2022
Michigan
Disadvantage
Negative › Internal Links › I/L Tech Leadership 1nr
Olson 4-12 – Tyler Olson, covers politics at Fox Business; “China bill could ease supply chain issues causing inflation, help US compete in 'dangerous world': Khanna;” 04-12-22, Fox News, https://www.foxbusiness.com/politics/ro-khanna-china-competition-bill-conferees-congress-house-of-representatives;
When Congress returns later this month one of its top priorities will be coming to a compromise on Chinese competition legislation, with dozens of lawmakers set to meet in a "conference committee" to work out the details.
The effort is more than a year in the making, but may be more important than ever, according to Rep. Ro Khanna, D-Calif., who said it could help address the root causes of inflation.
2022
Michigan
Disadvantage
Negative › Internal Links › I/L Tech Leadership 1nr
Rao 22 – Steve S. Rao, Morrisville Town Council member, board member of the American Immigration Council, serves on the N.C. League of Municipalities Race and Equity Task Force; “Opinion: Senate Must Pass COMPETES Act to Keep STEM Talent;” 04-18-22, Government Technology, https://www.govtech.com/education/higher-ed/opinion-senate-must-pass-competes-act-to-keep-stem-talent;
Our global competitors, like China, have been closing the gap with the United States for decades — building their economies, attempting to take over the manufacturing industry, funding innovation, and producing products that keep technology running worldwide.
Without action from Congress, those competitors could win the race for global talent, too, taking innovation and economic strength away from our shores.
2022
Michigan
Disadvantage
Negative › Internal Links › I/L Tech Leadership 1nr
Oxman 22 – Jason Oxman, B.A. cum laude from Amherst College, M.S. and J.D. from Boston University, President and chief executive officer of the Information Technology Industry Council; “Congress Must Reach Agreement on the Bipartisan Innovation Act;” 03-09-22, ITI, ;
As President Biden meets with U.S. business leaders about the importance of keeping the U.S. competitive, ITI echoes the president’s call for the U.S. Congress to pass the Bipartisan Innovation Act. This legislation would strengthen U.S. technological leadership and fortify the U.S. economy by increasing manufacturing in America, strengthening supply chains, and addressing bottlenecks in key areas like semiconductors.
The Bipartisan Innovation Act is integral to the United States’ future economic success and competitiveness in the global marketplace. That’s why it is so important for the U.S. Congress to reach an agreement on the historic competitiveness bills that have cleared both the U.S. House of Representatives and the U.S. Senate – the United States Innovation and Competition Act (USICA) and America Creating Opportunities for Manufacturing Pre-Eminence in Technology and Economic Strength (COMPETES) Act.
2022
Michigan
Disadvantage
Negative › Internal Links › AT Polarization Broke Congress
Zelizer 6/16
Julian E., CNN Political Analyst, “Opinion: Democrats shouldn't be so quick to throw Biden overboard” June 16, 2022 dmr
The American Rescue Plan and the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act are two major initiatives that passed despite intense polarization and the Democrats' narrow majorities in Congress. And both pieces of legislation have been integral to the nation's recovery from the pandemic. The Biden administration also oversaw the swift rollout of the Covid-19 vaccines, which have been key to protecting the country against the damage caused by new variants. On foreign policy, Biden has enjoyed considerable success strengthening NATO and ratcheting up economic sanctions against Russia while providing critical aid to Ukraine. As New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman wrote about his off-the-record lunch with the President, "What I felt afterward was this: For all you knuckleheads on Fox who say that Biden can't put two sentences together, here's a news flash: He just put NATO together, Europe together and the whole Western alliance together—stretching from Canada up to Finland and all the way to Japan—to help Ukraine protect its fledgling democracy from Vladimir Putin's fascist assault." None of this erases the significant challenge global inflation has on American families. To be sure, the President has taken steps to address this by shoring up key ports to alleviate supply chain problems. The Federal Reserve has just instituted the largest rate hike since 1994 to curb inflation and the administration has committed itself to focusing on this problem without undermining the strong jobs numbers that the country has enjoyed.
2022
Michigan
Disadvantage
Negative › Internal Links › AT Winners Win
Bennister and Worthy 12 - Mark Bennister was a Senior Lecturer in Politics, Ben Worthy is a lecturer in Politics at Birkbeck College. 4-12-2012, "Getting it, Spending it, Losing it: Exploring Political Capital by Mark Bennister, Ben Worthy :: SSRN," No Publication, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2480548
Political capital is frequently used as a short hand for the diverse range of attributes and advantages a leader brings with them to power and develops in office. Compared to other forms of ‘capital’ it remains under theorised. Since Pierre Bourdieu first outlined it, scholars have viewed political capital either as being synonymous with personal skills or a description of wider contextual attributes, particularly the link between leader and public. It is frequently seen as analogous to financial capital: a political leader has a fixed stock of capital that they can spend, hoard, fritter or gamble. This paper takes a first look at the literature and applies it to ‘t Hart’s approaches to leadership study, drawing on examples predominantly from US and UK politics. Following Lopez (2002) it takes the view that political capital is both ‘personal’ (in terms of their own skills) and ‘political’ (in terms of events, institutional resources and context). A politician with skills and attributes can use this to shape the context in which they operate, creating a ‘positive multiplier’ as the personal and political reinforce each other. Where events can also overwhelm leaders and expose flaws and personality weaknesses, a ‘negative multiplier’ takes effect. However, unlike money in the bank, political capital is finite and subject to depreciation as part of ‘a natural trajectory’ whereby support and power is lost over time. Yet this trajectory is not always uniform. The loss is inevitable but the rate and shape may not be.
2022
Michigan
Disadvantage
Negative › Internal Links › AT Winners Win
Lee et al 2019
Barton, Phd Political Economics @ UNSW Sydney, New South Wales and Junior Research Fellow at University of Oxford (Magdalen College). Gabriele Gratton, UNSW Australia Business School, School of Economics, Richard Holden, University of New South Wales (UNSW), “Political Capital” UNSW Economics Working Paper 2019-04 March 30, 2019 https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3363382
We study how the leader chooses to spend her capital depending on her initial stock of capital, the precision of her information, and whether the issue at stake is more or less important for her. For example, the President of the United States may choose to spend her political capital only on issues that were central to her campaign. Similarly, senior faculty may choose to spend their political capital only on job candidates in their own fields. We show that the leader optimally chooses one of four leadership styles and that the chosen style affects the dynamics of power within the organization. Irrelevant leaders have too little capital to influence decisions and therefore never voice their dissent. Leaders with sufficient political capital but poor information choose to be patient: they save their capital and spend it only on issues that are important to them. Although patient leaders spend their capital sparingly, when they spend it they are unlikely to regain it and therefore their power declines over time. Leaders with intermediate precision of information choose to be loud: they spend their capital on all issues and their power declines over time. Finally, the most informed leaders choose to be strong: they spend their capital on all issues and their power grows over time. For a given stock of political capital, leaders with the least precise information are more likely to be patient. Therefore, conditional on disagreeing with the majority of the organization, leaders are more likely to spend political capital when their information is more precise. But the unconditional probability of spending political capital on any given issue is non-monotonic on the precision of the leader’s information—while loud leaders have less precise information than strong leaders, they are more likely to voice their dissent on any given issue. More political capital does not necessarily induce the leader to voice dissent more often. How more capital affects the leaders’ decision hinges on the marginal power of political capital and therefore on the shape of the mapping of political capital into power. Intuitively, when the marginal power of capital is greater after the leader’s preferred alternative is revealed to be better (respectively, worse) than the default, then a larger initial stock of political capital translates into a greater return (respectively, smaller loss) to voicing dissent. We give a concrete example within a linear framework. In this example, leaders with little political capital have a greater chance of becoming irrelevant if they choose to push for a decision today. Therefore they compare a small chance of influencing today’s decision with the risk of losing their power in the future. For such leaders, a marginal increase in today’s capital (and therefore power) increases the potential power loss in the future more than it increases today’s gains. Therefore, for small stocks of capital, the probability of spending political capital may be decreasing in capital. To put it another way: some patient leaders have more political capital and power than some loud leaders have. This relation is reversed for larger stocks of political capital, for which a marginal increase in today’s capital increases the incentives for the leader to voice her dissent. However, as the leader’s power increases, the relation is reversed yet again, as very powerful leaders can only achieve a small increase in power by voicing dissent.
2022
Michigan
Disadvantage
Negative › Internal Links › AT Winners Win – Biden
Drezner 21, PhD, professor of international politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University and a regular contributor to PostEverything. (Daniel, “Biden’s brand of bipartisanship,” Washington Post, https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2021/03/30/bidens-brand-bipartisanship/)
The paradox for Biden is that the more successful he is at addressing the pandemic and the economy, the more difficulty he could encounter in building bipartisan coalitions to address other problems. Political Science 101 would suggest that if Biden gets credit for ending the pandemic and restoring a strong economy, that popularity should translate into greater political capital for other problems in the queue. Political Science 301 offers a cautionary warning: Solved problems fade from view. Biden is appropriately addressing the issues voters care about. But if the pandemic and the economy evolve as expected, voters will quickly bank those successes and focus on thornier problems — like immigration.
2022
Michigan
Disadvantage
Negative › Internal Links › AT Winners Win – Biden
Subramanian 3-7-2021 (Courtney and Joey Garrison, “'Dinner table' politics: Why Joe Biden ditched bipartisan dealmaking to pass his COVID-19 relief bill,” USA Today, https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2021/03/07/covid-19-bill-biden-chooses-dinner-table-politics-over-bipartisanship/6892438002/)
Despite the relief plan's popularity outside the Beltway, it is unlikely that momentum from its passage will hurtle Biden into future legislative wins, Howell said. “The idea that a legislative win begets a subsequent legislative win in this environment is probably asking for too much,” he said, noting the prospect of passing COVID-19 relief was higher than more hot-button issues like immigration or health care. A legislative defeat would have raised questions about Biden’s ability to pass any meaningful legislation, but its passage won’t be a “springboard to the production of all kinds of landmark legislation – far from it," Howell said.
2022
Michigan
Disadvantage
Negative › Internal Links › AT Winners Win – Biden
Smith 2021
Noah, Prof @Stony Brook University, “Biden Must Avoid Obama's Mistake When Setting His Agenda; Stick to the crisis at hand or risk spurring a backlash that could slow economic reforms and hurt Democrats in 2022,” January 13, 2021,
The universe of possibilities for the Biden administration radically expanded after the Democrats clinched the Senate majority, but the increase in political capital isn’t infinite. When deciding which problems to tackle first, President Joe Biden should prioritize initiatives that address the pandemic while moving the nation toward long-term goals for public health and green-energy stimulus. Biden can learn from the experience of Barack Obama, whose focus on health-insurance reform provoked a midterm backlash and probably forfeited a chance to boost the country out of the Great Recession sooner. He should heed the words of Winston Churchill who urged, “never let a good crisis go to waste.” Because crises are times when the public understands that change is necessary, it’s possible to make deep and lasting reforms. President Franklin D. Roosevelt understood this when he focused parts of his New Deal on long-term alterations to America’s economic structure, such as Social Security and the National Labor Relations Board. These policies not only contributed to the recovery from the Great Depression — the reason for Roosevelt's election — but created a more equal and stable economy in which workers had more bargaining power and old people didn’t have to live in penury. The U.S. was in the depths of the Great Recession when Obama took office in 2009. With the benefit of unified Democratic control of Congress, he passed a fairly substantial stimulus. But it was still too small to make more than a modest dent in the recession. It was too weighted toward tax cuts and it didn’t include much of a bailout for underwater homeowners. Instead, Obama spent much of his political capital on passing the Affordable Care Act, commonly known as Obamacare. Now, it’s true that health insurance was, and is, one of the country’s biggest problems. And it’s also true that Obamacare substantially reduced the ranks of the uninsured, which was a big, important victory. But the system Obama crafted was a compromise, which left the problem of ruinously high costs mostly unaddressed. The legislation failed to satisfy many on the left, with a few now even labeling it as mass murder for not making deeper reforms. Meanwhile, Obamacare remained unpopular throughout Obama’s term in office and may have substantially contributed to the Democrats’ catastrophic midterm election losses in 2010. Alternate histories are difficult to imagine, but it seems likely that had Obama spent his 2009 political capital on things more directly related to the recession — such as more infrastructure spending, a bigger bailout for underwater homeowners and a stronger welfare state — he'd have realized a higher return on that political capital. In other words, a crisis does present an opportunity for long-term reforms, but it’s best to use that opportunity for reforms that address the immediate crisis. The Democratic victories in the Georgia Senate runoffs have given Biden an unexpected opportunity to pass major legislation in the first year of his presidency, instead of relying on executive action and the faint hope of bipartisan compromise. The left will be clamoring for major action on health care and a variety of other momumental issues, but Biden needs to spend his political capital on reforms that are also tied to the COVID-19 pandemic and the resulting recession. The first priority is public health. COVID-19 exposed deep and catastrophic weaknesses in the U.S. public health institutions. Right now, vaccination is proceeding at a glacial pace due to an uncoordinated rollout that dumped vaccines in the lap of state public health agencies utterly unequipped to rapidly inoculate the entire populace. Biden needs to come right out of the gate with a coordinated, well-funded vaccination plan that reaches maximum vaccination rates as fast as possible. In doing so, he also needs to bolster public health agencies and revitalize and reform both the Centers for Disease Control and the Food and Drug Administration after years of neglect. This will be a bigger challenge than is popularly realized because of the possibility that vaccine-resistant virus strains will emerge. Biden will need to reorient much of the U.S. economy toward vaccine production and distribution until COVID-19 has been decisively beaten all around the world. It will take a lot of money and a lot of will. After the virus is beaten, the U.S. economy will still linger in recession unless the government acts decisively to boost demand. The best tool for doing this, as usual, is infrastructure investment. And the rapid progress in solar power and batteries means that Biden has a unique opportunity to address the climate crisis at the same time. A huge build-out of solar power and electric-car charging stations, including subsidies to rapidly replace fossil fuel plants and gasoline vehicles, will ensure that the U.S. economy comes roaring back while making huge steps toward decarbonization. Public health and green infrastructure should be the top priorities for Biden in 2021 and 2022. Yes, there are lots of other things in America that need reform, including health care. But the realities of the political system mean these will have to wait. Reforms must fit the crisis of the day; Biden can’t afford to get sidetracked on a quixotic quest to fix everything that’s wrong with the American economy.
2022
Michigan
Disadvantage
Negative › Internal Links › AT PC Fails – Party Unity
Lee 2021
Barton, Phd Political Economics @ UNSW Sydney, New South Wales and Junior Research Fellow at University of Oxford (Magdalen College), “Essays in Political Economics” August 2021
Most organizations—in politics, business, and academia—feature leaders who can sway collective decisions. In business, a CEO may persuade her firm’s board to approve a project the board is initially skeptical about. She may do so by appealing to personal friendships with members of the board, or even by threatening to resign. In politics, U.S. presidents may coax Congress into passing legislation that does not have the initial support of the majority of members. They may, for example, claim a popular mandate for policies on which they campaigned, or appeal to party unity. Similarly, in academia, a senior faculty member may push to hire a job candidate the recruiting committee is initially inclined to reject, perhaps by exerting influence over junior colleagues. That leaders have the power to influence decisions is not controversial. Yet, power to influence is not an easy concept to define, as it includes both formal and informal components. For example, in Hollander’s (1958; 1960; 1978; 2009) theory of “idiosyncrasy credit” leaders have an account of credit with group members they can spend to deviate from group norms and assert influence (see also Bass, 1990, Ch. 17).1 These credits are “given and received as rewards” from a leader’s social exchange with her followers (Hol- lander, 1978). Therefore, power to influence derives from the leader’s network of friends and allies within the organization, the organization’s informal system of favor exchanges, and even the organization’s culture (March, 1981, pp. 216–219).
2022
Michigan
Disadvantage
Negative › Internal Links › AT PC Fails – Theory
Siewert 18, PhD, dissertation to obtain the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Faculty of Social Sciences of the Johann Wolfgang Goethe University to Frankfurt am Main (Markus, “"It’s Never Easy for the President to Get Exactly What He Wants,”
One of the most important presidential strategies in the legislative arena is (trying) to set the agenda of Congress (see Wood 2009 for an extensive overview; Cohen 2012; Edwards and Wood 1999; Light 1999). The reasoning behind this is straightforward: Since presidents have only few tools at hand to sway lawmakers on how they cast their ballot, the focus of the White House is set at an earlier stage: by already influencing what is considered in the first place. Compared with the legislative prevalence of executives in parliamentarian democracies, presidents in the United States are clearly less able to dominate the agenda space. Yet based on his constitutional right to recommend legislation deemed necessary and appropriate (Art. II, Sec 3, U.S. Constitution), it is primarily the resources of the executive branch - i.e., the departmental bureaucracies, and the Executive Office of the President - which put the president into the position to exert policy leadership via drafting legislative proposals. Unmatched by any other single legislators or even Congress as a whole, John W. Kingdon is right to argue that “[…] no other single actor in the political system has quite the capability of the president to set agendas.” (Kingdon 2003, 24). Previous research has shown that defining the agenda is a promising strategy for the White House. Presidential initiatives, both major and minor ones, almost always find their way into the legislative hopper (Cameron and Park 2008, 51f; Cohen 2012, 24ff; Edwards and Barrett 2000, 116ff). Accordingly, legislation proposed by the administration makes up between 30% and 50% of the congressional calendar, while the remaining proportion is initiated by members of Congress, is based on recurring pieces of legislation, and are reaction to external events or imminent crises (Edwards and Barrett 2000, 112ff; Taylor 1998, 377ff; Theriault 2002). While this indeed makes the president the single most important agenda-setter, it also demonstrates that he does not dominate the legislative agenda of Congress (Sinclair 2006, 255–63). We can mainly identify three mechanisms how presidential agenda-setting affects the lawmaking process in Congress. First, it enables the president to define the boundaries of policies under consideration, and in this way to structure the following deliberation. In this sense, agenda setting is first and foremost about obtaining the Deutungshoheit - i.e., the prerogative of interpretation - over the policy debate through setting the terms of the debate, moving first on certain policy aspects, and via framing and priming of core arguments (Edwards and Wood 1999; Eshbaugh-Soha and Peake 2005). George W. Bush, for instance, during his 2000 presidential campaign advertised his plans for massive across the board tax breaks which, at that time, were perceived as a mere “pipe dream” on both sides of the political spectrum (Milbank 2001). Cutting taxes, and especially to this extent, did not rank high among the priorities of lawmakers nor the American public. The arrival of Bush in the White House, however, completely changed the dynamics of debate. It put the tax cut proposal upfront of the legislative agenda during his first half year as president, and Democrats in the end had to accept an amount of tax breaks which came up to more than double of what they called reasonable six months before during the election campaign. Bill Clinton, on the other hand, was largely rolled by the issue dynamics in the debates regarding the overhaul of the Internal Revenue Service in 1997. Favoring only minor reforms, he had to concede early on to pressures from the public and Congress who, fueled by several major scandals, thirsted for a largescale reorganization of the IRS instead of a fine-tuning approach preferred by Clinton (Broder 1997). Of course, these are only two illustrations highlighting how presidents can succeed but also fail in setting the tone of the debate from early stages and through this pre-structure the outcome of the lawmaking process. Second, presidential leadership at the agenda-setting stage helps to overcome collective action problems within Congress and among its 535 legislators by providing a focal point around which other political actors’ policy positions can crystalize (Cameron and Park 2008; Cohen 2012; Neustadt 1991, 8f). The USA PATRIOT Act can serve as a prime example in this regard, on which the New York Times stressed that “[b]y and large, the House and Senate bills both use as a starting point a proposal sent to Capitol Hill nearly two weeks ago by the White House.” (Lewis and Pear 2001). Since lawmakers in Congress today only have scarce resources to draft their own bills, presidential input from the beginning is often highly appreciated. Yet, a proposal from the White House furthermore fulfills the role of first mover draft upon which the subsequent debate can be structured. In this sense, it both offers a distinct policy outline upfront and provides guiding posts for the further deliberation process. Third, agenda-setting offers the White House the opportunity to highlight its priorities, how they are distributed across various policy issues, and in which way policies should be packaged (Rudalevige 2005, 437ff; Wayne 2009b, 317ff). Because the resources of any administration to lobby Congress are not infinite and the multiple political arenas are usually heavily crowded with myriad policy items and problems striving to be solved, the White House needs to prioritize its policy agenda. This involves, among other things, to select some issues over others, decide about their sequencing, how to pursue them, and how much political capital it wants or needs to spend on any given item. Therefore, the administration will focus on certain policies with more attention, on others with less, depending on the prioritization by the president but also upon other considerations, such as the overall density of the policy agenda or imminent pressures of the time. The trick is to not overwhelm Congress with the president’s initiatives. As Lyndon B. Johnson famously quipped, “Congress is like a Whiskey drinker. You can put an awful lot of whiskey into a man if you just let him sip it. But if you try to force the whole bottle down his throat at one time, he’ll throw it up.” (cited in Rudalevige 2002, 113). Thus, the failure to prioritize easily leads to overload of Pennsylvania Avenue with Congress at the one end, and to excessive demands and exhaustion for the White House at the other end. The rocky start of the Clinton administration underlines this argument: since the White House did not pursue a ‘rifle-approach’ to define clear policy priorities for its initial months and then execute them, it got lost in numerous legislative battles and mine-fields early on in its first year. Instead it followed a ‘shotgun-approach’ by addressing as many issues as possible at once leading to an overkill and chaos (Rockman 1996; Sinclair 2000b).
2022
Michigan
Disadvantage
Negative › Internal Links › AT PC Fails – Biden Specific
Schofield 11-9-2021 (Rob Schofield, Director of NC Policy Watch, has three decades of experience as a lawyer, lobbyist, writer and commentator, President Biden’s remarkable record of accomplishment under nearly impossible circumstances, )
Remind yourself for a moment of the scale and scope of the challenges Biden faced when he took office in January and the limited and inadequate collection of tools that were at his disposal to tackle them. Forty-one weeks ago, our nation had just survived a violent attempted coup d’état and the outgoing president who had spurred it on by refusing to acknowledge the fact of his defeat was about to be impeached for a second time. Meanwhile, daily deaths from a global pandemic were peaking at their highest levels, the national economy remained a mess, and a dire, worsening, and largely unaddressed environmental emergency continued to place the planet in an ever-tightening grip. Only Abraham Lincoln and possibly Franklin Roosevelt entered their presidencies under more difficult circumstances. What’s more, unlike Lincoln and Roosevelt who took office at a time in which their parties enjoyed large congressional majorities, Biden entered the oval office with no such advantage. Indeed, it was only thanks to two near-miraculous come-from-behind wins in a pair of January Georgia Senate runoffs that Democrats wield any authority at all on Capitol Hill. Now add to all this the fact that the impossibly narrow Democratic Senate “majority” (51-50 thanks to the presence of Vice President Harris) includes determined ideological conservatives like West Virginia’s Manchin and Arizona’s Sinema, and that the antiquated Senate filibuster rule that requires 60 votes to pass almost anything meaningful, and it’s a marvel that the nation has not descended into complete political gridlock and chaos. In comparison to Biden, the Apollo 13 astronauts were well-equipped when they jerry-rigged their spacecraft, quite literally on the fly, a half century ago. Amazingly, however, no national crash has ensued. Instead, under the President’s coherent, sober, and science-based leadership, the nation has aggressively locked horns with the pandemic by undertaking one of the largest and most successful mass vaccination campaigns in human history – a campaign that, despite persistent sabotage efforts from some on the political right, has saved millions of lives. Meanwhile, thanks in large measure to Biden’s aggressive and on-the-mark stimulus policies, the economy has revived at a record pace and huge strides have been made in slashing poverty – especially child poverty. And then there is the climate emergency, where, thanks to the President’s vision and simple common sense, the U.S. has rapidly transformed its role from that of science and reality-denying roadblock to a global leader. There are still miles to travel in this realm, but the massive infrastructure legislation finally approved this past weekend by small bipartisan majorities in both house of Congress further cements this vitally important policy 180. Now add to all this the literally thousands of talented and diverse appointees Biden has named to the judiciary, the ambassadorial corps, and the leadership of numerous regulatory agencies – most of whom have already effected huge and positive federal policy shifts in everything from student loans to toxic chemicals to human rights – and the magnitude of his administration’s accomplishments in less than 300 days looms even larger. Has the Biden presidency been perfect? Of course not. Like all of his predecessors, Biden has made his share of mistakes. Like Barack Obama, he’s likely wasted too much time in search of imaginary common ground with ideological conservatives determined to undermine him at every turn. While necessary, the Afghanistan withdrawal could have proceeded more smoothly. And as with many other presidents, one also yearns at times for a leader with the kind of rhetorical gifts that would enable him to easily skewer and deflate his adversaries and inspire widespread support for the kind of wholesale progressive changes the nation needs. But, in the end, this is quibbling. In light of the huge political challenges under which he’s been forced to operate (and especially in comparison to the lawless corruption and intellectual vacuity of his predecessor that inspired night terrors in millions – maybe even billions – of humans), Joe Biden has achieved a remarkable record of accomplishment. Whatever the future holds, our nation will be forever in his debt.
2022
Michigan
Disadvantage
Negative › Internal Links › AT PC Fails – Biden Specific
Yglesias 6/19
Matthew Yglesias is a columnist for Bloomberg Opinion. A co-founder of and former columnist for Vox, he writes the Slow Boring blog and newsletter, “Biden Is Delivering on His Bipartisan Promise” June 19, 2022 dmr
For all his many political struggles, President Joe Biden is quietly delivering on one of the central — and most implausible — promises of his campaign: restoring a sense of normalcy and bipartisanship to the legislative process. The latest example is an apparent bipartisan deal on gun regulation, which finally puts vague Republican rhetoric on school security and mental health into action while also embracing modest Democratic proposals on such matters as background checks and red-flag laws. The bill will probably not dramatically alter the level of gun violence in the US. But it should do some good, and re-establishes the idea that Congress can act in response to dramatic events. Before the gun deal, of course, Biden worked with Congress to deliver the kind of bipartisan infrastructure legislation that both his predecessors only talked about. There have also been many more obscure bills, ranging from legislation changing the regulation of ocean shipping to a major overhaul of the US Postal Service. Bipartisan science funding legislation has been languishing for months now, but that’s due to boring House-Senate disagreements that are being worked out by a conference committee — a process so old-school it had become basically forgotten in Washington. Progress is also being made on bipartisan bills about such thorny issues as Chinese investment in US companies and antitrust scrutiny of big technology companies. Much of this work is happening through a process I like to call the Secret Congress: Members quietly working together while allowing the political press to focus on Hunter Biden’s laptop, which books are in which school libraries, the latest Marjorie Taylor Greene tweet or any of the million other controversies that engage the body politic. The Secret Congress dynamic, of course, is one reason why it’s difficult for Biden to secure credit for delivering on this promise. During Barack Obama’s presidency, Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell was open about the fact that he was reluctant for Republicans to engage constructively on any topic lest the passage of bills come to reflect positively on an incumbent president he hoped to defeat. Biden has a much lower public profile than his recent predecessors. And while his team has been constructively engaged on all these issues, it’s been a quiet form of engagement that aims to be helpful without hogging the spotlight or preventing the members themselves from owning the process. Conservative firebrands found plenty of (real and fake) controversies with which to fill the air and maintain a sense of combat even as they collaborated on policy. Meanwhile, quite apart from Biden’s efforts, there is the fact that Donald Trump’s presidency helped break down the doors of ideological dogmatism on the right. Republicans don’t talk about it much these days, but the Trump administration’s willingness — led by Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin — to work with House Speaker Nancy Pelosi and Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer on the CARES Act is the only reason the 2020 elections didn’t turn into a party-destroying landslide. A free-market approach that devastated consumer spending power and led to liquidated many businesses would have ruined the economy, ruined Trump’s political standing, and driven the GOP into the ground. Trump lack of ideological purity, and Democrats’ willingness to bargain in good faith, saved the economy and the Republican Party — and perhaps opened the doors to further rounds of creativity. Alas, Biden has not had nearly such good fortune with his economic management. The multiple inflationary shocks — first a fiscal stimulus that spent too much too quickly, then a central bank that was probably too slow to react, then a war in Ukraine that’s ravaged the supply side of the global economy — have wrecked Biden’s public standing. When a president is unpopular due to bad economic news, the public doesn’t give him credit for anything. And columnists of all stripes are wont to criticize an unpopular leader. But the fact remains that important elements of Biden’s agenda have succeeded, notably including a Russia policy that has secured strong bipartisan and even international support despite the economic cost. The cloak of unpopularity, meanwhile, makes it even easier for bipartisanship to continue. In his current state, Biden is not politically threatening to Republicans, so they have no reason to avoid collaborating on bills they happen to like. A new proposal from Republican senators Mitt Romney, Richard Burr and Steve Daines to consolidate and simplify various family support programs in a way that would cut poverty and reduce marriage penalties has earned some cautious praise from Democratic Senator Michael Bennet and could be the basis for more bipartisan work. At the end of the day, life as a legislator is more fun if you get to legislate. Sheer exhaustion with the tedium of obstruction has helped make Biden’s approach work.
2022
Michigan
Disadvantage
Negative › Internal Links › I/L PC Key – Committee Action
Yglesias 6/19
Matthew Yglesias is a columnist for Bloomberg Opinion. A co-founder of and former columnist for Vox, he writes the Slow Boring blog and newsletter, “Biden Is Delivering on His Bipartisan Promise” June 19, 2022 dmr
For all his many political struggles, President Joe Biden is quietly delivering on one of the central — and most implausible — promises of his campaign: restoring a sense of normalcy and bipartisanship to the legislative process. The latest example is an apparent bipartisan deal on gun regulation, which finally puts vague Republican rhetoric on school security and mental health into action while also embracing modest Democratic proposals on such matters as background checks and red-flag laws. The bill will probably not dramatically alter the level of gun violence in the US. But it should do some good, and re-establishes the idea that Congress can act in response to dramatic events. Before the gun deal, of course, Biden worked with Congress to deliver the kind of bipartisan infrastructure legislation that both his predecessors only talked about. There have also been many more obscure bills, ranging from legislation changing the regulation of ocean shipping to a major overhaul of the US Postal Service. Bipartisan science funding legislation has been languishing for months now, but that’s due to boring House-Senate disagreements that are being worked out by a conference committee — a process so old-school it had become basically forgotten in Washington. Progress is also being made on bipartisan bills about such thorny issues as Chinese investment in US companies and antitrust scrutiny of big technology companies. Much of this work is happening through a process I like to call the Secret Congress: Members quietly working together while allowing the political press to focus on Hunter Biden’s laptop, which books are in which school libraries, the latest Marjorie Taylor Greene tweet or any of the million other controversies that engage the body politic. The Secret Congress dynamic, of course, is one reason why it’s difficult for Biden to secure credit for delivering on this promise. During Barack Obama’s presidency, Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell was open about the fact that he was reluctant for Republicans to engage constructively on any topic lest the passage of bills come to reflect positively on an incumbent president he hoped to defeat. Biden has a much lower public profile than his recent predecessors. And while his team has been constructively engaged on all these issues, it’s been a quiet form of engagement that aims to be helpful without hogging the spotlight or preventing the members themselves from owning the process. Conservative firebrands found plenty of (real and fake) controversies with which to fill the air and maintain a sense of combat even as they collaborated on policy. Meanwhile, quite apart from Biden’s efforts, there is the fact that Donald Trump’s presidency helped break down the doors of ideological dogmatism on the right. Republicans don’t talk about it much these days, but the Trump administration’s willingness — led by Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin — to work with House Speaker Nancy Pelosi and Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer on the CARES Act is the only reason the 2020 elections didn’t turn into a party-destroying landslide. A free-market approach that devastated consumer spending power and led to liquidated many businesses would have ruined the economy, ruined Trump’s political standing, and driven the GOP into the ground. Trump lack of ideological purity, and Democrats’ willingness to bargain in good faith, saved the economy and the Republican Party — and perhaps opened the doors to further rounds of creativity. Alas, Biden has not had nearly such good fortune with his economic management. The multiple inflationary shocks — first a fiscal stimulus that spent too much too quickly, then a central bank that was probably too slow to react, then a war in Ukraine that’s ravaged the supply side of the global economy — have wrecked Biden’s public standing. When a president is unpopular due to bad economic news, the public doesn’t give him credit for anything. And columnists of all stripes are wont to criticize an unpopular leader. But the fact remains that important elements of Biden’s agenda have succeeded, notably including a Russia policy that has secured strong bipartisan and even international support despite the economic cost. The cloak of unpopularity, meanwhile, makes it even easier for bipartisanship to continue. In his current state, Biden is not politically threatening to Republicans, so they have no reason to avoid collaborating on bills they happen to like. A new proposal from Republican senators Mitt Romney, Richard Burr and Steve Daines to consolidate and simplify various family support programs in a way that would cut poverty and reduce marriage penalties has earned some cautious praise from Democratic Senator Michael Bennet and could be the basis for more bipartisan work. At the end of the day, life as a legislator is more fun if you get to legislate. Sheer exhaustion with the tedium of obstruction has helped make Biden’s approach work.
2022
Michigan
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Negative › Internal Links › I/L PC Key – Committee Action
Beckman 10 Matthew N. Beckman, Professor of Political Science @ UC-Irvine, 2010, “Pushing the Agenda: Presidential Leadership in U.S. Lawmaking, 1953-2004,” pg. 50
That said, in cases where the president and his leading allies do disagree---if not on policy preferences, on matters like priorities or strategy---the White House must lobby their congressional leaders to ensure that they carry the president’s water (rather than their own). Hence, presidents want supportive leaders to use their prerogatives to keep the president’s proposed policies among those from which legislators choose.17 Getting their leaders “onboard” with the president’s preferences is the administration’s first order of business, and the bargaining tactics they use for this purpose runs the spectrum, from personal appeals to public pressure to political deals.¶ But even upon securing their support, the White House’s work with these supportive leaders is far from done. If anything, it has barely begun. Now the White House and their leading legislative allies must work together to best promote their overlapping interests.18 To this end, they should share policy information and political intelligence, not to mention the burden of putting them to good use. In short, after first bargaining over what policy they will advocate, the president and his leading allies should coordinate efforts to best execute that advocacy.¶ 2.2.2.1.2 Deterring leading opponents. When the president and his leading allies advocate a particular policy alternative, ultimately deciding its destiny is the members’ distribution of preferences in light of rival alternatives. The key variables at this point, therefore, are the preference distribution and the rival alternatives. The first of these---that is, the White House’s endgame strategy of shifting members’ preference distribution via vote-centered lobbying---has already been discussed, but still unexamined is the administration’s strategy for affecting rival alternatives. Let me now consider this crucial component of the White House’s earlygame strategy. ¶ By way of introduction, it is worth emphasizing the president’s motivation for affecting rival alternatives: beating the status quo is almost always easier than beating a strategic opponent. Accordingly, rather than just pulling pivotal voters toward the president’s position (and away from opponents’), the White House may also want to cut a deal with leading opponents, getting them to “pull their punches” against the president’s proposal, or at least something close to it. The obvious theoretical question begging, then, is the same one White House officials actually ponder: Why would an opposing leader ever endorse key planks of the president’s legislative agenda?¶ Well, one way to secure leading opponents’ submission is simply by fiat. If the president and his leading allies can prohibit, by rule, leading opponents from challenging their position, then the president’s policy options are constrained only by the range of potentially passable policies. But even if this brand of strategic censorship may occasionally occur via restrictive rules in the House of Representatives, it is not generally a viable strategy and certainly not a reliable one. First, the president’s party is often in the congressional minority, and second, even when in the majority, the Senate does not allow the president’s leading allies to impose restrictive rules on their leading opponents. Far from it.¶ Lacking the ability to censor leading opponents by decree, how can an administration keep leading opponents from challenging the president’s initiatives? To foreshadow, the basic answer is that White House officials can deter leading opponents inasmuch as the president can convince them that the intrapolicy benefits of fighting are low and the extrapolicy costs are high. Let me elaborate.¶ Figure 2.10 lays out the tenets underlying the White House’s options for deterring their leading opponents, adding to the now-familiar policy space a leading opponent, O, who joins the president, P, and pivotal voter, f (who can occupy any number of positions, f to f ). For the purposes of clarity, here I assume that the president and his supportive leader, S, agree on the policy and work together promoting it. Because an administration can rarely (if ever) get pivotal voters to support the president’s ideal outcome, deterring leading opponents from challenging the president’s bill (or some version of it) requires that the White House lobby more than pivotal voters; they must also target opposing leaders. The reason is that to be successful, presidential aides must convince their leading opponents that the policy loss they will suffer from “pulling their punches” is small and can be offset by gains on other fronts. In Figure 2.10, then, the nature of demobilizing the opposition lobbying should aim to minimize the opposing leader’s potential policy impact---that is, minimize the disparity between policies when he or she fights (say, f ) and policies when he or she does not (say, f )---and compensate the leader for the difference.¶ Developing this strategy further, it is worth reiterating that leading opponents’ decision is not a calculus about fighting to get one’s own preferences but rather fighting to get whatever the pivotal voter will ultimately support (f, or wherever f would end up after being targeted by the White House’s lobbying arsenal). Accordingly, the more pivotal voters’ preferences match the president’s proposal, the less incentive an opposing leader has to challenge that position (because he or she will get something close to it anyway). The first hypothesis for deterring the opposition, therefore, is somewhat surprising: the White House should lobby pivotal voters to make them more supportive of the president’s preferred position. Notice that although behaviorally equivalent to a pure vote-centered lobbying strategy, here the White House’s rationale for lobbying pivotal voters is not for their votes per se but rather to weaken leading opponents’ bargaining posture.¶ Beyond pulling pivotal voters’ preferences toward the president’s position, an additional way in which the administration can lessen opposing leaders’ incentive to fight the White House is to convince leading opponents to dislike the president’s position less (to move O toward f ). Importantly, this does not require that the White House induce leading opponents to support the president’s position, much less vote for it. Instead, the administration need only convince opposing leaders that the effects of their counteroffensive would be minimal or, at least, could be better served elsewhere. Accordingly, the second deterringthe- opposition hypothesis is that the White House should target leading opponents with the same lobbying tactics used in the legislative endgame; the president should engage his leading opponents with arm-twisting and browbeating, private appeals and public pressure.¶ Of course, a third way to diminish leading opponents’ incentive to fight is to compromise the president’s position (offer f instead of f ). This is not to say that the administration should capitulate all or even concede much; rather, the White House should compromise only enough to mollify leading opponents. Hence, this aspect of the demobilizing-leading-opponents hypothesis suggests that the White House should be willing to compromise with leading opponents, negotiating a “deal” that is more moderate than the best of the potentially passable policies but still better than what the president could get with an endgame floor fight. This is a point worth reiterating: the White House should only divert lobbying resources to leading opponents if doing so yields greater influence than would be possible through vote-centered lobbying alone.¶ This key point about agenda-centered lobbying leads to the final insight: because the president seeks a “deal” that is worse for leading opponents than what they could get by challenging him, the administration must compensate these leading opponents to offset the difference. This “horse-trading” can be on exogenous issues---for example, a different bill, an executive or judicial nomination, or some other executive-controlled offering---but often occurs within the confines of the same bill. Typically, the president’s part of the logroll is included as the bill’s first title, leading opponents’ part as its second.
2022
Michigan
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Negative › Internal Links › I/L PC Key – Committee Action
Beckmann and Kumar 11, *Professor of Political Science @ UC-Irvine, **Department of Political Science @ UC-Irvine (Matthew and Vimal, “How presidents push, when presidents win: A model of positive presidential power in US lawmaking,” Journal of Theoretical Politics, 23.1)
Considering that roll-call votes ultimately decide the president’s legislative fate, executing a vote-centered strategy is not only important, but often integral, for an administration looking to marshal the president’s agenda to passage. What is more, because endgame expectations condition all earlier stages of the legislative process, the administration’s potential for prevailing on important roll-call votes casts the shadow in which all other bargaining takes place. Thus, it is for good reason that practitioners and political scientists alike have highlighted pivotal voters and vote-centered lobbying when discussing the presidential–congressional relationship. Yet even as vote-centered lobbying is one essential option in the president’s strategic arsenal, it is not the only option. As Charles Jones noted: However they are interpreted, roll call votes cannot be more than they are: one form of floor action on legislation. If analysts insist on scoring the president, concentrating on this stage of lawmaking can provide no more than a partial tally. Jones (1994: 195) It is an admonition that Congressional Quarterly (CQ) staffers have emphasized year after year when characterizing the president’s legislative record by analyzing roll-call votes12. Discussing President Eisenhower’s legislative success in 1953, CQ issued a nowfamiliar caveat: …the President’s leadership often was tested beyond the glare spotlighting roll calls…Negotiations off the floor and action in committee sometimes are as important as the recorded votes. (Congressional Quarterly Almanac 1953: 77).
2022
Michigan
Disadvantage
Negative › Internal Links › I/L PC Key – Issue Specific
Clift 1-18-2022, covers politics for The Daily Beast (Eleanor, “Democrats Can Salvage Biden’s Presidency With These Three Simple Moves,” The Daily Beast, https://www.thedailybeast.com/democrats-can-salvage-bidens-presidency-with-these-three-simple-moves)
Biden ran on his long experience in the Senate and his belief that he could make the Congress work again. He was able to pass significant legislation on infrastructure with bipartisan support, and he could burnish his record with the U.S. Innovation and Competition Act (USICA). It passed the Senate in June (68 to 32) but has been languishing in the House along with the Creating Helpful Incentives to Produce Semiconductors for America Act (CHIPS), which is a component of the broader bill, USICA. Republicans and Democrats love this legislation because it stands up to China and it establishes new semiconductor facilities in the United States, along with a National Semiconductor Technology Center. Anybody paying attention to the supply chain crises knows there’s a crippling shortage of semiconductors. An analysis by Goldman Sachs found 169 industries are affected, with automobiles and electronics hit the hardest. This legislation could have passed and been signed by Biden six months ago, alleviating some of the supply chain issues that the administration is grappling with today. There’s still no timetable for passage, and no apparent rush by the House, where the leadership indicated it wanted to write its own bill as opposed to accepting what was sent over by the Senate. Back in the spring of 2021 when the CHIPS Act sailed through the Senate with 68 votes, everything seemed possible to achieve. “The mood was the sky’s the limit, and to some extent the administration got caught up in that,” says Bill Galston, a senior fellow in governance studies at The Brookings Institution. “After their stunning early victory with the American Rescue Plan, the administration may have concluded the force was with them — and so they outran their political supply lines.” This always happens, says Third Way’s Matt Bennett. “Presidents’ reach far exceeds their grasp. It happened to Clinton on health care, Obama on cap and trade (carbon tax) and Biden on voting rights, George W. Bush on privatizing social security and Trump on getting rid of the ACA (Affordable Care Act). Presidents always try for the moon, and they often fall short. It’s not unusual, not surprising, and now is the time when you take what you can get.”
2022
Michigan
Disadvantage
Negative › Internal Links › I/L PC Key – Issue Specific
JD Supra 2021
Vinson & Elkins LLP, “Labor, Defense, And Rail Services Among Top Competition Concerns Targeted In President Biden’s Executive Order” July 19, 2021 https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/labor-defense-and-rail-services-among-5461441/
As has been well-publicized, on July 9, 2021, President Biden issued an “Executive Order on Promoting Competition in the American Economy” (the “EO” or “Order”).1 As the preamble articulates, the EO’s focus is to “promote the interests of American workers, businesses, and consumers.” The lengthy and detailed Order is sweeping in its breadth, aiming to enhance competition across dozens of industries, and sets forth federal agency-specific instructions as to how particular goals should be carried out. A Rallying Cry to the “Whole-of-Government” The EO seeks to harness the coordinated power of the full federal government, emphasizing “that a whole-of-government approach is necessary to address” competition concerns in the U.S. economy.2 To that end, the Order establishes a White House Competition Council, to be led by the Director of the National Economic Council (“NEC”).3 An integral part of the Office of White House Policy, the general bailiwick of the NEC is to advise the president on economic policy matters. By embedding the new council within the White House, President Biden is sending the strong message that competition is a focus area over which he intends to keep close tabs and invest his personal political capital.
2022
Michigan
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Negative › Internal Links › I/L PC Key – Issue Specific
Mills 2021
Anthony, Senior Fellow American Enterprise Institute, “Funding Isn’t Enough to Fix Science” May 28, 2021
The Senate just spent a fevered 72 hours debating the U.S. Innovation and Competition Act, a bipartisan piece of legislation that aims to spur American innovation and bolster our competitiveness in science and technology by authorizing over $100 billion for federal research and development (R&D). With bipartisan support and the backing of the White House — not to mention a widely shared concern about China’s aspirations of scientific and technological dominance — some version of this bill appears likely to make it into law, eventually.
2022
Michigan
Disadvantage
Negative › Link › L Space Spending
Taylor 17 [Andrew Taylor began his journalism career in the late 1980s, clipping newspaper articles for the politics reporters at Congressional Quarterly. He now is a freelance journalist and writes for PBS https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/debate-over-these-bills-could-lead-to-a-government-shutdown]//LP
An early December government shutdown is a real possibility, since a divided Congress can’t agree on military spending, Democrats insist on help for young immigrants and President Donald Trump’s position can change with each lawmaker he talks to. Most of Washington is focused on overhauling the nation’s tax code, but lawmakers face a combustible mix of must-do and could-do items, with the current government spending bill set to expire Dec. 8. On the list are immigration and a U.S.-Mexico border wall; an impasse over children’s health care; pent-up demand for budget increases for the Pentagon and domestic agencies; and tens of billions of dollars in hurricane aid. There’s plenty at stake for Republicans controlling Washington. Politically, there’s an urgency to avoid a debilitating shutdown just as the GOP hopes to wrap up an overhaul of the tax code that’s its top priority. And legions of GOP defense hawks are adamant that the Pentagon receive a huge 2018 budget hike approaching $80-90 billion. Trump and many followers want the U.S.-Mexico wall. Democrats retain considerable power in the endgame — their votes are needed — and are pressing demands of their own. They want protections for immigrants who were brought to the U.S. illegally as young children. They also demand budget increases for domestic agencies. “I think we’re headed in a good direction on the spending caps,” Sen. Roy Blunt, R-Mo., said Monday. “I don’t know that will get to immigration this year but that’s a pretty easy thing to settle if the Democrats will give the president some of what he wants. I think he would be willing to be pretty forward-leaning on kids who were brought to the country illegally.” For his part, Trump tends to waver depending on the situation — siding with Democrats on a debt deal in September, promising Republicans last week that the controversial immigration issue won’t be part of the year-end spending measure. Meanwhile, the tax debate is taking up energy, time and political capital, and GOP leaders seem reluctant to issue controversial decisions that might harm its chances. Here’s a rundown of non-tax issues facing Congress and Trump Ideally, top leaders in both parties would like to agree on new spending levels and pass a catchall bill by the Dec. 8 deadline. That’s looking increasingly unlikely. Another temporary funding bill would be needed to avert a government shutdown, but many Democrats say they won’t be able to support any measure that doesn’t include help for so-called “Dreamer” immigrants facing deportation. That increases the odds of a shutdown. Congressional leaders are conducting secret talks on raising the spending levels and say they are optimistic of a deal. But there’s no sign of one yet. A possible agreement could add perhaps $100 billion to the budget for the current year alone, which is sure to cause sticker shock among the GOP’s fiscal conservatives. Trump’s demands for the border wall — a nonstarter with Democrats — could spark a shutdown battle. Then there’s aid to areas devastated by Hurricanes Harvey, Irma and Maria. The White House promises to submit a request later this month for “several tens of billions of dollars” aimed mostly at helping Texas and Florida. That’s likely to bring the total appropriated since September for hurricane relief to more than $100 billion, which is likely to rankle deficit hawks. House and Senate negotiators are putting the final touches on an annual defense policy bill for the 2018 fiscal year that’s expected to increase the Pentagon’s core budget by billions of dollars more than the $603 billion Trump requested. There’s some urgency to the talks since Senate Armed Services Chairman John McCain, R-Ariz., is battling an aggressive form of brain cancer. The defense policy bill is expected to expand U.S. missile defenses in response to North Korea’s advancing nuclear weapons programs. Lawmakers also are trying to resolve a long simmering debate over the creation of a new branch that would be in charge of the U.S. military’s space assets.