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2022 Michigan Evidence
China Heg Good AFF › 2ac/1ar --- AT: China Heg Inevitable

Reports of booming economy are wrong--- US is outpacing China annual growth.

Tom Hancock and Chris Anstey 05-20-2022 [Tom Hancock is a senior reporter, Chris Anstey is a senior editor, Bloomberg, “US Growth Seen Outpacing China’s for First Time Since 1979,” https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-05-20/us-growth-seen-outpacing-china-s-for-first-time-since-1976#xj4y7vzkg//ZW *graphics omitted*]

China’s coronavirus lockdowns mean its economic growth may undershoot the US for the first time since 1976, in a role reversal with potential political reverberations in both Beijing and Washington. The world’s second-largest economy will grow just 2% this year, Bloomberg Economics wrote in a report Thursday. By comparison, US gross domestic product will increase 2.8% this year, Bloomberg Economics predicts. While Beijing is applying fiscal, monetary and regulatory stimulus measures, the impact is being blunted by President Xi Jinping’s Covid Zero policy, which requires strict curbs on activity when virus outbreaks occur. The US, while struggling to cope with high inflation, is still being propelled by strong hiring and consumer spending. The Bloomberg Economics call is on the bearish end of the spectrum, with the median forecast for China’s 2022 GDP growth still over 4%. If they have it right, this year would be the first time that China’s full-year growth pace has lagged behind that of its rival since 1976, when China was emerging from the tumultuous decade of the Cultural Revolution, World Bank data show. Since the “reform and opening up” campaign launched in the late 1970s, China has enjoyed faster expansion rates, with plenty of scope still remaining for its per-capita GDP to narrow the gap with the US. Catching Up China's per-capita GDP remains well below US, showcasing growth potential President Joe Biden, who is urging congressional lawmakers to pass a package of legislation aimed at strengthening US competitiveness against China, would be sure to seize on such a relative growth outcome. He has framed his economic agenda in part around demonstrating whether democracies can stand up to Xi’s authoritarian model. The stakes are even higher for Xi, who is widely expected to secure a third term as Communist Party chief later this year in a precedent-breaking move. A 2% growth rate would be far below the government’s official growth target of about 5.5% this year. Xi told officials to ensure China’s growth outpaces the US this year, the Wall Street Journal reported last month. It would mark the first time the nation significantly undershot the annual goal since the practice of setting targets was adopted in the late 1990s. The government didn’t publish a target in 2020, when the pandemic hit. This year’s goal of “around 5.5%,” the lowest ever set, was determined by Chinese leaders before the latest spate of lockdowns in metropolises including Shanghai, which have devastated domestic spending. Some economists now estimate China’s GDP contracted this quarter amid April declines in retail sales and industrial production. A 2% expansion also would be the weakest for China since 1976, undershooting even 2020 when the pandemic pulled GDP growth down to 2.2%. Back in the aftermath of the Tiananmen Square crackdown, a much-smaller Chinese economy expanded 3.9% in 1990. Politics may have played some part in the setting of a target that already looked ambitious before the latest pandemic-related measures, according to Stephen Jen, who runs hedge fund and advisory firm Eurizon SLJ Capital. There are likely divisions over the magnitude of regulatory moves against industries including property and technology, in his analysis. “This is, we suspect, the main reason behind the obviously aggressive growth target: it was intentionally planted by the ‘pro-growth’ camp in Beijing to limit further ‘crackdowns’ and restore a better environment for the private sector to thrive,” Jen and colleague Joana Freire wrote in a note earlier this month. Policy makers indeed have repeatedly rolled out pledges of more growth-friendly measures. Vice Premier Liu He earlier this week hinted that Beijing may be ready to let up on the clampdown on technology firms. But announcements have fallen short of any specific, large-scale fiscal package or decisive across-the-board monetary easing, leaving economists and investors unimpressed. “China still has policy options,” Citigroup Inc. economists Xiangrong Yu and Xiaowen Jin wrote in a note this week. “At this juncture, a timely and decisive rollout of real stimulus measures is really critical to bring growth back on track.” One footnote to the GDP rivalry: Biden has already claimed credit for outpacing China. “For the first time in 20 years, our economy grew faster than China’s,” the president said in a statement on GDP data in January. Measuring the fourth-quarter of last year compared with the same period of 2020, the US expanded 5.5% against China’s 4%. American growth in the final three months of last year was accentuated by a jump in inventories. It remains to be seen whether the US can outstrip China on a calendar-year average basis

2022 Michigan Evidence
China Heg Good AFF › 2ac/1ar --- AT: China Heg Inevitable

American heg is sustainable.

Yoon Seok-cheon 03-13-2022 [Finance columnist, Hankyoreh, “Three reasons why China won’t overtake the US anytime soon,” https://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_international/1034592.html//ZW]

It’s in the nature of human beings, and countries, to want to be at an advantage over others. In that sense, history may be seen as a record of competitions for dominance. Another heated battle for dominance is unfolding today. We see signs of it in the conflict between the US and Russia over Ukraine. An even more intense competition is taking place between the US and China. In terms of economic might, China has reached a level where it poses a threat to the US. Dominance is decided as much by economic power as by military strength. It’s natural for the US to feel threatened by China’s pursuit. But some Westerners’ claims that China is poised to surpass the US should be seen as exaggerated. China has more weaknesses than people realize. Demographic issues China is a massive country. As of 2020, its population was counted at 1.41 billion. In terms of population, China is over four times larger than the US, which has around 330 million people. Gross domestic product (GDP) is calculated by multiplying productivity by the population. A higher population is clearly an advantage for a higher GDP. That fact serves as the basis for most of the predictions that have the Chinese economy poised to surpass the US economy in view of past growth rate trends. But those predictions are mere conjecture, which fails to take into account qualitative aspects related to the population. In China’s case, the qualitative aspects of its population are starting to have a negative impact on growth. In many countries, the pandemic served as a mechanism lowering the birth rate. When entire families are forced to remain at home, that translates for most households into greater fears for the future. As financial difficulties are factored in, stress levels escalate even further. It’s not the sort of climate that would put anyone in the mood. China’s disease containment measures have been particularly extreme in comparison with other countries. People are barred from going outside at all. This inevitably leads to greater stress for households. Under the circumstances, the chances of the low birth rate rebounding are effectively zero. The decline in China’s birth rate dates back to before the pandemic. The country abolished its one-child policy in 2016, but that alone is not enough to boost the birth rate. Simply changing the laws is not going to instantly wipe away memories of decades of education instructing people that they were only allowed to have one child, with punishments for those who violated the rule. The total fertility rate, which represents the average number of children that a woman of childbearing potential (aged 15 to 49) is expected to bear over the course of her life, remains down at 1.3. The situation has only gotten worse during the pandemic. According to the National Bureau of Statistics of China, around 10.6 million children were born in China in 2021. That’s compared to around 12 million in 2020 — showing that the various incentive measures haven’t been effective. For 2021, the number of births and deaths was roughly equivalent. Without people coming in from outside, China is poised to shortly face a population decline. A declining population doesn’t necessarily spell doom for GDP growth. You can still achieve growth through increased productivity. The problem arises when the population decline occurs in tandem with an aging population. In this case, senior citizens leave the labor market faster than young people arrive to take their place. It’s a problem that a lot of countries are facing, and it’s especially noticeable in China. Unless “Xi Jinping’s China” can solve it, a scenario where China surpasses the US may be unlikely. Lack of soft power Even without the US reining it in, China is unlikely to surpass the US. The reason has to do with its lack of soft power. Soft power can be seen as the finishing touch on a country’s dominance or standing. You can’t assume control of the world unless you can dominate through cultural products. At the moment, US cultural products are in a league of their own, circulating all around the world. Even in the 21st century, the US remains massively influential with its films and television series. What about China? Despite its long history and time-honored traditions, it has produced nothing to boast about in terms of cultural products. China may have the economic might to threaten the US, but in terms of soft power, it is still in its infancy. Over the four decades since it implemented reforms and openness, it has achieved global success with exactly two of its cultural products: Liu Cixin’s science fiction novel “The Three-Body Problem” and the short-form video service TikTok. Even those successes can only be viewed as partial. “The Three-Body Problem” won Liu the Hugo Award in 2015 — an honor that could be called the Nobel of science fiction. He was the first Asian to achieve that. Without question, the book is a work of genius. But its success is still only within the narrow confines of the science fiction genre. Not only has it failed to broaden its base, but the follow-ups have been underwhelming. We see a similar situation with TikTok. Owing to a lack of Chinese content, it hasn’t served as a window for distributing culture. Among Asian countries, soft power has been growing by the day in South Korea, Japan and Taiwan. South Korea’s popular music, films, and television series have joined the ranks of the world-class. Japanese animation remains influential as well. Yet China, a country seen as synonymous with Asian civilization, has yet to develop soft power. The reason for that is self-evident: the state itself clamps down on creativity. “The Three-Body Problem” was able to gain worldwide acclaim thanks to celebrities who actively promoted the book in various media. This is unimaginable in China right now. Chinese authorities thoroughly regulate speech unrelated to patriotism or everyday life. When channels of speech are obstructed, creativity dies out. Though Asian culture is now widely consumed in the West, Chinese culture’s share of the market is minimal at best. China clearly has a rich and lively culture. The problem is its government, which isn’t very interested in encouraging or enhancing cultural activity within its borders. The Chinese government believes information hinders stability. Under such circumstances, the promotion of Chinese culture abroad becomes a complicated matter. The Chinese government also partially blocks the influx of foreign cultural products into China. It’s only natural that Chinese culture is enjoying diminishing opportunities to globalize. Aside from censorship, indifference is another factor that’s further isolating Chinese culture from the world. China’s insistence on doing everything the Chinese way itself is causing the country’s soft power to languish. This in turn has inevitably led to the decline of the competitiveness of China and its companies. Debt and inequality Astronomical debt and severe inequality are other main factors impeding growth for China. While the latter is a big problem in and of itself, the bigger problem is that China is attempting to solve the issue of inequality through force. The country’s push for “common prosperity” will ultimately undermine its growth potential, as it will surely hurt the vitality of Chinese corporations. Private enterprises in China are rapidly becoming public under state control. Though the country’s authorities dream of realizing Chinese-style capitalism, such an approach may weaken entrepreneurship and temper the competitiveness of Chinese businesses in the long run. While the approach can effectively foster growth in fledgling industries, it will negatively impact industries that call for creativity and a daring spirit. Though China is attempting to redesign its economic and financial systems without destabilizing its society, it’s unclear whether this can be done without any changes in its governing system, the fundamental source of inequality in China. Chinese President Xi Jinping must simultaneously accomplish two seemingly contradictory goals, the very goals that past Chinese leaders strived to realize for centuries: growth and equality. Unfortunately, the path to these destinations is long and winding, and inequality is only worsening in China. Debt is another serious problem in the country, especially that of local governments. The real estate market, comprising 30% of China’s GDP, was what mainly powered the Chinese economy. But the debt explosion triggered by the bankruptcy of the China Evergrande Group may end up affecting local governments, who up until now made up for budgetary deficits by selling land to real estate developers. Now, this has become impossible. The finances of local governments will slowly deteriorate, and regional disparity will intensify. The conflict between the wealthy coastal region and the poor western region may come to light and lead to social unrest. The Chinese government has designated zero COVID, economic growth of 5%, and debt reduction as its three main policy objectives. Already, the last goal is falling by the wayside due to concerns that austerity measures for the purpose of debt reduction and stabilization will cause economic stagnation. That being the case, will China be able to achieve its other two goals? China’s zero-COVID policy has been put in jeopardy due to the emergence of the highly transmissible Omicron variant. Because of China’s track record of low caseloads, only a small number of Chinese people have developed natural immunity against the COVID-19 virus. The effectiveness of Chinese vaccines is also questionable. Rigid lockdowns for the sake of zero COVID transmission are impediments to growth in and of themselves. If lockdowns fail, China may be subject to the kind of economic chaos that swept the world early in the pandemic. Countries around the world are suffering from the consequences of COVID-19 — China won’t be the exception for long. What’s meant to happen is bound to happen. Will China be able to achieve a 5% economic growth under these circumstances? Pax Americana’s long run It was once projected that Japan, which entered the ranks of wealthy nations before becoming an aging society, would outpace the US in terms of its economy. This turned out to be a mere pipe dream. What then of China? China’s population is already aging when the country has yet to accumulate much wealth. Astronomical expenses will be needed to make sure its aging population doesn’t tip China into social unrest. The cost may be too much for China to handle. To make matters worse, Xi Jinping is pressuring corporations, the backbone of economic growth. More importantly, China can no longer boast low-cost labor as its strength. The country is losing its competitive edge in labor-intensive industries. But this doesn’t mean the country has become competitive enough in high-tech industries with high added value. These factors can all contribute to social instability. Considering all this, it’s baseless, wishful thinking to imagine China coming out victorious in its race against the US. The above-mentioned issues must be resolved for China to gain an upper hand in its competition with the North American powerhouse. Whether China is capable of overcoming these challenges under its current governing system is open to doubt. There are limits to the ruling class’s ability to better itself. The solution has to be structural. But to expect this of an unchecked power is in itself a contradiction. Then, it’s clear what the outcome will be of the hegemonic competition between the US and China. Pax Americana may continue on longer than one might think.

2022 Michigan Evidence
China Heg Good AFF › 2ac/1ar --- AT: China Heg Inevitable

Reject predictions--- they’re always wrong.

Mark Beeson and Corey Crawford 02-10-2022 [Mark Beeson is of the University of Technology Sydney, Ultimo, Australia, Corey Crawford is of the University of Western Australia, Perth, Australia; Chinese Political Science Review (2022), “Putting the BRI in Perspective: History, Hegemony, and Geopolitics,” https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s41111-022-00210-y//ZW]

Western IR theory does not have a good record in predicting major turning points in international affairs; the supposed inevitability of ‘hegemonic transitions’ looks anything but certain at this point in history. There are tentative signs that both Xi and President Joseph R. Biden Jr. recognise the importance of establishing some sort of working relationship—and the possible dangers of not doing so (Kanno-Youngs and Sanger 2021). The rest of the world may not be entirely happy about the prospect of the coordinated actions of a ‘G2’, but it may be preferable to its absence. If the US and China cannot find a way to manage their differences for the common good, then the discussions of comparative hegemony and the continuing rise of China will become theoretically irrelevant and empirically improbable.

2022 Michigan Evidence
China Heg Good AFF › 2ac/1ar --- AT: China Heg Inevitable

Alternate factors mean China will never be the hegemon--- even if it becomes militarily and economically superior.

Ashok Swain 01-21-21 [Ashok Swain is a Professor of Peace and Conflict Research at Uppsala University, Sweden, The Print, “China’s economy and military can overtake US, but it still won’t become global superpower,” https://theprint.in/opinion/chinas-can-overtake-us-but-it-still-wont-become-global-superpower/588718///ZW]

There is an ongoing discussion that China is emerging as a new superpower and replacing the US from the global power structure. China emerging strongly from the growing global economic crisis due to the Covid-19 pandemic and Donald Trump’s ally-alienating policies within NATO for the last four years have pushed this narrative forward considerably. There is no doubt that China has already become the global powerhouse economically, and is expected to surpass the US as the world’s biggest economy by 2028. China is still behind but on its way to surpassing the US in military power with increased spending on weapons technology and developing several secretive weapons. There is no doubt over China acquiring economic and military strength superior to the US sooner than later, but the question is, can the Communist Party-led China be ever as formidable and complete a superpower as the US has been for the last eight decades? When the Soviet Union competed with the US to claim superpower status during the Cold War period, it somewhat matched America’s strength in leading alliances and military power. However, at the height of its power, the Soviet Union was never a match for US domination economically or culturally. Like the Soviet Union in the past, China now faces several geopolitical and cultural challenges before it can reach global superpower status similar to the US. China can’t aspire to get the same respect and acceptance worldwide, even if its economic and military power overtakes the US. A democratic US will always have ideological, political, and cultural superiority compared to a Communist China. One-party Communist country Although China has developed a hybrid system to grow spectacularly on the economic front, it is still a one-party Communist country. Politically, it has become further closed and centralised than ever before. The Chinese Communist Party is celebrating its 100th anniversary this year. In 2011, when it was celebrating its 90th anniversary, I was fortunate to attend an invite-only meeting of the Chinese Political Science Association in Shanghai. Many top Chinese political scientists openly discussed the possibilities of China opening up to a multi-party electoral system. That sort of discussion is almost impossible to imagine in Xi Jinping-led China now. No doubt, China is a strong state with a powerful party bureaucracy, but its politics is potentially very fragile. Under a closed system, it is almost impossible to predict when that spark will arrive to ignite a political upheaval. This is a country where the Interpol chief or a globally famous billionaire can disappear without any official explanation. Hundreds of Chinese millionaires have been living abroad to protect their wealth from future uncertainties and to avail the opportunities of open societies. China has become rich, it is spending heavily on its university education, but 600,000 Chinese students go abroad for their higher studies every year. China’s economy might be booming for decades, but 10 million Chinese have traveled to other countries to find jobs while 51 million people from all over the world have moved to the US for better work and improved living. Tough neighbourhood Despite its ongoing political troubles, there is no doubt that the American political system is resilient to any attack from destabilising forces. But that sort of trust in the system continues to elude China. Though China has been enjoying political stability for long, the Chinese people don’t have similar trust and confidence in their political system as the Americans have in theirs. This will not help China command the respect of other countries in its competition to become the global superpower. Geopolitics also does not favour China as it has the US. Unlike the US, China is surrounded by several powerful and competing countries. Among them, at least two, Russia and India, see the dream of becoming superpowers. China has also fought wars against them and continues to have several border disputes. China is neither safe nor secure in its neighbourhood to freely engage in political and military projects in other parts of the world as the US does. Besides China’s location in a tough neighbourhood, it also lacks trusted, powerful allies. On the one hand, the democratic US has established strong political and military cooperation with many regionally powerful countries like the UK, Germany, Japan, and Australia from the Cold War days. It continues to keep those allies, while getting new ones like India. On the other hand, China’s only significant ally in the world is Russia, but that alliance suffers from many contradictions and has not passed the test of time. It will be hard to imagine China gaining the upper hand militarily, economically, and politically in the future, vis-à-vis the US and its allies’ combined forces. The US stands firm The US has been and will continue to be the global cultural superpower, and there is minimal possibility of China posing any serious challenge to that status. Not only does its democracy and freedom provide ideological superiority to the US, its cultural influence through movies, media, music, and literature also extends across the world. The US is a country of immigrants, and it represents and enriches the cultures and ideas of the world. But China has remained a closed country for long. While English remains the world’s language, it is almost impossible to imagine Mandarin taking up that place. China will always be struggling to catch up to the US and take the lead position in the global power race. Like the Soviet Union, its superpower status will be limited and confined to certain aspects of it. The US has everything to hold its own long in this competition if it doesn’t often engage in self-sabotaging acts like it has in the last four years.

2022 Michigan Evidence
China Heg Good AFF › 2ac/1ar --- AT: China Heg Inevitable

Studies exaggerate--- even if China takes the lead it means nothing for hegemony.

Ian Verrender 03-15-2022 [ABC Business Editor, Australian Broadcasting Corporation, “Why China is unlikely to overtake the United States to become the biggest economy in the world,” https://www.abc.net.au/news/2022-03-15/china-faces-significant-hurdles-to-become-biggest-global-economy/100912398//ZW]

For decades, it has been one of the great truisms of global foreign policy; the "inexorable rise of China". Never a question of if but only when, the betting amongst academics, politicians and diplomats has concentrated on how long it would take for China to overtake the United States as the world's biggest economy. Its sheer size, both in terms of land mass and population, made it seemingly inevitable as the economy developed and living standards soared in one of history's fastest transitions from a Third World agrarian nation to a highly urbanised society. But the path to becoming the biggest is becoming increasingly hazardous. China is experiencing serious growing pains. The easy gains have been extracted and many pundits are winding back those ambitious straight-line extrapolations of continuous growth. Even then, there are various ways to measure size. Time to scale back the growth prospects A new study by Lowy Institute researchers Roland Rajah and Alyssa Leng casts doubt upon the speed with which China can achieve the dubious honour of claiming the crown and questions whether it will ever become the most powerful. "China would overtake the United States to become the world's largest economy in nominal US dollar terms by about 2030," the report's authors conclude. "But it would never establish a meaningful lead ... and would remain far less prosperous and productive per person than America, even by mid-century." Most research concludes that China will be able to motor along with around 5 per cent annual economic growth until 2050. If it did, it would be the world's biggest economy by a country mile, with the capacity to be its own bloc. It is those kinds of projections that have created fear and angst among many Western nations, including Australia, on how best to deal with a global economic powerhouse of such magnitude that does not adhere to democratic norms. This new study paints a vastly different picture of the future. Rather than 5 per cent growth, it forecasts growth of around 2 to 3 per cent a year, which has significant ramifications for the balance of global power and a major impact on China's internal politics. "With slower growth, China's progress in catching up to rich country average living standards and productivity levels would remain significantly incomplete, even by mid-century," the study says. "On the one hand, the average person in China would be 2 to 3 times richer by 2050 compared to today and 2.5 to 3.5 times more productive. "Nonetheless, China would still be much poorer and less productive than the United States, based on current expectations of future US growth at around 1.6 per cent a year on average." By 2050, the authors calculate the average person in China would be only 40 per cent as rich as the average American and about half as productive. More than just teething problems The early gains were easy. From an economy largely run by the state, allowing individuals to own and operate their own businesses sent growth soaring. Global capital poured in, providing cheap investment and employment. But those easy gains no longer are available. And the ongoing fracturing in relations between the West and an inward looking Beijing, accelerated by Russia's invasion of Ukraine, will likely continue to see a slowing and perhaps withdrawal of foreign investment. In recent years, it has faced a series of crises fuelled by mounting debts which have seen a sharp uptick in defaults within private and government owned businesses, most recently concentrated within the property sector and companies such as Evergrande. Putting aside poor productivity, debt and overinvestment in infrastructure, the Lowy Institute report cites another issue as the biggest overall impediment to China's future; its ageing population and the legacy of its draconian past one child policy. "China's working age population has been shrinking since the middle of last decade," it says. "The fertility rate has fallen rapidly over the past decade to just 1.3 births per woman in 2020 — well below the replacement rate of 2.1." By 2050, China's working age population will have shrunk by around 220 million, which is around a fifth of its current level, with those aged over 65 making up about a quarter of the population. The authors conclude that you can never completely rule out the prospect China could rule the world, the chances of such are nowhere near as likely as most studies would indicate. "But it would require an enormous degree of success with productivity enhancing reforms well beyond China's track record to date," they argue. "It should not be the baseline expectation."

2022 Michigan Evidence
China Heg Good AFF › 2ac --- US Heg Good

Heg solves global nuclear war

Zalmay Khalilzad 16, former U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, counselor at the CSIS, 3/23/16, “4 Lessons about America's Role in the World,” http://nationalinterest.org/feature/4-lessons-about-americas-role-the-world-15574?page=show

Ultimately, however, we concluded that the United States has a strong interest in precluding the emergence of another bipolar world—as in the Cold War—or a world of many great powers, as existed before the two world wars. Multipolarity led to two world wars and bipolarity resulted in a protracted worldwide struggle with the risk of nuclear annihilation. To avoid a return such circumstances, Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney ultimately agreed that our objective must be to prevent a hostile power to dominate a “critical region,” which would give it the resources, industrial capabilities and population to pose a global challenge. This insight has guided U.S. defense policy throughout the post–Cold War era.

Giving major powers the green light to establish spheres of influence would produce a multipolar world and risk the return of war between the major powers. Without a stabilizing U.S. presence in the Persian Gulf and U.S. relationships with Jordan and the Gulf States, Iran could shut down oil shipments in its supposed sphere of influence. A similar scenario in fact played out during the 1987 “tanker war” of the Iran-Iraq war, which eventually escalated into a direct military conflict between the United States and Iran. Iran’s nuclear program makes these scenarios even more dangerous.

2022 Michigan Evidence
China Heg Good NEG › Block › 2nc --- AT: Strat Con Thumps

Strategic concept materially doesn’t do anything – it actually contributes to military overstretch

Arnold 7-1 [Ed Arnold is a Research Fellow for European Security within the International Security Studies department at RUSI, 7-1-2022, New Concepts but Old Problems: NATO’s New Strategic Concept, No Publication, https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/new-concepts-old-problems-natos-new-strategic-concept] Eric

Politically, the Strategic Concept and the unity it represents are very important. However, militarily and operationally, it is less significant. The 2010 Strategic Concept had been moribund since at least 2014, following Russia’s annexation of Crimea, but of course NATO has still been operating effectively since. While a lot of effort has gone into building consensus for Madrid, in many ways the hard work starts now.

There is a coherence issue. The Strategic Concept, as NATO’s strategy, comes after the two main plans – SACEUR’s  and the future  – have already matured. There was tacit acknowledgement at the Madrid summit that many underlying operational plans would have to be revised. However, with NATO’s strategy transforming, mere tweaks to plans do not seem sufficient, and their core assumptions should be revisited. For NATO’s Warfighting Capstone Concept – how it fights in the future – it is imperative that analysis of Russia’s military performance in Ukraine now becomes the backbone for its development.

2022 Michigan Evidence
China Heg Good NEG › Block › 2nc --- AT: Strat Con Thumps

The Concept is not cutting China from the rise to power, its emphasizing a “constructive relationship.” The aff materially orients NATO against China.

Stavridis 6-28 [James George Stavridis is a retired United States Navy admiral, currently Vice Chair, Global Affairs and Managing Director of the global investment firm the Carlyle Group, and Chair of the Board of Trustees of the Rockefeller Foundation, 6-28-2022, Analysis, Washington Post, https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/what-to-expect-from-natos-new-strategic-concept/2022/06/27/fd3eb3be-f5ef-11ec-81db-ac07a394a86b_story.html] Eric

Unlike in 2010, this long-term plan will describe China as a strategic competitor. NATO is not looking for conflict with Beijing, but must be capable of addressing concerns in cyberspace, human rights and territorial claims in the South China Sea — including consideration of NATO undertaking freedom of navigation patrols. The updated document will also likely emphasize cooperation globally with non-NATO democracies including Australia, Japan and South Korea.

Finally, the concept will emphasize that applications for expansion will be welcome, subject to the requirements for entry laid out in the NATO treaty. Finland and Sweden are at the front of the line, but Bosnia-Herzegovina and Georgia are still hoping for a path to membership, and so of course is Ukraine.

2022 Michigan Evidence
China Heg Good NEG › Block › 2nc --- AT: Strat Con Thumps

Strategic Concept still makes a cooperative effort to engage with China

Blankenship 6-30 [Bradley Blankenship is an American Journalist, columnist and political commentator. He has a column at CHTN and is a freelance reporter for international news agencies including Xinhua Agency, 06-30-2022, What NATO’s new strategic concept means for China, RT International, https://www.rt.com/news/558139-nato-china-strategic-concept/] Eric

Point 14 seems to walk back this confrontational stance by saying that NATO remains “open to constructive engagement with the PRC, including to build reciprocal transparency, with a view to safeguarding the Alliance’s security interests.” But it also says that its members will work to address “systemic challenges” posed by China, which is also alluded to in its “Cooperative Security” section, stating that the “Indo-Pacific is important for NATO, given that developments in that region can directly affect EuroAtlantic security.” 

2022 Michigan Evidence
China Heg Good NEG › Block › 2nc --- AT: Biden Asia Pivot is Happening

Diplomatic credibility is non-existent, stops effective deterrence

Sukin 21 [ is a MacArthur Nuclear Security Postdoctoral Fellow at Stanford University’s Center for International Security and Cooperation and an incoming Assistant Professor of International Relations at the London School of Economics and Political Science, 9-28-2021, Biden’s pivot to Asia is missing something: diplomats, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, https://thebulletin.org/2021/09/bidens-pivot-to-asia-is-missing-diplomats/] Eric

Eight months into Biden’s presidential tenure, the White House has nominated individuals to just  available ambassador positions, representing less than 30 percent of the total offices. Of the 134 positions currently without a Biden administration nominee, 97 are vacant, while three belong to Obama-era nominees. The remainder are filled with selections from the Trump administration. US allies have repeatedly expressed  with the slow US ambassadorial appointment process, with the average time to confirmation . But the Biden administration has been slower to fill diplomatic positions than previous administrations, and notable vacancies in many regions have  Currently, the Biden administration has unfilled ambassadorial positions in Japan, Singapore, China, South Korea, Vietnam, and the Philippines. No ambassador has yet been proposed for South Korea.

These missing and delayed diplomatic appointments affect the quality of US foreign relations. For example, repeated controversies with US ambassadors in South Korea (including one involving an ) have exacerbated  over US-South Korean  and  over North Korea. Effective diplomacy requires learning about allies’ threat perceptions and preferred solutions, while  to explain and promote US policies. Skilled diplomats can improve policy design and ensure effective policy implementation. Vacant positions or inexperienced diplomats, however, can complicate communication and hamper the Biden administration’s commitment to addressing nuclear and conventional security challenges from China and North Korea.

2022 Michigan Evidence
China Heg Good NEG › Block › 2nc --- AT: Biden Asia Pivot is Happening

History proves – every administration attempt to use NATO to counter China has failed.

Keith 22 [Tamara Keith has been a White House correspondent for NPR since 2014 and co-hosts the NPR Politics Podcast, the top political news podcast in America. In that time, she has chronicled the final years of the Obama administration, covered Hillary Clinton's failed bid for president from start to finish and thrown herself into documenting the Trump administration, from policy made by tweet to the president's COVID diagnosis and the insurrection, 6-24-2022, Biden said the G-7 would counter Chinese influence. This year, he'll try again, NPR.org, https://www.npr.org/2022/06/24/1106979380/g7-summit-2022-germany-global-infrastructure] Eric

Since then, his advisers have worked on the initiative, mostly without fanfare. There has been little tangible progress to herald. But at this year's G-7 summit, which begins Sunday in Germany, Biden plans to relaunch the effort — under a new name — and put forth some initial projects to show how the plan will work.

"He will be launching a partnership for global infrastructure, physical health and digital infrastructure that we think can provide an alternative to what the Chinese are offering — to the tune of tens and ultimately hundreds of billions of dollars when you add in what our G-7 partners are going to do as well," said Jake Sullivan, Biden's national security adviser, at a conference in Washington last week.

2022 Michigan Evidence
China Heg Good NEG › Block › 2nc --- AT: Biden Asia Pivot is Happening

Domestic barriers ensure no Asia Pivot

Davis 22 [Bob Davis is a senior editor who covers economic issues out of the Washington D.C. bureau, especially relations between the U.S. and China, 01-31-2022, Biden Promised to Confront China. First He Has to Confront America’s Bizarre Trade Politics., https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2022/01/31/biden-china-trade-politics-00003379] Eric

The more genteel Biden crowd is divided into three camps. The old globalist/nationalist labels don’t quite fit because they all agree on multilateral engagement (globalist) and they haven’t lifted Trump’s tariffs (nationalist). But there are big differences among them.

In one corner are the trade expansionists who want to tie Asian nations closer to the U.S. with trade deals. They include White House Asia coordinator Kurt Campbell, Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo, Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen and Secretary of State Antony Blinken.

2022 Michigan Evidence
China Heg Good NEG › Block › 2nc --- China Isn’t Revisionist

Internal policy -- retrenchment bolsters Chinese integrationists and moderates their foreign policy BUT hegemony ensures hawks take over.

Ward 17, Department of Politics, and International Studies @ the University of Cambridge. PhD in Government @ Georgetown and MA in Security Studies @ Walsh School of Foreign Service (Steven M., Status and the Challenge of Rising Powers, Cambridge University Press, pp. 197-200)

The foreign policy preferences of China’s elite vary fairly widely. Shambaugh and Xiao have identified seven distinct orientations toward the status quo within Chinese foreign policy discourse. At the integrationist end of the spectrum are the Globalists, who believe that China should take on additional responsibility for global governance within the existing framework of institutions – in short, China should “act as a responsible power.”56 Chinese Globalists are much like Western “liberal institutionalists,” and are thus generally supportive of the liberal order. Five other perspectives (which Shambaugh and Xiao identify as Selective Multilateralists, the Global South school, the Asia Firsters, the Major Powers School, and the Realists) are less sold on the liberal order, but at least agree that some degree of participation in its institutions, norms, and rules is necessary.57

But there is one group – the Nativists – that rejects participation in the liberal international order. The Nativists are “hyper-nationalist” Marxist ideologues who oppose domestic reforms aimed at producing openness and market capitalism. In the realm of foreign policy, they oppose participation in the liberal order because they “view international multilateral involvement as ‘traps’ (laid by the West) to embroil China in costly overseas commitments.”58 Nativists have multiple reasons for rejecting integration, not all of which have to do with status – for instance, they worry that participation in the Western order will destabilize the Communist Party. But they are also deeply concerned about China’s status and are skeptical about the prospects of achieving their ambitions within an order dominated by Western powers. According to Shambaugh and Xiao, Nativists “regularly harp on the nationalist theme of the ‘century of shame and humiliation’ and argue that China is entitled to global respect (particularly by those powers that previously humiliated China).”59

2022 Michigan Evidence
China Heg Good NEG › Block › 2nc --- China Isn’t Revisionist

Empirics

Klaus Heinrich Raditio 19. IR Prof @ University of Sydney. 2019. “Conclusion.” Understanding China’s Behaviour in the South China Sea, Springer Singapore, pp. 185–190. Crossref, doi:10.1007/978-981-13-1283-0_8.

The main findings of this thesis show strong support for defensive realism theory. During the period of de-escalation (1995 until between 2007 and 2009), China had the most advanced military power compared to other SCS claimants. However, instead of using force, China extended its cooperative behaviour which was successful in de-escalating the SCS tension. China demonstrated its serious commitment to stabilising the region by participating in several multilateral agreements: the 2002 DoC, the ASEAN TAC in 2003, and the JMSU in 2005. This fact is at odds with the offensive realism assumption that suggests China will pursue hegemonic ambition to resolve its dispute with other claimants.1

2022 Michigan Evidence
China Heg Good NEG › Block › 2nc --- China Isn’t Revisionist

China isn’t revisionist.

McKinney 19, *Jared Morgan; PhD candidate at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University (Singapore); **Nicholas Butts; Center for Strategic and International Studies Pacific Forum Young Leader. He holds an LL.M. from Peking University, an MSc from The London School of Economics and an MPA from Harvard University where he was also a Crown Prince Frederik Scholar and a Cheng Fellow. (Winter 2019, “Bringing Balance to the Strategic Discourse on China’s Rise”, Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs, pg. 75-76, https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/JIPA/journals/Volume-02_Issue-4/McKinney.pdf)

In the abstract, such claims are alarming—in context, and in balance, rather humdrum. In fact, the evidence of any Chinese intention to destroy, or even merely undermine and exploit, the current order is slight. China is certainly using its growing military power to defend its claims in the SCS and even—on occasion— to coerce its neighbors. It uses protectionist economic policies to boost the prospects of Chinese companies and reduce competition. It employs economic statecraft to serve its interests abroad. And it certainly is opposed to America’s policy of global democracy promotion. However, none of these positions fundamentally challenge the existing order, none of them radically depart from America’s own actions when it was a rising power in the nineteenth century, and none of them obviously surpass America’s own contemporary record of order subversion. When the United States was a rising power, it took half of Mexico and considered taking the rest, it colonized the Philippines and Hawaii, and it unilaterally seized the maritime choke points of the Caribbean (Puerto Rico and Cuba).21 The United States used tariffs—which by 1857 averaged 20 percent22 and by the end of the nineteenth century were “the highest import duties in the industrial world”23—to protect its industries. It stole intellectual property,24 and it ideologically challenged the governments of the “Old World.” Today, despite no longer being a rising power, the United States has launched two disastrous invasions, tortured prisoners, and dispatches drone strikes at a whim with little international legal authority.25 The point is not that two wrongs make a right; it is that international order is much more resilient than critics seem to realize,26 and it is utopian to expect any rising Great Power to act in a way that uniformly satisfies one’s moral scruples, evolving, in Friedberg’s words, “into a mellow, satisfied, ‘responsible’ status quo power.”27 Friedberg or Harris might object that America’s rise took place in the context of a different order. This is perfectly true, but the more important point is that the long nineteenth century (1815–1914)—the era of America’s rise—was the first iteration of the New Peace.28 The implication is that relative peace can and has coexisted with limited wars, property and territorial thefts, acts of coercion, and aggressive assertions of status. This does not mean any of these are desirable— they are not—but it shows that they need not be fatal to the system. Insofar as there is a lesson from that first period of relative peace, it is that Great Power confrontation is the one thing that is fatal. Accepting this does not mean capitulating in every instance, as implied by some,29 but it does mean rediscovering the rules of Great Power competition30 alongside the art of strategy.31 Focusing only on areas that China’s rise violates the scruples of the established powers, moreover, downplays the extent to which China, has, in fact, conformed to the existing order. As a RAND Corporation report published in 2018 concludes, China has been a supporter—albeit a conditional one—of the international order: “Since China undertook a policy of international engagement in the 1980s … the level and quality of its participation in the order rivals that of most other states.”32 The way in which Xi Jinping, following his 2017 Davos speech in defense of globalization, has been heralded as the most prominent champion of international order and defender of globalization underscores the fact that there are different elements of this order, and that China supports many, if not most, of them. Even in places where China is supposedly “altering” the current order, Beijing tends to simultaneously affirm that order. China’s Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, for instance, actually mirrors existing structures, and China has intentionally copied elements and “best practices” of the World Bank and Asian Development Bank. China is playing the same game, even if it is seeking a bigger role within it.33

2022 Michigan Evidence
China Heg Good NEG › Block › 2nc --- No Impact to Revisionism

Even if they’re revisionist, they’re ‘reformist’ not ‘revolutionary’---attempting to contain them causes revolutionary backlash to the LIO which turns the ADV

Kim and Kim 22 — Sung-han Kim a Graduate School of International Studies, Korea University, Seoul, Republic of Korea & Sanghoon Kim b Center for Maritime Security, Korea Institute for Maritime Strategy, Seoul, Republic of Korea (2022) China’s contestation of the liberal international order, The Pacific Review, DOI: 10.1080/09512748.2022.2063367 WMK

Despite conventional wisdom that the AIIB represents a challenge to the liberal international order and Chinese ambitions to establish a Sinocentric international order, the AIIB is an example of contested multilateralism. Specifically, it is a strategy of competitive regime creation to better reflect the interests of China in the multilateral development sector without challenging the constitutional structure and the fundamental institutions of the liberal international order. In fact, the AIIB has been working collaboratively with parallel institutions within the regime complex such as the World Bank, the IMF, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), and the ADB. In assessing whether the AIIB signifies deconcentration and delegitimation of the U.S.-led liberal order, it is too early to tell whether the AIIB will evolve into a multilateral development bank that serves as an instrument to export a Chinese model of economic statecraft such as state capitalism. Moreover, this paper examines only the AIIB as an example of Chinese contestation of the liberal international order and future research can test the contestation-challenge distinction of revisionist state behavior with other case studies in different issue-areas to corroborate the argument laid out in this paper. Moreover, the task remains on sophisticated ways to distinguish contestations from challenges in the security domain.

Certainly, the developmental model, emphasizing export promotion with a high degree of state intervention, is touted as an alternative pathway to achieve economic growth, especially after the experiences of the 1997 Asian financial crisis and the 2008 global financial crisis. However, it is hard to disregard the possibility of China using these infrastructure projects as ways to promote Chinese interests, by exporting excess capacity in domestic industries while paving the way for increased connectivity along the lines of land and sea communications. After all, even if China had the intention to construct a regional sphere of influence and an exclusive China-led international order, the success of such endeavor would rely on China’s ability to continue its material rise and to buy voluntary compliance of secondary powers, earning legitimacy of a renewed Chinese leadership in the region by presenting an alternative order. An early assessment of Chinese efforts at order-building in the multilateral development domain, reveals that secondary powers are, gradually, finding the shortcomings of China-led initiatives, ranging from the lack of transparency to the incurrence of exorbitant national debts. At the same time, the introduction of the ‘Build Back Better World (B3W)’ partnership, by the Biden administration, may restore U.S. leadership in the global infrastructure development sector with emphasis on liberal values such as transparency, good governance, and environmental safeguards (The White House, 2021).

2022 Michigan Evidence
China Heg Good NEG › Block › 2nc --- No Impact to Revisionism

Chinese revisionism won’t undermine territorial sovereignty

Griffiths, 16 - Senior Lecturer in the Department of Government and International Relations at the University of Sydney (Ryan D. Griffiths (2016) States, Nations, and Territorial Stability: Why Chinese Hegemony Would Be Better for International Order, Security Studies, 25:3, 519-545, DOI: 10.1080/09636412.2016.1195628

The rise of China has generated a veritable cottage industry of articles and books, and portents and predictions. Will China be content with current international order, or, like many past rising states, aim to revise it? My analysis is guided by the Sandholtz and Stiles cycle model.58 International rule structures are built on power and the appeal to precedent and normative tradition. In imagining a future where China is hegemonic I have sidestepped questions about what disputes may occur along the way, but I can speculate on how a preeminent China would influence the normative order. I argue that it will aim to modify the international order but, importantly, it will not attempt to redraw borders. It will not be revisionist in a territorial sense. I arrive at this conclusion by examining its current preferences with respect to self-determination and territorial integrity, and I contend that these preferences should endure in a time of Chinese hegemony.

With respect to self-determination, Chinese policy has shown a more limited support for minority nations. China recognizes secession when it is consensual, but when the national government in a secessionist crisis denies the aspiring group, China argues that sovereignty should be respected and that the outcome of the struggle should be resolved internally, without interference from the international community.59 Following Kosovo’s declaration of independence, Liu Jianchao, the spokesperson for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, commented:

2022 Michigan Evidence
China Heg Good NEG › Block › 2nc --- No Impact to Revisionism

No impact to Chinese revisionism – it will err towards negotiation, not force

Griffiths, 16 - Senior Lecturer in the Department of Government and International Relations at the University of Sydney (Ryan D. Griffiths (2016) States, Nations, and Territorial Stability: Why Chinese Hegemony Would Be Better for International Order, Security Studies, 25:3, 519-545, DOI: 10.1080/09636412.2016.1195628

China’s acknowledgement of the external meaning of territorial integrity is a contested topic. The cynical view holds that a predominant China will try to expand and redraw political borders because rising states are revisionist and territorial expansion is par for the course. Such behavior would clearly undermine the territorial integrity norm. But I contend that although China will increasingly insist on a hegemonic relationship with its neighbors, it will do so with an eye on preserving the territorial integrity of states. It might press its current territorial claims, but it would not strip states of their sovereignty and transform them into Chinese possessions.

My position is built on two related arguments. First, China’s territorial disputes are not based on claims over other sovereign states, in total, nor are the disputes over key sections of their landmass. There are important disputes to be sure, such as with India, but these do not lay claim to vital sections of the Indian state. More importantly, the trend has been toward reconciliation rather than escalation.66 Indeed, China has shown a proclivity toward negotiation, especially when it is strong. One might challenge my argument by pointing to Taiwan and arguing that China’s territorial claim threatens the very existence of a sovereign state. But in this case China actually invokes territorial integrity and treats Taiwan as an internal matter. Since it has never recognized the sovereignty of Taiwan, its claim is framed as a matter of sovereignty—an intrastate rather than an interstate issue. Overall, the real flashpoints in Chinese territorial disputes are maritime in nature, pitting it against its neighbors over control of sea-lanes and various uninhabited islands like the Spratlys or the Senkakus/Diaoyus. These contests are long running, their rightful ownership is debated, and increased assertiveness over them is unlikely to challenge the territorial integrity norm.

2022 Michigan Evidence
China Heg Good NEG › Block › 2nc --- AT: Hostile China

Respect is the key variable – US accommodation is vital to preventing a violent transition

Biba, 17 - Institute for Political Science, Goethe University Frankfurt (Sebastian, “It’s status, stupid: explaining the underlying core problem in US–China Relations” Global Affairs, 2017

Behind such behaviour, however, is a much more profound mechanism, namely, a gradually intensifying status rivalry between the United States and China. Status refers to an actor’s specific rank within a social hierarchy. Status is of intrinsic value for a state because, generally speaking, the higher its rank, the more privileges a state can enjoy. As a result, states tend to seek a high status, just as they require this status to be recognized by others. However, not every state can have a high status, because then none does (Larson, Paul, & Wohlforth, 2014, pp. 7–9). Transferred onto the current US– China relationship, the situation, roughly speaking, is as follows: The US status, both globally and in the Asia-Pacific, remains relatively higher than China’s. Also, the United States wants to defend and bolster this status. Meanwhile, China seeks a higher status increasingly on par with the United States in many issue-areas and wants the United States to respect this claim. The problem with this status competition between the United States and China is twofold, though: First, it underlies, and in fact nourishes, many other grave concerns prevalent in US–China relations. Second, if not mitigated, it has huge potential to end up in serious conflict.

The long shadow of power transition

2022 Michigan Evidence
China Heg Good NEG › Block › 2nc --- AT: Hostile China

Their read of Chinese motives is speculation without evidence

Swaine, 17 – senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and one of the most prominent American analysts in Chinese security studies (Michael, “Managing Asia’s Security Threats in the Trump Era” 1/19,

Regardless of its motives, China’s more recent, escalatory behavior has contributed significantly to the buildup in tensions in the disputed SCS and ECS areas. Beijing has refused to specify the precise nature of its claims both to individual land features and to the waters within the nine-dashed line in the SCS, and it has rejected the above-mentioned tribunal ruling (asserting that certain exceptions to such a ruling under UNCLOS Article 298 apply). Further, China seemed to assert the legal right of an archipelagic nation to draw boundary lines between the Paracel and perhaps the Spratly Islands in order to establish interior territorial waters, created sizable artificial islands with dual civilian-military facilities in the Spratlys, and regularly deployed a significant number of vessels and some aircraft near and sometimes into the territorial space of the S/D Islands. Due to all of this, many observers understandably assume the worst-case for China’s motives, ascribing them to the much larger, more aggressive and confrontational strategic motives outlined above.

This interpretation is purely speculative, however, and is certainly not confirmed by any authoritative Chinese statements or documents. In fact, China’s actions and statements can be most logically explained by the above interactive dynamic, which centers first and foremost on the maritime disputes themselves. Indeed, when measured against the metric of a supposed direct challenge to the U.S. position in Asia, Beijing’s actions seem cautious, even timid. It generally avoids the use of warships to assert its claims, has given assurances that it does not intend to militarize the Spratly Islands, and has certainly not attempted to seize land features held by other claimants to assure its control of the area. Moreover, Beijing continues to insist that it is dedicated to a peaceful, negotiated solution of the disputes and supports the peaceful objectives of the 2002 declaration. In general, it is attempting to increase its influence in both seas without increasing the chance of armed conflict with the United States.