2022
Michigan
Negative
**Counterplans** › Regulations CP › 1NC---CP--- Regulations—K Version
Jones, 21 [Emily Jones is a Lecturer in Law at the University of Essex, 2018, Human Rights Clinic at the University of Essex, accessed on 6-21-2022, “A Posthuman-Xenofeminist Analysis of the Discourse on Autonomous Weapons Systems and Other Killing Machines” http://repository.essex.ac.uk/21540/7/E.%20Jones%2C%20posthumanxenofeminist%20autonomous%20weapons.pdf]/ISEE
Despite current trends in military technologies and the ways in which machines are already helping to make life/death decisions, neither algorithmic ‘independence’, nor AI which decides to kill, nor any type of superhuman soldier would be covered under a pre-emptive ban of autonomous weapons. On the other hand, a posthuman approach to autonomous weapons would recognise the connections between the human and the machine. Such an approach would not fixate on autonomy but would instead work to break down the false dichotomies between autonomy-automation and human-machine, instead focusing on the ethical implications of killer systems across these lines.147 As noted above, whilst xenofeminism and posthuman feminism understand the dangers as well as the potentials of technology, xenofeminism in particular does not account for the power of militarism and the militarism-capitalism assemblage. It seems, therefore, that the risks of the technologymilitarism-capitalism assemblage need to be further read into xenofeminism to ensure that it stays true to its own aims of using and appropriating technology to construct an intersectional feminist future. Braidotti’s posthumanism pays attention to death and modes of dying while promoting an affirmative posthuman era in the face of the necropolitical.148 In contrast to the necropolitical politics of death itself,149 Braidotti proposes ‘a politics of life itself’150 which chooses to tackle the obstacles of the posthuman condition as they come. She thus states: It is a constant challenge for us to rise to the occasion, to be ‘worthy of our times’, while resisting them, and thus to practise amor fati affirmatively. It is quite demanding to catch the wave of life’s intensities in a secular manner and ride on it, exposing the boundaries or limits as we transgress them... Death is the ultimate transposition, though it is not final, as zoe carries on, relentlessly.151 It seems hard, however, to read autonomous weapons in the affirmative when weapons technologies kill people in ever more removed and de-personalised ways. Autonomous weapons, are/will be the child of the military economy. As Braidotti notes, however, to analyse in the affirmative is not to deny the horror of our times. Affirmation ‘proposes a different way of dealing with’ such horrors.152 I propose that xenofeminism provides an affirmative blueprint for embracing the current times. I have noted how xenofeminist method works to appropriate technology and existing political structures, bending them to feminist aims. 153 While the current form of xenofeminism does not fully account for the links between technology and militarism, this does not mean that xenofeminism cannot accommodate such concerns. Xenofeminist method is an affirmative approach in that it notes the contradictions and risks in the posthuman condition and works to deconstruct them. Thus, taking an affirmative posthuman-xenofeminist perspective, one which understands the ways in which the human and the machine are deeply interconnected, I wish to use xenofeminist method – the appropriation of technology for feminist aims – to propose a posthuman-xenofeminist discourse on autonomous weapons. While the XFM does not explicitly address the threat to life technology could pose, the wish to define and use technology for feminist aims, I have already suggested, inherently includes the wish to ensure that technology remains ethical. Taking this further, it is important to note that anti-militarism is a key part of the feminist project as exemplified by the Women’s Peace Conference of 1915, to the feminist activism of Greenham Common to the ways in which Haraway, in her early foundational works, highlighted anti-militarism as a key feminist project.154 While there are many feminists who do not promote an anti-violence stance, choosing to fight as part of their feminism, for example, this does not preclude an anti-militarism stance in the realm of military technologies.155 Neither does an anti-militarism stance in this area wish to judge those who engage in fighting as part of their feminist project as ‘not feminists’, nor to associate feminism inherently with peace. Rather, in noting the history of anti-militarism within the international feminist project, I wish to suggest that there is a need to promote an ethics of anti-militarism at the international structural level. This is precisely because of the ways in which militarism structures the global order, working to structure technological innovation and development alongside forces such as capitalism, colonialism and other power structures. Such a stance must therefore be contrasted to more contextual scenarios, where fighting may indeed be the best form of feminist response. In this sense, anti-militarism must be distinguished from an anti-violence position, with anti-militarism aiming to challenge the industrial, technologically crafted, capitalist driven military complex and with an antiviolence position calling more broadly for peace and non-violence. It thus follows, given the links between militarism, technological advancements and capitalism, that xenofeminism, as a project aiming to appropriate technology for feminist aims, must have regard for antimilitarism. A xenofeminist appropriation of technology must therefore include the desire to ensure that the technology of the now and future cannot be used either for military gains or for the taking of human or nonhuman life.156 Xenofeminist method provides an affirmative method for dealing with the current times and the issue of military technologies. Drawing on the will to appropriate technology for feminist aims and to create the future from the present, manipulating, hacking and coding the system, it seems that the appropriation of technology includes ensuring that technology can only be developed in ethical ways. Technology is dependent on a set of programming choices which will shape machine intelligence as technology advances. What choices are made now, what programming choices are made in these current times, could structure the entire future of technology and machine intelligence. There is a need for feminist posthuman perspectives and xenofeminist infiltrations now. The xenofeminists know well that it matters who makes those programming choices. As Haraway puts it, ‘it matters which figures figure figures, which systems systematize systems’.157 Noting that ‘technology isn’t inherently progressive’, the xenofeminists call for an intervention in these choices.158 While intelligent machines could indeed be the end of humanity, such machines may not make such choices. It is important to get the now right in the hope of working towards a future where the machine-human can work together ethically. As Haraway notes, ‘the machine is use, our processes, an aspect of our embodiment. We can be responsible for machines: they do not dominate or threaten us. We are responsible for boundaries; we are they’.159 The XFM advocates the infiltration of multiple discourses.160 I propose this could include law. I have argued that the discourse on autonomous weapons needs to be made posthuman, emphasising the links between the machine and the human and the ways in which seeing the autonomous weapon as the machinic other is a fallacy. Xenofeminist method calls for the appropriation of technology to promote, in Braidotti’s terms, affirmative aims: constructing the future from the now. While many of the groups calling for a legal ban of autonomous weapons may be overlooking some of the nuances in the debate and definitions, their larger goal – to seek legal frameworks to regulate these systems – is an aim which can remain useful. After all, legal regulation is a core manner in which profit-making tech creators may be forced to shape their innovations in ethical ways. In other words, a xenofeminist method may include not only the appropriation of technology itself but also the frameworks which regulate it. These frameworks are key in structuring future developments of technology, and thus work to appropriate technology through structuring the creation of technology from the outset. In line with xenofeminist method, therefore, I propose that a legal framework is needed to ensure that feminist ethics of anti-militarism, justice and intersectionality remain central to technological innovation. A feminist posthuman understanding of technology is required here: to ensure that the dark sides of technology are evaded whilst technology’s positive, subjectivity challenging and capitalism destroying potential is maintained. There is a need to focus on the regulation of all technologies, given the real possibility that killer machines may be created in multiple ways. There have been steps in other contexts towards creating broader ethical regulations for technology. This can be seen in the example of the European Parliament resolution of 16 February 2017, which makes recommendations to the Commission on Civil Law Rules on Robotics.161 The resolution is well thought out, considering a variety of issues around the legal regulation of technology and noting issues around liability, care robots, autonomous vehicles and privacy issues.162 The resolution calls for the urgent need to regulate technologies.163 While the resolution opens up debate on these issues, it is non-binding and seeks to regulate non-military technologies, thus upholding a false binary between military and civil technologies despite the clear cross-overs. As noted above, many civil technologies are originally created for military purposes, and there also remains a risk that civil intelligent technologies may decide to kill or may be easily adapted to make them kill.164 In addition, the resolution does not consider human enhancement technologies despite emerging developments in this area. This trend towards focusing on the immediate present and towards categorising military and non-military technologies separately is repeated throughout legal and policy attempts to regulate these technologies. There is an urgent need for a posthumanxenofeminist infiltration of the discussions around the legal regulation of technology, working to promote a future-facing feminist posthuman perspective which understands the cross-overs between civil and military technologies, the human and the machine, and autonomy and automation. While technology may be largely controlled at present by a capitalist elite with strong ties to militarism, this does not mean this technology will inevitably remain in their hands and under their control. By ensuring that basic ethical principles are applied now, through the application of laws to regulate programming choices and technological innovation in the present, technology can be shaped, working towards a post capitalist, fairer, more ethical and just, feminist world.
2022
Michigan
Negative
**Counterplans** › Patriot PIC › 2NC---CP---Patriot PIC---NB---Interoperability
Perkovich and Vaddi, 21 [George Perkovich PhD, University of Virginia is the Ken Olivier and Angela Nomellini Chair and vice president for studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, overseeing the Technology and International Affairs Program and Nuclear Policy Program, and Pranay Vaddi was a fellow in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, January 21, 2021, accessed on 6-27-2022, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, "Ballistic Missile Defenses - Proportionate Deterrence: A Model Nuclear Posture Review", https://carnegieendowment.org/2021/01/21/ballistic-missile-defenses-pub-83582]/ISEE
U.S. missile defenses, like nuclear forces, come in various forms, with different capabilities, objectives, costs, and reactions from allies and adversaries. The capabilities and footprint of U.S. missile defense have expanded continually over the past twenty years. Today, they have attained a global reach, increased technological capability, priority in defense budgets, and adoption by U.S. allies. (Appendix B contains a record of U.S. missile defense tests for Aegis and Ground-Based Midcourse Defense systems, perhaps the most relevant defensive systems to adversary nuclear postures.) Still, the technical functionality of missile defenses against modern missile forces is unknown. The United States has not used missile defenses against a nuclear-armed adversary. Nor have Israel’s vaunted air defenses been used against advanced cruise or ballistic missiles. Forward-deployed missile defenses—interceptors based on land and on ships with warning and communications assets—play a role in regional deterrence, defending allies and partners, U.S. forces, and critical military and civilian installations on foreign territory. The United States uses basing arrangements and foreign military sales to encourage interoperability and information-sharing among allies to improve the effectiveness of their missile defenses.1 Missile defenses on and near U.S. territory are supposed to defend the U.S. homeland from ballistic missile attacks of the scale that North Korea might be able to launch. In both scenarios, U.S. missile defense can contribute to defeating and deterring conventionally and nuclear-armed missile attacks, whether targeted at American cities or U.S. nuclear and military forces. Because the focus of this review is nuclear policy, its analysis and recommendations focus on three conundrums that missile defenses could pose to managing and reducing nuclear threats. U.S. regional missile defense arrangements include theater missile defense systems, such as Patriot and THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense), that are designed for terminal and “point” defense. These systems are better suited for protecting smaller areas where important military installations and critical infrastructure may be located. Longer-range systems, such as Aegis, also contribute to regional missile defense architectures, operating off the coasts of U.S. allies in Europe and Asia. In Europe, NATO allies host a radar site in Turkey, a command center in Germany, and an Aegis Ashore site where Aegis SM-3 interceptors are deployed on land in Romania with a planned second site in Poland, as part of the European Phased Adaptive Approach.2 In Asia, the United States has deployed THAAD radars and launchers in Guam, Hawaii, and South Korea.3 All of these systems are intended to protect U.S. allies as well as U.S. forces stationed on allied territories. Notwithstanding the primary missions of deterring and countering North Korean and Iranian missile threats, U.S. military planners and contractors also envision these systems’ potential role in interdicting Russian or Chinese conventional and nuclear attacks on targets in Europe and East Asia. For instance, the 2019 Missile Defense Review (MDR) states that “missile defense is an element of the U.S. effort to counter A2/AD [antiaccess/area denial] strategies that seek to deter or prevent the United States from supporting allies in contested regions,” implicitly suggesting that missile defense will blunt Russian and Chinese attacks associated with their strategies for regional conflicts.4 The November 2020 test of the SM-3 against an ICBM target deepened Russia’s and China’s suspicions that U.S. missile defenses will be directed against them.5 As the presence of Aegis ships and land installations increase, Russia and China may further lose confidence in the efficacy of their ballistic missiles. In 2017, China reacted harshly (including an economic boycott) to the deployment of THAAD radars in South Korea, claiming the system could help target Chinese ICBMs. These dynamics raise two conundrums at the regional level. First, the United States has insisted that regional defenses intended to deter or block North Korean or Iranian attacks do not pose threats to Russian and Chinese strategic nuclear deterrents. But Moscow and Beijing profess not to believe these statements. To the extent that Russia and/or China add offensive capabilities to counter such defenses, would the benefits of defenses against regional Iranian and/or North Korean missiles outweigh the costs? Second, the United States also seeks increased capabilities to defend its forward-deployed forces and allies and partners from Russian and Chinese regional missiles. These capabilities are especially important in East Asia, where China has steadily increased its arsenal of short- to medium-range conventionally armed and dual-capable missiles. Here the major conundrum is that it is easier and cheaper for China to add missiles of this range than it is for the United States to add defenses to feasibly counter them. Moreover, kinetic and perhaps cyber capabilities to target Chinese missiles and their command and control systems could intentionally or inadvertently attack (or be perceived to attack) Chinese nuclear command and control. This could exacerbate risks of escalating a regional conventional war into a nuclear one. That concern notwithstanding, such antimissile capabilities also could strengthen deterrence. The third set of conundrums involves U.S. homeland defenses against ballistic missiles, and the likelihood that they drive Russia and China to increase their arsenals of long-range missiles and warheads. When the United States withdrew from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty in June 2002, the stated reason was the need to develop and deploy systems that could defend the U.S. homeland from attack by future North Korean and Iranian ballistic missiles. This reasoning remains the stated objective of homeland missile defenses. Although Iran still does not possess missiles that could reach the United States, North Korea has tested several types of missiles that could improve its capabilities.6 For its part, to potentially counter this threat, the United States still deploys only a little more than half the number of missile interceptors on its territory that it would have been allowed had it remained under the ABM Treaty’s maximum of 100. The Ground-Based Midcourse Defense System (GMD) centered on these interceptors in Alaska and California cannot singlehandedly defeat a concerted missile attack from Russia or China. The 2019 MDR acknowledges this fact, stating “the United States relies on deterrence to protect against large and technically sophisticated Russian and Chinese intercontinental ballistic missile threats to the U.S. homeland.”7 Yet the MDR also states “in the event of conflict, it [GMD] would defend, to the extent feasible, against a ballistic missile attack upon the U.S. homeland from any source.”8 Russia is already developing and deploying new long-range nuclear delivery systems to defeat current and expected future U.S. missile defense capabilities. A major question is whether Chinese leaders genuinely perceive such defenses to threaten the viability of their growing strategic deterrent force of around 180 missiles, after that force has been attacked by U.S. conventional or nuclear weapons. If the answer is “yes,” then the conundrum is whether the benefits of maintaining or adding to such defenses are greater than the costs of doing so, in terms of both expense and the increased likelihood that Russia and China would counter by greater numbers of and/or more capable missiles and countermeasures. There are no clear or easy answers to these conundrums. Since its withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, the United States has acted as if the benefits of pursuing defenses outweigh the risks of arms racing with Russia and China and escalation of regional conflict. These posited benefits, which will vary based on the actual performance of defense systems, include strengthening deterrence, limiting the damage adversaries can inflict, and reassuring U.S. allies and partners in Europe, the Middle East, and East Asia. Advocates of missile defense do not fully acknowledge that their programs drive Russia and China to develop and deploy offensive countermeasures. Instead, they cite the modernization of Russian and Chinese offensive nuclear forces as justifications for development of even more modern U.S. missile defenses and offensive weapons, continuing the action-reaction cycle. However, the unintended consequences—especially those that impact U.S. nuclear deterrence relationships with each major adversary—are equally important to consider. Many of the Russian and Chinese nuclear capabilities that U.S. nuclear policymakers and politicians decry are, in part, responses to U.S. missile defense programs and their future potential capabilities. Russia’s much-vaunted new hypersonic weapons, including the intercontinental-range Avangard HGV and the regional-range Kinzhal ALBM, are notable not for their speed but their maneuverability, which may more easily circumvent U.S. defenses than traditional ballistic missiles. Similarly, the “exotic” Burevestnik nuclear-powered cruise missile and Poseidon nuclear-powered torpedo could evade interception and reinforce Russia’s second-strike capabilities. Russian Iskander deployments in and near Europe, now more than ten years old, were in response to U.S. and NATO Aegis Ashore plans. For its part, China has developed ballistic missiles capable of delivering multiple warheads and penetration aids, including its newest DF-41 ICBM and the still in-development JL-3 SLBM, and an HGV-equipped medium-range missile, the DF-17. China’s growing numbers of warheads and dual-capable (nuclear and conventional) missiles and development of hypersonic boost glide systems reflect a determination to improve the survivability of the country’s relatively small nuclear arsenal against U.S. offensive strikes and defensive interceptions. Perhaps paradoxically, as Russia and China develop maneuverable hypersonic weapons and other capabilities to bypass U.S. homeland missile defenses, they may solve (at least partially) the deterrence and instability challenges that U.S. ballistic missile defenses pose. North Korea and Iran are not (yet) capable of deploying such sophisticated offensive systems. Thus, U.S. homeland defenses predicated on ballistic missiles of the number that North Korea (and perhaps someday Iran) could deploy would not threaten forces as maneuverable as Russia’s or China’s. However, Moscow and Beijing would still worry and plan against future U.S. defense technologies, especially space-based ones. Current U.S. missile defense policy will suffice if policymakers believe that unconstrained competition in offensive and defensive weapons is preferable to potential agreements that would provide transparency and potentially some limits on U.S. missile defense in exchange for possible Russian and Chinese concessions. However, U.S. interests and those of allies and the rest of the world would be better served by exploring what possible trade-offs could be negotiated between transparency and potential limitations on some U.S. missile defense capabilities, on one hand, and Russia and Chinese reductions and/or constraints on some of their current and prospective offensive capabilities, on the other. The most promising way to assess these possibilities would be to explore whether and how regional and/or homeland missile defenses could be designed and deployed to protect against a lesser scale of missile threats (such as those posed by Iran and North Korea) without creating the realistic prospect that the United States could successfully negate a Russian or Chinese deterrent of U.S. first strikes against either Russia or China.
2022
Michigan
Negative
**Counterplans** › Patriot PIC › 2NC---CP---Patriot PIC---NB---Interoperability
NATO, 22 [NATO Allied Air Command Public Affairs Office, 4-19-2022, accessed on 6-27-2022, ac.nato.int, "Allies integrate PATRIOT missile defence system during NATO exercise in Slovakia", https://ac.nato.int/archive/2022/allies-integrate-patriot-missile-defence-system-during-slovakian-exercise-]/ISEE
During an Integrated Air and Missile Defence (IAMD) exercise in Sliač, Slovakia, from April, 19 to 21, 2022, Allies will train with the deployed PATRIOT missile defence system to enhance Alliance cohesion and interoperability. The exercise will involve increasingly complex scenarios, with the combined German-Netherlands PATRIOT battery on the ground working closely with the Slovakian and U.S. Air Forces. The Slovakian Air Force is contributing to the exercise with one MIG-29, the U.S. Marine Corps with F-18s from Łask Air Base, Poland and the U.S. Air Force with EA-18G Growler fighter aircraft from Spangdahlem, Germany. The defensive deployment of the PATRIOT system to Slovakia, which borders Ukraine, is being conducted to enhance the protection of Slovakian populations and territory "The defensive deployment of the PATRIOT system to Slovakia, which borders Ukraine, is being conducted to enhance the protection of Slovakian populations and territory", said Lieutenant General Pascal Delerce, Deputy Commander of the Headquarters Allied Air Command. "This joint exercise will demonstrate NATO's ground-to-air defence capabilities and promote the PATRIOT's integration into the networked system that assures the safety and integrity of NATO airspace", Lieutenant General Delerce added. During the exercise, staff will test Command Post tactics, techniques and procedures to build robust communications between ground and airborne assets. They will execute a range of realistic scenarios including simulations of Cruise Missile attacks and multiple hostile inbound aircraft. All systems defending against airborne targets will be integrated and closely coordinated with NATO IAMD. It is essential to steadily train and practice procedures while coordinating IAMD processes among Allies to optimize Allied cohesion and improve readiness. The Russian invasion of the Ukraine has increased the requirement for a robust 24/7/365 collective defence posture. NATO IAMD exercises in the East present crew training opportunities in conjunction with strengthening the Alliance's defence posture.
2022
Michigan
Negative
**Counterplans** › Patriot PIC › 2NC---CP---Patriot PIC---AT: Unsafe
Raytheon, 15 [Raytheon Missiles & Defense leadership team consists of experts from across the defense industry., 2015 (Last mentioned Date), accessed on 6-27-2022, Raytheonmissilesanddefense, "",
Since it was first fielded, Patriot has been used by five nations in more than 250 combat engagements against manned and unmanned aircraft, cruise missiles, and tactical ballistic missiles. Since January of 2015, Patriot has intercepted more than 150 ballistic missiles in combat operations around the world; more than 90 of those intercepts involved the low-cost Raytheon Missiles & Defense-made Guidance Enhanced Missile family of surface-to-air missiles. Those engagements were possible because Patriot is built on a foundation of more than 3,000 ground tests and over 1,400 flight tests. Each and every time Patriot is tested or live fired, engineers uncover new ways to further improve or enhance the system. The improvements are necessary because the threat is constantly changing and becoming more sophisticated.
2022
Michigan
Negative
**Counterplans** › Patriot PIC › 2NC---CP---Patriot PIC---Competition
Bartneck et al., 20 [Christoph Bartneck, Christoph Lütge, Alan Wagner and Sean Welsh, August 12, 2020, accessed on 6-27-2022,"Military Uses of AI", https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-030-51110-4_11#:~:text=Systems%20such%20as%20the%20Patriot,11.1).]/ISEE
War is inherently controversial. Many military uses of AI and robotics are likewise contentious. Perhaps the most controversial aspect of this topic is the development and use of lethal autonomous weapons systems capable of autonomously making life and death decisions regarding human targets. Some argue that cruise missiles are a form of lethal autonomous weapons system. Systems such as the Patriot missile system, AEGIS naval weapons system, Phalanx weapons system, and Israeli Harpy weapons system are examples of lethal autonomous weapons systems currently in use. The Patriot system, AEGIS, and the Phalanx system are generally considered defensive weapons (Fig. 11.1).
2022
Michigan
Negative
**Counterplans** › Patriot PIC › 1NC---CP---Patriot PIC
Stracqualursi, 3/10 [Veronica Stracqualursi is a CNN Politics writer covering breaking news in Washington, DC, 3-10-2022, accessed on 6-27-2022, CNN, "These are the missile defense systems the US sent to Poland", https://www.cnn.com/2022/03/10/politics/us-patriot-missile-defense-system-explainer/index.html]/ISEE
The two missile defense systems that the US delivered to Poland this week are part of a weapons system upon which the US military has heavily relied for nearly 40 years. The deployment, announced Thursday by Vice President Kamala Harris, is intended to deter Russia and boost Poland's security amid western concerns that the Ukraine conflict could spill into NATO-aligned nations. The Patriot air defense missile system -- Patriot stands for "Phased Array Tracking Radar to Intercept of Target" -- is designed to counter and destroy incoming short-range ballistic missiles, advanced aircraft and cruise missiles. The battery includes missiles and launching stations, a radar set that detects and tracks targets, and an engagement control station, according to the Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance. The US, seeking to avoid direct involvement in Ukraine -- which is not a member of NATO and therefore not subject to the pact's collective defense agreement, in which an attack on one aligned nation is considered an attack on all -- has repeatedly stressed that the deployment is only for defensive purposes. "This defensive deployment is being conducted proactively to counter any potential threat to U.S. and Allied forces and NATO territory," Capt. Adam Miller, spokesman for US European Command, said in a statement Tuesday. "This is a prudent force protection measure that underpins our commitment to Article Five and will in no way support any offensive operations." The Pentagon's deployment of the Patriot missiles to Poland "wasn't precipitated by one single moment or one single issue or one single act by the Russians," US Defense Department press secretary John Kirby said on Wednesday. The Patriot missiles had been moved from Germany for what Kirby described as a "temporary deployment." Retired US Army Gen. Wesley Clark, a former NATO commander, called the deployment of the two batteries "prudent" and said the Patriot system would be able to intercept many of the missiles Russian President Vladimir Putin has deployed in Russia and Belarus, which borders Poland. "So if there were to be a launch in some provocative way by Mr. Putin to attempt to intimidate us, these missiles have a very good probability of intercepting a Russian missile," Clark, now a CNN military analyst, told CNN's Brianna Keilar. He added that the deployment of the equipment "gives reassurance to the Poles. It also tells Putin that he's not going to be necessarily so successful in trying to blackmail us with nuclear weapons." See the US weapons being used in Ukraine 'Fire and forget': See the US weapons being used in Ukraine 02:56 A longtime mainstay of US military operations The Patriot missile system has undergone several improvements and upgrades since it was first deployed in 1982. Its first combat use was in the Gulf War, which was also the first time that an air defense system had destroyed a hostile tactical ballistic missile. The Patriot system was also deployed in 2003 during Operation Iraqi Freedom and was successful in hitting nine incoming missiles, but also were involved in several friendly fire incidents. In recent years, the US has sent Patriot missiles to Saudi Arabia and Iraq to counter threats posed by Iran and its proxies and to the Pacific region to deter North Korea. Earlier this year, the US military, along with the United Arab Emirates, used the Patriot missiles to intercept attacks by Houthi militants on a military airbase where Americans were stationed and while the Israeli President was visiting the UAE. A 2019 Pentagon missile defense review reported that eight battalions with 33 batteries were stationed in the United States while seven battalions with 27 batteries were stationed overseas. More than a dozen US allies, including Germany, Japan, and Israel, have also purchased the US missile defense system.
2022
Michigan
Negative
**Counterplans** › NC3 PIC › 1NC---NC3 PIC
Lowther, PhD, and McGiffin. 2X MA, 19
(Adam, Director of Research and Education at the Louisiana Tech Research Institute, Curtis, School of Strategic Force Studies, at the Air Force Institute of Technology and an adjunct professor for Missouri State University’s Department of Defense and Strategic Studies where he teaches strategic nuclear deterrence theory and NC3 education https://warontherocks.com/2019/08/america-needs-a-dead-hand/)
There is a fourth option. The United States could develop an NC3 system based on artificial intelligence. Such an approach could overcome the attack-time compression challenge. DARPA’s Knowledge-directed Artificial Intelligence Reasoning Over Schemas program is an example of how an American NC3 system based on artificial intelligence might function. Fusing the contextual and temporal events of a nuclear attack into an analytic-based artificial intelligence capability may ensure rapid comprehension and in turn generate associated and prompt actionable responses. The biggest challenge for such a system is its ability to learn and adapt. Unlike the game of Go, which the current world champion is a supercomputer, Alpha Go Zero, that learned through an iterative process, in nuclear conflict there is no iterative learning process. Thus, a fully empowered “general” artificial intelligence system that learns may be far more difficult to design than a “narrow” artificial intelligence system that engages in limited analysis and decision-making. Artificial intelligence is perhaps best poised to assist humans when it comes to the dimensions of detecting a nuclear attack and deciding which planned option best meets the criteria designed by programmers. Here, artificial intelligence may, to a small degree, mitigate the tyranny of attack-time compression and accelerate wartime decision-making. However, when a president may have, at most, six minutes to make a decision, time compression still poses a fundamental problem. Artificial intelligence is already being used for target identification, controlling autonomous platforms, pattern recognition, and a number of other wartime tasks. It is capable of processing vast amounts of information very quickly and assessing the pros and cons of alternative actions in a thoroughly unemotional manner. According to Vincent Boulanin: Recent advances in artificial intelligence could be leveraged in all aspects of the nuclear enterprise. Machine learning could boost the detection capabilities of extant early warning systems and improve the possibility for human analysts to do a cross-analysis of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) data. Machine learning could be used to enhance the protection of the command and control architecture against cyberattacks and improve the way resources, including human forces, are managed. Machine learning advances could boost the capabilities of non-nuclear means of deterrence: be it conventional (air defence systems), electronic (jamming) or cyber. However, artificial intelligence is no panacea. Its failures are numerous. And the fact that there is profound concern by well-respected experts in the field that science fiction may become reality, because artificial intelligence designers cannot control their creation, should not be dismissed. For the United States, every option presents significant risk and uncertainty. Reality, however, is progressing to a point where the United States must address the challenge we outlined above. Russia and China are not constrained by the same moral dilemmas that keep Americans awake at night. Rather, they are focused on creating strategic advantage for their countries.
2022
Michigan
Negative
**Counterplans** › NC3 PIC › 1NC---NC3 PIC
Horowitz et al 19 [Michael C. Horowitz is Professor of Political Science and Associate Director of Perry World House at the University of Pennsylvania. Paul Scharre is Senior Fellow and Director, Technology and National Security Program at the Center for a New American Security. Alexander Velez-Green is a defense analyst based in Washington, DC. "A Stable Nuclear Future? The Impact of Autonomous Systems and Artificial Intelligence." https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1912/1912.05291.pdf]
Automation could also be used to enhance defenses – physical or cyber – against attacks on nuclear early warning, command-and-control, delivery, and support systems, thereby enhancing deterrence and fortifying stability. It could also be used to bolster the resilience of vulnerable NC2 networks. For instance, long-endurance uninhabited aircraft that act as pseudo-satellites (“pseudo-lites”) to create an airborne communications network could increase NC2 resilience by providing additional redundant communications pathways in the event of satellite disruption. Automation could even enable autonomously self-healing networks – in physical or cyberspace – in response to jamming or kinetic attacks against command-and-control nodes, thereby sustaining situational awareness and command and control and enhancing deterrence.
2022
Michigan
Negative
**Counterplans** › NC3 PIC › 1NC---NC3 PIC
Scarry 18 Elaine Scarry is a professor at Harvard University and the author of numerous books, including The Body in Pain: The Making and Unmaking of the World. Her most recent book is titled Thermonuclear Monarchy: Choosing between Democracy and Doom. "In the United States, Just 1 Person Has the Power to Kill Millions of People." Nation, 26 Feb. 2018, www.thenation.com/article/archive/in-the-united-states-just-1-person-has-the-power-to-kill-millions-of-people.
Even more central to our discussion: The second feature of the nuclear arsenal is that this capacity for unthinkable levels of injury resides in the hands of a solitary person, or a small handful of persons, in the United States as well as in the other nuclear states. Nuclear weapons strategy in the United States is designed around “presidential first use,” an arrangement that enables one man, the president, to kill and maim many millions of people in a single afternoon. The key features of nuclear architecture are, then, this unthinkably magnified level of injury at one end of the weapon and at the other end of the weapon, an unthinkably small number of men who determine our collective fate and the fate of the planet. What remains to be seen is whether the people of our own country—and more generally the people of the earth—will permit these weapons and these arrangements for presidential first use to remain in place. And then there is a second key question: If the people of this country do not wish these arrangements to remain in place, are there legal and constitutional tools that can help dismantle those arrangements? Support Progressive Journalism If you like this article, please give today to help fund The Nation’s work. It will be helpful to keep in mind that the nuclear architecture is a physical architecture, but the physical architecture is accompanied by a mental architecture and it is this mental architecture that keeps the physical architecture in place. Let me say a few words about each. Click to enlarge. (Graphic: Nagasaki University, Research Center for Nuclear Weapons Abolition) As for the physical architecture, we can see from this chart that 93 percent of the world’s total arsenal is possessed by the United States and Russia. The small wedge at one o’clock is the portion of the arsenal owned by the other seven nuclear states. North Korea has, by the most accurate estimates, fissile material for fewer than 20 warheads. (Here and there estimates have come in as high as 60 warheads, but Hans Kristensen at the Federation of American Scientists—over time the single most reliable voice on weapons count—judges 20 or fewer to be still the best estimate.) The legend on the chart tells us that each icon represents five warheads. To get an accurate picture of the world arsenal, we need to multiply the field of icons fivefold. In attempting to comprehend the vast scale of the United States arsenal, we are assisted by The New York Times, which recently provided a compelling set of graphics. It calculated what portion of the US stockpile would be needed to “decimate” Libya, what portion to “decimate” North Korea, what portion to “decimate” Syria, Iraq, Iran, China, Russia, and then showed how many weapons would be left over after we had killed one-fourth of the population in those seven countries. Their answer: Seventy percent of the US arsenal would remain. It takes thousands of painstaking small steps to put a physical arsenal into place, and 99 percent of those steps have already been completed. We’re not waiting for something to start; we’re very late, as the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists’s 2 ½-minutes-to-midnight tells us. Only the last of the thousand steps—the launch itself—remains. For example, specific cities all over the world have specific targets assigned to them. Weapons are assigned not just to our opponents but to our potential opponents, and even to our non-opponents. During the most-recent Bush administration, Vice President Cheney became curious about how many are assigned to each city: “Tell me, I said to the planners, how many warheads are going to hit Kiev under the current plan. It was a difficult question to get an answer to because I don’t think anybody had ever asked it before, but I finally got a report back that under the current targeting plan, we had literally dozens of warheads targeted on this single city.” Until the Clinton administration, the longitude and latitude of those cities were programed into the missiles before they were loaded into the Ohio-class submarines. Out of fear that a hacker would initiate a launch, this practice was changed so that instead of the geographical coordinates of cities, the longitude and latitude of uninhabited regions of ocean were programed into the missiles. It is noteworthy that this ethical change was brought about not by the application of moral reasoning—not by the demands of the citizenry or councils of government—but by the very real possibility of a hacker. Throughout this enlightened shift to open-ocean targeting, what never changed was the assignment of specified weapons to specified cities. What about the mental architecture that has kept this physical architecture in place? Support our work with a digital subscription. Get unlimited access: $9.50 for six months. The mental architecture requires first and foremost that little information be given to the citizenry. In turn, attempts of the citizenry to protest can be silenced by pointing out that they are speaking without knowledge or information. This blackout of information imperils citizenship in the same way that in earlier centuries depriving people of the art of reading and writing imperiled citizenship. It has acted as a firm piece of social control. Many Americans believe that our nuclear weapons will be used only in response to a nuclear attack by another country. Nothing could be further from the truth. We have had first-use arrangements and a first-use policy throughout the 70 years of the nuclear age. Most Americans believe that the only time following Hiroshima and Nagasaki that the United States came close to launching a nuclear weapon was during the Cuban missile crisis. We now know that Eisenhower twice considered using an atomic weapon in the Taiwan Straits in 1954 and again in Berlin in 1959; that the Kennedy administration, according to Robert McNamara, three times came within “a hair’s breadth” of war with Russia; that Lyndon Johnson considered using a nuclear weapon against China to prevent that country from getting a bomb; and that Nixon, by his own account, four times contemplated using a nuclear weapon. The record stops there because only after a 30-year-time-lag when presidential papers are released do we learn what our leaders planned. Our current president, President Trump, is for many of us in the country and for many people throughout the world a particularly reckless figure. Yet the presidential first-use structure is catastrophic even in the hands of the best of men. Yes, it is wildly dangerous if someone is openly reckless and irrational; but it continues to be fatal even in the hands of those who are nominally rational because it is itself a deeply irrational and reckless architecture.
2022
Michigan
Negative
**Counterplans** › NC3 PIC › 1NC---NC3 PIC
Umbrello, et al, 20—Institute for Ethics and Emerging Technologies, University of Turin (Steven, with Phil Torres, Project for Future Human Flourishing, and Angelo De Bellis, University of Edinburgh, “The future of war: could lethal autonomous weapons make conflict more ethical?,” AI & Society, 35, 273–282 (2020), dml)
Yet, we would argue, such positions are predicated on an unfounded fear that taking control away from humans will enable robotic weaponry to demolish current, human-involved warfare practices. Extrapolating techno-development trends into the future, it is reasonable to expect future robotic weapons to acquire the capacity to reliably and accurately differentiate between combatants and noncombatants (Sharkey 2012; Egeland 2016); this could even occur in the near future (see Guizzo 2016). Indeed, Ronald Arkin (2008) anticipates such technologies—in particular, recognition software—to not only be developed but surpass human performance capabilities (see also O’Meara 2011; Egeland 2016). As he writes, “we must protect the innocent non-combatants in the battlespace far better than we currently do. Technology can, must, and should be used toward that end.” Like Nadeau, Arkin believes that moral LAWs would act in an ethically superior way to humans in war, saying that: The commonplace occurrence of slaughtering civilians in conflict over millennia gives rise to my pessimism in reforming human behaviour yet provides optimism for robots being able to exceed human moral performance in similar circumstances (Arkin 2015). One must also take into account the consequences of humans personally engaging in warfare. Historical records, including those of concurrent military engagements, recount numerous acts of barbarism as a result of the harsh conditions that combatants are exposed to (Arkin 2015). In fact, Lin et al. (2008) discuss how one of the most attractive prospects of LAWs is their inability to be affected by emotions on the battlefield (Lin et al. 2008). It is the emotional distress that often causes combatants to mistreat the enemy and commit war crimes. Hence, the introduction of LAWs that are unaffected by such emotional stress serves as an incentive for continued development (Klincewicz 2015).3 Second, the emotional and physical pressures that human combatants must endure during wartime have performance costs. The fatigue of a long and drawn-out battle affects the ability of individual soldiers to perform optimally, and thus affects the accuracy of their shots (Burke et al. 2007; Nibbeling et al. 2014). LAWs are naturally unaffected by similar physical pitfalls and can always—as long as the physical infrastructure is designed optimally from the start—permit the LAWs to continually perform accurately and as expected. The ability for LAWs to engage in unwavering, precise combat also resolves some ethical issues that arise from human-waged war. In light of the fact that LAWs do not possess emotions to guide their behaviors or personal stakes that affect their combat approaches, LAWs will always perform duties accurately under even the most physically—or to a human, emotionally—stressful conditions, thus enabling them to, at least more often than not, kill in a more humane manner. LAWs can be programmed to only engage targets in manners deemed most ethical based on the dynamics of war at the time of combat: the changing environment, the weapons being used by both the aggressor and the defender, and the characteristics of the target (human, robot, or physical structure). Already, computerized weapons platforms can engage targets far more accurately than any human counterpart can (Geibel 1997; Shachtman 2007; Katz and Lappin 2012; United States Navy 2017). Strong arguments can be levied that LAWs outfitted with such weapons platforms could engage in otherwise normal wartime duties but in a means that is far more accurate and thus ethical4 as a consequence of LAWs’ technological superiority. Part of this ethical prowess exhibited by LAWs is not only because they never tire, but because they are impervious to the psychological shortcomings of humans. Though a contentious topic, several high-profile cognitive psychologists suggest that humans fabricate reasons for their actions after committing them (Davidson 1982; Nadeau 2006). Thus, it is human to be irrational, to make unreasoned decisions toward an action that is then validated after carrying through. Such is not the nature of a robot. As mentioned, LAWs do not have any particular affinity to or personal interests in surviving battle; they do not have any drive to exhibit particular harshness against enemies of a certain culture; and they do not, outside of their goals, worry about winning the war and heading back home after using any unsavory methods to do so. What they do mind is their particular set of rules, their value-laden code that dictates how they are to conduct themselves in an ethical manner during combat.
2022
Michigan
Negative
**Counterplans** › NC3 PIC › 1NC---NC3 PIC
King 19 King, Iain. Iain King CBE is Defence Counsellor at the British Embassy in Washington D.C. "What Do Cognitive Biases Mean for Deterrence?" RealClearDefense, 12 Feb. 2019, www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2019/02/12/what_do_cognitive_biases_mean_for_deterrence_114182.html.
Humans make poor decisions—not just sometimes, but systematically—and new insights into these cognitive biases have implications for deterrence. To illustrate just how important these can be, consider the curious case of Abraham Wald, a respected Columbia academic who, in 1943, was selected by the U.S. War Department for an important task.[1] The United States Army Air Forces were losing too many bombers over Europe to anti-aircraft fire and were considering adding armour plating to the aircraft, but the extra metal made the aircraft heavier, reducing performance and bomb loads. So, armouring the whole plane was impossible. Where could extra armour be placed effectively? Abraham Wald and his study of aircraft armor (Slideshare) Wald researched where the bombers frequently suffered the most damage. After an extensive survey of the squadrons returning to base, Wald discovered most of the damage was to the wings and fuselage, whereas the engines and cockpits seemed to be hit much less. Initially, the War Department assumed the armour plating should protect the wings and fuselage, but Wald explained how they were completely wrong. Armour placement was needed where there was no damage since bombers hit there never returned home to be studied. On Wald’s advice, the armour plating was duly placed around the cockpit and engines. Wald demonstrated that the War Department was making a common mistake now known as survivorship bias.[2] By looking at a skewed sample—in this case, only those bombers surviving enemy fire—the War Department’s logic went awry. Survivorship bias is one of many deep-rooted and systematic flaws in the way humans process information. One might think people take in all the available information and make the best decisions; in fact, however, we tend not to. We make bad decisions for many reasons. For one, thinking takes time and effort, and so we often go for heuristic short-cuts.[3] For another, like pack animals, we follow the herd.[4] Furthermore, we regularly misunderstand the world in systematic ways. We have deep-rooted attachments to what we already own, even when we can have something better.[5] These traits have helped us to adapt and stay alive, and we have inherited them from our ancestors who survived because of them.[6] There are at least fifty of these proven quirks that warp our decision making.[7] One of these is confirmation bias, where we tend to underrate new information that challenges what we already believe. There is also optimism bias, which makes us overestimate our chances of getting away with something.[8] Next to these we have normalcy bias, where we refuse to plan for a disaster that has never occurred.[9] Then there is reactance, a phenomenon is which we do the opposite of what someone wants us to do just to defy a perceived constraint on our freedom of choice.[10] These biases can influence life in many ways, from who we marry to bad budgeting choices. But some of the most profound impacts are on deterrence. Promoted Content Mgid To understand the effect of these systematic mistakes on how we deter unwelcome behaviour, consider one of the oldest forms of deterrence, the threat of jail time to discourage theft. In a rationale calculation, a substantial prison sentence should be enough to deter almost anyone from stealing, but cognitive biases mean this is not necessarily so. Reactance spurs rebellious criminals to steal simply because stealing is outlawed. The normalcy effect makes the ruinous impact of a prison sentence just too hard to contemplate, so it does not factor properly in the criminal mind. Criminals who plan a clever theft and escape tune out ways they might be caught because of confirmation bias. Criminals who know successful thieves and none of the many others who are caught and locked up will suffer from survivorship bias if they calculate their own chances of getting away with crime. And some will suffer from and optimism bias if they just guess. So, every day punishments are in place that should deter every right-thinking individual in the world, but people still try their luck. Every prisoner is proof deterrence can and does fail. These biases affect us all—not just criminals—and they affect us much more than we realise. Almost all of us suffer from a bias blind spot: the proven tendency for people to recognise biases in others more readily than in themselves.[11] Thomas Schelling (EconLib) Proof that cognitive biases are real means several of the assumptions underpinning traditional deterrence theory are wrong. Academics like Thomas Schelling, who led U.S. thinking on nuclear deterrence in the 1950s and 1960s and who was a contemporary of Abraham Wald, simply applied a standard hypothesis from economics at the time: that people knew how to behave in their own best interests.[12] People might make mistakes, went the theory, but they’d soon learn how to correct their behaviour because they would benefit from doing so. Only in the 1970s, with the so-called third wave of deterrence theory, was psychology understood in enough detail to begin to grasp how people make systematic errors.[13] Kremlinology, the study of key figures in the Soviet system and how they behave and interact, became a key part of the West’s approach to nuclear deterrence. People, not weapons, became the central focus of Western defence. The science of cognitive bias has advanced considerably since then. We now know people consistently behave in ways that go against their best interests in almost every field.[14] Indeed, in the last decade many governments have set up so-called nudge units, playing on these behavioural quirks to achieve policy goals, from increasing pension contributions to enforcing traffic laws.[15] In military matters, even though the stakes are usually much higher, cognitive errors are still rife. Indeed, history is packed with examples of wars that might have been deterred were it not for strong cognitive biases affecting decision makers. Consider Argentina in 1982, which might not have invaded the Falkland Islands if it had a less distorted view of the United Kingdom’s resolve and capacity to respond. Or consider France in 1870, where military groupthink tipped Napoleon III into a disastrous war with Prussia. And Europe in the summer of 1914 was a cauldron of cognitive biases, as countries—Austria-Hungary, Serbia, Russia, Germany, France, and Britain—made a succession of poor judgments about the deterrence posture of rivals, rivals who, in turn, provided misleading signals themselves, ultimately leading to a catastrophe that spread around the world.[16] Mgid Signals Of Lung Cancer Learn More→ According to one study, the weaker power initiates conflict in some 33% of observations, suggesting military might fails to deter as much as a third of the time.[17] Perhaps the attackers suffered from restraint bias—the tendency for people and groups to underestimate how easily they succumb to temptation? Perhaps groupthink infected the highest levels of combatants’ government and armed forces? Perhaps the parties to conflict missed important signals from an enemy because confirmation bias meant they were not looking for them? Whatever the reason, chances are cognitive biases were involved. These tragic examples of conventional wars contrast with a much better record in nuclear matters where deterrence has, so far, been entirely successful. Nuclear conflict has been deterred for more than seven decades, partly because cognitive bias has been almost entirely squeezed out of it. This suggests the calculus governing our nuclear deterrent, and the strategic weapons of those who may oppose us, is as protected from human shortcomings as it can be, thus keeping the world safe. We still need to watch for normalcy bias, though. No nuclear weapons have been used in war since 1945, but it is folly to presume that will always be the case.
2022
Michigan
Negative
**Counterplans** › Baryaktar TB2 Pic › 2NC---CP---Bayraktar TB2 PIC---NB XT
Mittal, 22 [Vikram Mittal is the associate professor at the United States Military Academy in the Department of Systems Engineering, 6-23-2022, accessed on 6-28-2022, Forbes, "The Ukrainian Military Is Changing Its Tactics With Bayraktar TB2 Drones", https://www.forbes.com/sites/vikrammittal/2022/06/23/ukrainian-military-is-changing-its-tactics-with-the-bayraktar-tb2-drones/?sh=3557aa5a1ec0]/ISEE
During the first four months of the Russia-Ukraine war, the “Most Valuable Player” award could readily go to the Bayraktar TB2 drone. This drone provided the Ukrainians with the necessary air power to repel the initial Russian assault and then slow the Russian advances in the Donbas region. Despite the numerous successes of the TB2 drone, reports indicate that their usage in the Donbas region has become limited due to a large number of Russian anti-aircraft systems. The importance of the TB2 drones to the Ukrainians cannot be overstated. According to Oryx, a blog that tracks the destruction of military equipment through open-source reports, these drones are credited with destroying the following: 6 armored fighting vehicles, 5 towed artillery, 1 multi-rocket launcher, 2 anti-aircraft guns, 10 helicopters, 6 naval ships, 3 command posts, 1 communication station, 2 logistics trains, and numerous resupply trucks. The Ukrainian military reportedly started the war with just 30 of these drones and have lost only 8 in combat. Additionally, they recently received a gift of another TB2 drone from the Lithuanians who crowd-sourced funds to purchase one. The Ukrainian military used the TB2 drone to search for and destroy key targets behind enemy lines. In doing so, the TB2 drone has gained worldwide recognition, with several analysts claiming that this family of drones has changed the nature of warfare. Meanwhile, the manufacturers of the drone have stated that the drones are now in high demand from militaries across the world. UNKNOWN LOCATION, BELARUS - FEBRUARY 09: (——EDITORIAL USE ONLY â MANDATORY CREDIT - "BELARUS DEFENSE ... [+] MINISTRY / HANDOUT" - NO MARKETING NO ADVERTISING CAMPAIGNS - DISTRIBUTED AS A SERVICE TO CLIENTS——) S-400 and Pantsir-S air defence systems arrive to participate in the Russian-Belarusian military will start a joint exercise amid tension between Ukraine and Russia at an Unknown location in Belarus on February 9, 2022. According to the Belarusian Ministry of Defense, the joint military exercise "Allied Resolve 2022" will take place from February 10-20. The military units of the Russian Armed Forces from the Eastern Military District and some military units of the Belarusian Armed Forces will in the exercise. (Photo by Belarus Defense Ministruy/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images) Unfortunately for the TB2, the Russian military has focused their offense on the Donbas region. In doing so, they have been able to consolidate their anti-aircraft assets to that region rather than having them spread out across the country. The Russian military has now had the necessary time to repair the systems damaged in the initial invasion, while augmenting their anti-aircraft batteries with systems that were captured or held in reserve. Moreover, the Russian military appears to have learned their lesson from the initial assault, where their anti-aircraft systems were focused primarily on protecting front-line units, allowing the Ukrainians to use the TB2 to target the vulnerable supply lines and command nodes. With more assets and a consolidated region, the Russian military is able to provide coverage to most of their forces including their logistical units. Although much of the anti-aircraft assets are Soviet-era, the Russian military is likely also implementing new technology onto the battlefield, especially given their historical usage of electromagnetic weapons. The Russians first shot down a TB2 drone in mid-March; they have had ample time to study the drone and find vulnerabilities. By identifying the transmission frequencies and other electromagnetic signatures, the Russian military can more effectively detect and target the drones. Furthermore, the Russians could potentially jam the control signals to drone as well. Bayraktar TB-2 Armed Unmanned Aerial Vehicle on runway Given their limited supply of TB2 drones, the Ukrainian military is unlikely to fly them into areas where there is a high potential for them to get shot down, thus they are limiting their usage in the Donbas region. However, this is not a large blow to the Ukrainian forces. Given the close range between the Russian and Ukrainian ground forces, artillery fire can provide similar effects, albeit less accurate. Meanwhile, the TB2 drones can be used elsewhere. Recently, these drones featured heavily on the Ukrainian attempt to reclaim Snake Island, where they destroyed an ammunition depot, a command post, and a vehicle storage building. They were also used in destroying a tugboat in the Black Sea. It is important to note that although the Russians may have shut down the drone strikes in the Donbas region, they have not achieved air superiority. The Ukrainians have been reinforced with new anti-aircraft weaponry from the international community and are deploying them into the Donbas region. With neither side having air-superiority, the war will likely continue to be a slow-moving battle of attrition. As the war continues into its fourth month, the Bayraktar TB2 drone will likely continue to play a role in the conflict. However, it will likely not see the same degree of success that it saw over the past four months, especially in the Donbas region.
2022
Michigan
Negative
**Counterplans** › Baryaktar TB2 Pic › 2NC---CP---Bayraktar TB2 PIC---Competition
Trager and Luca, 22 [Robert F. Trager and Laura M. Luca, 5-11-2022, accessed on 6-28-2022, Foreign Policy, "Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems Are Here—and We Need to Regulate Them",
Swarms of robots with the ability to kill humans are no longer only the stuff of science fiction. Lethal autonomous weapons systems (LAWS) are here. In Ukraine, Moscow has allegedly deployed an artificial intelligence (AI)-enabled Kalashnikov ZALA Aero KUB-BLA loitering munition, while Kyiv has used Turkish-made Bayraktar TB2 drones, which have some autonomous capabilities. Although it’s always hard to determine whether a weapon’s autonomous mode is used, these technologies have reportedly been employed in at least one conflict: Last year, a United Nations report suggested Turkey used autonomous firing by its Kargu-2 drones to hunt fleeing soldiers in Libya’s civil war (though the CEO of the Turkish company that produced the drone denies it is capable of this). Unlike traditional drones, these systems have the ability to navigate on their own, and some can select targets. Although a human controller can still decide whether or not to strike, such weapons are acquiring ever more autonomous capabilities. Now that militaries and paramilitaries worldwide have taken note, these technologies are poised to spread widely. The world today stands at the very moment before much more advanced versions of these technologies become ubiquitous. So far, at least Israel, Russia, South Korea, and Turkey have reportedly deployed weapons with autonomous capabilities—though whether this mode was active is disputed—and Australia, Britain, China, and the United States are investing heavily in developing LAWS with an ever-expanding range of sizes and capabilities. Already, some LAWS can loiter in an area to find targets that machine-learning algorithms have trained them to recognize, including enemy radar systems, tanks, ships, and even specific individuals. These weapons can look vastly different: For instance, the Turkish Kargu-2 drone, which was introduced in 2020 and used in Libya’s war, is 2 feet long, weighs around 15 pounds, and can swarm in groups. Autonomous systems can also be much larger, such as unmanned AI-driven fighter jets like the modified L-39 Albatros, and much smaller, such as rudimentary commercial drones repurposed with autonomous software. Once these technologies have spread widely, they will be difficult to control. The world thus urgently needs a new approach to LAWS. So far, the international community has done nothing more than agree that the issue needs to be discussed. But what it really needs to do is take a page from the nuclear playbook and establish a nonproliferation regime for LAWS.
2022
Michigan
Negative
**Counterplans** › Baryaktar TB2 Pic › 1NC---CP---Bayraktar TB2 PIC
UN, 22 [United Nations, 6-21-2022, accessed on 6-28-2022, Un, "Warning Incitement of Racial, Religious Hatred Can Trigger Atrocity Crimes, Special Adviser Stresses States’ Legal Obligation to Prevent Genocide | Meetings Coverage and Press Releases", https://www.un.org/press/en/2022/sc14939.doc.htm]/ISEE
Russian Federation’s Disinformation Campaign Aimed to Justify Invasion of Ukraine, Several Speakers Stress Advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence is prohibited by law, Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide Alice Nderitu told the Security Council today, stressing that these acts represent potential triggers for the commission of atrocity crimes. “The prevention of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes is a legal obligation for States under international law,” she stressed. The 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide — which emerged from the shadows of the Holocaust — identifies as punishable offenses conspiracy to commit, direct and attempt to commit genocide. In a wide-ranging debate on “incitement to violence leading to atrocity crimes”, organized by Albania, as Council President for June, Ms. Nderitu said that even before the start of the conflict in Ukraine, her office was working with the United Nations country team to support intercommunal dialogue. She said that, because determination of the commission of genocide can only be made by a court of competent jurisdiction, she could only but reiterate the call to end the war, ensure protection of civilians and accelerate diplomatic efforts to make both possible. The Council must do its part by proposing a road map that considers that “peace itself is a process that is not indifferent to injustice”. Liubov Tsybulska, Head of the Centre for Strategic Communication and Information Security, underscored that “Russia wants to destroy Ukraine”, both literally — by killing and raping — and in a broader sense, eliminating its culture, language and history. She recounted Ukraine’s struggle for survival against the Russian Federation’s attempts at conquest — detailing mass famines; the murder and torture of Ukrainian writers, artists and architects in the 1930s; and the mass deportation of Ukrainian dissidents in the 1960s. “This is exactly what is happening now,” she stressed. While such crimes are “the modus operandi of the Kremlin”, the current war is extraordinary, with the Russian army demonstrating “barbarity that is difficult to imagine in the twenty-first century”. She urged the Council to understand that the threat exists not only for Ukrainians but for the entire world. Along similar lines, Jared Andrew Cohen, CEO of Jigsaw and Adjunct Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, said that, for the war on Ukraine, there are more hours of footage uploaded to YouTube, TikTok and other platforms than there are minutes of the conflict. “Like land, air and sea, the Internet has become a critical domain to occupy during war.” Nowhere has this been more evident than Ukraine, he said, where the Russian Federation has deployed distributed denial-of-service, or “DDoS”, attacks that have taken down connectivity by 15 to 20 per cent, and on many occasions, dropped Internet connectivity to zero. His team’s research confirms the ability to leverage disinformation to motivate violence, he added, noting that Russian propaganda that Ukrainians are “Nazis” likely dehumanized Ukrainians in the eyes of Russian soldiers, leading to the many war crimes now alleged against them. In the ensuing debate, several delegates evoked the calamitous consequences of inciting one group of people against another, with many recalling tragedies endured during the Second World War, in Rwanda in 1994, in Srebrenica in 1995 and in Myanmar more recently. Leading the discussion, Albania’s delegate spoke in his national capacity to recall how, in the early 1930s, the Nazis used virulently anti‑Semitic newspapers to incite Germans into persecuting Jews. On the eve of the invasion, Russian President Vladimir V. Putin described Ukraine as an “artificial creation of the Bolsheviks”, he said, stressing that “what begins with dehumanizing words ends in bloodshed”. Lithuania’s representative, speaking also for Estonia and Latvia, said that for years, Ukraine has been a target of Russian disinformation campaigns, aimed at justifying an invasion. “If there is no clear and strong international response to stop it, the aggression against Ukraine will be just the beginning,” he warned, a point echoed by Slovakia’s delegate, who said that the pretexts under which Moscow invaded Ukraine resemble past patterns of framing a targeted group as an existential threat in order to present war as defensive and inevitable. In turn, the Russian Federation’s delegate blamed Ukraine’s propaganda for pushing that country into Nazism. He denounced the demonizing of his country, as well as hatred of everything Russian, introduced year after year, with support from the United States and other Western allies. After the 2014 Maidan coup, the Kyiv regime incited violence against Russian-speaking inhabitants of Ukraine, dubbing all those against it as terrorists, separatist puppets and monsters. The United States delegate, meanwhile, strongly rejected Moscow’s efforts to distort history, noting that the General Assembly rejected its false narrative on Ukraine and neighbouring countries. Pointing out that some have ignored that the Russian Federation illegally invaded its neighbour, he urged the Russian Federation to immediately withdraw its forces and embrace diplomacy. China’s representative countered, urging certain countries to stop forcing others to take sides. The cold war mentality, the logic of hegemony and bloc politics “have long outlived their usefulness”, he added. Offering a word of caution, Ukraine’s delegate warned delegates not to be deceived by Moscow’s anti‑fascist rhetoric, denouncing it as “another manifestation of aggressive mimicry”. Noting that, a week ago, President Putin claimed that “the former Soviet Union was historical Russia”, he asked: “What is next?”
2022
Michigan
Negative
**Counterplans** › Baryaktar TB2 Pic › 1NC---CP---Bayraktar TB2 PIC
Jankowicz, 22 [Mia Jankowicz is a news reporter at Insider's London office, 6-28-2022, accessed on 6-28-2022, Insider, "Bayraktar firm refuses $20M, says it will donate drones to Ukraine", https://www.businessinsider.com/bayraktar-firm-refuses-20m-says-will-donate-drones-to-ukraine-2022-6]/ISEE
The Turkish defense manufacturer Baykar said it turned down $20 million in crowdfunded cash to buy its drones for Ukraine and would donate three military drones to the country instead. Baykar wrote in a Monday statement that it had learned about a campaign to raise funds to buy its Bayraktar TB2 drones, adding, "Baykar will not accept payment for the TB2s, and will send 3 UAVs free of charge to the Ukrainian war front." UAVs — unmanned aerial vehicles — are more commonly known as drones. "We ask that the funds instead be remitted to the struggling people of Ukraine," Baykar said. The money was raised through a campaign led by the Ukrainian TV personality Serhiy Prytula, the Ukrainian news agency Ukrinform reported. Prytula celebrated reaching the target figure in a June 24 tweet, saying it took under three days. The original plan appears to have been to obtain four of the drones. Baykar manufactures four types of drones, and it's unclear which model it intends to send to Ukraine. Its famed Bayraktar TB2 drones — known popularly as "Bayraktars" — have almost mythical status in Ukraine. The ongoing war against Russia is the first major conflict in which the Bayraktar drones have been deployed. A collage of four screenshots from what Ukrainian forces say is the viewfinder of Bayraktar TB2 drones targeting Russian-controlled assets Ukrainian forces say their Bayraktar drones scored against multiple Russian targets, presenting these videos as evidence. Commander-in-chief of Ukraine Armed Forces/Facebook/Insider Their ability to precisely target slow-moving Russian tank columns was a boost in Ukraine's early-stage defense, and they even inspired a viral folk song. Baykar's Monday statement, referring to Ukrainians, said it was "touched by their solidarity and resolve in the face of seemingly insurmountable challenges." It added, "Baykar prays for a just resolution and lasting peace." Euractiv reported that Selçuk Bayraktar, one of Baykar's codirectors, is related to Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan through marriage to his daughter. Russia has previously objected to Baykar's sale of the drones to Ukraine, but Turkish officials said Baykar is a private company and that these are not state-to-state deals, Reuters reported. Turkey hosted peace talks between Russia and Ukraine in late March, where Mikhail Podolyak, an advisor to President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, posed with another Baykar codirector, Selçuk Bayraktar's brother Haluk Bayraktar. Turkey has ruled out imposing sanctions on Russia, creating favorable conditions for fleeing oligarchs and their superyachts, several of which have been spotted in Turkish waters.
2022
Michigan
Negative
**Counterplans** › Abolish NATO CP › 2NC---CP---Abolish NATO---AT: Progress
Katharine AM Wright 22, Senior Lecturer in International Politics. Research and teach NATO, gender and security, “Challenging civil society perceptions of NATO: Engaging the Women, Peace and Security agenda”, Sage Publishing Library, 4-18-2022,
The article finds that’s NATO’s self-legitimisation narrative (see Von Billerbeck, 2019), resting on the assumption that if the intent is right, the outcome is less relevant, can be projected back to the alliance through civil society. Notably, while the ‘good intentions’ of the SGSR were repeatedly noted by interviewees in establishing CSAP, where these intentions were not perceived as good, civil society became less engaged. This is significant for understanding how NATO functions as an institution of international hegemonic masculinity given the centrality of both internal and external storytelling to reproducing a particular understanding of WPS within a militarist framework. This underscores the limits to the transformative potential of civil society engagement with NATO but also other military institutions.
2022
Michigan
Negative
**Counterplans** › Abolish NATO CP › 2NC---CP---Abolish NATO---NATO Bad
Angelo Cardona 21, is a Colombian social entrepreneur, peace and human rights activist. He is representative of Latin America to the International Peace Bureau, “Why should new generations advocate for the abolition of NATO?”, Pressenza New York, 5-16-2021, )/maze
The global defense budget exceeded 1.9 trillion dollars in 2019, of which NATO represents 54% of that military expenditure according to the latest report on military spending published by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). Despite the fact that many Alliance member states have not been able to invest at least 2% of their GDP in defense as agreed at the 2014 NATO Summit in Wales, yet NATO’s total military spending represents more than half of the global defense budget. Reallocating this military spending could help us tackle some of the most challenging issues of this century; such as global warming, the health crisis that we are experiencing due to the coronavirus, the eradication of poverty, universal access to higher education or fundamentally achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG).
The false narrative of security that NATO promotes through its consulting program for politicians and the military is precisely what prevents us from living in a peaceful world. More weapons can only mean more tension, more war, and more death. Why are weapons manufactured, sold, and acquired if they are not going to be used? the conflict must exist somewhere so that the arms industry does not go bankrupt.
2022
Michigan
Negative
**Counterplans** › Abolish NATO CP › 2NC---CP---Abolish NATO---NATO Bad
Ray Acheson 21 is the Director of Reaching Critical Will, the disarmament programme of the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF). They also represent WILPF on the steering group of the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons, the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots, and the International Network on Explosive Weapons. They are author of a forthcoming book about the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, Banning the Bomb, Smashing the Patriarchy., “The patriarchal militarism of NATO’s reflection group ”, Peace research perspectives on NATO 2030 A response to the official NATO Reflection Group Pages 17-25, 2-16-2021 )/maze
Abolish military alliances, build peace alliances There are ways to achieve collective security that do not necessitate “military prowess” and rely on the threat of massive nuclear violence. This involves building and maintaining real community, which requires reciprocity, trust, and understanding. It requires us to live in relationship with others, not simply to demand that everyone else obey our commands or conform to our way of thinking. Governments that say they believe in the rule of law, in cooperation and dialogue— which is most NATO members—need to embrace plurality rather than unanimity. The reflection group asserts that without “cohesion”, NATO’s members will face all challenges alone. But this is not how the rest of the world operates; it’s not how activists operate. The demand for unanimity is a patriarchal, authoritarian approach to an alliance— and it will ultimately fail. NATO should be abolished as an institution. It has been corrupted by the military pursuits of its most aggressive members; its framework of operation, as is made clear in this report, is one of violence, fear, and patriarchy. But the members of NATO could seek to establish a truly democratic, decolonised denuclearised, and demilitarised global alliance for collective security if they so wished. They could do by withdrawing from NATO and establishing feminist policies and partnerships with countries committed to nonviolence, equality, and global justice. They may find that in such a pursuit, they have more allies around the world—and less threats—than they currently see themselves facing.
2022
Michigan
Negative
**Counterplans** › Abolish NATO CP › 1NC---CP---Abolish NATO
Ray Acheson 21 is the Director of Reaching Critical Will, the disarmament programme of the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF). They also represent WILPF on the steering group of the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons, the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots, and the International Network on Explosive Weapons. They are author of a forthcoming book about the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, Banning the Bomb, Smashing the Patriarchy., “The patriarchal militarism of NATO’s reflection group ”, Peace research perspectives on NATO 2030 A response to the official NATO Reflection Group Pages 17-25, 2-16-2021 )/maze
The NATO reflection group report has a patriarchy problem. Given that NATO is primarily a military alliance, this is not surprising. But for a report that is looking ahead for the next decade, it offers retrogressive views not just on human security and the so-called Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) agenda, but also in terms of how it addresses concepts such as “cohesion” what it considers to be the biggest threats to NATO, and how it thinks the alliance should best deal with those challenges. Overall, the report embraces patriarchal approaches to “security”, dissention within NATO and where the alliance should go from here. The recommendations further entrench NATO members in a militarist pursuit of dominance, rather than true community and cooperation either internally or internationally. NATO members should reject this approach. The abolition of NATO would be the most straightforward way to allow its individual members to pursue genuine collective security with others. In the interim, NATO members that authentically care about peace, justice, international law, human rights and dignity, and cooperation need to renounce the violent masculinities1 espoused in this report, including by rejecting nuclear weapons and working to remove all weapons of mass destruction from NATO’s doctrine. They could also withdraw from NATO and adopt feminist foreign policies, finding common ground with other members of the world community for the nonviolent pursuit of peace and justice. NATO, WPS and human security A one-page section in the 67-page report deals with “Human Security and Women, Peace and Security” (WPS). These subjects come across as an afterthought of the report’s authors, who were perhaps seeking to check the ‘gender box’ that is increasingly a staple of checklists within many intergovernmental agencies. This suspicion deepens when reading the text, in which NATO both simultaneously positions itself as a progressive leader in respecting “human dignity” while making it clear that any efforts within these agenda items are exclusively for public point-scoring, not for serious policy development. The report urges NATO members to promote the alliance’s “work” on human security by including it in public messaging, especially to the “younger generation”. It suggests NATO should “leverage existing partnerships with civil society organisations” in order to “build a group of emissaries for its work in human security and in WPS, including female role models from countries where NATO has made a positive contribution”. It goes on to assert, “The personal stories, experiences, and engagement of such a group would provide NATO with a strong asset in ongoing efforts to raise awareness of the Alliance’s constructive role in promoting stability and addressing drivers of conflict” (p.43). Note that it doesn’t suggest NATO actually address drivers of conflict—just that it should spend more time telling people that it does. However, NATO does not address root causes of conflict. NATO members themselves drive many of the ongoing conflicts in the world. Their individual and collective policies of militarism, and the violent masculinities these policies reflect and further entrench, are part of the root causes of conflict. Rather than working within the human security and WPS agendas in order to prevent conflict, or seek nonviolent, non-militarised solutions to conflict, NATO reflexively turns again and again to weapons, war, aggression, and threats in order to promote and protect its interests. The challenges posed by institutionalising WPS The WPS agenda has, to a large extent, become about strategically instrumentalising women’s participation in order to legitimise existing practice. Academics Marie Bell and Milli Lake have well-articulated this problem, noting that “Adding certain excluded groups into existing institutions will ultimately reinforce the same patriarchal, capitalist, and militarist logics of hierarchy and exclusion that denied those groups access to power in the first place”.2 While women’s participation—and gender diverse people—is imperative and should be automatic, the way that the WPS agenda has been implemented over the past twenty years unfortunately has reinforced rather than challenged or changed the underpinnings of militarism throughout security discourse and practice. Rather than challenging the patriarchal structures and systems that have created the militarised world order, once inside these systems, most women tend to actively maintain it in order to maintain their positions. Nor do many of these women believe they should have to “carry the burden” of changing policies or structures. In a study from New America about women’s participation in the US nuclear weapon complex, for example, several women interviewed felt they were dismissed by male colleagues on the assumption that they would favour weapon cuts or disarmament. They had to prove, as former NATO Deputy Secretary General Rose Gottemoeller said she sought to do, that “women aren’t afraid of nuclear weapons”.3 As feminist scholar Cynthia Enloe says, “You can militarise anything, including equality”.4 You can also apparently whitewash anything, including NATO’s role as an aggressor in international politics. In its section on human security and WPS, the reflection group’s report asserts that “emphasising the value of human dignity and security differentiates NATO from authoritarian rivals and terrorist groups, which are among the world’s human rights abusers” (p.43). Yet NATO members have led and been involved in bombing raids that have killed civilians and destroyed cities and towns leaving civilians without housing, hospitals, food, schools, or basic water and sanitation.5 NATO members are also, for the most part, hostile towards or lacklustre about the current international political process to end the use of explosive weapons in populated areas, which is essential for protecting civilians and achieving human security.6
2022
Michigan
Negative
**AT: Case** › Solvency › 1NC---Solvency---ILAW Fails
Jones et al. 18 [Emily Jones is a Lecturer in Law at the University of Essex, and Sara Kendall, and Yoriko Otomo, (2018) Gender, War, and Technology: Peace and Armed Conflict in the Twenty-First Century. Australian Feminist Law Journal, 44 (1). pp. 1-8. ISSN 1320-0968.]/ISEE
Finally, the invested role of law appears throughout this terrain. As a field that deals in classification and categorisation, it holds out the promise of permitting and prohibiting certain behaviours, drawing the line between the licit and the illicit across battlefields and populations. It promises to do this through international treaties banning certain methods and weapons of warfare, for example, and by crystallising the norms of acceptable conduct. Yet there are challenges to this ambition on multiple fronts: the field of international law not only notoriously suffers from problems with compliance, but also from the more fundamental issue that it enables violence whilst seeking to constrain it.15 Critical scholars of international law experiencing a nostalgic desire for faith in legal forms might think of the opposition to the 2003 Iraq invasion that was based upon its illegality, when ‘all it would have taken to make the war legal was Security Council authorization’. 16 Our research agenda concerning gender, war and technology, regards law’s role from a standpoint of critical distance: as a vehicle for projecting strong state power and facilitating ‘proportionate’ violence grounded in ‘military necessity’, as well as a possible means of constraining warfare and providing redress. Kazan, for example, suggests that war torts be created in international law to provide some accountability in the case of the use of autonomous weapons systems, at the same time arguing for a radical change to the way in which law thinks about evidence. 17 Arvidsson suggests that the binary-gendered notion of the ‘human’ in IHL (combatant/man, civilian/woman), as well as the privileging of the ‘human’ and human agency in IHL more generally, requires us to rethink the boundaries of accountability where violence is enacted in the course of armed conflict. In the praxis section Clare Brown offers a practitioner’s account the use of ICTs in conflict and peacebuilding situations, including messaging and data collection technologies, in her article ‘The Use of CTs in Conflict and Peacebuilding: A Feminist Analysis’. Brown argues that in spite of the proliferation of new technological forms that are designed to respond to and document armed conflict, many of these ICTs have failed to incorporate the lived experiences of women, let alone feminist perspectives. Even if they were to incorporate feminist perspectives, however, tensions remain between the desire to use technology for change, as in feminist posthumanism and xenofeminism, and the recognition of its embeddedness within both militarism and capitalism.