2022
Michigan
Disadvantage
Negative › 1nc
AIP 6/29
American Institute of Physics, “Congress Searches for Compromise on Landmark Innovation Bill” June 29, 2022 https://www.aip.org/fyi/2022/congress-searches-compromise-landmark-innovation-bill
Negotiations to reconcile the House’s America COMPETES Act of 2022 with the Senate’s U.S. Innovation and Competition Act (USICA) are in the final stretch, with Democratic leaders pushing to pass a compromise bill by the time Congress departs for its usual August break. The urgency stems from the dwindling time remaining to reach a deal before the November election diverts lawmakers’ attention and the current legislative session expires at the end of the year. The bills reflect broad bipartisan interest in improving U.S. capabilities in research and technology development relative to China and other competitor nations, and each includes $52 billion in direct funding for semiconductor R&D and manufacturing. However, the bills sharply diverge over matters such as how to shape a multiagency R&D push, how to build up regional R&D capacity, whether to expedite visas for technically skilled foreign citizens, and how to protect U.S.-funded research from exploitation by rival governments. Lawmakers also attached a host of provisions unrelated to science policy to each bill, opening up debates over far-flung matters such as trade and environmental policy. Any final bill will require the support of at least 10 Republican senators to avoid a filibuster, which gives the Senate additional leverage in the negotiations. Democrats narrow ambitions in search of deal Negotiators have been working behind closed doors since the 107-member conference committee tasked with reconciling the legislation held its first meeting in May. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi (D-CA) said earlier this month that they are “narrowing” the scope of the legislation in hope of reaching compromise, without indicating what they have dropped. She and Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer (D-NY), a key proponent of the legislation, met with their Republican counterparts last week to discuss prospects for a final deal. “We expressed our belief that there is no reason that we should not pass this bill through Congress in July,” Pelosi and Schumer said in a statement. “Democrats have already made accommodations in the name of reaching an agreement, which we are optimistic can happen soon.” However, some Republicans reportedly prefer to revisit the legislation next year since they may gain control of Congress after the midterm elections. Nevertheless, any final bill would still require support from both parties and the Biden administration. The semiconductor funding has put lawmakers under particular pressure to complete the bill, with some leaders in the industry warning a delay could lead them to invest in other countries that have already moved ahead with incentives. President Biden has also made the case for quick action on the legislation, arguing it has measures that will help reduce supply chain disruptions that contribute to inflation. “Pass the damn bill and send it to me,” Biden said in May. “It’s going to help bring down prices, bring home jobs, and power America’s manufacturing comeback.”
2022
Michigan
Disadvantage
AT: Politics DA › 2AC – Won’t Pass
Shah 7-19 [Agam Shah is a writer at HPC wire, 7-19-2022, US Senate Passes CHIPS Act Temperature Check, but Challenges Linger, HPCwire, https://www.hpcwire.com/2022/07/19/us-senate-passes-chips-act-temperature-check-but-challenges-linger/] Eric
But the CHIPS Act doesn’t have bipartisan support. The bill is largely supported by Democrats and U.S. president Joe Biden, but faces opposition from many Republicans, who are trying to use it as leverage to pass bills not connected to semiconductors. Senate leader Mitch McConnell voted no on the Tuesday vote.
2022
Michigan
Disadvantage
AT: Politics DA › 2AC – Won’t Pass
Desiderio and Ferris 7-11 [Andrew Desiderio is a congressional reporter for POLITICO, covering the Senate, national security and foreign policy and Sarah Ferris covers the House for POLITICO’s Congress team, focusing on the Democratic caucus. She has covered Capitol Hill for six years, including stints focused on budget and health care policy for POLITICO Pro and The Hill newspaper, 7-11-2022, McConnell gets GOP backup in his move to snarl bipartisan U.S.-China bill, POLITICO, https://www.politico.com/news/2022/07/11/republican-us-china-bill-00045232] Eric
Senate Republicans are lining up to back Minority Leader Mitch McConnell as he threatens to tank multi-billion-dollar legislation aimed at confronting China, imperiling what initially appeared on track to join this Congress’ biggest bipartisan achievements.
McConnell’s threat, while senators were away from Washington, was aimed at derailing Democrats’ fledgling efforts to revive their party-line tax and climate bill, which all Republicans are expected to oppose. Although the Kentucky Republican supported the U.S.-China competition bill, known by some as USICA, he’s now vowing to block it if Democrats move forward with their separate legislation.
2022
Michigan
Disadvantage
Ptix DA › Will Pass
Evers-Hillstrom 7-20 [Karl Evers-Hillstromis a staff writer at the Hill, 7-20-2022, Lobbying firms report massive profits amid reconciliation, China bill fights, Hill, https://thehill.com/business-a-lobbying/3568053-lobbying-firms-report-massive-profits-amid-reconciliation-china-bill-fights/] Eric
Most of the top Washington lobbying firms continue to build on last year’s record-smashing revenues, and nearly all of them are earning more than they did in 2020, when COVID-19 introduced a flood of first-time lobbying clients seeking federal funds.
In return, K Street lobbyists have delivered results for powerful corporations and other cash-flush clients.
2022
Michigan
Disadvantage
Ptix DA › Will Pass
Tasolides 7-20 [Justin Tasolides is a writer at NYC news, 7-20-2022, Domestic semiconductor manufacturing bill clears key Senate vote, No Publication, https://www.ny1.com/nyc/all-boroughs/news/2022/07/20/senate-chips-semiconductor-bill-biden-schumer] Eric
The measure, known as the CHIPS Act of 2022, contains $39 billion in financial aid to “build, expand, or modernize domestic facilities and equipment for semiconductor fabrication, assembly, testing, advanced packaging or research and development.” Of that figure, $6 billion can be used for loan guarantees or direct loans.
The bill cleared a major procedural hurdle on Tuesday night, advancing comfortably in a 64-34 vote.
2022
Michigan
Disadvantage
Ptix DA › Will Pass
Mervis 7-21 [Jeffrey Mervis reports on science policy in the United States and around the world in an effort to explain to scientists how government works. He keeps a close eye on the changing fortunes of science across the federal government, 07-21-2022, U.S. innovation bill clears major Senate hurdle with research provisions intact, No Publication, https://www.science.org/content/article/u-s-innovation-bill-clears-major-senate-hurdle-research-provisions-intact] Eric
A massive bill to bolster U.S. innovation took a big step toward becoming law this week after a bipartisan coalition of senators defeated an attempt to strip away most of its research components. The latest version of the U.S. Innovation and Competition Act (USICA) also includes new language requiring the National Science Foundation (NSF) and the Department of Energy (DOE) to allocate their research dollars more evenly across the country.
The 64-to-34 vote on Tuesday represents a major victory for Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer (D–NY) and President Joe Biden, who has repeatedly urged Congress to pass legislation that would respond to China’s growing investments in many emerging technologies. But it wouldn’t have been possible without the support of 16 Republicans, who bucked their leadership to back changes that would benefit universities in their states.
2022
Michigan
Kritik
K—Racial IR—FMPS › Aff › Rejecting IR Fails
Michelsen, 21—Department of War Studies, School of Security, King’s College London (Nicholas, “What is a minor international theory? On the limits of ‘Critical International Relations’,” Journal of International Political Theory, Vol 17, Issue 3, 2021, dml)
The problem of synthesis stalks all self-defining Critical approaches to IR. Defining the terms of reference for intellectual dissidence in relation to IR’s ‘disciplinary crisis’, as the poststructuralists did in viewing critique as a function of disciplinary marginality, created conditions ripe for viewing any competitor theory as problematic to the degree that they can be deemed insufficiently minor (Whitehall, 2016). The idea that critique necessitates moving ‘beyond IR’ as an inherently majoritarian project has become a widely expressed trope. The result is that Critical IR theorists now engage in increasingly virulent disagreements over the political and ethical implications of disciplinarity itself. In perpetual abeyance, claimants to Critical IR become hostages to a continuous risk of being exposed as insufficiently pure of the (modernist, racist, colonial, patriarchal, heteronormative, positivist, capitalist) traces of ‘the major literature/discipline’. At the same time, Critical IR scholars who advocate for a disciplinary exit in search of ‘more Critical’ inter-disciplines have found themselves wrestling with the charge of pre-judgement: Since they appear to know what ‘Being Critical’ will look like after de-disciplinarisation, critique takes the form of testing whether other scholars meet these pre-given criteria (Holden, 2006; Howell and Richter-Montpetit, 2020).
This stream in contemporary IR scholarship ignores the manners in which minor theories, far from tending towards alliances, are often set to contradictory political and ethical purposes. And that the visions of world politics created by scholars ‘moving beyond’ disciplinary IR can be just as problematic as visions already settled within the discipline. Contemporary political and social movements borrow intellectual resources from various (once or still) minor theoretical traditions in IR to think against a ‘Globalist’ world order, incorporating the Gramscian position that ‘politics is downstream from culture’, the ideal of a transgressive emancipatory identity, and the critique of neo-colonialism (Love, 2017; Nagle 2017). The philosopher Alain De Benoist wrote his manifesto for the New Right in the year 2000 with the aim of challenging the oppressive implications of major international theories, especially Liberalism, borrowing widely from resources of minor intellectual critique (de Benoist and Champetier, 1999). This theory is marginal in disciplinary IR, but influential amongst populist politicians like Putin, Trump, Orban, Salvini and Le Pen, as well as online communities of Race Realists, western chauvinists, and white nationalists. It proposes that Liberalism destroys the autonomy of ethnicities and cultures, and that the history of the west has been one of ongoing cultural as well as political colonialism. De Benoist’s argument is that the project of decolonisation is incomplete, and continues through international aid and UN-led Liberal paternalism.
2022
Michigan
Kritik
K—Racial IR—FMPS › Aff › No Prior Questions/Root Cause
Rose, 21—editor of Foreign Affairs (Gideon, “Foreign Policy for Pragmatists,” Foreign Affairs, March/April 2021, dml)
Theories of history, fundamental beliefs about how the world works, are usually assumed rather than argued and rarely get subjected to serious scrutiny. Yet these general ideas set the parameters for all the specific policy choices an administration makes. Know an administration’s theory of history, and much of the rest is easy to fill in.
There are a lot of possible theories of history, but they tend to fall, like Bush’s and Trump’s, into two main camps: optimistic and pessimistic. Thus, the Clinton administration followed its own version of happy directionality—think of it as Bush with less muscular Christianity. And there have been earlier believers in Trump’s dark and stormy night, as well.
2022
Michigan
Kritik
K—Racial IR—FMPS › Aff › Integrative Pluralism
Wight, 19—Professor and Chair of Government and International Relations in the School of Social and Political Sciences at the University of Sydney, Australia (Colin, “Bringing the outside in: The limits of theoretical fragmentation and pluralism in IR theory,” Politics, Vol 39, Issue 1, 2019, dml)
Pluralism for the sake of pluralism seems to lead to an incapacitating relativism, or what Yosef Lapid (2003) calls a ‘flabby pluralism’. A better term might be disengaged pluralism. No claim or viewpoint would seem to be invalid, and theorists are free to pursue their own agenda with little or no contact with alternative views. This is a disengaged pluralism because there is no attempt to specify the relationships between theories or to examine one’s own theoretical position in the light of alternative views. The absence of an agreed unity of method would also entail that the standards by which the various theories are to be judged would be internal to the theory (Jackson, 2011; Smith, 2004). This would be a disengaged form of pluralism with each theoretical perspective legitimating its claims solely on its own terms and with little reason to engage in conversations with alternative approaches. It is the kind of pluralism that finds its political expression in apartheid. Despite the intense theoretical debate that followed the ‘third debate’ (Waever’s ‘fourth’), IR now seems to have settled into an uneasy truce based on theoretical pluralism/fragmentation. Indeed, in some respects, the validity of the ‘ism’s’ themselves have been called into question (Lake, 2013). Analytical eclecticism (Sil and Katzenstein, 2010) now seems to be the mantra of the day. The question remains as to whether we simply embrace this fragmentation or attempt to work towards a more coherent view of global processes. My own view is that we should attempt to move towards a position that I will term ‘integrative pluralism’ (Mitchell, 2003). Integrative pluralism is not an attempt to forge competing knowledge claims into one overarching position that subsumes them all. It is not a form of theoretical synthesis (Kratochwil, 2003), nor is it a middle ground that eclectically claims to take the best of various theories to forge them into a ‘grand theory of everything’ (Wendt, 1999). Integrative pluralism accepts and preserves the validity of a wide range of theoretical perspectives and embraces theoretical diversity as a means of providing more comprehensive and multi-dimensional accounts of complex phenomena. This is not a suggestion that a summation of the various theoretical claims will produce a complete account; we could not know when any account was complete. Moreover, engaging in integrative pluralism carries risks, and some theories may not survive. In the course engagement, some theories may ultimately be rejected, and others may undergo substantial change and modification; hence, it is not a form of relativism. Which theories contribute to our overall stock of knowledge and which fall by the wayside, however, is not an issue that can be resolved solely in the heat of metatheoretical debate. The ultimate test of integrative pluralism will be practice, but this is a practice that cannot even begin unless we have some sense of its problems, possibilities and practicality. Current theoretical debate in the discipline does not seem conducive to this discussion and theories seem to function as identity markers within a social system suffused by battles over resources and power. Understanding the different forms of pluralism is essential in terms of opening up space for global voices to enter the IR conversation. If mainstream, mainly Western, dominated IR theory struggles to listen to alternative voices from within its own limited inter-paradigmatic frameworks, then there is little chance that it will be open to non-western voices. In addition, if non-western global voices enter the terrain on the terms already set by the fragmentation of the ‘isms’ then opportunities for serious dialogue will be limited. Given the potential for non-western voices to reconfigure IR theory along new and interesting lines, it would be a disaster if those voices adopted the frameworks that have stymied serious cross theoretical debate thus far. Indeed, the current theoretical landscape that confronts new entrants to the discipline might be one factor that increases their exclusion. Those global voices will have a greater potential of not repeating the mistakes of the past if they have a sophisticated understanding of the structural configuration that has produced ‘isms inertia’. Getting around the current theoretical impasse will require an explanation of how it arises and an account of the limits, problems and potentials of theorising in IR. I suggest four main factors help explain theoretical fragmentation in the discipline. First is ontology. The contemporary international political system is best understood as a complex open system, which displays ‘emergent properties’ and degrees of ‘organised complexity’. Because all human systems have this form, they require a plurality of explanations to deal with phenomena at differing levels, and the complex differentiation of causal mechanisms within levels. Since theory is a process of abstraction, and since we cannot isolate particular mechanism in the manner of some of the natural sciences, then some form of theoretical pluralism is necessary and to be expected. Yet some of the natural sciences face a similar situation and have not regressed into a state of rampant theoretical fragmentation. So, complexity is not a sufficient explanation. Second, is the academic division of labour, which compartmentalises knowledge into zones of expertise, which in turn, structurally impedes the development of interdisciplinary research needed to explain complex systems. Third, is the structure of IR as an academic discipline, which using a framework developed by Richard Whitley (1984), I characterise as a ‘fragmented adhocracy’. Whitley views reputation as the currency of an academic discipline. A fragmented adhocracy is marked by a low degree of reputational interdependency between competing research groups, with few organisational impediments regarding the choice of theoretical framework, research methodology or even core problematic. As a consequence, the research activity within the field proceeds in an arbitrary, incoherent and at times ad hoc manner, with few sustained attempts to integrate new research with the existing configuration of knowledge. In such an intellectual structure, the potential for integrative pluralism is low. The fourth reason, however, is the most important, the most problematic, and I suspect the most difficult to change. This is the issue of epistemology, and in particular disciplinary accounts of its place in the practice of science. My argument here is simple: The way IR currently understands the issue of epistemology, is confused, incorrect and a severe barrier to serious debate across differing theoretical perspectives. I refer here to the widespread view that positivism, postpositivism, rationalism, constructivism, feminism and postmodernism, for example, are epistemological positions. For instance, according to Markus Kornprobst: The deepest and most consequential disagreements in the field are epistemological. Both the so-called ‘third debate’ (Lapid, 1989) between positivists and postpositivists and the ‘communicative stasis’ (Lapid, 2003: 130) that has succeeded it, speak volumes about the divisiveness of assumptions on how to produce knowledge. (Kornprobst, 2009: 87) And for Steve Smith: the key difference between rationalist and reflectivist approaches is that, broadly speaking, rationalist accounts are positivist, whereas reflectivist approaches oppose positivism … for now it is enough to note that the central differences between rationalist and reflectivist accounts are epistemological and methodological, and only secondarily about what the world is like (ontology). (Smith, 2010: 5) This account treats the debate between positivists and postpositivists as a debate between competing epistemologies. This is an error; positivism is not an epistemology but a philosophy of science. Moreover, the idea of a ‘feminist’ epistemology or a postmodern epistemology makes no sense. At best we might talk about feminist methods or postmodern methods. However, to ask of a positivist for example, ‘how do you know X’, and to receive the reply ‘because of positivism’ is not an epistemological position it is a statement of identity. As John Gunnell (1998: 7), argues ‘epistemology, properly construed, is I will maintain a post-hot enterprise contingent on substantive theory and scientific practice’. Yet rarely, if ever, are we told why the differences between positivism and postpositivism are legitimately treated in epistemological terms? Never is it explained why epistemologies cannot be integrated and/or combined; apart that is, from vague allusions to incommensurability (Wight, 1996). This is to misuse and abuse the term epistemology. It is a misuse and abuse of the term because epistemological positions do not operate as the a priori discontinuous and discrete entities this view suggests. I take it as given that the argument about complexity is a given. Likewise, the adverse effects of the academic division of labour in terms of impeding interdisciplinary work are not in doubt. Hence, the article will concentrate on the relationship between current understandings of epistemology and the structure of IR as an academic discipline. These two aspects are mutually reinforcing. Current understandings of epistemology in IR reproduce the disciplinary social structure, and the disciplinary structure reproduces the current understanding of epistemology. Before proceeding, however, a clarification on the issue of science. My position is based on what is known as scientific realism (Psillos, 1999). According to scientific realism, there is no such thing as the scientific method that can be applied in all domains and across all subject matters. Science is not one thing it is many. There is no one scientific method, and each science needs to orientate its methods according to the specifics of its object domain. How we study sub-atomic particles will require different methods to how we study human societies. For the sake of expediency, I will merely define science as the attempt to come to understand and/or explain the chosen object domain through systematic and critical inquiry.
2022
Michigan
Kritik
K—Racial IR—FMPS › Aff › IR Good---Short
Ettinger, 20—Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, Carleton University (Aaron, “Scattered and Unsystematic: The Taught Discipline in the Intellectual Life of International Relations,” International Studies Perspectives (2020) 0, 1–24, dml)
Taking teaching seriously as part of the intellectual life of international relations can lead to intellectual renewal and self-reflection for individual professors and for the discipline as a whole. At the individual level, teaching has the ability to catalyze an intellectual renewal in the mind of the individual professor. The intellectual challenges of the classroom can provoke new avenues of research for the instructor. The classroom is a much more permissive intellectual environment than academic publishing. It affords the professor a degree of freedom to explore topics, ideas, and arguments, outside of their research expertise. Making use of the opportunity to teach beyond one’s comfort zone permits thinking out loud, working through ideas, and entanglement in analytical puzzles. Doing so is demanding, and it is much easier to fall back on existing teaching content. But an ambitious teaching agenda can lead to new research questions, new and unexpected intellectual horizons, and better background context for existing expertise. Indeed, there is truth to the aphorism that there is no better way to learn than to teach.
This kind of renewal turns on the “eureka” moment when research ideas flows directly from classroom activities. A more systematic approach to renewal that is less reliant on serendipity begins by asking discipline-wide questions. The first is this: what is the purpose of teaching international relations? It is a variation on a core concern to the discipline and one that remains unresolved (Dyvik, Wilkinson, and Selby 2017)? Is it for disciplinary self-reproduction, to train future practitioners, or more broadly, citizens and knowledge workers in the twenty-first century economy (Darling and Foster 2012; Szarejko and Carnes 2018; Zartner et al. 2018)? Arriving at an official “purpose” for international relations is probably pointless, and it is best left to the decentralized community of scholars to decide. IR scholars have debated this question widely within the published discipline but far less so in the taught discipline. This is a shame because the answers matter for the nature of the design of individual courses and entire degree programs.
2022
Michigan
Kritik
K—Racial IR—FMPS › Aff › IR Good---Long
Ettinger, 20—Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, Carleton University (Aaron, “Scattered and Unsystematic: The Taught Discipline in the Intellectual Life of International Relations,” International Studies Perspectives (2020) 0, 1–24, dml)
The first benefit is generating a well-trained pipeline of future IR scholars and practitioners. Today’s students are the scholars and practitioners of tomorrow, and sparking curiosity in students, especially undergraduates, has the potential to rejuvenate the field from within. As Hagmann and Biersteker (2014, 292–293) argue, IR scholars should “take a more direct interest in how world politics is explained to students in everyday schooling practices.” This is eminently sensible. International relations’ preoccupation with “the cult of research intensivity” (Nossal 2006, 737), and to a lesser extent political practice, misleads the professoriate into believing that the very people who sustain universities as institutions and who are the future of the discipline—student subscribers—can be ignored. It has also led the IR professoriate to undervalue the contribution that the taught discipline makes to disciplinary renewal through the training of international relations’ next generation.
For future practitioners, whether in government or elsewhere, an IR education provides the conceptual architecture needed to make decisions about policy and its place in the world. In his memoirs, Henry Kissinger emphasizes this point: “The convictions that leaders have formed before reaching high office are the intellectual capital they will consume as long as they continue in office. There is little time for leaders to reflect” (as quoted in Desch 2019, 153). While Kissinger is talking about the highest level of elected office, it is equally true that policymakers throughout government come in equipped with the intellectual capital and technical skills learned in the classroom (Biswas and Paczynska 2015). For future scholars, early lessons have downstream effects on the very content of IR knowledge. After all, the classroom is where IR theory gets reproduced “for the first time” to future generations of IR scholars. As Newsom (1995, 64–65) put it, “[t]eachers plant the seeds that shape the thinking of each new generation; this is probably the academic world’s most lasting contribution.” It is also a place where the durability and centrality of the field’s major theories are reinforced as a matter of course and not necessarily for the better (Vitalis 2015, 6). Early undergraduates carry the assumptions they are taught throughout their undergraduate and graduate careers, and beyond. A discipline that cannot connect with students or is inward-looking and esoteric risks putting off its next generation. Thus, the classroom needs to be treated with greater regard as a site of knowledge production and dissemination in the intellectual life of the field. In this sense, curiosity can be provoked among students that may continue beyond an undergraduate career. Take, for example, the observation of one student on her intellectual awakening in the classroom:
2022
Michigan
Kritik
K—Racial IR—FMPS › Aff › Critiquing Western Scholarship Fails
Vickers, 20—Professor of Comparative Education at Kyushu University (Edward, “Critiquing coloniality, ‘epistemic violence’ and western hegemony in comparative education – the dangers of ahistoricism and positionality,” Comparative Education, 56:2, 165-189, dml) [gendered language modifications denoted by brackets]
The central flaw in the argument advanced by the CER authors stems from an apparent lack of awareness of contemporary scholarship on the comparative history of imperialism and colonialism. Criticism of the Eurocentric assumptions that inform much mainstream social science is certainly warranted, as is critique of the excessive influence exerted by institutions such as key journals based in North America or Europe. However, when critical arguments rely on selective and historically flimsy claims for the uniquely colonial quality of modern Western culture, the risks are twofold: firstly, and fundamentally, actually to sustain or reinforce Eurocentrism by deflecting the critical gaze from non-Western societies and the patterns of oppression (‘colonial’ or otherwise) therein; and secondly, by the same token to weaken or discredit the case for a more inclusive and culturally sensitive approach to the comparative analysis of education.
The empirical and theoretical flaws of this approach are intertwined with the problematic language in which its arguments are typically couched. Historical and anthropological scholarship on East Asia and other regions amply demonstrates that colonialist or neo-colonialist attitudes and strategies of domination are not and have never been a Western monopoly. But decolonial theory posits the more or less uniform victimhood of non-Western ‘others,’ deriving claims for the moral superiority of ‘authentically’ indigenous perspectives. Debating the validity of such claims is complicated by an emphasis on ‘positionality.’ Readers are exhorted to judge an argument less by standards of evidence or logic (often portrayed as camouflaging a Western ‘will to power’) than on the basis of the writer’s self-identification or ‘positioning.’ The language of ‘epistemic violence,’ ‘secure spaces,’ ‘epistemological diffidence,’ ‘border thinking’ and ‘location’ suggests an image of the critical scholar as revolutionary guerrilla, valiantly sniping at Western hegemony from his or her [their] marginal redoubt. In so far as this reflects a desire for a more just, tolerant and sustainable society – one that values diversity as a resource for mutual learning – it is admirable. However, if we seek to combat oppression, in the educational sphere or beyond, it is incumbent on us to pick our enemies, and our language, carefully. Aiming a blunderbuss at the supposedly illegitimate or self-serving ‘universalism’ of ‘modern Western social science,’ while ignoring how calls for indigenisation and ‘authenticity’ are used to legitimate highly oppressive regimes across Asia and elsewhere, is to risk undermining those universal social and political values (freedom of expression, civil liberties, rule of law) upon which critical scholars themselves rely.
2022
Michigan
Kritik
K—Racial IR—FMPS › ALT › AT: Perm Do The Aff Through The Lens
Howell and Richter-Montpetit 20(Alison, Associate Professor of Political Science at Rutgers University, Melanie, Senior Lecturer in International Relations and Director of the Centre for Advanced International Theory, “Is securitization theory racist? Civilizationism, methodological whiteness, and antiblack thought in the Copenhagen School”, CS)
This article has illustrated that classic securitization theory is structured not only by Eurocentrism, but also by civilizationism, methodological whiteness, and antiblack racism. This is evident in its conception of politics, borrowed from Arendt, which it defines as a sphere of (white) civilized dialogue where reason triumphs over irrational securitizations. This perspective is only made possible by ignoring colonial history, ongoing (settler-)colonial relations, and the racial violence of normal liberal politics. Securitization theory’s racism is also evident in its methodology, which examines securitizing speech acts in order to defend this (European, civilized) ‘normal politics’. Under cover of ostensibly neutral terms, securitization normatively prioritizes the defense of order over justice, positioning the securitization theorist as the defender of (white) civilized politics against (racialized) ‘primal anarchy’. We have further demonstrated the role of antiblack thought in securitization theory: its racist imaginaries of Africa serve as an indispensable foil, setting up a contrast between normal politics and securitization. One question beyond the scope of this article is whether this is similarly true of ‘second-generation’ and more empirical applications of securitization theory – or, indeed, the mere use of the word ‘securitization’. Postcolonial literature has long deliberated whether it is possible to rework theories built on racist precepts. For example, vigorous debate has surrounded whether the works of Marx (Coulthard, 2014; Rao, 2017; Robinson, 1983) or Foucault (Mbembe, 2003; Stoler, 1995; Thobani, 2007) can be adapted and made to work for anti-racist/anti-colonial purposes. Are there ‘reparative possibilities’ (Sedgwick, 1997; in relation to international relations, see Rao, 2017) for classic securitization theory? Can it excise or surmount its racist foundations? Our analysis suggests that securitization theory’s racism is not an incidental feature, nor ‘merely’ a matter of (empirical) application. Rather, it is baked into securitization theory’s conceptual apparatus and, in particular, its core concepts of politics and security. These problems cannot be remedied by applying classic securitization theory to non-Western spaces (as typically suggested by critics of its Eurocentrism), or by simply adding race or colonialism to its accounts. The retention of securitization theory’s concepts and methods leads to a primary focus on instances of overtly racist speech acts. Global racism is then treated as a matter of mere language. This elides the constitutive role of racist and colonial relations of force and expropriation in the making of the modern order, including ongoing security projects (see Howell and Richter-Montpetit, 2019). Once classic securitization theory is stripped of its racist conceptual and methodological apparatus, including its concepts of ‘normal politics’, its conservative deployment of speech act theory, its view of excessive securitization as threatening a racially encoded lower level of civilization, its faith in the social contract, and so on, there is very little left. Perhaps what remains is simply the word ‘securitization’. But even this word is potentially problematic, because inherent in it is a temporal move from normal politics towards the (exceptional) violence of security. Authors attempting to recuperate the term ‘securitization’ must take care not to indulge in white nostalgia for a better, more innocent time: a time that does not exist for those who have been subject to colonialism or the racial contract on scales from the local to the global – that is to say, the majority of the world’s people. Such a recuperative intellectual project, if at all possible, has yet to be articulated.
2022
Michigan
Kritik
K—Racial IR—FMPS › ALT › AT: Perm
Van Milders and Toros 20(Lucas, Assistant Professor in Critical Security Studies at the University of Groningen, Harmonie, Deputy Director of Institute of Cyber Security for Society (iCSS) at University of Kent, “Violent International Relations”, CS)
This has also left a mark on the dynamics of knowledge production. Our conceptualisation of ‘the other side of the line’ is always determined by Western epistemology’s abyssal thinking, that is, the colonial matrix of knowledge production (Santos, 2007). In other words, this messy cartography is predicated on the assumption that those within the zone of nonbeing cannot speak or think (Spivak, 1994). The hierarchy between rational, objective and universal knowledge and irrational, subjective and particular experience continues to operate through Orientalist conceptions about who knows and who is known or who produces knowledge and who produces experience. In short, the violence of colonial difference constitutes the Western, academic knowledge worker, whether they work strictly within disciplinary boundaries or an interdisciplinary fashion. And this brings us to the second question: what does this mean for knowledge production in IR? Here we point to the ontological gap between knowledge and experience that has recently been articulated as a critique of the role of the expert as an Orientalist subject (Kynsilehto and Puumala, 2015; Sylvester, 2011, 2012, 2013). Indeed, the ‘international’ nature of IR and of its scholars make the discipline a ‘frontline’ discipline that often resides in practices along the abyssal lines between the zones of being and nonbeing. This is caused by the object of enquiry of the discipline – formally the power relations between states but, as is increasingly recognised, the power relations between people. It is also caused by the practices of the discipline – the need to perform the role and lifestyle of the international expert for research, dissemination and increasingly impact. There are many ways in which this is distributed across the discipline, yet what the iterations of disciplinary violence in IR tend to have in common is a further proliferation of the limits of IR as essentially an abyssal line. This concerns, for instance, the decadent or disciplinary nature of mainstream IR, widely critiqued elsewhere (such as in Ashley and Walker, 1990 and Weber, 2014 to name but two separated by decades). However, critical strands of IR theory might have, despite their efficacy at exposing the violence performed by mainstream IR, implicitly (and presumably undeliberately) contributed to the image of the critical theorist as an expert or intellectual, characterised by the privilege to withdraw politically and theorise both systemically as well as globally (Linklater, 1996). This image subsequently solicits and naturalises a range of theoretical inquiries that not only stem from the zone of being but also, as mentioned above, continue to demarcate an abyssal line around the discipline. This has, in recent years, allowed for the continued support for Western military violence in post-colonial states, even when such instances have had disastrous effects (see debate between Dunne and Gelber, 2014, Hehir, 2015, and again Dunne and Gelber, 2015 as well as the critique of feminist support for war in Afghanistan in Wibben, 2011). The violent nature of IR is also evident from its inclusion of non-Western forms of theory (typically presented as reactionary and anti-Western) on the premise that they do not challenge the discipline’s inherently Western epistemology (Buzan, 2018). The violence of IR theory is then characterised by its capacity and often willingness to maintain relations of both material as well as epistemic coloniality.
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K—Racial IR—FMPS › ALT › AT: Perm
Chandler and Chipato 21(David, Professor of International Relations at University of Westminster, UK, Farai, PhD in Political Science from Queen Mary University of London, “A call for abolition: The disavowal and displacement of race in critical security studies”, CS)
The problem with this move of displacement is that the ethico-political stance of reparation is necessarily an affirmative one. As Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick (2003: 150–151) suggests, it is through this displacement that we can learn from the ‘ways selves and communities succeed in extracting sustenance from the objects of a culture – even of a culture whose avowed desire has often been not to sustain them’. As Tiffany Lethabo King powerfully argues, while it is the case that reading ‘for what is generative and provides openings’ (King, 2019: 230n74) is vital for coalition and collaboration, reparative work advocated in LGBT and queer theory presupposes the positionality of a shared humanist sexual subject position. As Fred Moten (2018: 11–12) notes in his essay on race and the work of Levinas, the reparative stance of being ‘open to the world’ or ‘available to the world’ can only work as a critical project for those for whom the world is accessible in these ways. For those structurally excluded from this political ontology of the subject, this openness would be critical only insofar as relationality is understood to be an expression of power, structured by the givenness of a transcendental subjectivity that the black cannot have but by which the black can be had; a structural position that he or she cannot take but by which he or she can be taken. (Moten, 2018: 204) Any project of reparative work for generative ethico-political openings would have to be undertaken after the abolition or dismantling of critical security studies, not as a substitute for this, displacing the problem to that of the repair of the disciplinary field. Reparative work proffered from within a system where race is not merely the ‘oil’ in the engine but the engine itself offers little hope of real change. How can critical security studies offer a space for a new antiracist political ethics, from within the wider ‘prison of colonial modernity’ (Blaney and Tickner, 2017)? Surely, if reparative work is to be undertaken, it should be carried out on the terms of those who are wronged, rather than on the grounds of the perpetrator of the offence. If critical security studies exists on the ground of the ‘human’, as a science of the humanity from which Blackness has always been excluded, then it cannot ameliorate the oppression that was required to clear that ground (Wynter, 2003). Instead, we might follow Alexander Weheliye (2014: 137) in arguing that humanity, the idea of the ‘human’, can only be overhauled from without, transformed by those who, he argues, ‘live behind the veil of the permanent state of exception’. Thus, we might argue that reparation ultimately leads us back to subjection (see Coulthard, 2007: 453). ‘Questions of race and racism’ are not the spectre haunting critical security studies, they are its life blood, its arteries and the muscles that power it. Critical security studies can have no reparative access to ‘questions of race and racism’ no matter how hard or how genuinely it tries. ‘Questions of race and racism’ are what enable the cuts and binaries, the world, the subjects, the concerns, the practices, the methods, the understandings of critical security studies. Critical. Security. Studies. What is it about these three words, singularly, together, in whatever order, that could make anyone think, in today’s world, there was a way beyond their imbrications in ‘questions of race and racism’? Critical of what? On what grounds? Security of what? On what grounds? Study of what? On what grounds? Answer: the grounds of anti-Blackness or ‘questions of race and racism’.
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K—Racial IR—FMPS › ALT › AT: Perm
Henderson 13(Errol, Associate Professor of Political Science at Pennsylvania State University, “Hidden in plain sight: racism in international relations theory”, CS)
In fact, the ‘norm against noticing’ white racism is so intense that it engenders a ‘silencing’ of those who would raise it; or it ensures against publication in mainstream outlets for such work except that authors provide appropriate euphemisms for the atrocities associated with white racism—especially against blacks—or they provide the requisite ‘balance’ to emphasize the role of nonwhites in their own subjugation—as if white supremacism and the imperialism, colonialism, neocolonialism and internal colonialism that it has employed against Africans, Asians, and Native Americans are somehow the responsibility of groups other than the whites who created, maintained and continue to profit from them. Thus, the racist dualism in world politics creates, in turn, a dual quandary for IR scholars and many Africanists seeking to publish in Western journals—and many non-Western ones, too—wherein white racist expectations of the appropriateness of certain lines of inquiry often limit the discourse of African politics to hollow phraseology and meaningless metaphors, while they simultaneously check informed challenges to historical and contemporary expressions, practices and institutions of white racism in academia by ensuring that such racism is rarely confronted in the major publications in IR/world politics in clear and direct terms. Another result is that the norm against noticing white racism leaves IR scholars teaching a history of the development of IR which ignores the salience of colonialism as central to the origins of the field. That is, in continuing to teach the fiction that the field emerged following the devastation of World War I as ‘idealists’ led by Wilson and others such as Lowes Dickinson, Zimmern, Giddings and Kerr sought to provide the institutional checks on the realpolitik that was implicated in the ‘war to end all wars’, we belie the reality of the centrality of colonialism, race development and white racial supremacy to the development of the academic field of IR. Thus, our narrative creates an academic fiction that hovers outside of its own history. The presence of this narrative is a testament to the white supremacism that is a centrepiece of the field given its role in ensuring a ‘norm against noticing’ the centrality of white racism in world politics. It simultaneously silences or marginalizes perspectives that focus on the importance of white racism in the development of the field of IR/world politics, and similarly, those who would raise this as a legitimate research focus for the most sensible of reasons: it happens to be true.
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K—Racial IR—FMPS › ALT › AT: No Spill Up
Gani and Marshal 22(Jasmine, PhD in International Relations from the London School of Economics, Jenna, PhD Political Science, Queen Mary University of London, “The impact of colonialism on policy and knowledge production in International Relations”, CS)
First, as a number of the contributions argue,15 academia has been a predominant influence in the production of broad epistemic communities. In the course of this process, academic knowledge production has acted as a supplier of racial, civilizational and imperialist discourse, ideology and ‘logic’ that were (and are) disseminated through research, teaching and broader public intellectualism. Bearing in mind that many policy-makers have been taught and trained within academia, especially elite institutions, it is necessary to recall that IR departments were founded in the early twentieth century in the United Kingdom and United States precisely to serve the purpose of informing imperial administrations.16 While this form of transmission is impossible to quantify precisely, the articles in this special issue show that nevertheless universities, along with think tanks and journals, delineated the parameters of rational and acceptable debate. That the ideas emanated (as they still do) from so-called bastions of scholarship and rigour meant they carried greater credibility and gravitas, and were accompanied by an assumption that they had been scientifically tested. In many cases universities and intellectuals were responsible for upholding the legitimacy of racist hierarchies and the necessity of colonialism in the West against the grain of anti-colonial and anti-racist social movements and intellectuals in the colonies, and subsequent grassroots movements for the abolition of colonialism and racism in the West. Thus, in contrast to the common refrain that academia is an ‘ivory tower’ that is disconnected from the real world, in IR it has in fact routinely demonstrated the opposite, with the capacity to embed and systematize racism, scavenging the disorganized and reactionary fears of society and refining them in such a way that they appear rational,17 indeed necessary for the sake of order, security and communal peace. A second way in which academia has historically fed and continues to feed policy is in a more direct way—through a supply chain of academically trained experts who go on to work in policy, either as consultants or by holding office in government or in other state institutions such as the military. This pattern was laid down during the peak period of European colonialism, the clearest example being provided by J. S. Mill: despite being a philosopher, he was anything but detached from the ‘real world’, taking up the position of colonial officer in British-controlled India, arguing against Indian self-rule on the racist intellectual basis that the natives were still in their infancy.18 Such ‘knowledge entrepreneurs’ were at the forefront of the knowledge ordering indispensable to Britain’s expansion into south Asia. These ‘epistemological invasions’, alongside the core group of ‘European explorers, diplomats, military men, and Company officials’, had the chief function of producing ‘a proto-episteme’ or ‘corpus of knowledge’ by which the region was rendered legible for imperial expansion.19 Later, the urgent imperatives of war established the revolving door that turned scholars into practitioners and vice versa, as witnessed, for example, in the interplay in 1930s British East Africa between colonial administrations and anthropologists to ensure indirect rule.20 But such close embodied relationships between academics and imperial governance were not confined to the age of formal empires. The scholarly sanitizing and rebranding of contemporary imperialism as ‘hegemony’ or ‘soft power’ prevents us from applying anti-colonial critiques to contemporary empires. In his contribution to the special issue, Randolph Persaud argues that this is a complicity especially epitomized by US ‘Disciplinary IR’, and challenges the feigning of neutrality in US-led theorizing, calling for it to be recognized as implicitly ideological.21 Moreover, it is precisely their ideological character that renders such academics ‘useful’ and allows them to move smoothly into policy roles. Thus, for Persaud, their service as practitioners acts as the chief conduit for those ideologies to travel into and be socialized in policy. Presidents Woodrow Wilson and Barack Obama, and Secretaries of State Henry Kissinger and Condoleezza Rice, are just some of the examples of academics who have served in high office in the United States. The notion that academic expertise might temper imprudence and propensity for war in policy-making is refuted by their respective willingness to approve of foreign occupations, military intervention, coups, drone attacks or authoritarian allies abroad, and of racial securitization, border regimes and incarceration at home. As Persaud points out, beyond those holding office there are multiple examples of academics who have acted as advisers to governments, obliquely upholding the principles of imperialism under the guise of ‘grand strategy’ or the ‘liberal international order’.
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K—Racial IR—FMPS › ALT › AT: IR=Redeemable
Vitalis 2K(Robert, Professor of Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania, “The Graceful and Generous Liberal Gesture: Making Racism Invisible in American International Relations”, CS)
Once, after I presented an account of the Saudi case, a colleague asked: ‘why do you seem surprised by any of this, what did you expect?’ This question tells us something about how the Cold War ‘norm against noticing’, the ‘graceful and generous liberal gesture’ proceeds, what it presumes. Race is already known, banal and commonplace, not worth noticing. Race is ‘really’ something else. Race is a ‘language that most would today find offensive and inappropriate’. This last statement sums up how the best history we have to date of the discipline of IR, Political Discourse of Anarchy, by Brian Schmidt, deals with the most significant force in American politics and culture. Schmidt dismisses in a single sentence in a self-styled discursive history what was known at the time to be basic to understanding world politics, the ‘conflict of color’.89 More recently, a colleague politely pressed me to name a single work by the towering intellect of the twentieth century that was significant for any aspect of IR. This form of question is a well-known reflex that is triggered when canons of seemingly timeless truths come under interrogation. But the truth is that ‘African Roots of War’, Du Bois’ bold attempt to theorise on imperialism and global conflict, which his biographer Levering Lewis calls ‘one of the analytical triumphs of the early twentieth century’, has never been anthologised or discussed in any IR theory text in the US.90 While ‘African Roots’ was celebrated then, and Du Bois lectured widely to black and white audiences at home and abroad on the topic, we are much more likely now to reference white writers—E.D. Morel’s Africa and the Peace of Europe, and especially, Lenin’s Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism—when creating our genealogies and canons of anti-imperialism and ‘radical’ theory traditions in world politics. Lord Zimmern, in contrast to Du Bois, is almost always included in one story IR tells about World War I and its putative impact on the emerging discipline in Great Britain and the US.91 But the transcripts of Lord Zimmern’s deeply rooted, extended, and quite serious conversations with his many colleagues about race as a fundamental part of world order, ‘the most urgent problem of our time’, inevitably go unreported, and so the questions they raise for Zimmern’s successors remain unresolved. The first post-war generation of émigré theorists was equally successful in mythmaking of its own. They created a world where realist thought in its classic geopolitical mode is a coherent and continuous tradition across space and time. Today’s national security debates and self-serving ‘strategic justifications’ are represented as the close echoes of earlier debates inside imperial states and societies. At key moments, the promotion of civilisation, greatness, and modernity (or, now, democracy and market economies), the preservation of a hegemon’s credibility, and other expansionist credos trump the arguments of those who really understand the true strategic or security value inhering in one course over that of another. Old metaphors are compared with new ones, for instance, a row of falling dominoes, a barrel contaminated by one rotten apple, and the like.92 Representatives of the American geopolitics tradition, such as Ellsworth Huntington and Alfred Thayer Mahan, can be summoned and selectively quoted without ever acknowledging their concern with the world racial balance of power that launched the quest for a whitewater Navy as defence against the teeming Asian multitudes who threatened from land and sea.93 It is in the forgotten, yet vast literature and the terms of the ongoing public debate on ‘race war’ that we can trace the roots of what is later recast as an American realist tradition in IR theory. We have to acknowledge, nonetheless, that the collectivity that identifies itself as ‘the field of International Relations’ in the US is tightly, organically bound to a particular place, history, and social formation.94 This inescapable fact, which applies equally across ‘schools’ of thought and methodological ‘approaches’, goes far to explain why IR today has little to say about racism as an international institution or white supremacy as the identity of the American state that the field’s founders embraced and elaborated. Certainly, this problematique would provide a better explanation than one that would simply erase racism from the historical record else deny its importance. It would place the post-Holocaust, post-World War II invention of realism as a tradition that argues against the explanatory significance of ideas (and morality) in world politics in a new and disturbing light. Critical alternatives need to be elaborated in opposition to the ‘norm against noticing’ and to the wider so-called ‘realist’ strains in American life (defined against hopelessly utopian visions about ‘ending war’ or ‘transcending capitalism’) that, without a hint of irony, insist that a ‘colour blind’ society is now within easy reach.95 Such are the terms today in which privilege is defended and hierarchy reconstituted. The embeddedness of writers and readers in a particular cultural formation is inescapable. But so too is the work of ‘clearing intellectual and moral space’ in this particular part of the increasingly globalised academy: Racial constructs are being forced to reveal their struts and bolts, their technology and their carapace, so that political action, legal and social thought, and cultural production can be generated sans racist cant, explicit or in disguise.96 Political Science, like other institutions, is constituted and regulated by a set of norms and armoured by a repertoire of material awards and sanctions that can affect the likelihood that members of the profession themselves will pursue the work that Toni Morrison writes about in ‘Home’.97 My interest in writing on racism is the chance that it offers to imagine what can be done to make it less easy and less safe for others to practice the politics of its denial.
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K—Racial IR—FMPS › ALT › AT: IR Isn’t Intrinsically Racist
Lake et al. 21(David, Distinguished Professor of Political Science at the University of California, San Diego, Bianca Freedman, PhD candidate in the Department of Political Science at UC San Diego, D.G. Kim, Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Political Science at the University of California, San Diego, “Race in International Relations: Beyond the “Norm Against Noticing””, CS)
The critique of IR’s race blindness begins with the Howard School. The tradition of unveiling the modern world from its racialized origins was proffered by Howard University–based African American IR scholars beginning in the late nineteenth century (Henderson 2013, 2017; Vitalis2015). Arguably path-breaking, the contributions associated with the Howard School highlight IR’s systematic failure to appreciate race and its inscription into world order. Silence about racism in IR, imposed in part by the exclusion of work that advanced its critique (Vitalis 2000), obscured race as an orienting worldview in the emergent field. Despite various adaptations of publications like Foreign Affairs—which had been titled the Journal of Race Development from 1910 to 1919—its genealogy implies what early scholars deemed the subject of IR to be. This veneer of substantive change in the discipline was counterpoised by W.E.B. Du Bois’s seminal thesis on the color line, first offered in The Souls of Black Folk[2015 (1903)] and later extended in “The Color Line Belts the World” (1906). Du Bois noted, “The problem of the twentieth century is the problem of the Color Line” [2005 (1906), p. 33]. For Du Bois, White supremacy and anti-Blackness were organizing principles of US expansionism. Similarly, other scholars of the Howard School made plain that theorizing the international required careful scrutiny of its imperial, colonial, and neocolonial foundations [Locke 1992 (1916), Bunche 1936, Tate (1943)]. Notwithstanding, mid-century debates in the field over stability, dependency, and territorial sovereignty were underpinned with racial ontologies, willful or otherwise, that privileged Whiteness in their assumptions about the social world (Vucetic 2016).This early critique of IR’s race blindness was elaborated in opposition to the incipient field’s essentialist notions of race. For Alain Locke and Ralph Bunche, race was what today we recognize as a social construct based on phenotypic characteristics that are themselves socially constructed. By advancing this argument, Locke and Bunche removed race from its biological and anthropological moorings, effectively rejecting the “hierarchy of races” assumption that anchored the developing field of IR (Henderson 2013). Locke’s [1992 (1916)] sociological thesis of race as a product occulture informed Bunche’s (1936) subsequent analysis in A World View of Race. For Bunche, race was arbitrary. Devoid of any scientific meaning, race was a device of national policy that shaped bargaining in class conflict. The Howard School also anticipated much of the postwar scholarship on race and racism in IR. To be sure, it developed some of the earliest theory of modern war as an outcome of imperialist and other racial projects (Du Bois 1915, Tate 1943, Bunche 1936), a point delivered in Henderson’s (2017) critique of Vitalis’s (2015) apparent disassociation of these scholars from the formulation of IR theory. Though met with scant regard, the insights developed by the Howard School unveil an IR that not only noticed race but also highlighted it as a prominent axis of inquiry and theory building. The norm against noticing has since been engaged by scholars, and this confrontation actively informs the present debate. Across interlocking approaches to the study of race, new scholarship coheres around the assertion that race and racism are unavoidable when grappling with the is-sues and methodologies of IR (Persaud & Walker 2000; Shilliam 2013, 2020b). The norm against noticing has been challenged by excavating disciplinary genealogies and unveiling forms of racialization as power in IR. Burgeoning literature on Eurocentrism (Hobson 2012) and new advances in non-Western IR theory, embodied by the “Global IR” project (Acharya & Buzan 2009, Haggard& Kang 2020), similarly examine the imperial conditions that constitute relations between the European “core” and the non-White “peripheries.” Recent contributions in the field also illuminate the racial and gendered patterns of IR canon formation. In a recent essay, for instance, Hutchings & Owens (2021) expose opportunities to theorize race in IR through a fundamental reorientation toward the international thought of women (of color).
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K—Racial IR—FMPS › ALT › Alt---Insignificant Acts of Resistance
Van Milders and Toros 20(Lucas, Assistant Professor in Critical Security Studies at the University of Groningen, Harmonie, Deputy Director of Institute of Cyber Security for Society (iCSS) at University of Kent, “Violent International Relations”, CS)
What we are more interested in here is how we can challenge the violence of the zone of being, our violence. Thus, what we aim to explore is how to remain ‘in’– in Mogadishu, in rooms with Western military and defence officials – while refraining (as far as possible) from participating in structural and epistemic violence, and indeed challenging it. Such a staying ‘in’ would allow critical IR scholars to uncover the fissures (Horkheimer, 1982) that exist in all structures of violence, and attempt to expose them and enlarge them. Before elaborating on this, it is important to point out that such an attempt is not rooted in the belief that we can find a path towards a completely ethical future in IR scholarship. Just as we argue that there is no ethical past to ground ourselves in – on the contrary, there is only a violent past – we are not contemplating the possibility of an ethical future free of tensions and violence. Such a stance is not of the purview of critical scholars, as it is inevitably based in the misrecognition of violences that always mark – to some degree – human social relations. Our aim is far more modest and thus hopefully more honest in that it seeks a path of discomfort that is ethical enough to allow for an engagement with today’s power structures, which we continue to insist are in need of critique and countering, also from within. Drawing some foundations from research on the everyday and the banal, we want to argue in favour of almost insignificant acts of subversion in the zones of being. These are acts that are so small that, for example, they cannot be used as a reason to exclude scholars from a gathering or even indeed to refrain from re-inviting them. They are almost insignificant. It is in the almost however that we seek ethical moments that have the potential to highlight and enlarge the fissures of violent power structures. Just as banal nationalism (Billig, 1995) can be ‘significant and political’ and instances of 'everyday peace’ and 'everyday resistance’ can be generative (Mac Ginty, 2014: 552; Vinthagen, 2015), almost insignificant acts of subversion can, we argue, be disruptive and generative. Such acts can take a variety of forms and, just as everyday peace, they 'probably cannot be modelled, taught or replicated’ (Mac Ginty, 2014: 554). They are available in the immediate and only exist contextually. They differ from the concept of the 'everyday’ insofar as the term has been used in IR to mean practices that are of the 'realm of the routine and humdrum which we take for granted’ (Holloway and Hubbard, 2001: 33). Our acts of subversion are just the opposite: They are precisely those conscious acts of agency that may be disguised within the routine and humdrum but that in fact aim to challenge and subvert it. They recognise our position as agents, our being internationals and use this position to authorise these minute acts that challenge our exclusive right to be. Methodologically, they operate like a crack – ‘the perfect ordinary creation of a space or moment in which we assert a different type of doing’ (Holloway, 2010: 21). What this means in terms of practices is not obvious and all we can put forward here is a discussion that is aimed at clarifying our argument rather than offer an exhaustive list of what they may entail. As such, we identify three forms of almost insignificant acts of subversion that acknowledge the position from which the enunciation takes place: (a) moments in which one implicitly recognises and, if appropriate, highlights the other as different but equal; (b) moments in which one implicitly recognises and, if appropriate, explicitly speaks out the power disparity and violence of a relationship; and (c) moments in which one implicitly recognises and, if appropriate, explicitly highlights the violence of power structures generally made invisible through habitus (Bourdieu, 1977). As with everyday peace, such subversion ‘is not something that people always and necessarily engage in. It relies on opportunities and context, as well as the ability of individuals and groups to exploit these’ (Mac Ginty, 2014: 550). Context – the power structures surrounding the individual and the latter’s capital within those structures – will be central to an actor’s ability to engage in such acts and to what degree.