2022
Michigan
Affirmative
AT: CPs › Airpower CP
BSR = Baltic Sea Region
Klein et al. 19 [Colonel Robert M. Klein, Senior Military Fellow in the Center for Strategic Research (CSR), Institute for National Strategic Studies, at the National Defense University; Lieutenant Commander Stefan Lundqvist, Ph.D., Researcher and Faculty Board Member at the Swedish Defence University (SEDU); Colonel Ed Sumangil, USAF, Senior Military Fellow in CSR; Ulrica Pettersson, Ph.D., assigned to SEDU, Adjunct Faculty Member at Joint Special Operations University; 11-2019; "Baltics Left of Bang: The Role of NATO with Partners in Denial-Based Deterrence"; Strategic Forum 301, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University; https://inss.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/stratforum/SF-301.pdf; KL]
Air Recommendations. NATO can no longer rely on airpower or air presence alone in the BSR to support deterrence by denial or punishment.51 Alliance experts concede that any Russian attack on the Baltic states will likely commence with air strikes against airfields, command and control nodes, and air defense sites of NATO and neighboring non-NATO countries.52 Follow-on attacks from air- and ground-based assets aim to limit Alliance ability to deploy forces forward to counter the Russian offensive. Russian success in such any offensive hinges on surprise and the speed at which its air force can strike targets to slow NATO’s response.53 This situation subverts NATO’s ability to utilize airpower to deter aggression in the BSR and limits the response options available to the Alliance during a crisis.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
AT: CPs › Baltic Army CP
Kundla 22 [LTC Tarmo Kundla; Lieutenant Colonel, Commander of the Chair of Tactics. Lecturer, The Estonian Military Academy; 2022; "Strategic leadership requirements for a Baltic unified military effort"; Ad Securitatem, Baltic Defence College; https://www.baltdefcol.org/files/files/publications/AdSecuritatem2022.pdf#page=95; KL]
To conclude, there is a need for a strong division-size operationally ready force to defend the Baltic states, but creation of it as a joint Baltic division is probably the biggest strategic leadership challenge that the Baltic states could have. It demands changes in the states’ constitutions, NATO’s framework on its eastern boundary, the Baltic states’ security policy, military build-up, etc. The other option, which is probably more realistic and demands a little fewer change, could be to invest more in the existing NATO framework divisions (MND N and MND NE) regarding capabilities, operational planning, readiness, training, etc., so that those will become fighting forces and not just units on paper. It also means that the Baltic states must take a more active leadership role in those divisions, which is not the case currently.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
AT: CPs › EU CP › Forward Presence CP
Gallardo 22 [Cristina Gallardo, POLITICO reporter; 3-8-2022; "Baltics look to Britain to firm up NATO support"; POLITICO; https://www.politico.eu/article/baltics-uk-security-nato-fears-russia-attack/; KL]
Even with the U.K.’s support, however, the rest of NATO will take some convincing to meet the Baltic demands — and especially to pay for them. For years, NATO hesitated over having significant troop numbers in the Baltic countries amid concerns this could antagonize the Kremlin. Members also worried about the cost of establishing permanent bases in the region and carrying out military exercises.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
AT: CPs › EU CP › Forward Presence CP
Emmott and Sytas 22 [Robin Emmott and Andrius Sytas, Reuters reporters; 6-15-2022; "The Baltic states want more NATO. They won't get all they seek"; Reuters; https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/baltic-states-want-more-nato-they-wont-get-all-they-seek-2022-06-15/; KL]
Many members, including Britain and the United States, do not favour permanent new bases in the Baltics, three of the diplomats told Reuters. They said it would cost billions and be hard to sustain: The states may not have enough troops and weaponry, and a permanent presence would be highly provocative for Moscow.
"The Baltic states will not each get enough NATO troops to create a division," a NATO diplomat said, referring to their request for up to 15,000 troops across the region, as well as more on stand-by in allied countries to complement national forces. "Whatever is decided must be sustainable."
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
AT: CPs › EU CP › Forward Presence CP
Blachford 20 [Kevin Blachford, Lecturer of International Relations at the Baltic Defence College; 2-7-2020; "Can NATO and The EU Really Defend the Baltic States Against Russia?"; National Interest; https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/can-nato-and-eu-really-defend-baltic-states-against-russia-121711; KL]
Primarily, the challenge facing NATO is dealing with the possibility of Russia using the Baltics as a way to test the credibility of the NATO alliance. The Baltic states of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia currently rely on NATO’s enhanced forward presence and air policing missions to deter Russian aggression. But this provides only short term reassurance to the region and overlooks the lessons of the Cold War in which West Germany played a vital role in the credibility of NATO’s deterrence posture. The reluctance of Germany to think seriously about the military security of Europe is, therefore, becoming a hindrance to NATO’s deterrence capabilities. Germany has repeatedly emphasized its aversion to militarism in recent years and its military has faced numerous bouts of austerity. But this reluctance to be seen as a military power overlooks the role of the West German Bundeswehr which acted as the first line of NATO’s defense in the Cold War.
The history of the Cold War provides clues to how deterrence could be increased in the Baltic region today. The defense and deterrence capability of West Germany revolved not just around the nuclear deterrent, but on the ability of the United States and its allies to deploy forces quickly. This related to the logistic capabilities to move forces quickly to the border with East Germany. An important part of NATO strategy therefore relied on the West German autobahns as a way to move both goods and people. Today, the Baltic region lacks any meaningful infrastructure in which reinforcements could be moved quickly to the region. Train lines are outdated and travel between the Baltics to Poland or further to Germany is painstakingly slow. The Baltic states also do not have any significant capabilities to host allied forces in large scale numbers, particularly as access to the area in a conflict scenario would be limited due to Russian air superiority and anti-access, area-denial capabilities. The large placement of U.S. forces in this sensitive area would no doubt invite reprisals and escalation from Russia. But showing the capabilities to quickly respond to a crisis by having the capacity to move resources to the region would enhance NATO’s deterrence in the long term. NATO should therefore consider developing its forces in Germany and even Poland, but with the added caveat of being able to move these forces quickly to where they are needed in the Baltics.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
AT: CPs › EU CP › Forward Presence CP
Klein et al. 19 [Colonel Robert M. Klein, Senior Military Fellow in the Center for Strategic Research (CSR), Institute for National Strategic Studies, at the National Defense University; Lieutenant Commander Stefan Lundqvist, Ph.D., Researcher and Faculty Board Member at the Swedish Defence University (SEDU); Colonel Ed Sumangil, USAF, Senior Military Fellow in CSR; Ulrica Pettersson, Ph.D., assigned to SEDU, Adjunct Faculty Member at Joint Special Operations University; 11-2019; "Baltics Left of Bang: The Role of NATO with Partners in Denial-Based Deterrence"; Strategic Forum 301, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University; https://inss.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/stratforum/SF-301.pdf; KL]
As outlined, the RAND scenario leaves NATO with a series of bad options. To deter Russia from such a gambit, the Alliance could deploy ground forces forward in sufficient numbers to defend the Baltics. To this end, the U.S. Army has begun rotating brigade combat teams through the Baltics, and NATO has developed what it calls the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force, a rapid reinforcement capability in the Baltics in the event of a major crisis.4 However, under most likely scenarios, deploying additional conventional ground forces to the Baltics for forward defense is problematic, even if they could arrive in time and in sufficient numbers. First, it remains unclear whether these forces would have the intended deterrent effect. They might instead escalate tensions and stoke Russian aggression because Moscow seems likely to view additional NATO forces in the Baltics as a threat to Kaliningrad and perhaps St. Petersburg. Second, although additional conventional Alliance forces in the Baltics would undoubtedly drive up the costs of conventional attack by Russia, the entire region is one gigantic kill zone where Russia could immediately target NATO forces at the onset of hostilities, including vulnerable assembly areas, supplies, and fuel stocks. Russian attacks emanating through Kaliningrad, from Russia itself, over the sea, and likely from Belarus would almost certainly render additional prepositioned NATO forces vulnerable—at best delaying inevitable Russian victory or at worst dealing the Alliance an overwhelming defeat with very negative political repercussions for NATO.5
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
AT: CPs › EU CP › Forward Presence CP
Kühn 18 [Ulrich Kühn, nonresident scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and a senior research associate at the Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation (VCDNP)/James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, based in Vienna, Austria. Previously, he was a Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow with Carnegie’s Nuclear Policy Program, and a fellow with the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg (IFSH). He holds a PhD (summa cum laude) in political sciences from Hamburg University, an MA in Peace Research and Security Policy from Hamburg University, and a Magister Artium in medieval and newer history as well as German literature from the Rheinische Friedrich Wilhelms University Bonn. His current research focuses on NATO-Russian relations, transatlantic security, nuclear and conventional deterrence and arms control, and the proceedings of the OSCE. Kühn worked for the German Federal Foreign Office and was awarded United Nations Fellow on Disarmament in 2011. He is the founder and a permanent member of the trilateral Deep Cuts Commission and an alumnus of the ZEIT Foundation Ebelin und Gerd Bucerius; 3-28-2018; “NATO’s Options”; Preventing Escalation in the Baltics: A NATO Playbook, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; https://carnegieendowment.org/files/Kuhn_Baltics_INT_final_WEB.pdf; KL]
If NATO wants to deny Russia the ability to successfully attack one or more Baltic states, it has little choice but to deploy forces on a much larger scale than it currently does. Such forces could be deployed gradually to avoid giving Russia a casus belli and to make such deployments more palatable to skeptical NATO members. The 2017 RAND study proposed deployments of around 35,000 personnel, with an additional reinforcement capability of up to about 70,000 personnel;1 this would certainly prevent a Russian military fait accompli and force Moscow to fight a bloody and drawn-out conventional war, should it attack. These deployments would also, perhaps, eliminate most of the difficulties—and some of the resulting escalation pathways—that stem from the alliance’s current need to reinforce troops rapidly and on a large scale in a crisis. In addition, these troop deployments would raise the costs to Moscow of deliberately forcing a military crisis with NATO.
While such measures might mitigate the short-term risk of deliberate Russian escalation, they would create a number of severe political trade-offs. First, a deterrence-by-denial approach would risk overstretching the delicate political consensus among NATO members about conventional deterrence and assurance. A number of member states, perhaps led by Germany and France, would not support such a policy and would seek to block it. Even more importantly, perhaps, not even the Baltic states are supportive of such a maximalist approach. While many Baltic officials and experts would like to see greater U.S. military engagement in the region, some of them are highly skeptical of the assumptions underlying the RAND war games and think that they are too pessimistic about Baltic defenses. While they would like to see a strong, unified allied response to the growing threat from Russia, they also recognize the need to avoid unnecessarily escalating general tensions with Russia.2 Also, against the background of often contentious debates within NATO about financial and military burden sharing, it would not be clear at all who would provide the necessary funds and forces for such a large military footprint. Neither the United States nor most other allies currently seem to be both willing and capable.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
AT: CPs › EU CP › EU-NATO CP---Norway
Bjonnes 21 [Roar Bjonnes, co-founder of Systems Change Alliance, long-time environmental activist and a writer on ecology and alternative economics, which he terms eco-economics; 4-23-2021, dated with Wayback Machine; "Why Norway Refused to Join the EU"; Systems Change Alliance; https://systemschangealliance.org/why-norway-refused-to-join-the-eu/; KL]
In 1972, the streets of Norway were filled with protests against the EU when by referendum a majority of Norwegian voters rejected EU membership. The same situation repeated itself in 1994. Throughout the years, opposition against the EU has been dominated by political groups from the centre-left, and especially by farmers, fishermen, and workers on the coasts and in the north. These early protests against the EU reflected, with almost farsighted precision, many of the same topics discussed today in countries like Portugal, Greece and Ireland: lack of democracy, lack of economic justice, lack of freedom and independence, and lack of concerns for the environment.
According to the Norwegian movement against the EU (Neitil EU), which has been active for the past four decades, the main reasons for remaining an independent nation are as follows:
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
AT: CPs › EU CP › EU-NATO CP---Britain
Valero 22 [Jorge Valero, Bloomberg reporter; 7-6-2022; "EU’s Sefcovic Signals Possible Trade Retaliation on Brexit Plan"; Bloomberg; https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-07-06/uk-plan-on-brexit-seriously-harms-eu-s-interests-sefcovic-says; KL]
The European Union’s chief Brexit negotiator signaled the bloc could impose retaliatory trade measures on the UK over its planned legislation to override parts of the withdrawal agreement, saying the proposal “seriously harmed” the bloc’s interests.
Maros Sefcovic told lawmakers in Strasbourg that if the bill put forward by Boris Johnson’s government is adopted as drafted, “of course in that case we would be forced to use the measures at our disposal, including the measures” in the Trade and Cooperation Agreement, known as the TCA.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
AT: CPs › EU CP › EU---Canada
Lacroix 16 [Rejeanne Lacroix, research assistant at the Fund for Peace. She holds a Bachelor of Arts in Political Science from Laurentian University in Ontario, Canada and a Master of Arts in International Security Studies from the University of Leicester, United Kingdom. Due to her Slavic maternal heritage, her area of focus is the post-Soviet space and the Balkans where she has contributed widely on de facto states, frozen conflicts, counter-extremism programming and state-building initiatives. Réjeanne has numerous academic publications under her belt ranging from Russian counter-terrorism financing policy, intelligence cultures of Central Asian states, and national security issues. In addition, Réjeanne has a keen interest in compliance and responsible business practices in fragile states and their relation to security.; 12-17-2016; "Guns versus Butter in the Baltics: How Canada Can Help"; NATO Association of Canada Association (NAOC); https://natoassociation.ca/guns-versus-butter-in-the-baltics-how-canada-can-help/; KL]
As Canada prepares to accept a leadership role in NATO operations in Latvia in 2017, it is apparent that Western powers prioritize military strength as the primary method to counter Russian aggression. Modern security threats are a nuanced consolidation of variables. The dichotomy of ‘guns or butter’, or the debate between military force and economic development, is representative of NATO’s mission in the Baltic States. Canadian-led military forces may prevent external Russian incursions but responsibility rests with the individual Baltic States to rectify any concerns from ethnic Russian populations within their borders.
National security concerns over Russian diaspora became prominent once analysts alleged that Russian hybrid warfare techniques would foment separatist sentiments in populations in Russia’s Near Abroad. After the annexation of Crimea and the ongoing conflict in southeastern Ukraine, such circumstances did not seem far-fetched. It is assumed that Russia’s northern neighbours are the next targets of its perceived neo-imperialism due to their relatively small geographic size and substantial ethnic Russian populations. (Estonia 24 %, Latvia 26 %, and Lithuania 6%)
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
AT: CPs › EU CP › EU---Britain
Simms and Clarke 21 [Brendan Simms, director of the Centre for Geopolitics at Cambridge University; Charles Clarke, Labour politician who served as home secretary from 2004 to 2006; 2-10-2021; "Why Britain matters in Europe"; ; https://www.newstatesman.com/politics/scotland/2021/02/why-britain-matters-europe; KL]
For centuries the United Kingdom has played different roles across Europe, as trading partner, military ally and deadly adversary. Yet nowhere has the relationship been more prolonged and pivotal than in the Baltic Sea. From the heights of medieval trade with the region to its role today as a base for Nato troops, British interests are rooted in Europe’s north-eastern periphery.
The importance of this relationship is unlikely to wane following Britain’s departure from the European Union. The government claims the UK will henceforth pursue a destiny called “Global Britain”. But Britain’s links to the rest of Europe will not only continue to be important, they will become even more so. The EU and the UK are now each other’s most significant neighbour. Britain has a much larger economy than either Russia and Turkey, and offers a potential “soft power” challenge to the EU that Vladimir Putin and Recep Tayyip Erdogan can only dream of.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
AT: CPs › EU CP › EU---Britain
Gallardo 22 [Cristina Gallardo, POLITICO reporter; 3-8-2022; "Baltics look to Britain to firm up NATO support"; POLITICO; https://www.politico.eu/article/baltics-uk-security-nato-fears-russia-attack/; KL]
LONDON — Amid fears they could be Russia’s next target, the Baltic countries hope Britain can amplify their calls for more military support from NATO.
Security cooperation between the U.K. and the three Baltic states — Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania — has long been regarded as strong and unaffected by the drama of Brexit.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
AT: CPs › EU CP › EU CP
Rzegocki and Ahmed 22 [SaraJane Rzegocki, Program Assistant with the Democratic Resilience Program at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA). She holds an M.A. in Political Science with a concentration in European Union Policy Studies from James Madison University; Alvina Ahmed, Project Assistant with the Atlantic Council’s Transatlantic Security Initiative, part of the Scowcroft Center for Security and Strategy. Previously, she was an intern with the Democratic Resilience Program at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA); 6-27-2022; "No Time for EU-NATO Squabbling as Russian Threat Nears"; CEPA; https://cepa.org/no-time-for-eu-nato-squabbling-as-russian-threat-nears/; KL]
But while unity in condemning the Kremlin’s action among Western nations has been strong, the ability of the EU and NATO to work together to reinforce transatlantic and European security architecture remains in question.
In the late 1990s, the EU’s aspiration to become less dependent on NATO clashed with transatlantic security priorities. Madeleine Albright, then US Secretary of State, warned that European defense must not de-link from NATO, duplicate existing defense efforts or discriminate against non-EU members. Debates over the EU’s strategic autonomy have continued ever since, with member states such as France arguing for greater leadership in European defense, while US administrations complained Europe had been too reliant on American support. Although neither side advocated for European defense completely independent from NATO, debates over greater strategic autonomy and burden sharing have strained transatlantic relations. And despite the US shift of its defense posture to Asia to confront China, administrations have remained dubious over activities outside the Transatlantic alliance.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
AT: CPs › EU CP › EU CP
Meijer and Brooks 21 [Hugo Meijer, CNRS Research Fellow at Sciences Po, Center for International Studies, and the director of the European Initiative for Security Studies; Stephen G. Brooks, a professor of government at Dartmouth College; 4-20-2021; "Illusions of Autonomy: Why Europe Cannot Provide for Its Security If the United States Pulls Back"; MIT Press; https://direct.mit.edu/isec/article/45/4/7/100571/Illusions-of-Autonomy-Why-Europe-Cannot-Provide; KL]
If the United States were to pull back from Europe, it remains to be seen whether the Europeans could rely on a “Europeanized” NATO, in which the integrated structures would stay in place but without the United States.115 Military planning and C2 require a clear chain of command. When NATO was created, Europeans agreed to be under U.S. military command, rather than attempting the far more difficult task of agreeing to be under the command of another European country or group of European states. More generally, as the hegemonic power in NATO, the United States has facilitated institutionalized cooperation among Europeans and helped partly contain Europe’s strategic cacophony.116 For decades, a U.S.-led NATO has been the overarching shaper of national defense policies and military transformation in Europe, helping overcome coordination and collective-action problems.117 In light of Europe’s deep-seated strategic divisions, a U.S. disengagement would amplify these coordination and collective action problems (assuming NATO survived) and would further hinder institutionalized, intra-European defense cooperation at all levels: strategies and doctrines; training; operational learning; interoperability; and joint capability development. Likewise, without the United States, the persistent and profound divergence of threat perceptions and strategic priorities among Europeans is likely to impede their capacity to agree on shared C2 structures for conducting operations, except for the lowest end of the spectrum of conflict (e.g., peace support operations).118
As a result of strategic cacophony, the EU has, in fact, struggled mightily to create even the most minimal C2 structure. As Luis Simón underscores, “It has taken nearly 20 years of allegedly significant steps for the European Union to establish a ‘Military Planning and Conduct Capability’ composed of up to 25 staffers, devoted to assisting with the planning and conduct of so-called non-executive (i.e., training and assistance) missions,” with an advisory role only.119 Ultimately, given Europe’s deep-seated divergences, there is no basis for optimism that Europeans will be able to agree being under the permanent command of another European country for deterrence and defense or to consistently undertake effective institutionalized military cooperation without the enabling role played by the United States within NATO.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
AT: CPs › EU CP › EU CP
European defense and technological industrial base = EDTIB
Meijer and Brooks 21 [Hugo Meijer, CNRS Research Fellow at Sciences Po, Center for International Studies, and the director of the European Initiative for Security Studies; Stephen G. Brooks, a professor of government at Dartmouth College; 4-20-2021; "Illusions of Autonomy: Why Europe Cannot Provide for Its Security If the United States Pulls Back"; MIT Press; https://direct.mit.edu/isec/article/45/4/7/100571/Illusions-of-Autonomy-Why-Europe-Cannot-Provide; KL]
THE FRAGMENTATION OF EUROPE’S DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL BASE
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
AT: CPs › EU CP › EU CP
Libicki 19. Martin C. Libicki is an American scholar and Professor at the Frederick S. Pardee RAND Graduate School in Santa Monica, California; “For a Baltic Cyberspace Alliance?”; 2019 11th International Conference on Cyber Conflict; //BY
One such institution is the EU. Because cyberattacks can influence economic and political well-being, there is a natural compatibility between the EU’s mission and collective action to help promote cybersecurity. Certain critical infrastructures under threat from cyberattack, notably the electric grid, span the EU. Correspondingly, the EU is a vital participant in whole-of-infrastructure protection efforts. But cyber security is not just a matter of hardening networks and systems. It involves intelligence to understand how and why such systems may be attacked and it may 13 involve active defenses to stymie imminent and ongoing cyberattacks.23 There may also be circumstances where reprisals may be called for; even if some reprisals such as economic sanctions can be organized under EU auspices,24 those that involve cyber operations are, again, incompatible with the EU’s purpose. Intelligence, active defenses, and retaliatory cyberattacks are, instead, actions of national security communities. The question of membership in the Baltic cyberspace alliance involves tradeoff: more members means more clout but also less focus and possibly less consensus. As noted, Norway and the Netherlands may be useful members of such an alliance even though neither abuts the Baltic. What about France? On the one hand, France’s emphasis on cyberspace25 looks much like Germany’s, and the bilateral relationship between France and Germany can be understood as the cornerstone of Europe’s stability. On the other hand, geography (e.g., distance from Russia) and history (e.g., former colonies) may lead France to different perspectives from Germany on the Russian threat from cyberspace. What about the UK? On the one hand, the UK government’s skepticism regarding Russian intentions is well understood, and its GCHQ brings considerable assets to the fight in cyberspace. But the UK is part of the Five Eyes group; thus, any intelligence-sharing arrangement the UK has with Baltic states necessary means similar intelligence-sharing arrangements with all the other Five Eyes members (notably, the United States), who may be uncomfortable with such sharing. Furthermore, the advantage of ambiguity afforded by having two independent alliances taking on Russia in cyberspace would be vitiated if both alliances contained the same member
The EU can’t deploy C4ISR, interoperability. It’ll take decades or more.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
AT: DAs › BBB › Aff
Can be retagged as a thumper for midterms
Romm and Stein 7-15 (Education: American University, BA in Journalism Tony Romm is the congressional economic policy reporter at The Washington Post, tracking infrastructure reform, government spending and the financial impacts of federal decision-making nationwide. Romm previously covered the tech industry for about 12 years, chronicling the myriad ways that tech companies like Apple, Facebook and Google navigate the corridors of government -- and the regulations that sometimes result. In his time at The Post, where he last served as senior technology policy reporter, he broke many of the most resonant stories on the beat, revealing once-secret information about state and federal probes into Silicon Valley’s largest firms. Romm arrived at The Post in 2018, after previously serving as a senior technology reporter for Politico and a senior editor for policy and politics at Recode, a tech business news site owned by Vox Media. Romm is also an on-air contributor to NBC News and MSNBC. Education: Cornell University, BA in history Jeff Stein is the White House economics reporter for The Washington Post. Since joining The Washington Post in November 2017, he has covered the Republican tax law; the government shutdown; and the administration's economic response to the coronavirus, among other topics. In 2014, he founded the local news nonprofit the Ithaca Voice in Upstate New York. The Ithaca Voice has a full-time staff of reporters and remains the best publication in the city. “Manchin says he won’t support new climate spending or tax hikes on wealthy”, https://www.washingtonpost.com/us-policy/2022/07/14/manchin-climate-tax-bbb/)LR
Sen. Joe Manchin III (D-W.Va.) told Democratic leaders Thursday he would not support an economic package this month that contains new spending on climate change or new tax increases targeting wealthy individuals and corporations, marking a massive setback for party lawmakers who had hoped to advance a central element of their agenda before the midterm elections this fall. The major shift in negotiations — confirmed by two people familiar with the matter who spoke on the condition of anonymity to describe the talks — threatened to upend the delicate process to adopt the party’s signature economic package seven months after Manchin scuttled the original, roughly $2 trillion Build Back Better Act, which President Biden had endorsed. But Manchin told Democratic leaders he is open to provisions that aim to lower prescription drug costs for seniors, the two people said. And the West Virginia moderate expressed support with Senate Majority Leader Charles E. Schumer (D-N.Y.), the party’s chief negotiator, for extending subsidies that could help keep health insurance costs down for millions of Americans, one of the sources said. “Political headlines are of no value to the millions of Americans struggling to afford groceries and gas as inflation soars to 9.1 percent,” said Sam Runyon, a spokeswoman for Manchin. “Senator Manchin believes it’s time for leaders to put political agendas aside, reevaluate and adjust to the economic realities the country faces to avoid taking steps that add fuel to the inflation fire.” The stunning setback late Thursday came despite weeks of seemingly promising negotiations between Schumer and Manchin in pursuit of a broader deal that would have delivered on the promises that secured Democrats control of both chambers of Congress and the White House in 2020. Without Manchin, the party cannot proceed in the narrowly divided Senate, since Democrats need all 50 votes in the caucus, plus Vice President Harris’s tiebreaking vote, to use the special process known as budget reconciliation to overcome Republicans’ expected filibuster. Democrats see hope for spending deal with Manchin as Congress returns. To win over Manchin, Democrats already had agreed to surrender their most prized spending proposals, from offering paid family and medical leave to providing child care, free prekindergarten and tax benefits to low-income Americans. But their cuts still proved insufficient for the austerity-minded moderate, who in recent days grew ever more skittish amid reports of record-high prices. This week, new data showed that inflation rose at its highest rate in roughly 40 years, prompting Manchin to tell reporters Wednesday that he would be “cautious” about any new federal spending. But Manchin’s new opposition leaves Democrats in a difficult political bind: They must decide between pressing him after months of false starts or accepting what would still be significant changes to the law lowering health care costs. A package addressing health care, for example, could spare roughly 13 million people from higher insurance costs in January if lawmakers act swiftly. Manchin has endorsed a two-year extension. Similar trade-offs previously prompted Biden’s top aides to deliver a stinging rebuke of Manchin, though the White House late Thursday did not immediately respond to a request for comment.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
AT: DAs › USICA › Aff
Desiderio and Ferris 7-11 ( Andrew Desiderio is a congressional reporter for POLITICO, covering the Senate, national security and foreign policy. He previously covered House investigations and oversight of the Trump administration. He joined POLITICO from The Daily Beast, where he covered Congress with a focus on national security, foreign affairs and Senate campaigns. He previously worked at BBC News and RealClearPolitics. He is a graduate of The George Washington University’s School of Media and Public Affairs, where he studied journalism and Italian language and literature. He hails from Philadelphia and is a proud Philly sports fan. Sarah Ferris covers the House for POLITICO’s Congress team, focusing on the Democratic caucus. She has covered Capitol Hill for six years, including stints focused on budget and health care policy for POLITICO Pro and The Hill newspaper. A graduate of the George Washington University, Ferris spent most of her time writing for The GW Hatchet. She has also written for outlets including The Washington Post, the Houston Chronicle and the Center for Investigative Reporting. “McConnell gets GOP backup in his move to snarl bipartisan U.S.-China bill”, https://www.politico.com/news/2022/07/11/republican-us-china-bill-00045232)LR
McConnell gets GOP backup in his move to snarl bipartisan U.S.-China bill. Senate Republicans are lining up to back Minority Leader Mitch McConnell as he threatens to tank multi-billion-dollar legislation aimed at confronting China, imperiling what initially appeared on track to join this Congress’ biggest bipartisan achievements. McConnell’s threat, sent via tweet while senators were away from Washington, was aimed at derailing Democrats’ fledgling efforts to revive their party-line tax and climate bill, which all Republicans are expected to oppose. Although the Kentucky Republican supported the U.S.-China competition bill, known by some as USICA, he’s now vowing to block it if Democrats move forward with their separate legislation. The move jostled lawmakers from both parties. But even Republicans who toiled on the now-at-risk competitiveness bill are behind him. “USICA is a national security imperative,” said Sen. John Cornyn (R-Texas), whose effort to spur microchip production is included in the legislation. “I interpreted that as Sen. McConnell’s firm indication that he wants us to deal with that and not a partisan reconciliation bill.” Top Democrats say they are unrattled by a McConnell maneuver widely viewed as a last-ditch effort to sink a party-line spending bill that could help them dismantle much of the GOP’s 2017 tax cuts. Moving forward with the tax and climate bill as they brush off McConnell’s posture, Democrats insist the GOP leader has little leverage over their cross-Capitol talks. After three months, negotiators from both parties and both chambers are still finalizing a China competition bill that bridges differences between the House- and Senate-passed versions. The Senate passed its version more than a year ago, with nearly every Democrat and 19 Republicans voting yes. Democrats insist that Republicans who previously backed USICA wouldn’t suddenly oppose it simply because they’re pursuing priorities they’ve gone after since they took power on the Hill. But if their bet goes sour, some Democrats privately acknowledge they have at least one plan B, even if they’re not prepared to use it yet: Ditching cross-aisle bicameral talks altogether and sending the Senate-approved version through the House. On Monday, McConnell argued that a party-line spending bill will “crowd out” the Senate’s ability to pass USICA and “paralyze” the chamber. Cornyn indicated that he wasn’t particularly worried about USICA going by the wayside, citing Democrats’ months-long failure to reach an agreement on their unilateral spending bill — though majority-party senators involved in the talks are hinting at progress in the latest round of talks. Democrats say it shouldn’t be a zero-sum choice between two substantively different bills. They point to McConnell’s own insistence that last year’s bipartisan infrastructure bill proceed separately from an earlier, $1.7 trillion version of this summer’s party-line spending plan. “The right question is how ridiculous is it to kill a bill that you say you like because there’s a different negotiation about a different thing,” Sen. Brian Schatz (D-Hawaii) said. “There’s just no way you can govern that way.” Even before McConnell’s tweet, a growing number of battleground-district House Democrats had been pressuring party leaders to simply take up the Senate version, eager to tout the bipartisan victory back home and anxious that talks could break down fully before November.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
AT: DAs › A2: Politics
Grassley 22 [Chuck Grassley, 3-30-2022, "Grassley, Durbin Introduce Legislation to Strengthen Security and Economic Cooperation with the Baltics amid Russian Aggression", No Publication, https://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/news-releases/grassley-durbin-introduce-legislation-to-strengthen-security-and-economic-cooperation-with-the-baltics-amid-russian-aggression, DOA: 7-20-2022 //ArchanSen]
“Not only do I have strong personal ties to the region, but the Baltic countries are essential NATO partners in upholding democratic values abroad,” said Durbin. “Our bill deters Russia from extending Putin’s war into NATO territory, strengthens our partnerships with the Baltics, and enhances their capabilities as critical allies on NATO’s eastern flank. I remain steadfast in my support for the Baltic States as they work to combat Russian aggression as well as Chinese economic pressure.”
More than four million Ukrainians have fled their country since February 24. The Senate unanimously passed a resolution cosponsored by Grassley condemning Russian President Vladimir Putin as a war criminal. In early February – before Putin attacked Ukraine – Grassley and Durbin met with the Lithuanian Delegation to discuss Russian aggression and the impact it would have on the region. Grassley has since led a number of additional efforts to support Ukraine and hold Putin accountable for this unprovoked war.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
AT: DAs › Thumpers
Mclaughlin 22 [Jenna Mclaughlin; NPR's cybersecurity correspondent, Gerald R. Ford Award for Reporting on the National Defense in 2019, finalist nomination in 2020 for the University of Michigan's Livingston Awards; 5-2-2022; "Estonia hosts NATO-led cyber war games, with one eye on Russia"; NPR; https://www.npr.org/2022/05/02/1095008257/estonia-nato-cyber-war-games-russia; KL]
TALLINN, Estonia — Two months after Russia's invasion of Ukraine, the cyberwar that experts feared has yet to materialize. But in the tiny Baltic nation of Estonia, digital disaster is playing out nicely. Over the last week, the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense Center of Excellence hosted the 10th edition of one of the world's largest annual interactive cybersecurity drills. Over 2,000 participants from 32 countries formed teams and logged in remotely to help defend regions of Berylia — an imaginary island nation in conflict with its Southern neighbor, Crimsonia — represented by organizers in Tallinn, Estonia's capital city. Participants included cybersecurity experts from governments and private companies, as well as academics. While the countries are fake, the threats are real — a subject of increasing attention as experts continue to warn Russia could launch destructive digital attacks on Ukraine and its allies in the West. A scarf with the Ukrainian flag colors is draped over a war hero statue next to the first Estonian armourd car in Tallin, Estonia. Nora Lorek for NPR Estonia's digital revolution In Estonia, where Russia launched one of the earliest destructive cyberattacks in 2007, things are even more serious. After Estonia gained independence from the former Soviet Union in 1991, its leaders pushed for a digital revolution, and today, almost all government and private services are online. During the cyber drills, teams were responsible for protecting those critical services, which were under constant attack. They were tasked with keeping the power grid running, responding to disinformation and propaganda over social media, and protecting a new 5G substation. Lauri Almann, co-Founder of CybExer and former Permanent Secretary of Defense, here at the Cyberex office with view of Old Town of Tallinn. Nora Lorek for NPR Merle Maigre, senior cybersecurity expert at Estonia's E-Governance Academy and former head of NATO CCDCOE. Nora Lorek for NPR They also had to prevent any interference with a financial communication system similar to SWIFT, which allows for secure financial transactions between international banks. Russian banks have recently been banned from SWIFT in light of Russia's invasion. Finally, the exercise included defending remote work environments, an addition inspired by cybersecurity threats emerging from the Covid-19 pandemic. A hotel room as battleground During a tour of the exercise war room at a hotel in Tallinn, organizers from different teams told NPR about the different challenges the teams face. Beyond the technical, that also includes answering legal questions and responding to media requests, making strategic and political decisions, identifying and isolating digital threats as they were launched, and even working with other teams in case of an emergency, like connecting a failing power grid to a neighboring region to keep it online. The name of the exercise, Locked Shields, is inspired by the military concept of linking defenses and working together, explained exercise director Carry Kangur. Locked Shield Excercise at Hilton Tallinn Park. Nora Lorek for NPR Mehis Hakkaja, the founder and CEO of cybersecurity company Clarified Security, was the leader of the red team, or the attackers. He said his team's strategy was to launch distracting, unsophisticated attacks early in the exercise, like website defacements. Then they would slowly burrow their way into a team's office computers and infiltrate the rest of the network. That strategy is a mirror of what happens in the real world. For example, as Russia was launching early cyberattacks during the ongoing war in Ukraine, unsophisticated denial of service attacks on government websites drew attention while Russia was actually launching more destructive and subtle attacks, including deploying wiper malware on satellite servers and other Ukrainian government devices to render them inoperable. Fake targets, real malware The targets in the exercise, like the Berylia Institute of Virology, are fake, but the technology and the malware used to attack it are real. Some of the technology was donated by companies like Siemens, manufacturers of industrial infrastructure. Urmas Ruuto, the Chief of the Technology Branch at the NATO Cyber Center, helped design the game's systems. He showed reporters large screens representing the power grid in Berylia, the water purification system, voice over IP servers representing the phone lines, satellite communications channels, and a financial messaging system. It's easy to track how teams are doing. Siim Marvek, cyber conscript at CR14 Cyber Range. His uniform is made from pixels of photos of Estonian wilderness. Nora Lorek for NPR "If it turns red, that means there is trouble," said Ruuto. And if a team fails to protect its region from an attack on the power grid that would cause physical destruction in real life, the organizers will set off real firecrackers to represent the damage. For the first time this year, teams have to defend a new 5G substation, cutting edge technology that's caused controversy over recent years due to the Chinese company Huawei's ambitions to develop and monopolize its release. Currently, most phone companies claim to have released 5G, but are actually offering 4G with additional bandwidth, Ruuto explained. Additionally, teams faced a wider range of social media influence campaigns. In the war room, organizers in Tallinn had a green screen to film TikTok style videos at any point in the exercise, responding to teams as they posted their own messages. Dr. Adrian Venables, senior researcher at NATO CCDCOE, at the Locked Shield Excercise at Hilton Tallinn Park. Nora Lorek for NPR Estonia's cyber conscripts Siim Marvet is a trainee in Estonia's military Cyber Command unit. His job during the cyber drills was to monitor web logs for potentially suspicious code as well as making sure there was no evidence of website defacements or alterations of digital news articles during the exercise. A patc on Col. Jaak Tarien's uniform. Nora Lorek for NPR Col. Jaak Tarien, head of NATO CCDCOE. Nora Lorek for NPR In Estonia, a small nation on Russia's border, people are still conscripted into military training. Marvet is a cyber conscript, meaning he applied to do his military training with the cyber units, who not only work on computers but are trained in wilderness survival, which includes testing technology in the woods to make sure it would function during a potential conflict. Adrian Venables, the mastermind behind the plot of the cyberwar drill, explained that the scenario focused on disputes between the two imaginary islands and groups of smaller surrounding islands, as well as tensions between minority populations. He told NPR that he had no lack of real-world inspiration when drafting the story teams would engage with. He said he is already working on both the next exercise to take place in Estonia, an offensive cybersecurity drill called Crossed Swords, and next year's Locked Shields. The exercise "has been in the works for a year," explained Col. Jaak Tarien, the director of the NATO Cyber Center, during a briefing. "But the war in Ukraine has been going on since 2014. Russia has been attacking the power grid," for example, he said. Ukrainian businesses were also the target of a destructive attack later called NotPetya, which ultimately got loose and damaged companies around the world, costing billions of dollars in damages. The war unites hackers in the 'free world' The exercise organizers told NPR they were not surprised by Russia's ongoing digital attacks on Ukraine, though Col. Tarien said he was impressed by how Russia's invasion "has united hackers in the free world," referring to how hacktivists from around the world have joined forces with a new Ukrainian volunteer hacker army to target Russia. "It's quite unique," he said. Tarien also said Ukraine has been surprising Russia, both in its military defenses and its ability to fend off cyberattacks. According to Taurien, he still frequently communicates with his colleagues in Ukraine. "When I'm sending emails to them, they are coming back." The text Killnet Hacked You is removed from the outside The NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence. Killnet is Russian hacker group. Nora Lorek for NPR Tallinn, Old Town. Nora Lorek for NPR Despite the war, cybersecurity professionals from Ukraine partnered with a team from the United States to participate in the exercise. After some earlier resistance, Ukraine was recently invited to be a contributing member of the NATO Cyber Center, particularly given the valuable intelligence about Russian cyberattacks Ukrainian experts can provide. When the exercise concluded, a Finnish team won, earning the most points in both technical defending and strategic decision making. In Estonia, the target of one of the first major nation-on-nation cyberattacks from Russia, experts and average people alike recognize that digital attacks are a part of Russia's strategy. While cyberattacks haven't been as destructive as many expected in the war on Ukraine, Estonian officials warn that the threat has not been eliminated. "The fact of the matter is that the almighty cyber power of Russia did not roll out," Permanent Secretary Kusti Salm, the highest civilian defense official in Estonia, told NPR. "But clearly it would be extremely false to draw a conclusion that they are not capable."