2022
Michigan
Counterplan
EU-Russia Relations › 2NC UQ/Link Toolbox › 2NC – UQ
Carment and Belo 22 (David Carment and Dani Belo; "The war in Ukraine shows it’s time for a new way to ensure security in Europe", 6-16-2022, Carleton Newsroom, https://newsroom.carleton.ca/story/ukraine-war-ensure-european-security/, DOA: 7-17-2022)//sposten
The ongoing political and military standoff between Russia and the United States is the most recent indicator that Europe’s security and economic architecture must be transformed to harmonize European and Russian strategic interests.
In other words, the path toward ending the war in Ukraine requires focusing on the security priorities of those who have the most to gain from a diplomatic solution — European nations, not the U.S. Peaceful co-existence is dependent upon successful negotiations among European capitals and Moscow.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
EU-Russia Relations › 2NC UQ/Link Toolbox › 2NC – UQ
Menon 22 (Rajan Menon is the Anne and Bernard Spitzer Professor of International Relations at the Powell School, City College of New York, and a nonresident fellow at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft. He is the author, most recently, of The Conceit of Humanitarian Intervention, June 29, 2022, “How Will the War in Ukraine End?”, https://www.thenation.com/article/world/ukraine-russia-war-end/)
Before the war, Putin pushed for a neutral Ukraine that would foreswear all military alliances. No dice, said both Ukraine and NATO. That alliance’s decision, at its 2008 Bucharest summit, to open the door to that country (and Georgia) was irrevocable. A month after the Russian invasion began, Zelensky put neutrality on the table, but it was too late. Putin had already opted to achieve his aims on the battlefield and was confident he could. Still, Russia and Ukraine have now been fighting for more than three months. Both have suffered heavy losses and each knows that the war could drag on for years at a staggering cost without either achieving its aims. The Russian president does control additional chunks of Ukrainian territory, but he may hope to find some way of easing Western sanctions and also avoiding being wholly dependent on China. These circumstances might revive the neutrality option. Russia would retain its land corridor to Crimea, even if with some concessions to Ukraine. It would receive a guarantee that the water canals flowing southward to that peninsula from the city of Kherson, which would revert to Ukrainian control, would never again be blocked. Russia would not annex the “republics” it created in the Donbas in 2014 and would withdraw from some of the additional land it’s seized there. Ukraine would be free to receive arms and military training from any country, but foreign troops and bases would be banned from its territory. Such a settlement would require significant Ukrainian sacrifices, which is why candidate membership in the European Union (EU) and, more importantly, a fast track to full membership—one of that country’s key aspirations—as well as substantial long-term Western aid for economic reconstruction would be a necessary part of any deal. Expediting its membership would be a heavy lift for the EU and such an aid package would be costly to the Europeans and Americans, so they’d have to decide how much they were willing to offer to end Europe’s biggest conflict since World War II.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
EU-Russia Relations › 2NC UQ/Link Toolbox › 2NC – UQ
Charles A. Kupchan, 6-15-22 https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2022/06/15/negotiating-to-end-the-ukraine-war-isnt-appeasement-00039798
As the war in Ukraine grinds through its fourth month, defiant Ukrainians continue to bloody Russian’s invasion force. The United States and its allies are backstopping Ukraine’s staunch defense of its territory through a steady inflow of weapons. The goal, as President Joe Biden put it in a recent essay in the , is “to work to strengthen Ukraine and support its efforts to achieve a negotiated end to the conflict.” A negotiated end to the conflict is the right goal — and one that needs to arrive sooner rather than later. Ukraine likely lacks the combat power to expel Russia from all of its territory, and the momentum on the battlefield is shifting in Russia’s favor. The longer this conflict continues, the greater the death and destruction, the more severe the disruptions to the global economy and the food supply, and the higher the risk of escalation to full-scale war between Russia and NATO. Transatlantic unity is starting to fray, with France, Germany, Italy and other allies uneasy about the prospect of a prolonged war — especially against the backdrop of rising inflation. But if Biden is serious about facilitating negotiations, he needs to do a better job of laying the political groundwork and shaping a narrative that prioritizes arriving at a diplomatic endgame. There is still too much , with U.S. arms flowing to Ukraine “so that it can,” in the , “repel Russian aggression and fully defend its independence and sovereignty.” Meanwhile, , not surprisingly, that “victory will be ours” and to “defend every meter of our land.” And Biden, even as he makes mention of the need for diplomacy, has so far been unwilling to caution Kyiv against those aims, instead affirming “I will not pressure the Ukrainian government — in private or public — to make any territorial concessions.” “We’re not going to tell the Ukrainians how to negotiate, what to negotiate and when to negotiate,” Colin Kahl, the undersecretary of defense for policy, . “They’re going to set those terms for themselves.” But Washington has not only a right to discuss war aims with Kyiv, but also an obligation. This conflict arguably represents the most dangerous geopolitical moment since the Cuban missile crisis. A hot war is raging between a nuclear-armed Russia and a NATO-armed Ukraine, with NATO territory abutting the conflict zone. This war could define the strategic and economic contours of the 21st century, possibly opening an era of militarized rivalry between the world’s liberal democracies and an autocratic bloc anchored by Russia and China. These stakes necessitate direct U.S. engagement in determining when and how this war ends. Instead of offering arms with no strings attached — effectively leaving strategy up to the Ukrainians — Washington needs to launch a forthright discussion about war termination with allies, with Kyiv, and ultimately, with Moscow. To prepare the ground for that pivot, the Biden administration should stop making claims that could tie its own hands at the negotiating table. Biden insists that the West must “make it clear that might does not make right.” Otherwise, “it will send a message to other would-be aggressors that they too can seize territory and subjugate other countries. It will put the survival of other peaceful democracies at risk. And it could mark the end of the rules-based international order.” Really? Russia has illegally held Crimea and occupied a chunk of Donbas since 2014. But the rules-based international order has not come to an end; indeed, it has performed admirably in punishing Russia for its new round of aggression against Ukraine. Washington should avoid painting itself into a corner by predicting catastrophe if Russia remains in control of a slice of Ukraine when the fighting stops. Such forecasts make compromise more difficult — and risk magnifying the geopolitical impact of whatever territorial gains Russia may salvage. The claim that Vladimir Putin will end his trouble-making only if he is decisively defeated in Ukraine is another fallacious argument that distorts debate and stands in the way of diplomacy. Writing in The Atlantic, calls for the “humiliation” of Putin and insists that “the defeat, sidelining, or removal of Putin is the only outcome that offers any long-term stability in Ukraine and the rest of Europe.” Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin “to the degree that it can’t do the kinds of things that it has done in invading Ukraine.” But this is wishful thinking, not strategic sobriety. Putin is poised to remain in power for the foreseeable future. He will be a troublemaker no matter how this war ends; flexing his geopolitical muscle and burnishing his nationalist credentials are the primary sources of his domestic legitimacy. Furthermore, humiliating Putin is risky business; he could well be more reckless with his back up against the wall than if he can claim victory by taking another bite out of Ukraine. The West has learned to live with and contain Putin for the past two decades — and will likely continue to have to do so into the next. Finally, Biden needs to start weaning mainstream debate away from the false equation of diplomacy with appeasement. When Henry Kissinger recently proposed in Davos that Ukraine may need to make territorial concessions to end the war, : “It seems that Mr. Kissinger’s calendar is not 2022, but 1938, and he thought he was talking to an audience not in Davos, but in Munich of that time.” Biden himself asserts that “It would be wrong and contrary to well-settled principles” to counsel Ukraine on potential concessions at the negotiating table. But strategic prudence should not be mistaken for appeasement. It is in Ukraine’s own self-interest to avoid a conflict that festers for years and instead negotiate a ceasefire and follow-on process aimed at concluding a territorial settlement. The United States, its NATO allies, Russia, and the rest of the world have an interest in securing this same outcome — precisely why it is now time for Biden to set the negotiating table.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
EU-Russia Relations › 2NC UQ/Link Toolbox › 2NC – UQ
Matina Stevis – Gridneff and Michael Schwirtz, 7-13-2022, “After Ukraine – Russia Meeting, U.N sees ‘a Ray of Hope’ to Free Grain,
BRUSSELS — Russian and Ukrainian negotiators met on Wednesday in an increasingly desperate effort to release huge stores of grain blocked by Russian warships, yielding what the United Nations secretary general called “a ray of hope” but no formal agreement that could alleviate rising world hunger. Wednesday’s meeting, held in Istanbul with U.N. representatives and military officials from Russia, Ukraine and Turkey, had raised hopes for a breakthrough. It ended with progress, the U.N. official said, but no comprehensive deal. “This was a first meeting, the progress was extremely encouraging. We hope that the next steps will allow us to come to a formal agreement,” said António Guterres, the secretary general, speaking to reporters in New York after the one-and-a-half hour meeting ended. “We still need a lot of good will by all parties,” he said, adding, “More technical work will now be needed to materialize today’s progress, but the momentum is clear.” Hulusi Akar, the Turkish defense minister who hosted the talks, said that Ukrainian and Russian negotiators would meet again in Istanbul next week, and that a coordination center with representatives from both sides would be set up there. Officials have tried for months to break the impasse over Ukrainian grain without triggering an escalation in the war or a direct confrontation between Russia and NATO. In interviews, more than half a dozen officials directly involved or briefed on the plans cited obstacles to an agreement that ranged from the mundane to the downright “Mission Impossible.” Proposed alternatives, such as moving the grain overland or through the Danube River, have been deemed too slow, cumbersome and small-scale, given that more than 22 million tons of grain are trapped in Odesa and other Black Sea ports blockaded by Russian warships. Failing to move the grain from ports and silos could begin to hamper the summer harvest, leaving farmers no place to store fresh crops. The war in Ukraine is already adding to a global food crisis that has sent the prices of vital commodities like wheat and barley to historic highs. The most immediate and consequential fallout is , where years of drought have devastated communities in Somalia and parts of neighboring countries. Ukraine, the world’s fourth-largest exporter of grains, is a key source for that region. Efforts to reach a diplomatic agreement have been hampered by problems that include mines in the Black Sea, arranging at-sea inspections of the cargo, and convincing the Kremlin that it has an interest in resolving the blockade. While officials were discussing the grain crisis in Istanbul, Ukraine’s military began to punch back on the battlefield in eastern Ukraine, striking bases and ammunition depots deep within Russian-occupied territory with the help of new, more powerful weapons provided by the West. Early Wednesday morning, a fireball lit up the sky over Luhansk, the capital of a Russian-held province in eastern Ukraine. Russian media reported that Ukraine’s military had hit an antiaircraft battery. That followed the destruction of six ammunition warehouses on Tuesday in Russian-controlled territories in southern and eastern Ukraine, according to Serhii Bratchuk, the spokesman for Odesa’s military administration. The strategy by Ukrainian forces was still in its early days, and it was not yet clear whether it was allowing them to disrupt Russian artillery attacks and offensive operations. Some Ukrainian officials argued that the Russians were being forced to move supply hubs farther from the front, a claim that could not be verified.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
EU-Russia Relations › 2NC UQ/Link Toolbox › 2NC – UQ
Jakob Augstein, 7-14-2022, "A European Call for an end to the Ukraine War," Just World Educational, https://justworldeducational.org/2022/07/a-european-call-for-an-end-to-the-ukraine-war/
Europe faces the task of restoring and securing peace on the continent. This requires the development of a strategy to end the Russian war in Ukraine as soon as possible. Ukraine has been able to defend itself against Russia’s brutal war of aggression for three and a half months now, partially thanks to massive economic sanctions and military support from Europe and the United States. However, the longer this support continues, the less clear it becomes which goals are being pursued with it. A Ukrainian victory with the recapture of all occupied territories, including the Donezk and Luhansk oblasts and Crimea, is considered unrealistic by most military experts, given Russia’s military superiority and ability to further escalate militarily. All western countries that provide military support to Ukraine must therefore ask themselves what their precise goal is and whether (and for how long) arms deliveries continue to be the right course of action. Continuing the war with the aim of Ukraine’s complete victory over Russia means that thousands more victims will die for a purpose that does not seem realistic. Moreover, the consequences of the war are no longer limited to Ukraine. Its continuation is causing massive humanitarian, economic, and environmental distress around the world. Rapidly rising prices, energy and food shortages have already led to unrest in many countries. Fertilizer shortages will have a global impact if the war lasts beyond the fall. High casualty rates, many deaths from hunger and disease and destabilization of the global situation are to be expected. Warnings of these dramatic consequences are also being issued at the international political level (G7, UN). All western countries must stand united against Russia’s aggression in Ukraine and further revanchist claims. However, prolonging the war in Ukraine is not the solution. The current developments surrounding rail transit to the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad and Putin’s announcement to deliver nuclear-capable missile systems to Belarus, show that the danger of escalation is increasing. The western countries must do anything they can to ensure that the war parties reach a negotiated settlement as soon as possible. This alone can prevent years of a war of attrition with its fatal local and global consequences, as well as a military escalation that could lead to the use of nuclear weapons. Negotiations does not mean a surrender of Ukraine, as is sometimes assumed. A dictated peace by Putin is not an option. The international community must do everything it can to create conditions under which negotiations are possible at all. This includes a declaration that the Western actors have no interest in continuing the war and will adjust their strategies accordingly. It also entails a willingness to secure the terms of a truce as well as the results of peace negotiations internationally, which may require a high level of commitment. The longer the war continues, the more international pressure will be necessary to get both sides back into negotiations. The West must make every effort to persuade the governments of Russia and Ukraine to suspend combat actions. Economic sanctions and military support have to be integrated into a political strategy aimed at gradual de-escalation until a ceasefire is fully implemented. So far, there has not been a joint and concentrated effort by the international community, the major Western players in particular, to seek negotiations. As long as this is not the case, it cannot be assumed that an understanding is impossible and that Putin in particular does not want to negotiate. In a deadlocked conflict, it is a standard practice that war parties have maximum demands or explicitly reject peace talks. The course of the negotiation attempts so far has shown some initial willingness on both sides to come to an understanding by a flexible approach to the attainment of their goals. At this point, only a major diplomatic offensive can lead out of the current impasse. The opening of negotiations is not a justification for war crimes. We share the desire for justice. Negotiations, however, are first and foremost a necessary means to prevent further suffering in Ukraine and adverse consequences of the war around the world. Considering the threat of humanitarian catastrophes and the manifest risks of escalation, stability must be restored as quickly as possible. Only a suspension of combat actions will create the time and opportunity necessary to do this. The supreme importance of this goal demands that we rise to the challenge and do everything in our power to make an early ceasefire and the start of peace negotiations possible – and refrain from doing anything that contradicts this goal.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
EU-Russia Relations › 1NC – EU Relations › 1NC – Famine Scenario
Agyemfra et. Al 11 (Francis Asiedu Agyemfra, Brigadier General (Rtd), former Chief of Staff and serving as Ghana’sambassador to the Republic of Liberia; Colin Essamuah, educated at Mfantsipim School, Ghana, the University of Ghana and the Johns Hopkins University in the USA, national service at the Department of History at the University of Ghana; Gifty Anin-Botwe, retired Commissioner of Police, Master’s degree in governance and leadership; Ken Ahorsu, research fellow and a lecturer in Conflict resolution and Peace Studies at the Legon Centre for International Affairs and Diplomacy; Erasmus Ndemole Migyikra, founder and a member of the West Africa Centre for Peace Studies, MA in Peace and Conflict Studies, LLM in International Crime and Justice (International Criminal Law), LLM in International Human Rights, and Humanitarian Law, Post Graduate Diploma in Law (GDL), LLB and Diploma in Social Administration; James J. Hentz, Professor and Chair of the Department of International Studies and Political Science at the Virginia Military Institute, PhD from the University of Pennsylvania; “Reflections on Security I;” Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung; https://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/ghana/10502.pdf; November 2011)//sposten
After the initial wave of military coups, political disturbances, including revolutions and violent secessionist attempts, leading to national insecurity and instability, have known no end in Africa. It is a matter of great regret that, because of these negative developments, Africa has become notorious for military interventions and political upheavals that have rocked the peace and developments of our respective countries. Somalia, Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo stand out today as African countries which have become epicentres of instability and scars on the conscience of the whole world.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
EU-Russia Relations › 1NC – EU Relations › 1NC – Famine Scenario
Glick 7, Middle East fellow at the Center for Security Policy, Condi’s African holiday,http://www.carolineglick.com/e/2007/12/condis-african-holiday.php?pf=yes
The Horn of Africa is a dangerous and strategically vital place. Small wars, which rage continuously, can easily escalate into big wars. Local conflicts have regional and global aspects. All of the conflicts in this tinderbox, which controls shipping lanes from the Indian Ocean into the Red Sea, can potentially give rise to regional, and indeed global conflagrations between competing regional actors and global powers.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
EU-Russia Relations › 1NC – EU Relations › 1NC – Famine Scenario
Adams 7/15 (Mubarak Adams, Department of Political Science, University of Ghana; “THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE RUSSIAN-UKRAINE WAR THREATENS GLOBAL PEACE: AN EXAMINATION,” Research Gate, 7/15/2022)//sposten
Food insecurity in Africa As the war in Ukraine affects global food security; nevertheless, Africa is the worst impacted. Globally, Russia and Ukraine are key commodity producers; but, as a result of the war, global commodity prices have skyrocketed, notably for oil and natural gas. Russia and Ukraine account for up to 30% of world wheat exports (Ashby & Mutah, 2022). The war has increased food shortages, blocked global wheat supply, and forced the price raise of food, particularly in African nations that rely on Russia and Ukraine, this should serve as a wake-up call (IMF,2022; World Bank, 2022; Ashby & Mutah, 2022). The contribution of these two nations to agriculture is enormous; nevertheless, the conflict has reduced worldwide fertilizer supplies, resulting in low yields (WTO, 2022). Sacko and Mayaki (2022), declare that Russia and Ukraine, both known as the world's breadbasket, are important actors in the sale of wheat and sunflower to Africa. North Africa (Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, and Tunisia), Nigeria in West Africa, Ethiopia and Sudan in East Africa, and South Africa account for 80 percent of wheat imports. Wheat consumption in Africa is expected to reach 76.5 million tonnes by 2025, with 48.3 million tonnes, or 63.4 percent, imported from outside the continent. According to (UN, 2022; Ashby, and Mutah, 2022), Africa bought $4 billion in agricultural items from Russia and $3 billion from Ukraine, respectively. Due to the fighting, over 20 million people in the Sahel and West African regions lack access to adequate food (UN, 2022; Ashby & Mutah, 2022). Ashby and Mutah (2022), avow that some African nations, notably Senegal, Cameroon, Kenya, and Ghana, rely substantially on importing phosphorus and potassium fertilizer from Russia. However, as a result of the heavy economic sanctions imposed on Russia, Russia's capacity to sell fertilizer abroad has plummeted. In this view, the World Trade Organization (2022), avers that 35 African nations buy food, and 22 import fertilizer from Ukraine, Russia, or both. Some people rely significantly on both nations for critical necessities like wheat. Because of the war, Ukraine's ports remain closed, preventing existing grain supplies from being exported, and in the absence of a quick truce that allows farmers to return to fields, the interruption to spring planting will drastically reduce future production. Africa and the Middle East are the most susceptible regions since they rely on Ukraine and/or Russia for more than half of their cereal requirements (WTO, 2022). Ellyatt (2022), also asserts that with the conflict in Ukraine, global food security is jeopardized. Russia and Ukraine export more than 60 percent of the world's sunflower oil production. Because these two countries produce over 70 percent of global agricultural commodities, any disruption in supply affects pricing. Sub-Saharan Africa is caught in the crossfire of this conflict because the region's governments are yet to deal with the shocks of the destruction of Covid-19 (Ibid). According to records, 85 percent of the region's grains, primarily wheat, are imported from Europe, with one-third coming from Russia and Ukraine. The result is that tensions in the region will rise as food prices soar high (Ibid).
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
EU-Russia Relations › 1NC – EU Relations › 1NC – Famine Scenario
Strupczewski 22 (Jan Strupczewski; "No more EU sanctions on Russia needed, negotiations better option -Hungary", 6-23-2022, Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/no-more-eu-sanctions-russia-needed-negotiations-better-option-hungary-2022-06-23/, DOA: 7-17-2022)//sposten
BRUSSELS, June 23 (Reuters) - The European Union should stop adding sanctions on Russia over its invasion of Ukraine and instead push for a ceasefire and the start of negotiations, a senior aide to Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban said on Thursday.
Speaking on the sidelines of a summit of EU leaders which granted Ukraine the status of a candidate to become a member of the EU, the aide said the more sanctions the EU adopted the more they hurt the bloc, while Russia survived.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
EU-Russia Relations › 1NC – EU Relations › 1NC – Famine Scenario
Stevis-Gridneff and Schwirtz 7/13 (Matina Stevis-Gridneff, Brussels bureau chief for The New York Times, covering the European Union. She joined The Times after covering East Africa and previously Europe for The Wall Street Journal; and Michael Schwirtz, investigative reporter with the International desk. With The Times since 2006, he previously covered the countries of the former Soviet Union from Moscow and was a lead reporter on a team that won the 2020 Pulitzer Prize for articles about Russian intelligence operations; "After Ukraine-Russia Meeting, U.N. Sees ‘a Ray of Hope’ to Free Grain", 7-13-2022, New York Times, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/07/13/world/europe/ukraine-grain-negotiations.html, DOA: 7-17-2022)//sposten
BRUSSELS — Russian and Ukrainian negotiators met on Wednesday in an increasingly desperate effort to release huge stores of grain blocked by Russian warships, yielding what the United Nations secretary general called “a ray of hope” but no formal agreement that could alleviate rising world hunger.
Wednesday’s meeting, held in Istanbul with U.N. representatives and military officials from Russia, Ukraine and Turkey, had raised hopes for a breakthrough. It ended with progress, the U.N. official said, but no comprehensive deal.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Central Europe-Russia Relations › AFF Answers › 2AC – Ukraine Thumper
Brix 2-24 [Emil; the Director of the Diplomatische Akademie Wien – Vienna School of International Studies since 2017. After joining the Austrian diplomatic service in 1982, Mr. Brix worked as political secretary for the parliamentary group of the Austrian People’s Party. In 1986, he was appointed Head of Cabinet at the Ministry of Science and Research. From 1990 until 1995, he served as Austrian Consul General in Cracow, Poland. Subsequently, he was Director of the Austrian Cultural Institute in London, a position he held for four years. In 2002, Mr. Brix was appointed Director-General of Foreign Cultural Policy at the Ministry for European and International Affairs of Austria. After serving five years as the Austrian Ambassador to the UK from 2010-15, he became Austrian Ambassador to the Russian Federation in 2015. He is deputy chairman of the Institute for the Danube Region and Central Europe and member of the governing board of the Austrian Research Association. He holds a PhD from the University of Vienna and was awarded by the University of Drohobytsch, Ukraine and by the University of Cluj-Napoca, Romania. He is an alumnus of the Diplomatische Akademie Wien and published numerous books and articles on Austrian and European history of the 19th and 20th century; 2-24-2022; "Interview with Ambassador Emil Brix"; Central European Network for Teaching and Research in Academic Liaison; https://central-network.eu/news-events/interview-with-ambassador-emil-brix/; Accessed 7-16-2022; RL😊]
Ambassador Brix, February 24, 2022 marked a change in Europe's relations with Russia. Before that, there was a period of economic integration and a hope for peaceful, prosperous neighbourly relations. This hope seems to have been destroyed. How do you see the further development of Europe's relations with Russia?
February 24 was a decisive turning point in the relations between Europe and Russia. The reason for this was that it marked the destruction of the hope that through close cooperation – between universities, civil society, but also economic partners – we could achieve a reasonable relationship between Russia and Europe. The war of aggression is proof that one side does not want that. Therefore, we have to assume that a rather impenetrable new wall is being created here in Europe between Russia and the rest of Europe. And this also raises the question: what does this mean for Central Europe, for those states that are relatively recent members of the European Union, that have had decades of experience with communism, with the Soviet Union? To what extent have these countries now become a region in Europe that can, on the one hand, help us to understand what's going on; and on the other hand, actually help us defend what European values are?
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Central Europe-Russia Relations › AFF Answers › 2AC – Cyber Thumper
Hakmeh & Naylor 3-7 [Joyce; a senior research fellow for the International Security Programme at Chatham House; Esther; a research analyst at the International Security Programme; 3-7-2022; "How the tech community has rallied to Ukraine’s cyber-defence"; Guardian; https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2022/mar/07/tech-community-rallied-ukraine-cyber-defence-eu-nato; Accessed 7-19-2022; RL]
In response to the Russian threat, there have been unprecedented efforts by private and government entities – and even individuals – to support Ukraine’s cyber resilience.
Responding to cyber-attacks and building national cyber resilience has never been – and will never be – the sole responsibility of governments. It requires a whole-of-society approach grounded in international cooperation efforts. For the first time since its inception, the EU rapid cyber response team, with capabilities to detect and respond to a variety of threats, and headed by Lithuania, was deployed to help defend against cyber-attacks targeting Ukraine. The Romanian national cybersecurity agency and a cybersecurity company called Bitdefender launched a public-private partnership to provide pro bono technical support and threat intelligence to Ukraine’s government, businesses and citizens for “as long as it is necessary”. NATO, which has been working for a number of years with Ukraine to increase its cyber defences, signed an agreement a few weeks before the invasion aimed at enhancing cyber cooperation with Ukraine.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Central Europe-Russia Relations › AFF Answers › 2AC – China Thumper
McCarthy 6-30 [Simone; correspondent for China for CNN Digital Worldwide; 6-30-2022; "Europe sees China through a Russian lens, and Beijing is not happy"; CNN; https://www.cnn.com/2022/06/29/china/china-nato-g7-russia-ukraine-intl-hnk-mic/index.html; Accessed 7-16-2022; RL😊]
China’s concerns have been clear this week, as its Foreign Ministry pushed back on the NATO designation in regular scheduled press briefings. “China pursues an independent foreign policy of peace. It does not interfere in other countries’ internal affairs or export ideology, still less engage in long-arm jurisdiction, economic coercion or unilateral sanctions. How could China be labeled a ‘systemic challenge’?” ministry spokesperson Zhao Lijian said on Tuesday. “We solemnly urge NATO to immediately stop spreading false and provocative statements against China,” he said, adding that NATO should “stop seeking to disrupt Asia and the whole world after it has disrupted Europe.” But that rhetoric – blaming NATO for “disruption” in Europe – is part of what is driving a shift in European perspectives, analysts say, as Beijing has refused to condemn Russia’s actions in Ukraine, including the killing of civilians, while actively blaming the US and NATO for provoking Moscow. China “very quickly and very clearly lined itself up – at least in words, not so much in deeds – with Russia,” while transatlantic partners came together against Russia and in support of Ukraine in the wake of the invasion, said Pepijn Bergsen, a research fellow in the Europe Program at the Chatham House think tank in London. The contrast between the two has helped drive an emerging “democracies versus autocracies” narrative in Europe, he said, adding that internal politics also play a role. “In Eastern and Central Europe, where Russia is regarded as by far the number one security threat, relations (with China) had already been starting to fray, but the fact that China so clearly lined up with Russia has accelerated a shift,” Bergsen said. China, for its part, appears to have underestimated the extent to which its stance would reverberate through its relationship with Europe, one that was already on shaky ground following European concerns over alleged human rights abuses in Xinjiang, erosion of freedoms in Hong Kong and China’s economic targeting of Lithuania over the Baltic nation’s relations with Taiwan.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Central Europe-Russia Relations › AFF Answers › 2AC – UQ
Strozewski 6-29 [Zoe; correspondent at Newsweek, citing Defense Secretary Lloyd J. Austin III; 6-29-2022; "U.S. establishing permanent troops in Poland amid fears of NATO-Russia war"; Newsweek; https://www.newsweek.com/us-establishing-permanent-troops-poland-amid-fears-nato-russia-war-1720384; Accessed 7-19-2022; RL]
The U.S. will station its first permanent forces on NATO's Eastern flank, U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd J. Austin III announced Wednesday, as fears mount over a potential war between Russia and the 30-member alliance.
In a Twitter thread detailing several new commitments from U.S. President Joe Biden to bolster security in Europe, Austin said that the V Corps Headquarters Forward Command Post, an Army garrison headquarters and a field support battalion will be stationed in Poland, which shares a border with non-NATO member Russia.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Central Europe-Russia Relations › AFF Answers › 2AC – UQ
Wigura & Kuisz ’22 [Karolina; sociologist and historian of ideas; Jaroslaw; a political analyst who is writing a book about Poland’s illiberal turn; 3-25-2022; "America Thinks the War Is About Ukraine. Russia’s Neighbors Disagree."; NYTimes; https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/25/opinion/nato-russia-poland-europe.html; Accessed 7-8-2022; RL]
WARSAW — The symbolism was striking. On March 12, two weeks into Russia’s brutal bombardment of Ukraine, the leaders of France and Germany held a joint call with President Vladimir Putin. Just days later, three prime ministers from post-Communist Europe — Polish, Czech and Slovenian — traveled to Kyiv by train, despite the danger.
This divergence exposed a sharp divide in how Eastern and Western NATO member states view the war in Ukraine. For Western countries, not least the United States, the conflict is a disaster for the people of Ukraine — but one whose biggest danger is that it might spill over the Ukrainian border, setting off a global conflict.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Central Europe-Russia Relations › AFF Answers › 2AC – UQ
Tůma ’22 [Petr; visiting fellow at the Atlantic Council's Europe Center, a Czech career diplomat with an expertise on Europe, Middle East and transatlantic relations, previously worked at the Czech Embassy in Washington, DC, posted as a Deputy Chief of the Czech Embassy in war-torn Syria and held the same position in Ramallah; 3-30-2022; "Central Europe leads the way in backing Ukraine. Here’s its game plan for what’s next."; Atlantic Council; https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/central-europe-leads-the-way-in-backing-ukraine-heres-its-game-plan-for-whats-next/; Accessed 7-8-2022; RL]
As the West scrambles to maintain its united front against Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the European Union (EU) member states of Central and Eastern Europe have led the way as some of the continent’s loudest moral voices, sending arms and humanitarian aid to Ukraine while receiving streams of refugees.
But while neighboring Poland has perhaps been most visible—hosting both US President Joe Biden and Vice President Kamala Harris in recent weeks while absorbing more than two million refugees—geography isn’t the only factor that determines who is a frontline state.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Central Europe-Russia Relations › 2NC Impact Toolbox › 2NC – Yes Russian Hostility
Freire ’12 [Maria Raquel; researcher at the Centre for Social Studies and professor of International Relations at the Faculty of Economics of the University of Coimbra, Ph.D. at the University of Kent; 2012; "Russia at the Borders of Central Europe: Changing Dynamics in Foreign Policy Relations"; SpringerLink; https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1057/9781137283450_7; Accessed 7-19-2022; RL]
7.1 Introduction Since 1989, Central Europe1 has seen substantial reforms, which included its countries’ membership in the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which signalled a posture on its part in which they distanced themselves from decades of subordination to the Soviet Union. Meanwhile, in the Russian Federation, a strong regime has been consolidating in order to reassert the Russian Federation’s status in a post-Soviet context. This process, of course, includes the redefinition of the official Russian politics towards its (new) neighbourhood, including Central Europe. Looking at the interconnections that resulted from post-Cold War developments, the foreign policy changes that have taken place in Central Europe and the Russian Federation have allowed for the distinct dynamics that this chapter seeks to explore. It starts by setting down the evolving context of Russian foreign policy. It looks at the definition of Russia’s multi-vectoral2 and pragmatic policy and the strengthening of the multipolar international order as two factors that constitute the main axis for understanding the projection of Russia’s goals in its neighbouring areas. The analysis of the Russian Federation’s relations with Central European states is then pursued in the broader framing of the integration processes of these countries in NATO and the EU, and the Russian Federation’s own shaping of relations with these multilateral organizations. The analysis follows the identification of three factors that are central to the understanding of the Russian Federation’s policies towards Central Europe: the course of political reform and institutional capacity building; the redefinition of security and defence alignments after the end of the Warsaw Pact and the Cold War rivalry; and energy security as an essential factor in the redefinition of relations. These factors highlight different approaches to common issues, suggesting the need for a careful management of challenges and opportunities, as will be analysed later in the chapter. The chapter argues that, despite difficulties at both the level of the EU–Russian Federation and NATO–Russia relations and the bilateral level of Russia’s relations with Central European countries, the current state of affairs points to an increased trend in cooperation between the Russian Federation and Central Europe. It should be noted, however, that this cooperative trend does not do away with the Cold War rhetoric, which is still very much present (as will be shown below); traditional ‘issues’ still play a considerable role in the shaping and making of policies and actions both in the Russian Federation and in Central European states. 7.2 Russian Federation foreign policy: multi-vectoral and pragmatic The first post-Cold War decade allowed for a clarification of the Russian Federation’s foreign policy objectives which resulted from various adjustments that the process of transition from Soviet times demanded. In the proWestern context of the period after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, President Boris Yeltsin proclaimed the Russian Federation as a natural ally of Europe and pursued Russia’s integration into European institutions on the basis of the belief, as expressed by the first Russian foreign minister Andrei Kozyrev, that there were ‘neither potential adversaries nor military threats to Russian interests’ in Europe (Thorun 2009: 29). This posture also implied an inward-driven approach towards the domestic transition process in which relations with the former satellites to the West were not prioritized. ‘The story of relations between Russia and the East-Central European countries in the nineties was the story of Russia’s departure from the region’ (Póti 2007: 118). During the second term of Boris Yeltsin’s presidency, in the face of the Central European states’ integration into Euro-Atlantic structures, the Russian Federation’s policy has evolved from one of ‘indifference’ to one of ‘engagement’. Many concerns were voiced in the Russian Federation regarding the impact of expanding NATO towards its borders, including concerns about the status and protection of borders in the face of an alliance that, according to Russian sources, had transformed itself from a defensive into an offensive alliance (Yugoslavia in 1995 and 1999) (Karaganov 2011: 7; Krastev et al. 2009: 57). Also, there was the predicted economic impact that the membership of the Central European countries in the EU was expected to have on the Russian economy, which would consist of a decrease in trade indicators along with new formalities that would have implications for the openness of the Central European markets to Russian products.3 Arguably, though, the NATO enlargement is a much more delicate issue for Russian foreign policymakers.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Central Europe-Russia Relations › 2NC Impact Toolbox › 2NC – Ext Russia Probing
Zuesse 6/21 (Eric Zuesse, “The War America Is Waging Against Europe,” Modern Diplomacy, , 6/21/2022)//sposten
Europe is more dependent upon Russia for the fuels that heat it in winter, cool it in summer, heat its water year-round, and energize its factories, than is any other part of the world, but heavy pressures from Washington have driven its leaders — most of them (other than Ursula von der Leyen, Robert Habeck, and Annalena Baerbock) very reluctantly — to slash imports of Russian fuels, and to cut them drastically in October, and then eliminate them almost totally soon after that, in December, when the coldest weather will set in. Cutting those fuel-supplies will cause fuel-prices in Europe to soar. This will be nothing less than the planned immiseration of the peoples of Europe, and it has been planned in Washington, and is being carried out by its vassal-heads-of-state in Europe.
All of this is being done in order to punish Russia. Washington is obsessed with its hatred of Russia, and has been ever since 25 July 1945.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Central Europe-Russia Relations › 2NC UQ/Link Toolbox › 2NC – Link – Security Cooperation Key
Vít Střítecký and Nik Hynek ‘09, *is an international security research fellow at the Institute of International Relations in Prague., **works as a research fellow at the Institute of International Relations in Prague., “Divided We Stand: Limits of Central European Atlanticism in the New Era”, International Issues & Slovak Foreign Policy Affairs, Vol. XVIII, No. 4, 2009, https://ciaotest.cc.columbia.edu/journals/iisfpa/v18i4/f_0019340_16550.pdf
It is a market dream to publish a book that would define several months of frequent discussions in the transatlantic area. One of the authors with a great sense for timing is apparently Robert Kagan, whose fairly simplistic metaphors became widely discussed during the first major post-Cold War transatlantic dispute surrounding the beginning of the war in Iraq.10 Kagan’s ideas did not only influence scholars and analysts but determined a context in which Donald Rumsfeld could express his idea about the new/old Europe division. Although these discussions have been fortunately deeply buried11, it should be understood that the idea of the new Europe is the American geopolitical mirror image to the Central European Alanticist conception. Ironically, this perspective has appeared to be reflected by the current American administration that tends to view the Baltic and Central European states as accomplices of the former Bush’s administration. This became quite apparent from the US treatment of the former Polish foreign minister Radek Sikorski’s candidacy for the post of NATO Secretary-General. One of the senior Obama administration officials reportedly commented on his endeavor expressing a belief that “Radek Sikorski now wishes that he had chosen Brookings over AEI.”12 The signs of symbolic diplomacy could be also recognized in other Obama’s moves. For the official commemoration of the outbreak of World War II organized in Gdansk on September 1st the administration selected William Perry, a former secretary of defense, who became known in Central Europe as the staunch opponent of the Polish NATO membership. Finally, president Obama’s long awaited and perhaps postponed announcement about the future of the third pillar of the American missile defense came on September 17th, which is the date of the Soviet invasion to Poland in 1939.13 No matter how suspicious one wants to be, these events reveal a substantial lack of interest at best. It has been already mentioned that from a broader perspective all Central European countries have a tendency to emphasize the importance of the transatlantic link. Indeed, for a substantial part of political elites as well as intelligentsia the interests of the US have served as a sufficient legitimization for their own countries’ foreign political attitudes and decisions. Nevertheless, the Alanticist positions differ in various countries. The following lines will analyze the Czech and Polish reactions on the two recently important themes of the transatlantic cooperation. The first will be the Iraqi issue that has already been mentioned in a context of the new/old Europe split. Then, the other topic will concern the American plan to build the components of the third pillar of the ballistic missile defense in the Czech Republic and Poland.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Central Europe-Russia Relations › 2NC UQ/Link Toolbox › 2NC – Link – Security Cooperation Key
Tamás MAGYARICS ‘19, Professor, Department of American Studies, Eötvös Loránd University; Senior Research Fellow, American Studies Research Institute, National University of Public Service, “How to Revitalise the U.S.– Eastern European Relations”, Institute for Foreign Affairs and Trade - Budapest, Foreign Policy Review, 2019, https://kki.hu/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/FPR_2019_online_final.pdf
The ’new’ Eastern and Central European members of the Atlantic Community put more trust into American security guarantees than the ’old’ members for two reasons: one is a perceived lack of capabilities of the latter, the other one is the rather mixed historical experiences with their Western neighbors, especially with Germany, when it comes down to the existential threat provided by Russia (formerly the Soviet Union). In parallel with the Eastern and Central Europeans’ continued reliance on U.S. deterrence against Russia’s repeated attempts to regain, at least, some of its influence in the region, a number of Western European countries have been capitalising on having an entended strategic depth against potential Russian threats, and have shown skepticism and reluctance to follow the U.S. lead in a number of issues (for instance, regarding U.S. policies towards Iraq in 2002-2003, see CNN, 2003.)