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2022 Michigan Counterplan
AT: EU CP (Disinfo) › 2AC --- Disinfo

No follow on. And it takes years.

AP 4-23-2022. Associated Press. "EU law targets Big Tech over hate speech, disinformation". NPR. https://www.npr.org/2022/04/23/1094485542/eu-law-big-tech-hate-speech-disinformation. DL

The act is the EU's third significant law targeting the tech industry, a notable contrast with the U.S., where lobbyists representing Silicon Valley's interests have largely succeeded in keeping federal lawmakers at bay.

While the Justice Department and Federal Trade Commission have filed major antitrust actions against Google and Facebook, Congress remains politically divided on efforts to address competition, online privacy, disinformation and more.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
AT: Fund DoD CP › 2AC – Net Ben – No Link

It only needs to send a few ambassadors to negotiate – an MOU can be done over the phone

Office of the Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation, 12-31-1981, "A Guide to Memorandum of Understanding Negotiation and Development," ASPE, https://aspe.hhs.gov/reports/guide-memorandum-understanding-negotiation-development-0

Stage One. Planning Stage. The planning stage is essential as a basis for subsequent MOU activity and will, if carefully executed, provide a set of decisions and determinations which will facilitate smooth negotiation and implementation of the relationship with the provider. It is also essential as the basis for developing a contract. Step One. Begin with internal brainstorming. Administrators, case managers, or others involved in your agency's efforts should identify: What you want or need another party to provide; What you are willing to negotiate; What you are willing to give up; What you have to offer; The rationale for entering the MOU process. Step Two. Identify the potential providers in the community. In this process, identify provider needs and explore ways in which you can, to some extent, address their needs. Be realistic about what you can expect providers to deliver and what you can deliver. Explore ways to establish appropriate relationships in order to maximize the probability of achieving what you want. Step Three. Define your agency's program objectives for a particular MOU and evaluate whether you can accomplish the objectives without the MOU. The definition of program objectives is a crucial process in the development of an MOU. Clearly defined program objectives can be translated into the terms and conditions of the MOU. In developing the objectives you should: Define the client population to be served; Define the service to be provided, or the understanding you desire; Assess any costs, both direct and indirect, to your agency and the agency with which you are negotiating an MOU; Define the minimally acceptable standards of performance. Program objectives stated in terms of measurable outcomes will facilitate monitoring, evaluation, and MOU renogotiation later on after the MOU has been implemented. Program objectives can be used as a point of reference against which to weigh the advantages and disadvantages of developing an MOU. Their consideration will assist you in determining whether the creation of an MOU will unnecessarily formalize a relationship, create unnecessary bureaucracy or be counterproductive. An MOU should not be attempted if it will disrupt a good relationship. Finally, reference to program objectives will help you set up the criteria for agencies and individuals with which to negotiate an MOU. Step Four. Identify the level of staff to be involved in the negotiation process. Involve those persons in the process as early as possible. Their value in negotiation will be enhanced if they are thoroughly familiar with what you want accomplished. Step Five. Identify agencies which have money for services. Consider some of the ways you can tap into their money and services. For example, you could act as a referral source to the agency or perform preauthorizations for service for them. Step Six. Identify agencies which authorize or pay for services. Consider ways to negotiate some transfer of authority to the case management agency. Step Seven. Identify individuals who are influential among service providers and enlist their support and assistance. Stage Two. Negotiation Stage. The negotiation stage begins through contact with the agency, preferably in-person. It is a good idea to include the staff member who will be responsible for implementing the MOU in the initial visit. Have a clear agenda for the meeting. Describe your agency, what you hope to demonstrate through case management, why the participation of the provider agency is Important, and how clients will be better served by the joint effort. Sell the concept of case management as one that eliminates duplication and enhances delivery of services to clients and their families. After the sales pitch, service providers will probably be able to anticipate what you want from them. You have spent time during the planning stage identifying what you want and what you are prepared to negotiate and now is the time to lay out your expectations. Be realistic about what you expect and be prepared for trade-offs. Develop a timetable with the provider, setting clear deadlines. It is helpful if each party knows what time constraints and limitations exist in the process. Important points to consider are listed below. Identify the internal review process for both your agency and the provider. If the approval of an Advisory Board or Board of Directors is required, learn when these groups meet and plan with that date in mind. Check on whether you or the provider require a legal review and build that into the timeline. Identify any insurance needs, relevant personnel policies, and requirements for physical examinations, T.B. or other tests. Decide who will pay if any tests are required. Identify strategies for enhancing the professional status of both the provider and the case management agency in the community. One strategy is to jointly serve on each other's Boards. Identify whether staff in-service training is required in order to implement the MOU. Agree on how, when, and who will provide that training. If the reaction is negative, you might try a little community pressure. Find an influential friend in another agency, or locate a helpful Board member or use your state agency contacts. A little persuasion or arm-twisting is all part of a tough negotiation process. Any research components in your program should be discussed in the process of negotiating MOU's with provider agencies. Confidentiality assurance should be discussed with the provider during the negotiation stage. It should be understood that only authorized persons may have access to client information and records, that the records must be adequately secured at all times, that release of information is allowable only with the client's permission. These are good practice procedures which protect the rights of clients. Stage Three. Completing the MOU. This final step begins with the preparation of a draft of the MOU instrument which is based on your meeting and negotiations with the provider agency. Generally, since you are initiating the process, you will assume responsibility for preparing the draft. Send the draft to the other party, along with a cover letter in which you identify controversial areas. Try to negotiate those points where there is some flexibility and identify the immutable points. This phase of the negotiation could be handled by phone or in person, however personal contact may carry more impact in terms of developing the relationship. Involving the persons with the authority to negotiate for the agency at this draft stage can minimize the time to complete the MOU. If programmatic objectives have been specified in the planning process, developing a system for monitoring and/or evaluation can be fairly easy. You could identify data needs and develop the appropriate forms and filing and tracking systems to be used jointly by your agency and the agency with which you are developing the MOU. Special Concerns. Timing. The finalization process can take as little as a few days, or as long as a few months. Factors which tend to increase the amount of time to finalize the MOU are: the people involved, the individual personalities and the number of individuals can impact on the length of time needed to finalize the MOU; the number of drafts prepared and reviewed; legal review; board review; staff review; revisions; negotiations; holidays; anything subject to action by a third party; involvement by more than two agencies; turf issues and interagency feuds.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
AT: Fund DoD CP › 2AC – UQ – Space Specific

SDA and Space Force got a pay raise

Sandra Erwin, 3-13-2022, "Congress gives DoD more money for space, with caveats," SpaceNews, https://spacenews.com/congress-gives-dod-more-money-for-space-with-caveats///jc

The 2022 spending bill added nearly $1.3 billion for U.S. Space Force and Space Development Agency programs above what the Biden administration requested WASHINGTON — The defense spending bill for fiscal year 2022 that Congress passed last week gives the Pentagon $743.4 billion. Military space programs got a big boost. Appropriators added nearly $1.3 billion for U.S. Space Force and Space Development Agency projects above what the Biden administration requested. President Biden is expected to sign the $1.5 trillion federal spending bill before current funding expires on March 15. The government has been operating under continuing resolutions since the 2022 fiscal year started Oct. 1. The $1.3 billion Congress added for military space funds technology development projects run by the Space Force, pays for an extra Global Positioning System satellite, increases spending on small launch services and Space Development Agency (SDA) missile-detecting satellites. One of the largest items appropriators inserted into the budget is a $550 million demonstration of missile-tracking satellites to be developed by SDA for the U.S. Indo-Pacific military command. “The threats are driving space spending,” said Peter Garretson, a space and defense consultant and senior fellow at the American Foreign Policy Council. China’s recent displays of advanced space technology have not gone unnoticed, and there are growing worries about Russian aggression, he said. SDA is building a large mesh network of satellites in low Earth orbit to detect and track enemy missiles, and to move data around the globe. Increasing the agency’s budget is ”absolutely the right move at this point in time,” said Garretson. “I’m hoping that SDA with their multiple layers of satellites will really get the DoD back in the game of rapid innovation and technology development.”

2022 Michigan Counterplan
AT: Fund DoD CP › 2AC – UQ – Space Specific

Squo solves

Thomas Novelly, 10-16-2021, "Space Force Looking for Surge in Funding for 2023 to Focus on Missile Defense Warning Systems," Military, https://www.military.com/daily-news/2022/03/29/space-force-looking-surge-funding-2023-focus-missile-warning.html//jc

The Space Force, America’s newest and smallest service branch, is seeking a huge increase in funding as part of the White House’s 2023 defense budget, with a goal of developing and growing the nation’s missile warning systems as tensions rise with China and Russia. In 2023 budget documents released Monday, Space Force – which falls under the department of the Air Force – requested $24.5 billion, which marked a nearly 40% increase from the previous year. The majority of funds are projected to be used on research and development as well as establishing more missile warning systems in space. Advertisement “The reason there is a Space Force, the reason the Obama administration changed its strategy for space was because of the threat,” Air Force Secretary Frank Kendall told reporters during a media roundtable Friday. “The widespread investment that both China and Russia have in anti-space, counter-space capabilities including things that threaten us in all different orbital regimes.” Read Next: New 'Basic Needs' Allowance on Top of Increases for Housing and Food in Air Force's 2023 Budget The majority of Space Force’s 2023 budget, 65%, would be focused on research, development, testing and evaluation, according to the budget documents. It’s a 33% increase from last year’s ask. Advertisement Since being created in 2019, Space Force's mission -- to protect and defend the massive U.S. satellite fleet -- is crucial in everything from the country's reliance on GPS to detecting abnormalities in the Earth's orbit, and the 2023 budget shows some of the largest investments in developing and growing their capabilities. Todd Harrison, director of the Aerospace Security Project at the nonprofit Center for Strategic and International Studies, said Monday’s budget numbers show that the military is taking space capabilities seriously with the Department of the Air Force focusing its attention not just on Russia but primarily on China. This past November, the Russian Federation destroyed one of its own Soviet-era satellites with a missile, sending thousands of scraps of shrapnel hurtling through space, a cloud of debris that threatened other orbiting satellites, including those belonging to the U.S. But even with that notable incident, China remains more of a threat, Harrison added. “China has the full suite of anti-satellite weapons, everything from jammers that could do electronic attacks to lasers that could blind the sensors on satellites, and missiles that could shoot down satellites and create debris,” Harrison said. Nearly $3 billion would be spent on missile warning development programs, which Kendall underscored as the biggest priority and goal for the new service. “There's no more important services than missile warning, and nuclear command control, particularly from space,” Kendall said. “So we're trying to move forward aggressively.” Many of the funding increases come from reallocated money and resources as the Space Development Agency moves from the Secretary of Defense’s Office to being a part of Space Force, and very little of the funds are connected to personnel increases, according to the budget documents. The 2023 budget transfers $1 billion to run personnel expenses separate from the Air Force, and would build the active-duty strength of the Space Force to 8,600 – adding 200 new Guardians to the total force, mostly through transfers from other service branches. The 2023 budget also requests funding to provide a 4.6% pay raise, a 4.2% basic housing allowance increase as well as a 3.6% basic allowance for subsistence, which can be used to offset the price of groceries during inflation. It also allows for a 4.6% pay increase for civilian contractors in the Space Force. There were no construction estimates in the 2023 budget request for Space Force, but the Air Force budget did ask for $68 milion to build a dormitory at Clear Space Force Station in Denali, Alaska.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
AT: Fund DoD CP › 2AC – Turn – Too Much Funding Bad

Increased DoD funding trades off from other programs

Farhad Manjoo, 01-13-2022, “We Must Stop Showering the Military With Money”, New York Times, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/01/13/opinion/military-budget-build-back-better.html//jc

Of course, I’m only kidding. I don’t actually wonder about Manchin’s stance on showering the Department of Defense with more money than it asks for, even more than it seems to know what to do with. Right around the time he was bayoneting Build Back Better, Manchin joined 87 other senators — Democrats and Republicans — in rubber-stamping another gargantuan budget for the Pentagon. They allocated $768 billion for the military in 2022, roughly $24 billion more than the White House requested from Congress. Given all the challenges we face at home, does it make any sense to keep spending so many hundreds of billions on the Pentagon? And even just in terms of fighting wars, can anyone be satisfied with the way the military is managing its funds? The Pentagon has never passed an audit and says it may not be able to until 2028. In 2020 the U.S. military’s budget accounted for almost 40 percent of the world’s military expenditures. This level of spending has long been excessive, but after a pandemic that has claimed the lives of more Americans than any war we fought, continuing to throw money at the military is an act of willful disregard for the most urgent threats we face. According to a projection by the Congressional Budget Office, Congress is projected to spend about $8.5 trillion for the military over the next decade — about half a trillion more than is budgeted for all nonmilitary discretionary programs combined (a category that includes federal spending on education, public health, scientific research, infrastructure, national parks and forests, environmental protection, law enforcement, courts, tax collection, foreign aid, homeland security and health care for veterans). You don’t have to be a pacifist to wonder if this imbalance between military and nonmilitary spending makes sense. When we face so many other major challenges — from climate disasters to political instability and insurrection — shouldn’t we ask whether it remains wise to keep handing the military what is effectively a blank check? Are such lavish resources even good for national defense, or might the Pentagon’s near-bottomless access to funds have encouraged a culture of waste and indulgence that made it easier to blunder into Iraq and contributed to its failures in Afghanistan? This gets to what’s most frustrating about the Pentagon’s enormous budget: the halo of protection it enjoys in our political culture. Despite the Pentagon’s numerous missteps, our representatives too rarely ask how much money for the military may be way too much money for the military. We have long national debates about whether it makes sense to spend on things like parental leave or college tuition, but lawmakers seldom expect such rigor from the Defense Department. For example, why should we keep building aircraft carriers — each of which costs about $1.5 billion a year to operate — when we’ve already got most of the world’s fleet of active aircraft carriers? (We’ve got 11; no other nation has more than two, though China may be launching a third soon.) There is ample evidence that Congress’s reluctance to ask basic questions of the Pentagon has harmed, rather than helped, the military’s effectiveness. Consider the boondoggle that is the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program — the plan the Pentagon conceived in the 1990s to build a new plane, which is expected to cost taxpayers more than $1 trillion over its 60-year life span. A recent audit from the Government Accountability Office found that even the Pentagon’s extended timeline for when the plane might finally go into full production is “not achievable,” and there were more than 850 “open deficiencies” in the project as of November 2020. I wonder if Manchin could explain to his constituents how tolerating such a level of mismanagement is good for our security. I also wonder if Manchin could explain the staggering size and top-heaviness of the Pentagon’s staffing — why the ratio of enlisted troops to officers is declining across the U.S. forces, cluttering the chain of command with layers of bureaucracy. A 2015 internal study found that the Pentagon employed (or hired contractors to employ) nearly as many deskbound, back-office people as it had active-duty troops. The report found that it could save $125 billion a year by, among other measures, reducing overstaffing through retirements and attrition. The Pentagon buried that report, according to The Washington Post. Not only do lawmakers give the Pentagon a free pass on its budget; sometimes they even force the agency to keep the little fat it’s trying to trim. The Air Force says that it’s ready to retire its fleet of A-10 Warthogs, fighter airplanes that date back to the 1970s. Congress forbade any such reduction in 2022. Starting in 2017, Congress even required each military service to submit an annual wish list of “unfunded priorities” — that is, goodies that the services might want but that the White House had not requested in its budget. It has since become routine for Congress to not only give the Pentagon much of what it asks for but also ladle on extras. The reasons such spending persists aren’t a big mystery. The military-industrial complex is every bit as politically powerful as Dwight Eisenhower warned it would be. (A recent Wall Street Journal headline captured the situation well: “Who Won in Afghanistan? Private Contractors.”) In another trick, the military spreads its contracts to a large number of congressional districts, giving every lawmaker a reason to celebrate excessive military spending. (Manchin put out a statement taking credit for all the benefits the new defense appropriation will bring to West Virginia.) And finally, there is plain patriotic posturing: Because every dollar to the Pentagon can be defended as protecting the troops and the nation’s security, no politician will ever get in trouble for giving too much money to the military. Mandy Smithberger, who studies Pentagon excess at the Project on Government Oversight, a nonpartisan independent group, told me that while she has hopes that younger generations will begin to question the military’s excessive spending, the situation is unlikely to change anytime soon. “It’s going to take members of Congress to really step up,” she said. That seems about as likely as pigs flying — or, more aptly, F-35s.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
AT: Fund DoD CP › 2AC – Solvency – Doesn’t Solve

The CP will just cause more wasteful spending

Kyle Rempfer, 3-12-2019, "Use-it or lose-it: DoD dropped $4.6 million on crab and lobster, and $9,000 on a chair in last-minute spending spree," Military Times, https://www.militarytimes.com/news/your-military/2019/03/12/use-it-or-lose-it-dod-dropped-46-million-on-crab-and-lobster-and-9000-on-a-chair-in-last-minute-spending-spree///jc

The federal government found a way to spend $97 billion in a single month last year, of which more than $61 billion can be attributed to the Pentagon. It’s not a new phenomenon. In the last month of every fiscal year, federal agencies work to spend all that’s left in their annual budgets. If they don’t, the agencies worry they’ll be appropriated a smaller share by Congress next year, hence the “use-it or lose-it” spending sprees. Rather than spend money on frivolous items, federal agencies like the Defense Department should admit their offices can be run on less, according to Adam Andrzejewski, founder and CEO of OpenTheBooks. OpenTheBooks is a nonprofit aimed at bringing transparency and efficiency to the federal budget. They released a report this March detailing fiscal 2018 use-it-or-lose-it spending habits. The military spent the most, by far, which isn’t surprising, Andrzejewski told Military Times. “Let me clear: Congress is the problem here, not DoD or other agencies,” he said. “Historically, both parties tend to look the other way at Pentagon waste. This is a shame because the troops and taxpayers suffer. Lower priority items get funded while mission critical needs are short-changed.” Andrzejewski calls the spending spree “Christmas in September” for the federal government. And last fiscal year was the worst his group has tracked so far. One of the stand-out purchases by the Pentagon included a $9,341 Wexford leather club chair purchased from the Interior Resource Group, according to the report. The DoD also bought $32 million worth of batteries, $4.3 million worth of books and pamphlets, $220 million worth of furniture, $7.6 million worth of workout equipment and $786.3 million on “guns, ammunition and bombs." The Pentagon spent the most on five of those products: $124.3 million on medium caliber ammunition, $92.3 million for modification purposes, $75 million on the Paveway family of laser-guided bombs, nearly $54 million on M795 TNT, and $2.8 million on 40mm ammunition systems. Federal agencies also like to splurge on luxury food items before the end of the fiscal year, according to the report. The Pentagon spent $2.3 million on crab, including snow crab, Alaskan king crab, and crab legs and claws, as well as another $2.3 million on lobster tail. Federal agencies also spent $293,245 on steak, to include rib eye, top sirloin and flank steak. Marines eat their meals during a birthday lunch at the Anderson Chow Hall, Marine Corps Base Hawaii, Nov. 11, 2018. Anderson Chow Hall held a birthday lunch celebrating the 243rd Corps Birthday, serving steak, lobster, crab legs and cake. (Sgt. Jesus Sepulveda Torres/Marines) Andrzejewski said that in some cases, like the surf-and-turf, the spending can actually trickle down to the troops. But that doesn’t mean the dollars couldn’t be better allocated on more necessary items at the beginning of the year if the funds are actually needed. “Our theory is that, in many cases, the people in charge of the accounts simply follow the path of least resistance,” he said. “When faced with the structural use-it or lose-it deadline they spend as much as they can on whatever is easiest to spend money on. Again, Congress created this perverse incentive structure.” The DoD also spent big on public relations and marketing in September, inking $153.3 million in contracts. The military also dropped $86.5 million on transportation contracts, of which more than $53.5 million went to passenger vehicles from Navistar Defense, the maker of Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles. Some of the big ticket spending items are attributed to the usual major defense contractors. The Pentagon spent $8.1 billion on contracts with Lockheed Martin and $5.1 billion with Boeing in September, for instance.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
AT: Fund DoD CP › 2AC – PDCP – Normal Means

Prefer most recent examples of APFIT

U.S. Department of Defense, 7-19-2022, "DoD Announces First Set of Projects to Receive Funding From the Pilot Program to Accelerat," https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3098211/dod-announces-first-set-of-projects-to-receive-funding-from-the-pilot-program-t///jc

The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering (OUSD(R&E)) announced the first set of projects to receive funding via the pilot program to Accelerate the Procurement and Fielding of Innovative Technologies (APFIT). The purpose of the APFIT pilot program is to expeditiously transition technologies – with priority given to those developed by small businesses and/or nontraditional defense contractors – from pilot programs, prototype projects, and research projects into production. The benefits of this pilot will be to deliver war-winning capability earlier than scheduled while contributing to the viability of small business and nontraditional defense contractor vendors. APFIT is an additional tool the DoD can use to propel innovative capabilities across the “Valley of Death” and into the hands of the warfighter. “APFIT holds great promise to transform the way the Department procures next generations solutions. This pilot program is well positioned to be a key asset as we continue to work to bridge the valley of death,” stated Heidi Shyu, Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering. “The ten companies being funded will fill critical capability gaps. Without APFIT, their innovative technologies could take much longer to reach the hands of our warfighters.” The National Defense Authorization Act of FY22 directed the Secretary of Defense to establish APFIT as a competitive, merit-based program for innovative and mature technologies and products that can meet warfighter demands but currently lack the necessary funding to transition the capability into the production delivery phase. The U.S. Congress funded $100 million in FY22. Ten DoD program offices will each receive $10 million in APFIT funding. These program offices will in turn use that funding to procure innovative technologies from small businesses or nontraditional defense contractor vendors, as listed below. To be eligible for APFIT funding, these vendors must have received less than $500 million in cumulative revenue from DoD.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
AT: Fund DoD CP › 2AC – PDCP – Normal Means

Historically, Congress has increased funding for every new program from the DoD

American Institute of Physics, 6-15-2022, "DOD Budget: FY22 Outcomes and FY23 Request," No Publication, https://www.aip.org/fyi/2022/dod-budget-fy22-outcomes-and-fy23-request//jc

Following on a string of budget increases, funding across the Department of Defense’s Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E) accounts increased 11% in fiscal year 2022 to a new record of $123 billion. That is nearly $50 billion above where those accounts stood just five years earlier. The Biden administration is seeking a 7% increase in fiscal year 2023, which would bring RDT&E spending to $132 billion. Within RDT&E funding, the budget increased 12% to $18.9 billion for DOD’s early-stage science and technology portfolio, comprising Basic Research, Applied Research, and Advanced Technology Development accounts. The appropriation rebuffed the 13% cut to the portfolio the administration proposed, and it significantly exceeded the amounts proposed by House and Senate appropriators. That outcome stemmed from negotiations between Democrats and Republicans that resulted in the legislation containing a much higher allocation for overall defense spending than Democrats' initial drafts. For fiscal year 2023, the administration is seeking $16.5 billion across these three accounts, representing a 13% cut. However, Republicans are again insisting on higher defense spending than the administration proposes, which could well result in another spending increase.

2022 Michigan Kritik
POMO AFFS › Lines of Flight DA

LINES OF FLIGHT DA: Framework is an instance of political narcissism that destroys radical potentialities and lines of flight from the debate space

Evans and Reid 14 (Brad Evans *Senior Lecturer in International Studies at the University of Bristol, ** and Julian Reid, The Art of Living Dangerously, 194-8, 2014)

Liberal regimes have moved way beyond the security imperative so foundational to their origins, centuries ago, as the promise of security which once appeared to legitimate them back then has been disintegrated by a catastrophic imaginary that promotes what we have called insecurity by design. What once appeared to be the promise of progress and worldly transformation has given way to a full life crisis that offers us no means for escape. This way of treating liberalism, as a regime founded on catastrophic promises and ruinous images, does not mean we are in denial of the reality of the disastrous nature of the world we now inhabit and which liberal regimes understand themselves as responding to. But it would be wrong to think we can distinguish between the real and the imaginary. There is no hard and fast distinction, even though the fact that we speak of the real and the imaginary indicates that they are different. We perceive and make sense of the real through images. We are continuously interpellated within ‘regimes of signs’ that profoundly influence our affective registries and hence our sense of any given situation as it unfolds before us. And so the maps we construct to navigate the real are composed only of images. Liberalism itself, including its contemporary idea of the resilient subject, is a product of the imaginary. And so now we inhabit its nightmarish effects. Nor are the images through which we make sense of and give representation to the real simply dependent on the real. If anything, the images precede the real, making and shaping it into what we come to name and know as the real, producing it, fabricating it, into the worlds we come to inhabit. The catastrophic nature of the world we now do not so much possess as find ourselves exposed and vulnerable to is of our own creation. It is a world which appears every bit as much in our heads as much as our heads are in this world, drowning in its images of impending disaster, species extinction, tipping points and catastrophe effects. The image and reality of catastrophe are ceaselessly interchanging such that the two are forever interfused. What we have learnt to call ‘the world’ is the manifestation of that interfusion. Politics is an art of worldly transformation, and transformation demands, [p. 195] first of all and fundamentally, a subject capable of conceiving the possibility of worldly transformation. A subject that sees the intolerability of the world as it is presently imagined and demands the seemingly impossible; the creation of a new one. A subject which affirms and follows the paths opened up to it by the visions of other worlds which the play of images creates for it. And a subject which affirms the reality of the existence of different worlds, their antagonisms, as well as tangibility and reachability, so to say. What we call the poetic subject therefore seeks to have a faith beyond that which arises simply from endangerment, as well as rekindling long diminished understandings of political subjectivity. Its diminishment owes everything not to the realities of a world which demand an evacuation of the political, but to the overwrought influence of liberalism over our own self-understandings of the limits of this world, its planetary boundaries, the weight of finitude, and the dangers which liberalism believes, and has preached for some time, that the imagination poses to a species equipped more than any other to transcend each and every boundary, each and every limit, and lose all sense of its own finitude and that of the world itself; the human. We are now governed by Ministries of Anxiety of multiple kinds, whose dominant strategic mantra of resilience stems from the catastrophic imaginary of late liberal rule. We only have to step back ever so slightly from this blackmail, however, to see the political narcissism at work here. If we take, for instance, the idea of the full life crises seriously, how might we conceive of the governance of the subject such that it may once again conceive of better worlds to come? Instead of demanding, for example, that impoverished children, who are increasingly subjected to surveillance and lockdown conditions far beyond the reaches of earlier penitentiary systems, accept the vulnerabilities of their fate; what if they were instructed on the virtues of critical pedagogy such that the confidence and the poetic freedom to radically transform their lived [p. 196] condition was merited? That is a situation which begins at the earliest stages of development, wherein the transformative and critical power of imagination is welcomed, and the quality of lives assessed in terms of its poetic contributions. Pablo Picasso stated that ‘all children are artists. The problem is how to remain an artist once he grows up’. This was not only a reflection on the power of the imagination. It is also acknowledgement of the power of a critical subjectivity which, as anybody who has a young child will testify, overwhelmingly appears when the former is suffocated such that the latter is expressed as a form of discontent for otherwise affirmative performances. But it also needs to be more than this. That is why exhaustion is fundamental to thinking about the poetic, for it allows us to take it out of the realms of fleeting abstraction. The art for living poetically needs to be crafted as a lifetime work. It must not be reduced to some Warholian commodifiable chancery that lasts but 15 minutes. In this sense, the diagnosis of the contemporary degradations of human experience, which we have sought to provide here, remains an argument with the legacies of Immanuel Kant. The Kantian enlightenment, if we want to give it that absurdly paradoxical name, gave licence to human beings to speculate on the possibility of other worlds but always with the insistence that this world, as it is supposedly known, is the only world that can be. The possibility of another world is thinkable only within this world we inhabit, Kant said, and thus the possible has to always be suborned to the actual. The corollary of the possibility of us conceiving another world is the impossibility of us moving beyond this world, the world, as it is known and said to be. Thus understood, it was and still is a powerful and demeaning discourse on limits, one which forces us to accept our sense of the limits of this world as an imperious necessity without which we cannot think or act or indeed, imagine. Its influence goes some way to explaining why the world we live in has becomes so depoliticized, so absent of any sense of tangible [p. 197] alternatives, and crucially, subjects capable of creating and establishing them. When one reads back through the history of liberal thought, what’s striking is the extent to which this project of constituting a subject of limits required a wholesale pathologization of the human imagination. Kant was a very sober man, for a reason. What existence beyond the harmonious regulation of the faculty of reason was to be feared; its abilities to incite the imagination, the wildness of what we see and feel, the freedom it gives us, and sense of increased vital force which leads us to follow the trajectories it opens up for us. We all know, or should know, the experience that arises from freeing ourselves and welcoming new experiences, and the ways in which it enables us to see the world differently, as well as act and speak differently, on account of the images it induces in us. There has to be an art to these imaginaries, and we have to be able to discern the differences between the subjective states we encounter in ourselves and each other under their influence. The war on the imagination Kant and his disciplines inaugurated was also an attempt to govern truth, practices of truth-telling, and human relations to truth. It is not that the Enlightenment forbids us to tell truth, but that it sought to govern its production, and to subject it to a new regime of biopolitical power relations. For truth to be truth, Kant said, it had to be allied not simply to the world, but to the life of the world, or better understood, a world which itself is finite and living, requiring care and protection, vulnerable to the destructive potential of the maps and trajectories human beings impose on it on account of the power of their visions of what it can become. Today it is apparent, and we have sought to reveal, that the name we give to that Kantian conception of the world as a living being is the biosphere. Biospheric life is the vulnerable guide of the Kantian subject of liberal modernity. As living beings, so the story goes, our time cannot be indifferently dispersed and scattered. We have not just a path to follow, but a movement by which we might learn to follow life [p. 198] along that path, by accepting the reality that we owe our life, its sustenance and survival, finitely, to the world on which our paths are inscribed. Sustainable development is the name we give, today, to the Kantian conception of truth. The discourse on worldliness, and the prescription of the limits of the human imagination, is underwritten by a claim as to the infinite debt of all finite beings to the biosphere. The truths we can tell of this world and those to come have to be said in recognition of our debt and responsibility to it in all its finitude, vulnerability and limits. Now it seems to us that this original investment of Kant and others in biospheric life is what accounts for the fundamental antinomy between political and liberal subjectivity. An antinomy which continues to shape the antagonism between the neoliberalism analysed here in this book, the subject it calls into being globally today, and the erstwhile political subject of modernity that we have attempted to recover the lost signs of in this text.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Aff – Digital Cyclops 2 – BFHR 7wk › 2AC---AT: Cap K

Only the aff can destroy capitalism

Hui 19 (Yuk Hui PhD - juror of the  since 2020, and initiator of the  since 2014, teaching in various institutes including Goldsmiths College, Leuphana University, Bauhaus University, Strelka Institute Moscow, Chinese Academy of Art, and City University of Hong Kong, “Recursivity and Contingency”, Rowman and Littlefield International, Pages 255-258, January 2019, MG s/o PFox)

The technophobes see the first image of cybernetics; Simondon sees the second image of cybernetics and imagines a universal cybernetics or general allagmatic to resolve alienation and antagonism between nature and technics. Heidegger sees both mechanism and organism as the impasse of philosophy and therefore wants to go back to another beginning by invoking the pre-Socratic thinkers, an attempt to discover a new cosmotechnics, as I have claimed elsewhere. 96 I believe that it is necessary to read Simondon with Heidegger here, since Simondon’s concept of genesis of technicity resonates with Heidegger’s proposal to overcome modern technology by reconstructing a different thinking hence another beginning, and in this sense Simondon’s more technologyoriented approach complements Heidegger’s more culture-oriented program. Lyotard, in spite of his fierce critique of cybernetics, allows us to see the importance of the question of sensibility and how it constitutes the postmodern episteme, which may be strategically appropriated to open society to new transformations. These two images of cybernetics have completely different social, economical, and political implications. The organicist epistemology, presenting a new paradigm shift of thought in the twentieth century, is naturalized in practice and it turns out to be nothing organicist but mechanical, like when we use a recursive machine to write a program printing out “Hello, World.” Control through tertiary retentions and protensions such as surveillance, social credits, and big data analysis is taking the first path, in which recursive machines are integrating individuals as the constituents of computation. What Deleuze calls the society of control is fully demonstrated in our digital epoch, of which digital control and flexibility (e.g., modulation or performativity) are its means. We may want to say that it is a mechanist use of organicist machines for deterministic use, which, as we wanted to show, is something that has to be reproached, and a broader historical and philosophical perspective opened up, as we have attempted throughout this book. However, let us raise the final question: Is it possible to take seriously the organismic philosophy and transform it into elements of an organology that would allow us to reevaluate actual technological development and leave its finality open?

Organicism is still a philosophy of nature. General systems theory and secondorder cybernetics have moved a step further, but in the twenty-first century, can we go even further toward elaborating an organological thinking, one that goes beyond the illusion of human beings as mere observers and machines as replacements for human beings? In order to do so we need to inscribe the cosmos organologically, and this is what cybernetics didn’t do and this is at core of the thinking of cosmotechnics. Cybernetics in the Western tradition has already adopted its “modern cosmology,” namely, astrophysics: the end of the cosmos, as some historians have claimed. 97 It is also in this sense that Heidegger sees the end of philosophy and the beginning of a world civilization based exclusively on Western thought. In Chinese cosmotechnics, the cosmos is organic insofar as it is analogical to the body. Chinese medicine is therefore very different from Greek medicine, even though they share certain similarities (for example, diagnosis according to pulses). 98 The cosmos is an organ of principle, governing both the aesthetic and the moral. The heaven-earth that is the name for the cosmos is correlated with the human activities, while these relations are real and maintained by “resonance.” Precisely because of this, Needham considers neo-Confucianism to be a veritable organic philosophy. 99 It is also the reason that Mou Zhongsan, the great New Confucian of the twentieth century, characterizes Chinese philosophy as a moral metaphysics and moral cosmology. 100 Standing against it is treating the cosmos as a mere resource—the eternal goal of the deterritorialization of capital.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Aff – Digital Cyclops 2 – BFHR 7wk › 2AC---C/I---HW v. SW

Counter-interpretation – reject debating the Hardware called by the resolution and instead teams must debate over Software

Hui 19 (Yuk Hui PhD - juror of the  since 2020, and initiator of the  since 2014, teaching in various institutes including Goldsmiths College, Leuphana University, Bauhaus University, Strelka Institute Moscow, Chinese Academy of Art, and City University of Hong Kong, “Recursivity and Contingency”, Rowman and Littlefield International, Pages 238-241, January 2019, MG s/o PFox)

The destruction of all organic life points to the only possibility for the survival of the human, which is the separation between body and mind, between hardware and software. This metaphor of software and hardware is technological, but it is also not a metaphor because it is a research agenda that covers everything from dietetics, neurophysiology, genetics, and tissue synthesis to particle physics, astrophysics, electronics, information science, and nuclear physics. 57 The search for the separation between thinking and organic life is a response to the prospect of solar catastrophe, since the central question is, how is it possible to survive without an organic form of life? Or, as Lyotard puts it: “[H]ow to provide this software with a hardware that is independent of the conditions of life on earth?” 58 This is a negative organology, or an extreme humanism. It is negative since it is based on a total negation of the organic and on the belief that there is a possibility, no matter how small it might be, of replacing the organic body with an inorganic artifice for the survival of thinking. Lyotard, through the incarnation of a female interrogator called Him, implicitly goes back to the recursive structure of organization and the possibility that such a recursive algorithm could be independent from the organic body:

Most of all: [human]’s equipped with a symbolic system that’s both arbitrary (in semantics and syntax), letting it be less dependent on an immediate environment, and also “recursive” (Hofstadter), allowing it to take into account (above and beyond raw data) the way it has of processing such data. . . . Isn’t that exactly what constitutes the basis of your transcendence in immanence? 59

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Aff – Digital Cyclops 2 – BFHR 7wk › 2AC---C/I---HW v. SW

Only a software based analysis can provide a better understanding of technology in the world

Frabetti 14 (Federica Frabetti PhD - MRes and PhD in Media and Communications at Goldsmiths, University of London, “Software Theory”, Rowman and Littlefield International Ltd, Pages xv-xix, 2014, MG)

This ambivalence—one could even say, this circular movement—between the technical and the social seems to me to characterize the whole field of software and code studies. Individual academic contributions can choose to privilege one term over the other, but ultimately they turn to the technical in order to explain the social, and then revert to the social in order to explain the technical. Representative of a stronger emphasis on the technical aspects of new technologies are studies such as Nick Montfort and Ian Bo- gost’s 2009 book on the Atari video computer system, entitled Racing the Beam, which has been positioned as the inaugural text of platform studies. Overlapping with software studies, platform studies pays particular attention to the specific hardware and software systems on which ‘expressive computing’ (another name for Manovich’s ‘cultural software’—that is, software applications for video games, digital art, and electronic literature) is based. Montfort and Bogost recommend ‘delving into the code’ and giving ‘serious and in-depth consideration [to] circuits, chips, peripherals and how they are integrated and used’ in order to make sense of new media.22 Also intent on the functional unpacking of technology is the classical work of Alexander Galloway, Protocol (2004), which offers a welcome counterargument to the widespread discursive use of digital networks as metaphors of horizontal connectivity and intrinsic political empowerment. By unpacking the hierarchical workings of ‘real’ networks, which are functionally based on layers of software that ‘wrap up’ the contents of communication, Galloway also unpacks and critiques the rhetoric of freedom that surrounds digital networks. For instance, he demonstrates how protocols incorporate (‘embed’) censorship and other mechanisms of distributed control, and how these technical characteristics embody a logic of governmentality which he ultimately associates with the military origins of the Internet. ‘Distributed networks’, Galloway states, ‘are native to Deleuze’s control society.’ 23 In sum, for Galloway, discovering the control mechanisms which found the technical functioning of networks is a way to complicate the political discourse on networks inside and outside the academy. Although Galloway’s approach remains very important and politically meaningful for the cultural study of software, it also runs the risk of positioning the technical as the ultimate truth, as showing what ‘truly’ lies behind any discourse on technology (celebratory or otherwise). In the end, this approach rests on a strategy that draws on technical explanation as a way to reach a ‘deeper’ understanding of technology—an understanding supposedly located ‘behind’ or ‘beyond’ the social.

This ‘quest for depth’ in the analysis of software, which positions software as the truth of new technologies while also intertwining software with issues of ‘power’ (or ‘biopower’), ‘control’ and ‘governmentality’, is also present in more socially orientated studies of software, such as David Berry’s 2011 book, The Philosophy of Software. For Berry, in order to understand the way in which one experiences software today and to develop a ‘phenomenology of software’, software studies need to ‘unpack’ software, to understand what it ‘really does’, to reach a technical grasp of it.24 Yet, again, this process of unpacking leads to the analysis of the practices of production, usage, and consumption that shape and are shaped by software. Importantly, according to Berry, such a deeper understanding of software—which, for instance, unmasks the decisions made by big corporations such as Google with regard to their software—is ultimately an emancipatory practice, because it leads individuals to better-informed political decisions. An analogous emancipatory aim characterizes Robert Kitchin and Martin Dodge’s book, Code/Space (2011), which investigates the way in which software shapes social space by enabling ‘forms of automation, the monitoring and controlling of systems from a distance, the reconfiguring and rejuvenation of established industries, the development of new forms of labor practices and paid work, the reorganization and recombination of social and economic formations at different scales’ and many other innovations.25 Kitchin and Dodge develop the idea of ‘automated management’ in order to explore how software enables a whole new range of movements and transactions across space while also automatically and systematically capturing and storing data on these transactions, thus bringing about new opportunities for personal and collective empowerment which are also new possibilities for regulation and control.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Fem IR Supplement – AFF › Essentialism-ish

The kritik’s framing of women as victims steals female power – turns the K.

Stringer 2k, [Rebecca, “’A Nietzschean Breed’: Feminism, Victimology, Ressentiment,” Why Nietzsche Still? Reflections on Drama, Culture, Politics. Pg. 249-251] Mr.Mr.

There is nothing wrong with identifying one’s victimization. The act is critical. There is a lot wrong with moding it into an identity. Naomi Wolf, Fire with Fire. Feminist debate about victimology is not new, but its appearance in the feminist popular press is. That discourse about feminist victimology has attracted substantial contributions from popular press feminists is an indication of this discourse’s significance to feminism’s appeal as a social movement, indeed to feminism’s “marketability” as a cultural formation. For these contributions aim precisely to revitalize feminism’s appeal, to rewire its “marketing strategy,” in order to overcome the “alienation” of “ordinary” women from feminism that, they argue, victimology has brought into effect. Although Denfeld, Wolf, and Roiphe have been vocal about their disagreements with one another, their accounts of “the victim problem in current feminism” have more substantive similarities than differences, with Wolf having produced the most generous and systematic account. The manner in which they deal with victim feminism follows the same line, and both Denfeld and Wolf exhibit the same desire to cure feminism of victimology and charge inexorably toward an alternative. What, then, is feminist victimology, or victim feminism? It can be understood in general terms as an attitude fueled by the belief that women are victims of power, where power is understood exclusively as man’s capacity to dominate – a capacity given a fixed and central place in a social order (patriarchy) that fosters its systematic and repeated expression. In short, and to exemplify, relations between the sexes are understood as “a system of sexism in which men as a group have access to power and privilege that women do not have.” This understanding of the sexed distribution of power is posited as an exhaustive account of the power and, as such, breathes life into an elaborate feminist morality. Feminist victimology is, on all accounts, a morally righteous kind of feminism. The experience of powerlessness (women’s experience, whether they “realize” it or not), as the inverse and opposite of power, is the raw material from which the injurious effects of domination can be tabled. As Wolf writes, victim feminism proffers definitive judgment on good and evil with reference to sexual difference and thereby “casts women themselves as good and men themselves as wrong.” A mantle of virtue is bestowed on women and their distinctive ways of doing things, on account of their radical subjection to power, while men “as a group” take on the suits of evil as they are cast as the source of harm. Under the auspice of victim feminism, resistance to domination begins with the process of articulating and tabling its effects to produce an undistorted view of how domination really works, where the responsibility for it really lies, and who stands outside of it – who can, at the end of the day, be evacuated to a position that is, morally speaking, “above” domination and outside of power. Wolf’s criticism of situating feminism’s constituency outside of power is that it “urges women to identify with powerlessness even at the expense of taking responsibility for the power they do possess.” It follows from this that adherents to a victimological line of thinking would avoid registering the figure of the consciously and deliberately powerful woman – who is not, and does not desire to be, above or outside of power – much less the workings of power within its own auspice. The possibility that women and feminists might themselves practice and participate in domination, that not all men have or use the capacity to dominate, that power expresses itself in forms other than domination, is rendered unthinkable if power is conflated with male domination. This much is noted by Denfeld, who argues that victimology makes some women’s conscious participation in “racism, sexism, and violence” at most invisible and at least excusable. For Denfeld, under the auspice of victim feminism women are cast not only as victims but also as dupes. This casting serves a dual purpose. First, some women’s participation in regimes of domination can be excused as “manipulated by negative male ideas.” Second, anointing patriarchy with great powers of deception is an effective means of defending feminism against negative criticism. Denfeld writes, If you don’t agree with current feminists about the enemy, that’s only another sign that he exists.” Victimology, on Denfeld’s account, embraces a hopeful purity of position and registers anything less as contaminated compromise. We can add to Denfeld’s complaint that a victimological perspective will evade the idea that not all experiences of powerlessness are the same and should not, therefore, be collapsed under a single moral claim and that the experience of powerlessness offers no less distorted a view than does the “power-infused” view with which it competes politically. Wolf argues that victimology is especially impoverished in the respect that it inhibits the registration and representation of women’s capacities to assume positive relationships to power. It dwells exclusively on powerlessness, “molding it into an identity,” ratifying and regenerating, rather than transforming, socially derived stereotypes of female weakness and vulnerability. Moreover, having granted victimhood the status of a grand category into which women as a group can be hereded, feminists effectively eschew the conceptual strategies at their disposal for overcoming victim identity. As Sandra Harding has commented, “Victimology… often hide[s] the ways in which women have struggled against misogyny and exploitation.” Harding’s comment indicates that even as a victimological perspective can have a dramatic reversal of the social order in mind – for men must be made to repent for the injuries they have caused by relinquishing the values, ideals, and sociocultural configurations that secure their power – the very logic through which relations of power are conceived from this perspective works against registration of struggle (successful and otherwise) with these values, ideals, and sociocultural configurations.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Fem IR Supplement – AFF › Perm

Our methods are compatible

Hudson et al 10 [Valerie M. Hudson, Prof of Poli Sci at Texas A&M University, PhD in Poli Sci from Ohio State R. Charli Carpenter, Associate Prof of Poli Sci at the University of Massachussetts-Amherst, PhD in Poli Sci from the University of Oregon; Mary Caprioli, Associate Prof of Poli Sci and Director of the International Studies program at the University of Minnesota-Duluth, PhD from the University of Connecticut; “Gender and Global Security,” from The International Studies Encyclopedia, ed. Robert A. Denemark]

We acknowledge the important role played by some IR feminists in critiquing/expanding security studies to be more inclusive of women's needs. But it is also true that deploying gender as a variable and a category of analysis has contributed important insights to security studies, which must be taken seriously by security studies scholars not only for feminist reasons, but because security scholars – and policy makers – miss much of what is going on by ignoring gender. We reject the claim that IR feminist approaches require non-quantitative methods or a critical theoretical epistemology, a claim which has in the past been reified both by IR feminists (Tickner 2005) and by those writing within the IR mainstream (e.g., Carpenter 2003). As Mary Caprioli has argued, much quantitative work is also relevant to feminist questions (Caprioli 2004). We agree with Robert Keohane (1989) that gender as a category of analysis can contribute something to IR as conventionally defined, and it is this contribution which we explore in this essay. In our view, seeking to integrate gender more fully into the discipline of security studies serves to validate the empirical insights yielded by many feminist IR scholars by taking them seriously within the mainstream. While methodologies and specification of explanans and explanandum may differ from the work cited above, such analysis can indeed be consistent with “rethinking security on feminist grounds.” By drawing on empirical insights from gender theory, while speaking to the major concerns of international security studies as a discipline, the literature on gender and security can speak to both IR feminists and security studies scholars. In this essay, we will concentrate on what this literature can say to mainstream security studies, whose primary concerns are, following Walt: “the conditions that make the use of force more likely, the ways that the use of force affects individuals, states and societies, and the specific policies that states adopt in order to prepare for, prevent, or engage in war (1991:212). Taking a gender perspective need not entail a rejection of conventional concepts, methodologies, or questions that define the discipline. Unlike the critical feminist scholarship, which is skeptical of conventional methodologies, this literature review includes a range of empirical scholarship on gender, whether qualitative or quantitative, positivist or constructivist, that make a meaningful contribution to security studies.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Fem IR Supplement – AFF › Perm

Perm do both - IR is not over-determined by gender – their scholarship creates new biases without disrupting masculinity – we’ll win even under their framework

Caprioli 04 [Mary, Professor of Political Science – University of Tennessee, “Feminist IR Theory and Quantitative Methodology: A Critical Analysis”, International Studies Review, 42(1), March, ] Mr.Mr.

The derision with which many conventional feminists view feminist quantitative studies persists to the detriment of both feminist and other types of IR scholarship. As Jan Jindy Pettman (2002) has argued, however, no single feminist position exists in international relations. One of the most common feminist critiques of feminist quantitative research is that scholars cannot simply "add gender and stir" (Peterson 2002;Steans2003), for gender is not just one of many variables. Yet, gender is one of many variables when we are discussing international issues, from human rights to war. As Fred Halliday (1988) has observed, gender is not the core of international relations or the key to understanding it. Such a position would grossly overstate the feminist case. Gender may be an important explanatory and predictive component but it certainly is not the only one.260 Such a critique only serves to undermine the feminist argument against a scientific methodology for the social sciences by questioning the scholarship of those who employ quantitative methodologies. One does not pull variables "out of the air" to put into a model, thereby "adding and stirring." Variables are added to models if a theoretical justification for doing so exists. Peterson (2002:158) postulates that "as long as IR understands gender only as an empirical category (for example, how do women in the military affect the conduct of war?), feminisms appear largely irrelevant to the discipline's primary questions and inquiry." Yet, little evidence actually supports this contention—unless one is arguing that gender is the only important category of analysis. If researchers cannot add gender to an analysis, then they must necessarily use a purely female-centered analysis, even though the utility of using a purely female- centered analysis seems equally biased. Such research would merely be gender-centric based on women rather than men, and it would thereby provide an equally biased account of international relations as those that are male-centric. Although one might speculate that having research done from the two opposing worldviews might more fully explain international relations, surely an integrated approach would offer a more comprehensive analysis of world affairs. Beyond a female-centric analysis, some scholars (for example, Carver 2002) argue that feminist research must offer a critique of gender as a set of power relations. Gender categories, however, do exist and have very real implications for individuals, social relations, and international affairs. Critiquing the social construction of gender is important, but it fails to provide new theories of international relations or to address the implications of gender for what happens in the world. Sylvester (2002a) has wondered aloud whether feminist research should be focused primarily on critique, warning that feminists should avoid an exclusive focus on highlighting anomalies, for such a focus does not add to feminist IR theories.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Fem IR Supplement – AFF › A2 science links

Positivism is good and compatible with a feminist framework– the assumptions of science aren’t intrinsically androcentric – if we win the product is good, the process is justified.

Neilson 5, [Joyce, Sociology Prof @ University of Colorado at Boulder, “Vital Variables and Gender Equity in Academe: Confessions from a Feminist Empiricist Project,” Signs 31(1), pp. 1-28] Mr.Mr.

The now substantial literature on the topic describes feminist research as “passionate, scrappy, energizing” (Garko 1999, 167) and also as contradictory, controversial, revolutionary, dynamic, problematic, oxymoronic, explosive, and filled with creative tension. Deborah L. Tolman and Laura A. Szalacha refer to “epistemological unrest” (1999, 10). Michelle Fine and Susan Gordon describe feminist psychology as an inherent contradiction, pointing out that psychological laboratory studies, with their isolation, sterility, and lack of relationships, are designed to “drive women mad” (1992, 11). Elizabeth Merrick (1999) describes her complex feminist reanalysis of data on teen pregnancy as “like chewing gravel.” There is agreement in the literature that traditional methods need feminist-inspired interruption (Harding 1987). Indeed, Ellen Scott and Bindi Shah (1993, 99) cite Beatriz Pesquera as wondering if “we can develop empowering methodologies without examining the whole process of academic production within the university.” Certainly we have accomplished one goal of this article, that is, to capture the contradictory, emergent, and potentially revolutionary nature of feminist research as it is practiced. Backstage, inside-story accounts of research in progress have been contributing to improving methodologies at least since Julius A. Roth’s “Hired Hands Research” (1966). Feminist research is especially known for its reflectivity. It is not surprising, then, that there is a substantial literature of case studies of feminist research projects.16 Indeed, there is so much that Jane Ussher (1999) asks if feminist researchers are obsessed with methods. A second purpose of this article is to contribute to this literature. Our focus is specifically on feminist empiricism, something described in the literature as in transition and controversial even (or primarily) among feminists. See, for example, Sandra Harding’s (1993) detailed comparison between the feminist standpoint, on the one hand, and prefeminist and spontaneous feminist empiricist epistemologies, on the other; Richmond Campbell’s (1994) model of internal feminist empiricism; Helen Longino’s (1993) philosophical model of contextual empiricism; and Lynn Hankinson Nelson’s (1990, 1993) naturalized empiricism. Thus, juxtaposing our reflective thoughts on feminist empirical work with writings by theorists and philosophers on the topic should be informative. Not surprisingly, we do not exactly fit any one description of feminist empiricism—not completely and not yet anyway. Certainly we recognize what Harding (1993) calls spontaneous feminist empiricism in the earliest stages of this project. But our thinking quickly became unstable, transitioning across different feminist approaches.17 To contribute to current discussion and debate around feminist empiricism, how it is practiced, and how it is transitioning, we present a few close-to-the-ground conclusions based on this particular research experience. As stated earlier, we recognized, perhaps agonizingly, that our feminist thinking had outpaced available methods and strategies. This was most obvious in efforts to measure feminist consciousness when we realized that it was impossible to capture conceptual complexities and refinements in a few or even a series of survey questions. We also realized that to generate useful data and capture the thinking of our respondents, we had to abandon our own constructs and temporarily adopt our respondents’ points of view. We saw the same pattern—that our feminist thinking had outpaced our empiricist approach—with respect to understanding salary differences between male and female faculty. We began with an effort to explain (away) via regression analyses the gendered gap in salaries at this university. We ended with critical questions about the larger social structure and culture—questions that are unanswerable within regression-mode thinking. The questions that emerge when one attempts a deeper—behind the numbers—understanding of this pattern relate to the division of labor by sex. That is, answers to questions about salary differences are found in patterns of sex segregation by academic discipline and likely by associated patterns of work distribution (research, teaching, and service) across and within disciplines. These in turn are patterns that reflect the larger societal division of labor by sex. It is interesting that these kinds of substantive questions begin to approach those that constitute starting points for feminist standpoint theory. We cite, for example, Harding’s description of Dorothy Smith’s questions about women’s work that are generated by a strategy of grounding knowledge in women’s everyday experience: “She [Smith] points out that if we start thinking from women’s lives, we (anyone) can see that women are assigned the work that men do not want to do for themselves” (Harding 1993, 53). We come to a similar conclusion—that our feminist work developed similarities to standpoint and postmodern approaches—from our experience of dual vision. That is, as we shifted between views of the university from central and from marginal social locations, from both the inside and the underside, we experienced firsthand the multivocal and complex nature of the realities we were studying. In other words, this process erased, eroded, and undermined any semblance of the monologic voice that usually underlies and characterizes prefeminist empiricism and much of feminist empiricism. Does it matter what we call our practice of feminist research? Does it matter whether what we have described is contextual (Longino 1993), spontaneous (Harding 1993), positivist, internal (Campbell 1994), or naturalized feminist empiricism (Nelson 1990, 1993)? It does insofar as feminist empiricism is still emerging and this work can be seen as part of the transition toward delineating an effective, successful, and transforming version of feminist research. As a feminist project whose researchers are cognizant of the variety of feminist alternatives, it has descriptive and thus epistemological value. As an actual project against which primarily theoretical work can be compared, its value is in its very doing. Why confessions? This account feels confessional in the sense that alternatives to feminist empiricism—standpoint and postmodern feminism—seem more cutting edge because they are more deliberately critical of traditional ways of producing knowledge. We felt apologetic for continually falling back on known empiricist strategies when we were thinking more radically and aware of being constrained methodologically. This is an odd stance to take, though, since feminist empiricism has been revolutionary in its contribution to women’s liberation, and, as Francesca Cancian (1996) and Longino (1993) point out, despite much writing about creating innovative methods, most feminist work revises mainstream methodologies. (An oft-repeated theme in the literature is that feminism is not in the methods per se but in their use.) Postmodern thinking in particular is often more exhilarating and challenging theoretically, yet insofar as it rejects grand theory, large-scale models, and indeed any kind of generalization, it poses almost irresolvable empirical challenges. Our theme that feminist empiricism is outgrowing its traditional methods is worth pursuing through further analysis of specific research projects such as the one we describe. For now, we continue to stretch and expand the research paradigm with which we began.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Fem IR Supplement – AFF › A2 Hypermasculine Warmaking (Sjoberg)

The hypermasculine war-making thesis lacks predictive and explanatory power. Sjoberg also engages with the “mainstream” in her analysis, which proves that traditional IR is both unavoidable and necessary in feminist theorizing – the perm! Plus, she excludes non-binary people from the discussion of gender IR theory.

Prugl 14 [Elisabeth Prügl is Professor of International Relations/ Political Science at the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva, Perspectives on Politics , Volume 12 , Issue 1 , March 2014 , pp. 176 - 177 DOI: ] Mr.Mr.

I am sympathetic to Sjoberg’s agenda. Like her, I believe that there is no credible way for feminist IR to develop knowledge on war without engaging nonfeminist literatures on the topic. We may want to disavow the mainstream, but it does not allow itself to be ignored and invariably pops up in our topics, framings, and contestations. Because there is no pure feminist location outside previously existing knowledge, the long-standing debate among IR feminists over whether one should engage with the mainstream or not is beside the point. The question should be instead: What are the terms of engagement and who gets the home field advantage? And on this point I become uneasy with Sjoberg’s method; her dialogical approach does not sufficiently recognize the power relations that underlie her engagement with war studies. The author gives the home field advantage to the other team: She seeks an engagement on a playing field mapped by levels of analysis and structuralism, in a game following the rules of positivism and rationalism. But she is ambivalent about this. In the course of her dialogue, she sometimes plays by the rules but more often than not seeks to change them—a dialogue with feminism cannot be con- fined to positivism and rationalism. Not an easy way to win! Her decision to proceed from mainstream rather than feminist literature compounds the problem. Both the mainstream (“studies of war”) and the margin (“feminisms”) are introduced as diverse. Yet whereas the former is invited to play with well-coordinated teams and mature theories (structural realism, decision-making theories, dyadic theories, domestic politics approaches), the latter is presented as an assortment of seemingly disjointed ideas that are deployed on individual missions to rattle the mainstream. Feminisms do not seem to be amenable to team formation; feminisms apparently are good only for critique. Sjoberg is in good company with this approach: Poststructuralist feminists in IR are similarly wary of categorizing thought. But the approach systematically prevents a serious engagement between existing bodies of feminist war theorizing, hiding the complexity of feminist contributions to an understanding of war. For example, Betty Reardon, Valerie Hudson and her co-authors, Cynthia Cockburn, Dubravka Zarkov, and many others have put forward significantly different theories on war and gender that could be discussed against one another. Sjoberg cites them all, but does not start from this literature. She forgoes an opportunity to valorize it by weighing its merits and developing it, including with tools eclectically drawn from war studies. Instead, she recreates the role of the feminist underdog barking bits of critique at the mainstream and admonishing it that it should be doing better. Alternatively, it seems to me, there are spaces between the mainstream and the margins that could have been more hospitable points of departure. They pop up in the book in the persons of women who do not fit: Lene Hansen, presumably a member of the Copenhagen School but also its feminist critic; Mary Caprioli, identified as a liberal peace theorist but also its feminist critic. By playing on more than one team, do these scholars, and their work, not offer an engagement on a more equal playing field? And could not have critical security studies, constructivism, and poststructuralism provided a setting for dialogue in which rules of engagement are more welcoming to feminist ideas? Indeed, feminists have contributed to these approaches. The book unfortunately dispenses with them in a few short pages. One of the dangers of unmooring feminism from itself and from other critical approaches is that its insights become molded so as to be all things to all approaches. In the process, its core propositions get flattened so they can adjust to other theoretical axioms. This is the case here with regard to gender, arguably feminism’s core analytical concept. Sjoberg develops a “realist feminism,” proposing that gender hierarchy is a structural feature of the international system and a permissive cause of war, in addition to or substituting for anarchy (p. 98). In this approach, gender becomes “genders” (pp. 76 ff), that is, the categories women and men, and gender hierarchy an organizational attribute of states. What is lost is gender as a relational concept and as an analytical category, the usages preferred by many feminists. Casting aside feminist debates about the sense and nonsense of structuralist theories of patriarchy, Sjoberg resurrects them under the mantle of gendering neorealism. In her dialogue between unequals, gender yields to the theoretical axioms of the mainstream. Another casualty of this dialogue between unequals is the explanatory status of masculinity, which has become somewhat contested in feminist IR. In Sjoberg’s hands, hegemonic masculinity freezes into a predictive variable. She hypothesizes that “the more competitive a state’s hegemonic masculinity, the more likely that state is to make war. . . . States with elements of hypermasculinity in the nationalist discourse would be expected to be more aggressive” (p. 100). We are left to guess why masculinities always seem to be (more or less) competitive, what hypermasculinity consists of, and how its characteristics can be known in advance. Despite the feminist truism that gender (and thus masculinity) is a social construct, pro- fessed also by Sjoberg, she seems to imply that too much masculinity somehow brings about war. That is, masculinities always seem to be already tainted with militarism and aggression, suggesting some masculine core that no amount of social construction can overcome. Perhaps it is overdrawn to assign responsibility for this confusion to a dialogue between unequals in which gender is reformu- lated to fit positivist epistemologies; however, a targeted engagement with feminist literatures on militarist masculinities might have prevented this mistake.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Fem IR Supplement – AFF › Turn—Gendered politics check bioweapons

Gender politics deter use of bioweapons – patriarchal militaries don’t want to use “feminine” weapons.

Cecire 9, [Ruth Cecire, “Bioweapons: Postmodern Ruminations on a Premodern Modality,” , Feminist Studies, Vol. 35, No. 1 (Spring 2009), pp. 41-65] Mr.Mr.

The feminine/masculine divide is a (or perhaps "the") critical hermeneutic through which each society constructs experience, assigns meaning, and asserts its basic values. Bridging the essentialist/constructionist rift, I would argue that this divide is informed by a conflation of biological difference and cultural representation. It is my contention that bioweapons have been disdained and ostensibly banned, at least in part, because they are largely gendered female and, hence, do not serve the fantasies and ends of the patriarchal war system; their semi-androgynous amalgam of science and disease fuels and substantiates extant culture and gender wars. As instruments of terror for the aforementioned "disenfranchised" nations and groups, they connote the mythical "furies" of "disempowered" female rage. That is not to say that bioweapons will never be employed by First World powers but, rather, that gendered perceptions shape their geopolitical status and deter potential use.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Fem IR Supplement – AFF › Alt fails—Ivory Tower

The oxymoronic act of reading their K in the debate space dooms the alt.

Stern and Towns 22, [Maria Stern, Ann E. Towns, “Feminist IR in Europe: Knowledge Production in Academic Institutions,” , 2022] Mr.Mr.

Scholars’ geographical locations matter for a number of reasons to do with the politics of knowledge (some of which are discussed above), and they also matter because they can shape the types of research that is possible. While in some locations (e.g. in Hungary) it may be impossible to conduct feminist research in an academic institution at all, practical issues in other locations—such as the priorities and methodological biases of funding bodies, the relative permissiveness of risk assessment regimes, and the possibility of getting research access into military institutions—all shape what types of feminist research are possible. This likely plays out in different ways across Europe, but I offer a couple of examples from the UK here because, given that most scholars are located in the UK, this likely has the most significant impact on the field as a whole. The most immediate point here is that the concentration of scholars in the UK leads to an disproportionate focus in the literature on the UK military, but there are also more subtle factors at play. Many UK institutions have cautious travel risk assessment policies that somewhat simplistically (and influenced by a colonial mindset) divide the world into ‘low risk’ and ‘high risk,’ or even ‘hostile’ locations. Anecdotally, this may result in researchers being denied permission to carry out fieldwork in certain locations in a way that would not happen, for example, in Sweden, where universities do not seem to follow restrictive travel risk assessment regimes. Similarly, the quantity of scholarship that does exist on the British military perhaps masks the often difficult processes required to gain approval to conduct research with members of the institution itself, which particularly constrain research that is interpretive, critical, and/or feminist. The power and biases of military gatekeepers in the British context have doubtless prevented and/or reshaped feminist research that would otherwise have been conducted (Basham and Catignani 2021). It is not possible, of course, to conduct a review of literature not published and research 2 DISPARITIES AND DIVERSIFICATION … 25 not carried out. However, the point I want to make here is that it is not only intellectual interest that drives how feminist scholars in Europe select the focus of their research, it is also political economic realities and the constraints of requiring various forms of institutional permission. These realities shape the body of feminist literature on war and militarism that is produced across Europe in powerful, if usually unseen, ways.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Fem IR Supplement – NEG › Framework › K2 politics

FW - Realism’s relationship to gender is problematic and a feminist analysis is crucial to understand conflict

Sjoberg 2013 (Laura Sjoberg, Professor of Political Science at U Florida. Gendering Global Conflict: Toward a Feminist Theory of War (Print Book)) CL

This card is basically just a better version of the previous one but I’m gonna keep the old one there in case anyone wants it

This is not to say that mainstream war studies has never paid any attention to gender, or that gender has been completely absent from critical theorists’ work on war and conflict. It is, instead, to make two distinct (and hopefully more modest) claims. The first is that, to the extent that gender has been taken up in war theorizing, it remains peripheral and has not become a central part of research programs outside feminist security studies considering the nature, constitution, causes, and consequences of war(s).326 The second is that, to the extent that mainstream studies of war have considered gender, they have actually been largely talking about a partial and limited idea of gender that involves women as a biological sex being imbued with characteristics gendered feminine for the purpose of analyzing war.327 This second claim will be discussed in more detail in chapter 2, when I lay out this book’s feminist approaches to studying war ontologically, epistemologically, and methodologically. For now, it is the first claim—that gender theorizing remains absent from (and when not absent from, marginal to) both mainstream and critical war theorizing—that lays the foundation for this book’s work. In the remainder of the text, I seek to analyze and problematize “genderless” war studies. In calling war studies genderless, I am not implying that it is somehow gender neutral or without gender implications. Quite the opposite, I am arguing that it is impossible to think about war well without gender analysis and that doing so obscures the empirical operation of and normative consequences of gender in the nature, causes, performances of, and consequences of war(s). Gender is necessary, conceptually, to understanding the nature of war(s); empirically, to understanding wars’ causes and consequences; ethically, to understanding its implications; and prescriptively, to understanding how to stop wars. Gender does “analytical and normative work” and serves as a “resource for thought” in almost every aspect of how we fight wars and how we read them.328 War, wars, and the study of both are fundamentally (if not unalterably) gendered and, therefore, feminist theorizing about war is not only a part of, but a crucial piece of, the war puzzle.329 Feminist theory “raises the question of what kind of politics and theory would be possible without the work accomplished by gendered logics” in war theorizing.330 Also, when I call war studies genderless, I am not arguing that the work I outlined in this chapter does not have a relationship with gender theorizing—I am arguing that its relationship is (normatively and empirically) negative, problematic, and untenable. These relationships between gender theorizing and security or war studies have variously been called “impossible,”331 “awkward,”332 “uneasy”333 “limited,”334 and akin to “exile.”335 While (many in) IR generally and security studies specifically have conceded that feminist scholarship may exist at the margins, gender analysis “does not simply ‘add’ gender to an unchanged object of study, but… force[s] a more radical rethinking of what properly constitutes I/international R/relations to begin with, transforming the boundaries and conceptual basis.”336 This work starts with the feminist analysis of and deconstruction of war theorizing. It requires showing the gendered nature of that theorizing, of the meaning, causes, and consequences of war(s) at each level of analysis.