2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Potential 1ac › Modelling Advantage
EEA, European Environment Agency 8-1-2017, "Energy and climate change," European Environment Agency, https://www.eea.europa.eu/signals/signals-2017/articles/energy-and-climate-change//DG
The global climate is changing and that is posing increasingly severe risks for ecosystems, human health and the economy. The EEA’s recent assessment ‘’ shows that Europe’s regions, too, are already facing impacts of a changing climate, including rising sea levels, more extreme weather, flooding, droughts and storms.
These changes are happening because large amounts of greenhouse gases are released into the atmosphere as a result of many human activities worldwide, including, most importantly, burning fossil fuels for electricity generation, heating and transport. Combustion of fossil fuels also releases air pollutants that harm the environment and human health.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Potential 1ac › Modelling Advantage
Lukas Trakimavičius, 3-19-2021, Trakimavičius works at the Research and Lessons Learned Division of the NATO Energy Security Centre of Excellence "The untapped green energy potential of the Baltic States," euractiv, https://www.euractiv.com/section/energy/opinion/the-untapped-green-energy-potential-of-the-baltic-states//DG
As the global energy transition gathers speed, the Baltics may not seem like its obvious frontrunners. Despite making great strides in making their energy systems cleaner, fossil fuels still remain a staple of their energy diet. However, growing evidence suggests that the Baltics have a massive offshore wind energy potential, which could have a game-changing effect for the entire region. Chances are, wind turbines could not only propel the Baltics to the forefront of the energy transition, but also to the ranks of clean energy exporters. As things stand, few would argue that the Baltics are on the cutting edge of the clean energy transition. Like most of their European peers, they get the bulk of their energy from fossil fuels such as oil and natural gas. These are either imported from far abroad or, as is the case with Estonian oil shale, mined from deep underground. Meanwhile, renewables such as onshore wind, solar or hydropower still account for a tiny fraction of their overall energy needs. In 2019, these energy sources met some 2.6 percent of ’s, 4.6 percent of ’s and 1.3 percent of ’s total primary energy demand. Granted, the overall share of renewables is vastly greater once biomass is added into the mix. Yet, some scientists that fuels such as firewood or wood pellets may not be the most environmentally sustainable sources of energy. However, what the Baltics lack in fossil fuels, they make up for with an abundance of wind in the Baltic Sea, which can be harnessed and converted into electricity. Though currently none of the Baltics have any windmills in the open seas, all three have major offshore wind plans for the future. Lithuania, for example, intends to at least 700 megawatt (MW) of offshore wind farms in operation by 2030. Latvia and Estonia are also eying to co-develop a 1,000 MW wind farm in the Gulf of Riga. On top of that, Estonia to have a 1,000 MW offshore wind park near the island of Saarema by 2028, in addition to a slew of other projects that are under .All of this sounds great, but it could just be the beginning. According to a recent WindEurope , the Baltic Sea could be the next big thing for Europe’s energy transition. It is estimated that Lithuania have up to 3,600 MW, Latvia up to 2,900 MW and Estonia up to 1,500 MW of offshore windfarms by 2050. If this generation capacity could be met, the study claims that the Baltics could potentially around half of their offshore wind electricity to neighboring states. Obviously, it is difficult to say with certainty just how much electricity would the Baltics be able to export and others would like to import. After all, to get to a zero-carbon future, the Baltics and their neighbors will have to tremendous changes by 2050. Not only will they have to make energy use more efficient, but they will also have to decarbonize and electrify large portions of their economies. Still, if the Baltics would harness their full offshore wind potential and would continue to develop other renewable sources of energy, there are few doubts that a good chunk of their electricity might still be available for export. To get more bang for the buck, the Baltics could also take some of this newfound electricity and transform it into green hydrogen using a process known as electrolysis. Green hydrogen could be used for manufacturing, transport, heating or back into electricity to back up the grid. Or it could simply be exported to neighbouring states. This step would prevent excess electricity from being wasted and also help decarbonise those sectors of the economy where electrification is difficult.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Potential 1ac › Modelling Advantage
ÇAlışMa Grupları, Diplomasigeneluluslararası, which is a very important job in another language İLişKiler· 4-28- 2022·, "The Energy Security of the Baltic States and the Tensions with Russia," TESAD, https://www.tesadernegi.org/the-energy-security-of-the-baltic-states-and-the-tensions-with-russia.html//DG
The last term applies to the interconnection between the Baltic States and Russia as the Baltics are considered vulnerable and a trade war could drag them down in a crisis[45]. Since the Baltic market is not economically important to Russia, the interdependence is considered asymmetrical. Russian exports for the year 2020 to Latvia were 2.23B, Estonia $2.59B, and Lithuania $2.39B[46]. Nevertheless, from the opening of the Balticconnector and other interconnections belonging to the European network the region plays an important role in gas and petroleum transit, ensuring the uninterrupted flow of energy to further European destinations. Consequently, the Kremlin started to look around for solutions and has developed a strategy comprising the construction of alternative routes, namely the Nord Stream 1 and 2, the Turkish Stream and the Power of Siberia pipelines.
However, the complex situation must be framed inside a broader strategic vision according to Keohane’s and Nye’s interdependence theory. Russian weight in the Baltic energy security undergoes military security conditions. The Baltic States are part of the eastern flank of NATO, therefore their integration into the Russian energy infrastructure is meant to balance the presence of the Western military alliance in the region[47]. Moreover, the Baltics register a high presence of Russian immigrants in their populations, thus energy is used as a weapon to prevent any kind of discrimination.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Potential 1ac › Cyber Advantage
Tisdall 22 [Simon Tisdall is a foreign affairs commentator. He has been a foreign leader writer, foreign editor and US editor for the Guardian, 1-9-2022, "The epic struggle for America’s soul is just getting started", Guardian, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2022/jan/09/the-epic-struggle-for-americas-soul-is-just-getting-started, DOA: 7-20-2022 //ArchanSen]
A new USA Today/Suffolk University poll found eight in 10 Republicans, Democrats and independents are worried about the future of American democracy. But they disagree over the causes – and who’s to blame: 85% of Democrats call the Capitol Hill rioters “criminals”; two-thirds of Republicans believe “they went too far but had a point”.
“Only free and fair elections in which the loser abides by the result stand between each of us and life at the mercy of a despotic regime,” warns Harvard law professor Laurence Tribe. But increasingly, for today’s politicians, honourable defeat is a wholly foreign concept.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Potential 1ac › Cyber Advantage
Banka 2022, (Andris Banka , Journal of Transatlantic Studies volume 20, pages161–183 (2022), Published 4/5/2022 “Neither reckless nor free-riders: auditing the Baltics as US treaty allies” https://link.springer.com/article/10.1057/s42738-022-00096-3)
A great deal of scholarly literature has treated Baltic States’ physical proximity to Russia as their Achilles heel. The conventional wisdom holds that due to the force imbalance in the region, which heavily favours the Russian side, Baltic republics are hard to defend territories.Footnote82 While this assumption is certainly valid, there is, however, a flip side to this predicament. Situated at a geopolitical crossroads, these small nations are in an advantageous position to produce valuable insights into Kremlin’s statecraft. As James Carafano suggests: “To a major power, a country’s greatest asset might be its map coordinates rather than the size of its arsenal or bank account”.Footnote83 Similarly, Brands and Feaver have noted that some of the most valued US intelligence assets stem from allied partners “geographical capability” and “proximity to the theater of interest”.Footnote84 Lacking in material power resources, the Baltic States, within the past decade, have made a concerted effort to set up “knowledge hubs” that excel in analysing their much larger eastern neighbour. Having been subjected to Russian-directed gray zone tactics for decades, the Baltics have amassed valuable regional expertise. Testifying before the US Committee on Foreign Affairs, a prominent Russia-observer explained: “They [the Baltics] see things that we don’t see. They can go to places that we don’t go. They understand things that we don’t in cyber and intelligence”.Footnote85 Retired Lieutenant General Ben Hodges, who commanded the US Army Europe, concurs by emphasizing that the Baltic republics, due to their location, “know more what is happening in Russia, than any American will ever know”.Footnote86 Indeed, the Baltics fill in critical gaps in fields such as cyberwarfare, intelligence gathering, and disinformation, actively sharing this “know-how” with their US counterparts. The following details such contributions The Republic of Estonia was the first known victim of a state-directed cyberattack. The 2007 incident, widely attributed to the Russian Federation, for weeks incapacitated Estonian governmental structures. Somewhat paradoxically, in the long run, the event turned out to have a positive impact as it propelled the nation of 1.3 million people to treat the cyber domain as an intricate part of its national security. Subsequently, the country set up the Tallinn-based NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence. According to the Estonian President Kersti Kaljulaid, this was a smart way for a small country to demonstrate its contributions to allies.Footnote87 Understanding that it has little to offer in hard-power deliverables, Estonian leadership chose instead to focus on the cyber domain. In the words of Kaljulaid’s predecessor, Toomas Ilves, the IT field served as “the great equalizer”, allowing a small nation to contribute considerably more than one “would expect by looking at the map, population, and GDP per capita”.Footnote88 Today, Estonia has a well-established reputation among its peers as the lead authority for devising cybersecurity-related solutions. When it comes to countering cyber threats, Tallinn and Washington have forged a close bilateral relationship on various departmental levels. In 2020, the two governments set up a joint cyber-threat intelligence-sharing platform.Footnote89 In addition, the US Army and Estonia’s Ministry of Defence entered into an agreement for collaborative research on cyber defence matters.Footnote90 Such joint initiatives have already borne fruit. In the run-up to the 2020 US Presidential election, in order to learn more about Russian hacking methods, the USA dispatched its cyber force operatives to Estonia.Footnote91 For the USA, this allowed to observe the work of Kremlin-linked agents and bolster its own election defences. Commenting on this deployment, US Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Cyber Policy pointed out: “Cyber is a team sport—when it comes to halting threats from cyberspace, no one can go it alone”.Footnote92 Such operations illustrate how small states can amplify the reach of the USA and effectively complement its capabilities. Estonian authorities have regularly received praise for the provision of such services. James Mattis, US Secretary of Defense in the Trump administration, upon meeting his Estonian counterpart underscored that Washington highly appreciates Estonian leadership in this new area of competition, and that its positive example speaks to the fact that the size of the country does not necessarily determine its contributions to collective security.Footnote93 In a similar vein, NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg has spoken highly of Estonia for its efforts in training and educating NATO military staff.Footnote94 After being the first victim of a Russian-linked cyberattack, Estonian leadership managed to turn the incident into a certain asset. By studying its lessons and building resilience, it gradually emerged as the lead cyber-knowledge exporter. For many, Russia’s abilities to effectively plant disinformation campaigns overseas came into sharper focus during the 2016 US presidential election. For the Baltics, however, such malign interference and attempts to sow societal divisions were hardly anything new. Lawmakers in the region have been sounding the alarm about it ever since regaining independence in the early 1990s. However, it was only in 2014 that Latvia opened the NATO Centre of Excellence devoted to the exploration of such issues. Its central analytical focus is on tracking and analysing Russia’s digital footprint. Since its establishment, the research institution has produced innovative studies regarding information-warfare efforts employed by Kremlin-linked actors and experimental takes on societal vulnerabilities. Such analysis has often been shared with the US government via testimonies before the US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and briefings with the US military staff.Footnote95 Commenting on the centre’s work, a senior US Congressman pointed out that because of their “first-hand experience with the Soviet Union and Putin’s Russia”, the Baltics have become “a valuable source of insight” for the US government.Footnote96
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Potential 1ac › Cyber Advantage
Zemelyte 6-27 (Beatrice, BA in Administration, Human Resources, and Marketing at University of Vermon, interviewing Agnia Grigas - Dr. Agnia Grigas is an energy and political risk expert. She specializes in energy and foreign policy of the U.S. and Eurasia including Europe, Russia, China, the states of the former Soviet Union, and the Baltic States. She has fifteen years of experience as a business development and political risk advisor to corporations and government agencies. She is an author of three critically acclaimed books The New Geopolitics of Gas (Harvard University Press, 2017), Beyond Crimea: The New Russian Empire (Yale University Press, 2016), and The Politics of Energy and Memory Between the Baltic States and Russia (Ashgate 2013). Dr. Grigas graduated cum laude with a BA in economics and political science from Columbia University, New York, NY and earned her Master’s and Doctorate in international relations from the University of Oxford, UK where she is an alumna of St Antony’s and Brasenose colleges. “Kaliningrad standoff could reveal if Russia wants to ‘escalate’”, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/6/24/achilles-heel-of-nato-tensions-amid-kaliningrads-transit-ban)LR
Al Jazeera: Russia has said Lithuanian citizens will “feel the pain” over Kaliningrad. How might Moscow respond? Grigas: Russia could enact its own sanctions on the sale of goods to Lithuania. The key Russian exports are oil and gas, and electricity, and Lithuania has already made a decision much earlier before this conflict, that it will not be purchasing any Russian energy sources. There could be a question of fertilisers and other elements but there is already a broad blanket of European sanctions against Russian goods. I view Russia’s statements more as threats and posturing for the Russian domestic audience because a lot of [Russian President Vladimir] Putin’s statements tend to be aimed to show the resolve and the strength of the Kremlin, rather than necessarily specifying any sort of actions they would take or for the external audience. What is concerning is that Russia used or the Kremlin use the terms that Lithuania has enacted a blockade, either the word choice is important, because blockade could be perceived as a military already action, and therefore, Russia could try to, you know, justify some sort of [military action], as well.” Al Jazeera: How do you think the Kaliningrad situation can impact the war in Ukraine? Grigas: I think this situation in Kaliningrad will show whether Russia is willing to escalate further this conflict against the West, the European Union and NATO. Al Jazeera: The United States has said that it will stand behind Lithuania and its NATO commitments to defend it … Grigas: NATO, the United States and European Union countries have been very cautious not to get involved in this war. There’s a real fear of potential escalation of conflict with Russia directly because one, Russia remains a nuclear state. Second, because of the fact that it’s controlled essentially by a single man with a very small circle of advisers, who has essentially a free hand to take whatever decisions he may wish. Al Jazeera: Lithuania and Russia already had weak diplomatic relations, and the war in Ukraine has worsened them. How will their ties be affected by the ban? Grigas: Lithuania has been a very vocal supporter of Ukraine since the very start of the war this February and, frankly, since Russia’s occupation of Crimea [in 2014] and the initial invasion of the Donbas. Earlier this summer, Russia and Duma deputies were discussing whether they should revoke Lithuania’s independence that was agreed to by the Soviet Union in 1991. This is part of kind of a broader package of the Kremlin’s threats on a smaller neighbouring country. I don’t think Lithuanian-Russian relations will improve in the near future. Frankly, European and Russian relations will not improve in the near future, nor will NATO and Russian relations, particularly as long as the ongoing war in Ukraine continues.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Potential 1ac › Cyber Advantage
Manthorpe 6-28 (Rowland, studied History at Cambridge and Political Theory at the London School of Economics, and has been awarded the Ben Pimlott Prize for Political Writing by the Guardian and The Fabian Society. Rowland is Technology correspondent, reporting on the many areas tech is transforming lives. “Could the Russian cyber attack on Lithuania draw a military response from NATO?”, https://news.sky.com/story/could-the-russian-cyber-attack-on-lithuania-draw-a-military-response-from-nato-12641986)LR
A NATO member is under attack. The NATO member in question is the Baltic state of Lithuania, which was targeted on Monday by Russian hackers. According to the hackers, the attack is still going on. Transport and media websites have been hit, as have the websites of various state institutions such as the Lithuanian tax service, which had to pause its operations yesterday. A Russian hacker group known as Killnet claimed responsibility for the attacks, claiming on its Telegram channel that the attack was retaliation for Lithuania's decision to stop the transit of some goods to the Russian territory of Kaliningrad on the Baltic coast. The politics of this situation are extremely complicated. Kaliningrad is Russian-owned, but it isn't connected to the main body of Russia - it's a small piece of Russia surrounded by NATO countries. The Lithuanian government says it is simply enforcing European Union sanctions on goods, but Russia has responded with outrage, saying it is being stopped from accessing its sovereign territory. Russia promised to respond in a way that would "have a serious negative impact on the population of Lithuania". Then, a few days later, came this cyber attack. Does that mean Russia attacked a NATO member? Not so fast. For a start, the group that claimed responsibility denies any connection to the Russian state, saying it is "not affiliated with any law enforcement authorities". The Russian government has long used third-party criminal groups to conduct hacks and cyber attacks, so it would not come as a surprise if it was involved. Nevertheless, on the surface at least, its hands are clean. Then there's the nature of the attack. Reports so far suggest that it's a distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack, a crude attack which involves throwing huge amounts of traffic at a website until it is forced offline. The attack has been described as "massive", which is technically true, because in order to work a DDoS attack has to be large, but that doesn't mean it will have a massive effect. DDoS attacks are so common that most websites nowadays have protection against them as standard. Even if an attack does work, it won't steal any data. It's a blunt force instrument, little more. Yet that does not mean we aren't moving towards that point, nor that a cyber attack cannot lead us there. Another way in which cyber attacks are different to physical attacks is that once they are started they can spiral out of control. Unlike a bomb or a bullet, a virus can spread in ways that even its makers don't intend. Almost exactly five years ago, the costliest ever cyber attack was launched: a malware attack called Not Petya. It is believed to have begun when Russian operatives infected a small piece of Ukrainian accounting software, intending to disrupt Ukrainian businesses. But from there it spread to companies around the world, including shipping giant Maersk and food conglomerate Mondelez. By the time it was done, Not Petya had caused $10bn in estimated damages.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Potential 1ac › Cyber Advantage
Delacourt 22 [ 02-01-2022, "Cyberattacks on Critical Infrastructure as the New WMD", Hstoday, https://www.hstoday.us/featured/cyberattacks-on-critical-infrastructure-as-the-new-wmd/, DOA: 7-20-2022 //ArchanSen]
Should the acronym WMD, which stands for “Weapons of Mass Destruction,” be updated to “Weapons of Mass Disruption?” I think it is a timely question in this Digital Age as we connect and integrate billions of new digital devices into our lives and business processes and when a cyber-attack against one supply chain provider can lead to cascading effects on entire communities across the globe. Cyberattacks on Critical Infrastructure (CI) can cause mass economic and societal impacts. Fewer strategies than cyber-attacks can offer better plausible deniability and can cause greater anxiety and instability to our society than targeting the systems and networks that enable our day-to-day activities. Consider that 20 years ago terrorists killed 3,000 Americans and disrupted the entire U.S. and global economies with only four planes. Given the growth and ubiquity of technology today we must consider how the exponential growth of cyberattacks on CI might be similarly leveraged by adversaries and criminal actors as Weapons of Mass Disruption, the new WMD.[1]
Cyberattacks take many forms, often progressing through multiple phases as they escalate in severity. Malicious actors often initiate a network intrusion through phishing campaigns or the purchase of compromised user credentials on the dark web. What begins as the hijack of a single user profile expands in severity. Intruders move laterally across internal systems, conducting surveillance and gathering intelligence on network environments before escalating to data theft, service disruptions, and ransomware extortion.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Potential 1ac › Cyber Advantage
Dupay et al 21 [Dr Arnold C. Dupuy is a Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) employee and Chair of the NATO Science and Technology Organization’s program to study hybrid warfare. Dr Dan Nussbaum is a faculty member at the Naval Postgraduate School, the Chair of the NPS Energy Academic Group, and is the Mentor of the NATO Science and Technology Organization’s program to study hybrid warfare. Vytautas Butrimas works in the area of industrial cybersecurity for the NATO Energy Security Centre of Excellence. Alkman Granitsas is a communications consultant at Kyklos Associates with a focus on public policy issues. 1-13-2021, "NATO Review", NATO Review, https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2021/01/13/energy-security-in-the-era-of-hybrid-warfare/index.html, DOA: 7-20-2022 //ArchanSen]
Hybrid warfare is roughly defined as ‘grey area’ warfare, which often exists just beneath the threshold of armed conflict. It is designed to erode public confidence in civil society and democratic foundations, primarily through cyber attacks on critical infrastructure, including energy, or targeted disinformation methods. In this regard, it poses a potential threat to sovereignty, as it gives nations, terrorist organisations and criminal actors relative anonymity via a low-cost, high-yield method to influence the politics and policies of other states.
Russia is one of the most active perpetrators of hybrid warfare and implemented it most effectively in its 2014 illegal annexation of Crimea. The Kremlin continues to use it today, notably in some countries to realise desired political outcomes such as undermining pro-Western governments, dividing and weakening the NATO Alliance, or advancing its own economic interests. China too has recently engaged in cyber attacks and disinformation campaigns aimed at NATO Allies and poses a grave risk to critical infrastructure, including energy infrastructure, as highlighted in the recent NATO 2030 experts’ report.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Potential 1ac › Cyber Advantage
Brent Eastwood 22, Now serving as 1945s New Defense and National Security Editor, Brent M. Eastwood, PhD, is the author of Humans, Machines, and Data: Future Trends in Warfare. He is an Emerging Threats expert and former U.S. Army Infantry officer, January 2022, "Forget Ukraine: Could Russia Invade And Conquer The Baltic States?" https://www.19fortyfive.com/2022/01/forget-ukraine-could-russia-invade-and-conquer-the-baltic-states/ //AShah
We’re Focused on Ukraine But Look Out For the Russian Threat to the Baltics: It was a shot heard around the world in the Russian military analysis community. A RAND Corporation simulated wargame in 2016 concluded that the Russian military could reach the suburbs of the Estonian and Latvian capitals of Tallinn and Riga in less than 60 hours. In the iterations of the exercise, the Estonians and Latvians would need at least seven brigades of troops that include at least three armored brigades to potentially fight the Russians to a standstill.
But it gets worse from here. In another RAND wargame in 2019, the players examined if NATO and Russia would use tactical nuclear weapons during a simulated war in the Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania). The scenario also had Russian conventional forces over-running capitals in the Balkans and NATO having the last fail-safe option to use non-strategic nuclear weapons.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Potential 1ac › Cyber Advantage
SEM = structural equation modeling method
Morkūnas 7-12 [Mangirdas Morkūnas, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, Vilnius University; 7-12-2022; "Russian Disinformation in the Baltics: Does it Really Work?"; Taylor & Francis; https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10999922.2022.2092976; KL]
Introduction In recent years, awareness of Russian disinformation activities and disinformation efforts has been growing both in the West and in Central and Eastern Europe (Baumann, 2020; Kuczyńska-Zonik & Tatarenko, 2019). Russian disinformation is considered to have achieved some success even in the most developed western countries, where it is presumed to have interfered in the election campaign in the USA (Golovchenko et al., 2020), harassed and impeded independent investigations in Western Europe (Aro, 2016), sought to impair public support for Western assistance to former Soviet countries (Richey, 2018), and significantly affected the election campaign in France (Makhashvili, 2017). Among the main targets for Russian disinformation are the former Soviet Union countries that in Russia are referred to by a unique term coined in 1992, called “near abroad,” (ближнее зарубежье) which attempts to emphasize their status as foreign countries not fully recognized by Russia (Rotaru, 2018). Russian disinformation in the “near abroad” countries seek two main objectives: to inflict as much damage to the statehood of the target countries and to portray Russia in much better colors in the eyes of their citizens (Shakrai, 2015), typically by distorting historical events (Ehrlich, 2021). Although the aim of preventing former Soviet Union Republics from fully diverging from the Russian sphere of influence (Cooley, 2017; Dunn & Bobick, 2014), the Russian Federation has made the Baltic States a target of continuous negative disinformation and psychological subversion tactics (Veebel, 2015), making the disinformation dominated by negative messaging (Thornton & Karagiannis, 2016). It is even stated that among all the European nations, citizens of the Baltic States experience the most concentrated and sophisticated disinformation efforts as an expression of soft power (Simons, 2015). Such Russian disinformation has been affecting the citizens of the Baltic States for more than the past three decades. Arguably residents of the Baltic States are believed to be more susceptible and receptive to various forms of Russian disinformation, having been subject to some 50 years of Soviet brainwashing (Schuhrke, 2019; Thompson, 2019). Such disinformation increases dissatisfaction with domestic governments (Golovchenko, 2022) and the state of democracy generally (Oates, 2016), lowers incentives for personal self-development (Benkler et al., 2018), and provokes anger and social inequality within society (Bardach-Yalov, 2012). There are additional thoroughly documented cases about the intimidation of Baltic States from the Russian side. Matthews (2020) points out at Russian actions aimed at increasing ethnic tensions within these countries. It becomes possible because Baltic States have a significant Russian minority (Best, 2013). Russia is also fully engaged in spreading false information about the possible revision of various treaties between the Baltic States and Russia (Matthews, 2020) up to revoking the recognition of Lithuanian independence (Labanauskas, 2022). Baltic States also have been a subject of various cyber-attacks from Russian based hackers and are expected to experience even more sophisticated cyber-warfare activities it in a foreseeable future (Mälksoo, 2018). The position of Baltic States as a frontline in a cyber-warfare was acknowledged also by NATO by a decision to establish its cooperative cyber-defense competence centre of excellence in one of the Baltic States – Estonia (Kovács, 2018). In this study the follow the definition of disinformation presented by Bayer et al. (2019). It covers the spreading of information which is designed to be false or manipulated or misleading. It also has the intention of generating insecurity, tearing cohesion or inciting hostility, or directly to disrupt democratic processes (Bayer et al., 2019, p. 18). Although in recent years, Russian disinformation reached the level of “strategic information operations” (Flanagan et al., 2019), there have been very few studies on the actual effect of such disinformation. Completed studies were based on qualitative evaluations (Surowiec, 2017), focused on Western countries (Carter & Carter, 2021), or investigated only specific issues – mostly the Russia-Ukraine dispute (Gerber & Zavisca, 2016). Therefore, the present paper aims to evaluate the effect of Russian disinformation on the Baltic States. In order to assess the latent variables related to the effect of disinformation activities on citizens’ minds, this paper uses the structural equation modeling method (SEM), in which a partial least squares technique is employed. To our knowledge, this is the first study on the effect of disinformation on the target countries’ populations using sophisticated statistical methods. The study consists of several parts: the introductory section provides a brief overview of the aims and impact of Russian disinformation in the Baltics, the “Materials and Methods” section introduces the research model and the hypotheses for the study, and the main results are presented in the “Results” section. Finally, the “Conclusions and Discussion” section summarizes the insights of the study, juxtaposes it with the prevailing theoretical streams, and offers directions for future studies in the subject area. Theoretical background There is increasing debate about the socio-political consequences of negative disinformation. Arguably, disinformation enables the success of populist parties during election campaigns (Chernobrov & Briant, 2020) and affects political decisions, as politicians are reluctant to take actions that are potentially unpopular with certain voting groups (Acemoglu et al., 2013) that could be subject to various disinformation tactics (Van Herpen, 2015). Prolonged negative disinformation campaigns lower public participation (Bonch-Osmolovskaya, 2015) through both increased perception of negligibility of voters actions (Van Herpen, 2015) and increased apathy (Gulenko, 2021). In recent years, the intensity of Russian disinformation has substantially increased, especially on social media (Prier, 2020). One of the main aims of destructive Russian disinformation, which has intensified since 2014, is to discredit national authorities by questioning the independence of their actions or decisions (Lelich, 2014). This leitmotif of the “other hand ruling the government” has also been applied through information warfare against another post-soviet country – Ukraine – and is considered to be highly effective (Karlsen, 2016). It also increases citizens’ perception of hostility with respect to the surrounding environment and diminishes their participation in public life and socio-economic activity (Irisova, 2015). Furthermore, Russian disinformation in post-Soviet states boosts nihilism to substantially undermine the economic activity of their populations, especially with respect to future gains (Julukhidze, 2020). Nihilism as a result of increased distrust provoked by Russian disinformation is mentioned by Paul and Matthews (2019), and Russian disinformation objectives to create and facilitate distrust in Government were also noticed by Sanovich (2017). Disinformation also violates the self-identity and perception of justice (Blouin & Mukand, 2019). Reflections on the exaggerated perception of corruption within the state apparatus were found to be one of the most discussed topics (Miller, 2019). The emphasized narrative of the “failed state” in which everything is decided in advance, and in which citizens can neither influence policy decisions nor be the masters of their own personal or career development, is also important for Russian disinformation architects (Helmus et al., 2018). The disinformation-related influence of diminished motivation for positive, personal development has also been mentioned by Smith and Lasswell (2015). Attempting to undermine the perception of safety within the country through constant intimidation and threat of imminent military actions is another major tactical aspect of Russian disinformation (Giles et al., 2015). Although in the short term, the effect may be opposite to that expected by the disinformation designers – a consolidation of the nation in the face of immediate aggression (Yurkova, 2018), in the long term, it rewards the disinformation creators in the form of decreased trust in public institutions (Haas, 2017) and the state itself (Redley, 2007) in the target country. Such dual effects of disinformation not only increase the complexity of how it may be detected, (Kausar et al., 2020) but also make understanding its effects even more puzzling. It has been noted that although Russian state disinformation is very effective within Russia itself by forcing the Russian population to accept a distorted reality, it becomes a counterproductive element outside Russian borders (Belousov, 2012) where it no longer achieves its main objectives (Benkler et al., 2018). These contradictions not only substantiate polemics about the ambiguity of Russian disinformation outcomes but also add weight to arguments in favor of the present study. In summary, Russian disinformation in the Baltic States is directed at increasing the populations” distrust in their governments (Lough et al., 2014), promoting the perception of a lack of justice (Paul & Matthews, 2016) or career possibilities (Kuczyńska-Zonik, 2017) within the country, and reinforcing the threat of the imminent military action in the region (Buinauskas et al., 2016).
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Potential 1ac › Cyber Advantage
Kols 2022, Rihards Kols Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee The Saeima (Parliament) of the Republic of Latvia (3/17/2022 “Hybrid Threats: The Baltic Perspective” https://www.csce.gov/sites/helsinkicommission.house.gov/files/RKols_Hybrid%20threats%20Baltic%20Perspective-2022.pdf
Since regaining our independence from the Soviet Union in 1990, Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia have been under constant Russian pressure. This pressure has manifested itself is through the conventional military threat, punctuated by ongoing airspace violations by Russian military aircraft and navy, unannounced, large-scale military exercises of inherently offensive nature along their borders, and the general disposition of Russia's military forces in regions closest to the Baltic borders, doing so under the pretence of counteracting the "hostile West" and promoting militarism. Influence, psychological, and information operations have been part of Russian doctrine since the early days of the Soviet Union, but historically they have been relegated to supporting roles. Nevertheless, as General Gerasimov has observed and thus included in the Russian military doctrine, non-kinetic are exceedingly practical, and these instruments will become dominant in future warfare. This is reflected in most current Russian foreign, security and defence policies and doctrinal documents. For years, the strategic goal of Russian information operations in the Baltic states has been to create distance between the Baltics and the West. The Russian concept is rooted in the idea that democratic societies are vulnerable to political manipulation, and exploiting this perceived weakness is far less costly than pursuing annexation or occupation. Consequently, Russian information operations in the Baltics focus on nine objectives: (1) Encourage and support armed actions by separatist groups to promote chaos and territorial disintegration; (2) Increase polarisation between elites and society to foment a crisis of values followed by process of orientation toward Russian values; (3) Demoralise the military and otherwise attrit resolve; (4) Undermine socioeconomic stability; (5) Engender socio-political crisis; (6) Intensify simultaneous forms and models of psychological warfare to demoralise the Baltic states' armed forces and population and break their resolve; (7) Incite mass panic and degrade confidence in crucial government institutions; (8) Defame political leaders not aligned with Russian interests; (9) and Undermine international alliances and partnerships.12 Russia seeks to achieve its strategic ends in the Baltics through influence operations rather than conventional means. Recognising resistance to deeper ties with Russia in the Baltics, Russia has diversified its messaging beyond pro-Russia content. Instead, the Russian strategy is to attempt to convince members of the population that their countries' current alignment with the West, embrace of democracy, and membership in NATO and the EU are in some way detrimental, degrading or dangerous. Russia heavily leverages Russian and local-language traditional media, social media, and the internet toward this end. There is no universally agreed definition of hybrid threats, considering that a wide range of activities falls under this term. Moreover, hybrid threats evolve constantly, and new means in hybrid warfare emerge. However, the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats defines hybrid threats as "an action conducted by state or non-state actors, whose goal is to undermine or harm a target by influencing its decision-making at the local, regional, state or institutional level. Such actions are coordinated and synchronised and deliberately target democratic states and institutions' vulnerabilities". 3 The use of hybrid tactics often is based on trying to undermine fundamental democratic values and liberties, and it is done under what some call a "chaos strategy". Russia sows chaos to achieve its agenda beyond its borders by deploying an array of hybrid warfare tools - hybrid warfare is a tactical application of the chaos strategy. Total spectrum warfare deploys a blend of conventional and nonconventional means to affect on the ground changes in target populations or territories while seeking to avoid direct military confrontation. Hybrid warfare is employed in a tailored way to sow chaos in target countries. Such efforts generally include irregular warfare, active measures, and special operations. Like the world, hybrid war is not static, and new tools are developed and employed constantly. For the Baltics, having lived in this environment for the majority of their lives, both under Soviet occupation and after regaining their countries' independence, this multi-vector warfare - hybrid warfare tactics and the chaos they attempt to create, have become intuitively recognisable and often seep into the background like white noise.4 From the perspective of the Baltic states, the development of hybrid threat-related policies at the EU or NATO level has been a natural consequence of the changing security landscape in Europe, especially the gradually deteriorating relations between the West and Russia. In the immediate aftermath of Russia's first attack on Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity, different hybrid attack scenarios against one of the three Baltic states were envisaged, e.g., Russia's attempt to overtake Narva, a city in the extreme eastern point of Estonia, where more than 80% of the population are ethnic Russians; or the so-called "little green men", armed soldiers without insignia that were seen in Crimea in March 2014, entering Latgale, the region in Latvia's east5 ; or Russia creating an incident linked to Kaliningrad – the Russian enclave on the Baltic sea wedged between Lithuania and Poland. In the event of any war between Russia and NATO countries, it is through this gap that NATO would have to rush reinforcements and supplies from Poland to the Baltic countries, and it is this gap that Russia would have to close to prevent that. Military strategists have long suggested that Russian forces from Belarus could attempt to punch across the narrow Lithuanian territory known as the Suwalki Gap to the Moscow-controlled enclave of Kaliningrad, effectively cutting off the three Baltic states. 6 These scenarios included Russia sending troops to "restore order" in case of an uprising in Kaliningrad or sabotaging the train lines across Lithuania that serve as a vital transit corridor from Russia. Because Baltic rail infrastructure is still primarily dominated by Soviet-era rails of a specific gauge width, one incompatible with the EU standard rail gauge width, the risks are substantial enough to cause concern. It has been considered that Russia could use the same pretext as in Ukraine, i.e., protection of the Russian-speaking minorities, to target one of the countries in the region, or rely on state-controlled Russian TV channels widely watched by ethnic Russians in the Baltics to spread propaganda and air true and imagined grievances.7
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Potential 1ac › Cyber Advantage
Horchakova 2022, Veronika Horchakova Mykolas Romeris University, European and International Business Law program, Master’s degree student (“STRENGTHENING THE TRANSATLANTIC PARTNERSHIP: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE BALTIC STATES” https://repository.mruni.eu/bitstream/handle/007/18311/Teisines_minties_svente-97-107.pdf?sequence=1)
The other non-military threat for the Baltic region is Moscow’s use of the Russophone minority as political instruments against the West. For example, signs of warfare were identified when Russian-speaking inhabitants in Vilnius received brochures with disinformation on the economic situation in Lithuania and a call to participate in the resettlement of ethnic Russians from Lithuania to Russia.13 This kind of propaganda was also used in Ukraine to disrupt loyalty to the State. The Baltic countries need to create a “defensive shield” to fight against Russia’s disinformation and propaganda. Moscow’s primary goal is to form a positive opinion of Russia among local inhabitants by creating dissatisfaction with the relevant governments, shaping and misrepresenting historical facts, and exploiting the vulnerabilities of the Baltic’s political systems, economy, and society. Here the Lithuanian case can serve as a guide for the other two Baltic States and NATO members, too. The roots of the anti-Russian propaganda and disinformation campaign originated in 2016, when Lithuania introduced temporary bans on Russian media outlets that breached pre-existing media laws.14 Shortly after that, the Lithuanian parliament adopted an ordinance restricting Russian media production content on Lithuanian TV. In 2018, the Lithuanian parliament adopted new amendments to the Public Information Law. TV channels in Lithuania must translate TV programs into Lithuanian “if these programs are produced in Russian or other non-EU languages and broadcast for longer than one hour and a half.”15 Such restrictions are effective at diminishing the Russian influence, but are not a panacea. As for cyber security, the Baltic States have undertaken successful work in combating cyber-attacks. According to the International Telecommunication Union’s Global Cybersecurity Index 2020, among 194 countries, Estonia is ranked third after the US and the UK. Followed by the Russian Federation, Lithuania is the sixth-best cyber protected country. Latvia completes the list of the top 15.16 This ranking is based on five pillars: legal, technical, organizational, capacity building, and cooperation measurements related to cybersecurity. Since 2019, these countries have each had Cyber Security Strategies, but we have to consider that these rankings are not always reliable, and sometimes they do not represent reality in all its shapes. Despite establishing the NATO cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence in 2008 (hosted by Estonia), several commentators have criticized the real cyber warfare capabilities of NATO. In a 2019 interview, the former supreme allied commander of NATO, Adm. James Stavridis, USN (Ret.), warned that “in cyber, and cybersecurity, we have the greatest mismatch between the level of threat and level of preparation.”17 New asymmetric or technological threats require extensive cooperation not only within but also outside of the Alliance. The security and defence sectors in the Baltic States need to build partnerships with the private and academic sectors, all of which will need to cooperate with each other to maintain situational and technological awareness.18 It is clear that, in reality, the ongoing conflict between western countries and Russia does not take place inside tanks or submarines but behind a computer. Russia has massively increased its cyber warfare capabilities and is particularly strong in social manipulation and other cyber-attacks. In this context, there are signs of significant commitment over time to enable the Baltic countries to develop their national defence further. For example, the Baltic States have already signed a five-year roadmap of defence cooperation with the Pentagon,19 meaning that, by 2024, capability development and defence-related aid, training exercises, and cyber defence will be exercised with the US. Officials emphasized the benefits of this program and said that they look forward to its further development. Activated transatlantic relationships are the perfect opportunity for Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia to generate new partnership programs, agreements, and projects against Russian soft power.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Potential 1ac › Cyber Advantage
Cerulus 2-22 (Laurens Cerulus leads POLITICO Europe’s team of reporters covering cybersecurity, privacy and data protection issues as Cybersecurity Editor. He also supports the broader team of reporters covering technology issues as Deputy Technology Editor. He is a graduate of City University London’s journalism department and holds master’s degrees in history and international politics. He is a Belgian, born in Leuven. “Cyber ‘spillover’ from Ukraine looms in the Baltics”
The conflict between Russia and Ukraine puts neighboring EU countries at risk of disruption from cyberattacks and the spread of disinformation, officials warned Tuesday. "The Baltic states, for Russia, are the easiest way to put pressure on the EU and NATO ... This is the place where we have to pay careful attention," said Bart Groothuis, Liberal member of the European Parliament and former cybersecurity official at the Dutch Ministry of Defense. Groothuis is leading a delegation of members of the European Parliament's subcommittee on defense and security on visits to Estonia on Tuesday and Lithuania on Wednesday, in what he said was a "show of solidarity" with Ukraine. Those two Baltic countries are already involved in a cyber defense operation to support Ukraine through the EU's Cyber Rapid Response Team, which was activated Tuesday. The threat of cyberattacks on European soil is two-fold: First, attacks launched on Ukrainian networks could spread to European networks. Second, Russia could choose to launch direct attacks on European targets through its intelligence services or cybercriminal groups to disrupt the West's response to the Ukraine crisis. Cyberattacks on Ukraine have affected Europe in the past. In 2017, hackers spread malware known as NotPetya through a Ukrainian piece of software and triggered a worldwide cyber crisis seen as the most devastating cyberattack in history. Western security services later attributed the attack to Russia's military intelligence agency GRU. "There is always the threat of a spillover" like NotPetya, said Jaak Tarien, director at the Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE), a NATO-accredited cyber defense center based in Tallinn that advises the defense alliance and its members on cybersecurity. "It's the one internet we're using," Tarien said, pointing to the connections Europe's tech networks have with Ukraine. Baltic countries, in particular, in past years were often the target of campaigns by Russian state-backed hacking groups targeting public and private institutions. The EU attributed a campaign known as "Ghostwriter" at least in part to Russia, after it first plagued Baltic countries with phishing emails and disinformation campaigns and then moved on to target Polish and German politicians. Countries like Estonia and Lithuania have also emerged as vocal proponents of a tougher response to Russian cyber aggression in Europe. Officials in the Baltics are now on high alert, expecting more attacks to come from Russia as the conflict in Ukraine escalates. Last week, Lithuania's Ministry of Defense raised the alarm, saying it expected serious cyberattacks on the country's public authorities. "We definitely see how, as the general state of security deteriorates, the likelihood of cyber activities increases. We're working on a higher alert level," said Margiris Abukevičius, vice minister at the Ministry of National Defense in Lithuania.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
2AC---AT: Queer IR › perm
Amoureux 15 – Scholar postdoctoral fellow at Wake Forest University; received his PhD from Brown University in Political Science [Jack, 2015, “Queer Ethics of World Politics”, Academia.edu]
In summarizing some of these themes, controversies and tensions, I am unavoidably reading queer theory as an IR scholar steeped in a literature that, for the most part, has not accepted and has even been actively hostile to a ‘queer IR’ (Weber 2014b). Nevertheless, an intersection of queer and ‘dominant’ IR is potentially fruitful, but it is not a matter of ‘mixing and stirring’ since the queer has been relevant to IR and world politics all along, in its dominant narratives of discipline as they extend through the halls of power, products of media and culture, and the offices, conference rooms and journals of the field of International Relations (Weber 2013; 2014a, 2014b; Wilcox 2015). In other words, I am interrogating IR from a body of literature that has become known as ‘queer theory’ but this effort should not be read as a neglect of the ways in which a growing contingent of IR scholars have read world politics through a queer lens to make up a rich variety of critical and innovative approaches
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
2AC---AT: Queer IR
Cocks 16 — Joan Cocks, Emeritus Professor of Politics and Co-Founder of the Program in Critical Social Thought at Mount Holyoke College, holds a Ph.D. from the University of Massachusetts-Amherst, 2016 (“Queer International Relations (II),” The Disorder of Things—a scholarly blog, November 22nd, Available Online at , Accessed 02-06-2020)
Although he/she stands as an emblem of Cynthia’s hope for pluralizing the monolithic concept of sovereign man and for queering an integrated Europe, I’m going to gesture only briefly to the border-straddling Eurovision song contest winner Neuwirth/Wurst. I have to confess that I’ve never watched Eurovision and so must trust Cynthia’s reading of N/W entirely, but as she depicts him/her, unlike the normal homosexual, this bearded lady from Austria and Colombia managed to provoke wildly clashing reactions from leaders and peoples in different countries and of different political stripes by impaling him/herself on the border of masculine and feminine, the Global North and Global South, secularism and religion, white and brown racial identities, and national particularity and regional integration. Still, while Cynthia’s layered reading of N/W is as sophisticated an interpretation of identity deconstruction as any cultural theorist could hope for, a performance of ambiguities in identity on stage, and the parsing of those ambiguities in a queer IR theory text, can push the world forward (or, to the minds of N/W’s critics, backward) only so far.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
2AC---AT: Queer IR
Weber 16 (Cynthia Weber, Professor of International Relations at the University of Sussex, “Sovereignty, Sexuality And The Will To Trump: A Queer IR Analysis And Response,” 11-27-2016, accessed 07-21-2022, https://thedisorderofthings.com/2016/11/27/sovereignty-sexuality-and-the-will-to-trump-a-queer-ir-analysis-and-response/)//sfs
Crucially, the Trump campaign didn’t just roll out its vision of this ‘US sovereign subject’ by employing either/or logics, even though much of the time this seemed to be the case. Yes, Trump pitted ‘trustworthy’ and ‘untrustworthy’ US citizens against one another. But he constantly flip flopped on who these trustworthy and untrustworthy citizens were, whether in the case of women, ‘the blacks’ or the first black President of the United States of America. The campaign also rolled out Mike Pence to deny many of the things Trump said. And Trump made a lot of inherently contradictory statements that suggested he was for and against some groups or policies at the same time. For example, Trump said, ‘There can be no discrimination against gays. I’m against gay marriage’ (although in his 60 Minutes interview, Trump said gay marriage was a legally settled issue). Trump also made inconsistent statements about the anti-trans* bathroom law in North Carolina. Comments like these were implicitly and explicitly made in the register of sex, gender and sexuality throughout the campaign, and they were more consistent with and/or logics and neither/nor logics than they were with either/or logics. These statements demonstrate how some of the paradoxical figures and logics found in queer discourses were coopted by the Trump campaign for its own purposes. All of this left many politicians, pundits, and ordinary US American citizens wondering if Trump was a clown who should be laughed off or an existential threat to the American democratic project. Trump positioned himself as either and both and even neither as it suited his ambitions. And he will likely continue to do so as the 45th President of the United States. What is to be done? As the US and the world face up to the realities of the impossible Presidency that the Trump campaign made possible, there is no shortage of recommendations circulating in critical camps about what is to be done. These include: Organizing new coalitions and devising experimental techniques to make them effective; Disarming the specific modalities of citizenship, governance and reason that make (un)reasonable identifications with a will to Trump possible; and Resisting all xenophobias, forms of racism, misogyny, homo/bi/trans*phobias, and other oppressive ideologies and social relations that violently order the world in whatever name – be it white supremacy, rightwing nationalism, conservatism, or neoliberalism. I am less hopeful than Joan Cocks might be that these new political alliances and institutions will be forged ‘without sovereign aspirations, delusions, or pretensions’, whatever their scale. And I may be more persuaded than Cocks is that the counter-Trump re-imaginings of the US that will support these political alliances and institutions are an essential part of what makes radical change possible, even if these re-imaginings fail to escape the ‘delusion of sovereignty’ and its corresponding delusions of things like sex, gender and sexuality. This, it seems to me, is something Trump’s radical re-imagining of the US as his platform for winning the White House underscores. As we all move forward and ready ourselves for some difficult conversations, this queer IR analysis suggests we keep the following two points in mind. First, connections between sovereignty, sex, gender and sexuality are neither academic nor trivial. Nor are they separable from racisms, xenophobias and other systems of power. How sovereignties are specifically sexualized, racialized, classed and otherwise configured to authorize the defense of particular nationalisms and internationalisms has real effects on real people. This is as true in relation to the hate speech and physical violence authorized in the name of Trump as it is for the policies that will emerge from a Trump administration. Second, exclusively anti-normative, always contrarian, somehow liberating understandings of ‘queer’, ‘queers’, and ‘queer logics’ can obscure the fact that ‘queer’ – just like any (dis)position, strategy, or tool – can be captured, mimicked, and mobilized to map the world in despicable ways. Alt-Right offers one important example of a white supremacist organization adopting techniques of the left for such purposes. How the Trump campaign mobilized what (otherwise) might appear to be queer logics of statecraft to de-normalize Clinton’s ‘neoliberal US sovereign subject’ on behalf of Trump’s (re)normalized ‘repressed, entitled, white US sovereign subject’ is another. There is no reason to believe that, as President, Trump will abandon the very logics and tactics that helped win him the Presidency. These are among the stakes a queer IR analysis of a will to Trump makes plain. For me, opposing a will to Trump starts by reminding myself that – like ‘queer’ – a ‘state’s sovereign subjectivity is…”[i]llusive, always on the move.” It is “at best like something, but it never is that something”’. Trump is of some ever-changing United States of America, but Trump is not the United States of America. The same can be said of the ‘US sovereign subject’ Trump’s campaign strategically figured to authorize Trump’s will to power. It is in these gaps and fissures where I will pitch my political tent and stage my practical political resistance to a will to Trump.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
2AC---AT: Queer IR
Dillon Tatum 18. Assistant professor in the Department of Political Science and Geography at Francis Marion University. “Toward a Radical IR.” Duck of Minerva. 11/28/2018.
David Brook’s latest column in the New York Times, banging on the same themes about “the kids are just not right,” raises some questions about what it means to engage in radical politics in the Trump era. Brooks compares the younger generation’s belief “that the system itself is rotten and needs to be torn down” to accomodationist and gradualisms. He continues on to speculate about how these new attitudes might affect older, more “pragmatic,” liberals who desire to work within the system. Brooks, as usual, uses a conservative argument to position himself in the “middle.” I have been thinking a lot about this issue of “radicalism” contra arguments about working within systems that are unjust in thinking about liberal world order and its futures. It has led me to a question I am currently exploring in a work-in-progress about what the possibilities are of radicalism as a way of approaching international politics. Against arguments like Brooks’, and even more sophisticated arguments about agonistic democracy developed by thinkers like Chantal Mouffe, I think there is a place in IR for radical conceptions of transformation, order, and politics. What is radicalism? Brooks never fully fleshes out this concept. Philosophy and political theory have engaged with the issue of radicalism as a concept, though the results are often divergent. To quote Agnes Heller, in her treatise on radical philosophy, it “can give the world a norm, and it can will people to want to give a world to the norm.” Radicalism as an idea, and as a form of critique, mobilizes many different modes of thinking about the social and the political. The most comprehensive definition of radicalism is that provided by Paul McLaughlin, who defines radicalism “in terms of (i) a fundamental orientation (toward fundamental objects) (ii) in the political domain (iii) of an argumentative nature.” More than that, though, we can add that radicalism intervenes in the political domain with the goal of fundamental transformation. Additionally, though radicalism indeed proceeds in an argumentative nature, this methodology for argument is one that is aimed at critiquing, and seeking the destruction/replacement of existing institutions. A revised working definition of radicalism, therefore, is: a way of thinking about politics that focuses on totalities, praxis and political action, and the deployment of historicist methods with an eye toward “getting to the root of things.” Thus, radicalism is both a broad range of critical thought and practice, but also is specific in the realms of focus, action, and method. If Brooks is right that there is a major clash between a radical younger generation and a more pragmatic and moderate older generation in American politics, these differences are not well expressed in contemporary thinking about IR. Some of the biggest divisions are between what Robert Cox called “problem-solving theories” and theories that critique such approaches, but provide little argumentation aimed at tearing structures of injustice down altogether. In short: IR, even at its critical ends, is not radical (for an excellent exception see here and here). Why is this important? This morning, I taught a seminar on the question “Is Liberal World Order Finished?” I asked my students to think about what makes a liberal order “liberal,” and then asked: “Can we fix the liberal world order, or can we imagine a world without it?—and what would that look like?” The students were quick to point out the violences, inequities, and problems inherent in a liberal world order, but it took a good bit of pushing and prodding to get them to articulate whether/how we should/could take this order apart and rethink it. This was not just a difficult task for the students—it is something IR has not spent enough time meditating on.
There is a lot to be critical of these days. And, I disagree with Brooks’s pessimism about a younger radical generation. Politics is deeply intertwined with engagements with radicalism. What I think is missing when we consider global politics, though, is that many of our pressing questions about institutions, order, and state action proceed from the same sort of moderation, accomodationism, or—at the most—an immanently critical vein. If we want to intellectually and politically approach issues like: What do we make of the future(s) of liberal world order? IR needs to engage with radicalism.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
2AC---AT: Queer IR
Currah 14 — Paisley Currah, Professor of Political Science and Gender Studies at Brooklyn College, 2014 (“The State,” TSQ: Transgender Studies Quarterly, Vol. 1, No. 1-2, Accessible Online via e-Duke Journals Scholarly Collection, Accessed On 07-13-2016)
According to Gilles Deleuze, a concept ‘‘should express an event rather than an essence’’ (1995: 14). Molar, large-scale accounts of sex and the state have assumed a sameness to sex and a singular rationality to state actors, decisions, and projects. If the state is not unitary, coordinated, and hierarchically organized in an ultimately rational way—if, as Michel Foucault suggests, ‘‘the state is only a composite reality and a mythicized abstraction whose importance is much less than we think’’ (1991: 103)— then it should come as no surprise that state definitions of sex are also plural. A contradiction is something that does not make sense, a position that is logically inconsistent. To begin by letting go of the assumption that there is any ‘‘there there,’’ any whatness, to (legal) sex apart from what an agency says it is, the contradiction evaporates. The official sex designation—or, more precisely, the M or the F— stamped on documents or coded in records becomes the starting point. Then an analysis can focus not on what sex is, or what it should be, but on what it does, what it accomplishes, what it produces. Indeed, if the only thing we know for sure about sex is what any of these many state actors say it is in any particular instance, sex will turn out to be as messy and diffuse a concept as the state. Entering into the analysis without a firm sense of what sex is or what the state is—as a priori facts, as edifices—makes the processes through which they come into being more visible. It might be better to defer attempts to resolve— theoretically or politically— the messiness in order to understand what a particular system of sex designation does for a particular state project such as recognition or redistribution (Currah, forthcoming). Of course, states should not only or always be imagined as messy, scattered nodes of local and arbitrary power arrangements. The Leviathan state’s terrible concentrated authority to impose sanctions (death, imprisonment, fines) has been the subject of theories of sovereignty for centuries. For this purpose, the most apt definition of the state begins with the simple description from Max Weber: ‘‘A human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate physical violence within a particular given territory’’ (1991: 78). To create a truly compelling account of sovereign violence and the paradox of sovereignty, one must take Weber’s definition, put question marks around ‘‘legitimate,’’ and add the observation made by scholars such as Walter Benjamin, Carl Schmitt, Hannah Arendt, Jacques Derrida, and Giorgio Agamben that the force that creates the law and makes it legitimate cannot be justified by a law that does not yet exist. Still, much of what states do— regulating the health, safety, and public welfare through myriad regulations, rules, decisions, practices— does not reach the threshold of juridical violence, even if those actions are ultimately undergirded by its threat. Fetishizing a generalized idea of the state and its terrifying or redemptive power (depending on one’s perspective) can obscure what is actually happening in the local, micro, particular sites where most public authority is exercised. While it is crucial to theorize the singular finality of state violence, neglecting to examine the messiness of actually existing and potentially incommensurate policies, practices, rules, and norms risks substituting the conceptual for the concrete and gets in the way of understanding what might actually be going on (Latour 1995: 48).
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Bronze Night Aff › Ks › AT: Tech=Violent
Toupin 21 (sophie, doctoral student in the Department of Art History and Communication Studies at McGill University, “More widespread than we think”) //ansel
During the anti-globalization movement of the early 2000s, tech collectives such as and came into existence to provide autonomous, non-corporate communication tools and “How-Tos” for social movements to organize safely and securely with emerging new media. In South Africa, the campaign was initiated in 2010 in response to the Protection of State Information Bill, which aimed at weakening the rights of journalists and whistleblowers to access information. As part of their work, R2K has published to protect themselves digitally.
To heighten my own digital defense practice, I recently took a virtual workshop offered by the New York-based . This collective provides technology education for radical organizers and revolutionary communities with special attention to underserved groups. These groups, which design tools and training for activists, are not a new occurrence. They have an interesting history across varying political cultures dating back, at the very least, to the national liberation struggles of the 20th century. Let’s take two of these, both armed struggles.