2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Cyber Advantage Cards › Hybrid War Disinformation › Cyber---China
LRT 20 [Lithuanian National Radio and Television (LRT), the Lithuanian public broadcaster is the media group that is owned by the public; 5-13-2020; "Latvian intelligence names China, Russia a threat"; https://www.lrt.lt/en/news-in-english/19/1177615/latvian-intelligence-names-china-russia-a-threat; KL]
Latvia’s yearly security assessment named China a growing cyber and espionage threat, alongside risks posed by Russia’s historical revisionism and foreign policy. Warsaw Institute, a think tank in Poland, analyses the report.
Chinese influence in the Baltics
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Cyber Advantage Cards › Hybrid War Disinformation › Cyber---Hybrid
Wierenga 22 [Louis Wierenga, Junior Research Fellow, Johan Skytte Institute of Political Studies, University of Tartu | Lecturer in International Relations, Department of Political and Strategic Studies, Baltic Defence College; 2022; "Cybersecurity and Hybrid Threats in the Digital Baltic States: A state of the art"; Hybrid Threats in Baltics and Taiwan: Commonalities, Risks and Lessons for Small Democracies; https://www.baltdefcol.org/files/files/publications/Hybrid%20Threats_LIIA.pdf#page=58; KL]
In a very recent and insightful study on AI for digital warfare, Hageback and Hedblom (2022) in their synonymous monograph pose a fascinating question: what Clausewitz would have thought of digital warfare.1 Hageback and Hedblom (2022) then correctly note that the new digital technology which we are now in possession of has led way to a new digital sphere which substantially increases the speed, reach, stealth, precision, diffusion, and breadth of a potential attack.2 Much has changed in the realm of cybersecurity and cyberwar since academic literature first took note.
There is broad consensus amongst academics and policy makers that the nature of warfare and security is changing.3 While this is not disputed, and warfare changes and progresses with time, this claim should be placed within the broader notion of a changing geopolitical landscape and a multipolar world order and in light of Hageback and Hedblom’s (2022) aforementioned observation, relating to digital warfare and cyber conflict. Moreover, there is a growing consensus that within renewed great power competition, the likelihood of a ‘great power war’ is enough to resurrect old fears and direct contemporary security debates. Hybrid warfare usually precedes kinetic warfare or take place simultaneously.4 The targets of acts of hybrid aggression tend to be small states which are geographically near greater powers which seek to dominate them.5
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Cyber Advantage Cards › Hybrid War Disinformation › Cyber---Hybrid
Brooke and Stradner 22 [James Brooke, visiting fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies with a focus on Ukraine; Ivana Stradner, adviser at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies; 6-29-2022; "It’s Time for NATO to Help the Baltics "; The Dispatch; https://thedispatch.com/p/its-time-for-nato-to-help-the-baltics; KL]
A new flashpoint between NATO and Russia’s new expansionism flared up after Lithuania banned the transit of sanctioned goods from Russia to Kaliningrad, its exclave on the Baltic Sea, as part of the EU’s sanctions regime that took effect on June 17. Russia called Lithuania’s actions “hostile” and threatened “serious” consequences.
Undeterred, Lithuania this weekend blocked an EU motion that would have nullified the restrictions. Vilnius said that the EU must not succumb to Russian pressure and compromise on its sanctions package.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Cyber Advantage Cards › Hybrid War Disinformation › Cyber---Hybrid
Martin and Maynes 22 [Rachel Martin and Charles Maynes, NPR reporters; 6-30-2022; "Tensions are on the rise between Russian and Europe's Baltic region"; NPR.org; https://www.npr.org/2022/06/30/1108843823/tensions-are-on-the-rise-between-russian-and-europes-baltic-region; KL]
The Kremlin is threatening to retaliate against NATO member state Lithuania, after the Baltic state decided to block some goods into a Russian territory known as Kaliningrad.
RACHEL MARTIN, HOST:
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Cyber Advantage Cards › Hybrid War Disinformation
SEM = structural equation modeling method
Morkūnas 7-12 [Mangirdas Morkūnas, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, Vilnius University; 7-12-2022; "Russian Disinformation in the Baltics: Does it Really Work?"; Taylor & Francis; https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10999922.2022.2092976; KL]
Conclusions and discussion
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Cyber Advantage Cards › Hybrid War Disinformation
SEM = structural equation modeling method
Morkūnas 7-12 [Mangirdas Morkūnas, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, Vilnius University; 7-12-2022; "Russian Disinformation in the Baltics: Does it Really Work?"; Taylor & Francis; https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10999922.2022.2092976; KL]
Introduction
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Cyber Advantage Cards › Hybrid War Disinformation
Brent Eastwood 22, Now serving as 1945s New Defense and National Security Editor, Brent M. Eastwood, PhD, is the author of Humans, Machines, and Data: Future Trends in Warfare. He is an Emerging Threats expert and former U.S. Army Infantry officer, January 2022, "Forget Ukraine: Could Russia Invade And Conquer The Baltic States?" https://www.19fortyfive.com/2022/01/forget-ukraine-could-russia-invade-and-conquer-the-baltic-states/ //AShah
We’re Focused on Ukraine But Look Out For the Russian Threat to the Baltics: It was a shot heard around the world in the Russian military analysis community. A RAND Corporation simulated wargame in 2016 concluded that the Russian military could reach the suburbs of the Estonian and Latvian capitals of Tallinn and Riga in less than 60 hours. In the iterations of the exercise, the Estonians and Latvians would need at least seven brigades of troops that include at least three armored brigades to potentially fight the Russians to a standstill.
But it gets worse from here. In another RAND wargame in 2019, the players examined if NATO and Russia would use tactical nuclear weapons during a simulated war in the Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania). The scenario also had Russian conventional forces over-running capitals in the Balkans and NATO having the last fail-safe option to use non-strategic nuclear weapons.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Cyber Advantage Cards › Hybrid War Disinformation
Kols 2022, Rihards Kols Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee The Saeima (Parliament) of the Republic of Latvia (3/17/2022 “Hybrid Threats: The Baltic Perspective” https://www.csce.gov/sites/helsinkicommission.house.gov/files/RKols_Hybrid%20threats%20Baltic%20Perspective-2022.pdf
Since regaining our independence from the Soviet Union in 1990, Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia have been under constant Russian pressure. This pressure has manifested itself is through the conventional military threat, punctuated by ongoing airspace violations by Russian military aircraft and navy, unannounced, large-scale military exercises of inherently offensive nature along their borders, and the general disposition of Russia's military forces in regions closest to the Baltic borders, doing so under the pretence of counteracting the "hostile West" and promoting militarism. Influence, psychological, and information operations have been part of Russian doctrine since the early days of the Soviet Union, but historically they have been relegated to supporting roles. Nevertheless, as General Gerasimov has observed and thus included in the Russian military doctrine, non-kinetic are exceedingly practical, and these instruments will become dominant in future warfare. This is reflected in most current Russian foreign, security and defence policies and doctrinal documents. For years, the strategic goal of Russian information operations in the Baltic states has been to create distance between the Baltics and the West. The Russian concept is rooted in the idea that democratic societies are vulnerable to political manipulation, and exploiting this perceived weakness is far less costly than pursuing annexation or occupation. Consequently, Russian information operations in the Baltics focus on nine objectives: (1) Encourage and support armed actions by separatist groups to promote chaos and territorial disintegration; (2) Increase polarisation between elites and society to foment a crisis of values followed by process of orientation toward Russian values; (3) Demoralise the military and otherwise attrit resolve; (4) Undermine socioeconomic stability; (5) Engender socio-political crisis; (6) Intensify simultaneous forms and models of psychological warfare to demoralise the Baltic states' armed forces and population and break their resolve; (7) Incite mass panic and degrade confidence in crucial government institutions; (8) Defame political leaders not aligned with Russian interests; (9) and Undermine international alliances and partnerships.12 Russia seeks to achieve its strategic ends in the Baltics through influence operations rather than conventional means. Recognising resistance to deeper ties with Russia in the Baltics, Russia has diversified its messaging beyond pro-Russia content. Instead, the Russian strategy is to attempt to convince members of the population that their countries' current alignment with the West, embrace of democracy, and membership in NATO and the EU are in some way detrimental, degrading or dangerous. Russia heavily leverages Russian and local-language traditional media, social media, and the internet toward this end. There is no universally agreed definition of hybrid threats, considering that a wide range of activities falls under this term. Moreover, hybrid threats evolve constantly, and new means in hybrid warfare emerge. However, the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats defines hybrid threats as "an action conducted by state or non-state actors, whose goal is to undermine or harm a target by influencing its decision-making at the local, regional, state or institutional level. Such actions are coordinated and synchronised and deliberately target democratic states and institutions' vulnerabilities". 3 The use of hybrid tactics often is based on trying to undermine fundamental democratic values and liberties, and it is done under what some call a "chaos strategy". Russia sows chaos to achieve its agenda beyond its borders by deploying an array of hybrid warfare tools - hybrid warfare is a tactical application of the chaos strategy. Total spectrum warfare deploys a blend of conventional and nonconventional means to affect on the ground changes in target populations or territories while seeking to avoid direct military confrontation. Hybrid warfare is employed in a tailored way to sow chaos in target countries. Such efforts generally include irregular warfare, active measures, and special operations. Like the world, hybrid war is not static, and new tools are developed and employed constantly. For the Baltics, having lived in this environment for the majority of their lives, both under Soviet occupation and after regaining their countries' independence, this multi-vector warfare - hybrid warfare tactics and the chaos they attempt to create, have become intuitively recognisable and often seep into the background like white noise.4 From the perspective of the Baltic states, the development of hybrid threat-related policies at the EU or NATO level has been a natural consequence of the changing security landscape in Europe, especially the gradually deteriorating relations between the West and Russia. In the immediate aftermath of Russia's first attack on Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity, different hybrid attack scenarios against one of the three Baltic states were envisaged, e.g., Russia's attempt to overtake Narva, a city in the extreme eastern point of Estonia, where more than 80% of the population are ethnic Russians; or the so-called "little green men", armed soldiers without insignia that were seen in Crimea in March 2014, entering Latgale, the region in Latvia's east5 ; or Russia creating an incident linked to Kaliningrad – the Russian enclave on the Baltic sea wedged between Lithuania and Poland. In the event of any war between Russia and NATO countries, it is through this gap that NATO would have to rush reinforcements and supplies from Poland to the Baltic countries, and it is this gap that Russia would have to close to prevent that. Military strategists have long suggested that Russian forces from Belarus could attempt to punch across the narrow Lithuanian territory known as the Suwalki Gap to the Moscow-controlled enclave of Kaliningrad, effectively cutting off the three Baltic states. 6 These scenarios included Russia sending troops to "restore order" in case of an uprising in Kaliningrad or sabotaging the train lines across Lithuania that serve as a vital transit corridor from Russia. Because Baltic rail infrastructure is still primarily dominated by Soviet-era rails of a specific gauge width, one incompatible with the EU standard rail gauge width, the risks are substantial enough to cause concern. It has been considered that Russia could use the same pretext as in Ukraine, i.e., protection of the Russian-speaking minorities, to target one of the countries in the region, or rely on state-controlled Russian TV channels widely watched by ethnic Russians in the Baltics to spread propaganda and air true and imagined grievances.7
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Cyber Advantage Cards › Hybrid War Disinformation
Horchakova 2022, Veronika Horchakova Mykolas Romeris University, European and International Business Law program, Master’s degree student(“STRENGTHENING THE TRANSATLANTIC PARTNERSHIP: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE BALTIC STATES” https://repository.mruni.eu/bitstream/handle/007/18311/Teisines_minties_svente-97-107.pdf?sequence=1)
The other non-military threat for the Baltic region is Moscow’s use of the Russophone minority as political instruments against the West. For example, signs of warfare were identified when Russian-speaking inhabitants in Vilnius received brochures with disinformation on the economic situation in Lithuania and a call to participate in the resettlement of ethnic Russians from Lithuania to Russia.13 This kind of propaganda was also used in Ukraine to disrupt loyalty to the State. The Baltic countries need to create a “defensive shield” to fight against Russia’s disinformation and propaganda. Moscow’s primary goal is to form a positive opinion of Russia among local inhabitants by creating dissatisfaction with the relevant governments, shaping and misrepresenting historical facts, and exploiting the vulnerabilities of the Baltic’s political systems, economy, and society. Here the Lithuanian case can serve as a guide for the other two Baltic States and NATO members, too. The roots of the anti-Russian propaganda and disinformation campaign originated in 2016, when Lithuania introduced temporary bans on Russian media outlets that breached pre-existing media laws.14 Shortly after that, the Lithuanian parliament adopted an ordinance restricting Russian media production content on Lithuanian TV. In 2018, the Lithuanian parliament adopted new amendments to the Public Information Law. TV channels in Lithuania must translate TV programs into Lithuanian “if these programs are produced in Russian or other non-EU languages and broadcast for longer than one hour and a half.”15 Such restrictions are effective at diminishing the Russian influence, but are not a panacea. As for cyber security, the Baltic States have undertaken successful work in combating cyber-attacks. According to the International Telecommunication Union’s Global Cybersecurity Index 2020, among 194 countries, Estonia is ranked third after the US and the UK. Followed by the Russian Federation, Lithuania is the sixth-best cyber protected country. Latvia completes the list of the top 15.16 This ranking is based on five pillars: legal, technical, organizational, capacity building, and cooperation measurements related to cybersecurity. Since 2019, these countries have each had Cyber Security Strategies, but we have to consider that these rankings are not always reliable, and sometimes they do not represent reality in all its shapes. Despite establishing the NATO cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence in 2008 (hosted by Estonia), several commentators have criticized the real cyber warfare capabilities of NATO. In a 2019 interview, the former supreme allied commander of NATO, Adm. James Stavridis, USN (Ret.), warned that “in cyber, and cybersecurity, we have the greatest mismatch between the level of threat and level of preparation.”17 New asymmetric or technological threats require extensive cooperation not only within but also outside of the Alliance. The security and defence sectors in the Baltic States need to build partnerships with the private and academic sectors, all of which will need to cooperate with each other to maintain situational and technological awareness.18 It is clear that, in reality, the ongoing conflict between western countries and Russia does not take place inside tanks or submarines but behind a computer. Russia has massively increased its cyber warfare capabilities and is particularly strong in social manipulation and other cyber-attacks. In this context, there are signs of significant commitment over time to enable the Baltic countries to develop their national defence further. For example, the Baltic States have already signed a five-year roadmap of defence cooperation with the Pentagon,19 meaning that, by 2024, capability development and defence-related aid, training exercises, and cyber defence will be exercised with the US. Officials emphasized the benefits of this program and said that they look forward to its further development. Activated transatlantic relationships are the perfect opportunity for Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia to generate new partnership programs, agreements, and projects against Russian soft power.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Cyber Advantage Cards › Attacks coming now
Thibault Spirlet 22 [Thibault Spirlet, 7-17-2022, "'Is NATO going to fight?' Baltic States on brink of Putin's invasion as EU could cave in", Express.co.uk, https://www.express.co.uk/news/world/1641537/putin-russia-ukraine-war-news-nato-eu-nord-stream-1-sanctions-energy-vn, DOA: 7-18-2022 //ArchanSen]
NATO and the European Union might not get directly involved in a military confrontation with Russia, should Vladimir Putin decide to expand the conflict beyond Ukraine's borders, a former US Ambassador to Ukraine has warned. As Europe is suffering from the economic sanctions imposed on Russia with inflation propelling up prices across the continent, former Ambassador Herbst says it is becoming more likely Europe will cave in. The latest Russian threat is an energy blackmail through the Nord Stream 1 pipeline – currently closed because of maintenance – which may not reopen on the July 21 deadline, dropping Russian gas imports to close to zero – a scenario that could plunge the EU into an energy crisis.
When asked about the possibility of Putin expanding the war beyond Ukraine’s border, Ambassador Herbst told Express.co.uk: "He [Putin] has said he believes he should have a substantial influence in all the post-Soviet countries.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Cyber Advantage Cards › Attacks coming now
Heinrichs 22 [Rebeccah L Heinrichs and Timothy Walton., 7-8-2022, "NATO Must Back Lithuania Against Russian Coercion", No Publication, https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/nato-must-back-lithuania-against-russian-coercion/, DOA: 7-18-2022 //ArchanSen]
Within this context, deterrence could falter in some scenarios. There is a plausible – if still small – chance that Russia could notice US risk-aversion over enabling Ukraine to fight back too hard, and flagging Western support for Ukraine generally, and conclude that attacking a small NATO country would not result in a war with the US. Some may incredulously respond that such an outcome is impossible, because of course the US has the resolve to defend every inch of NATO. Even if the US has such resolve, for deterrence to hold, Moscow must believe that. Deterrence can fail if an aggressor decides that a defending country cannot or will not make good on its deterrent threats. Therefore, strong signals underscoring the US and broader NATO commitment to defend the Baltic states are in order, especially considering Germany’s denunciation of Lithuania’s sovereign decision to enforce EU sanctions on Russia.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Potential 1ac › Solvency
Horchakova 2022, Veronika Horchakova Mykolas Romeris University, European and International Business Law program, Master’s degree student(“STRENGTHENING THE TRANSATLANTIC PARTNERSHIP: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE BALTIC STATES” https://repository.mruni.eu/bitstream/handle/007/18311/Teisines_minties_svente-97-107.pdf?sequence=1)
In conclusion, taking into account the current geopolitical situation and the number of commitments in the international arena, the Baltic States are likely to remain strong US allies and important US security partners in Europe. Analysts believe that close cooperation between the United States and the Baltic States will continue for the foreseeable future in areas such as efforts to deter potential Russian aggression, the future of NATO, energy security, and socioeconomic issues. As long as there are objective fears of peace demolition, NATO is interested in deepening cooperation with like-minded countries. There is still work to be done within the Baltic region to strengthen resistance to Russian propaganda and maintain sovereignty and determination towards pro-European standards in the socio-economic field. This work will follow, for instance, the example of banning Russian propaganda in the media. To achieve this, the Baltic States will likely continue to rely on the United States for leadership on foreign policy and security issues. This can be seen from current partnership programs devoted to enhancing defence power and providing training and an educational practicum. This reliance is not only from the side of the Baltic region; it is seen as a reciprocal one. For instance, there are climate change issues where Lithuania can share its experience and the best approaches to green ecology with the United States, and the US may be more eager to cooperate with Lithuania. Moreover, in terms of geopolitics, the United States should try to defeat China’s attempts to collaborate with US allies on the same issues. On successfully implementing and finalising those partnership activities, further steps will be taken to proceed with cooperation. In short, the United States’ commitment to Baltic security is part of the US commitment to European security, and the former would not and cannot exist without the latter. As new challenges are emerging, more efforts should be made to guarantee these commitments, thus strengthening transatlantic ties concerns building this partnership, reinforcing power, and preventing threats. This attitude undoubtedly appears to be beneficial for both sides.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Potential 1ac › Solvency
Cyberattacks in general too
Pernik 21 (Piret, is a researcher at the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE). She has researched cybersecurity strategic and policy aspects since 2013. She has published research reports and analyses on cyber resilience, military 5G security, cyber commands, and cyber defence training. She is also a co-editor of the volume Cyber Threats and NATO 2030: Horizon Scanning and Analysis, published by the CCDCOE. Her articles have been published in academic journals and she has written book chapters, as well as online commentaries. She holds an MA in Social Sciences from the University of Tallinn, and an MA in International Relations and European Studies from the Central European University, Budapest. “Cyber deterrence: A case study on Estonia’s policies and practice”, https://www.hybridcoe.fi/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/20211012_Hybrid_CoE_Paper_8_Cyber_deterrence_WEB.pdf)LR
Estonia does not have a standalone policy of cyber deterrence, but strategic documents relating to national security, foreign policy and cybersecurity describe diverse components of cyber deterrence. Cybersecurity is deemed a part of foreign, security and defence policy, as well as domestic/internal security. It is also included in strategic documents and policies concerning digital modernization, technology, education and research, and so forth. The review and analysis of Estonia’s strategic documents associated with cybersecurity (presented in Annex I) shows that two concepts – cross-domain deterrence and cyber deterrence – play an important role in the government’s cybersecurity discourse. Three layers of deterrence – entanglement and norms, denial and punishment – are equally upheld. Generally speaking, the analysis demonstrates that in the Estonian national security discourse, deterrence by denial and punishment tend to be conceptualized in the context of national security and defence policy; entanglement and norms in the context of foreign policy and cyber diplomacy; and denial (domestic defence/resilience) in the context of digital and technology policies. In the latest strategy (2019–2022), cyber deterrence is referenced almost as frequently as in the 2014–2017 document, apart from the fact that cross-domain deterrence and military deterrence are not mentioned. Rather, concerns about challenges relating to digital modernization and technology policies come to the fore in this strategy. The last column of Table 2 provides examples of how a deterrence tool has been implemented. To strengthen its cyber diplomacy capacity, Estonia established a position in 2018 for an ambassador-at-large for cybersecurity. Estonia is one of the leaders among the Baltic and Nordic countries when it comes to cyber diplomacy. It has been a member of the UN Group of Governmental Experts for many years, and is also a leader in cyber diplomacy education for foreign diplomats.35 As a member of the UN Security Council in 2020– 2021, in June 2021 Estonia organized for the first time in the Council’s history an open meeting on cybersecurity, where it raised the issue of state behaviour in cyberspace in the context of international peace and security.36 Since 2008, Estonia has hosted the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE), which sponsors the publication of world-renowned scholarly works on international law applicable to cyberspace – the Tallinn Manuals 1.0 (2013), 2.0 (2017), and the forthcoming volume 3.0.37 Deterrence by denial, conceptualized in Estonia primarily as domestic defence/resilience measures, is foundational for the country’s cybersecurity posture.38 Deterrence in this area includes a full spectrum of activities prescribed in the national cybersecurity strategies, in cybersecurity legislation and other relevant ministerial regulations. Some of the resilience-related objectives have remained constant since 2008, such as applying measures to harden networks (for example, standards, risk analysis and management tools, incident response, raising awareness, building cybersecurity capacity and competence, to name a few).39 In June 2021, Estonia published its first national information security standard entitled E-ITS, which is a guideline for public and private network owners and operators to ensure minimum security standards.40 The Estonian Information System Authority regularly alerts stakeholders and the general public to cyber threats, vulnerabilities and exploits, and helps them to protect their networks. These activities contribute to deterrence by denial by increasing the ability to protect networks and recover from cyber incidents. Public attribution can be regarded as a tool for deterrence.46 Indeed, among Estonian experts, public attribution is regarded as a primary tool of cyber deterrence.47 As noted by scholars, one aim of public attribution is the act of norm-setting – that is, establishing “the rules of the road” and subsequently enforcing appropriate behaviour in cyberspace (response measures).48 In a similar manner, the Estonian government holds that “public statements on attribution can be made, with the aim of increasing accountability in cyberspace and emphasising the importance of adhering to international law obligations and norms of responsible state behaviour”.49 The Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs subscribes to the opinion that “public attribution […] allows states to send clear messages and shape expectations that malicious cyberspace operations will not be tolerated” and “it is necessary to send a message that harmful cyberspace operations are not part of acceptable state behaviour”.50 In other words, Estonia directly links public attribution to setting cyber norms, thus connecting deterrence by entanglement and norms to legal consequences, namely deterrence by punishment. According to this view, Estonia supports public attribution and collective measures “where possible” and “public attribution and messaging are tools for deterring and responding […] but also for raising wider awareness”.51 To support collective public attribution and to hold violators responsible, Estonia actively contributes to EU and NATO cyber deterrence discussions, and belongs to the US-led international cyber deterrence initiative.52 Based on the Estonian case study, a policy recommendation for EU and NATO countries is to apply a three-layered deterrence model.73 First, EU and NATO countries should participate in entanglement and norms measures such as cyber diplomacy and capacity-building globally. Second, they should invest more in denial measures and, third, jointly develop policies for punitive response options, including developing public attribution procedures to enable quick attribution, and systematically implementing sanctions regimes. It would be feasible to establish memoranda of understanding, and operational- and technical-level frameworks to radically improve information- and intelligence-sharing. Participation in cyber defence and crisis management exercises should be open to like-minded NATO partner countries. Joint bilateral cyberspace operations likewise contribute to mutual trust-building and information-sharing, and increase parties’ operational and technical competence.74 Operational- and technical-level joint activities should be regularly practised among allies and with like-minded partners as they contribute to deterrence by denial. Given that NATO’s cyber With regard to deterrence by denial, Estonia, together with other EU and NATO countries, should develop a zero trust security strategy and architecture.75 Zero trust is a cybersecurity paradigm that treats networks as untrusted, and that moves defences from static, network-based perimeters to focus on users, assets, and resources. It assumes that there is no implicit trust granted to user accounts or assets in any network segment (including a corporate local area network), and applies authentication and authorization before a session is established.76 While deterrence might work at the high end, novel security principles should be implemented by governments because deterrence is not sufficient to deter cyberattacks. Estonia’s public attribution guidelines serve as a blueprint for other countries to attribute cyberattacks and impose meaningful costs. A sharper focus on responses to high- and low-end cyberattacks should be developed in the future along with concrete deterrence actions and tools for individual 75 For example, the US government has released a strategy, architecture and maturity model that the US federal government agencies will implement: ‘Moving the U.S. Government Towards Zero Trust Cybersecurity Principles’, The White House, https://zerotrust.cyber.gov/. 76 Scott Rose, Oliver Borchert, Stu Mitchell and Sean Connelly, ‘Zero Trust Architecture SP 800-207’, August 2020, NIST, https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-207/final. 77 ‘Nye, Deterrence and Dissuasion in Cyberspace’, p. 62. sectors and target types. For example, deterrence tools can differ for diverse targets: internet voting and e-health systems would be targeted by different cyber threat actors that have political or criminal motives, and the same tool is not effective across all actors. Estonia’s forms of cyber deterrence are not effective individually, nor every time, but when implemented together in a whole-of-society approach, and systematically over a longer period of time, it is likely that many malicious cyberattacks can be deterred. As Joseph Nye pointed out, deterrence tools “can complement one other in affecting actors’ perceptions of the costs and benefits of particular actions”.77 Certainly, one cannot deter all cyberattacks – especially those conducted as part of malicious influencing campaigns below the threshold of the use of force – however, it is possible to reduce the number and effect of strategic cyberspace operations. It is likely that punitive responses may deter hostile actors from conducting similar attacks in the future. It will remain to be seen whether the EU and NATO can deter cyberattacks both above and below the threshold of an armed attack better in the future when they apply systematically stronger punitive responses.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Potential 1ac › Solvency
David Shedd 20, professor at the Patrick Henry College, former acting director of the Defense Intelligence Agency; and Ivana Stradner, Visiting Research Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, J.S.D. from the University of California, Berkeley,8/11/2020, "Countering Russia’s Influence Operations in the Balkans," https://www.heritage.org/europe/commentary/countering-russias-influence-operations-the-balkans, RMax
Even the pandemic has the potential for fomenting political unrest.
In recent days, thousands of Serbs have taken to the streets to protest Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic’s announced strict curfew in response to a surge in Covid-19 cases. Many have pointed a finger at pro-Russia ultra-right groups and foreign intelligence services for fueling the violent riots.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Potential 1ac › Solvency
Atalayar 7-20 [Atalayar, 7-20-2022, "The Baltic States, a defence model for the future of cyberwarfare", https://atalayar.com/en/content/baltic-states-defence-model-future-cyberwarfare, DOA: 7-20-2022 //ArchanSen]
The world is moving towards a digitised global society full of cyber opportunities. However, as a fully cyber-connected society, this future society will also have to cope with new patterns of conflict, such as cyber-attacks and hybrid warfare.
The Baltic countries - Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania - which for years were under the control of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and then forced to fight on the front line of digital warfare, have been forced to take the lead in this process of cyber-innovation. Moscow's attacks on the three pioneers of independence from the USSR have been a constant for years. And they have grown exponentially since the early 2000s.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Potential 1ac › Modelling Advantage
Pettyjohn and Wasser 5-20-2022, *senior fellow and director of the defense program at the Center for a New American Security, **fellow in the defense program and co-lead of The Gaming Lab at the Center for a New American Security (Stacie and Becca, “A Fight Over Taiwan Could Go Nuclear,” Foreign Affairs,
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has raised the specter of nuclear war, as Russian President Vladimir Putin has placed his nuclear forces at an elevated state of alert and has warned that any effort by outside parties to interfere in the war would result in “consequences you have never seen.” Such saber-rattling has understandably made headlines and drawn notice in Washington. But if China attempted to forcibly invade Taiwan and the United States came to Taipei’s aid, the threat of escalation could outstrip even the current nerve-wracking situation in Europe. A recent war game, conducted by the Center for a New American Security in conjunction with the NBC program “Meet the Press,” demonstrated just how quickly such a conflict could escalate. The game posited a fictional crisis set in 2027, with the aim of examining how the United States and China might act under a certain set of conditions. The game demonstrated that China’s military modernization and expansion of its nuclear arsenal—not to mention the importance Beijing places on unification with Taiwan—mean that, in the real world, a fight between China and the United States could very well go nuclear. Beijing views Taiwan as a breakaway republic. If the Chinese Communist Party decides to invade the island, its leaders may not be able to accept failure without seriously harming the regime’s legitimacy. Thus, the CCP might be willing to take significant risks to ensure that the conflict ends on terms that it finds acceptable. That would mean convincing the United States and its allies that the costs of defending Taiwan are so high that it is not worth contesting the invasion. While China has several ways to achieve that goal, from Beijing’s perspective, using nuclear weapons may be the most effective means to keep the United States out of the conflict. China is several decades into transforming its People’s Liberation Army (PLA) into what the Chinese President Xi Jinping has called a “world-class military” that could defeat any third party that comes to Taiwan’s defense. China’s warfighting strategy, known as “anti-access/area denial,” rests on being able to project conventional military power out several thousand miles in order to prevent the American military, in particular, from effectively countering a Chinese attack on Taiwan. Meanwhile, a growing nuclear arsenal provides Beijing with coercive leverage as well as potentially new warfighting capabilities, which could increase the risks of war and escalation. China has historically possessed only a few hundred ground-based nuclear weapons. But last year, nuclear scholars at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies and the Federation of American Scientists identified three missile silo fields under construction in the Xinjiang region. The Financial Times reported that China might have carried out tests of hypersonic gliders as a part of an orbital bombardment system that could evade missile defenses and deliver nuclear weapons to targets in the continental United States. The U.S. Department of Defense projects that by 2030, China will have around 1,000 deliverable warheads—more than triple the number it currently possesses. Based on these projections, Chinese leaders may believe that as early as five years from now the PLA will have made enough conventional and nuclear gains that it could fight and win a war to unify with Taiwan. Our recent war game—in which members of Congress, former government officials, and subject matter experts assumed the roles of senior national security decision makers in China and the United States—illustrated that a U.S.-Chinese war could escalate quickly. For one thing, it showed that both countries would face operational incentives to strike military forces on the other’s territory. In the game, such strikes were intended to be calibrated to avoid escalation; both sides tried to walk a fine line by attacking only military targets. But such attacks crossed red lines for both countries, and produced a tit-for-tat cycle of attacks that broadened the scope and intensity of the conflict. For instance, in the simulation, China launched a preemptive attack against key U.S. bases in the Indo-Pacific region. The attacks targeted Guam, in particular, because it is a forward operating base critical to U.S. military operations in Asia, and because since it is a territory, and not a U.S. state, the Chinese team viewed striking it as less escalatory than attacking other possible targets. In response, the United States targeted Chinese military ships in ports and surrounding facilities, but refrained from other attacks on the Chinese mainland. Nevertheless, both sides perceived these strikes as attacks on their home territory, crossing an important threshold. Instead of mirror-imaging their own concerns about attacks on their territory, each side justified the initial blows as military necessities that were limited in nature and would be seen by the other as such. Responses to the initial strikes only escalated things further as the U.S. team responded to China’s moves by hitting targets in mainland China, and the Chinese team responded to Washington’s strikes by attacking sites in Hawaii. A NEW ERA One particularly alarming finding from the war game is that China found it necessary to threaten to go nuclear from the start in order to ward off outside support for Taiwan. This threat was repeated throughout the game, particularly after mainland China had been attacked. At times, efforts to erode Washington’s will so that it would back down from the fight received greater attention by the China team than the invasion of Taiwan itself. But China had difficulty convincing the United States that its nuclear threats were credible. In real life, China’s significant and recent changes to its nuclear posture and readiness may impact other nations’ views, as its nuclear threats may not be viewed as credible given its stated doctrine of no first use, its smaller but burgeoning nuclear arsenal, and lack of experience making nuclear threats. This may push China to preemptively detonate a nuclear weapon to reinforce the credibility of its warning. China might also resort to a demonstration of its nuclear might because of constraints on its long-range conventional strike capabilities. Five years from now, the PLA still will have a very limited ability to launch conventional attacks beyond locations in the “second island chain” in the Pacific; namely, Guam and Palau. Unable to strike the U.S. homeland with conventional weapons, China would struggle to impose costs on the American people. Up until a certain point in the game, the U.S. team felt its larger nuclear arsenal was sufficient to deter escalation and did not fully appreciate the seriousness of China’s threats. As a result, China felt it needed to escalate significantly to send a message that the U.S. homeland could be at risk if Washington did not back down. Despite China’s stated “no-first use” nuclear policy, the war game resulted in Beijing detonating a nuclear weapon off the coast of Hawaii as a demonstration. The attack caused relatively little destruction, as the electromagnetic pulse only damaged the electronics of ships in the immediate vicinity but did not directly impact the U.S. state. The war game ended before the U.S. team could respond, but it is likely that the first use of a nuclear weapon since World War II would have provoked a response. The most likely paths to nuclear escalation in a fight between the United States and China are different from those that were most likely during the Cold War. The Soviet Union and the United States feared a massive, bolt-from-the-blue nuclear attack, which would precipitate a full-scale strategic exchange. In a confrontation over Taiwan, however, Beijing could employ nuclear weapons in a more limited way to signal resolve or to improve its chances of winning on the battlefield. It is unclear how a war would proceed after that kind of limited nuclear use and whether the United States could de-escalate the situation while still achieving its objectives. AN OUNCE OF PREVENTION The clear lesson from the war game is that the United States needs to strengthen its conventional capabilities in the Indo-Pacific to ensure that China never views an invasion of Taiwan as a prudent tactical move. To do so, the United States will need to commit to maintaining its conventional military superiority by expanding its stockpiles of long-range munitions and investing in undersea capabilities. Washington must also be able to conduct offensive operations inside the first and second island chains even while under attack. This will require access to new bases to distribute U.S. forces, enhance their survivability, and ensure that they can effectively defend Taiwan in the face of China’s attacks. Moreover, the United States needs to develop an integrated network of partners willing to contribute to Taiwan’s defense. Allies are an asymmetric advantage: the United States has them, and China does not. The United States should deepen strategic and operational planning with key partners to send a strong signal of resolve to China. As part of these planning efforts, the United States and its allies will need to develop war-winning military strategies that do not cross Chinese red-lines. The game highlighted just how difficult this task may be; what it did not highlight is the complexity of developing military strategies that integrate the strategic objectives and military capacities of multiple nations. Moving forward, military planners in the United States and in Washington’s allies and partners must grapple with the fact that, in a conflict over Taiwan, China would consider all conventional and nuclear options to be on the table. And the United States is running out of time to strengthen deterrence and keep China from believing an invasion of Taiwan could be successful. The biggest risk is that Washington and its friends choose not to seize the moment and act: a year or two from now, it might already be too late.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Potential 1ac › Modelling Advantage
Cyber - -> invasion and PRC can destabilize/counter US forces
Sacks 22 (David, research fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, where his work focuses on U.S.-China relations, U.S.-Taiwan relations, Chinese foreign policy, cross-Strait relations, and the political thought of Hans Morgenthau. “Enhancing U.S.-Japan Coordination for a Taiwan Conflict”, https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/Enhancing%20U.S.-Japan%20Coordination%20for%20a%20Taiwan%20Conflict_DP_1.pdf)LR
Adding to the worry, over the past five years China has steadily increased its pressure on Taiwan, reducing the number of mainland tourists who can visit the island, stripping away its few remaining diplomatic partners, placing an embargo on certain Taiwanese exports, ramping up military activities in its vicinity, conducting cyber-attacks, and interfering in Taiwan s democratic process. While Xi continues to publicly stress his commitment to peaceful reunification” with Taiwan and has not introduced an explicit timeline for achieving this objective, he has also said that the Taiwan issue cannot be passed on from generation to generation.”2 He has set 2049 as the date by which China must achieve the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation,” and achieving reunification” with Taiwan is a core condition for that project.3 Still, it remains unlikely that Xi has already decided to use force against Taiwan, which provides an opening for the United States to adjust its policies and work with its allies to help prevent such an outcome. Although there is debate over whether China will resort to force, China is clearly developing capabilities needed to invade and occupy Taiwan. Preparing for a conflict over Taiwan has driven China s military modernization campaign for the past two and a half decades. China has invested significant resources in developing the tools to defeat Taiwan and prevent the United States from coming to its aid, principally an arsenal of accurate ballistic missiles, the world’s largest navy, hundreds of modern fighter aircraft and bombers, and advanced cyber and counterspace assets The recommendations proposed, while ambitious, are feasible in the current political climate in both Washington and Tokyo, and, with sustained focus in both capitals, can be implemented in the next five years. While China has a number of options it could take to put pressure on Taiwan—seizing an offshore island, initiating massive cyberattacks, firing hundreds of ballistic missiles to take out critical infrastructure, and conducting a quarantine of the island—this paper focuses squarely on how to deter and respond to an invasion of Taiwan. It does so in the belief that Japan s appetite for assisting the United States in countering Chinese aggression against Taiwan short of a full war is politically challenging and likely limited. China is not relying on its inherent advantages, however, and has instead spent the last two and a half decades developing capabilities designed to neutralize U.S. power in the Taiwan Strait. Its military budget has grown from $14.3 billion in 1996 to $252.3 billion in 2020, a nearly eighteenfold increase (see figure 2).7 Preparing for a conflict over Taiwan has consistently driven Beijing s procurement decisions, and China can now bring significant capabilities to bear. The PLA Navy (PLAN) is now the largest navy in the world (as measured by the number of ships, although the United States continues to exceed it by tonnage), with 355 ships and submarines, and is set to grow by nearly 100 ships by the end of the decade.8 The PLA Air Force is the largest air force in the region and is rapidly catching up to Western air forces” and eroding U.S. advantages, according to the U.S. Department of Defense.9 The PLA has one thousand short-range ballistic missiles and six hundred medium-range ballistic missiles in its arsenal.10 China has also established an advanced integrated air defense system on its east coast that can cover Taiwan.11 The PLA is now turning its attention to addressing previous gaps that have persisted, such as anti-submarine warfare, while also rapidly developing information, cyber, and space and counterspace capabilities.12 Taiwan, however, is belatedly recognizing the need to dramatically rethink and invest in its defense. In 2017, its military leadership introduced the Overall Defense Concept(ODC), which aims to develop asymmetric approaches to fend off a Chinese invasion and calls for investing in a large number of smaller, cheaper, and more mobile weapons.23 Rather than seeking to defeat the PLA through attrition, ODC focuses on a decisive fight near Taiwans shores and the prevention of a successful PLA landing. Taiwan has steadily increased its defense budget in recent years, which is now the highest it has ever been in absolute terms.24 More important is using these funds to resource an asymmetric strategy, purchasing missiles, drones, and howitzers.25 There remain obstacles to ODC s implementation, however, and more traditional thinking could well make a comeback.26 All of this means that U.S. intervention on Taiwan s behalf would be a risky and costly proposition, as China can now challenge the United States across all domains and place U.S. aircraft, surface vessels (including aircraft carriers), and bases throughout the Indo-Pacific at risk. In addition, the United States would for the first time be fighting a nuclear-armed opponent with precision standoff weapons, extensive cyberwarfare capabilities, and the ability to target its satellites.27
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Potential 1ac › Modelling Advantage
Cole 21 (J. Michael Cole, Senior Advisor, Countering Foreign Authoritarian Influence (CFAI) at the International Republican Institute (IRI); Global Taiwan Institute, Macdonald-Laurier Institute, Prospect Foundation. Senior Non-Resident Fellow @ Global Taiwan Institute, Masters in War Studies @ Royal Military College of Canada, International Diploma in Humanitarian Assistance @ Fordham University. “The Lithuanian model for expanding Taiwan’s ties with Baltic States”, https://www.caribbeannewsglobal.com/the-lithuanian-model-for-expanding-taiwans-ties-with-baltic-states/)LR
The establishment of a representative office in Lithuania constitutes a victory for Taiwan in its efforts to counter both international isolation and the Chinese narrative of Taiwan’s supposedly inevitable international isolation. By focusing on a part of the world that has not traditionally been an area for Taiwanese presence and engagement, Taipei has also demonstrated the virtues of an asymmetrical approach to combating China on the world stage. This development also exposes the fact that Beijing is willing to break its own rules on “One China,” in that it is now willing to punish states even when they continue to abide by their “One-China Policy” by not establishing official ties with Taiwan. Although the object of Beijing’s ire is ostensibly related to the nomenclature used for Taiwan’s office in Vilnius (which uses the word “Taiwan”), at a deeper level, the source of its anger is the gains that Taiwan has made in Europe, an area where China had hoped to increase its influence. Lithuania has taken some risks in placing its bets on Taiwan, and besides the retaliation it is currently facing, the move may also have cost it future economic opportunities. Consequently, it will be crucial for Taiwan to demonstrate that Vilnius’ risk-taking was not in vain. Already, a large Taiwanese trade and investment delegation has visited the country, with a total of 240 online and offline trade talks involving more than 150 Lithuanian firms and various Taiwanese ones. Taiwan must build on the complementarity of the two economies to replicate its successes in countries like the Czech Republic, where despite much Chinese propaganda, Taiwan has been a much more substantial investor and job creator. Lithuania has a hard-working, highly educated and productive workforce in the manufacturing sector, with strengths in areas such as the laser industry—which has also become a target for Chinese retaliation, with China deciding to halt cooperation between its laser industry bodies and Lithuania. Trade forms the basis of bilateral relations and must be mutually beneficial. Lithuania has made it clear that it expects to reap the benefits of engagement with Taiwan, a country with an economy approximately 11 times larger than its own, as well as a highly advanced tech sector. Lithuania therefore represents a golden opportunity for Taiwan to showcase the advantages of engagement and to demonstrate that small and medium states not only can afford to defy China but can actually benefit materially from doing so. Conversely, failure to build upon and to sustain this momentum could dissuade prospective partners from going down that path. Thus, Taipei must demonstrate a commitment to building prosperous and mutually beneficial ties with its new Baltic ally, and the tangible results must materialize as expeditiously as possible. The potential for engagement between Taiwan and the Baltics goes well beyond trade and investment, however. Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia all have traditions of resistance to external aggression and, by virtue of their proximity to Russia, have developed their own strategies to counter the security threat posed by their much more powerful – and like China, expansionist neighbor. Taiwan and the Baltic states, therefore, have much to learn from each other, in areas ranging from cyber and hybrid warfare to the implementation of an asymmetrical defense posture. While Russia poses the more immediate threat to the Baltic region underscored by apprehensions across the region that Moscow could launch an invasion of Ukraine as early as next January – it is also clear that China has become a more active player in the region, with all the risks of espionage, cyberattacks, co-optation, and hybrid threats that this new presence entails. Countries like Lithuania that have already defied Beijing are now bracing for the very real possibility of cyberattacks against their institutions, and this is an area where Taiwan’s expertise in addressing such threats can come in handy. Appropriate intelligence-sharing mechanisms must therefore be established to facilitate communication, threat mitigation, and response; these are areas where, again, Baltic states can make real gains from a deeper relationship with Taiwan, whose capabilities in the cyber sector are larger by orders of magnitude. The fledgling relationship with this part of Europe also creates opportunities for Taiwan’s indigenous defense industry, particularly in the unmanned vehicle sector: for example, Taiwan donated 10 police drones to Lithuania in October to assist the country as it deals with an influx of refugees from Belarus. For its part, Taiwan has much to learn from the Baltic states in non-traditional military areas, particularly in areas of state resilience and the concept of total defense. For example, as it explores ways by which to increase its deterrence against a Chinese attack, the Taiwanese military could learn important lessons from the Lithuanian Lietuvos Šaulių Sąjunga (“Riflemen’s Union”), the Estonian Defense League, and the National Guard, initiatives that blend traditional military forces with a militia and civilian component. Among other things, Taiwan could learn from those countries’ experiences in providing training to these additional layers of defense, as well as how and where to safely store weapons so that they can be quickly accessed by paramilitary forces in times of national emergency. No doubt Taiwan could learn a thing or two about forming and training a proper Reserve Force. Taiwan and the Baltics can also identify areas for the joint training of special forces and other units charged with waging asymmetrical war against a much more powerful and better-equipped opponent. Latvia and Lithuania, in particular, have clearly signaled their willingness to engage Taiwan more closely on such matters. For this to happen, the Taiwanese government will have to be willing to go beyond its traditional areas of engagement on security issues, and civilian authorities will have to contend with a culture of historical resistance within the ministry of national defense to the idea of giving the population a role in national security (especially one that involves arming them). But as with trade, Taipei will need to overcome those difficulties and, as rapidly as possible, demonstrate to its potential partners that it is ready to engage them in a way that is mutually beneficial. As the experience with Lithuania shows, an unprecedented window of opportunity has been created for Taiwan in the Baltics -one that will not remain open indefinitely. While we cannot expect results overnight, especially on security matters, Taipei cannot afford to drag its feet – and must therefore be proactive in its efforts to turn this potential into a source of real benefits for all the countries involved. It has natural and willing partners in the Baltics; Taipei, too, must demonstrate that it means what it says. If it does well in that area, there is a high likelihood that countries elsewhere will take notice. Failure to seize this moment, however, could have long-term detrimental effects on Taiwan’s appeal, and thereby strengthen China’s ability to deter engagement with Taiwan. The ball, therefore, is very much in Taipei’s court. The main point: A window of opportunity has opened for Taiwan to deepen its engagement with the Baltic states, a grouping of small nations that also faces an existential threat from a powerful authoritarian neighbor. In areas ranging from trade to non-traditional defense, these states are natural allies for Taiwan, and provide a chance for Taipei to showcase the real benefits of closer ties despite threatened retaliation by Beijing.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Potential 1ac › Modelling Advantage
Wierenga 22 (Louis Wierenga Junior Research Fellow, Johan Skytte Institute of Political Studies, University of Tartu | Lecturer in International Relations, Department of Political and Strategic Studies, Baltic Defence College. “Cybersecurity and Hybrid Threats in the Digital Baltic states: A state of the art”, https://www.baltdefcol.org/files/files/publications/Hybrid%20Threats_LIIA.pdf)LR
In light of power competition vis-à-vis cooperation with the US, NATO, and the EU, and small states standing up to larger powers with nefarious intentions, the drawback is that no entity is capable of defeating all cyberattacks; rather, in order to succeed in cyberspace, the key is learning how to adequately cope.24 When it comes to information warfare, and one of the reasons for which it is so dangerous, is that the antagonist need not win – they succeed if they are able to successfully cloud the issue.25 It is no secret that Russia has waged numerous information warfare campaigns in the Baltics and show no sign of giving up. Recommendations and policy developments Keep on the cusp of cyber hygiene and widely promote amongst citizens: General H.R. McMaster notes the importance of American efforts to conduct reconnaissance in cyberspace and preempt attacks.26 Strive to continuously be one step ahead of hackers. Although this is a daunting, if not (nearly) impossible task, it is one which would involve both governments and the general public. One aspect which has greatly contributed to the success of Estonia in becoming a world leader in cyber defence is investing in people.27 Promoting cyber hygiene is one aspect at which Estonia excels. Raising further awareness about media literacy to combat disinformation and misinformation also helps to win the battle against information warfare. McMaster also advocates for the US to learn from countries which were on the receiving end of Russian aggression.28 As one of the strengths which Estonia possesses is its investment in people, Estonia is a success story in cyber and IT education and training, ranging from kindergarteners to the elderly.29 In an increasingly multipolar world order, the rise of China presents a serious security challenge to Europe and the Transatlantic alliance and can be seen on a number of fronts. One of the most pressing, especially when it comes to cybersecurity, is 5G. If seen through the lens of ‘the West’, then a united front should consist of the US and NATO, plus PfP countries, along with the EU in cyber policy. When it comes to 5G, this is especially important. The Baltic states have taken strides to become leaders in 5G policy and can use this opportunity to take a leading role in a Western front in the battlegrounds for 5G policy. Keeping focus on both China and Russia as threats to the security of NATO and the EU: For valid reasons – both historical and contemporary – the Russian Federation is identified as the primary security threat to the 3 Baltic states. The most contemporary events in the neighborhood do not indicate any change in the consistency or persistence of the threat, nor its digital nature. Cyber and hybrid threats directed towards the Baltic states from the Russian Federation will not cease and military, government, and civilian entities need to continue with vigilance, adapt to the rapidly changing nature of cybersecurity and cyberwar, as well as anticipate future changes, staying ahead of the curve. However, despite the very valid concerns over Russian cyber activity, the Baltic states should not neglect such concerns as they relate to China. Indeed, as aforementioned, the Baltic states, especially Lithuania, have taken a firm stance towards China, in cyberspace and beyond, and should continue to use their growing digital prowess to expand their influence in the EU and NATO. Lithuania, under the leadership of Foreign Minister Gabrielius 63 Landsbergis, has increasingly stood up to China.30 Minister Landsbergis’s stance towards China led to him being named as one of Politico’s ‘most influential people in Europe’ – and the only one to make the list from any of the Baltic states.31 Latvia has called upon China to respect the rules of international cyberspace.32 It should be noted that this is certainly not the first time that leaders from the Baltic states have appeared on similar lists, granting small states representation on lists where the usual larger powers within Europe enjoy substantial representation. Such leadership should be emulated, and the digital advances made by the Baltic states provides an ideal way to achieve this, as many countries look to the Baltics as digital leaders. Demonstrating leadership to allies: If ever there was a time, as well as a concrete area for the Baltic states to showcase their strengths as small states, demonstrating leadership in the cyber and tech fields presents the perfect opportunity. Estonia has been the Baltic champion for cybersecurity and e-governance. Lithuania, and to a lesser extent Latvia have shown signs of catching up. Much like offline matters, the three Baltic states use opportunities to meet with US and EU leaders to highlight the dire security situation which the Transatlantic alliance faces from a resurgent Russia – they know from experience and contemporary matters. As the security of cyberspace is one of the acute questions of global politics this century33, cybersecurity and matters of digital warfare will be issues which merit pressing resolve, which is constantly changing. Being on the cutting edge will require countries to remain that way. While member of the United Nations Security Council for the first time, Estonia made cybersecurity a priority, along with the overall security of the region.34 As well, when a member of the UN Security Council, Estonia made it a point to align with the US and the UK to call Russia out over a cyberattack directed at Georgia.35 Latvia and Lithuania have also been active on such fronts. In 2021, Latvia signed an agreement with Poland which establishes a framework for cooperation between Latvia’s Military Information Technology Security 64 Incident Team (MilCERT) and Poland’s National Cyber Security Center.36 Latvia is also taking the opportunity to reach out to the United States to discuss cybersecurity in the region.37 Lithuania has, as aforementioned, developed their own cyber center the RCDC, which is a bilateral LithuanianUS initiative.38 Conclusion To conclude, the domain of cyberspace will be an arena for battle for the foreseeable future. All countries, governments, militaries will be faced with such threats, and the likelihood of businesses and private individuals being faced with such threats is high. The Baltic states are no strangers to such threats and have been leaders in facing up to them. Given the nature of threats faced and the manner in which the Baltics have faced up to them, it is safe to say that the Baltic states will continue to rise up to the challenges and keep up with the rapidly changing nature of cyber threats. However, the last point is the most persisting challenge any entity faces in cyberspace – the need to not only consistently keep up but remain steps ahead of adversaries. The bi- and multilateral agreements made as well as the leadership demonstrated, and the digital awareness can go a long way to not only meet contemporary and future challenges but serve as examples and demonstrate leadership. Cyber and hybrid threats are ominous, but on a positive note, the Baltic states have achieved many remarkable accomplishments in this field.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Potential 1ac › Modelling Advantage
John Coviello 21 [John Coviello, 12-18-2021, Author of . Winner of the prestigious 2021 Book Excellence Award for Sustainability. Are Humans Facing Near-Term Human Extinction Due to Global Warming? Soapboxie, https://soapboxie.com/social-issues/Are-Humans-Facing-Near-Term-Human-Extinction-Due-to-Global-Warming, DOA: 12-26-2021 //ArchanSen] *edited for sexist language
While some scientists started raising concerns about the burning of fossil fuels eventually warming the Earth’s atmosphere as far back as the middle 20th century, a consensus among scientists that global warming is a problem we have to address didn’t form until the later part of the 20th century. Now that we’re progressing through the 21st century, why are some in scientific circles raising concerns about our near-term survival as a species? In recent years, the effects of global warming have become exceedingly extreme. In fact, from record-breaking heatwaves to unprecedented forest fires to melting polar ice sheets, the effects of global warming are occurring faster than the scientific community had projected they would just a decade or two ago. The concern about our viability as a species on Earth is due to the fast-developing effects of global warming. If we don’t address the causes of global warming or take mitigative actions, it could transform into runaway global warming that would heat up the Earth so rapidly that humans and many other species will likely be imperiled. Many scientists wrongly had confidence that [hu]mankind would come to its senses when faced with the stark reality that our survival as a species is threatened and we’d collectively take actions to avert catastrophic global warming by discontinuing our burning of fossil fuels and replacing them with renewable non-carbon energy sources. However, despite some tepid efforts to cut carbon emissions, such as the 2016 Paris Agreement, it appears that due to a combination of ignorance and a concerted effort by the fossil fuels industry to stop any efforts to move away from carbon-based products, we will likely not address our continuing release of global warming gases into Earth’s atmosphere until it’s too late and the global warming we’ve experienced in recent decades transforms into irreversible and catastrophic runaway global warming. This will occur because human-caused global warming will eventually trigger natural climate warming feedback loops to take over. At that point, global warming will be like an unstoppable runaway train, as the Earth’s atmospheric temperatures rise to life-threatening levels. These warming feedback loops include such things as releases of global warming gases from melting polar ice sheets and from frozen methane deposits beneath the oceans, as well as the loss of polar ice causing the Earth to absorb more of the sun’s heat energy. All of which will cause additional warming, which then results in additional releases of global warming gases that will cause additional global temperature rises in an unstoppable loop that will continue until the planet is warmer than it has been in many millions of years (long before humans existed). Such rapid and uncontrollable warming of Earth’s atmosphere could warm the planet by 4 to 5 degrees Celsius (7 to 9 degrees Fahrenheit) within the current century and perhaps eventually lead to a planet that is 8 to 9 degrees Celsius (14 to 16 degrees Fahrenheit) warmer than it was before humans started burning fossil fuels in large quantities starting in the 19th century. Some might wonder, what’s the big deal if the planet is 4 to 5 degrees Celsius or even 8 to 9 degrees Celsius warmer than it has been as humans evolved on Earth? After all, many parts of the planet routinely experience temperature swings of this magnitude on a daily or weekly basis. There are several ways that rapid global warming on a planetary scale could threaten human survival. Warming is not evenly distributed. Some areas, including currently farmable land, will warm well in excess of the global average, which would lead to desertification and crop failures. This would obviously imperial humans due to massive food shortages. Oceans, another major source of food that humans need to survive, are impacted by rising global temperatures, as higher ocean temperatures lead to acidification of ocean water, which will eventually lead to massive die-offs of sea life that provide much-needed food for humans. Water resources will completely dry up in many arid parts of the world, making those areas uninhabitable. Dwindling food and water resources will inevitably lead to wars between competing nations that could be catastrophic. Humans can’t survive at wet-bulb temperatures above 35 degrees Celsius (95 degrees Fahrenheit), even in the shade, as the human body loses its ability to cool itself off. Higher global temperatures and the higher humidity levels that will occur with the higher temperatures could make large parts of the Earth uninhabitable due to wet bulb temperatures that are lethal. Would Runaway Global Warming Actually Lead to Human Extinction? It’s a very big step go from runaway global warming to the extinction of all human beings on Earth. Humans possess the intellectual skills necessary to design and build technologies that can help us adapt to climate change. We’re also able to move to places with more hospitable climates. However, some scientists are concerned that humans will not have time to adapt to the quick pace of runaway global warming and some of the impacts will be too harsh for us to survive. If farmlands and oceans are no longer capable of providing food for humans, where will we turn to obtain life-sustaining food? It is possible that humans could migrate towards the poles and try to farm on land in those areas that is freed up from the ice. However, it is unclear if the currently frozen areas in and around the polar regions will have topsoil suitable for farming. What about freshwater fish? Unfortunately, freshwater lakes and rivers will also undergo acidification that will likely wipe out most or all fish species that can provide humans nourishment. Our only hope might be some sort of synthetic food that is created in factories using basic elements (a technology that is certainly viable). There will be other life-threatening factors that humans will face in a fast warming world. Massive fire balls from methane releases will create havoc for humans. These fireballs will start enormous forest fires driven by the warmer and in many places a more arid world, which will cause turmoil for humans. A lack of freshwater in areas that undergo desertification will make survival impossible in such areas. Wars over dwindling resources will be fought out of desperation and could end in catastrophe. The stress of a warmer world will weaken human immune systems. If industrial society collapses or is greatly reduced, healthcare and medicines might become very limited, lowering life expectancy dramatically. Humans that survive all the dangers associated with runaway global warming might succumb to pandemics that will likely sweep the world as opportunistic pathogens take advantage of weakened human systems and cause a large loss of life in the remaining human populations.