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2022 Michigan Evidence
China Heg Good NEG › 1NC › 1nc --- Nato Expansion

Developing a united NATO front is the US’ primary mechanism to check China rise

Lee 22 [David Lee is a consultant and author based in Beijing who focuses on energy, health, international politics and international development, 04-29-2022, 'Defensive' NATO destabilizes Pacific for U.S. hegemony, CGTN, https://news.cgtn.com/news/2022-04-29/-Defensive-NATO-destabilizes-Pacific-for-U-S-hegemony-19CKc8rupfW/index.html] Eric

NATO touts itself as a "defensive" alliance, but in reality, it has been destabilizing the world for Washington's pursuit of hegemony. Established in response to the Soviet Union, the bloc's mission was accomplished three decades ago and should have shut down upon the end of the Cold War. However, desperately looking for new missions, the bloc has enlarged five times since 1999, expanding its members from 16 to 30. This raised the anxiety level of Russia and has eventually led to the war in Ukraine.

Shouting peace and security, the bloc has dropped a massive amount of bombs on the soil of other countries. Under the slogan of "preventing humanitarian disasters," NATO bombed Yugoslavia for 78 continuous days, killing and injuring more than 8,000 civilians. Demanding other countries abide by international rules, the alliance blatantly intervenes into domestic affairs of sovereign states, waging wars at its will for selfish goals.

2022 Michigan Evidence
China Heg Good NEG › 1NC › 1nc --- China Tech Good

Underregulated AI cause extinction.

Paul Salmon, Peter Hancock, and Tony Carden 01-24-2019 [Paul Salmon is a professor of Human Factors, University of the Sunshine Coast, Peter Hancock is a professor of Psychology, Civil and Environmental Engineering, and Industrial Engineering and Management Systems, University of Central Florida, Tony Carden is a researcher, University of the Sunshine Coast, The Conversation, “To protect us from the risks of advanced artificial intelligence, we need to act now,” https://theconversation.com/to-protect-us-from-the-risks-of-advanced-artificial-intelligence-we-need-to-act-now-107615//ZW]

Artificial intelligence can play chess, drive a car and diagnose medical issues. Examples include Google DeepMind’s AlphaGo, Tesla’s self-driving vehicles, and IBM’s Watson. This type of artificial intelligence is referred to as Artificial Narrow Intelligence (ANI) – non-human systems that can perform a specific task. We encounter this type on a daily basis, and its use is growing rapidly. But while many impressive capabilities have been demonstrated, we’re also beginning to see problems. The worst case involved a self-driving test car that hit a pedestrian in March. The pedestrian died and the incident is still under investigation. The next generation of AI With the next generation of AI the stakes will almost certainly be much higher. Artificial General Intelligence (AGI) will have advanced computational powers and human level intelligence. AGI systems will be able to learn, solve problems, adapt and self-improve. They will even do tasks beyond those they were designed for. Importantly, their rate of improvement could be exponential as they become far more advanced than their human creators. The introduction of AGI could quickly bring about Artificial Super Intelligence (ASI). While fully functioning AGI systems do not yet exist, it has been estimated that they will be with us anywhere between 2029 and the end of the century. What appears almost certain is that they will arrive eventually. When they do, there is a great and natural concern that we won’t be able to control them. The risks associated with AGI There is no doubt that AGI systems could transform humanity. Some of the more powerful applications include curing disease, solving complex global challenges such as climate change and food security, and initiating a worldwide technology boom. But a failure to implement appropriate controls could lead to catastrophic consequences. Despite what we see in Hollywood movies, existential threats are not likely to involve killer robots. The problem will not be one of malevolence, but rather one of intelligence, writes MIT professor Max Tegmark in his 2017 book Life 3.0: Being Human in the Age of Artificial Intelligence. It is here that the science of human-machine systems – known as Human Factors and Ergonomics – will come to the fore. Risks will emerge from the fact that super-intelligent systems will identify more efficient ways of doing things, concoct their own strategies for achieving goals, and even develop goals of their own. Imagine these examples: an AGI system tasked with preventing HIV decides to eradicate the problem by killing everybody who carries the disease, or one tasked with curing cancer decides to kill everybody who has any genetic predisposition for it an autonomous AGI military drone decides the only way to guarantee an enemy target is destroyed is to wipe out an entire community an environmentally protective AGI decides the only way to slow or reverse climate change is to remove technologies and humans that induce it. These scenarios raise the spectre of disparate AGI systems battling each other, none of which take human concerns as their central mandate. Various dystopian futures have been advanced, including those in which humans eventually become obsolete, with the subsequent extinction of the human race. Others have forwarded less extreme but still significant disruption, including malicious use of AGI for terrorist and cyber-attacks, the removal of the need for human work, and mass surveillance, to name only a few. So there is a need for human-centred investigations into the safest ways to design and manage AGI to minimise risks and maximise benefits. How to control AGI Controlling AGI is not as straightforward as simply applying the same kinds of controls that tend to keep humans in check. Many controls on human behaviour rely on our consciousness, our emotions, and the application of our moral values. AGIs won’t need any of these attributes to cause us harm. Current forms of control are not enough. Arguably, there are three sets of controls that require development and testing immediately: the controls required to ensure AGI system designers and developers create safe AGI systems the controls that need to be built into the AGIs themselves, such as “common sense”, morals, operating procedures, decision-rules, and so on the controls that need to be added to the broader systems in which AGI will operate, such as regulation, codes of practice, standard operating procedures, monitoring systems, and infrastructure. Human Factors and Ergonomics offers methods that can be used to identify, design and test such controls well before AGI systems arrive. For example, it’s possible to model the controls that exist in a particular system, to model the likely behaviour of AGI systems within this control structure, and identify safety risks. This will allow us to identify where new controls are required, design them, and then remodel to see if the risks are removed as a result. In addition, our models of cognition and decision making can be used to ensure AGIs behave appropriately and have humanistic values. Act now, not later This kind of research is in progress, but there is not nearly enough of it and not enough disciplines are involved. Even the high-profile tech entrepreneur Elon Musk has warned of the “existential crisis” humanity faces from advanced AI and has spoken about the need to regulate AI before it’s too late. The next decade or so represents a critical period. There is an opportunity to create safe and efficient AGI systems that can have far reaching benefits to society and humanity. At the same time, a business-as-usual approach in which we play catch-up with rapid technological advances could contribute to the extinction of the human race. The ball is in our court, but it won’t be for much longer.

2022 Michigan Evidence
China Heg Good NEG › 1NC › 1nc --- China Tech Good

Regulatory capture kills US government control of the industry.

Simon Constable 03-26-18 [Contributor to Forbes; Forbes; “Why we should not regulate the tech industry”; https://www.forbes.com/sites/simonconstable/2018/03/26/no-we-really-dont-need-government-regulation-of-the-tech-industry/?sh=29e545a4eb8d//ZW]

It's time to just say no to calls for more government regulation of the tech industry. Such requests would be laughable if they weren't so sad. The truth is that the government proved beyond reasonable doubt its inability to effectively regulate during the financial crisis. In that light, calls for the government to now impose and administer new rules on an equally complex industry seem preposterous. The desires for more regulation came last week from Facebook founder Mark Zuckerberg who was responding to revelations in The Observer newspaper that data on perhaps more than 50 million of Facebook's users had been shared. Talking on CNN last week Zuckerberg said: "I actually am not sure we shouldn’t be regulated," which will no doubt be taken as we need the government to step in. Indeed that seems to be what happened when another tech titan, Apple's CEO Tim Cook, explicitly requested more government mandated rules. He said: Expect such calls to grow into a chorus before long. But just because we are likely to hear thunderous demands for Federal oversight doesn't mean that new rules from the government make any sense. Here's why: [graphic omitted] Recent history shows the incompetence of government regulators. An alphabet soup of government agencies failed to stop the financial crisis of 2007-2008 which resulted from making too many home loans to people with less than perfect credit. The organizations charged with regulation included the Securities Exchange Commission, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the state-level regulators, as well as the Federal Reserve. The latter, it should be noted, wasn't sure that there was a problem with dodgy mortgages even as late as 2007. Then chairman of the Fed, Ben Bernanke, said: We believe the effect of the troubles in the subprime sector on the broader housing market will be limited and we do not expect significant spillovers from the subprime market to the rest of the economy or to the financial system. Given what happened to the economy after that, Bernanke's statement may well go down as the definition of incorrect. It doesn't seem reasonable to expect the that the government would fare better with regulating tech than it did in finance. The private sector was way ahead of the government. Rather than the government spot the problem, it was the private sector that highlighted the burgeoning issues of mortgages turning from good to bad. Notably, investor John Paulson saw the cracks in the mortgage market clearly and then took action that made him billions of dollars in profits. He made sizable bets that the mortgage loans were indeed as dodgy as he thought. That story is ably told by Michael Lewis in his fabulous book, The Big Short. If you don't fancy reading it, then try watching the movie. Either the book or the film will give you an education in markets. In any event, in the case of tech, without doubt, the private sector will be far ahead of the bureaucrats. Expert regulators get hired by the regulated. If the regulators themselves were any good at what they do, then it is more than likely that they'd end up working for one of the regulated companies. Why? This happens because the private sector can and does pay far more than does the government for such expertise. The hiring companies can afford to pay fat salaries because the knowledge the former regulators bring allows the companies to run circles around the rules. Investopedia dubs the situation one of "gamekeeper turned poacher." The only caveat is that the poacher manages to give the gamekeeper the runaround while remaining within the rules of the law. In short, it makes the regulations impotent. It is part of a problem known as regulatory capture whereby the regulators listen far more to the companies/industry they are supposed to oversee rather than anyone else. For a more detailed outline of the matter see Investopedia. Regulatory capture, without doubt, can occur in the tech business just as much as it has elsewhere. Regulations help the largest companies the most. By no means least important, is the fact that government rules help to entrench the dominant companies more than they would be otherwise. Regulations, whether they be simple form-filling or more extensive, are costly to administer by the companies regulated. These costs tend to disproportionately fall on smaller firms which don't have the economies of scale associated with being a large corporation. When the so-called regulatory burden, or the dollar costs of complying with the rules, get large then some smaller companies will decide to throw in the towel and get out of the industry in question. Eventually, if regulations continue their momentous march forward from reams of paper to filing cabinets full, then the industry will solely be dominated by massive companies. In other words, more regulation leads to fewer but larger competitors. When an industry has fewer competitors, the result tends to be increased profits for the remaining companies. This is true regardless of the industry. Solutions? How should we solve the data breaches and the misuses of personal information? It is an important question. In the first instance, the U.S. does have a reasonably well-functioning court system. Maybe the infractions will result in a lawsuit so that the maligned can seek financial redress. If the data sharing wasn't significant enough to warrant a court filing, then maybe we don't need the government to step in to save the situation in the first place. Second, the market for technology services, such as social media, is highly competitive. In 2005 Facebook was a bit player in the social media industry; then second fiddle to MySpace as maestro. Now not so much as MySpace has shrunk in importance. It seems evident that either Facebook will get its act together quickly to redress the problems and gain back lost credibility with users. Failing that a new company will offer a better service to people.

2022 Michigan Evidence
China Heg Good NEG › 1NC › 1nc --- China Tech Good

Revitalization of American hegemony forces takeover of the sector.

Gabriella M. Dominguez 12-21-21 [An intelligence specialist with analytic expertise in adversarial doctrine, plans, and tactics regarding the employment of space, counterspace, and denial and deception systems against EUCOM; Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs; “Smart Power is Hard Power: A liberal position on US approach to China”; https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/JIPA/Display/Article/2880386/smart-power-is-hard-power-a-liberal-position-on-the-us-approach-to-china///ZW]

To “rethink the policies of the last two decades,” military coercion and engagement strategies, previously enacted by the United States, have been largely unsuccessful in deterring China’s revisionist activities and ambition to achieve great power status in the Pacific theater.2 The Biden administration’s interim national security strategy guidance, published in March of 2021, demonstrates a small step toward reinvigorating US liberal hegemony via multilateralism to combat Chinese aggression and “ensure America, not China, sets the international agenda.”3 The current US strategy places an emphasis on strengthening ties with Allied and partner nations to unite the world’s democracies for collective security, reinvesting in innovation to maintain US technological advantages, and defending democratic values at home and abroad to promote open and free societies to advance American interests. To go a step further, the United States must ground its overall approach to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) with a strategy of liberal hegemony that maintains America’s status as “the world’s lone superpower” and counters Beijing’s rise in the international system by leveraging “smart power” tools—developing high-tech military concepts to dominate the information sphere and enhancing soft power efforts to competitively attract the international community to the US’ liberal values.4 This is an effective approach for two reasons: first, “power is becoming less transferable, less coercive, and less tangible;” and second, Beijing’s ability to successfully challenge US liberal hegemony lies in its employment of asymmetric tools, not in order of battle.5 “While President Xi Jinping has proclaimed “China will never seek hegemony or engage in expansion,” PRC actions display deliberate attempts to “displace the United States in the Indo-Pacific region” and challenge US liberal hegemony across the international system.6 This US “smart power” approach to China focuses on reducing legacy force structure, prioritizing a smaller, more capable force, and strengthening attractiveness of US liberal hegemony to combat the multi-dimensional challenges posed by a revisionist China. Power is the ability to get others to want what you want by changing the behavior of states to support your desired outcome.7 In the past, the character of power correlated closely with capital, which funded the use of military force to coerce adversarial actors. The United States came to its current position on the back of this form of power. It has long sought military and economic preeminence to prevent the emergence of “challenger” states in the international arena.8 The invasion of Iraq and overthrow of Saddam Hussein showcased US strategy to employ military power to defeat a perceived threat to US objectives and influence in the Middle East. Currently, the US continues to flex its economic prowess by imposing several sanctions on Russia as a response to the annexation of Crimea and multiple cyberattacks on US infrastructure to cripple its economic and military capacity but has made little progress in altering the Kremlin’s aggressive behavior. As illustrated in the Russian example, this old view of power—an overwhelming emphasis on hard power to advance US interests and preserve liberal hegemony—will fail in the long run against the multi-dimensional world of today wherein “power is passing from the ‘capital-rich’ to the ‘information-rich.’”9 It is no longer enough to have a large military force or a deep pocketbook. One must be able to obtain and analyze the correct information quickly to enable rapid decision-making and generate effects that the adversary is unable to effectively respond to. A timely response to new information before one’s opponent can act gives one the strategic advantage, necessary to achieving a favorable balance of power. The ability to take action on US terms and force our adversaries to respond. Advances in technology have led to enhanced digitization, increasing the importance of organizational skills and flexibility over material capabilities.10 Information-rich power has altered the landscape of geopolitics in another way by elevating the importance of strategic narratives. “Great powers use strategic narratives to establish and maintain influence in the international system and to shape the system itself.”11 In other words, “success is the result not merely of whose army wins, but also whose story wins.”12 Vladimir Putin’s strategic narrative concerning the crisis in Ukraine in 2014 was able to weaken the US credibility and US-NATO collective efforts to effectively deter Russia’s annexation of Crimea. With the help of its state-owned media outlets, social media, and spending on international broadcasting, Russia claimed that most of the Crimean population desired reunification with Russia, appealed to USSR nostalgia by insisting that the former Soviet republics were one country with Russian ethnic groups being wrongly split across borders, and framed the US as a bully by emphasizing US unilateral action in Iraq and Afghanistan and condemning US attempts to assert its dominance over Europe and Russia.13 Moscow’s employment of identity, historical, and international narratives to justify Russian behavior in Crimea challenged US authority in the international community and undermined US sanction efforts as some NATO countries stood firmly opposed to supporting EU sanctions against Russia. Despite its military and economic prowess, the US was unable to deter Crimea’s annexation and failed to credibly influence Russia behavior. China has taken advantage of this shift in the character of power. Since 2000, China has become the second largest economy in the world, militarized islands in the South China Sea of which it has no rightful claim,14 and committed numerous cyber intrusion and theft operations against US information networks. Beijing continues aggressive and manipulative activities against its neighbors in the Indo-Pacific region that support Washington’s leadership position in the intelligence community (IC)—a conscious attempt to oppose US hegemony in pursuit of the “Chinese Dream.”15 Furthermore, China has embraced information warfare and soft power to directly counter the United States—a militarily stronger foe.16 Rather than matching US comprehensive power, the PRC has chosen to conduct asymmetric warfare to target key US vulnerabilities, counter overall American strengths, and gradually chip away at US hegemony.17 Previous US strategies have yet to adequately address this shift in the character of power. The US is still focused on capital-rich power employment. A classic example of this is Washington’s intervention in Afghanistan and Iraq. America’s involvement in the Middle East to quell terrorist organizations are attempts at employing traditional power coercion through brute force. While this strategy worked in the Gulf War, the US hasn’t seen much, if any, success in employing this strategy since. Currently, US forces have been ordered to withdraw from Afghanistan after a decades-long war that has seen very little progress in employing military power to solve the complex problems of the Middle East nation, sacrificing numerous US lives in the process. Due to its inability to pivot to information-rich power employment, the US has thus far been unable to counter Chinese aggression in the information sphere and counter its efforts to influence states to legitimize Chinese leadership. The United States “crime-and-punishment” approach during the Six Party Talks—specifically, its unwillingness to hold direct talks with North Korea (DPRK), demands for unilateral concessions, and “unilateral display of muscle” by threatening military force and imposing economic sanctions on the “rogue” state—ultimately failed to compel a permanent halt in DPRK nuclear weapon ambitions.18 China’s role as host and mediator of the Six Party Talks provided it an opportunity to exploit participants’ concerns over the United States’ aggressive strategy toward DPRK. The PRC—pledging its commitment to a multilateral approach to reach a peaceful resolution—rallied participants behind less stringent actions ultimately thwarting Washington’s approach to dismantle DPRK’s nuclear program.19 As a result, the PRC was able to construct a ‘good guy’ persona to improve foreign perceptions of China, demonstrate its capability to shape global affairs, and reshape the international order to one that is responsive to China’s interests.20 On the other hand, an engagement strategy to encourage and maintain dialogue with the PRC while attempting to avoid direct confrontation with China has increased uncertainty regarding US commitment to its Allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific region. US failure to preempt or adequately respond to Chinese aggressive or irresponsible behavior has hindered US influence and capability in the Pacific region and worldwide. This strategy continues to allow China to exert influence over US foreign policy, weaken US credibility in the region, and freely propagate its brand of Communism globally, undermining US liberal hegemony without incurring costs. This is demonstrated by continued Chinese military aggression in the South China Sea wherein smaller countries, at times, acquiesce to Chinese demands or fail to denounce Chinese actions due to their uncertainty regarding US commitment in the region. This sows doubt across the international community regarding America’s credibility and strength to act freely and secure its interests in the region with states questioning continued alignment to the US, threatening US access and influence in the Indo-Pacific theater. Put simply, the United States is in danger of losing the information and soft power war against the PRC and with it, its superpower status. China has successfully conducted numerous cyberespionage operations, stealing information to build advanced technology and military equipment to counter US information and military advantage. Moreover, the US is failing to rapidly transition emerging technologies into the armed forces and has fallen short in discovering novel ways in which these technologies can be used for enhanced military advantage over an adversary. In 2020, Secretary of Defense Mark Esper stressed the inability of the Department of Defense (DOD) to appropriately and rapidly acquire and scale innovative technology for military employment.21 Beijing has initiated a number of efforts to continue to move China closer toward attaining a global leadership position in the IC. China’s “intelligent” approach to warfare—the militarization of enabling technologies such as cloud computing, artificial intelligence (AI), quantum information, big data analytics, and unmanned systems—demonstrate its efforts to prepare for the demands of future combat operations requiring “rapid processing and the fusing of information to support quick and efficient command decision-making.”22 In 2016, China launched the first space-based quantum satellite, Micius, demonstrating considerable progress in in its goal to develop unhackable global communications through entanglement-based quantum key distribution.23 Additionally, its “Three Warfare” strategy—nonkinetic measures to manipulate the behavior of states in favor of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) preferred outcomes—serves to maintain CCP legitimacy, extend Beijing’s reach, and insert China’s brand of socialism across the IC.24 China’s use of information at the political level buoy these advances in information’s operational employment. Most recently, the PRC has taken advantage of the US State Department’s delayed response to the coronavirus pandemic, its emphasis in placing the blame on China and the Chinese people for the creation and spread of COVID-19, and its failure to rapidly allocate COVID-19 resources, including providing vaccines beyond US borders. Notably, Beijing was able to quickly portray itself as a “well-organized state capable of controlling the full situation,” rapidly distribute conspiracy theories that accused the US of spreading COVID-19, pose as the defender against an American bully, and provide vaccines to countries in need before the US—all soft power tools shaping global perceptions in favor of Chinese leadership and direction concerning the pandemic.25 Every action China takes to pursue its interests weakens the legitimacy and attractiveness of US hegemonic leadership, which results in a loss in relative power. A 2020 Pew Research Center survey of 14 advanced economies, three located in the Indo-Pacific region, most people believed China handled the coronavirus better than the US and overall had unfavorable views of both the US and China.26 While limited in scope, this poll provides a glimpse of reduced attractiveness to US liberal hegemony largely influenced by its soft power deficiencies. For weak Indo-Pacific states that regularly employ hedging strategies to prevent either the US or China from dominating the region, the decreased attractiveness of a US partner may spell disaster.27 The US can reverse this potential disaster through a strategy that combines power with ideas—strength with liberal values. The United States must maximize its power relative to that of China to preserve American dominance in the international community, while reinvesting in the propagation of its liberal values28 These smart power objectives emphasize the militarization of emerging technologies to deny CCP advantages in the information domain and require the US to take the lead in strengthening the legitimacy and attraction to US liberal hegemony. To gain a clear military advantage over China, the United States needs to continue to heavily invest in the research and development of emerging information-age technologies—AI, autonomy, robotics, quantum, big data, and machine learning—and its rapid integration into all aspects of US military infrastructure to increase the effectiveness of the information collected and how it is used. Specifically, the United States needs to allocate a larger portion of defense spending to the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, increase defense partnerships with Silicon Valley industries and research universities, and improve acquisition practices to facilitate and accelerate military applications of intelligent technologies. The US must invest in and further develop technologies that will enable persistent awareness of adversary actions, speed up effective decision-making, and increase lethality at a low cost and low risk to the US. Specifically, investing in quantum, AI, autonomy, and cyber technologies for offensive and defensive purposes requires further integration and cooperation between the Department of Defense and the scientific community. Increased integration and cooperation between scientific and technical entities and the DOD will assist and maintain US technical and military advantages. Information is power. These high-tech systems are a cost-effective avenue to overcome the limits of human intelligence and allow the United States to rapidly understand the environment and make decisions faster than the adversary. Moreover, a high-tech–enabled force supports rapid collection and analysis of large amounts of data, enables swift decision-making, and enhances the lethality of US military forces.29 Whereas now the US can neither effectively stop nor respond to China stealing US intellectual property via cyber channels, technology such as AI-enabled cybersecurity can be used to rapidly detect China encroachment into US systems and automatically deny its ability to steal US scientific and military data. In an environment characterized by information power, operational agility against an adversary must be met with agility at the political level. The US Department of State (DOS)—responsible for advancing American interests through diplomacy, advocacy, and assistance efforts—has fallen short in the narrative battle against its adversaries leading to an overall decline in US appeal and influence worldwide. To increase the attractiveness of US liberal hegemony, the United States needs to influence states to champion American interests and combat adversaries’ anti-US information campaign. To achieve this, the United States must craft a strategic narrative in which ‘a strong America means freedom, prosperity, and security for all,’ consistently reinforcing the story that only through US liberal hegemony can the international community achieve a peaceful end state. Knowing this, the United States must increase its emphasis on alternative instruments to comprehensively maximize power and maintain its superpower status, or risk being outpaced by its competitors. The United States must reinstate the US Information Agency to ensure that American soft power is “always on display” wherein its stated culture and liberalist values are clearly demonstrated in its policies and activities to attract states to US interests and legitimize American liberal hegemony in the world order.30 “If the state’s power seems legitimate, it will encounter less resistance to its wishes. If its culture and ideology are attractive, others will more willingly follow.”31 Perceptions and popularity are equally important to hard military power in influencing states’ behavior. Currently, the lack of such an agency and DOS shortfalls has resulted in the muddling of US strategic narrative and a perceived loss of credibility in American leadership—which gives China an in-road to vie for IC support and tip the balance of power in its favor. The DOD can help reclaim some of this credibility by investing more heavily in HA/DR operations in East Asia. Furthermore, a strategy of US liberal hegemony must not only work to counter Chinese advantages but credibly convince Pacific states of America’s benign character and of the detrimental impact Chinese hegemony will have on the region. This will promote hedging strategies that will, with greater probability, favor Washington as opposed to Beijing leadership. HA/DR operations are a means to amplify one’s foreign policy goals by providing goodwill and leverage. Research suggests that US aid increases support for Washington and its liberal democratic values, such as free and fair elections.32 However, in the aftermath of the Soviet-Afghan War, where the US failed to provide aid following the Soviet’s defeat by the Mujahideen, the Taliban and Al-Qaeda were able to fill the void and fortify their power in the region—resulting in a hostile nation diametrically opposed to US hegemony and its liberal values. Today, the US has been in a war against terror in Afghanistan for 22 years to combat these same threats wherein US sacrifices might have been avoided with initial aid to improve relations in Afghanistan and promote its liberal values. In a similar vein, Beijing recognizes that development is an instrument of power, 33 and is increasing its activities in HA/DR to gain legitimacy for Chinese global leadership. Moreover, if the United States does not consistently take a leading role in world development, China will fill this gap to weaken the credibility and influence of US liberal hegemony. Currently, delayed response times, lack of a unified US message, and ineffective coordination between USAID and the DOD has hindered US proficiency in humanitarian aid and disaster relief (HA/DR) efforts, providing adversaries an opportunity to enhance influence.34 The United States must take a commanding lead in humanitarian aid by increasing funding and military assistance to, while also providing more opportunities for interagency coordination with the US Agency of International Aid (USAID). This will enhance rapid mobility and sustainability of HA/DR efforts worldwide and adequately showcase the benefits of powerful US leadership in the international system. Assistance recipients are more likely to buy-in to the US brand of leadership when they have directly benefited from it. It is in America’s best interest to prioritize HA/DR and provide increased support to USAID to improve relations, gain access, and expand its influence across the IC. Traditionally, power is measured by states’ ability to coerce using hard power; however, the diffusion of power largely due to increased interdependence and advanced technology development has rendered these traditional sources of power less effective in achieving desired outcomes. Today, it is not enough to coerce states into accepting US liberal hegemony. The United States must also be able to credibly attract and legitimize American leadership to garner deep commitment for US liberal hegemony across the IC. America’s renewed focus on “smart power”—using hard and soft power in concert to increase the balance of power in its favor—will reassert American dominance in the international system and counter PRC efforts to revise the world order.35 A strong America is vital for a secure, prosperous, and free world.

2022 Michigan Evidence
China Heg Good NEG › 1NC › 1nc --- China Tech Good

China wins the tech race now.

Daniel Wagner 01-13-2020 [Daniel Wagner is senior investment officer for guarantees and syndications at the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank in Beijing and has worked for some of the world’s most respected and best-known companies, including AIG, GE, the African Development Bank, the Asian Development Bank and the World Bank Group, Fair Observer, “China’s Race for Scientific and Technological Supremacy,” https://www.fairobserver.com/region/asia_pacific/china-economy-news-chinese-technology-news-asia-pacific-world-news-today-80194///ZW]

Science and technology will become the lifeblood of the Chinese economy in this decade and will remain its lifeblood in the future. That is, in part, because China has become sufficiently advanced to be able to effectively compete with the US and other technological leaders in the West. It is also the key to China’s ability to innovate and compete in the future, as it is for other advanced economies. Innovation-driven growth is also required in order for Beijing to smoothly deleverage away from its manufacturing base model of growth, which is slowly running out of steam. In the decade that has just passed, its productivity gains faltered and credit-driven investment in low return capital propped up its growth. China must address its slowing productivity gains to produce a smooth rebalancing of the economy. Productivity growth will not come from textiles, steel or the property market, and the flourishing services sector will require cutting-edge technology to remain competitive. To pull it off, China will need to acquire and deploy advanced technology quickly and efficiently throughout its economy. China is diligently preparing to assume a seemingly preordained role as the world leader in a plethora of areas. It is driven. It is focused. And it will stop at nothing to ensure that it has all the advantages it can glean from the existing world order to create a world order in its own image. Technology is absolutely critical to achieving that objective, and there is little that is more important in that regard than cutting-edge telecommunications — specifically 5G technology. The Huawei saga has served to illustrate this point. America’s issues with Huawei are as much about who has access to, and thus controls, the data of the future, as they are about superpower politics and the rule of law. Some Western intelligence sources believe the company is state-owned and has deep connections to China’s intelligence services. Its founder was an engineer with the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), and it is worth adding that no large Chinese company is fully independent of the government. Although China spends more than $200 billion on research (second only to the US), generates close to 30,000 PhDs in science and engineering, and leads the world in patent applications each year, its record is mixed in terms of the actual impact of innovation, as measured by the success of companies in commercializing new ideas and competing in the global market. China has some unique strengths in innovation, which includes the rapid commercialization of new ideas by virtue of the size of its consumer base. It also has the world’s most extensive manufacturing ecosystem, enabling continuous innovation in production processes that reduce costs and improve quality, and has created capacity for research with a growing number of universities and research institutions, as well as an expanding pool of talent. On the minus side of the ledger, China’s slow regulatory processes and weak intellectual property protections prevent foreign investors from wanting to bring their best and brightest researchers and innovations to the country. Completing the journey from innovation sponge (absorbing and adapting existing technology and knowledge from around the world) to global innovation leader is not just a way to signal China’s progress as an economy and society. The boost to productivity that innovation provides is critically important for sustaining China’s growth. Beijing has enacted some two dozen laws that have created a technology-siphoning machine. That apparatus maintains databases of foreign co-optees and distributes stipends, sinecures and cash to foreign donors of high-tech innovations. China has targeted all sources of American innovation, including universities, corporations and government labs, exploiting both their openness and naivete, with methods and tradecraft custom-tailored to each target. The Chinese government’s current system for processing and reverse engineering stolen designs has grown significantly larger than it was during the Cold War and has developed from a strictly military operation into a system permeating the entire Chinese government. It is an elaborate, comprehensive system for identifying foreign technologies, acquiring them by every means imaginable and converting them into weapons and competitive goods. China could not have experienced the dramatic economic transformation it has experienced in the 21st century, nor have sustained its progress as it has, without inexpensive and unrestricted access to other countries’ technology. Chinese firms have routinely become investors in American startups, particularly those working on cutting-edge technologies with potential military applications. These are companies that make rocket engines for spacecraft, sensors for autonomous navy ships and printers that make flexible screens that can be used in fighter-plane cockpits. Many of the Chinese firms are owned by state-owned companies or have direct connections to Chinese leaders. According to the US Department of Defense, Beijing actively encourages Chinese companies with close government ties to invest in American startups specializing in critical technologies such as artificial intelligence (AI) and robots to advance China’s military capacity, as well as its economy. US government controls intended to protect potentially critical technologies against countries like China have fallen short. It took a while, but such transactions eventually started ringing alarm bells in Washington. US lawmakers raised broad questions about the nature of China’s economic relationship with the US well before the Trump administration started applying tariffs on Chinese products, in an effort to reduce the inherent inequity in bilateral trade between the two nations. China is extremely capable and driven. When it aims to be a leader in a particular sector or acquire a certain technology, it does so with precision. There is no question that Beijing aims to be a leader in AI, semiconductors and any number of other sub-sectors of the technology-driven 21st-century economy. It has the advantage of having a lot of money to spend and plenty of people and resources to devote to the issue. Since it certainly appears that the US government will not be devoting similar resources to the tech sector any time soon, it is merely a question of time until China captures that title, too. In the battle for the future, the Chinese Communist Party understands very well what is at stake. It took the US and West too long to realize what China was doing, and by the time they did, Beijing was already approaching strongly from behind. Soon enough, the West will be looking at China in the tech space from the front window, rather than the rearview mirror.

2022 Michigan Evidence
China Heg Good NEG › 1NC › 1nc --- China Tech Good

China led AI is better.

Kai-Fu Lee and Paul Triolo 12-2017 [Dr. Kai-Fu Lee is the founder and CEO of Sinovation Ventures, and president of Sinovation Ventures Artificial Intelligence Institute, Paul Triolo is the Practice Head, Geo-technology at Eurasia Group, Ltd; Sinovation Ventures, “China embraces AI: A Close Look and A Long View,” https://www.eurasiagroup.net/files/upload/China_Embraces_AI.pdf//ZW]

AI policy in China Beijing’s AI policy priorities are clear. The “Next Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan,” announced by China’s State Council in July 2017, called for China to catch up on AI technology and applications by 2020, and to become a global AI innovation hub by 2030. Chinese President Xi Jinping hammered the point home in his 19th Party Congress speech in October, when he mentioned the development of advanced manufacturing and the promotion of further integration of the Internet, big data and artificial intelligence with the real-world economy. Beijing has placed huge bets on AI for a host of political and economic reasons, from improving governance capacity to improving policy development and surveillance. The plan calls for China to lead the way in developing a regulatory environment to both encourage AI development and to mitigate the potential downsides of AI. A few months after the national plan’s announcement in July, the Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST) designated Baidu to lead the autonomous vehicle platform, Tencent for medical, Alibaba for Smart Cities, and iFlyTek for speech interfaces. These plans should be taken seriously, as the Chinese government has shown a strong track record in delivering results. For example, Beijing announced in 2010 that China would become the world’s leader in adopting high-speed rail (HSR). Today it has 60% of the world’s HSR market. In 2014, the Chinese government announced the “Mass Entrepreneurship and Innovation Plan.”Today there are business 8000 incubators in China, compared to 1400 in 2014. These plans have teeth, both due to the deadlines and metrics set out at the national level, as well as the local companies that are likely to take these directions as top priorities. We can expect a similar trajectory for China’s AI policies. Historically, the Chinese government has been open-minded towards technology development. When a new technology comes out, the government will give it the benefit of doubt and let it grow, rather than stifle it with policy or endless debates. Also, the environment in China is more conducive to fast launch and iteration. There is a general belief that it is better to launch something and then get it approved later. This allows Chinese businesses to generate real data at scale, which in turn allows technology to improve over a shorter period of time, particularly once AI is introduced into the equation. For example, while in the US, truckers’ unions are petitioning the Department of Transportation to delay autonomous truck testing, in China, the Xiong’an New Area, a planned smart city development southwest of Beijing, is being designed from the ground up with full autonomy in mind. Various highway authorities are willing to develop road augmentation, special lanes, or move warehouses near highway exits, all to facilitate faster deployment of autonomous trucks. We also see major initiatives in cities, following the central government’s call to action. Shanghai, Nanjing, Wuhan, and Tianjin are but a few of the cities coming out with their own AI initiatives. As with past policies, much of the resources will be applied at the provincial and city government levels. The types of resources may include subsidies for top talent (especially overseas talent); guidance for top VC funds, with the government playing the role of limited partner (LP) but offering some of its upside to the general partners (GPs) of the funds; special programs for top AI companies and start-ups (free rent, subsidy for local hiring, housing and private school for top talents); and technical awards for companies and individuals. Finally, the US, EU, and China will also compete to be out in front on developing a regulatory regime around AI technologies and applications. The National Plan’s explicit recognition of the need for regulatory, legal, and ethical principles for AI development and use represents an uncommonly foresighted approach. Of course, the government’s approach to AI regulation, ethics, and economic adjustment will reflect Beijing’s broader model of governance and ideology. Given its preference for a state-centric approach to international issues, for example, it is possible China will launch an initiative via the UN to establish first an automation/AI-related “code of conduct,” or basic regulatory approach, followed by a special committee on the topic and eventually an oversight body operating within a UN framework. Such an initiative would put China at the forefront of developing a global approach to these issues. Beijing has attempted a similar approach on cybersecurity issues, which it argues have a global impact and require a global regulatory response.

2022 Michigan Evidence
China Heg Good NEG › 1NC › 1nc --- China Tech Good

US AI is unregulated--- that’s an existential risk.

George Dvorsky 10-25-2017 [A senior reporter specializing in spaceflight, space policy, and space exploration, Gizmodo, “Powerful Lobby Group Wants to Keep AI Unregulated,” https://gizmodo.com/powerful-lobby-group-wants-to-keep-ai-unregulated-1819842165//ZW]

The Information Technology Industry Council (ITI)—a Washington D.C.-based lobby group that boasts Google, Amazon, and Microsoft among its many clients—is telling governments to think twice about establishing laws to regulate AI. But given mounting safety, ethical, and social justice concerns, is that such a good idea? On Tuesday, ITI released its “AI Policy Principles,” in which the lobby group outlined “specific areas where industry, governments, and others can collaborate, as well as specific opportunities for public-private partnership.” In the new document, ITI acknowledged the need for the tech sector to promote the responsible development and use of AI, while calling upon governments to support, incentivize, and fund AI research efforts. But as for letting governments take a peek at an ITI client’s source code, or enact laws to steer the safe and ethical development of AI, that’s something it’s a bit less enthused about. “We also encourage governments to evaluate existing policy tools and use caution before adopting new laws, regulations, or taxes that may inadvertently or unnecessarily impede the responsible development and use of AI,” notes ITI in its new list of AI principles. “This extends to the foundational nature of protecting source code, proprietary algorithms, and other intellectual property. Failure to do so could present a significant cyber risk.” According to its mandate, ITI seeks to “encourage all governments around the world—including the US government—to develop policies, standards, and regulations that promote innovation and growth for the tech industry.” It represents some of the heaviest hitters in the tech sector, including Amazon, Facebook, Google, IBM, and Microsoft, while claiming to be “the global voice of the tech sector” and “a catalyst for preparing an AI world.” ITI’s document is timely given just how important AI is starting to become, both in terms of its burgeoning influence on our lives (whether it be a photo-sorting app or an algorithm that invents new medicines), and in the global economy (ITI estimates that AI will add at least $7 trillion to the global economy by 2025). But it’s also timely given the recent calls for oversight and regulation. As Bloomberg reporters Gerrit De Vynck and Ben Brody write: Big tech companies, and their software, are coming under more scrutiny in the wake of news that Russian-sponsored accounts used social networks to spread discord and try to influence the outcome of the 2016 U.S. presidential election. Algorithms designed by Facebook, Twitter Inc. and Google have also been criticized for increasing political polarization by giving people the type of news they already agree with, creating so-called “filter bubbles.” And the concerns don’t stop there. Developers are starting to be criticized for allowing their AI systems to adopt human biases and prejudices (a recent Princeton study, for example, showed that some AI systems are sexist and racist). There’s also uncertainty about how AI will contribute to technological unemployment, automated warfare, and computer hacking. And there’s still no consensus on the specific ethical or moral codes that need to be imbued into these systems. There’s also the frightening potential, as thinkers like Elon Musk, Stephen Hawking, and others have pointed out, for something to go horribly wrong with AI. As the recent AI breakthrough by Google-owned DeepMind demonstrated, a fast takeoff event, in which AI evolves into a superintelligent form, may happen relatively quickly and without warning, thus introducing catastrophic—and possibly existential—threats. As all of this is happening, it shouldn’t come as a surprise that some concerned observers are calling for the government to step in. Musk has warned that governments need to implement regulations “before it’s too late,” and that it’s only after things get out of hand that we tend to act. Two years ago, the White House implemented a preliminary AI strategy, saying AI needs to be ethical, that it must augment, and not replace, humans, and that everyone should have a chance to participate in the development of these systems. But as for formal regulations, the White House said it’s still premature. As former US president Obama told Wired last year, “Most people aren’t spending a lot of time right now worrying about the Singularity—they are worrying about ‘Well, is my job going to be replaced by a machine?’” Patrick Lin, director of the Ethics + Emerging Sciences Group at California Polytechnic State University, says that regulating new technologies is always a delicate balancing act. “If you set regulation too early, then you may be betting on the wrong standards, and that would be terrible for commercialization, which is important,” Lin told Gizmodo. “The same problem exists with setting too many or unnecessary regulations; they can create barriers to innovation. But commercialization isn’t the only value at stake here; public safety is another value in the equation. So, if there’s little or no regulation for technologies that can have serious impact on our lives—from self-driving cars to AI systems that make criminal sentencing and bank lending decisions—then that will be bad for society. It’s a mistake to have a knee-jerk reaction either way, reflexively for or against regulation. Each technology is different and needs to be considered carefully on its own merits.” Lin says this conversation is currently happening in regards to autonomous vehicles, with one camp arguing that regulatory standards will put manufacturers on the same page about safety-critical functions (which would protect the industry from some liability), with the other camp saying we don’t know enough to start forging standards. “A middle path between no regulation and state regulation is to let industry regulate itself, which is the ITI approach,” says Lin. “But this is far from ideal as well: it’s letting the fox guard the henhouse. There’s no teeth to enforce self-regulations if a company breaks rank; there may be even less transparency than with government regulators; and many other problems.” Currently, the US has no federal agency dedicated to regulating or monitoring AI, and it’ll probably be a while before we see anything like that (if ever). In the meantime, it’ll be up to various groups, both inside and outside the government, to monitor developments in AI, such as the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (to oversee development of autonomous vehicles) and the Department of Homeland Security (to monitor cybersecurity threats). Some private individuals and companies have created their own groups, such as Musk’s OpenAI initiative and Google’s DeepMind Ethics & Society group. But as Lin points out, there’s a “having your cake and eat it, too” aspect to self-regulation. “On one hand, industry (correctly) says that AI is going to be this game-changing, super-revolutionary thing, but on the other hand, they often tell us not to worry about it, that they have it handled,” he said. “Worse, because the AI industry is so fragmented and full of start-ups—or even individuals without formal education or professional training, working from their basements—you couldn’t possibly get them all on board with your self-imposed regulations, whereas government regulations can use the full force of law to achieve compliance.” Lin says that self-regulation may be better than no regulation or uninformed regulation, especially when it’s about a technology that could cause major problems for society. As examples, he points to fake news, dieselgate, biased decision systems, and so on. Sara Wachter-Boettcher, author of Technically Wrong: Sexist Apps, Biased Algorithms, and Other Threats of Toxic Tech, says she’s happy to see an acknowledgement of the problem and development of shared principles, but the underlying message to her seems to be, “trust us, we’re working on it.” “I would ask, what evidence do we have that they’ve got a handle on removing bias from AI? Why should we trust tech companies when we see examples of them embedding bias into software, or launching products with unintended consequences, every day?,” Wachter-Boettcher told Gizmodo. “I understand that it’s not as simple as lifting the curtain and letting the public look at the code, but there needs to be agreed-upon and enforced levels of transparency and accountability. While industry says it’s afraid of slowing down innovation, I think the rest of us should be a lot more worried about the real risk of flying headfirst into even more inequality, bias, and unintended harm.” In an email to Gizmodo, Jaan Tallinn, the co-founder of Skype, said “we need regulation eventually, but first we need more research into what a positive and effective regulation should look like.” And indeed, those arguing for regulations are having some difficulty articulating what actually needs regulating, and how it should be implemented and enforced. Thankfully, however, these conversations have started and the frameworks for AI regulation are starting to emerge. As Tallinn noted, we’re going to need regulations eventually. The self-serving principles set out by ITI can be seen as pre-emptive attack to delay the inevitable, and to protect its clients from what it sees as meddlesome and potentially costly intrusions. And self-serving it is; it can hardly be said, for example—and as stated in the new list of principles—that the ITI clientele could use some additional financial support from the government. As Oxford philosopher Nick Bostrom wrote last year, “Great resources are devoted to making [progress in AI] happen, with major (and growing) investments from both industry and academia in many countries.” At the same time, investments “in long-term AI safety...remains orders of magnitude less than investment in increasing AI capabilities.” That ITI did not list the funding of AI safety initiatives by industry, government, and private sources as an “AI principle” is as problematic as it is revealing. Moreover, it’s not immediately obvious that profit-driven companies with cranky shareholders in the background are in any way interested in constraints imposed by outside forces, or in voluntarily contributing to the public good. Regulations and government oversight exists in the absence of pro-social forces within the overarching capitalist framework. “We can hope that corporate self-interest will align with public interests, but that is a giant leap of faith, and many companies in ITIC don’t exactly have a great track record at winning public trust,” Lin told Gizmodo. “It’s important to remember that they’re not in the business of protecting the public or promoting democracy—their business is business. When profit motives and humanitarian motives collide, take a wild guess which one usually wins.”

2022 Michigan Kritik
AT: Capitalism › 2AC---Sustainability

Seriously, we’ll do the math and insert charts

Hausfather 21 – a climate scientist and energy systems analyst whose research focuses on observational temperature records, climate models, and mitigation technologies. He spent 10 years working as a data scientist and entrepreneur in the cleantech sector, where he was the lead data scientist at Essess, the chief scientist at C3.ai, and the cofounder and chief scientist of Efficiency 2.0. He also worked as a research scientist with Berkeley Earth, was the senior climate analyst at Project Drawdown, and the US analyst for Carbon Brief. He has masters degrees in environmental science from Yale University and Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam and a PhD in climate science from the University of California, Berkeley. (Zeke, "Absolute Decoupling of Economic Growth and Emissions in 32 Countries," Breakthrough Institute, 4-6-2021, https://thebreakthrough.org/issues/energy/absolute-decoupling-of-economic-growth-and-emissions-in-32-countries, Accessed 4-11-2021, LASA-SC)

Emissions reductions in the US have been a result of a wide variety of factors; this includes the switch from coal generation to lower-carbon natural gas, the rapid expansion of wind and solar generation, reduced industrial energy consumption, reduced electricity use in buildings, and reductions in transportation emissions — particularly as a result of increased vehicle fuel economy and reduced miles driven per-capita. Since 2005, US territorial emissions have fallen around 15%, with consumption emissions falling around 18% (much larger reductions were seen in 2020, and some of this is expected to persist). At the same time, GDP has increased by around 29%.

In the UK, territorial emissions have fallen by nearly 40% and consumption emissions have fallen by around 30%, while GDP has increased by 22%. Similar to the US, there are a wide variety of drivers of UK emissions reductions, though renewable energy generation, reductions in electricity use, and reductions in industrial and residential energy use are the largest contributors.

2022 Michigan Kritik
AT: Capitalism › 2AC---Sustainability

Recent data.

Hausfather 21 – a climate scientist and energy systems analyst whose research focuses on observational temperature records, climate models, and mitigation technologies. He spent 10 years working as a data scientist and entrepreneur in the cleantech sector, where he was the lead data scientist at Essess, the chief scientist at C3.ai, and the cofounder and chief scientist of Efficiency 2.0. He also worked as a research scientist with Berkeley Earth, was the senior climate analyst at Project Drawdown, and the US analyst for Carbon Brief. He has masters degrees in environmental science from Yale University and Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam and a PhD in climate science from the University of California, Berkeley. (Zeke, "Absolute Decoupling of Economic Growth and Emissions in 32 Countries," Breakthrough Institute, 4-6-2021, https://thebreakthrough.org/issues/energy/absolute-decoupling-of-economic-growth-and-emissions-in-32-countries, Accessed 4-11-2021, LASA-SC)

The past 30 years have seen immense progress in improving the quality of life for much of humanity. Extreme poverty — the number of people living on less than $1.90 per day — has fallen by nearly two-thirds, from 1.9 billion to around 650 million. Life expectancy has risen in most of the world, along with literacy and access to education, while infant mortality has fallen. Despite perceptions to the contrary, the average person born today is likely to have access to more opportunities and have a better quality of life than at any other point in human history. Much of this increase in human wellbeing has been propelled by rapid economic growth driven largely by state-led industrial policy, particularly in poor-to-middle income countries. However, this growth has come at a cost: between 1990 and 2019, global emissions of CO2 increased by 56%. Historically, economic growth has been closely linked to increased energy consumption — and increased CO2 emissions in particular — leading some to argue that a more prosperous world is one that necessarily has more impacts on our natural environment and climate. There is a lively academic debate about our ability to “absolutely decouple” emissions and growth — that is, the extent to which the adoption of clean energy technology can allow emissions to decline while economic growth continues. Over the past 15 years, however, something has begun to change. Rather than a 21st century dominated by coal that energy modelers foresaw, global coal use peaked in 2013 and is now in structural decline. We have succeeded in making clean energy cheap, with solar power and battery storage costs falling 10-fold since 2009. The world produced more electricity from clean energy — solar, wind, hydro, and nuclear — than from coal over the past two years. And, according to some major oil companies, peak oil is upon us — not because we have run out of cheap oil to produce, but because demand is falling and companies expect further decline as consumers increasingly shift to electric vehicles. The world has long been experiencing a relative decoupling between economic growth and CO2 emissions, with the emissions per unit of GDP falling for the past 60 years. This is the case even in countries like India and China that have been undergoing rapid economic growth. But relative decoupling alone is inadequate in a world where global CO2 emissions need to peak and decline in the next decade to give us any chance at limiting warming to well below 2℃, in line with Paris Agreement targets. Thankfully, there is increasing evidence that the world is on track to absolutely decouple CO2 emissions and economic growth — with global CO2 emissions potentially having peaked in 2019 and unlikely to increase substantially in the coming decade. While an emissions peak is just the first and easiest step towards eventually reaching the net-zero emissions required to stop the world from continuing to warm, it demonstrates that linkages between emissions and economic activity are not an immutable law, but rather simply a result of our current means of energy production. In recent years we have seen more and more examples of absolute decoupling — economic growth accompanied by falling CO2 emissions. Since 2005, 32 countries with a population of at least one million people have absolutely decoupled emissions from economic growth, both for terrestrial emissions (those within national borders) and consumption emissions (emissions embodied in the goods consumed in a country). This includes the United States, Japan, Mexico, Germany, United Kingdom, France, Spain, Poland, Romania, Netherlands, Belgium, Portugal, Sweden, Hungary, Belarus, Austria, Bulgaria, El Salvador, Singapore, Denmark, Finland, Slovakia, Norway, Ireland, New Zealand, Croatia, Jamaica, Lithuania, Slovenia, Latvia, Estonia, and Cyprus. Figure 1, below, shows the declines in territorial emissions (blue) and increases in GDP (red). To qualify as having experienced absolute decoupling, we require countries included in this analysis to pass four separate filters: a population of at least one million (to focus the analysis on more representative cases), declining territorial emissions over the 2005-2019 period (based on a linear regression), declining consumption emissions, and increasing real GDP (on a purchasing power parity basis, using constant 2017 international $USD). We chose not to include 2020 in this analysis because it is not particularly representative of longer-term trends, and consumption and territorial emissions estimates are not yet available for many countries. There is a wide range of rates of economic growth between 2005-2019 among countries experiencing absolute decoupling. Somewhat counterintuitively, there is no significant relationship between the rate of economic growth and the magnitude of emissions reductions within the group. While it is unlikely that there is not at least some linkage between the two factors, there are plenty of examples of countries (e.g., Singapore, Romania, and Ireland) experiencing both extremely rapid economic growth and large reductions in CO2 emissions. One of the primary criticisms of some prior analyses of absolute decoupling is that they ignore leakage. Specifically, the offshoring of manufacturing from high-income countries over the past three decades to countries like China has led to “illusory” drops in emissions, where the emissions associated with high-income country consumption are simply shipped overseas and no longer show up in territorial emissions accounting. There is some truth in this critique, as there was a large increase in emissions embodied in imports from developing countries between 1990 and 2005. After 2005, however, structural changes in China and a growing domestic market led to a reversal of these trends; the amount of emissions “exported” from developed countries to developing countries has actually declined over the past 15 years. This means that, for many countries, both territorial emissions and consumption emissions (which include any emissions “exported” to other countries) have jointly declined. In fact, on average, consumption emissions have been declining slightly faster than territorial emissions since 2005 in the 32 countries we identify as experiencing absolute decoupling. Figure 2, below, shows the change in consumption emissions (teal) and GDP (red) between 2005 and 2019. There is a pretty wide variation in the extent to which these countries have reduced their territorial and consumption emissions since 2005. Some countries — such as the UK, Denmark, Finland, and Singapore – have seen territorial emissions fall faster than consumption emissions, while the US, Japan, Germany, and Spain (among others) have seen consumption emissions fall faster. Figure 3 shows reductions in consumption and territorial emissions for each country, with the size of the dot representing the size of the population in 2019. Absolute decoupling is possible. There is no physical law requiring economic growth — and broader increases in human wellbeing — to necessarily be linked to CO2 emissions. All of the services that we rely on today that emit fossil fuels — electricity, transportation, heating, food — can in principle be replaced by near-zero carbon alternatives, though these are more mature in some sectors (electricity, transportation, buildings) than in others (industrial processes, agriculture).

2022 Michigan Kritik
AT: Capitalism › 2AC---Sustainability

Best studies.

Hideo Noda & Shigeru Kano 21, Tokyo University of Science; The Shoko Chukin Bank, "Environmental Economic Modeling of Sustainable Growth and Consumption in a Zero-Emission Society," Journal of Cleaner Production, Vol. 299, 05/25/2021, pg. 1-2.

Manufacturing activities that pollute the soil, atmosphere, and water have adversely affected the environment. The abatement of pollution is therefore essential to maintaining environmental standards in the future. The purpose of this paper is to examine what kind of economic conditions should be satisfied if an economy adopts a rule stating that pollution must be cleaned up when it is produced, and whether the zero net emission of pollution flow (in the sense of a zero residual amount of pollution created minus pollution abated) is compatible with the continued growth of gross domestic product (GDP) and consumption when the economy experiences cyclical fluctuations.

A detailed understanding of the economic implications of cyclical fluctuations is crucial because actual economies inevitably undergo cycles of expansion and recession. In this respect, on the basis of the laboratory equipment model of Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991), Matsuyama (1999) constructed a useful model that generates endogenous fluctuations. Notably, under specific conditions, an economy can perpetually oscillate between a capital-accumulation-based (no-innovation) growth phase and innovation-led growth phase. The former phase is called the Solow regime, after the work of Solow (1956), while the latter phase is called the Romer regime, after the work of Romer (1990) and Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991).

2022 Michigan Kritik
AT: Capitalism › 2AC---Sustainability

It’s sustainable.

Shi-Ling Hsu 21, D'Alemberte Professor of Law at the Florida State University College of Law, “2 How Capitalism Saves the Environment,” Capitalism and the Environment, Cambridge University Press, 10/31/2021, pp. 28–55

2.8 CHOOSING CAPITALISM TO SAVE THE ENVIRONMENT: LARGE-SCALE DEPLOYMENT

Finally, a third reason that capitalism is suited to the job of environmental restoration and protection is its ability to undertake and complete projects at very large scales. In keeping with a major thesis of this book, construction at very large scales should give us a little pause, because of the propensity of capital to metastasize into a source of political resistance to change. But some global problems, especially climate change, may require very large-scale enterprises.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Aff › Fourth Branch Fails

(Don’t Read) Yes modelling & it disproportionately impacts the most marginalized

--SRHR = sexual and reproductive health and rights

Pugh 19 – PhD in International Development and Political Science, Research Fellow with the Centre for International and Comparative Politics at Stellenbosch University. Based in Cape Town, South Africa, Sarah comes from a background of international development, migration, gender and health (Sarah, “Politics, power, and sexual and reproductive health and rights: impacts and opportunities,” Sexual and Reproductive Health Matters, 2)

The capacity of people to access and realise their sexual and reproductive health and rights (SRHR) has long been influenced by the shifting tides of politics and the various configurations of political power that hold sway in specific times and specific places. As the articles in this issue make clear, pronounced shifts towards far right-wing and conservative politics are threatening hard-won progress in SRHR [sexual and reproductive health and rights]. This is happening globally, regionally, nationally and locally, affecting progress in many areas, such as access to safe abortion, access to contraception, the protection of the sexual and reproductive rights of migrants and refugees including those in humanitarian settings, and the advancement of the rights of LGBTI+ individuals. Taken together, the articles paint a compelling picture of how governments, political leaders, activists, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), lawyers, and others are all engaging in the politics of SRHR, with profound impacts, both positive and negative, on the everyday lived realities of people around the world. As these articles illustrate, the impacts of politics on SRHR are often the greatest for the most vulnerable or marginalised populations, who themselves may have limited opportunity to influence political outcomes on their own behalf. The embodied consequences of SRHR politics Political decisions have embodied consequences. Decisions made in the corridors of power in one part of the world can reverberate across the globe, with very real implications for the lives and health of individuals in other parts of the world. It is the bodies and lives of women and girls that are most often impacted by domestic and international political decisions related to SRHR. For example, in the 2017 reinstatement and expansion of the Mexico City Policy, or Global Gag Rule, under US President Trump, we are witness to the devastating international impacts of a political decision taken in the US to prohibit any foreign NGO that receives US global health funds from engaging in “certain abortion-related activities, including providing abortion services, information, counselling and referrals, and advocating to expand access to safe abortion services.”1 Against public health evidence, such politics and politically-driven decisions restrict the life choices and undermine the fundamental human rights of some of the most marginalised people in the world. For many women, such as those forced in the circumstances to seek unsafe abortions, they are also a matter of life and death.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Aff › Fourth Branch Fails

Specifically supreme court precedent creates a framework that gets modelled

Elster 16 (Naomi, writer and scientist with a PhD in cancer medicine at the Royal College of Surgeons, Ireland, supported by the Irish Cancer Society, "How U.S. Policies Shape Abortion Rights Around The World," http://www.theestablishment.co/2016/09/19/how-u-s-policies-shape-abortion-rights-around-the-world/)

It’s no secret that the United States has a massive global influence on politics—but too often, we forget how this influence extends to women’s rights. Around the world, countries make decisions on abortion and reproductive health that can be traced, at least in part, to precedents set in the U.S. “The U.S. can be quite isolationist; it doesn’t often look outside of its borders. But a lot of other countries do look to the U.S. and will cite U.S. Supreme Court proceedings in their own court proceedings,” explains Grace Wilentz, a human rights activist and policy expert based in Dublin, Ireland, who has over 10 years of experience working in the sexual and reproductive rights arena and consulting for multiple international NGOs and UN agencies on these issues. With the election approaching, it’s a particularly valuable time to look at the ways that U.S. policies shape those around the world—and how this affects even more than the crucial issue of abortion access. Roe v. Wade Not surprisingly, one of the most influential U.S. decisions on other countries has been Roe v. Wade. Decided in 1973, the ruling was of its time, heavily influenced by abortion liberalization happening globally, particularly in Western Europe. And it, in turn, has had significant global significance. By grounding the right to choose in a solid constitutional argument about privacy and individual liberty, the United States created a framework that could be applied by other countries. And applied it has been; since Roe was decided, more than 40 countries have adopted laws to permit abortion under certain circumstances.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Aff › Fourth Branch Fails

Just like “horse-trading” could be the link to an agenda politics DA- it could also work for amendments

Gilbert 17 (Michael, Sullivan & Cromwell Professor of Law, University of Virginia, Virginia Law Review, Vol. 103, No. 4 (June 2017), pp. 631-671, )

In addition to constitutional failure, these ideas cast light on an important question of constitutional evolution: When to amend and when to convene? Article V authorizes two methods for changing the text of the Constitution: amendments and conventions.146 Other constitutions offer the same basic choice.147 Amendments are more likely to fit the spatial models, which assume decisions happen on one issue at a time. Thus, changing law through amendment will more likely produce the incrementalism and instability described above. Conventions, on the other hand, often involve bargaining across multiple issues. Such bargaining can generate meaningful change. Returning to Figure 5, voter l will not, without more, approve replacing SQ with a law at m. She might, however, support such a change if she gets a change on another issue in ex change. Suppose the dimension in Figure 5 reflects rights for religious minorities, and another unpictured dimension reflects the right to educa tion. Voter l opposes moving rights for religious minorities further from her ideal point—which going from SQ to m would do—but she would nevertheless support it as part of a deal that simultaneously moves the right to education closer to her ideal point. Thus, bargaining can produce large change even when law is entrenched and the incrementalism and pace principles operate. In short, the solution to the constitutional predicament described above is a convention. Voters or their representatives must bargain across issues, not vote individually on each one. Returning to the case of France, after the constitution collapsed in 1958, General de Gaulle's government drafted a new one. Voters cast one vote on the complete package; they did not vote on each provision. According to a key parliamentarian, the new constitution "embodied] the reforms envisaged earlier," meaning the amendments considered but rejected during the Fourth Republic.148 Revision accomplished what amendment could not. France's Fifth Republic endures to this day

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Aff › Fourth Branch Fails

Kay ‘19

Richard S. Kay: Oliver Ellsworth Research Professor and Wallace Stevens Professor Emeritus, University of Connecticut School of Law “UPDATING THE CONSTITUTION: AMENDING, TINKERING, INTERPRETING, SYMPOSIUM DISCUSSION: KAY” APRIL 13, 2019, 67 Drake L. Rev. 909 (2019), HeinOnline

Audience Member: I think it's safe to say, or at least a consensus or a soft majority of the academic community would agree, that the Constitution should be amended in certain places. But the problem with that being that you need a pretty strong majority to accomplish that. I'm going to harken back to something Professor Levinson hit on. In this country where the Constitution is viewed as this absolute, almost biblical, document in its original sense, is there a way to repackage the republican view that it is important to amend the Constitution but alternatively that maybe the Constitution has served as sort of a baseline?

Kay: I can't say that it's impossible. Nothing lasts forever. This Constitution has lasted a long time and things in this country are really different now. Different in a way that I've never experienced in my unfortunately very long life. So, yes, it's possible. I think what you need is a crisis though that's kind of a tough thing to wish for. But, we may not see it. I won't see it.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Aff › Fourth Branch Fails

Reaction to Citizens United proves amendments aren’t happening now because they’re seen as impossible- the aff reverses that and revitalizes them as a means of change

Jackson 15 (Vicki, Thurgood Marshall Professor of Constitutional Law, Harvard Law School, The (myth of un)amendability of the US Constitution and the democratic component of constitutionalism, International Journal of Constitutional Law, Volume 13, Issue 3, July 2015, Pages 575–605, )

2.3. Predictions of failure and normative objections may both contribute to disuse of amendment What may increase the difficulty of formal amendment in the United States is a seemingly widespread view that constitutional change cannot , as a practical matter, be sought through amendment, and that as a normative matter amendments should not be the vehicle for legal change (but rather changes in judicial interpretation should be sought). Taking account of these aspects of political culture in assessing the effects of the different amendment procedures is consistent with some recent studies indicating that the formal rigidity of amending formula has, at best, limited value in predicting rates of amendment. 37 Although I cannot offer conclusive proof in this paper that empirical beliefs in impossibility and normative attitudes of constitutional veneration contribute to disuse of the Article V amendment process, the suggestion that they may be causal factors is consistent with emerging work on the significance of culture as a factor influencing amendment rates. 38 On the first of these—overstatements of the difficulty of using the amendment process—as already noted, Levinson entitled a chapter in his book, “The Impermeable Article V,” and refers to Article V as making it “practically impossible” to enact constitutional change. 39 He is by no means alone in doing so. Professor William Eskridge describes the failure of the Equal Rights Amendment as having apparently been the “death” of the Article V amendment process. 40 Joel Colón-Ríos describes Article V as “creat[ing] almost insuperable constraints on constitutional change.” 41 These statements are widely echoed in the scholarly literature. Predictions of impossibility often combine with asserted reverence for the Constitution, related normative resistance to proposing changes in its text, and, sometimes, fears that any resort to the amendment process will invite populist movements to amend in undesirable ways; these all may cause hesitation to resort to the amendment process even when it would seem a logical response. Consider the reactions from groups that disagreed with the Court’s decision in Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm’n . 42 Public opinion polls after the decision indicated that public sentiment, among both Republican and Democratic voters, was running strongly against the decision. 43 One might have thought this was an opportune moment to go the people, through the amendment process, to obtain constitutional authorization for regulation of campaign expenditures and contributions. Yet some combination of reasons—which may include concerns for overriding the Supreme Court through amendment, reluctance to amend in any way the First Amendment, as well as a belief in the futility of the amendment process, and support for the decision by influential minorities—prevented any groundswell of support for a responsive amendment in the first years after the decision came down. Yet an immediate response through constitutional amendment (as occurred, for example, after Oregon v. Mitchell ) had some compelling reasons behind it, including the benefits of acting before spending and fundraising patterns adjusted to the new regime under Citizens United and expectations by politicians and corporations became entrenched. 44 A leading public interest group that opposed the Citizens United decision was the Brennan Center for Justice at New York University School of Law. The Brennan Center devoted considerable effort to developing strategies for responding to the decision, including hosting conferences and preparation of research/policy papers. The nature of the organization’s early response is illustrated by a paper, Renewing Democracy After Citizens United, which proposed three strategies toward renewing democracy: enacting legislation for small donor public financing; increasing voter registration; and developing new jurisprudence, that is, new doctrinal arguments to persuade future courts of a different view. 45 In 2011, the Brennan Center held a conference, Accountability After Citizens United , also on responses to Citizens United , that focused on statutory approaches through securities and corporate law; activating administrative agencies, like the Federal Election Commission (FEC), Federal Communications Commission (FCC), and Internal Revenue Service (IRS); and, again, developing new jurisprudence around the issue. 46 The Brennan Center’s failure in those responses to devote any attention to the possibility of an amendment as a form of “democratic renewal,” or “accountability,” speaks volumes about its belief in the possibility, and/or desirability, of amendment. Similarly, an issue analysis prepared for another public interest group, the American Constitution Society (ACS), soon after the Citizens United decision, addressed several issues. 47 They included the need to have better factual records for “strict scrutiny” review to support the claimed need for regulation; increasing disclosure requirements; addressing disclosures and expenditure issues through corporate law and requirements of shareholder approval; moving towards public funding of campaigns; modernizing voter registration; and appointing as Supreme Court justices those with a “voter-centric” view of the First Amendment. 48 Despite its thoughtfulness and seemingly comprehensive overview of possible responses (including the constitutional politics of appointments to the Court), this memo for ACS did not mention the possibility of constitutional amendment. 49 To be sure, some critics of Citizens United have tried, and with some success, to promote a constitutional amendment in response. At least fourteen proposals were introduced in Congress within two years of the decision; these range from amendments sweeping broadly to say that corporations do not hold rights under the Constitution, to those authorizing legislatures to regulate corporate, or all, campaign contributions and expenditures, to those excluding campaign expenditures from First Amendment protections, to those establishing a substantive rule, for example, banning corporate contributions or expenditures. 50 An organization called “Move to Amend” seeks petition signatures for a proposed amendment to “our Constitution to firmly establish that money is not speech, and that human beings, not corporations, are persons entitled to constitutional rights”; they reportedly had about 300,000 signatures in mid-2013. 51 Another organization, “Free Speech for People,” supports amendments to “(1) enable Congress and the states to limit campaign spending and (2) to make it clear that corporations do not have constitutional rights;” in 2013 it claimed to be “one-third” of the way to succeeding with a constitutional amendment. 52 In 2014, the “Democracy for All” amendment, Senate Joint Resolution 19, 113th Congress, did not receive the necessary two-thirds vote, notwithstanding majority support in the Senate. 53 Some well-established public interest groups, including People for the American Way, 54 and Public Citizen, 55 have supported amendment as an approach, as have some legal scholars. 56 But other influential non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and political actors who disagreed with the decision in Citizens United nonetheless ruled out seeking an amendment, either because they believed it is so unlikely to succeed and/or because they believe other approaches have normative advantages. It is possible that those groups that did not include amendment as a possible response to Citizens United did so because they believed a constitutional amendment is a bad idea for reasons other than its unlikelihood of enactment. 57 They might believe that an amendment would be too hard to craft to achieve its goals in the hands of an uncertain Supreme Court; or that entrenching provisions relating to the subject is a bad idea for democratic politics; or even that “progressives” who oppose Citizens United should not seek amendment lest it encourage “conservatives” to seek amendments that progressives disagree with. 58 But a significant part of the opposition to amendment—among those who would like to overturn the effects of Citizens United —has to do with a belief that it would be impossible. For example, Mark Schmitt, Senior Fellow of the Roosevelt Institute, advanced a series of arguments, which appear mostly bottomed on the unlikelihood of an amendment passing. 59 In one debate with proponents of amendment, he stated that proceeding with an amendment would imply to those working on other approaches that “we can’t do anything until we have a constitutional amendment,” and argued that “under the current circumstances, ‘We can’t do anything until we have a constitutional amendment’ is exactly the same as saying, ‘We can’t do anything.’” 60 Later remarks made clear he was not substantively opposed to amendment insofar as it related to campaign finances, and that he agreed that Citizens United was wrongly decided, 61 though he also raised questions about the capacity to draft an adequate amendment. 62 Thus evidence suggests that opposition to amendment is based in part on concerns that it would be impossible and in part on normative worries about amendment as opposed to other mechanisms of change.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Aff › Fourth Branch Fails

One amendment spurs others- history proves that it overcomes procedural barriers

Jackson 15 (Vicki, Thurgood Marshall Professor of Constitutional Law, Harvard Law School, The (myth of un)amendability of the US Constitution and the democratic component of constitutionalism, International Journal of Constitutional Law, Volume 13, Issue 3, July 2015, Pages 575–605, )

Under existing procedures, it is not at all clear that the US amendment process should be regarded as “impossible” or even “close to impossible.” According to John R. Vile, a leading scholar of the US amendment process, of the thirty-three amendments that have been proposed by a two-thirds vote of both Houses of Congress, only six have failed to be enacted. 13 This record might be read to suggest that the major hurdle for amendments is the Congress, since the great majority of proposals that emerge are passed. How difficult is it to obtain agreement of two-thirds of both houses on proposals? It is not easy, to be sure. But if we consider the other situation in which the Constitution requires action by two-thirds of both Houses of Congress, the two-thirds of both houses requirement does not appear to be an “impermeable” barrier. To propose an amendment to the states requires two-thirds of both houses; to override a presidential veto also requires two-thirds of both houses. There have been approximately 110 congressional overrides of presidential vetoes since 1789 (including 15 during the highly confrontational presidency of Andrew Johnson). 14 Although this number is under 5 percent of the total number of presidential vetoes, even this data suggests that it is far from impossible to obtain agreement from the two houses by a two-thirds vote on substantive issues. Moreover, more meaningful figures focus on only those “regular” vetoes that were not “pocket vetoes” (which do not go back to Congress for possible override), 15 and on public (rather than private) bills. 16 Focusing on these categories of presidential vetoes of legislation likely to be of consequence and capable of being overridden by Congress, one finds that a significantly higher percentage have been overridden. For example, a 2013 study finds that looking only at “regular vetoes” since 1961, thirty-seven out of 233 vetoes were overridden—for a rate of 15.9 percent. 17 If two-thirds of both Houses of Congress can join together to override Presidential vetoes at these rates, then perhaps the requirement that two-thirds of each House join in proposing amendments may not, by itself, be quite so large an obstacle to proposing amendments as might be thought; and as noted, most amendments proposed by Congress have been ratified by the states. On the other hand, there are differences between veto overrides and proposals for amendment relating to ease of formulation, 18 and prior congressional investment, 19 that may make it more difficult for Congress to propose amendments than to override vetoes. The most recent proposal for an amendment from Congress—the Equal Rights Amendment proposed in 1972—failed to be ratified; although garnering ratifications in 35 states, it fell three states short of the 38 needed, illustrating that the requirement of ratification by three-fourths of the states poses an additional and real obstacle. Moreover, the first 12 amendments occurred very early in US history—by 1804. There may, then, be political phenomena that exist now, that did not exist before, that make amendment particularly difficult. 20 Indeed, to the extent that an amendment becomes a highly partisan issue, under conditions of relatively even partisan divide, the amending formula will pose a very substantial obstacle. 21 Whether in the long run that is a good or bad effect is debatable; slowing down amendment in times of intense partisan divides is not necessarily a bad thing. 22 Overriding presidential vetoes also appears to have varied in rate over time; the first override of a presidential veto was not until 1845 (Tyler’s administration), and the pace of overrides has varied with the political makeup of the Congress and the President (with thirty overrides, for example, from the beginning of President Nixon’s term until the end of President Reagan’s). 23 A different way of looking at things is to introduce the possibility of variation in amendment pace over different time periods. 24 The United States has had several long periods without amendments: from 1804 to 1865; from 1870 to 1913; and from 1971 to the present (with the bizarre exception of the 27th Amendment). 25 Between 1865 and 1870, there were three important amendments in the wake of the Civil War; and between 1913 and 1971 there were eleven amendments. We may not, then, know the extent to which the Article V process is “dead,” or simply quiescent, as it has been in the past. There is at least a possibility that enacting amendments makes enacting other amendments somewhat more likely—and conversely, that disuse of the amending procedures may increase the political or cultural resistance to their use. 26

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Aff › Fourth Branch Fails

One amendment spurs others

Versteeg and Zackin 14 (Mila, Associate Professor of Law, University of Virginia School of Law; Emily, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Johns Hopkins University. American Constitutional Exceptionalism Revisited , The University of Chicago Law Review 81:1641, SSRN)

In fact, flexible and detailed constitutions may actually become more specific over time. The possibility of frequent constitutional updating may encourage a variety of issue-oriented groups to pursue constitutional change in advancing their particular policy goals. As constitutions begin to respond to these groups’ demands, other groups may follow suit, insisting on the inclusion of new or countervailing instructions. Thus, the frequent addition of detailed instructions on a wide range of policy choices may be a long-term mechanism through which constitutions require government to abide by the will of the governed.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Aff › Fourth Branch Fails

The aff revitalizes US “amendment culture”- overcomes Article V barriers

Ginsburg and Melton 14 (Tom Ginsburg & James Melton, Leo Spitz Professor of International Law, University of Chicago Law School; Lecturer in Comparative Politics, University College London, Does the Constitutional Amendment Rule Matter at All? Amendment Cultures and the Challenges of Measuring Amendment Difficulty, (Coase-Sandor Institute for Law & Economics Working Paper No. 682, 2014), )

IV. Results: Amendment Difficulty or Culture? How well do amendment culture and amendment institutions predict observed amendment rates?43 We answer this question by estimating a series of ordinary least squares regression models, in which the unit of analysis is the constitutional system. Table 3 presents the results. The dependent variable is the unweighted amendment rate in columns 1-4 and the weighted measure of amendment rate in columns 5-9. For each measure of the amendment rate, two models are estimated on two different samples, for a total of four regressions. The two samples are the full sample of countries and a smaller sample of democratic constitutions only, following the convention adopted by Lutz and Lorenz.44 For each dependent variable and sample, we estimate one model with covariates and one without. Recall that the measures of amendment difficulty are expected to have a negative, statistically significant effect on the measures of amendment rate, and amendment culture is expected to have a positive effect. --Table 3 here-- The results are intriguing and consistent with our expectations. The best predictor of constitutional amendment rates, it turns out, is what we have called an amendment culture, as measured by the frequency of amendment in the country’s previous constitution. This is particularly true of the first four models; in each, amendment culture has a large effect. When we use weighted amendment rate as the dependent variable, though, amendment culture is only significantly related to the amendment rate in democratic constitutions. Notably, the coefficient estimates are quite large for the amendment rate, indicating both their statistical and substantive significance. The institutional variables are never statistically significant, and often, they do not even have the sign one would expect. For instance, large vote thresholds are positively correlated with the amendment rate, suggesting that higher vote thresholds actually yield higher amendment rates. Similarly, requiring votes in multiple parliamentary sessions is associated with higher amendment rates. The only procedural variable with the correct sign is the one indicating the number of approving actors. More approvers decrease the amendment rate, but the magnitude of the coefficient is not large enough to achieve statistical significance. Some of the control variables in the model are also interesting. First, as expected, the length of the constitution is positively correlated with the amendment rate. Length is a significant predictor in model 3, where the unweighted amendment measure is used. In that model there is expected to be about 1 additional amendment every 10 years a constitution survives for every additional 1,000 words in the constitution. Scope is statistically significant in the same model. For an increase from minimum to maximum scope, the expected number of constitutional amendments is expected to decrease by 2.5 for each 10 years of a constitutions life span. The effect of judicial review is also interesting. Surprisingly, the presence of judicial review actually increases the amendment rate. Although the effect is only statistically significant in model 4, the sign of the variable is consistent across models. This suggests that de jure judicial review may not substitute for constitutional amendments, a finding that should be explored further in future research. From a constitutional design perspective, this result is a bit depressing. The results suggest, quite strongly, that constitutional designers have little influence over the observed flexibility of their product. V. Conclusion: Whither Amendment Culture? This article has spent a good deal of time on technical issues of measurement, showing that existing measures of amendment difficulty are poorly correlated and may not be valid. But even more critically, we have suggested that a perfectly valid measure may not matter at all in terms of constraining or facilitating amendment. Our argument is that institutions are not the primary determinant of amendment rates. At the end of the day, it is hard to disagree with Rasch, who summarizes the situation by noting that the “empirical relationship between rigidity and amendment is however not very robust.”46 Instead, we argue, attitudes about amendments matter. Our main claim is that something we are calling amendment culture exists and is important. There have been other efforts to tie particular constitutional amendments to cultural concerns, even concerns about the nature of writing and change.47 But to our knowledge no one has articulated the idea of an amendment culture at the level of a constitutional system.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Aff › Fourth Branch Fails

Links to politics.

Jay Riestenberg 18, M.A. in Political Management from George Washington University, citing three Supreme Court Justices, two U.S. Solicitor Generals, one U.S. Attorney General, and thirty-one Professors of Law, 3/21/2018, “U.S. Constitution Threatened as Article V Convention Movement Nears Success,”

“But no rule or law limits the scope of a state-called constitutional convention. Without established legal procedures, the entire document would be laid bare for wholesale revision. Article V itself sheds no light on the most basic procedures for such a convention. How many delegates does each state get at the convention? Is it one state, one vote, or do states with larger populations, like California, get a larger share of the votes? The Supreme Court has made at least one thing clear — it will not intervene in the process or the result of a constitutional convention. The game has neither rules nor referees.” – McKay Cunningham, professor of law at Concordia University “The result will be a disaster. I hate to think of the worst-case scenario. At best, the fight over every step along the way would consume our country’s political oxygen for years.” – David Marcus, professor of law at the University of Arizona