**Disadvantages** › Terrorism DA › 2NC---DA---Nuke Terror---AT: Wouldn’t Use / McIntosh and Storey
(Mark, PoliSci@MIT, AssistProfPoliSci@Minnesota, Defending the “Acquisition-Use Presumption” in Assessing the Likelihood of Nuclear Terrorism, International Studies Quarterly)
In their recent article in International Studies Quarterly, McIntosh and Storey (2018, 289) criticize existing analyses for falling prey to an “acquisition-use presumption” that “assumes that once a terrorist group acquires a nuclear weapon, it will, at some point, attempt to detonate it.” Instead, they argue that “a nuclear terrorist attack is the least likely outcome—even for terrorist groups with nuclear capability.” McIntosh and Storey (2018, 289, 296–97) identify three reasons why terrorist organizations would be unlikely to detonate a nuclear weapon even if they acquired one. First, they point to “many options available to a terrorist group” other than detonating a nuclear weapon. Second, “terrorist organizations are not unitary, homogenous organizations” and must maintain “the continued support of . . . multiple audiences” such as funders and state sponsors, as well as individuals within the organization. These organizational dynamics should be expected to reduce the likelihood of a nuclear attack by a terrorist organization, even if it has acquired nuclear weapons. Third, scholars “conflate capitulation and surrender” because a nuclear attack would likely increase threats to the terrorist organization. These arguments, however, are ultimately unpersuasive. The acquisition-use presumption remains a valid basis for theorizing about the probability of nuclear terrorism.1 Alternatives to a Nuclear Attack McIntosh and Storey (2018, 292–93) identify a range of options for a terrorist organization that has acquired nuclear weapons. Drawing on the literature on the ways that states use nuclear weapons, they highlight four potentially attractive strategies for a terrorist organization with a nuclear weapon. First, a terrorist organization could pursue “ambiguity,” in which a terrorist organization “neither publicly identifies the conditions triggering nuclear attack nor publicizes acquiring the weapon.” “Latency,” the second option, requires a terrorist organization to “keep its capacity covert, but publicly state conditions under which it would employ a nuclear weapon.” A third possibility, “opacity,” occurs when an organization “admits a nuclear capacity but does not identify conditions resulting in an attack.” The fourth option, “blackmail,” involves an organization making “specific nuclear threats to achieve an outcome.” McIntosh and Storey (2018) conclude that “there is always a myriad of options that remain available” other than detonating a nuclear weapon and that nuclear weapons are “much more effectively used, paradoxically, when [they] remain holstered.” These strategies, however, are unlikely to appeal to a terrorist organization with a nuclear weapon. A terrorist organization with a nuclear weapon that adopts a strategy of ambiguity neither acknowledges its nuclear capability nor the circumstances in which it might use it; as McIntosh and Storey (2018, 292, 289) say, nuclear weapons are “not utilized directly.” If so, ambiguity merely provides the terrorist organization with the option of future operational or political use. If that future use involves a nuclear detonation, then the acquisition-use presumption, that the terrorist organization “will, at some point, attempt to detonate [its nuclear weapon]” remains valid. If that future use does not involve a nuclear detonation, then the attractiveness of the strategy of ambiguity depends on the attractiveness of potential future options other than detonation. The other strategies that McIntosh and Storey (2018) identify—latency, opacity, and blackmail—involve the terrorist organization revealing (to some degree) its nuclear capabilities and seeking to gain political utility from nuclear weapons without detonating them, through deterrence or compellence (or both).2 McIntosh and Storey (2018) are correct that states have generally sought political benefits from possessing rather than directly using nuclear weapons.3 However, terrorist organization would find it far harder than states, which are better positioned to reap deterrent or compellent benefits from the possession of nuclear weapons, to gain political benefits from merely possessing nuclear weapons. First, a terrorist organization with nuclear weapons would be in a more vulnerable position than any state with respect to its nuclear weapons. Even newly nuclear-armed states typically possess numerous nuclear weapons, a range of facilities in which weapons and delivery capabilities can be held, military resources to protect facilities and weapons, and control of the territory in which those weapons are being held. These capabilities substantially reduce a state’s vulnerability to having its nuclear capabilities attacked and destroyed militarily and allow a state to achieve political goals without detonating its nuclear capabilities. A terrorist organization’s nuclear arsenal, by contrast, would likely be more vulnerable. Terrorist organizations do, of course, vary substantially in terms of their resources, military capabilities, and control over territory; terrorist organizations with more resources, capabilities, and territorial control would be better able to protect their nuclear capabilities. For example, an organization holding substantial territory, such as the Islamic State at the height of its power, would have a better chance of protecting nuclear weapons. Nonetheless, even an extremely well-resourced, sophisticated terrorist organization is likely to have a far more vulnerable nuclear arsenal than a weak state. Just assembling a single gun-type nuclear device (the crudest and easiest type of nuclear weapon to build) would be a remarkable technological achievement for any terrorist organization, and even scholars concerned about nuclear terrorism conclude that “an attack by nonstate terrorists using an actual nuclear explosive—self-made or stolen—would clearly be among the most difficult types of attack to carry out” (Bunn and Weir 2006, 133–34). A terrorist organization would not be able to produce highly enriched uranium or plutonium (which require operating a nuclear reactor or uranium enrichment technologies such as centrifuges); would not be able to manufacture substantial numbers of nuclear weapons; would not have a large cadre of nuclear engineers, scientists, and metallurgists at its disposal; and generally would not have a large range of facilities or the military capabilities to protect them from attack by powerful states.4 Even the most sophisticated terrorist organization’s nuclear arsenal would, therefore, be more vulnerable than the nuclear arsenal of a weak state. This vulnerability has important consequences for the incentives facing a terrorist organization with nuclear weapons. A terrorist organization with a nuclear weapon would face an extreme version of the “use-them-or-lose-them” incentives that states with vulnerable nuclear arsenals face: to “posture [its] forces for an early use . . . before its nuclear option is curtailed” (Feaver 1992/1993, 165). Similarly, a terrorist organization with a vulnerable arsenal would face strong incentives to use its nuclear weapons to avoid having the opportunity to use them taken away (Van de Velde 2010, 685). Second, states can gain political leverage from nuclear weapons without using them in a direct military attack because a state revealing its nuclear capabilities does not reduce the weapons’ potency or the state’s ability to use them. As Gartzke and Lindsay argue, “nuclear actors can openly advertise their weapons to signal the costs of aggression to potential adversaries” (2017, 37). This is partly because states can protect their nuclear assets, as discussed above. However, additionally, states have generally relied on military technologies to deliver nuclear weapons that are (to differing degrees) difficult to defend against: military aircraft, land-based missiles, or submarine-launched missiles. Indeed, the fact that nuclear weapons delivered by missile or aircraft are difficult to defend against regardless of knowledge of an adversary’s capabilities is at the core of arguments about the stabilizing effects of nuclear weapons on international politics.5 A terrorist organization, however, has much stronger incentives to maintain secrecy about its nuclear capability. As discussed, a terrorist organization cannot protect its nuclear assets to the same degree as a state. In addition, a terrorist organization would likely employ crude methods of delivery such as a truck or a ship navigated into a port rather than the sophisticated delivery technologies available to states (Bunn 2010, 16). Such methods of delivery are far easier to defend against than those employed by states if the defender has knowledge of the attacker’s capabilities or intentions. As a result, any sort of disclosure by a terrorist organization reduces the potency of its nuclear arsenal. For example, if a state knew that a terrorist organization had a nuclear device, it would have a wide range of counterterrorism policy tools at its disposal to reduce the likelihood of a successful terrorist attack. For example, a state could shut down border crossings, increase security at potential target sites, activate intelligence assets within the terrorist organization, share intelligence with other states, or pursue assassinations or other kinetic operations (Ganor 2006). Terrorist organizations, therefore, have greater incentives for secrecy, thereby reducing the feasibility of them achieving political leverage from possessing nuclear weapons without using them directly in a nuclear attack. This, in turn, increases the attractiveness of detonation relative to any other strategy. Third, for a terrorist organization seeking to gain political leverage from possessing nuclear weapons, it must first persuade the world that it has a capability that no previous terrorist organization has previously acquired. States may reasonably doubt such claims by a terrorist organization. First, no terrorist organization has previously acquired nuclear weapons. And second, responding to a nuclear threat from a terrorist organization by granting concessions would set a precedent that other organizations could exploit. Of course, states can unambiguously demonstrate their nuclear capabilities using public and observable nuclear tests because they can replenish their nuclear arsenals; states with uranium-enrichment or plutonium-reprocessing capabilities can easily produce more fissile material. Terrorists are unlikely to have these capabilities and would therefore have a fixed, finite quantity of nuclear materials; any sort of public nuclear test is, therefore, costlier for a terrorist organization than for a state. The United States during World War II provides the closest example of a state facing these constraints. As (Schelling 1982, 67) notes, when the United States “had a very small capability to produce nuclear bombs . . . the possibility of a harmless detonation in an unpopulated place was considered but rejected.” A terrorist organization with a nuclear weapon would face the same incentives as the United States faced in 1945—a small arsenal and limited fissile material, a world potentially skeptical of any claim to have acquired a revolutionary new capability, and defenders potentially capable of interfering with an attack. A terrorist organization in this position would likely conclude, as the United States did in 1945, that “the weapons couldn’t be wasted on a remote battlefield . . . [N]o warning [could be] given that might have allowed interference with the demonstration” (Schelling 1982, 67). This is not to say that terrorist organizations might never seek to demonstrate their capabilities prior to detonating a nuclear weapon in an attack, but such demonstrations are much costlier, and thus less attractive, for terrorist organizations than states. In sum, states can generally protect their nuclear arsenals from attack, can deliver nuclear weapons regardless of actions by adversaries, and can disclose their capabilities without reducing their potency. This makes it plausible for them to use nuclear weapons for deterrence or compellence— gaining political utility from their nuclear weapons without directly using them. While terrorist organizations vary substantially, and some may even approximate some of the capabilities of states on some dimensions, their nuclear arsenals would likely be more vulnerable, their delivery methods cruder, and their incentives for secrecy greater than states. Gaining political leverage from nuclear weapons without using them is more difficult in such circumstances. As a result, a terrorist organization with nuclear weapons would be unlikely to find the strategies that McIntosh and Storey (2018) identify feasible or attractive. Organizational Dynamics While McIntosh and Storey’s (2018) first argument is that a nuclear attack would be a poor strategic choice for a rational terrorist organization, their second argument does not assume that terrorist organizations are unitary, rational actors. As the literature has increasingly recognized, organizational dynamics and intragroup politics shed light on the behavior of terrorist and insurgent organizations.6 For example, terrorist organizations are composed of multiple suborganizations that may have their own interests and incentives distinct from those of the larger organization; have links to other organizations and are embedded within broader societal structures; must maintain the support of individuals within the organization; and must maintain the support of external audiences such as funders or states. McIntosh and Storey (2018, 296–97) argue that these organizational dynamics reduce the validity of the acquisition-use presumption. They argue that (1) “there could be divisiveness [within the organization] regarding themost effective use of the weapon,” (2) “a nuclear attack would exponentially raise the threat to each individual who composes the extended organization,” (3) “transgressing the longstanding nuclear taboo would have dramatic and negative effects on broader public support,” and (4) any “host state/government will likely be much less committed to the survival of the terrorist group” if it conducted a nuclear attack. However, if these arguments should reduce our estimate of the likelihood of nuclear terrorism, it is not because the acquisition-use presumption is faulty.7 Rather, these arguments reduce the probability of a terrorist organization acquiring nuclear weapons in the first place.8 If there are organizational rifts about the utility of using nuclear weapons, an organization will find it hard to generate internal support for a decision to acquire nuclear weapons. If individual members of the terrorist organization fear the consequences of nuclear use, they are likely to resist the acquisition of a nuclear weapon. And if a terrorist organization relies on support from a state that would oppose its use of nuclear weapons, the state has incentives to prevent the terrorist organization from acquiring nuclear weapons in the first place. For example, Pakistan may support numerous terrorist organizations including Lashkar-e-Taiba, Jaish-e-Mohammad, or the Haqqani network (Byman 2005, chap. 6; Fair 2011; 2014, chap. 9) but has strong incentives not to allow such organizations to acquire nuclear weapons (Lieber and Press 2013, 93–95). McIntosh and Storey’s (2018) arguments about the organizational politics of terrorist organizations actually reinforce the logic of the acquisition-use presumption via selection effects: the particular terrorist organizations able to overcome these issues to acquire nuclear weapons are also likely to be those able to overcome them in the decision to detonate nuclear weapons.9 As Schelling argues, only an organization of “high professional quality and excellent organization and discipline” would be able to acquire nuclear weapons (1982, 65). Selection effects also reinforce the acquisition-use assumption through mechanisms other than organizational politics. Groups with ideologies and goals that might incentivize acquiring nuclear weapons— such as those with apocalyptic worldviews or a desire for mass-casualty terrorism, like Al Qaeda or the Japanese cult Aum Shinrikyo—will also be those most inclined to use nuclear weapons after acquiring them and best able to enforce ideological discipline among their members. In short, the terrorist organizations that have the motivation, discipline, and capability to acquire nuclear weapons would be least subject to the dynamics that McIntosh and Storey (2018) identify as a constraint on nuclear use. The Escalatory Potential of an Attack Finally, McIntosh and Storey (2018, 297) argue that “assuming nuclear attack is inevitable postacquisition conflates capitulation and surrender.” As they argue, “it is certainly the case that [a terrorist organization] utilizing threats and violence can sometimes shift a target state’s policy,” but this does “not necessarily end the threat to [its] organization.” A nuclear attack, in short, could worsen the threats a terrorist organization faces. It certainly seems likely that a terrorist organization would “be subjected to heavier attacks than ever before” if it successfully detonated a nuclear weapon in an attack. This is not, however, a persuasive argument against the acquisition-use presumption. First, terrorist organizations often undertake attacks that increase the threats they face. Indeed, terrorist or insurgent organizations often deliberately seek to escalate a confrontation with a state; scholars have long understood the logic of “provocation” or “outbidding” strategies by groups competing for recruits, resources, or notoriety.10 Al Qaeda, for example, sought to provoke the United States into a costly and destructive war using the 9/11 attacks, with Osama bin Laden boasting that the United States had been “easy for us to provoke” (Kydd and Walter 2006, 71). Other terrorist organizations such as Hamas or Shining Path have sought to “outbid” other terrorist organizations to demonstrate that they are “zealots rather than sellouts” (Kydd and Walter 2006, 76). For a terrorist organization seeking provocation, escalation, or outbidding, it is hard to imagine a better way to achieve those goals than a nuclear attack. The argument that a nuclear attack would lead to the escalation of hostilities does not, therefore, support the conclusion that a terrorist organization with a nuclear weapon would not seek to conduct a nuclear attack. Second, the claim that a nuclear attack would cause significant blowback only undermines the acquisition-use presumption if other strategies a terrorist organization could employ with nuclear weapons would not result in significant blowback. However, as discussed above, the other strategies that McIntosh and Storey (2018) identify are unlikely to be attractive to a terrorist organization. More importantly, to the extent that other strategies are attractive, they are also likely to result in significant blowback from states. For example, as Van de Velde (2010, 685) argues, if Al Qaeda sought to gain political leverage from its nuclear weapons without using them, it would be faced with overwhelming “pressure, airstrikes, troop movements, alliances, and alike to find the weapon.” This, as discussed above, would increase the incentives for a terrorist organization to use a nuclear weapon in an attack before its ability to do so is destroyed.