2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Iran-Russia Relations › 2NC Impact Toolbox › 2NC – Central Asian Economy Impact
Starr 3 (S. Frederick, Chair – Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, “Afghanistan: Free Trade and Regional Transformation”, )
However great the economic and social benefits of renewed regional trade across the broader region of Central Asia, they are fully matched by the huge gains in world security that will flow from these changes. Indeed, it is hard to imagine any other practical and simple steps anywhere that would bring about greater geopolitical benefits for all. There are ten different areas in which these improvements will be quickly felt: 1. The revival of regional trade will do more than any other single measure to rebuild the Afghan economy, generate state income, and enable the government to provide security and basic human services to its people. This in turn will undercut the appeal of extremist and criminal activities. And it will do so in a way that reinforces Afghanistan's need to maintain cordial relations with all its neighbors. 2. Trade with Afghanistan and the broader region of Central Asia, as well as with India and Iran, will stimulate the flagging economy of Pakistan. The port of Karachi will become a regional hub and Pakistani businesses will be able to exploit new opportunities in every direction. 3. Indians will not choose to remain aloof from this opportunity, even if the price is improved relations with Pakistan. Although this will not in itself resolve the conflict over Kashmir, it will improve the climate in which the parties address that thorny problem. 4. Through regionwide trade to the northeast and east, Iran will reclaim its traditional vocation as a pragmatic trading state. This will tip today's fragile balance between mullahs and merchants in favor of the latter, hastening positive political change in that country. It will also cause Iran to look eastward and will distance it from the messy and seemingly intractable problems of the Arab world. 5. By renewing trade with their old-age partners to the south and southeast and by gaining direct access to the nearby port of Karachi, the new states of Central Asia will become economically more viable and sustainable. Although regionwide trade will benefit all five of these states, the impoverished mountain countries of Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan will see the biggest gains as they acquire the ability to market their most valuable product, hydroelectric power. 6. Trade will encourage all the Central Asian leaders and their governments to work with, rather than against, each other because these economic benefits can be reaped only when harmonious and productive relations prevail among the regional states. 7. In the five new states, as in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran, trade and investment will favor the formation of an independent middle class and undercut the appeal of radical Islamist movements. As the new governments gain in confidence they will be able to tolerate greater openness and participation by members of the public. This will in turn strengthen their identity as moderate Islamic societies ruled by secular states. As such, they will presentan alternative model of modern development to the entire Muslim world.8. Through the opening of trade relations with their natural partners to the south and access to the port of Karachi, the new states of Central Asia will shed their one-sided dependence on Russia and reduce that country's ability to control their overall destinies. Stated differently, free trade will do for these countries what multiple pipelines will do for the oil-producing countries of the Caspian basin. 9. The growth of stability in Afghanistan and the broader region of Central Asia will address what Russia has, for a decade, identified as its number one security concern. Free trade with the south all the way to Pakistan and India will stimulate the flagging economies of the Urals region as well. All this will cut the ground from under those in the Russian military and intelligenceserviceswho feelthat they must somehow regain a deciding voice in Central Asian affairs. The waning of neo-imperial sentiment will in turn enhance the prospects for more open public life in Russia. 10. The establishment of stable and prosperous regimes in neighboring Afghanistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, and the fadingofradical Islamist currents there will address China's major security objective, namely, that these countries not become transmission points for destabilizing movements within Turkic and Muslim Xinjiang. While this will not resolve the question of Xinjiang autonomy (any more than it will resolve the analogous issue in Kashmir), it will at least improve the climate in which it can be considered. America's Decisive Role in Building a New Central Asia Reviewing this list, it is clear that the establishment of free trade throughout the broader region of Central Asia promises benefits for all and liabilities for none. This is a policy that is not directed against the interests of any state in the region. On the contrary, it is a policy that promotes the long-term objectives of all the states and their peoples. The regional transformation described above will take place on its own, without any major push from any quarter. Supporting this claim is the fact that the changes in question are neither new nor revolutionary. Rather, they will bring about the reestablishment of certain relationships that proved their value over the course of several thousand years. The first steps along these lines are already visible, lending further credibility to this argument. At the same time, the region in question poses unique dangers. No other area on the planet is surrounded by four, possibly five, nuclear powers and a sixth power, Turkey, a NATO member. Nowhere else do the tectonic plates of several great civilizations and economic zones grind so directly against one another. So while the opening of freer trade may somehow be in the natural order of things, the risks of the process going awry are enormous. And were that to happen, it would put at risk not one but several of the relationships on whichworld security is grounded.
Yes escalation—key geopolitical hub
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Iran-Russia Relations › 2NC Impact Toolbox › 2NC – Central Asian Economy Impact
Alex Vatanka ’20, Director of Iran Program and Senior Fellow at Frontier Europe Initiative, “Iran and Russia: A tale of unfulfilled economic potential”, MEI, 3/17/20, https://www.mei.edu/publications/iran-and-russia-tale-unfulfilled-economic-potential
The outbreak of a Russian-Saudi oil price war earlier this month might offer some comfort to Iran, a country which has in recent years become unnerved by the increasingly close ties between Moscow and Riyadh. However, it is premature to see an Iranian geopolitical win emerging from the Russian-Saudi spat, and history should give Tehran plenty of reservations about Moscow’s ability to deliver on its economic promises to Iran. With Iran and Russia both large exporters of oil and natural gas, closer economic cooperation would invariably involve the energy sector. And given the size of their economies, the entire Caucasus and Central Asia region will feel the impact should Russia-Iranian relations tilt one way or another. Iran and Russia will likely continue to pay lip-service to the idea of an economic partnership, but each side will remain preoccupied with larger concerns. This is a tale of unfulfilled economic potential.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Iran-Russia Relations › 2NC Impact Toolbox › 2NC – Syria Impact – AT: Defense
Douglas Mackinnon 19, political and communications consultant, was writer in the White House for Reagan and Bush, and former special assistant for policy and communications at the Pentagon, "Syria and Hong Kong: Beware the tripwires for World War III," TheHill, 10/23/2019, https://thehill.com/opinion/international/466725-syria-and-hong-kong-beware-the-tripwires-for-world-war-iii, /\
In June 1914, the assassination of Austria’s Archduke Ferdinand triggered a chain of events that led to World War I and the eventual loss of more than 30 million lives.
The escalating rhetoric today regarding Syria and Hong Kong has the potential to turn dangerously high-risk conflicts into tripwires, which would set off confrontations that could spread across the globe.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Iran-Russia Relations › 2NC Impact Toolbox › 2NC – Syria Impact – AT: Defense
Tom O’Conner 20, an award-winning senior writer of foreign policy at Newsweek, where he specializes in the Middle East, North Korea and other areas of international affairs and conflict. He has previously written for International Business Times, the New York Post, the Daily Star (Lebanon) and Staten Island Advance, 2/11/2020, “Syria Warns of 'Terrorists' Using Nuclear Weapons as War Worsens at Home,” , RES
A senior Syrian official warned world powers of the potential of militant groups gaining access to nuclear weapons as a war at home worsened among both domestic and international forces. Bassam Sabbagh, Syria's permanent representative to the United Nations International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), told an agency gathering on Tuesday that "the issue of nuclear security has emerged during the past decade as an important issue that calls the attention of the international community and that the convening of this conference for the third time reflects the increasing importance of nuclear security as a common global area of concern," according to the official Syrian Arab News Agency. The diplomat argued that criminal or "terrorist" groups could potentially get their hands on and use nuclear or radioactive material to advance their agendas, presenting a major threat to global security, especially as borders are increasingly violated and cyberwarfare becomes increasingly commonplace. He invited foreign delegates to visit Syria and pool their efforts against such risks. Though a nearly nine-year nationwide civil war has calmed in many parts of the country, it has intensified in the northwest in recent months. Here, failing cease-fires between Russia and Turkey have given way to a government offensive in Idlib, the last province largely under the control of rebels and jihadis battling overthrow President Bashar al-Assad. Despite Moscow's efforts to prevent direct hostilities between the forces of Ankara and Damascus, recent deadly exchanges threatened to erupt into a wider conflict between neighboring states in the Middle East.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Iran-Russia Relations › 2NC Impact Toolbox › 2NC – Syria Impact – Brink
Dr Haid Haid 6/22, a Syrian columnist and a consulting associate fellow of Chatham House’s Middle East and North Africa program, 6/22/2022, “Russia maintains grip on Syria while mired in Ukraine,” , RES
In late February, when Russia launched its unprovoked invasion of Ukraine, regional analysts began speculating how the fighting would impact Moscow’s military presence in Syria. The guesswork didn’t last long. Faced with unexpected resilience from Ukraine’s army, Russia reportedly began to withdraw infantry, aviation, and engineering units from various parts of Syria. As a result, many assumed that Moscow’s willingness – or even its ability – to support Syrian President Bashar Al Assad had been wounded by overextension in Ukraine. The conclusion: Russia’s military role in Syria would be significantly decreased. But recent developments on the ground tell a much different story. In addition to reinforcing its forces in northern Syria in response to Turkish threats of a cross-border military operation, Moscow is carrying out operations as before with joint air force drills with Damascus over the war-torn country, and humanitarian aid to people in Sweida and Hassakeh. Taken together, these activities suggest that despite decreasing its presence in Syria, Russia is determined to mobilize its forces there to maintain its means of influence. Since September 2015, an estimated 63,000 Russian military personnel have been deployed to Syria. While the number of soldiers currently stationed in the country is likely much lower, what’s important to recognize is that Moscow doesn’t actually need to keep many troops there to maintain operational advantage. That’s because the level of active fighting has dramatically decreased since March 2020, after the ceasefire brokered by Russia and Turkey in Idlib. With somewhat frozen frontlines, Russia can recall units from Syria without fear of pushback from opposition forces. A more accurate measure of Russia’s influence in Syria is its ability to stabilise the fractured north, and so far, Moscow’s war in Ukraine has had little effect on that mission. In fact, Russia has increased its activities in the northern part of the country to deter Turkey from carrying out a new military operation against Kurdish factions based there. In late May, Moscow deployed soldiers, six Ka-52 “Alligator” attack helicopters, and two Su-34 fighter bombers to the Qamishli airport, according to Syrian media. It also deployed military convoys with dozens of vehicles to the cities of Manbij and Tel Rifaat. More importantly, Russia has increased its air force activities over the Syria-Turkey border as well as the frontlines in Hassakeh and Aleppo governorates. The aim of these activities is to ensure that a new Turkish offensive cannot take place without a green light from Moscow. Meanwhile, Moscow remains engaged in mediating between the Syrian regime and Kurdish fighters in the northeast. Despite the absence of active hostilities between Damascus and Kurdish soldiers, clashes are still common in the region, and Russia’s ability to ease tensions is often tested. The latest round of Russian-led negotiations occurred in April, when Russia succeeded in getting rival Kurdish and Syrian government forces to lift sieges held against each other. The deal demonstrates Moscow’s continued ability to act as a mediator. Russia also appears determined to stand between Iran and Israel to prevent any escalation between those two states. For instance, Russia has allowed Israeli warplanes to use Syrian airspace to target Iranian-linked sites and arms shipments in Syria. Russia has also continued to prevent Iran from deploying its allies close to Israel’s borders. At the same time, however, Russia has pressured Israel to limit airstrikes in Syria, in deference to Iran’s interests; reportedly fired S-300 missiles at Israeli jets over Syria; and carried out joint patrols along the occupied Golan Heights in simulated confrontation with “hostile” warplanes and drones. Beyond its military presence, Russia’s ability to influence events in Syria is contingent on the financial support it provides to allied militias. While information about Russia’s funding to local militias in Syria is scant, according to Syrian news websites, Moscow does appear to have transferred roughly $250,000 in May to pay some 16,000 fighters affiliated with local armed groups. How long this support will last is unclear. Financial difficulties caused by the war in Ukraine could hamper Moscow’s ability to continue funding a second war effort. If Russian money dries up, some militias might agree to be paid by Iran or the Syrian regime, but former rebels in the south operating under the umbrella of the Fifth Corps, which remains hostile to Tehran and Damascus, are unlikely to do so peacefully. Such a development could further destabilize southern Syria, which in turn would threaten Jordan’s national security across the border through a new wave of refugees and smuggling. Hence, Russia’s continued involvement in Syria has security implications beyond the troubled north. Moscow’s shifting role in Syria will remain a topic of intense regional speculation. But while the war in Ukraine is stretching Russia’s military capacity and altering its strategic priorities, it’s hard to imagine any scenario in which Moscow completely abandons its role in maintaining Syria’s fragile status quo. On the contrary, Russia’s Ukraine-fueled withdrawal from Syria, once eagerly predicted, now seems like wistful conjecture.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Iran-Russia Relations › 2NC Impact Toolbox › 2NC – Syria Impact – Astana Key
TRT World ’20, is a Turkish state international news channel broadcast 24 hours per day in English, “Syria's territorial integrity a priority – Astana guarantors”, TRT World, 7/1/20, https://www.trtworld.com/middle-east/syria-s-territorial-integrity-a-priority-astana-guarantors-37776
Leaders of Turkey, Russia, and Iran have called for a peaceful dialogue between warring sides in Syria while pledging to protect the territorial integrity of the war-torn country. "Maintaining the political unity and territorial integrity of Syria, the establishment of calm on the ground and a lasting solution to the conflict are our priorities," Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan said during a televised meeting with his Iranian and Russian counterparts on Syria on Wednesday. "We'll continue to do our best to provide peace, security, and stability in our neighbour Syria," he added. Russian President Vladimir Putin denounced the United States for imposing new sanctions on Syria's regime during the coronavirus pandemic. "Despite the call from the UN secretary general to ease sanctions under pandemic conditions, Washington, like Brussels, decided to prolong measures against Syria," Putin said in his speech. "In addition, new sanctions presumably aimed at economically suffocating Syria have been adopted," he said. Putin told his counterparts that there was a need for peaceful dialogue between warring sides in Syria and that "hot spots of terrorism" still remain in Syria's Idlib and other regions. "An inclusive inter-Syrian dialogue should be actively promoted within the framework of the constitutional committee in Geneva. I propose to support this process, to help the participants to meet and start a direct dialogue," Putin said. Rouhani: No military solution for Syria "The Islamic Republic believes the only solution to the Syrian crisis is political and not a military solution," Rouhani said in a televised opening address. "We continue to support the inter-Syrian dialogue and underline our determination to fight the terrorism of Daesh, Al Qaeda, and other related groups." "I emphasise that the fight against terrorism will continue until it is completely eradicated in Syria and the region in general," he added. Astana talks After delivering opening statements, the three presidents discussed Syria in private and also released a joint declaration. The talks are the first since September in the so-called Astana format, in which the three powers discuss developments in Syria, where the conflict has entered its 10th year.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Iran-Russia Relations › 2NC Impact Toolbox › 2NC – Syria Impact – Astana Key
Al Jazeera ’20, is a Qatari pay television news channel owned by the Al Jazeera Media Network, “Iran, Russia Turkey in talks to find political solution for Syria”, Al Jazeera, 7/1/20, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/7/1/iran-russia-turkey-in-talks-to-find-political-solution-for-syria
Opposing sides in Syria’s war Iran, Russia and Turkey have held talks reflecting “harmonised” efforts to bring peace to the country after nine years of devastating conflict. During a meeting held on Wednesday, the three sides “expressed the conviction” that Syria’s war had no military solution and must be settled only through a political process, a joint statement said. In the virtual meeting, Russian President Vladimir Putin denounced newly imposed US sanctions that he said were aimed at “suffocating” Syria, while Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan called for peace and security to be restored in his country’s southern neighbour. The talks were the first since September in the so-called Astana format, three-way talks between the key foreign powers in the Syrian conflict. In early March, an agreement between Turkey and Russia halted the Syrian government’s three-month air and ground campaign into rebel-held Idlib province. The ceasefire has largely held.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Iran-Russia Relations › 2NC Impact Toolbox › 2NC – Syria Impact – Astana Key
Islamic Republic News Agency IRNA ’20, is the official news agency of the Islamic Republic of Iran, “Putin: Astana peace process to help normalize situation in Syria”, IRNA, 7/1/20, https://en.irna.ir/news/83841145/Putin-Astana-peace-process-to-help-normalize-situation-in-Syria
The three guarantors of the Astana peace process (Iran, Turkey, and Russia) have started to discuss the Syria peace process via video conference. President Putin said that the trilateral summit meetings had reduced the level of violence in Syria. He said that Russia agrees with Iran's assessment for the continuation of cooperation in Syria. The Russian president added that the level of violence in Syria has dropped significantly and the activities of ISIS and terrorists in Syria have been reduced. Referring to Russia's intensive cooperation with Turkey regarding the Idlib region, President Putin said that "we are working together to implement the September 2018 Sochi Agreement and its additional protocol dated March 5, 2020". He stated that the unilateral sanctions imposed on Syria without the approval of the UN Security Council have a negative impact on the situation in Syria. In fact, these sanctions are illegal. He pointed out that cooperation among Iran, Russia, and Turkey within the framework of the Astana process is stabilizing Syria.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Iran-Russia Relations › 2NC UQ/Link Toolbox › 2NC – Brink/Link UQ
Katharine Nasielski ’17, is an experienced foreign policy professional with a strong track record in building strategic relationships that strengthen and diversify the reach of organizations. She has expertise in strengthening civil society, public-private partnerships, project management, coalition-building, policy analysis, and public diplomacy, “Disrupting the Russian-Iranian Rapprochement”, American Security Project, 4/17/17, https://www.americansecurityproject.org/disrupting-the-russian-iranian-rapprochement/
The relationship between Iran and Russia has never been built on trust. Since 1979, Iran has held a “No East, No West” policy. No country has seized more territory from Iran in recent centuries than Russia, and Iran has not fully forgiven Russia for its support of Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War. Tehran has consistently been used as a bargaining chip between Russia and the U.S., most notably in backroom negotiations in 1995 when Vice President Al Gore and Russian Prime Minister Chernomyrdin agreed to end arms sales to Iran without their knowledge or consent. But now, U.S. policymakers are faced with the challenge of a fundamentally changed relationship between Iran and Russia derived from military coordination to prop up the Assad regime. Russia and Iran have been working in tandem to ensure that the Syrian government survives. Without their support, President Assad could not have remained in power. Iran’s ambitions for regional hegemony and to counter Saudi Arabia’s strength in the Middle East require Assad’s survival. Russia seeks a larger role in the Middle East and to limit America’s influence. While Russia may not necessarily be committed to President Assad’s personal maintenance of power, it views a continued Russian-Syrian alliance as critical for its access to this region and to the Mediterranean. Because of these shared priorities with Russia, Iran appears to have diverted from “No East, No West.” In August 2016, Iran allowed Russia to use its Hamadan Air Base to take off and refuel in support of its joint military operations; no foreign power has been permitted to base forces in Iran since 1979. Russia has been training and providing weapons to Hezbollah, Iran’s proxy militia in Lebanon. Since the beginning of the war, Hezbollah has adapted from a small terrorist organization to a small-sized army, posing a direct threat to U.S. allies in Israel and Saudi. In the aftermath of the JCPOA, Iran and Russia signed a $10 billion arms deal, and Russia delivered S-300 missile systems that had been delayed due to international sanctions regimes. But the U.S. has the power to drive a wedge between Iran and Russia’s blossoming relationship. Even though Iran and Russia might have similar visions of the Syrian conflict in the immediate term, their long-term regional goals differ significantly.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Iran-Russia Relations › 2NC UQ/Link Toolbox › 2NC – Link – NATO Key
Lt. Col. Gordon B. Hendrickson ’05, Atlantic Council Senior Fellow, “The Future of NATO-Russian Relations: Or, How to Dance with a Bear and Not Get Mauled”, The Atlantic Council, December 2005, https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/46291/2005_12_The_Future_of_NATO-Russia_Relations.pdf
Leading intelligence experts also highlight the importance of a strong Russian economy to the security of Europe, and of the role Europe can play in drawing Russia closer. In their view, if Russia knows Western Europe wants to forge a “special relationship” with a Russia that is economically stronger, Moscow is more likely to be tolerant of former Soviet states moving closer to Europe.103 Such a closer relationship to European institutions and structures would also provide Russia a vital counterweight to the strong economic lure of weapons of mass destruction and other weapons proliferation, as well as reducing its perceived need for growing ties with other regions and countries, such as China, India, and Iran. President Putin has made clear this Russian need and desire for further development, stating shortly after his re-election in March 2004, The main goal of our policy is not to demonstrate some or other imperial ambitions, but rather to secure favorable external conditions for the development of Russia. There is nothing unusual in that. And we will be building a multi-vector foreign policy, we will work together with the United State, the European Union, and with individual countries of Europe. We will work together with our Asian partners, with China, India, and with countries of the Asia-Pacific region.104 As a result, the support of NATO and other Western institutions takes on vital importance in keeping Russia positively engaged in and cooperating with the rest of Europe.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Iran-Russia Relations › 2NC UQ/Link Toolbox › 2NC – Link – NATO Key
Lt. Col. Gordon B. Hendrickson ’05, Atlantic Council Senior Fellow, “The Future of NATO-Russian Relations: Or, How to Dance with a Bear and Not Get Mauled”, The Atlantic Council, December 2005, https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/46291/2005_12_The_Future_of_NATO-Russia_Relations.pdf
Russia is now more readily acknowledging, at least publicly, the value of NATO and of closer relations with the Alliance. Ambassador Anatoly Adamishin, President of the Russian Association for Euro-Atlantic Cooperation, recently affirmed this view when he opined that NATO-Russian relations are currently exemplary, despite some disagreements. As he pointed out, Russia must “have an alliance with the Alliance” and any quarrels between the two must be settled without taking sides. He put it plainly when he said, “NATO is necessary.” The challenge, he said, is to avoid tackling new problems with old, obsolete methods.105 It is vital for the Alliance to encourage this view and to keep Russia engaged with the West. Without a continuation of strong, active, and regular engagement from NATO and other important Western institutions, such as the EU, Russia naturally will look for support, security and prosperity from other sources, such as China, India, and even Iran, if they offer much-needed economic capital for Russia. NATO’s European members will be particularly key players in this regard, both multilaterally and even bilaterally, as Moscow looks more and more toward integration into European institutions and seeks to regain what it considers its rightful, prominent role on the continent. Without such continued active engagement, NATO could face a hardening of Russian attitudes toward the West. The likely result would be for Russia to close more of its society and become even more secretive than it already is, clearly a step backward from the Alliance’s goal of transparency. NATO has to avoid these pitfalls, insofar as it can possibly influence them. Above all, NATO should avoid marginalizing Russia, which will take creativity as NATO’s borders expand further eastward toward Russia’s. The Alliance could encourage a more active Russian role in the PfP, include more Russian officers in technical ventures such as joint exercises and force planning, and even possibly integrate Russia into its own efforts at military reform.106 One thing NATO leaders can count on is that as NATO expands its membership, especially to the east, Russia will continue to look more to other nations to establish or strengthen other alliances and partnerships in response. NATO’s leaders also must keep in mind that words matter to the Russians. The details and exact wording of international treaties, agreements, and even simple diplomatic notes matter. The author saw this repeatedly during his time in Moscow, when reaching agreement on the seemingly smallest details sometimes took excruciating lengths of time. In the Russian view, the spirit and intent of an agreement cannot necessarily be proven—only that which is written can be proven. Accurate words also prevent a subsequent administration or government from changing the intent of an agreement without resorting to formal channels. Russian leaders believe they can avoid being cheated or taken advantage of by correctly spelling out everything. Conversely, they do not see a problem in taking advantage of loopholes in treaties and agreements, if the letter of the law is not violated. In their view, it is perfectly fair, even if it might violate the intent of the law. Otherwise, their treaty partner should have seen this possibility and guarded against it. The moral: Whenever Alliance leaders can join formally with Russia in an activity or partnership, they should do it. Close, honest and transparent dialogue is critical to NATO success in continuing to engage Russia, and the NRC definitely has been a step in the right direction. Fortunately, the Alliance has recognized this, and should do everything it possibly can to encourage dialogue. Ambassador Maurizio Moreno, Italian Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council, recently commented on the importance of dialogue regarding NATO’s new history in its relations with Russia. In his view, Russia is now an equal partner and the process within the NRC is working well, even on sensitive issues such as Iraq, Afghanistan, Georgia, and the recent Ukrainian presidential election. Although there are natural differences of opinions, and even some differences between NATO and Russian values, he believes the two sides can work successfully through these challenges. According to Moreno, “there are values we can share” and he stated that we have done so recently through the NRC. Although Russia has not joined NATO, and most likely will not, in his view there is still the definite possibility for beneficial and productive dialogue.107 Former NATO Secretary-General Lord Robertson captured the essence of NATO’s success in the NRC when he presciently stated in 2002, “the real difference between ‘19+1’ and ‘20’ is not a question of mathematics, but one of chemistry: the success of the NATO-Russia Council will depend on the political will of the participants.” Based on the apparent willingness of both sides to make it work, he believed “the prospects for a genuinely new quality in NATO-Russia relations appear bright.”108 Thus far, his belief in the NRC’s prospects has proven well founded. Now, it is up to Alliance and Russian leaders to ensure that chemistry remains strong and positive. This will undoubtedly require a skillful mix of patient dialogue combined at times with more forceful pressure, without resorting to confrontation. As history has shown, confrontation, demands, and ultimatums will accomplish very little with Russia (as indeed, these tactics accomplish little with any country). The best prospects for NATO-Russia relations will result from NATO leaders honestly listening to and considering Russian views, even if in the end Moscow does not like the answer. To the extent possible, NATO must avoid marginalizing Russia.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Iran-Russia Relations › 2NC UQ/Link Toolbox › 2NC – Link – Cohesion/Hypocrisy
Reid Standish and Amy Mackinnon ’20, *is an Alfa fellow and Foreign Policy’s special correspondent covering Russia and Eurasia, **is a staff writer at Foreign Policy, “Putin Moves to Heighten Russia’s Role After Suleimani Killing”, Foreign Policy, 1/8/20, https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/01/08/putin-suleimani-russia-iran/
Since its pivotal intervention in the Syrian civil war in 2015, Russia has sought to position itself as a major player in the Middle East, establishing itself as a rare broker that is on good terms with all of the region’s feuding powers. Now Moscow has a fresh chance to solidify that reputation. Russian President Vladimir Putin will look to boost his country’s standing in the Middle East following the Trump administration’s decision to assassinate the Iranian military leader Qassem Suleimani last week and Iran’s missile attack against U.S. air bases in Iraq on Tuesday, which have roiled the Middle East and pushed Iran and the United States to the brink of war. The escalating situation raises the stakes for Moscow’s calculus in the region significantly, but it also provides Putin with new opportunities to achieve two of his long-standing goals: undermining U.S. credibility and expanding Russia’s footprint across the Middle East. “Putin sees pushing back against U.S. unilateralism as a personal mission and he is extremely opportunistic. He will therefore seek to capitalize on every opportunity he can to use the assassination of Suleimani and any ensuing instability to tarnish Washington’s reputation in the region,” said Andrea Kendall-Taylor, a senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security think tank who previously served as deputy national intelligence officer for Russia and Eurasia at the National Intelligence Council. The killing sparked a flurry of diplomatic activity from Moscow. In phone calls with his American, Iranian, Chinese, and Turkish counterparts, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov condemned the killing and characterized it as a gross violation of international law. On Tuesday, Putin made an impromptu visit to Damascus to meet with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and shore up Moscow’s patronage. “The last thing Putin wants is to have to pick a side in the Middle East,” said Anna Borshchevskaya, a senior fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, a Washington-based think tank. “His best card is as a mediator and I suspect they are in a wait-and-see mode now. If Russia does something major, it will be diplomatically.” On Wednesday, Putin traveled to Istanbul to meet with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan to discuss escalating tensions in the Middle East. Despite not always seeing eye to eye on the future of the region, Erdogan and Putin have managed to cut deals in the past, such as when both leaders agreed to effectively carve up northeastern Syria last year following the Trump administration’s unexpected withdrawal. On Saturday, Putin will welcome German Chancellor Angela Merkel to Moscow for talks about the crisis. Both Russia and Germany are among the countries that have sought to prop up the Iranian nuclear deal following the U.S. withdrawal from the agreement in 2018. The killing of the Quds Force leader Suleimani in a U.S. drone strike at the Baghdad airport on Jan. 3 will likely stress test Moscow’s ability to be a friend to all major players in the region. Russia and Iran have developed deep ties in recent years, working together in Syria to tilt the balance of power in favor of the Assad regime. Despite their shared interests, Moscow has simultaneously pursued deeper ties with Israel and Saudi Arabia, Tehran’s foes, as well as with other players across the region. “Moscow is trying to play this role as a reliable and stable player in the Middle East and this certainly helps its cause,” said Julia Sveshnikova, a Middle East expert and consultant at the PIR Center, a Moscow think tank. “But Moscow is also very concerned about this situation and will be looking to stay out of the fray as much as possible.” The Trump administration’s decision to assassinate a high-ranking official caught many countries around the world off guard and undermined U.S. credibility in the Middle East, an opening that Moscow will be looking to capitalize on. The Kremlin has long proven adept at exploiting crises around the world to advance its strategic objectives, from Ukraine to North Africa to Syria. Washington has slapped Russia with sanctions for its intervention in eastern Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea, but the Kremlin has long pointed to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan as evidence of U.S. hypocrisy and will likely use Suleimani’s killing and Trump’s call to target Iranian cultural sites as further evidence of U.S. overreach while furthering its own standing as a regional power broker. While many of the United States’ regional allies may privately welcome Suleimani’s demise, many also feared that they may bear the brunt of Iran’s retaliation. Those fears may have been allayed slightly as Iran responded to the killing of its general by firing over a dozen missiles at U.S. military and coalition forces in Iraq. Early reports suggested that there were no U.S. casualties, and both sides showed signs that they wanted to de-escalate the situation. U.S. allies in the region may be breathing a sigh of relief, but if they conclude that Washington had left them exposed to Iranian retaliation, it could encourage a pivot toward Moscow for future mediation. The last months of 2019 were marked by a wave of anti-Iranian protests in Iraq and Lebanon, and for a moment it looked as if Tehran’s potent influence in the region may be starting to fray. But the Jan. 3 airstrike brought anti-American sentiment in the region to the fore once more, a shift that will undoubtedly be welcomed by Moscow. “As much as Putin may have wanted [a rise in anti-American sentiment] to occur, Russia could not have brought it about on its own,” said Mark Katz, a professor of politics and government at George Mason University. “But Trump has done it for him.”
2022
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Counterplan
Iran-Russia Relations › 2NC UQ/Link Toolbox › 2NC – AT: Swindland
O’Connor 7-1 (Tom O'Connor is an award-winning senior writer of foreign policy at Newsweek, where he specializes in the Middle East, North Korea and other areas of international affairs and conflict. He has previously written for International Business Times, the New York Post, the Daily Star (Lebanon) and Staten Island Advance, 7-1-22, “As NATO Grows, China and Russia Seek to Bring Iran, Saudi Arabia Into Fold”, Newsweek, SC)
Finland and Sweden's green light to join NATO is set to bring about the U.S.-led Western military alliance's largest expansion in decades. Meanwhile, the G7, consisting of NATO states and fellow U.S. ally Japan, has adopted a tougher line against Russia and China. In the East, however, security and economy-focused blocs led by Beijing and Moscow are looking to take on new members of their own, including Iran and Saudi Arabia, two influential Middle Eastern rivals whose interest in shoring up cooperation on this new front could have a significant impact on global geopolitical balance. The two bodies in question are the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and BRICS. The former was established in 2001 as a six-member political, economic and military coalition including China, Russia and the Central Asian states of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan before recruiting South Asian nemeses India and Pakistan in 2017, while the latter is a grouping of emerging economic powers originally consisting of Brazil, Russia, India and China (BRIC) upon its inception 2006, and including South Africa in 2010. "The BRICS and the SCO share one important ideological quality: they are both focused on multipolarity, and their summits have even been held back to back with one another at times," Matthew Neapole, an international affairs expert and contributor to the Macdonald-Laurier Institute in Canada, told Newsweek. "Both are angling to act as force multipliers for this drive for multipolarity, to help along with alternatives [i.e, in currency or banking]," he added. "It could, in theory, facilitate economic linkages and step into gaps that U.S. institutions are not filling due to sanctions, such as those laid on Russia." Iran, already an SCO observer, began its formal membership ascension process amid the latest leaders' summit in September. On Monday, the Iranian Foreign Ministry announced the Islamic Republic would also seek to join BRICS. Across the Persian Gulf, Saudi Arabia has also reportedly considered applying for BRICS membership, as revealed by Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov during his visit to the kingdom in late May. The announcement followed Saudi Arabia joining Argentina, Egypt, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Nigeria, Senegal, Thailand and the United Arab Emirates at China's invitation for a "BRICS+" discussion, after which Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Wang Wenbin announced members had "reached consensus on the BRICS expansion process." Of these candidates, Argentina has already applied for membership, potentially advancing the group's status toward being a major player in international economic relations. And with the SCO seeking to grow as well, Beijing and Moscow might be poised to advance their effort to sway the international influence equilibrium toward a broader group of countries that do not necessarily sign on to an explicitly U.S.-led international order. And while Neapole argued that there would be "big hurdles to get over" in trying to transform this vision from ambitious talk to substantive action, he said a cohesive SCO-BRICS bloc could have a huge impact on reshaping the world order. "If it can be successful in positioning itself as the standard-bearer of the Global South or G20, develop strong organizational mechanisms and integrate more thoroughly," he said, "it could be quite influential." BRICS' multipolar approach to international affairs has proven attractive to both Iran and Saudi Arabia alike. The two nations, however, have their own unique reasons for seeking membership. For Riyadh, the move would likely be less about choosing sides against the close ties it has fostered for decades with Washington and more about the kingdom's own growing status as an independent player.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Iran-Russia Relations › 2NC UQ/Link Toolbox › 2NC – AT: Ukraine
Yana Dlugy 7/14, a contributing writer with the Briefings team at The New York Times, and has reported from abroad for more than 20 years. She has been on several postings in Moscow, including for Newsweek and Agence France-Presse, and has also been based for AFP in Kyiv, the Middle East and Europe, 7/14/2022, “Russia Gets Closer to Iran,” ?, RES
Russia gets closer to Iran President Vladimir Putin will travel to Iran next week to shore up military and economic support for Russia. The trip will follow President Biden’s tour of the Middle East this week, where Iran and its nuclear program were main topics of discussion. The relationship between Moscow and Tehran stretches back centuries and has often been fraught. Iranians still recall the territory that the Persian Empire had to cede to Russia’s czar in the early 19th century. Today the two countries find themselves in the club of nations hit by sanctions and shunned by the West. To learn more about the relationship, I spoke to Farnaz Fassihi, a Times journalist who covers the U.N. and is an expert on the Middle East. Our conversation has been lightly edited. How has the war changed relations between the two countries? Before, Iran and Russia had an alliance that was much more tactical than strategic. Iran really always wanted to develop this relationship. But because Russia had economic dealings with the West, Russia was always keeping Iran at arm’s length. The war in Ukraine changed that. Russia now faces international isolation, so it needs to figure out how to skirt sanctions. So it’s looking at Iran, a country with a lot of expertise on getting around sanctions. Iran sees an opportunity to get closer to Russia. And Russia now sees Iran as an important ally that could help it sell oil and energy and avoid sanctions.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Iran-Russia Relations › 2NC UQ/Link Toolbox › 2NC – AT: Ukraine
Maziar Motamedi 2/24, a Tehran-based journalist who covers Iran, 2/24/2022, “‘Rooted in NATO’: Iran responds to Russia’s Ukraine attack,” , RES
The significant escalation in the Ukraine crisis comes as consequential talks in Vienna to restore Iran’s 2015 nuclear deal with world powers have entered their “endgame”, according to diplomats. The United States in 2018 unilaterally abandoned the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), as the deal is formally known, imposing harsh sanctions. In response, Tehran has since 2019 significantly advanced its nuclear programme while maintaining it is strictly peaceful. Seyed Mostafa Khoshcheshm, a Tehran-based Iran affairs analyst currently focused on the Vienna talks, said the Ukraine war has just started and would require more time to directly affect the talks in the Austrian capital. But he told Al Jazeera both Ukraine and JCPOA are security issues and “crises that have been manufactured by the US”. “It appears this will ultimately lead to Russia getting closer to Iran and expand its support of Iran,” Khoshcheshm said, adding this could include closer economic cooperation despite US sanctions, since Russia is now heavily sanctioned by the West. The analyst said the Ukraine crisis could also lead to closer security and military cooperation between Iran and Russia, especially in Syria. He pointed out that Israel had built strong ties with Russia, but its support of the Western bloc on Ukraine could endanger that.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Iran-Russia Relations › 2NC UQ/Link Toolbox › 2NC – AT: Ukraine
Fathollah-Nejad 3-21 (Dr. Ali Fathollah-Nejad is an Associate Fellow and the author of the Iran in Focus brief at the Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy & International Affairs (IFI) at the American University of Beirut (AUB). He is also the author of Iran in an Emerging New World Order: From Ahmadinejad to Rouhani (2021) and the initiator and co-host of the Berlin Mideast Podcast (Konrad Adenauer Foundation). He is affiliated with the Center for Middle Eastern and North African Politics, Freie Universität (FU) in Berlin and the Centre d’Etudes de la Coopération Internationale et du Développement (CECID) at the Université libre de Bruxelles (ULB), 3-21-22, “Russia's invasion of Ukraine and the nature of Iranian-Russian relations”, SC)
Russia’s Feb. 24 invasion of Ukraine, which triggered Europe’s first major conflict since the Balkan Wars of the 1990s, marks a watershed in the continent’s post-Cold War history. The conflict poses significant security challenges for countries throughout Eurasia and beyond, and has given rise to unexpected changes in long-established European foreign and security policy paradigms toward autocracies, as the case of Germany illustrates. Iran is by no means immune to the geopolitical changes underway. Before the war on Ukraine broke out, after almost a year of back-and-forth diplomatic efforts in Vienna, the Iran nuclear negotiations seemed poised to revive the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). The invasion, which caught many in the West by surprise, initially led Tehran and Moscow to seemingly modify their positions, giving rise to widespread uncertainty over the talks and even fears of their collapse. As of late March, however, the talks appear to be back on track and are expected to lead to a deal soon. Beyond the JCPOA, the New Cold War pitting Vladimir Putin’s Russia against the transatlantic alliance has also re-energized debates within Iran about its implications for the country’s standing in the world order. In this context, it is crucial to analyze Iran’s domestic discourse about its powerful Russian partner — some might say overlord — and its relationship with the leadership in Tehran. Iranian reactions to Russia's invasion and Moscow acting as overlord Tehran’s geopolitical hopes The Islamic Republic of Iran’s official reaction to the Russian invasion, both by state media and officials, echoed Moscow’s war propaganda, all while paying lip service to “the preservation of the territorial integrity and national sovereignty of all countries” (in the words of President Ebrahim Raisi). In most cases, the invasion was described as a Russian “special operation” provoked by the eastward expansion of the U.S.-led NATO alliance. From this viewpoint, Russia is simply safeguarding its security in the face of decades of destabilizing Western expansionism. This narrative has been promoted by key Iranian media outlets (affiliated with the state and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps or IRGC) and representatives (including the supreme leader, president, minister of intelligence, and the Tehran Friday prayer imam). Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, they argue, constitutes a necessary act of resistance against Western/NATO aggression, so blame for the present escalation lies squarely with the latter. By defending Russia, they implicitly justify Iran’s own offensive regional posture, known as “forward defense,” which Tehran similarly likes to portray as a legitimate reaction to equally destabilizing U.S. expansionism in its near abroad. From this elite group’s perspective, Russia’s move against Ukraine in the face of Western hesitation is in line with Tehran’s own interests and overlaps with an Iranian grand strategy of confronting the U.S. and projecting power in the Middle East and beyond. Western reluctance to intervene, especially militarily, poignantly signals the decline of U.S. power. The image of America’s military prowess had already been undermined by the fiasco of the Afghanistan withdrawal last fall and other West Asian quagmires in which the U.S. and its allies failed to overcome Iran-allied groups. In sum, these misadventures left Washington bereft of its superpower status in international relations.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Iran-Russia Relations › 2NC UQ/Link Toolbox › 2NC – AT: Ukraine
Troianovski et. al. 1-19 (Anton Troianovski is the Moscow bureau chief for The New York Times. He was previously Moscow bureau chief of The Washington Post and spent nine years with The Wall Street Journal in Berlin and New York, Farnaz Fassihi is a reporter for The New York Times based in New York. Previously she was a senior writer and war correspondent for the Wall Street Journal for 17 years based in the Middle East, Steven Erlanger is the chief diplomatic correspondent in Europe, based in Brussels. He previously reported from London, Paris, Jerusalem, Berlin, Prague, Moscow and Bangkok, 1-19-22, “Russia and Iran Put on a Show of Unity — Against the U.S.”, New York Times, SC)
MOSCOW — Sitting across a long table from President Vladimir V. Putin at a Covid-conscious distance, President Ebrahim Raisi of Iran reminded his Russian counterpart on Wednesday that Tehran had been “resisting America for 40 years.” And now that Russia was plunging deeper into its own confrontation with the United States, Mr. Raisi told Mr. Putin in televised remarks, it was time to take on “the power of the Americans with an increased synergy between our two countries.” It was a bit of geopolitical theater at the Kremlin at a critical moment for Washington and its adversaries. Mr. Raisi, the hard-line Iranian leader, started a two-day trip to Moscow on Wednesday designed to showcase tightening bonds between two countries with often-diverging interests and a history of strained relations — but, increasingly, along with China, a single adversary: the United States. For Mr. Putin, embroiled in a dispute with the United States over spheres of influence and facing harsh sanctions if he follows through on a threatened invasion of Ukraine, it was a chance to show that Russia has friends it can call on in its battles with the West. In keeping with that message, the visit will include an address by Mr. Raisi to Russia’s lower house of Parliament, a rare honor for a visiting leader. Image Ukrainian soldiers this week on the front line of Katerynivka, in eastern Ukraine. Mr. Raisi supported President Putin’s policies there. Ukrainian soldiers this week on the front line of Katerynivka, in eastern Ukraine. Mr. Raisi supported President Putin’s policies there.Credit...Tyler Hicks/The New York Times Iran, its economy already strangled by U.S. sanctions, is involved in delicate negotiations to revive the 2015 nuclear accord. Mr. Raisi nevertheless voiced tacit support for Mr. Putin in Ukraine, and Iran’s foreign minister emphasized that the two presidents had agreed on the “framework” of an agreement governing increased economic and military cooperation. Dig deeper into the moment. Special offer: Subscribe for $1 a week. No deals were signed publicly, however, and the extent of the Kremlin’s willingness to sell to Iran more of the modern Russian weaponry that Tehran has long sought remained unclear. But along with an upcoming naval exercise combining warships from Russia, Iran and China, the Kremlin appeared intent on sending a message that it was continuing to foster new ties that could serve as a counterweight to the West. Iran, too, is signaling that it also has alternatives if Western sanctions are not lifted. “On the international arena, we are cooperating very closely,” Mr. Putin told Mr. Raisi, noting the crises in Syria and Afghanistan, and pledging to bring Iran closer to the Russia-led trade bloc known as the Eurasian Economic Union. Russia and Iran still have a host of differences. Despite years of sanctions, Russia’s economy, unlike Iran’s, remains closely integrated with the West. Mr. Putin has worked to foster close ties with Israel, which Iranian leaders see as an enemy. And in Vienna, Russia has been working with the United States and Europe to try to resuscitate faltering negotiations over restoring the deal restricting Iran’s nuclear program. But as Russia’s conflict with the West intensifies, Russian officials are increasingly willing to look past those differences. Grigory Lukyanov, an international relations specialist at the Higher School of Economics in Moscow, said that Russian officials had grown more aligned in recent years with the more strident anti-Western stance of some Iranian counterparts. And Mr. Raisi, an ultraconservative cleric who became president in August, has spoken out in favor of closer ties to Russia despite skepticism in the Iranian public. “This visit is oriented not so much toward the domestic audience in both countries but, most of all, toward the West,” Mr. Lukyanov said of Mr. Raisi’s trip to Moscow. “There are now more supporters in the Russian leadership of adopting Iran’s radical course, which used to be considered unacceptable in Russia.” Russia has massed some 100,000 troops around Ukraine, while demanding guarantees that the NATO alliance not expand into Ukraine or elsewhere in Eastern Europe. Western officials say Mr. Putin could launch an invasion of Ukraine at any time, and have threatened crushing sanctions against Russia and new military support to Ukraine if he does so. Mr. Raisi, in the public portion of his meeting with Mr. Putin, did not bring up Ukraine, but echoed the Kremlin’s longtime disdain for the Western military alliance. Image A Ukrainian soldier on the front line of Zolote, in the Luhansk province of eastern Ukraine. A Ukrainian soldier on the front line of Zolote, in the Luhansk province of eastern Ukraine.Credit...Tyler Hicks/The New York Times “NATO’s influence under any pretext in the Caucasus and Central Asia is a threat to the mutual interests of independent countries,” Mr. Raisi said, according to the Iranian government’s account of the meeting. He was referring to two other regions that were once within the Soviet Union and that the Kremlin still sees as part of Russia’s rightful sphere of influence. Mr. Raisi’s presidency consolidated the power of a hard-line faction that had criticized the previous centrist government of President Hassan Rouhani as too accommodating to the West, aligning Iran more closely with Mr. Putin’s stance. Mr. Putin met with Mr. Raisi despite the Kremlin’s intense efforts to shield Mr. Putin from the coronavirus, with the omicron variant coursing through Moscow. The two leaders sat some 20 feet apart, and Mr. Putin’s spokesman later told the Russian news media that the seating arrangement was due to “measures of sanitary necessity.” “Neither video conferences nor phone calls can replace in-person contact — even like this,” Mr. Putin told Mr. Raisi, pointing at the long table between them. After Wednesday’s meeting at the Kremlin, the Iranian foreign minister, Hossein Amir Abdollahian, posted on Twitter that the two presidents had “agreed on the framework of a long-term agreement.” In his remarks Wednesday, Mr. Raisi said the document had been “delivered” to Mr. Putin. “Tehran and Russia relations entered a new, fast-paced and dynamic path,” Mr. Amir Abdollahian said. “Excellent cooperation will begin in this new phase of relations.” The 20-year agreement discussed by Mr. Putin and Mr. Raisi, Iranian officials said, focuses on technology transfers from Russia, the purchase of Russian military equipment and Russian investments in Iranian energy infrastructure. Iran has said the agreement would be modeled after a sweeping economic and security deal signed in September between Iran and China. Under that agreement, China will invest nearly $400 billion in a wide range of projects in Iran in exchange for discounted oil for two decades. “We are definitely pursuing a long-term agreement with Russia because it is a necessity,” Mahmoud Shoori, deputy director of the Institute for Iran and Eurasian Studies in Tehran, said in a phone interview. “More important than economic partnership with Russia is a military and intelligence alliance.”
2022
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Counterplan
Iran-Russia Relations › 2NC UQ/Link Toolbox › 2NC – UQ – Cyber
John Hardie, 2-8-2021, "Russia-Iran cooperation poses challenges for US cyber strategy, global norms," C4ISRNet, https://www.c4isrnet.com/thought-leadership/2021/02/08/russia-iran-cooperation-poses-challenges-for-us-cyber-strategy-global-norms/
Russia and Iran an agreement last month on information security, a term that in Russian encompasses not only cyber but information and communications technology (ICT) more broadly. Such cooperation will help these authoritarian regimes to continue suppressing internal dissent and to expand joint efforts to counter the Western goal of preserving an open and free internet. to Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, the deal will allow Russia and Iran “to coordinate [their] activities given the growing importance of cyber issues and their increasing impact on” both “international relations” and “situations in various countries.” Andrei Krutskikh, Moscow’s lead diplomat on information security, that the agreement stipulates broad cybersecurity cooperation, including coordination of actions, exchange of technologies, training of specialists, and coordination at the United Nations and other international organizations. Calling the deal “a milestone” in Russian-Iranian cyber cooperation, Iran’s Foreign Ministry that the agreement envisions “international cooperation including detection” of cyber intrusions and “coordination … to ensure national and international security.” This statement suggests that Moscow and Tehran may share intelligence about U.S. cyber operations, posing new challenges for U.S. Cyber Command as it seeks to “” against foreign cyber threats. Moreover, stronger Iranian defenses may complicate America’s ability to use to to Iranian aggression as the Trump administration did. Last week’s agreement follows a preliminary Russian-Iranian cyber in 2015, which the head of Iran’s Civil Defense Organization was necessary because the two countries face common enemies in cyberspace. In 2017, Moscow and Tehran signed a for cooperation on ICT-related issues, including “internet governance, network security,” and “international internet connection.” Under the new agreement, Tehran stated, the two countries will cooperate against “crimes committed with the use of” ICT, which these authoritarian regimes define as including political dissent. As with Tehran-Beijing on Iran’s national internet, Tehran will likely seek to learn from Moscow’s efforts to develop the Russian and so-called “.” The latter is designed to expand Moscow’s capabilities and enable it to “” connections to the global internet, which Russian President Vladimir Putin has “a CIA project.” During 2019 and 2020 group on ICT cooperation, for example, Moscow offered to help Iran emulate Russia’s project, which allows authorities to track citizens through technologies such as facial recognition — something Moscow specifically offered to provide to Iran. Tehran will also likely seek insights — and potentially technology — from Russia as both nations seek to reduce their dependence on Western technology. In 2016, the countries to cooperate on “demonopolizing software” to end “unilateral Western domination” in the field. For example, Iran may be interested in a Russian to Windows and in Russia’s “MyOffice” product, which for local data storage. In 2017, Moscow to provide Tehran with Russian servers built on Russian processors. The new agreement also builds on existing collaboration in the information sphere. In 2018, at Tehran’s , the two sides established a bilateral committee on media cooperation, aimed at combating what Tehran’s delegation head has Western “media terrorism.” The works on issues such as exchanges of journalists, mutual provision of favorable media coverage, of content, Western media , and media targeting foreign audiences. Russia has also provided the Iranians with in new media platforms and . Additionally, and disinformation and global communications have converged since the COVID-19 crisis began. In August 2020, that convergence culminated in a Russian-Iranian to counter what Russia’s Foreign Ministry called “increasing information pressure from the West” designed “to discredit Russia and Iran,” as well as alleged Western discrimination against Russian and Iranian media abroad. For Russia, last week’s agreement is part of a broader effort that has seen Moscow sign over 30 international agreements and at least 50 international agreements since 2014. These agreements often involve countries Moscow sees as areas of historical Russian influence or as vulnerable to Western interference. As analysts at the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) have , Moscow uses these deals to expand its human and institutional networks, cultivate Russia’s image as a trustworthy information security partner, and promote Kremlin-friendly outlets, narratives, and global information security norms while countering perceived Western “digital neocolonialism” and destabilization. The ISW analysts warn that Moscow may also seek to enhance Russia’s cyberattack capabilities by expanding its access to foreign cyber infrastructure and systems. also Russia’s push at the to authoritarian- rules and of state control of the internet. Similar efforts are underway at the (SCO), where Iran holds observer status and has for increased cooperation against “cyber terrorism” stemming from foreign social media networks. Russia and Iran also both in the Russia-based Caspian Media Forum, established in 2015 to discussion on issues such as combating “imposed external values alien to” regional countries. To counter authoritarian corruption of internet norms and to cooperate with allies and partners to hold malicious hackers accountable, “well-resourced and persistent diplomatic efforts” are essential, as the congressionally mandated Cyberspace Solarium Commission in its March 2020 report. During his confirmation hearing, Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin that from the Pentagon’s perspective “it is absolutely important that the State Department be resourced adequately.” Indeed, U.S. Cyber Command chief Gen. Paul Nakasone has that U.S. cyber “capabilities are meant to complement, not replace” diplomacy and other tools of U.S. statecraft. To date, however, the State Department’s efforts have fallen short. Both the (GAO) and have the State Department’s for its poor interagency coordination and inefficiency. In a report released last week, the GAO that as currently structured, the State Department may not be able to “effectively set priorities and allocate appropriate resources to achieve its intended goals.” Given this assessment as well as the expanding cooperation among U.S. adversaries, the Biden administration and Congress should work together to better resource and organize the State Department to defend U.S. values and interests in cyberspace.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Iran-Russia Relations › 2NC UQ/Link Toolbox › 2NC – UQ – Cyber
Weschler 21 Omree Wechsler is a senior researcher at the Yuval Ne'eman Workshop for Science, Technology, and Security at Tel Aviv University.
This January, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and his Iranian counterpart Javad Zarif signed a cooperation on cybersecurity and information and communications technology (ICT). The agreement cybersecurity cooperation, technology transfer, combined training, and coordination at multilateral forums, like the United Nations. Although the cooperation with Moscow outlined in the agreement could Tehran’s offensive cyber capabilities, the agreement is largely defensive, motivated by the countries’ shared toward the United States and U.S. influence in the Middle East as well as a desire to reduce dependence on Western technology. There are limits, however, to how closely the two sides can be expected to work together. The relationship between Russia and Iran has long suffered from mutual suspicion, ideological differences, and competition. Moreover, in the past, Russian and Iranian operators have operated at cross purposes. For example, in October 2019, British and U.S. officials that the Russian threat actor had Iranian hacking infrastructure as part of a false-flag operation. Due to suspicion and conflicting objectives, Cyber cooperation between Moscow and Tehran is likely to be focused on intelligence sharing and improving cyber defenses, rather than sharing offensive capabilities. Nonetheless, the agreement could pose four challenges to U.S. cyber operations. First, Russia could help Iran obtain stronger cyber defense systems. Harvard’s Belfer Center’s [PDF] lists Iran as the lowest-scoring nation for cyber defense capabilities, with Russia ranked in the middle of the countries surveyed. If Tehran addresses these defensive deficiencies with the help of Russian technology and training, it could make U.S. initiatives like [PDF] more challenging and costly. Second, Iran-Russia cyber cooperation could entail Russian cyber teams deploying to Iran to monitor Iranian networks in order to collect insights and identify U.S. malware, similar to U.S. Cyber Command’s “” operations. Acquiring and analyzing Cyber Command or National Security Agency hacking tools and techniques could help improve Russian and Iranian defenses, thwart future U.S. cyber operations, and force U.S. hackers to develop new exploits sooner than they hoped. Third, if able to access Iranian defense systems, Russian hackers could acquire and reverse engineer U.S. or Israeli malware that has been used against Iran. This occurred with the Stuxnet worm, which targeted Iran’s nuclear facilities in 2010 and was attributed to the United States and Israel. Since then, numerous cyber actors have developed over pieces of malware that used Stuxnet’s blueprint to target organizations around the world. Stuxnet eventually infected thousands of networks globally, so hackers had access to lots of samples, but an attack that did not become as widely known could still be repurposed if Russia is able to access Iranian networks. Fourth, technologies and techniques that Iran acquires from Russia could be provided to Iran’s proxies around the Middle East, including Hezbollah and militias in Iraq and Yemen. Some of these groups have already shown considerable hacking capabilities. In January, security firm ClearSky that a Hezbollah-affiliated hacking group named Lebanese Cedar was involved in an extensive campaign that targeted telecoms and internet service providers in the United States, Europe, and Middle East. Equipping Iranian proxies with advanced Russian cyber capabilities could allow them to threaten government agencies, businesses, and U.S. operations in the Middle East. It could also hamper investigations into cyber operations conducted by Iranian proxies and lead to misattributing them to Russia, possibly causing unintended escalation. Although the agreement between Moscow and Tehran could pose challenges for U.S. cyber strategy, some of its disruptive implications can be mitigated. To minimize the risk of their hacking tools being repurposed for use against them, the United States and its allies should establish a unified vulnerability disclosure mechanism to share vulnerabilities, including those that have already been exploited, with each other and vendors. While the United States already has a , other allies seem to have only varying degrees of similar processes, if at all. Because victims are likely to patch vulnerabilities once they’ve been targeted, the attacking country can disclose the vulnerabilities it used after they’ve been exploited without weakening its offensive capabilities. Furthermore, the United States could promote the responsible development of offensive capabilities by adding to prevent them from being analyzed by adversaries. These modules have been as part of highly sophisticated malware campaigns in the past and are designed to overwrite their own file data in order to prevent forensic analysis. Bottom of Form Establishing a standardized vulnerabilities disclosure mechanism could take place as part of a broader effort to strengthen intelligence sharing and security ties between the United States, Israel, the Gulf States, and possibly other actors in the region. As cyber cooperation between Russia and Iran grows, leaving it unchallenged could pose new threats to U.S. security and strategy in the Middle East.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Iran-Russia Relations › 2NC UQ/Link Toolbox › 2NC – UQ – Sanctions
Adam Kredo 7/7, a senior writer reporting on national security and foreign policy matters for the Washington Free Beacon. An award-winning political reporter who has broken news from across the globe, Kredo’s work has been featured in the Wall Street Journal, the Weekly Standard, Commentary Magazine, the Drudge Report, and the Jerusalem Post, among many others. , 7/7/2022, “Iran and Russia Expand ‘Sanctions Busting’ Network,” , RES
Trade between Russia and Iran has topped $4.5 billion as the two regimes integrate their economies to create a network capable of evading U.S. and international sanctions. Russia is making major investments in Iran's ports, nuclear infrastructure, energy sector, and military machine. Iran's deputy roads and urban development minister, Shahriar Afandizadeh, this week valued this trade at $4.5 billion. Tehran and Moscow also recently inked an economic deal to carry some 10 million tons of goods from Russia into Iran through a land corridor. This deal "puts emphasis on transit in addition to imports and exports," according to a summary of Afandizadeh's comments published Wednesday in the country’s state-controlled press. This relationship helps to keep Moscow afloat as international sanctions cripple Russia's economy as a result of its war in Ukraine. Members of Congress and regional experts have warned for some time that Iran and Russia are ratcheting up relations to combat Western sanctions and boost each other's militaries. With the Biden administration's diplomacy aimed at securing a revamped version of the 2015 nuclear accord, warnings have swirled on Capitol Hill that a new deal will create a "sanctions evasion hub for Vladimir Putin based in Iran," the Washington Free Beacon reported. Iran, Russia, and China also are slated to hold a series of major war drills in Latin America next month, highlighting the emphasis these countries place on combatting the United States in its own backyard. Iran also recently announced that it will boost exports to Russia, including "construction materials," with an estimated worth of $3 billion. The total amount of trade between Iran and Russia last year totaled around $2.5 billion, signaling that in the year since, trade between the countries has increased significantly. Russian companies also stand to cash in on a new nuclear deal with Iran. Several of Russia's top state-controlled nuclear companies would receive billions of dollars in revenue once sanctions are waived as part of a new agreement. Iran has reportedly already paid Russia more than $500 million for its work building out Iran's nuclear plants. If a nuclear deal is inked, Iran and Russia will be free to continue building nuclear sites. Sanctioned Russia ships also have been caught in recent months ferrying illicit Iranian oil, providing both regimes with financial lifelines. At least two Russian tankers sanctioned as part of U.S. efforts to isolate Russian businesses were seen carrying illicit Iranian oil from various ports. This type of sanctions-busting scheme is also employed between Iran and China. Behnam Ben Taleblu, an Iran expert at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies think tank, said that Russia is learning sanctions evasion techniques from its ally Iran. "Russia, which is now under increasing sanctions due to its invasion of Ukraine, stands to learn a lot from the Islamic Republic in the sanctions busting space," he said. "Therefore, the value of Russo-Iranian collaboration will not just be quantitative as represented by the volume or value of trade, but qualitative, namely the industries as well as what contacts are made and experiences gained." "The longer Russia's invasion and war against Ukraine continues, the deeper its embrace of actors like the Islamic Republic, who are used to operating outside or abusing formal financial networks, will be," Ben Taleblu said.