeking to strengthen its cyber posture through an EU Cybersecurity Strategy. The first piece of corresponding legislation, the EU Network and Information Security Directive (EU 2016/1148), established substantial cybersecurity standards that member states must adopt to protect critical sectors.66 Meanwhile, in its latest summit communiqué, NATO stated that “a decision as to when a cyber-attack would lead to the invocation of Article 5 would be taken by the North Atlantic Council on a case-by-case basis,” thus highlighting the increased awareness of the security implication of cyberattacks on critical infrastructure.67 Despite their different approaches, both NATO and the EU included cyber in their 2016 cooperation frameworks and started a series of joint exercises between the EU’s 2017 Parallel and Coordinated Exercise and NATO’s 2017 Crisis Management Exercise, as well as more recent exercises like those conducted through the CYBERSEC 2019 forum.68 However, while incredibly valuable, such exercises have not gone much beyond staffto-staff interactions and joint workshops. Understandably, cybersecurity cooperation implies a significant amount of intelligence sharing, which is ultimately impeded by a lack of trust stemming from political tensions and by the national security concerns of individual member states. In addition to establishing a more substantial channel for intelligence sharing to immediately warn allies about a cyberattack and prevent domino effects, other smaller steps could help increase cooperation and strengthen resilience in the trans-Atlantic space. For instance, the establishment of common standards related to threat and resilience capabilities could, in the event of a cyberattack, facilitate talks between allies and improve the interoperability of infrastructure. Within the United Nations, there are already two working groups trying to advance international legislation and standards covering the cybersecurity space.69 In line with these efforts, NATO and the EU could adopt similar standards that also help integrate and reinforce their complementary cybersecurity strategies. In particular, NATO could look at the existing EU regulatory framework and adopt similar strategies and resilience practices across the alliance, and the EU could benefit from NATO’s vast military experience and capabilities that are relevant to the cyber domain in order to bolster the security aspect of the EU’s cybersecurity strategy.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
EU CP › EU Unilat Solvency › Block – Solvency – Ethical AI

EU can coordinate AI.

Lawrence and Cordy 20, *Christie Lawrence is a Director for Research and Analysis working on international AI cooperation and intellectual property. Prior, she worked at Harvard Belfer Center’s Cyber Project, the State Department, and as a management consultant. She holds a B.A. in Public Policy from Duke University and is a concurrent MPP/JD candidate at Harvard Kennedy School and Stanford Law School. ** Researcher, Center for Security Studies, ETH Zurich. Koichiro Komiyama – Director, Global Coordination Division, JPCERT/CC, (Christie and Sean, “The Case for Increased Transatlantic Cooperation on Artificial Intelligence”, Belfer Center, https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/case-increased-transatlantic-cooperation-artificial-intelligence) //CHC-DS ‍

European Union: The European Union, like the United States, intends to leverage AI’s potential as a strategic and transformative technology.17 However, the EU has positioned itself as a leader in trustworthy, human-centric, ethical, and values-based AI,18 in comparison to the US government’s emphasis on the need for AI innovation to protect American values, civil liberties, and privacy. The EU recognizes that it trails behind the US and China in terms of volume of investment and maturity of its tech industry.19 Nonetheless, the EU believes it can capitalize on its underlying structural strengths (e.g., academic and innovation record) and on its values to compete globally and reaffirm its digital and technological sovereignty.20 Starting with its 2018 Communication: Artificial Intelligence for Europe,21, 22 the European Commission (EC) has launched a coordinated effort promoting AI.23 Policies include increasing public and private investments from $5.6 billion to $22 billion annually;24 coordinating research and innovation across Europe; devising ethical guidelines; fostering digital skills in its workforce; and promoting public and private sector adoption of AI.25 To support and counsel these efforts, the EC has established the High-Level Expert Group on AI (AI HLEG) comprising 52 experts who advise the Commission on policy and regulatory changes.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
EU CP › EU Unilat Solvency › Block – Solvency – AI regulation

NATO not the only actor in AI governance --- EU can act

Stanley-Lockman and Trabucco ‘22

(Zoe Stanley-Lockman was previously an Associate Research Fellow at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) and contributed to this chapter in a personal capacity. Lena Trabucco is a Postdoctoral Researcher at the Centre for Military Studies at the University of Copenhagen. Both authors contributed equally to this chapter, “NATO’s Role in Responsible AI Governance in Military Affairs,” pg online @ //um-ef)

To be sure, NATO is far from the only institution that impacts military AI governance and its security implications. Indeed, international technology governance is inherently complex because it includes diverse stakeholders in a system of “organizations, regimes, and other forms of principles, norms, regulations, and decision-making procedures” with a shared interest and responsibility in a given issue-area of world politics.9 Existing discussions of the impact of AI on international security have looked to nation-states, regional institutions like the European Union (EU), or international bodies like the United Nations Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (UN CCW) for discussions on the military governance of AI.10 Without expanding on the role of these other stakeholders, this chapter begins to explore pressing questions for NATO and international relations scholars that illustrate NATO’s role in AI governance, which has not had a comprehensive analysis.11

2022 Michigan Counterplan
EU CP › EU Unilat Solvency › Block – Solvency – AI regulation

The EU has the capacity and motivation to get ahead on AI regulation --- EU regulation is critical to ensuring fail-safe mechanisms that prevent unpredictable AI

Boulanin et al ’20 – Vincent, Senior Researcher leading SIPRI’s research on emerging military and security technologies., Netta Goussac, Associate Senior Researcher within the Armament and Disarmament research area with particular expertise in legal frameworks related to the development, acquisition and transfer of weapons., Laura Bruun, Research Assistant working on emerging military and security technologies., Luke Richards, Research Assistant working on emerging military and security technologies.,(“ RESPONSIBLE MILITARY USE OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE Can the European Union Lead the Way in Developing Best Practice?”, 11/20, pg.13-16, ) – sel

Ethical acceptability: Defining shared principles for human-centric artificial intelligence in the military

Human agency as a central issue in responsible military use of artificial intelligence

2022 Michigan Counterplan
EU CP › EU Unilat Solvency › Block – Solvency – AI – Generic

EU MUST lead on AI

Boulanin et al ’20 – Vincent, Senior Researcher leading SIPRI’s research on emerging military and security technologies., Netta Goussac, Associate Senior Researcher within the Armament and Disarmament research area with particular expertise in legal frameworks related to the development, acquisition and transfer of weapons., Laura Bruun, Research Assistant working on emerging military and security technologies., Luke Richards, Research Assistant working on emerging military and security technologies.,(“ RESPONSIBLE MILITARY USE OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE Can the European Union Lead the Way in Developing Best Practice?”, 11/20, pg.3-4, ) – sel

II. Strategic autonomy, interoperability and more effective collaboration at the European Union level

There are also very practical reasons for a more substantial intra-European conversation about responsible military use of AI, mainly internal to the economic and military future of the EU. These relate to the EU’s ambition regarding its strategic autonomy, the interoperability of EU armed forces and the progress of European research and industrial collaboration. The notion of strategic autonomy in Europe has recently gained greater salience within European political discourse, due to increased global instability and geopolitical tensions, and the idea that Europe can no longer rely on global institutions and partners as it has done in the past.13 Yet the concept remains vague and contested within Europe.14 It rests on the perceived need for the EU to protect and develop its technological, industrial, defence and economic interests.15 Access to technology is one central aspect of the debate around Europe’s desire to gain strategic autonomy, and the development of AI can fall within this.16 A coherent EU position around the responsible use and development of AI for use within the military could feed into this wider debate. Historically, the competence of the EU institutions on defence has been limited, but now the EU and its member states are committed to fostering greater cooperation between its member states in this area.17 In 2016 the Global Strategy for the Foreign and Security Policy of the EU, known as the EU Global Strategy (EUGS) was released and EU members states’ commitment to work together on defence matters has increased alongside an evolving EU common security and defence policy.18 EU member states have increased cooperation in a range of measures, from the creation of the EDA in 2004 to the activation of the permanent structured cooperation (PESCO) in 2016. Given the EU’s competencies much of the work is led by member states rather than the European Commission or other EU institutions.19 Such cooperation allows member states to coordinate their views on capability development needs, prevent duplication and reduce the cost of European intellectual and industrial investments related to defence innovation and work on projects that will foster greater interoperability between EU armed forces. AI already plays a role—and is bound to play an even larger one in the future, as it is considered a key domain—in projects conducted by the EDA and PESCO.20 Alongside this, the newly established EDF, under the responsibility of the European Commission, will look to bolster European defence research and industrial projects.21 EU guidelines about what constitutes responsible military use of AI could aid the AI-related