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2022 Michigan Negative
**Disadvantages** › Russia DA › 1NC---DA---Link

LAWS are being used by Russia now

Robert F. Trager 22, an associate professor of political science at the University of California, Los Angeles,, “Killer Robots Are Here—and We Need to Regulate Them”, Foreign Policy Magazine, 5-11-2022, https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/05/11/killer-robots-lethal-autonomous-weapons-systems-ukraine-libya-regulation/)/maze

Swarms of robots with the ability to kill humans are  only the stuff of science fiction. Lethal autonomous weapons systems (LAWS) are here. In Ukraine, Moscow has allegedly  an artificial intelligence (AI)-enabled Kalashnikov ZALA Aero KUB-BLA loitering munition, while Kyiv has used Turkish-made , which have some . Although it’s always hard to determine whether a weapon’s autonomous mode is used, these technologies have reportedly been employed in at least one conflict: Last year, a United Nations  suggested Turkey used autonomous firing by its Kargu-2 drones to hunt fleeing soldiers in Libya’s civil war (though the CEO of the Turkish company that produced the drone  it is capable of this).

2022 Michigan Negative
**Disadvantages** › DOD Tradeoff › 1NC---DA---DOD Link

Using robots reduces DoD spending

Francis 13 [David Francis (Editor-at-large for The Fiscal Times. He has reported from all over the world on a number of topics, from transatlantic relations, to border security, to finance, and has spoken about his work at the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service, the Johns Hopkins School for Advanced International Studies, and the World Affairs Council of Pittsburgh), 4-2-2013, "How a New Army of Robots Can Cut the Defense Budget," Fiscal Times, ] // st

Right now, each soldier in Afghanistan costs the Pentagon $850,000 a year, according to DOD estimates. Some independent experts put that number as high as $1.2 million. That’s just the cost of keeping soldiers in the field of battle. Over time, these soldiers are expected to cost the Pentagon tens of billions of dollars in long-term health care costs. This expense is expected to be one of the main drivers of DOD spending in the coming years: According to the left-leaning Center for American Progress, health care costs will reach $63.9 billion by 2015. Compare that, however, to the cost of building and maintaining a robot. The TALON robot, a small rover that can be outfitted with weapons, costs $230,000 right now. The SGR-A1, used by the South Korean military to detect movement in the demilitarized zone, costs $200,000. The 710 Warrior, a miniature rover with enough power to tow a car, costs between $300,000 and $400,000. Even the larger, more sophisticated robots that are in development are relatively cheap. PETMAN, the humanoid robot that can run and do pushups, cost $26.3 million to develop. The Pentagon has only invested $11 million in its program to develop robots that can act autonomously. The Navy has invested $813 billion in its unmanned X-47B, a project that is close to operational. This might seem like a large amount until you consider that DOD plans to spend $1.5 trillion on its manned F-35. Of course, these costs will grow as the robots are produced on a larger scale. And people will never be completely eliminated from the DOD: Pentagon commanders are likely to use robots as companions to human soldiers, not as replacements. But because they’re cheap to maintain, the rise of robot warriors is likely to reduce DOD spending. As production increases, efficiencies will be found, reducing costs. All signs indicate that the cost of using a robot in battle is likely to be less than using a human. The real savings come through medical costs. Robots do not require long-term medical care, the time and services of the Veterans Administration, or anything else connected to the government’s bottom line.

2022 Michigan Negative
**Disadvantages** › China DA › 1NC---DA---China

Shifts in power causes Russia-China War—that outweighs

Lowry 22 – Rich Lowry is editor of National Review and a contributing editor with Politico Magazine. ("The Isolationists Are Wrong: The Pax Americana Is Worth Defending," 2-24-2022, https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2022/02/24/isolationists-are-wrong-pax-americana-worth-defending-00011448, Accessed 6-25-2022, LASA-SC

Vladimir Putin’s war against Ukraine doesn’t just herald a new era in European security, it underlines a growing threat to the American-led international order.

Pax Americana, the post-World War II system that has created the conditions for peace and prosperity in Europe and elsewhere, is entering a great period of testing, with the revanchist powers of Russia and China seeking to overturn it.

2022 Michigan Negative
**Disadvantages** › China DA › 1NC---DA---China

Banning LAWS prevents delicate balance between great powers.

John Williams 21, is Professor of International Relations in the School of Government and International Affairs at Durham University, UK. His research addresses ethical, regulatory, and security issues associated with new and emerging military technologies, “Effective, Deployable, Accountable: Pick Two’: Regulating Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems”, E-International Relations, 8-12-2021, https://www.e-ir.info/2021/08/12/effective-deployable-accountable-pick-two-regulating-lethal-autonomous-weapons-system/)/maze

Secondly, I assume efforts to ban the development and deployment of LAWS will fail. Despite a large coalition of NGOs, academics, policymakers, scientists, and others (e.g. , , ) LAWS development is more likely than not. Amandeep Singh Gill (, 175), former Indian Ambassador to the UN Conference on Disarmament and former Chair of the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on LAWS at the UN Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW), stresses how:

The economic, political and security drivers for mainstreaming this suite of technologies [AI] into security functions are simply too powerful to be rolled back. There will be plenty of persuasive national security applications – minimizing casualties and collateral damage …, defeating terrorist threats, saving on defense spending, and protecting soldiers and their bases – to provide counterarguments against concerns about runaway robots or accidental wars caused by machine error.

2022 Michigan Negative
**Disadvantages** › China DA › 1NC---DA---China

China is rising in LAWS BUT they are lagging behind in expertise.

Justin Haner & Denise.Garcia 19 Justin Haner is a doctoral candidate in the Department of Political Science at Northeastern University, specializing in International Relations,;Denise Garcia is a Northeastern University professor, International Panel for the Regulation of Autonomous Weapons member, and vicechair of the International Committee for Robot Arms Control, “The Artificial Intelligence Arms Race: Trends and World Leaders in Autonomous Weapons Development”, Global Policy Volume 10 . Issue 3 . September 2019, 9-26-2019, https://skrcmdo.com/assets/rmat/AI%20Arm%20trends.pdf)/maze

China is the clear rising contender in lethal AWS and AI development and has outlined in its ‘Next Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan’ that it intends to utilize AI on the battlefield in association with AWS (China State Council, 2017; Kania, 2017). With a combination of 70 per cent citizen trust in AI (the highest of the 24 countries surveyed) and the heavy pressure it can exert on companies to transfer technology to the state, it is unlikely to face significant internal resistance to AWS development (Ipsos, 2018). China’s capacity for weapons development is high with an estimated annual budget of $250 billion and projected spending of $4.5 billion on drone technology by 2021 (SIPRI, 2019; Statista, 2019). Most impressively, Chinese companies have tested swarming technology with over 1,000 synchronized drones (Kania, 2017). However, while some countries, such as South Korea, Israel, and Japan, seek AWS development to augment their soldiers and fill near-term gaps in security, China, with the world’s largest army, does not have this problem. This frees China to focus the bulk of its resources on long-term strategic investments in AI. China publicly plans to become the world leader in AI development by 2030 (China State Council, 2017). China’s controversial methods of intellectual property procurement have allowed them to make technological leaps forward in a non-linear fashion. With heavy ‘civil-military fusion’ investment, China’s State Council estimates their AI industries to be worth $22 billion by 2020, $59 billion by 2025, and $150 billion by 2030 (China State Council, 2017; Kania, 2017). By some metrics, China has already taken the lead in AI. Despite lagging in total publications, between 2011 and 2015 Chinese scientists published 41,000 papers on AI, almost double the United States during the same period (Baker, 2017). Further, Chinese investment and financing in AI projects between 2013 and 2018 is estimated to be 60 per cent of the entire worlds funding of such projects, again more than doubling United States investment during the same period (CAICT and Gartner, 2019). However, China does face a problem of top expertise flight as despite having over 18,000 talented AI developers, when it comes to those who rank among the world’s best, the United States and EU each have more than five times as many of the top experts (CISTP, 2019a).

2022 Michigan Negative
**Disadvantages** › Terrorism DA › 2NC---DA---Nuke Terror---AT: Wouldn’t Use / McIntosh and Storey

Acquisition does mean use – no ability to secure and detonate against raised defense create use it or lose it pressures rather than threats.

Bell, PhD, 19

(Mark, PoliSci@MIT, AssistProfPoliSci@Minnesota, Defending the “Acquisition-Use Presumption” in Assessing the Likelihood of Nuclear Terrorism, International Studies Quarterly)

In their recent article in International Studies Quarterly, McIntosh and Storey (2018, 289) criticize existing analyses for falling prey to an “acquisition-use presumption” that “assumes that once a terrorist group acquires a nuclear weapon, it will, at some point, attempt to detonate it.” Instead, they argue that “a nuclear terrorist attack is the least likely outcome—even for terrorist groups with nuclear capability.” McIntosh and Storey (2018, 289, 296–97) identify three reasons why terrorist organizations would be unlikely to detonate a nuclear weapon even if they acquired one. First, they point to “many options available to a terrorist group” other than detonating a nuclear weapon. Second, “terrorist organizations are not unitary, homogenous organizations” and must maintain “the continued support of . . . multiple audiences” such as funders and state sponsors, as well as individuals within the organization. These organizational dynamics should be expected to reduce the likelihood of a nuclear attack by a terrorist organization, even if it has acquired nuclear weapons. Third, scholars “conflate capitulation and surrender” because a nuclear attack would likely increase threats to the terrorist organization. These arguments, however, are ultimately unpersuasive. The acquisition-use presumption remains a valid basis for theorizing about the probability of nuclear terrorism.1 Alternatives to a Nuclear Attack McIntosh and Storey (2018, 292–93) identify a range of options for a terrorist organization that has acquired nuclear weapons. Drawing on the literature on the ways that states use nuclear weapons, they highlight four potentially attractive strategies for a terrorist organization with a nuclear weapon. First, a terrorist organization could pursue “ambiguity,” in which a terrorist organization “neither publicly identifies the conditions triggering nuclear attack nor publicizes acquiring the weapon.” “Latency,” the second option, requires a terrorist organization to “keep its capacity covert, but publicly state conditions under which it would employ a nuclear weapon.” A third possibility, “opacity,” occurs when an organization “admits a nuclear capacity but does not identify conditions resulting in an attack.” The fourth option, “blackmail,” involves an organization making “specific nuclear threats to achieve an outcome.” McIntosh and Storey (2018) conclude that “there is always a myriad of options that remain available” other than detonating a nuclear weapon and that nuclear weapons are “much more effectively used, paradoxically, when [they] remain holstered.” These strategies, however, are unlikely to appeal to a terrorist organization with a nuclear weapon. A terrorist organization with a nuclear weapon that adopts a strategy of ambiguity neither acknowledges its nuclear capability nor the circumstances in which it might use it; as McIntosh and Storey (2018, 292, 289) say, nuclear weapons are “not utilized directly.” If so, ambiguity merely provides the terrorist organization with the option of future operational or political use. If that future use involves a nuclear detonation, then the acquisition-use presumption, that the terrorist organization “will, at some point, attempt to detonate [its nuclear weapon]” remains valid. If that future use does not involve a nuclear detonation, then the attractiveness of the strategy of ambiguity depends on the attractiveness of potential future options other than detonation. The other strategies that McIntosh and Storey (2018) identify—latency, opacity, and blackmail—involve the terrorist organization revealing (to some degree) its nuclear capabilities and seeking to gain political utility from nuclear weapons without detonating them, through deterrence or compellence (or both).2 McIntosh and Storey (2018) are correct that states have generally sought political benefits from possessing rather than directly using nuclear weapons.3 However, terrorist organization would find it far harder than states, which are better positioned to reap deterrent or compellent benefits from the possession of nuclear weapons, to gain political benefits from merely possessing nuclear weapons. First, a terrorist organization with nuclear weapons would be in a more vulnerable position than any state with respect to its nuclear weapons. Even newly nuclear-armed states typically possess numerous nuclear weapons, a range of facilities in which weapons and delivery capabilities can be held, military resources to protect facilities and weapons, and control of the territory in which those weapons are being held. These capabilities substantially reduce a state’s vulnerability to having its nuclear capabilities attacked and destroyed militarily and allow a state to achieve political goals without detonating its nuclear capabilities. A terrorist organization’s nuclear arsenal, by contrast, would likely be more vulnerable. Terrorist organizations do, of course, vary substantially in terms of their resources, military capabilities, and control over territory; terrorist organizations with more resources, capabilities, and territorial control would be better able to protect their nuclear capabilities. For example, an organization holding substantial territory, such as the Islamic State at the height of its power, would have a better chance of protecting nuclear weapons. Nonetheless, even an extremely well-resourced, sophisticated terrorist organization is likely to have a far more vulnerable nuclear arsenal than a weak state. Just assembling a single gun-type nuclear device (the crudest and easiest type of nuclear weapon to build) would be a remarkable technological achievement for any terrorist organization, and even scholars concerned about nuclear terrorism conclude that “an attack by nonstate terrorists using an actual nuclear explosive—self-made or stolen—would clearly be among the most difficult types of attack to carry out” (Bunn and Weir 2006, 133–34). A terrorist organization would not be able to produce highly enriched uranium or plutonium (which require operating a nuclear reactor or uranium enrichment technologies such as centrifuges); would not be able to manufacture substantial numbers of nuclear weapons; would not have a large cadre of nuclear engineers, scientists, and metallurgists at its disposal; and generally would not have a large range of facilities or the military capabilities to protect them from attack by powerful states.4 Even the most sophisticated terrorist organization’s nuclear arsenal would, therefore, be more vulnerable than the nuclear arsenal of a weak state. This vulnerability has important consequences for the incentives facing a terrorist organization with nuclear weapons. A terrorist organization with a nuclear weapon would face an extreme version of the “use-them-or-lose-them” incentives that states with vulnerable nuclear arsenals face: to “posture [its] forces for an early use . . . before its nuclear option is curtailed” (Feaver 1992/1993, 165). Similarly, a terrorist organization with a vulnerable arsenal would face strong incentives to use its nuclear weapons to avoid having the opportunity to use them taken away (Van de Velde 2010, 685). Second, states can gain political leverage from nuclear weapons without using them in a direct military attack because a state revealing its nuclear capabilities does not reduce the weapons’ potency or the state’s ability to use them. As Gartzke and Lindsay argue, “nuclear actors can openly advertise their weapons to signal the costs of aggression to potential adversaries” (2017, 37). This is partly because states can protect their nuclear assets, as discussed above. However, additionally, states have generally relied on military technologies to deliver nuclear weapons that are (to differing degrees) difficult to defend against: military aircraft, land-based missiles, or submarine-launched missiles. Indeed, the fact that nuclear weapons delivered by missile or aircraft are difficult to defend against regardless of knowledge of an adversary’s capabilities is at the core of arguments about the stabilizing effects of nuclear weapons on international politics.5 A terrorist organization, however, has much stronger incentives to maintain secrecy about its nuclear capability. As discussed, a terrorist organization cannot protect its nuclear assets to the same degree as a state. In addition, a terrorist organization would likely employ crude methods of delivery such as a truck or a ship navigated into a port rather than the sophisticated delivery technologies available to states (Bunn 2010, 16). Such methods of delivery are far easier to defend against than those employed by states if the defender has knowledge of the attacker’s capabilities or intentions. As a result, any sort of disclosure by a terrorist organization reduces the potency of its nuclear arsenal. For example, if a state knew that a terrorist organization had a nuclear device, it would have a wide range of counterterrorism policy tools at its disposal to reduce the likelihood of a successful terrorist attack. For example, a state could shut down border crossings, increase security at potential target sites, activate intelligence assets within the terrorist organization, share intelligence with other states, or pursue assassinations or other kinetic operations (Ganor 2006). Terrorist organizations, therefore, have greater incentives for secrecy, thereby reducing the feasibility of them achieving political leverage from possessing nuclear weapons without using them directly in a nuclear attack. This, in turn, increases the attractiveness of detonation relative to any other strategy. Third, for a terrorist organization seeking to gain political leverage from possessing nuclear weapons, it must first persuade the world that it has a capability that no previous terrorist organization has previously acquired. States may reasonably doubt such claims by a terrorist organization. First, no terrorist organization has previously acquired nuclear weapons. And second, responding to a nuclear threat from a terrorist organization by granting concessions would set a precedent that other organizations could exploit. Of course, states can unambiguously demonstrate their nuclear capabilities using public and observable nuclear tests because they can replenish their nuclear arsenals; states with uranium-enrichment or plutonium-reprocessing capabilities can easily produce more fissile material. Terrorists are unlikely to have these capabilities and would therefore have a fixed, finite quantity of nuclear materials; any sort of public nuclear test is, therefore, costlier for a terrorist organization than for a state. The United States during World War II provides the closest example of a state facing these constraints. As (Schelling 1982, 67) notes, when the United States “had a very small capability to produce nuclear bombs . . . the possibility of a harmless detonation in an unpopulated place was considered but rejected.” A terrorist organization with a nuclear weapon would face the same incentives as the United States faced in 1945—a small arsenal and limited fissile material, a world potentially skeptical of any claim to have acquired a revolutionary new capability, and defenders potentially capable of interfering with an attack. A terrorist organization in this position would likely conclude, as the United States did in 1945, that “the weapons couldn’t be wasted on a remote battlefield . . . [N]o warning [could be] given that might have allowed interference with the demonstration” (Schelling 1982, 67). This is not to say that terrorist organizations might never seek to demonstrate their capabilities prior to detonating a nuclear weapon in an attack, but such demonstrations are much costlier, and thus less attractive, for terrorist organizations than states. In sum, states can generally protect their nuclear arsenals from attack, can deliver nuclear weapons regardless of actions by adversaries, and can disclose their capabilities without reducing their potency. This makes it plausible for them to use nuclear weapons for deterrence or compellence— gaining political utility from their nuclear weapons without directly using them. While terrorist organizations vary substantially, and some may even approximate some of the capabilities of states on some dimensions, their nuclear arsenals would likely be more vulnerable, their delivery methods cruder, and their incentives for secrecy greater than states. Gaining political leverage from nuclear weapons without using them is more difficult in such circumstances. As a result, a terrorist organization with nuclear weapons would be unlikely to find the strategies that McIntosh and Storey (2018) identify feasible or attractive. Organizational Dynamics While McIntosh and Storey’s (2018) first argument is that a nuclear attack would be a poor strategic choice for a rational terrorist organization, their second argument does not assume that terrorist organizations are unitary, rational actors. As the literature has increasingly recognized, organizational dynamics and intragroup politics shed light on the behavior of terrorist and insurgent organizations.6 For example, terrorist organizations are composed of multiple suborganizations that may have their own interests and incentives distinct from those of the larger organization; have links to other organizations and are embedded within broader societal structures; must maintain the support of individuals within the organization; and must maintain the support of external audiences such as funders or states. McIntosh and Storey (2018, 296–97) argue that these organizational dynamics reduce the validity of the acquisition-use presumption. They argue that (1) “there could be divisiveness [within the organization] regarding themost effective use of the weapon,” (2) “a nuclear attack would exponentially raise the threat to each individual who composes the extended organization,” (3) “transgressing the longstanding nuclear taboo would have dramatic and negative effects on broader public support,” and (4) any “host state/government will likely be much less committed to the survival of the terrorist group” if it conducted a nuclear attack. However, if these arguments should reduce our estimate of the likelihood of nuclear terrorism, it is not because the acquisition-use presumption is faulty.7 Rather, these arguments reduce the probability of a terrorist organization acquiring nuclear weapons in the first place.8 If there are organizational rifts about the utility of using nuclear weapons, an organization will find it hard to generate internal support for a decision to acquire nuclear weapons. If individual members of the terrorist organization fear the consequences of nuclear use, they are likely to resist the acquisition of a nuclear weapon. And if a terrorist organization relies on support from a state that would oppose its use of nuclear weapons, the state has incentives to prevent the terrorist organization from acquiring nuclear weapons in the first place. For example, Pakistan may support numerous terrorist organizations including Lashkar-e-Taiba, Jaish-e-Mohammad, or the Haqqani network (Byman 2005, chap. 6; Fair 2011; 2014, chap. 9) but has strong incentives not to allow such organizations to acquire nuclear weapons (Lieber and Press 2013, 93–95). McIntosh and Storey’s (2018) arguments about the organizational politics of terrorist organizations actually reinforce the logic of the acquisition-use presumption via selection effects: the particular terrorist organizations able to overcome these issues to acquire nuclear weapons are also likely to be those able to overcome them in the decision to detonate nuclear weapons.9 As Schelling argues, only an organization of “high professional quality and excellent organization and discipline” would be able to acquire nuclear weapons (1982, 65). Selection effects also reinforce the acquisition-use assumption through mechanisms other than organizational politics. Groups with ideologies and goals that might incentivize acquiring nuclear weapons— such as those with apocalyptic worldviews or a desire for mass-casualty terrorism, like Al Qaeda or the Japanese cult Aum Shinrikyo—will also be those most inclined to use nuclear weapons after acquiring them and best able to enforce ideological discipline among their members. In short, the terrorist organizations that have the motivation, discipline, and capability to acquire nuclear weapons would be least subject to the dynamics that McIntosh and Storey (2018) identify as a constraint on nuclear use. The Escalatory Potential of an Attack Finally, McIntosh and Storey (2018, 297) argue that “assuming nuclear attack is inevitable postacquisition conflates capitulation and surrender.” As they argue, “it is certainly the case that [a terrorist organization] utilizing threats and violence can sometimes shift a target state’s policy,” but this does “not necessarily end the threat to [its] organization.” A nuclear attack, in short, could worsen the threats a terrorist organization faces. It certainly seems likely that a terrorist organization would “be subjected to heavier attacks than ever before” if it successfully detonated a nuclear weapon in an attack. This is not, however, a persuasive argument against the acquisition-use presumption. First, terrorist organizations often undertake attacks that increase the threats they face. Indeed, terrorist or insurgent organizations often deliberately seek to escalate a confrontation with a state; scholars have long understood the logic of “provocation” or “outbidding” strategies by groups competing for recruits, resources, or notoriety.10 Al Qaeda, for example, sought to provoke the United States into a costly and destructive war using the 9/11 attacks, with Osama bin Laden boasting that the United States had been “easy for us to provoke” (Kydd and Walter 2006, 71). Other terrorist organizations such as Hamas or Shining Path have sought to “outbid” other terrorist organizations to demonstrate that they are “zealots rather than sellouts” (Kydd and Walter 2006, 76). For a terrorist organization seeking provocation, escalation, or outbidding, it is hard to imagine a better way to achieve those goals than a nuclear attack. The argument that a nuclear attack would lead to the escalation of hostilities does not, therefore, support the conclusion that a terrorist organization with a nuclear weapon would not seek to conduct a nuclear attack. Second, the claim that a nuclear attack would cause significant blowback only undermines the acquisition-use presumption if other strategies a terrorist organization could employ with nuclear weapons would not result in significant blowback. However, as discussed above, the other strategies that McIntosh and Storey (2018) identify are unlikely to be attractive to a terrorist organization. More importantly, to the extent that other strategies are attractive, they are also likely to result in significant blowback from states. For example, as Van de Velde (2010, 685) argues, if Al Qaeda sought to gain political leverage from its nuclear weapons without using them, it would be faced with overwhelming “pressure, airstrikes, troop movements, alliances, and alike to find the weapon.” This, as discussed above, would increase the incentives for a terrorist organization to use a nuclear weapon in an attack before its ability to do so is destroyed.

2022 Michigan Negative
**Disadvantages** › Terrorism DA › 2NC---DA---Nuke Terror---Nuke Terror Impact Calc

Government studies prove nuclear terror is possible and has devastating impacts – err on the side of caution.

Bunn, PhD, and Roth, MA, 8

(Matthew, AssocProfPublicPolicy@Harvard, TechnologyManagmentAndPolicy@MIT, Nickolas, PublicPolicy@Maryland, SeniorResearchAssociate@Belfer, 9-28, https://thebulletin.org/2017/09/the-effects-of-a-single-terrorist-nuclear-bomb/)

The escalating threats between North Korea and the United States make it easy to forget the “nuclear nightmare,” as former US Secretary of Defense William J. Perryput it, that could result even from the use of just a single terrorist nuclear bomb in the heart of a major city. At the risk of repeating the vast literature on the tragedies of Hiroshima and Nagasaki—and the substantial literature surrounding nuclear tests and simulations since then—we attempt to spell out here the likely consequences of the explosion of a single terrorist nuclear bomb on a major city, and its subsequent ripple effects on the rest of the planet. Depending on where and when it was detonated, the blast, fire, initial radiation, and long-term radioactive fallout from such a bomb could leave the heart of a major city a smoldering radioactive ruin, killing tens or hundreds of thousands of people and wounding hundreds of thousands more. Vast areas would have to be evacuated and might be uninhabitable for years. Economic, political, and social aftershocks would ripple throughout the world. A single terrorist nuclear bomb would change history. The country attacked—and the world—would never be the same. The idea of terrorists accomplishing such a thing is, unfortunately, not out of the question; it is far easier to make a crude, unsafe, unreliable nuclear explosive that might fit in the back of a truck than it is to make a safe, reliable weapon of known yield that can be delivered by missile or combat aircraft. Numerous government studies have concluded that it is plausible that a sophisticated terrorist group could make a crude bomb if they got the needed nuclear material. And in the last quarter century, there have been some 20 seizures of stolen, weapons-usable nuclear material, and at least two terrorist groups have made significant efforts to acquire nuclear bombs. Terrorist use of an actual nuclear bomb is a low-probability event—but the immensity of the consequences means that even a small chance is enough to justify an intensive effort to reduce the risk. Fortunately, since the early 1990s, countries around the world have significantly reduced the danger—but it remains very real, and there is more to do to ensure this nightmare never becomes reality.

2022 Michigan Negative
**Disadvantages** › Terrorism DA › 2NC---DA---Nuke Terror---Nuke Terror Impact Calc

Nuclear terror likely now and turns every impact.

Arguello, MA, and Buis, PhD, 18

(Irma, SecurityStudies@EscuelaDeDefensaNacional, Emiliano, LLM NationalDefense@NationalMinistryOfDefense, Classics@UniversityBuenosAires, AssocProfILaw@UBA, The global impacts of a terrorist nuclear attack: What would happen? What should we do? Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 74(2), 114–119)

Though hard to accept, the detonation of a nuclear device – by states or non-state actors – is today a plausible scenario. And while much of the world’s focus has been on the current nuclear weapons arsenals possessed by states – about 14,550 warheads, all of which carry the risk of intentional or unintentional use – the threat of nuclear terrorism is here and increasing. For more than a decade, Al Qaeda, Aum Shinrikyo, and other terrorist groups have expressed their desire to acquire fissile material to build and detonate an improvised nuclear bomb. None of them could fulfill that goal – so far. But that does not mean that they will not succeed in the future. Making matters worse, there is evidence of an illicit market for nuclear weapons-usable materials. There are sellers in search of potential buyers, as shown by the dismantlement of a nuclear smuggling network in Moldova in 2015. There certainly are plenty of sites from which to obtain nuclear material. According to the 2016 Nuclear Security Index by the Nuclear Threat Initiative, 24 countries still host inventories of nuclear weapons-usable materials, stored in facilities with different degrees of security. And in terms of risk, it is not necessary for a given country to possess nuclear weapons, weapons-usable materials, or nuclear facilities for it to be useful to nuclear terrorists: Structural and institutional weaknesses in a country may make it favorable for the illicit trade of materials. Permeable boundaries, high levels of corruption, weaknesses in judicial systems, and consequent impunity may give rise to a series of transactions and other events, which could end in a nuclear attack. The truth is that, at this stage, no country in possession of nuclear weapons or weapons-usable materials can guarantee their full protection against nuclear terrorism or nuclear smuggling. Because we live in a world of growing insecurity, where explicit and tacit agreements between the relevant powers – which upheld global stability during the post- Cold War – are giving way to increasing mistrust and hostility, a question arises: How would our lives be affected if a current terrorist group such as the Islamic State (ISIS), or new terrorist groups in the future, succeed in evolving from today’s Manchester style “low-tech” attacks to a “high-tech” one, involving a nuclear bomb, detonated in a capital city, anywhere in the world? We attempted to answer this question in a report developed by a high-level multidisciplinary expert group convened by the NPSGlobal Foundation for the Latin American and Caribbean Leadership Network. We found that there would be multiple harmful effects that would spread promptly around the globe (Arguello and Buis 2016); a more detailed analysis is below, which highlights the need for the creation of a comprehensive nuclear security system. The consequences of a terrorist nuclear attack A small and primitive 1-kiloton fission bomb (with a yield of about one-fifteenth of the one dropped on Hiroshima, and certainly much less sophisticated; cf. Figure 1), detonated in any large capital city of the developed world, would cause an unprecedented catastrophic scenario. An estimate of direct effects in the attack’s location includes a death toll of 7,300-to-23,000 people and 12,600-to-57,000 people injured, depending on the target’s geography and population density. Total physical destruction of the city’s infrastructure, due to the blast (shock wave) and thermal radiation, would cover a radius of about 500 meters from the point of detonation (also known as ground zero), while ionizing radiation greater than 5 Sieverts – compatible with the deadly acute radiation syndrome – would expand within an 850-meter radius. From the environmental point of view, such an area would be unusable for years. In addition, radioactive fallout would expand in an area of about 300 square kilometers, depending on meteorological conditions (cf. Figure 2). But the consequences would go far beyond the effects in the target country, however, and promptly propagate worldwide. Global and national security, economy and finance, international governance and its framework, national political systems, and the behavior of governments and individuals would all be put under severe trial. The severity of the effects at a national level, however, would depend on the countries’ level of development, geopolitical location, and resilience. Global security and regional/national defense schemes would be strongly affected. An increase in global distrust would spark rising tensions among countries and blocs, that could even lead to the brink of nuclear weapons use by states (if, for instance, a sponsor country is identified). The consequences of such a shocking scenario would include a decrease in states’ self-control, an escalation of present conflicts and the emergence of new ones, accompanied by an increase in military unilateralism and military expenditures. Regarding the economic and financial impacts, a severe global economic depression would rise from the attack, likely lasting for years. Its duration would be strongly dependent on the course of the crisis. The main results of such a crisis would include a 2 percent fall of growth in global Gross Domestic Product, and a 4 percent decline of international trade in the two years following the attack (cf. Figure 3). In the case of developing and less-developed countries, the economic impacts would also include a shortage of high-technology products such as medicines, as well as a fall in foreign direct investment and a severe decline of international humanitarian aid toward low-income countries. We expect an increase of unemployment and poverty in all countries. Global poverty would raise about 4 percent after the attack, which implies that at least 30 million more people would be living in extreme poverty, in addition to the current estimated 767 million. In the area of international relations, we would expect a breakdown of key doctrines involving politics, security, and relations among states. These international tensions could lead to a collapse of the nuclear order as we know it today, with a consequent setback of nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation commitments. In other words, the whole system based on the Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty would be put under severe trial. After the attack, there would be a reassessment of existing security doctrines, and a deep review of concepts such as nuclear deterrence, no-firstuse, proportionality, and negative security assurances. Finally, the behavior of governments and individuals would also change radically. Internal chaos fueled by the media and social networks would threaten governance at all levels, with greater impact on those countries with weak institutional frameworks. Social turbulence would emerge in most countries, with consequent attempts by governments to impose restrictions on personal freedoms to preserve order – possibly by declaring a state of siege or state of emergency – and legislation would surely become tougher on human rights. There would also be a significant increase in social fragmentation – with a deepening of antagonistic views, mistrust, and intolerance, both within countries and towards others – and a resurgence of large-scale social movements fostered by ideological interests and easily mobilized through social media.

2022 Michigan Negative
**Disadvantages** › Terrorism DA › 2NC---DA---Nuke Terror---Nuke Terror UQ

Nuclear terror risk has diminished but threats remain given emerging tech and widespread vulnerabilities.

Roth, MA, 20

(Nickolas, Public Policy Analysis from the University of Maryland, Senior Fellow and Director of the Nuclear Security Program at the Stimson Center, Preventing Nuclear Terrorism, Blundering Toward Nuclear Chaos, ed. Wolfsthal, pp. 64-65, May) BW

Nuclear threats from major terrorist groups seeking nuclear weapons appear to have diminished in recent years as some of the most dangerous groups – well-funded, sophisticated organizations with apocalyptic beliefs like the Islamic State and al-Qaeda – have faced major defeats. This is a positive development, but serious risks remain. The number of incidents involving rapid radicalization of violent insiders appears to be increasing. There are large areas of ungoverned land where terrorists could hide throughout the world. Nuclear security incidents in which adversaries employ emerging technologies like drones and cyber tools are becoming increasingly common and increasingly dangerous. This is not a time to be complacent. Unfortunately, nuclear facilities in many countries remain dangerously vulnerable to serious threats. Not all nuclear facilities are protected against all plausible threats, especially emerging threats; many do not have comprehensive, multilayered defenses against insiders; some nuclear security systems are not exposed regularly to rigorous vulnerability assessments and testing; the culture within many nuclear organizations is still not focused sufficiently on security; and nuclear materials remain in far too many locations. In addition, the regime underpinning global nuclear security efforts has major weaknesses. Elements of the five action plans agreed to at the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit are being implemented, but international organizations and multilateral groups are doing little to expand their nuclear security-focused work. Many of the joint commitments that countries endorsed during nuclear security summits have been preserved as International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Information Circulars, but few additional countries have endorsed them. Finally, existing forums for discussing nuclear security have not filled the gap left by the end of the summits. Hardly any countries are reporting their progress in strengthening nuclear security or announcing new commitments. The combination of persistent threats and evidence of nuclear security weaknesses means that the risk of nuclear terrorism remains unnecessarily high.

2022 Michigan Negative
**Disadvantages** › Terrorism DA › 2NC---DA---Terror---Impact---Terrorism

Terrorism leads to extinction

Bostrom 2 [Nick Bostrom (PhD and faculty in Philosophy at Oxford University), “Existential Risks: Analyzing Human Extinction Scenarios and Related Hazards,” ] // st

Risks in this sixth category are a recent phenomenon. This is part of the reason why it is useful to distinguish them from other risks. We have not evolved mechanisms, either biologically or culturally, for managing such risks. Our intuitions and coping strategies have been shaped by our long experience with risks such as dangerous animals, hostile individuals or tribes, poisonous foods, automobile accidents, Chernobyl, Bhopal, volcano eruptions, earthquakes, draughts, World War I, World War II, epidemics of influenza, smallpox, black plague, and AIDS. These types of disasters have occurred many times and our cultural attitudes towards risk have been shaped by trial-and-error in managing such hazards. But tragic as such events are to the people immediately affected, in the big picture of things – from the perspective of humankind as a whole – even the worst of these catastrophes are mere ripples on the surface of the great sea of life. They haven’t significantly affected the total amount of human suffering or happiness or determined the long-term fate of our species. With the exception of a species-destroying comet or asteroid impact (an extremely rare occurrence), there were probably no significant existential risks in human history until the mid-twentieth century, and certainly none that it was within our power to do something about. The first manmade existential risk was the inaugural detonation of an atomic bomb. At the time, there was some concern that the explosion might start a runaway chain-reaction by “igniting” the atmosphere. Although we now know that such an outcome was physically impossible, it qualifies as an existential risk that was present at the time. For there to be a risk, given the knowledge and understanding available, it suffices that there is some subjective probability of an adverse outcome, even if it later turns out that objectively there was no chance of something bad happening. If we don’t know whether something is objectively risky or not, then it is risky in the subjective sense. The subjective sense is of course what we must base our decisions on.[2] At any given time we must use our best current subjective estimate of what the objective risk factors are.[3] A much greater existential risk emerged with the build-up of nuclear arsenals in the US and the USSR. An all-out nuclear war was a possibility with both a substantial probability and with consequences that might have been persistent enough to qualify as global and terminal. There was a real worry among those best acquainted with the information available at the time that a nuclear Armageddon would occur and that it might annihilate our species or permanently destroy human civilization.[4]  Russia and the US retain large nuclear arsenals that could be used in a future confrontation, either accidentally or deliberately. There is also a risk that other states may one day build up large nuclear arsenals. Note however that a smaller nuclear exchange, between India and Pakistan for instance, is not an existential risk, since it would not destroy or thwart humankind’s potential permanently. Such a war might however be a local terminal risk for the cities most likely to be targeted. Unfortunately, we shall see that nuclear Armageddon and comet or asteroid strikes are mere preludes to the existential risks that we will encounter in the 21st century. The special nature of the challenges posed by existential risks is illustrated by the following points:  Our approach to existential risks cannot be one of trial-and-error. There is no opportunity to learn from errors. The reactive approach – see what happens, limit damages, and learn from experience – is unworkable. Rather, we must take a proactive approach. This requires foresight to anticipate new types of threats and a willingness to take decisive preventive action and to bear the costs (moral and economic) of such actions.  We cannot necessarily rely on the institutions, moral norms, social attitudes or national security policies that developed from our experience with managing other sorts of risks. Existential risks are a different kind of beast. We might find it hard to take them as seriously as we should simply because we have never yet witnessed such disasters.[5] Our collective fear-response is likely ill calibrated to the magnitude of threat.         Reductions in existential risks are global public goods [13] and may therefore be undersupplied by the market [14]. Existential risks are a menace for everybody and may require acting on the international plane. Respect for national sovereignty is not a legitimate excuse for failing to take countermeasures against a major existential risk.         If we take into account the welfare of future generations, the harm done by existential risks is multiplied by another factor, the size of which depends on whether and how much we discount future benefits [15,16]. In view of its undeniable importance, it is surprising how little systematic work has been done in this area. Part of the explanation may be that many of the gravest risks stem (as we shall see) from anticipated future technologies that we have only recently begun to understand. Another part of the explanation may be the unavoidably interdisciplinary and speculative nature of the subject. And in part the neglect may also be attributable to an aversion against thinking seriously about a depressing topic. The point, however, is not to wallow in gloom and doom but simply to take a sober look at what could go wrong so we can create responsible strategies for improving our chances of survival. In order to do that, we need to know where to focus our efforts. 

2022 Michigan Negative
**Disadvantages** › Terrorism DA › 2NC---DA---Terror---Impact---Terrorism

Nuclear terror leads to extinction

Toon 7, PhD, chair of the Department of Atmospheric and Oceanic Sciences at CU-Boulder (Owen B., et al., “Atmospheric effects and societal consequences of regional scale nuclear conflicts and acts of individual nuclear terrorism,” Atmospheric Chemistry and Physics, 7)//BB

To an increasing extent, people are congregating in the world’s great urban centers, creating megacities with populations exceeding 10 million individuals. At the same time, advanced technology has designed nuclear explosives of such small size they can be easily transported in a car, small plane or boat to the heart of a city. We demonstrate here that a single detonation in the 15 kiloton range can produce urban fatalities approaching one million in some cases, and casualties exceeding one million. Thousands of small weapons still exist in the arsenals of the U.S. and Russia, and there are at least six other countries with substantial nuclear weapons inventories. In all, thirty-three countries control sufficient amounts of highly enriched uranium or plutonium to assemble nuclear explosives. A conflict between any of these countries involving 50-100 weapons with yields of 15 kt has the potential to create fatalities rivaling those of the Second World War. Moreover, even a single surface nuclear explosion, or an air burst in rainy conditions, in a city center is likely to cause the entire metropolitan area to be abandoned at least for decades owing to infrastructure damage and radioactive contamination. As the aftermath of hurricane Katrina in Louisiana suggests, the economic consequences of even a localized nuclear catastrophe would most likely have severe national and international economic consequences. Striking effects result even from relatively small nuclear attacks because low yield detonations are most effective against city centers where business and social activity as well as population are concentrated. Rogue nations and terrorists would be most likely to strike there. Accordingly, an organized attack on the U.S. by a small nuclear state, or terrorists supported by such a state, could generate casualties comparable to those once predicted for a full-scale nuclear “counterforce” exchange in a superpower conflict. Remarkably, the estimated quantities of smoke generated by attacks totaling about one megaton of nuclear explosives could lead to significant global climate perturbations (Robock et al., 2007). While we did not extend our casualty and damage predictions to include potential medical, social or economic impacts following the initial explosions, such analyses have been performed in the past for large-scale nuclear war scenarios (Harwell and Hutchinson, 1985). Such a study should be carried out as well for the present scenarios and physical outcomes.

2022 Michigan Negative
**Disadvantages** › Terrorism DA › 2NC---DA---Terror---AT: Won’t Get LAWS / Advanced Tech

Terrorists want LAWS – cost, traceability, and lethality

Ware 19 [Jacob Ware (research associate at the Council on Foreign Relations), 9-24-2019, "Terrorist Groups, Artificial Intelligence, and Killer Drones," War on the Rocks, ] // st

Terrorist groups will be interested in artificial intelligence and lethal autonomous weapons for three reasons — cost, traceability, and effectiveness. Firstly, killer robots are likely to be , while still maintaining lethality. Experts agree that lethal autonomous weapons, once fully developed, will provide a cost-effective alternative to terrorist groups looking to maximize damage, with Tegmark “small AI-powered killer drones are likely to cost little more than a smartphone.” Additionally, killer robots will minimize the human investment required for terrorist attacks, “greater degrees of autonomy enable a greater amount of damage to be done by a single person.” Artificial intelligence could make terrorist activity cheaper financially and in terms of human capital, lowering the organizational costs required to commit attacks. Secondly, using autonomous weapons will reduce the trace left by terrorists. A large number of munitions could be launched — and a large amount of damage done — by a small number of people operating at considerable distance from the target, reducing the signature left behind. , for “a terrorist wanting to assassinate a politician … all they need to do is upload their target’s photo and address into the killer robot: it can then fly to the destination, identify and eliminate the person, and self-destruct to ensure nobody knows who was responsible.” With autonomous weapons technology, terrorist groups will be able to launch increasingly complex attacks, and, when they want to, escape without detection. Finally, killer robots could reduce, if not eliminate, the physical costs and dangers of terrorism, rendering the operative “” Raising the possibility of “fly and forget” missions, lethal autonomous weapons might simply be deployed toward a target, and engage that target without further human intervention. As P. W. Singer in 2012, “one [will] not have to be suicidal to carry out attacks that previously might have required one to be so. This allows new players into the game, making al-Qaeda 2.0 and the next-generation version of the Unabomber or Timothy McVeigh far more lethal.” Additionally, lethal autonomous weapons could potentially reduce human aversion to killing, making terrorism even more palatable as a tactic for political groups. According to the aforementioned , “AI systems can allow the actors who would otherwise be performing the tasks to retain their anonymity and experience a greater degree of psychological distance from the people they impact”; this would not only improve a terrorist’s chances of escape, as mentioned, but reduce or even eliminate the moral or psychological barriers to murder.

2022 Michigan Negative
**Disadvantages** › Terrorism DA › 2NC---DA---Terror---AT: Won’t Get LAWS / Advanced Tech

Terrorists will get their hands on LAWS – multiple warrants.

Ware 19 [Jacob Ware (research associate at the Council on Foreign Relations), 9-24-2019, "Terrorist Groups, Artificial Intelligence, and Killer Drones," War on the Rocks, ] // st

Terrorist Acquisition of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Is Realistic The proliferation of artificial intelligence and killer robot technology to terrorist organizations is realistic and likely to occur through three avenues — internal development, sales, and leaks. Firstly, modern terrorist organizations have advanced scientific and engineering departments, and actively seek out skilled scientists for recruitment. ISIL, for example, has appealed for to work on drone and AI technology. The individual technologies behind swarming killer robots — including unmanned aerial vehicles, facial recognition, and machine-to-machine communication — already exist, and have been adapted by terrorist organizations for other means. “the technological challenge of scaling it up to swarms and things like that doesn’t need any inventive step. It’s just a question of time and scale and I think that’s an absolute certainty that we should worry about.” Secondly, autonomous weapons technology will likely . Because AI research is led by private firms, advanced AI technology will be publicly sold on the open market. As Michael Horowitz , “militant groups and less-capable states may already have what they need to produce some simple autonomous weapon systems, and that capability is likely to spread even further for purely commercial reasons.” The current framework controlling high-tech weapons proliferation — the Wassenaar Arrangement and Missile Technology Control Regime — is voluntary, and is constantly tested by great-power weapons development. Given interest in developing AI-guided weapons, this seems unlikely to change. Ultimately, as AI expert Toby Walsh , the world’s weapons companies can, and will, “make a killing (pun very much intended) selling autonomous weapons to all sides of every conflict.” Finally, autonomous weapons technology is likely to leak. Innovation in the AI field is led by the private sector, not the military, because of the myriad commercial applications of the technology. This will make it , and prevent it from proliferating to nonstate actors. has been issued by Paul Scharre, a former U.S. defense official: “We are entering a world where the technology to build lethal autonomous weapons is available not only to nation-states but to individuals as well. That world is not in the distant future. It’s already here.”

2022 Michigan Negative
**Disadvantages** › Terrorism DA › 2NC---DA---Terror---Link

LAWs can contain the rise of terrorism but a ban increases casualties

Yoo 17 [Joh Yoo (A professor of Law at UC Berkeley), 2017, Embracing the Machines: Rationalist War and New Weapons Technologies, California Law Review, Vol 105: 444-448, https://29qish1lqx5q2k5d7b491joo-wpengine.netdna-ssl.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/Yoo-4.pdf] // st

Unmanned Predator and Reaper drones rove the skies above the Middle East and Africa. They hover over a target for days and launch Hellfire missiles on a moment’s notice. Robots on the battlefield below breach doors in house-to-house searches and explode improvised explosive devices common in wars with terrorists or resistance fighters. Future advances will bring armed sentry robots, autonomous armored vehicles, and automatic missile and artillery fire. On the sea, X-47 aerial drones take off and land on aircraft carriers while others already perform strike and reconnaissance missions. Soon, unmanned surface combat vessels may deploy close to shore, and others may track enemy submarines beneath the waves. Combat is not just moving toward the robotic; it is also becoming ethereal.1 During its 2008 Georgia incursion, Russia became the first nation to deploy cyberattacks on enemy command, control, and communication systems to augment a ground invasion.2 To delay the Iranian nuclear program, the United States and Israel allegedly deployed the Stuxnet virus to damage centrifuges engaged in uranium enrichment.3 China has stolen large databases of U.S. government personnel information in addition to penetrating the networks of U.S. defense contractors, airlines, and technology companies.4 Russia, meanwhile, has allegedly hacked into databases and email systems of the U.S. Departments of Defense and State, along with those of the Democratic National Committee and the campaign of presidential candidate Hillary Clinton.5 These examples illustrate the dramatic advances in weapon technology over the last two decades, which observers sometimes refer to as the “revolution in military affairs.”6 The United States now fields thousands of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) for both reconnaissance and armed attacks. Combined with stealth technology, these drones allow the United States and other nations to gather intelligence around the clock and launch immediate attacks in trouble spots around the world. In the future, the most advanced ground and sea-based armed forces will employ remote-controlled units, such as sentries, light armor, and littoral naval vessels. Advances in missile technology and precision targeting will allow the United States to field a conventional global-strike capability that can hit any target in the world within an hour. Some experts even anticipate autonomous weapons systems that militaries can program for action independent of direct human controllers. The revolution in military affairs may reduce the destruction of war. A nation will place fewer soldiers in harm’s way when remote-controlled combatants are available. Precision-guided weapons and clearer real-time intelligence will inflict less death and destruction on soldiers and military assets. With drones available, for example, nations will no longer need to resort to World War II or Vietnam-era bombing runs to destroy arms factories or oil installations. Precision-strike technology may also shorten war by targeting an opponent’s leadership and strategic vulnerabilities, as it did with the one hundred-hour Persian Gulf War of 1991 and the lightning-quick invasion of Iraq in 2003. Future technology could also reduce harm to civilians—one of the central principles of the laws of war—by tightly concentrating the use of force on military targets. Technology will contribute to changes in tactics that are already blurring our understanding of what constitutes “war.” While modern war has concentrated highly destructive forces on discrete battlefields, new technology may disperse less destructive forces across the globe. For one, technology has played a central role in the rise of nonstate actors. The September 11, 2001, attacks and the evolving sophistication of terrorist groups like the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) show that states no longer have a monopoly on international violence that can rise to the level of armed conflict. Nations have responded to unconventional attacks by nonstate actors with a mixture of armed force, economic sanctions, and criminal prosecution, leaving unclear where law enforcement ends and armed conflict begins. Technology allows nations to gain better intelligence on these groups and attack them without deploying large conventional forces. Moreover, high-tech surveillance and strike systems allow nations to identify enemy groups that hide among civilians, follow a decentralized command structure, and attack civilian targets as often as military targets. While technology has contributed to the effective reach of nonstate terrorist groups, it has also assisted nations in responding to them both domestically and abroad. Critics, however, worry that advances in weapons could increase conflict by making war easier to initiate. If a nation can simply press a button and destroy a target or cripple enemy infrastructure without risking its own personnel, it will choose a military response more often than it should. United Nations officials give voice to these growing worries. “The expansive use of armed drones by the first States to acquire them, if not challenged, can do structural damage to the cornerstones of international security and set precedents that undermine the protection of life across the globe in the longer term,” declares Christof Heyns, the UN’s Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions.7 States can use drones and other technology, such as cyberweapons, to launch attacks far from conventional battlefields in ways that escape immediate detection, and perhaps even responsibility. Ultimately, pinpoint strikes and cyberattacks will continue to blur any clear line between war and peace. Cyberwarfare further blurs this line. Internet attacks can cause real-world destruction and harm, or they can simply interfere with another nation’s communications, financial, or information networks. A cyberattack, for example, could cause a flood by disabling the control mechanisms for a dam or trigger an explosion by forcing a power plant to malfunction. As Russia demonstrated in its invasions of Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014, nations can also launch cyberattacks as part of an electronic warfare campaign to support a conventional armed attack.8 They can use cyberweapons in place of conventional weapons to commit sabotage, such as the Stuxnet virus. Or governments can use the Internet to steal significant military or intelligence information, such as weapons designs or strategic plans, which appears to be occurring with increasing frequency between the United States and China. “China is using its cyber capabilities to support intelligence collection against the U.S. diplomatic, economic, and defense industrial base sectors that support U.S. national defense programs,” the U.S. Defense Department stated in a 2016 report to Congress.9 “The accesses and skills required for these intrusions are similar to those necessary to conduct cyber attacks.”10 The anonymity of cyberattacks may prevent open armed conflict because targeted nations will not know against whom to retaliate. Indeed, nations have been uncertain about their responses to robotic and cyberwarfare attacks. They sometimes treat them as a form of espionage or covert action, refusing to consider the resulting damage as an act of war. China’s theft of the U.S. Office of Personnel Management database did not prompt an official use of U.S. force, nor did North Korea’s hacking of Sony’s electronic files. Iran took no overt military response to the Stuxnet virus. American drones execute dozens of strikes in countries, such as Yemen, Somalia, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, without sparking any military reaction. And yet, use of these weapons in other contexts would likely start an armed conflict. Cyberattacks to disable military units or critical civilian networks, or to augment a broader military offensive, would surely constitute acts of war, as would the use of robots and drones to harm people or real property. Robotics and cyberweapons could also exert force that does not necessarily kill or destroy tangible objects, but fall somewhere in between the line between domestic crime and an act of war. Governments and scholars are not always clear about when such attacks meet the legal standards for an armed attack or something less. For example, the new United States Law of War Manual, issued by the Department of Defense in 2015, declares that the existing laws of war should apply to what it calls “cyber operations.”11 But it then concedes that the rules here are “not well-settled” and are “likely to continue to develop.”12 The United States even takes the position that it may not have a position, as the manual declares that it does not “preclude the [Defense] Department from subsequently changing its interpretation of the law.”13 This Essay argues that efforts to constrain new military technologies with ex ante per se rules, rather than ex post reasonable regulation, are not only doomed, but dangerous. History is littered with proposals to stop advances in weapons. Medieval leaders tried to ban crossbows, early artillery, and firearms because they violated chivalry and honor.14 During World War I, nations argued over whether international law prohibited airplanes from bombing targets or submarines from sinking ships without warning.15 But by the end of World War II, the United States used atomic bombs to end the war against Japan.16 International agreements, such as the League of Nations and the Kellogg-Briand Pact, failed to stop the Axis. History tells us that restraint arrives through deterrence, not law or morality. In World War II, the Allies and Axis stockpiled ample arsenals of chemical weapons, but did not use them for fear of retaliation.17 During the Cold War, mutually assured destruction ultimately led both superpowers to agree to limits on, and then reductions of, nuclear weapons. International law, rightly understood, does not prohibit the use of these new weapons. The United States will not stop China from stealing its government personnel databases by appealing to common values, but by deploying equally effective offensive and defensive cyber weapons. Europeans will not force the United States to limit its drone campaign against terrorist leaders through legal arguments, but they could pressure Washington by refusing to cooperate with intelligence sharing and joint operations. In fact, limiting, and especially prohibiting, the use of robotic and cyber weapons could have perverse effects on the very goals of international law. If nations cannot employ new, more precise weapons, they will have to resort to traditional conventional warfare, using human soldiers and pilots in larger numbers with more destructive weapons. In addition to causing greater destruction, limits on new weapons will discourage nations from using force when the international system needs it most: to stop terrorism, human rights disasters, nuclear proliferation, and aggression. Perversely, banning new weapons out of a vague desire to make war harder to start will make war more destructive and harmful to the innocent—the very antithesis of the laws of war.

2022 Michigan Negative
**Disadvantages** › Terrorism DA › 2NC---DA---Terror---Link

A ban doesn’t stop great power usage of LAWs- terrorist groups will find a way to acquire them post-plan

Ware 19 [Jacob Ware (research associate at the Council on Foreign Relations), 9-24-2019, "Terrorist Groups, Artificial Intelligence, and Killer Drones," War on the Rocks, ] // st

Secondly, the international community could look to ban AI use in the military through an international treaty sanctioned by the United Nations. This has been the strategy pursued by activist groups such as the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots, while leading artificial intelligence researchers and scientific commentators have published open letters warning of the risk of weaponized AI. That said, great powers are not likely to refrain from AI weapons development, and a ban might outlaw positive uses of militarized AI. The international community could also look to stigmatize, or delegitimize, weaponized AI and lethal autonomous weapons sufficiently to deter terrorist use. Although modern terrorist groups have proven extremely willing to improvise and innovate, and effective at doing so, there is an extensive list of weapons — chemical weapons, biological weapons, cluster munitions, barrel bombs, and more — accessible to terrorist organizations, but rarely used. This is partly down to the international stigma associated with those munitions — if a norm is strong enough, terrorists might avoid using a weapon. However, norms take a long time to develop, and are fragile and untrustworthy solutions. Evidently, good counter-terrorism options are limited.

2022 Michigan Negative
**Disadvantages** › Terrorism DA › 2NC---DA---Terror---Link

LAWs are key to counter-terrorism

Iyengar and Miller 16 [SS Iyengar (Professor at the School of Computing and Information Sciences) and Jerry Miller (Lab member at Florida International University and a part of the US Air Force for over two decades), 8-6-2016, "Robots to counter terrorism: a brave new world?," Deccan Herald, ] // st

As early as 2009, organisations began calling for a pre-emptive ban on killer robots, when the International Committee for Robot Arms Control (ICRAC), founded by roboticists, ethicists, and others, issued a call to stop AI research that could lead to development of killer robots. Five years later, the European Parliament passed a resolution calling for a ban after more than 20 Nobel Peace Laureates issued a statement in favour of banning the robot. In the Third Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) held in Geneva from April 11 to 15, 2015, two high-ranking UN experts issued a report to the Human Rights Council calling for a moratorium on autonomous killer robots. By July 2015, the Future of Life Institute issued an open letter which more than 1,000 AI experts signed supporting a prohibition. Today, there is an active Human Rights Watch campaign to ban the development and use of these technologies. But are they fighting to turn back time? In 1863, English author Samuel Butler published an article, “Darwin among the machines,” arguing that “the machines will hold the real supremacy over the world and its inhabitants,” and further arguing that as a precaution, humans should return to the “primeval condition of the race.” Earlier, the Luddites ravaged English factories, destroying machines they feared were threatening their jobs. In the 17th century, during a period of intense seclusion, the Japanese went so far as to outlaw the use of firearms, which had been introduced into the country as early as 1270 from China, only to resume their use during the conflicts of the mid-1800s. Over the past few days, events in the United States demonstrate the short-sightedness of these actions while illustrating the benefits of the use of robots for law enforcement. After an intensive 45-minute shootout in Dallas, Texas, USA, two police officers lay dead and three others would die within hours from massive injuries received at the outset. An assassin was targeting police officers and terrorising a major US city. Police began negotiating with the sniper to no avail. After two-hours of intensive negotiations, the Dallas chief of police gave an order to neutralise the suspect by any means without risking more officer’s lives. The plan was ingenious. The SWAT team called upon the RemotecAndrox Mark V A-1 robot, manufactured by Northrup Gruman, to deliver a pound of high explosive C-4 directly against a wall on the second floor of the building behind which the sniper was cowered. The robot delivered its payload, completing its mission with only minor damage after the explosive charge ripped a hole in the wall, fragmenting the sniper. This ended the standoff and officially introduced robots as an anti-terrorist weapon. Robots can be mounted with a variety of sensors and tools for law enforcement. The A-1 generally carries a flashbang, a device that emits a bright light and loud sound to stun criminals. These robots can also place an explosive near a bomb in order to disarm it through the explosive discharge. But there are far more uses for the robot, as outlined on Northrup Grumman’s Remotec website based upon an assortment of accessories available. The robot can be affixed with a modified 12 gauge shotgun, which can also be used as a breaching tool; a gas can dispenser mount; a window breaker, a cable cutter; a variety of drills and saws, as well as real time x-ray machines, or mounts for the weapons launcher. Innovative new uses Interestingly, Northrup Grumman lists the Remotec Androx Mark V A-1 robot as, “ready to handle any situation at a moment’s notice.” Thankfully it was ready when called upon. Police departments across the United States, and around the world, are procuring the next generation of robots to make law enforcement safer, as criminals and terrorist employ innovative new uses for common items, such as passenger aircraft and explosives. One of the largest robots currently in the field is the BatCat—a 39,000-pound remote controlled vehicle used to lift cars, and tear into buildings, or barricaded areas. The BatCat (Bomb Assault Tactical Control Assessment Tool) is built upon Caterpillar’s Telehandler base and comes equipped with claw, forklift, and/or bucket in order to make a dynamic entry or respond to improvised explosive devices on vehicles. On the small end is the Recon Robotics Throwbot, which can run slightly ahead of a clearing team to provide valuable intelligence and pictures of potential threats. Weighing just 1.2 pounds, Throwbot can be thrown up to 120 feet (36m) in front of a police team. Directed by an operator receiving audio and video, Throwbot can also transmit infrared optical data of its surroundings. Autonomous and semi-autonomous robots are already involved in a multitude of missions against terrorists and criminals alike. Our safety, as well as that of the men and women who serve us in law enforcement, depends even more on the tools available to outwit the evil that surrounds us. While we accept the fact that technology must advance, we also must accept that all technologies can be used for both good and evil. We are a long way from autonomous robots using artificial intelligence to destroy humankind. At Florida International University (FIU) Discovery Lab, we are exploring robots for many real-time applications.

2022 Michigan Negative
**Disadvantages** › Terrorism DA › 2NC---DA---Terror---Link

LAWs are crucial for counter-terrorism efforts

Bento 15 [Lucas Bento (International lawyer with a degree from Columbia Law), 8-31-15, "Could Science Defeat Terrorism? Using Robots to Hunt Down ISIS," No Publication, ] // st

In a more practical sense, applied science, and particularly artificial intelligence, may provide more immediate tactical benefits. Enter killer robots, artificially intelligent lethal machines capable of selecting and engaging targets without human intervention. Killer robots have received considerable bad press in recent months. Many scientists, nongovernmental organizations, and states have called for a preemptive ban on their development and eventual use on the battlefield. They fear that lethal autonomous robots may increase the likelihood of war and could one day pose an existential threat to humankind. This anxiety is nothing new. In an article published in 1863 entitled “Darwin among the machines,” English writer Samuel Butler argued that the “the machines will hold the real supremacy over the world and its inhabitants.” The author recommended that as a precaution, mankind should return to the “primeval condition of the race.” Technophobic–or perhaps neophobic, the aversion to all things new–sentiments have ebbed and flowed throughout history, peaking at times when revolutionary technologies were introduced in society. Seventeenth century Japan rejected the use of firearms, then an “advanced military technology.” Nineteenth century England grappled with the Luddites, who smashed mechanical looms for fear of putting people out of work. In many ways, artificial intelligence is different because it raises unique issues about control, legitimacy, and accountability. But could the pessimistic prognoses about killer robots miss the forest for the trees? What if robots were used as partners of peace and promoters of global order and justice? Or, importantly, as terrorist hunters? The war on ISIS shows no end in sight. The group’s unrestrained campaign of violence in Iraq and Syria continues to reveal new shades of brutality. Its disregard for the well-being of humanity is unrivaled in the 21st century. I say “humanity” because ISIS’ political war is costing the lives of the innocent by using tactics that are perhaps best suited to earlier iterations of the human race. Rape, beheadings, torture. Repeat. But I could just as well say that the group has no respect for the “humanities,” the branch of human learning that studies human culture. ISIS’ iconoclastic crusade against Syrian and Iraqi cultural heritage is well documented, both by the group itself and the international community. The group’s obliteration of numerous World Heritage Sites, including the recent destruction of the Baalshamin temple in Palmyra, and of priceless cultural artifacts around the region are part of a systematic campaign to enforce their puritanical interpretation of Islam. For ISIS, cultural cleansing is necessary to wipe the slate clean and build a caliphate free from idolatry. As a commercial hub linking the Far East with the Roman Empire, the city of Palmyra marked “the crossroads of several civilizations in the ancient world.” Its destruction has been condemned as a “war crime” by UNESCO. Irina Bokova, UNESCO’s chief, deplored these actions as the “most brutal, systematic” destruction of cultural heritage since World War II. Enjoying this article? Click here to subscribe for full access. Just $5 a month. These ancient sites are symbols of humanity’s cultural history: a reminder of how the web of human relations intersect and knowledge flows interact. This is what makes ISIS particularly dangerous: not only are they murdering members of communities but also destroying the cultural foundations upon which such communities were built. Culture is not some whimsical collection of pretty paintings and table manners; it is a reflection and embodiment of social identity. Through language, art, music, knowledge, and religion we continuously give meaning to our social existence. By destroying these cultural anchors, ISIS is now on an ideological path that would make Hitler and Malan throw evil nods of approval. Earlier this year, Dario Franceschini, Italian Minister of Cultural Heritage and Tourism, called for the formation of a UN military force to protect the world’s cultural heritage. Killer robots would be particularly useful against groups like ISIS, where political costs are too high for major military powers to put boots on the ground, and political momentum too low to justify human military intervention to protect sites of cultural importance. In addition to using robots offensively to fight terrorists, robots could be used to promote peaceful objectives, such as protecting humanitarian convoys, refugee camps, schools, hospitals, and museums. First iterations will likely be semi-autonomous, featuring some level of human supervision and control. Once the technology is sufficiently capable of meeting the stringent standards of international humanitarian law, such as discriminating between combatants and civilians, as well as operational safety, such as recognizing friendly fire, greater autonomy may be delegated to the robot. ISIS may be defeated before killer robots ever see the light of day. But the value of autonomous lethal technology, operating within legal and morally sound grounds, cannot be underestimated to solve global security problems. Scientific advancements–and its evolving creations, like artificial intelligence–must be given serious thought as a bridge to peace, or at the very least as a weapon to defeat terror.

2022 Michigan Negative
**Disadvantages** › Terrorism DA › 2NC---DA---Terror---Link

Absent LAWs, the weapons are proliferated to terrorist organizations

Yoo and Rabkin 17 [John Yoo (A professor of Law at UC Berkeley) and Jeremy Rabkin {A professor of Law at George Mason University), 9-1-2017, "‘Killer Robots’ Can Make War Less Awful," American Enterprise Institute - AEI, ] // st

Robots won’t bring perfection to the use of force, but they can reduce mistakes, increase precision and lower overall destruction compared with their human counterparts. Some worry that autonomous weapons might prompt leaders to turn more readily to conflict. But decisions about war and peace have much more to do with political leaders and their choices than with the technology available to them. Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama had roughly the same military at their disposal, but they used it very differently. The greater risk today isn’t that the U.S. will intervene impulsively but that it won’t intervene at all, allowing serious challenges to intensify. Robotic weapons can ease the dilemma. In World War II, the Allies leveled cities, at enormous human cost, to destroy Axis transportation and manufacturing facilities. Drones today can strike an arms factory, pick off terrorists or destroy nuclear-weapons sites while leaving neighboring structures and civilians untouched. Robotic weapons can reduce the costs that discourage the U.S. and its allies from intervening in humanitarian disasters or civil wars. Even if we shared the apocalyptic worries of Mr. Musk and his allies, it isn’t at all clear that arms control could begin to deal with the problem. Arms control has mostly failed to prevent weapons innovation, from the crossbow to the nuclear bomb. Nations have had more success in imposing rules of warfare, especially to protect civilians, than in restricting specific weapons. Robotics and AI will be even harder to control. Countries already hide their nuclear-weapons programs behind claims of scientific research or energy production. The technology involved in autonomous weapons is a classic instance of “dual use,” with obvious peaceful applications. The same technology that can produce a self-driving car can also drive an autonomous tank. A drone can just as easily deliver a bomb as a box from Amazon . A ban on military development would be almost impossible to verify. Such limits would also be a serious handicap for the U.S. The new technology is most likely to benefit countries with the technical dynamism and the innovative drive to deploy them broadly. Restraining their development seems likely to cancel an American advantage over our authoritarian rivals and terrorist enemies. Tech executives may worry that consumers will come to associate their products with war. But responsible governments buy weapons and wage wars for good reasons, such as self-defense, coming to the assistance of allies, pursuing terrorists and alleviating humanitarian disasters. If force is misused, we should blame our elected leaders, not the weapons.

2022 Michigan Negative
**Disadvantages** › Terrorism DA › 2NC---DA---Terror---UQ

ISIS is weak now but gaining strength

TW: includes statistics regarding suicide bombings and attacks

Sagramoso 20 [Dr. Domitilla Sagramoso (Senior Lecturer in Security and Development. Expert on Russian foreign and security policy, with a particular focus on Islamist-jihadist violence in the Russian North Caucasus. Her research examines the dynamics of terrorist violence in the North Caucasus region and Central Asia. She also studies in detail Russia’s actions in the former Soviet space in the military, economic and institutional spheres. This analysis is carried out within the framework of ‘Hegemony’ and ‘Neo-Empire’ theories of International Relations), 5-6-2020, "Who ‘Defeated’ ISIS? An Analysis of US and Russian Contributions," ] // st

ISIS: Down but Not Out While there is little doubt that ISIS had by the summer of 2019 lost control over most, if not all, of its territorial “caliphate,” it is also clear that the group has not been fully defeated, strategically or militarily. In the past two years we have seen ISIS once again become an insurgency group engaged in hit-and-run tactics and brutal terrorist attacks not only around the globe but also in areas supposedly liberated by U.S.-led coalition forces in Iraq and Syria. Between the summer of 2018 and late March 2019, ISIS carried out at least 250 attacks in areas outside its control in Syria, according to . In Iraq, the numbers seem to be much higher:  by the Combating Terrorism Center identified 1,271 attacks there by ISIS in the first months of 2018 alone, including a twin suicide bombing in Baghdad that left 38 dead and over 100 wounded. Other notable attacks in Iraq in the past two years have included  at the funeral of anti-ISIS militiamen, which killed 16, a  on a soccer field near Kirkuk, which killed six, and  last September, which killed 12. This year ISIS fighters have continued the onslaught,  with a roadside bomb in April and  near the Syrian border in January. Inside Syria itself ISIS’ most prominent recent attacks include: a series of coordinated suicide bombings in the southwestern region of Suwayda in July 2018, which killed over 200 people; a January 2019  at a restaurant frequented by U.S. military personnel in Manbij, which , including four Americans; and  in Hasakah province in July 2019. This February, according to one Syrian NGO  news website, ISIS and other groups carried out 53 attacks in SDF territory in the country’s northeast, “mostly targeted killings and home invasions” in the regions of Deir ez-Zor and Raqqa. In addition to staging attacks, the terror group’s fighters and supporters are dispersed across both countries, “reconstituting key capabilities” since late 2018, ; a recent concurred, saying that ISIS—also known as ISIL and IS—has now “solidified its insurgent capabilities in Iraq” and is also “resurgent in Syria.” ISIS fighters have taken refuge in Iraq’s “most forbidding terrain,”2 where government control is tenuous at best, “including mountains and caves, remote desert, orchards, river groves and islands,” as well as in “destroyed and abandoned villages,” according to , or ICG.3 (An attempt to clear ISIS militants out of one such area, a cave complex, in Iraq  to this year’s first U.S. troop fatalities in the anti-ISIS battle.) Likewise, ISIS fighters are present in Syria: in the open expanses of its central Badiya desert, finding shelter in its “rocky outcroppings and caves” and launching regular attacks against exposed Syrian military positions, but also in Raqqa and Hasakah provinces, where ISIS is believed to have a sophisticated clandestine network and has conducted more “complex and ambitious attacks.”4 ,5 as of 2019 ISIS had also established a rural network of support on the outskirts of Idlib province, now the last bastion of anti-regime forces in Syria, which Damascus has been trying to retake for months with Russian support. However, while many ISIS militants fled to the province after March 2019, the terror group’s presence in Idlib has been “low-key,” in the , as Idlib is  by , in particular an anti-ISIS , or HTS. Some of the  have been supported by Turkey, whose , coupled with  from the area, has only served to further strengthen ISIS’ capabilities in this Middle Eastern region, according to a .

2022 Michigan Negative
**Disadvantages** › Terrorism DA › 2NC---DA---Terror---UQ

Terrorism decreasing now

Institute for Economics & Peace 6/11 [Institute for Economics & Peace (Chaired by technology entrepreneur Steve Killelea founder of IR, IEP is a global think tank headquartered in Sydney, Australia with branches in New York City, Mexico City and Oxford. IEP develops conceptual frameworks to define peacefulness, providing metrics for measurement, uncovering the relationship between peace, business, and prosperity, and seeking to promote understanding of the cultural, economic, and political factors that drive peacefulness). Global Peace Index 2022: Measuring Peace in a Complex World, Sydney, June 11, 2022. Available from: ] // st

On a more positive note, there were substantial improvements for the scores for a number of indicators, including terrorism impact, nuclear and heavy weapons, deaths from internal conflict, military expenditure, incarceration rates and perceptions of criminality. Terrorism impact is now at its best level in six years. The violent demonstration indicator also improved in 2022, albeit marginally. This is in contrast to the trend since 2008, which has seen the indicator deteriorate by 49.6 per cent. The biggest improvements in 2022 in the violent demonstrations indicator were in recorded in Iceland, Romania and Ecuador, while the largest deteriorations were seen in Kazakhstan, Papua New Guinea and Rwanda. Iceland remains the world’s most peaceful nation, a position it has held since the first iteration of the GPI. Afghanistan is the world’s least peaceful country for the fifth consecutive year. Denmark and Slovenia were the only countries to fall in rankings out of the ten most peaceful countries, driven by deteriorations in violent demonstrations and other indicators. Over the history of the GPI high peace countries scores have remained consistently good, highlighting how Positive Peace underpins the necessary resilience to maintain high levels of peace.