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2022 Michigan Affirmative
OCO Aff Updates › AT Cybercom DA › 2AC---NC3 D

No NC3 impact.

Erica Lonergan 22, assistant professor in the Army Cyber Institute at West Point and a research scholar at the Arnold A. Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University; and Keren Yarhi-Milo, the Arnold A. Saltzman Professor of War and Peace Studies in the political science department and the School of International and Public Affairs and the director of the Arnold A. Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University, 4/21/2022, “CYBER SIGNALING AND NUCLEAR DETERRENCE: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UKRAINE CRISIS,” , edited for ableist language, cc

First, successfully conducting cyber operations against strategic targets, like nuclear systems, is harder than the conventional wisdom might suggest. It requires a means of gaining access to a particular system and developing an exploit to cause a desired effect — and then maintaining persistent (and stealthy) access to be able to conduct an offensive operation at the desired time. Moreover, the overall outcome may be unpredictable and net less-than-desirable results.

Second, even if a state is able to conduct these kinds of operations, they typically prefer to do so in secret — and this mitigates some escalation concerns. That’s because, to cause an escalatory response, a state like Russia would have to uncover a cyber operation during a particular time period — such as while the Ukraine conflict is unfolding. For example, Russia would have to detect a cyber operation against a nuclear command and control system to cause Putin to perceive a “window of vulnerability,” perhaps assessing that it is part of a U.S. or NATO counterforce strategy to disable [destroy] Russia’s ability to retaliate with nuclear weapons. But the likelihood of these circumstances arising is low because — unless a state is trying to signal with a cyber capability — it will try to keep these kinds of sensitive operations secret. Therefore, the chances of such an operation being discovered at a particular time period are relatively small.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
OCO Aff Updates › AT Cybercom DA › 2AC---Taiwan D

A confluence of historical evidence and economic factors prove Xi will not invade Taiwan.

Andrew Nathan 6/23, Class of 1919 Professor of Political Science at Columbia University, 6/23/2022, “Beijing Is Still Playing the Long Game on Taiwan,” , cc

But fears of an imminent Chinese attack are misplaced. For decades, China’s policy toward Taiwan has been characterized by strategic patience, as has its approach to other territorial claims and disputes—from India to the South China Sea. Far from spurring China to jettison this approach in favor of an imminent military assault on Taiwan, the war in Ukraine will reinforce Beijing’s commitment to playing the long game. The price Moscow has paid, both militarily and in the form of international isolation, is but a fraction of what China could expect if it were to attempt to take Taiwan by force. Better to wait patiently for Taiwan’s eventual surrender, as Beijing sees it, than to strike now and risk winning the island at too high a cost—or losing it forever.

IMPENDING ATTACK?

2022 Michigan Affirmative
OCO Aff Updates › AT Cybercom DA › 2AC---Cybercom Normal Means

CYBERCOM legally can’t execute security cooperation

Robert Chesney 18, the Charles I. Francis Professor in Law and Associate Dean for Academic Affairs at the University of Texas School of Law and serves as the Director of UT-Austin's interdisciplinary research center the Robert S. Strauss Center for International Security and Law, 4/12/2018, “Title 10 and Title 50 Issues When Computer Network Operations Impact Third Countries,”’ , cc

Does Title 10 impose a legal barrier on U.S. Cyber Command conducting operations outside of the Pentagon’s own networks?

That’s the question raised earlier this week by this story from Chris Bing at Cyberscoop (an increasingly interesting site), which builds on recent congressional testimony from Admiral Rogers. The story depicts a “quiet but constant tug of war … between the intelligence community and the military over the future of government—backed hacking,” with the central issue concerning the allocation of lead responsibility for conducting computer network operations outside the government’s own systems in order to “strike back at foreign targets.” More specifically, the story depicts something of a turf war between NSA and an increasingly independent CYBERCOM (highlighting a number of key themes, including the inherent challenge of balancing intel collection equities against the interest in having disruptive effect on some targets; on that point, read all the way to the bottom for spot-on observations from Jamil Jaffer of George Mason).

2022 Michigan Affirmative
OCO Aff Updates › AT Cybercom DA › 2AC---T Title 50

The distinction between Title 10 and Title 50 is meaningless.

Andru Wall 11, Senior Associate with Alston & Bird LLP; former senior legal advisor for U.S. Special Operations Command Centra, 12/2/2011, “Demystifying the Title 10-Title 50 Debate: Distinguishing Military Operations, Intelligence Activities & Covert Action,” , cc

Read in concert with Title 10, Title 50 does not infringe upon the Secretary of Defense’s authorities to collect intelligence. Rather, Title 50 recognizes the authorities assigned to the Secretary of Defense under Title 10 over all DoD intelligence activities, and adds Title 50’s provisions regarding Congressional oversight to intelligence activities conducted primarily by DoD personnel in support of or in furtherance of tasking from the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) (as opposed to tasking from the Secretary of Defense).

Thus, Title 10 and Title 50 are mutually-reinforcing authorities, not mutually-exclusive authorities; these statutory authorities may even be exercised simultaneously by personnel under the command and control of the Secretary of Defense. Labeling some intelligence activities “Title 50” activities while labeling similar activities “Title 10” activities creates a distinction where the law does not. Importantly, the statutes make distinctions based on direction, control, and funding—not on nomenclature.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
OCO Aff Updates › AT Cybercom DA › 2AC---Link UQ---Cybersecurity

The DOD’s Cyber Command is already cracking down on ransomware.

Jaspreet Gill 4/28, reporter covering emerging technology and defense networks at Breaking Defense, 4/28/2022, “CYBERCOM increasing intel collection in light of Russia-Ukraine conflict,” , cc

CYBERCOM has also had a pivot in the last year when it comes to thinking about ransomware, Kennedy said.

“I think about a year and a half ago if you had asked me what the…responsibility of the Department of Defense in ransomware was, [it] was purely in support of [the Department of Justice] and that activity is primarily a [law enforcement] activity,” Kennedy said. “What we’re finding, though, in recent times is that ransomware is a national security imperative as well.”

2022 Michigan Affirmative
OCO Aff Updates › AT Cybercom DA › 2AC---UQ---Ukraine

Ukraine thumps.

Colin Demarest 4/7, reporter at C4ISRNET, where he covers military networks, cyber and IT, 4/07/2022, “US Cyber Command reinforces Ukraine and allies amid Russian onslaught,” , cc

WASHINGTON — U.S. Cyber Command has played a pivotal role in shielding networks and critical infrastructure stateside and abroad in the run up to and during Russia’s attack on Ukraine, its leader told Congress this week.

Along with tasking teams with identifying cyber vulnerabilities and threats — operations that have since “bolstered the resilience of Ukraine” and others — the command has gleaned and shared intelligence, worked hand-in-glove with U.S. government and industry, and pursued extensive contingency planning, Gen. Paul Nakasone said April 5.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
OCO Aff Updates › AT Cybercom DA › 2AC---No Link---Normal Means

The NSA can serve as an implementing agency for the plan.

DSCA 21, Defense Security Cooperation Agency, carries out all security cooperation, 10/01/2021 (carbon dated), “THE SECURITY COOPERATION ENTERPRISE,” , cc

The Military Departments (MILDEPs) advise the Secretary of Defense on all SC matters for their respective departments. The MILDEPs also execute foreign sales and training as Foreign Military Sales (FMS) “Implementing Agencies” (IAs):

Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Defense Exports and Cooperation (DASA (DE&C)) provides policy oversight for international affairs functions, including FMS.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
OCO Aff Updates › AT Cybercom DA › 2AC---Resources Infinite

CYBERCOM’s budget is ballooning AND the aff is priced in.

Mark Pomerleau 3/14, reporter for DefenseScoop, covering information warfare and cyberspace, 3/14/2022, “Cyber Command prepares to gain significant budget control,” , cc

U.S. Cyber Command is preparing to wield much greater budget control over major cyber programs, shifting funds away from the Army and Air Force programs that currently procure systems on behalf of the command and its forces.

The fiscal 2022 National Defense Authorization Act gave the commander of Cybercom responsibility for direct control and management of planning, programming, budgeting and execution of the resources to maintain the cyber mission force, an authority known as enhanced budget control.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
OCO Aff Updates › AT: NSA DA › Elections D---2AC

No impact to election hacking.

John Mueller 22, Adjunct Professor of Political Science, Ohio State University; Senior Fellow, Cato Institute, 3/22/2022, “The Cyber-​Delusion,” , cc

Election interference also features prominently in alarmist discourse on cyberthreats. During the 2016 U.S. presidential election, for instance, the United States highlighted apparent attempts by Russian hackers to undermine Hillary Clinton’s campaign. Although Clinton still handily won the popular vote, many analysts argued that digital interlopers sought to undermine the integrity of U.S. elections and perhaps democracy itself.

These warnings are exaggerated and—coming from U.S. policymakers—arguably hypocritical. It is worth noting that the United States has intervened in foreign elections for decades. Moreover, the idea that elections and voters are easily manipulated is suspect. If extensive promotion could guarantee success, Americans would all be driving Edsels and drinking New Coke—legendary marketing failures in 1958 and 1985 by two of the most successful businesses in history: the Ford Motor Company and Coca-​Cola. In any capitalist society, people are regularly deluged by advertising and marketing campaigns. In all cases, those petitioned remain free to ignore the ads, and most become quite good at it. In fact, studies have shown that campaign information rarely changes many votes. As political scientist Diana Mutz points out, the impact of campaign advertising “is marginal at most.”

2022 Michigan Affirmative
OCO Aff Updates › AT: NSA DA › Cybercrime D---2AC

Resilience measures check cybercrime.

John Mueller 22, Adjunct Professor of Political Science, Ohio State University; Senior Fellow, Cato Institute, 3/22/2022, “The Cyber-​Delusion,” , cc

Despite the overheated rhetoric about war, terrorism, election interference, and critical infrastructure, most cyberattacks target the private sector, seeking to steal or extort money from businesses and their customers. The record here, however, is rather encouraging, and it likely has broader relevance. To be sure, cybercriminals have stolen and extorted billions of dollars from businesses and individuals, but firms have done well at limiting the damage by closing software holes, maintaining backups, and safeguarding sensitive material.

A central issue for potential hackers is the profitability of their enterprise. A report by the cybersecurity firm Symantec estimates that 978 million people were affected by cybercrime in 2017, losing $172 billion in total. That number—regardless of how hackers divvy up the profits—is actually remarkably small compared to losses from other forms of illegal activity. Personal and property crimes in 2017, for instance, cost Americans $2.6 trillion.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
OCO Aff Updates › AT: NSA DA › Cyberterror D---2AC

Cyberterrorists are bums.

John Mueller 22, Adjunct Professor of Political Science, Ohio State University; Senior Fellow, Cato Institute, 3/22/2022, “The Cyber-​Delusion,” , cc

Fears that terrorist groups could inflict damage through cyberspace have been around for many years. And although cyber played no direct role in the execution of the 9/11 terrorist, the event stirred anxiety about the issue. In 2002, for instance, The Washington Post published a lengthy front-​page article conveying the views of “government experts” that “terrorists are at the threshold of using the Internet as a direct instrument of bloodshed.”

To date, however, no terrorist group has launched a successful cyberattack. And even if it becomes possible for hackers to shed blood, shootings and bombings are likely to accomplish the same goal far more reliably. Still, cyber has undoubtedly proved to be a relatively convenient method for terrorist groups to recruit and communicate. Rather than creating a paradigm shift, however, this technique has simply replaced or embellished older methods. Even comparatively savvy groups such as the Islamic State (also known as ISIS) tend to comically fail when using the Internet to stir up violence and instruct potential sympathizers. In one case, an ISIS handler connected his eager American charge to a prospective collaborator who happened to be an FBI operative.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
OCO Aff Updates › AT: NSA DA › Cyberwar D---2AC

Cyberattacks are bearable AND dwarfed by squirrel sabotage.

John Mueller 22, Adjunct Professor of Political Science, Ohio State University; Senior Fellow, Cato Institute, 3/22/2022, “The Cyber-​Delusion,” , cc

This contemporary approach to cyberthreats resembles the aftermath of 9/11, when almost all experts believed an even larger terrorist attack would soon take place. Then, as now, the threat is overblown. Although occasionally dramatic, cyberattacks have turned out to be a comparatively minor and manageable threat. Far too much discussion around the issue focuses on worst-​case scenarios, fails to contextualize the problem, and neglects to weigh the costs of cyberattacks against the enormous value of the Internet and artificial intelligence. Most commentary, moreover, does not fully appreciate the ability of the business sector—by far the most tempting of targets for malevolent hackers—to develop effective countermeasures.

Cyberwar

2022 Michigan Affirmative
OCO Aff Updates › AT: NSA DA › Democracy D---1AR

Norms are tautological and impossible to measure.

Doorenspleet 19 – Renske Doorenspleet, Politics Professor at the University of Warwick. [Rethinking the Value of Democracy: A Comparative Perspective, Palgrave Macmillan, p. 85-86]

There are only few statistical studies focusing on this argument of norms. Zeev Maoz and Bruce Russett (1993) defended this idea and stated that they found evidence, but their measure is very weak and lacks validity. They employed two measures of the prevalence of democratic norms. The first is through the concept of political stability, the persis¬tence of the political system in years. The second is through the amount of political violence within a state, which is measured by the number of deaths from political violence and extent of domestic conflict. In my view, those measures do not really measure 'democratic norms' but simply 'political stability and violence'. Other studies have focused on conflict management as proxy for democratic norms. William J. Dixon (1994), for example, discovered that democratic systems are better at conflict management. Democratic opponents are significandy more likely to reach peaceful settlements than other types of disputants. In addition, in disputes between democra¬cies, mediation is more likely to be pursued (Inman et al. 2014; see also Dixon 1993). Those scholars argued such outcomes supported the dem¬ocratic norms argument, but eventually they do not directly measure this concept. Moreover, the existence of democratic norms apparently did not stop the democracies to go war in the first place. Within this approach of democratic norms, other scholars stated that greater support for core liberal values leads to a rejection of destruc¬tive political activities and reduced support for violent politics. People in democracies are less aggressive, the argument goes, which could help understand the assumed existence of democratic peace. Analyses of public opinion surveys showed that American and British people are somewhat more inclined to use force against dictatorships than against democracies (Johns and Davies 2012), but the effect is very small, and it is unclear why this is the case. There is actually more evidence for the idea that the liberal norms lead to more (not less!) violence. Bear Braumoeller (1997), for example, argued that liberal norms of conflict resolution vary because liberalism takes many forms. By examining survey results from the newly independ¬ent states of the former Soviet Union, he showed that liberalism in that region bears a stronger resemblance to nineteenth-century liberal nation¬alism than to the sort of universalist, Wilsonian liberalism described by democratic peace theorists. As a result, liberals in the region are more, not less, aggressive than non-liberals. Carol Fair and her colleagues (Fair et al. 2014) came to similar conclusions. They conducted surveys in Pakistan (with 6000 respondents) and found that strong supporters of democratic values are actually not less but more supportive of militant groups. Moreover, it seems that individuals' attitudes towards war are shaped by core beliefs about revenge, which vary across countries. Democracies with a strong tradition to support ideas of revenge24 are significantly more likely to initiate conflicts (Stein 2015). We cannot state that people in democracies are not belligerent. These results challenge the conventional wisdom about the roots of militancy and the existence of universal democratic norms, which would encourage peace. Some scholars have argued that not the liberal democratic norms, but market-oriented development creates the norms and values that explain the democratic peace (see, e.g., Mousseau 2000). When opportunities to come to a deal in the market are widespread, as in market-oriented developed countries, a culture of contracting emerges that encourages shared respect for individualism, negotiations, compromise, respect for the law and equality before the law. Constrained by voters, democrat¬ically elected leaders in market-oriented developed countries abide by these norms. In contrast, voters in democracies without developed mar¬ket economies, and the leaders in nondemocracies, have other norms and values that encourage conflict. Hence, there is not only a lack of statistical studies, but also most findings do not support the ideas of the so-called democratic norms argument. Moreover, it is not clear why the pacifist attitude of citizens is 'only evident in cases of democratic adversary', while this is not the case when there are conflicts with nondemocracies, colonial expansion or third-party interventions (Gates et al. 1996: 5-6). Finally, this kind of argument tends to be tautological, stating that 'relations between democratic states are peaceful because they are informed by a common perception that democracies are peaceful' (Gates et al. 1996: 5-6).23

2022 Michigan Affirmative
OCO Aff Updates › AT: NSA DA › Democracy D---2AC

Democracy solves nothing.

Renske Doorenspleet 19, Political Science and International Studies Professor at Warwick University, “Democracy and Interstate War,” Chapter 3 of Rethinking the Value of Democracy: A Comparative Perspective, Stras

There is actually more evidence for the idea that the liberal norms lead to more (not less!) violence. Bear Braumoeller (1997), for example, argued that liberal norms of conflict resolution vary because liberalism takes many forms. By examining survey results from the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union, he showed that liberalism in that region bears a stronger resemblance to nineteenth-century liberal nationalism than to the sort of universalist, Wilsonian liberalism described by democratic peace theorists. As a result, liberals in the region are more, not less, aggressive than non-liberals. Carol Fair and her colleagues (Fair et al. 2014) came to similar conclusions. They conducted surveys in Pakistan (with 6000 respondents) and found that strong supporters of democratic values are actually not less but more supportive of militant groups. Moreover, it seems that individuals’ attitudes towards war are shaped by core beliefs about revenge, which vary across countries. Democracies with a strong tradition to support ideas of revenge24 are significantly more likely to initiate conflicts (Stein 2015). We cannot state that people in democracies are not belligerent. These results challenge the conventional wisdom about the roots of militancy and the existence of universal democratic norms, which would encourage peace.

Some scholars have argued that not the liberal democratic norms, but market-oriented development creates the norms and values that explain the democratic peace (see, e.g., Mousseau 2000). When opportunities to come to a deal in the market are widespread, as in market-oriented developed countries, a culture of contracting emerges that encourages shared respect for individualism, negotiations, compromise, respect for the law and equality before the law. Constrained by voters, democratically elected leaders in market-oriented developed countries abide by these norms. In contrast, voters in democracies without developed market economies, and the leaders in nondemocracies, have other norms and values that encourage conflict.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
OCO Aff Updates › AT: NSA DA › Terror D---1AR

Security systems don’t work, BUT that doesn’t matter because terrorists are incompetent.

Mueller and Stewart, 18—Woody Hayes Senior Research Scientist, Mershon Center for International Security Studies, and adjunct professor of Political Science, at Ohio State University AND Professor of Civil Engineering and Director of the Centre for Infrastructure Performance and Reliability at The University of Newcastle (John and Mark, “Terrorism and Bathtubs: Comparing and Assessing the Risks,” Terrorism and Political Violence, October 29, 2018, dml) [ableist language modifications denoted by brackets]

There may also be something of a grand or ultimate deterrent at work, but it has little to do with security measures. Although one shouldn’t give most terrorists all that much credit for careful and especially for long-term thinking, that terrorism is such a rare phenomenon in the developed world may derive at least in part from the fact that terrorism simply doesn’t recommend itself as a course of practical political action because of the futility and fundamental absurdity of the enterprise. In general, in fact, it tends to be counterproductive.37 Maybe at least a few terrorists have figured that out and have given up early. That there is so little terrorism, then, is not because of the efficacy of security measures or because it is so difficult to pull off—lucrative targets are ubiquitous and headlinegrabbing mayhem is easy to commit. To a considerable degree, terrorism is rare because terrorists, unlike bathtubs, don’t exist. As Bruce Schneier puts it bluntly, “there isn’t much of a threat of terrorism to defend against.” 38

2022 Michigan Affirmative
OCO Aff Updates › AT: NSA DA › Terror D---2AC

Terrorism isn’t existential.

Walt 16 – Stephen M. Walt, international relations professor at Harvard University. [My Top 5 Foreign-Policy Unicorns — and Why I Want to Kill Them, 9-8-2016, https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/09/08/my-top-5-foreign-policy-unicorns-and-why-i-want-to-kill-them/]

3. The terrorist mastermind. A close cousin to the nuclear rogue is the terrorist mastermind, busily concocting elaborate and highly destructive plots to bring the world to its knees. People like Osama bin Laden and Islamic State leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi have made extravagant and dire threats, but the good news is that they’ve never come close to toppling a foreign government, winning millions of followers, or threatening our way of life. I don’t deny that some terrorist groups have devised and executed successful assaults — of which the 9/11 attacks were by far the most damaging — but a word like “mastermind” conjures up images of Dr. Evil-style villains who will inevitably outwit our feeble efforts to stop them and unleash fearsome destruction on an innocent world. In fact, as John Mueller and others keep reminding us, the vast majority of contemporary terrorists are incompetent misfits, and even the very best of them fall well short of evil genius. They can and do stage small-scale attacks that cause modest amounts of harm, but they have repeatedly shown themselves to be incapable of orchestrating complicated operations that could actually bring a stable country to its knees. There have been serious terrorist attacks in Boston; London; Paris; Brussels; Orlando, Florida; and several other places in recent years, for example — yet in each case, these societies proved resilient, and they are thriving again today. Or just look at New York City, which suffered the worst single attack ever and has since fully recovered. Terrorism is a problem, the lives lost to it are an unfortunate tragedy, and those who employ it are dangerous criminals. A few terrorists are moderately clever; most are not. None rises to the level of a “mastermind,” and none poses an existential threat. Reporters, pundits, and speechwriters should drop this term from their lexicon, because this particular animal doesn’t exist. Fortunately.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
OCO Aff Updates › AT: NSA DA › NC3 D---1AR

NC3s are disconnected from the Internet.

Futter ’16 [Andrew; 2016; International Politics Professor at the University of Leicester; “War Games Redux? Cyberthreats, US–Russian Strategic Stability, and New Challenges for Nuclear Security and Arms Control,” European Security 25(2), p. 171-172]

It is of course highly unlikely that either the USA or Russia has plans – or perhaps more importantly, the desire – to fully undermine the other’s nuclear command and control systems as a precursor to some type of disarming first strike, but the perception that nuclear forces and associated systems could be vulnerable or compromised is persuasive. Or as Hayes (2015) puts it, “The risks of cyber disablement entering into our nuclear forces are real”. While the growing possibility of “cyber disablement” should not be overstated (notions of a “cyber-Pearl Harbor” (Panetta 2012) or “cyber 9–11” (Charles 2013) have done little to help understand the nature of the challenge), cyberthreats are nevertheless an increasingly important component of the contemporary US–Russia strategic context. This is particularly the case when they are combined with other emerging military-technical developments and programmes. The net result, especially given the current downturn in US–Russian strategic relations, and the way cyber is exacerbating the impact of other problematic strategic dynamics, is that is seems highly unlikely that either the USA or Russia will make the requisite moves to de-alert nuclear forces that the new cyber challenges appear to necessitate, or for that matter to (re)embrace the “deep nuclear cuts” agenda any time soon.

Assessing the options for arms control and enhancing mutual security

2022 Michigan Affirmative
OCO Aff Updates › AT: NSA DA › NC3 D---2AC

No NC3 impact.

Erica Lonergan 22, assistant professor in the Army Cyber Institute at West Point and a research scholar at the Arnold A. Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University; and Keren Yarhi-Milo, the Arnold A. Saltzman Professor of War and Peace Studies in the political science department and the School of International and Public Affairs and the director of the Arnold A. Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University, 4/21/2022, “CYBER SIGNALING AND NUCLEAR DETERRENCE: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UKRAINE CRISIS,” , edited for ableist language, cc

First, successfully conducting cyber operations against strategic targets, like nuclear systems, is harder than the conventional wisdom might suggest. It requires a means of gaining access to a particular system and developing an exploit to cause a desired effect — and then maintaining persistent (and stealthy) access to be able to conduct an offensive operation at the desired time. Moreover, the overall outcome may be unpredictable and net less-than-desirable results.

Second, even if a state is able to conduct these kinds of operations, they typically prefer to do so in secret — and this mitigates some escalation concerns. That’s because, to cause an escalatory response, a state like Russia would have to uncover a cyber operation during a particular time period — such as while the Ukraine conflict is unfolding. For example, Russia would have to detect a cyber operation against a nuclear command and control system to cause Putin to perceive a “window of vulnerability,” perhaps assessing that it is part of a U.S. or NATO counterforce strategy to disable [destroy] Russia’s ability to retaliate with nuclear weapons. But the likelihood of these circumstances arising is low because — unless a state is trying to signal with a cyber capability — it will try to keep these kinds of sensitive operations secret. Therefore, the chances of such an operation being discovered at a particular time period are relatively small.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
OCO Aff Updates › AT: NSA DA › CMR D---1AR

The narrative is a partisan ruse.

Dunlap 17 Former Major General Charles J. Dunlap, a Duke Law Professor with a focus on security and civil-military relations after retiring from the Air Force. [Let’s Temper the Rhetoric About Civil-Military Relations, Dec 15, 2017, https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/lets-temper-rhetoric-about-civil-military-relations]//BPS

Let’s pose the issue a little differently. Are “dire” fears about the military profession as a whole really supported by a study that shows that despite today’s extraordinarily divisive political environment, two-thirds of West Point cadets and National Defense University colonels had nonetheless not observed or shared any insulting, rude, or disdainful comments about elected leaders? The reality is that however regrettable such commentary may be, it’s occurred within the ranks throughout our history (and especially during the Revolution and the Civil War)…yet the Republic has not suffered “dire” consequences. In truth, in a democracy that treasures free speech, there is a limit to the wisdom of trying to suppress every untoward remark that someone in uniform might make about an elected leader. This may be one reason why Article 88 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (which criminalizes “contemptuous language” by officers about certain elected officials) is so limited, and why the Manual for Courts-Martial counsels that “if not personally contemptuous, adverse criticism of one of the officials or legislatures named in the article in the course of a political discussion, even though emphatically expressed, may not be charged as a violation of the article.” Do we have issues that bear watching about civil-military relations? Absolutely! As I explained at the Army War College Strategy conference recently, I believe that technology---particularly social media, big data, and even neuroscience---could operate to change not only how military leaders relate to their subordinates and the public, but also to change society itself. The “civil” of civil-military relations may evolve into an entity that is markedly different from today, and this could---and probably will---impact civil-military relations. But all that is quite different from the perils Matt sees. To be crystal clear, we certainly do have work to do, but excitedly proclaiming that we are on the cusp of “dire consequences” unhelpfully overstates and, even worse, obfuscates the real issues. In fact, over-hyping issues in civil-military relations plays into partisan politics. How? Consider that journalist Ross Douthat observed in the New York Times recently that the US won a great victory over ISIS, but “nobody seemed to notice.” Douthat cites a number of reasons for the lack of attention, but most interesting is this: But this is also a press failure, a case where the media is not adequately reporting an important success because it does not fit into the narrative of Trumpian disaster in which our journalistic entities are all invested. In other words, conjuring up impending apocalypse in civil-military relations can become another weapon which, whether intended or not, may be used by critics invested in the “narrative of Trumpian disaster” to try to delegitimize an area in which the Administration has enjoyed, as Douhet points out, some undeniable success: national security. Addressing the perennial challenges of civil-military relations isn’t facilitated when they get wrapped up with political narratives about specific individuals.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
OCO Aff Updates › AT: NSA DA › CMR D---2AC

Political influence thumps.

Risa Brooks 21, Allis Chalmers Associate Professor of Political Science at Marquette University; Jim Golby, Senior Fellow at the Clements Center for National Security at the University of Texas at Austin; and Heidi Urben an Adjunct Associate Professor in Georgetown University’s Security Studies Program, “Crisis of Command,” , cc

Of course, senior military leaders do not always get everything they want, but they often get more than they should. Their power also extends beyond headline-grabbing decisions about overseas deployments or troop reductions. The military’s influence manifests hundreds of times a day through bureaucratic maneuvers inside the Pentagon, in policy discussions in the White House, and during testimony on Capitol Hill. These mundane interactions, perhaps more than anything else, steer decision-making away from civilians in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and toward uniformed personnel. Inside the Pentagon, for instance, military leaders often preempt the advice and analysis of civilian staff by sending their proposals straight to the secretary of defense, bypassing the byzantine clearance process that non-uniformed staffers must navigate.

There are signs of the erosion of civilian control outside the Pentagon, as well. Congress too rarely demands that the military bow to civilian authority, instead weighing in selectively and for partisan reasons. During the Obama administration, for example, some commentators and at least one member of Congress suggested that Martin Dempsey, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, should resign in protest over the president’s management of the campaign to defeat the Islamic State, also known as ISIS. The goal was to use Dempsey’s role as the president’s chief military adviser as leverage in a partisan battle over Obama’s foreign policy. Under Trump, many Democrats cheered on the retired and active-duty generals who pushed back against the president’s decisions. These “adults in the room” included James Mattis (the secretary of defense), John Kelly (the secretary of homeland security and then White House chief of staff), and H. R. McMaster (Trump’s national security adviser). At the extreme, some of Trump’s opponents even urged senior military leaders to contemplate removing Trump from office. In August 2020, two well-known retired army officers, John Nagl and Paul Yingling, penned an open letter to Mark Milley, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, telling him to do just that if the president refused to leave office after losing the 2020 election. Although these efforts may have comforted those concerned about Trump’s erratic policies, they undermined civilian control by suggesting that it was the military’s job to keep the executive in check. When politicians endorse military insubordination that serves their interests, they do long-term damage to the principle of civilian primacy.