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2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Erdoğan Disadvantage › AFF › 2AC — Econ Alt Cause

Econ alt cause—it decides the election

AydıN 22 — Selçuk Aydın holds his PhD from King’s College in the School of Security Studies. He has conducted projects and published articles, book chapters and opinions on Turkey's history, Turkish diaspora, Kurdish Studies and Middle East politics. He is currently a lecturer at Giresun University. SelçUk AydıN, "Turkey is now on an election footing, and the economy could decide it," Middle East Eye, 1-17-2022, https://www.middleeasteye.net/opinion/turkey-politics-all-about-election-economy, accessed 6-25-2022, WMK

There is still one and a half years left until the presidential and parliamentary elections in Turkey, due simultaneously in June 2023, according to the law. But the country appears to have already switched to poll mode, as political tensions escalate between the ruling alliance and opposition bloc over the question of when to hold the elections.

But today, with the presidential system, both political successes and failures are attributed directly to politicians. This puts civilians at the centre of political discussions and shows that the government will be held directly responsible for its failures.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Erdoğan Disadvantage › AFF › 2AC — Thumper — Ukraine

Ukraine thumps—gives Erdogan a political win which will swing the election — diverts attention from the economy and political crackdowns

Tremblay 22 — Pinar Tremblay Professor in the Economics department at California State Polytechnic University - Pomona (Brendan Tremblays mom lol) "How Erdogan could emerge stronger from war in Ukraine," Al-Monitor: The Pulse of the Middle East, 3-15-2022, https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2022/03/how-erdogan-could-emerge-stronger-war-ukraine, accessed 6-24-2022, WMK

Yet since the Russian invasion of Ukraine began nearly three weeks ago, there has been a newfound optimism among the AKP ranks. No one can deny that the invasion will cost Turkey, as it will lead to revenue losses from tourism to agriculture.

However, AKP elites also see this as a God-sent opportunity to sweep the 2023 elections.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Erdoğan Disadvantage › AFF › 2AC — Non UQ — Elections

Erdogan just screwed himself—electoral reform

Tremblay 22 — Pinar Tremblay Professor in the Economics department at California State Polytechnic University - Pomona (Brendan Tremblays mom lol) How Turkey’s election bill could backfire on Erdogan’s ruling party," Al-Monitor: The Pulse of the Middle East, 6-22-2019, https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2022/03/how-turkeys-election-bill-could-backfire-erdogans-ruling-party, accessed 6-24-2022, WMK

Turkey’s ruling party and its de facto coalition partner revealed a long-awaited draft amendment to the country’s election law March 14. The bill is expected to become law in April with the alliance’s majority vote. According to Turkey’s constitution, electoral changes must come into effect at least one year before elections, meaning that it's too late for the bill to affect any snap elections before the general and presidential elections scheduled for 2023.

Erdogan has been talking about an overhaul in the election law since last year, promising “a very different” electoral system. A senior bureaucrat working for the Ministry of Interior told Al-Monitor on condition of anonymity, “Experts studied this bill over a year and there were different proposals, simulations run. They picked this version.”

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Erdoğan Disadvantage › AFF › 2AC — Non UQ — Polls

He’s getting destroyed no matter who the candidate is

BIA 5/24 — Poll: Erdoğan loses to unspecified 'opposition candidate'," Bianet 05-24-2022, https://m.bianet.org/english/politics/262262-poll-erdogan-loses-to-unspecified-opposition-candidate, accessed 6-25-2022, WMK

President and Justice and Development Party (AKP) Chair Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's popular support has fallen below 35 percent, according to a new poll.

In the poll between May 12-15 among 2,400 people in 27 provinces, the Yöneylem Research company, respondents were asked, "If there was a presidential election next Sunday, would you vote for President Erdoğan or the opposition candidate?" According to the results, Erdoğan seems to have lost his chance against the opposition.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Erdoğan Disadvantage › AFF › 2AC — Non UQ — Erdogan Unpopular

Erdogan has no support—loses to every opposition figure and alt causes to base collapse

Arab News 21 — Arab News, "Erdogan rivals surge in polls ahead of 2023 Turkey election," 5-17-2021, https://www.arabnews.com/node/1860081/middle-east, accessed 6-24-2022, WMK

Turkish opposition figures are gaining ground among voters ahead of the country's critical 2023 presidential elections and are likely to pose a major threat to President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his ruling party,recent surveys show.

Istanbul mayor Ekrem Imamoglu and Ankara mayor Mansur Yavas, who head two opposition-controlled municipalities in Turkey's largest cities, previously challenged Erdogan and his party in the March 2019 local elections.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Erdoğan Disadvantage › AFF › 2AC — Non UQ — Erdogan Unpopular

Erdogan gets trounced—diversions have failed

Daragahi 6/5 — Borzou Daragahi is International Correspondent for The Independent. He has been covering the Middle East, North Africa, South Asia, and Europe since 2002, with stints in Tehran, Baghdad, Beirut, Cairo, and now Istanbul. Daragahi, Borzou. "Opinion: The world is unprepared for Turkey’s potentially cataclysmic 2023 elections," 6-5-2022, https://www.independent.co.uk/independentpremium/voices/turkey-erdogan-elections-2023-nato-b2094281.html, accessed 6-24-2022, WMK

So far, the machinations have failed to win over voters, enraged and disillusioned by what they perceive as economic mismanagement, with inflation reaching a 24-year high of 73.5 per cent.

Multiple opinion polls conducted over months by various firms suggest that Imamoglu, as well as CHP leader Kemal Kilicdaroglu and Ankara mayor Mansur Yavas, would handily trounce Erdogan were elections held now. Despite its legal troubles, HDP still polls over the 10 per cent threshold necessary to win a parliamentary bloc.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Erdoğan Disadvantage › AFF › 2AC — Cooperation Now

Turkey-NATO and Turkey-US coop now

Kim and Utku 5-10 (Prof Dr Tongfi Kim is the Programme Director of the BA in International Affairs and Professor at the Centre for Security, Diplomacy and Strategy (CSDS) of the Brussels School of Governance (BSoG-VUB) and a Senior Researcher at the KF-VUB Korea Chair. Mehmet Algin Utku is a research intern at the Brussels School of Governance. Brussels Times, 10 May 2022, “It’s time to bind Turkey to NATO,” ; accessed 6/23/2022) ng

The West has greater leverage The West, however, has its own tools to bind Turkey to NATO. Most importantly, the West has a superior power to reward Turkey. For instance, analysts often refer to close economic ties between Turkey and Russia, but the EU is by far Turkey’s largest trading partner and main source of investments, accounting for 33.4% of Turkey’s imports and 41.3% of its exports in 2020 (and 21 out of the 27 EU member states are also members of NATO). Military relations between Turkey and NATO also favour the West. NATO’s collective defense protects Turkey, and the decades-old alliance ties have made Turkey far more dependent on the West than on Russia. The S-400 system is expensive, but the delivery to Turkey began only in 2019, and Russia accounts for only 5% of arms import by Turkey in the last ten years between 2012 and 2021. During the decade, Russia ranked below other weapons suppliers of Turkey such as the United States (51%), Italy (16%), Spain (13%), and South Korea (6%) according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute’s Arms Transfers Database. For binding Turkey to NATO and wedging Turkey away from Russia, we recommend reward-based strategies rather than coercion. Academic literature suggests that positive sanctions work better and that a coercive approach is chosen by those with weaker reward power. A coercive strategy can easily antagonize the target, whereas a reward-based strategy is unlikely to worsen the status quo. Reward-binding is particularly important in relation to the Turkish public, who have resented the West’s treatment of their country in the aftermath of the Syrian refugee crisis and the 2016 coup attempt against Erdoğan. This anti-Western sentiment has been further exacerbated by pro-government Turkish media. In fact, unlike the seemingly neutral position of the Turkish government in this Russia-Ukraine war, Turkish mass media is dominated by anti-Western discourse and criticism against NATO. A poll in March revealed that 48.3% of Turks blamed the United States and NATO for the current situation in Ukraine and only 33.7% thought Russia was responsible. In the same poll, 51.7% of Turks see the United States as the biggest threat to their country as opposed to Russia (19.4%). As a Turkish scholar points out, anti-Western sentiments that developed for years will not easily disappear from the Turkish public opinion even after Erdoğan’s recent U-turn. In international security and diplomacy, NATO allies have already begun taking a conciliatory approach toward Ankara. This can be seen in the recent Franco-Turkish rapprochement and the Biden administration’s support for “appropriate U.S. defense trade ties with Turkey.” Economic reward-binding by NATO allies is likely to be appreciated by Erdoğan, who faces the presidential election in 2023. More importantly, this is a chance for the West to offer the olive branch to the Turkish public as Turkey experiences the highest level of inflation in 20 years, with Erdoğan’s economic mismanagement, the COVID-19 pandemic, and the war in Ukraine creating a perfect storm for the economy. Deepening of the EU-Turkey customs union and other positive economic incentives are useful tools to improve media freedom and human rights in Turkey, and the West should ask for domestic political concessions from Erdoğan. Rather than using Turkey’s political problems as excuses to keep Turkey at distance, however, economic rewards should be employed to bind the hearts of the Turkish public to NATO.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Erdoğan Disadvantage › AFF › 2AC — Non UQ — Relations High

Erdogan wants to cooperate now

Danforth 21 — Nicholas Danforth is a Senior Non-Resident Fellow at the Brookings institute. Nicholas Danforth, "A cool, cautious calm: US-Turkey relations six months into the Biden administration," Brookings, July 2021, https://www.brookings.edu/research/a-cool-cautious-calm-us-turkey-relations-six-months-into-the-biden-administration/, accessed 6-25-2022, WMK

President Joe Biden has made it six months into his term without a new U.S.-Turkish crisis. Amidst simmering tensions, strategic disagreements, and so many potential flashpoints, even this comparative calm counts as an achievement. It is a product of both the White House’s new approach to Turkey and Ankara’s eagerness to maintain the appearance of good relations in the face of more pressing problems. Biden has been appropriately cool and consistent in his dealings with Turkey, emphasizing human rights in his rhetoric and seeking to establish a new tone for the relationship that will give the United States greater leverage. This has corresponded with a period of consolidation and greater caution in Turkish foreign policy. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, for his part, has been on an international charm offensive as he confronts regional isolation, economic turbulence, and his own dwindling poll numbers.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Erdoğan Disadvantage › Impact › AT: Erdogan Bad Turn

If he’s too far behind, he’ll rig it—that turns the impact

Daragahi 6/5 — Borzou Daragahi is International Correspondent for The Independent. He has been covering the Middle East, North Africa, South Asia, and Europe since 2002, with stints in Tehran, Baghdad, Beirut, Cairo, and now Istanbul. Daragahi, Borzou. "Opinion: The world is unprepared for Turkey’s potentially cataclysmic 2023 elections," 6-5-2022, https://www.independent.co.uk/independentpremium/voices/turkey-erdogan-elections-2023-nato-b2094281.html, accessed 6-24-2022, WMK

So far, there is little sign that western nations or any other regional or world power are preparing for any outcome other than a clean Erdogan victory. But Turks are already discussing what could happen if he loses the election and refuses to relinquish power.

Like Belarus dictator Aleksander Lukashenko in 2020, some worry that Erdogan and his allies would cheat so egregiously and crack down on opponents so harshly that world leaders would be unable to sweep the matter under the rug. There is also the possibility that Erdogan wins the presidency but loses the parliament, or that a new centre-left administration comes into power in Ankara and renews demands to enter the EU.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Erdoğan Disadvantage › Impact › AT: Erdogan Bad Turn

His predecessors won’t change anything. This answers every scenario

Takins 21 — Hasim Tekines previously worked in the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Prime Ministry. He is currently an MA student at Leiden University focusing on Middle East Studies. Tekines is a contributor to Fikra Forum. M. Hasim Takins — What Would a Post-Erdoğan Turkish Foreign Policy Look Like?. War on the Rocks. Decatur 10th 2021. WMK

Both his admirers and detractors agree that President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has radically transformed Turkish foreign policy. But, if Erdoğan were to leave power, would Turkey’s approach to the world “normalize” and turn back to its pre-Erdoğan settings? With economic conditions in Turkey worsening, public outrage over the country ’ s mismanagement mounting, and Erdoğan ’ s health visibly declining, this question has generated increasing debate.

Under Erdoğan, Turkey has embraced aggressive military initiatives, worked with radical or criminal groups, made friendly overtures to revisionist powers like Russia and China, and distanced itself from Western institutions and values. Yet, it would be misleading to attribute all these changes to Erdoğan or his party.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Erdoğan Disadvantage › Impact › AT: Erdogan Bad Turn

Structural factors prevent changes to Turkey’s fopo—Erdogan was not the problem

Ünlühisarcıklı 22 — Özgür Ünlühisarcıklı is the director of GMF's office in Ankara, Turkey. Özgür Ünlühisarcıklı "It Is Not Too Early to Think About Political Change in Turkey," GMFUS, 1-10-2022, https://www.gmfus.org/news/it-not-too-early-think-about-political-change-turkey, accessed 6-25-2022, WMK

Under any of these scenarios, there would likely be less change in Turkish foreign policy than what foreign observers might expect or desire. Turkey is no exception to the fact that a country’s foreign policy is determined by factors such as history, geography, the international system, the regional balance of power, and national capacity, as well as values, public opinion, and the interests of the ruling elite. The structural factors will continue to play a significant, perhaps dominant role, but values, public opinion, and elite interests may be more variable over time.

Structural factors determine a country’s long-term strategy. However, how this is pursued could change significantly in the case of a change in government.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Erdoğan Disadvantage › Impact › AT: NATO Checks

NATO doesn’t check

Salacanin 20 — Stasa Salacanin, Author for Inside Arabia. 10/21/2020. “NATO’s Dilemma Over Greece-Turkey Friction”, Inside Arabia, https://insidearabia.com/natos-dilemma-over-greece-turkey-friction/ WMK

Faced with numerous challenges from outside and within, it is rather unclear whether NATO possesses enough capabilities to alleviate rivalries in the Mediterranean.

Basbugoglu believes that while NATO played a crucial role in decreasing the tensions between Turkey and the French-Greek alliance in the East Mediterranean, the bilateral problems within NATO like the Turkish-French spat could decrease its conflict mitigation capacity.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Erdoğan Disadvantage › Impact › AT: No Divisionary War—Generic

Empirics prove—Erdogan uses diversion to distract from domestic problems

Kara 22 — Mehtap Kara Mehtap Kara. Department of Political Science and International Relations, Bahçeşehir Cyprus University, Nicosia, Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. (2022): Linking Turkey’s domestic politics and foreign policy: the justice and development party’s political strategies and their divergent foreign policy effects, Turkish Studies, DOI: 10.1080/14683849.2022.2060082 WMK

The AKP government continued to manipulate the country’s foreign policy through military operations and escalated tension with foreign countries to contain domestic opposition, especially (as noted in Figure 1) prior to elections or whenever the approval rating of the government declined.46 A series of incidents and dog fights between the Turkish and Greek warplanes in April 2018 before the snap elections in June is an example of these policies.47 Turkey’s traditional competition with Greece and the RoC was periodically used to increase tension and mobilize the nationalist base and distract people’s attention from problems at home.48 During this episode with Greece and the RoC, Bahçeli and Erdoğan submitted another joint proposal to move the elections forward (originally scheduled to be held in November 2019), and on June 24th, the presidential election and parliamentary elections were held on the same day. Although the AKP failed to secure the necessary majority of 300 deputies in the election, its alliance with the MHP gained 342 out of 600 seats. Interestingly, the new system was designed to reduce the possibility of coalitions to ensure that coalition governments were not able to return decades of instability. However, the AKP failed to obtain the 300 deputies needed for the majority of the seats in the first general election of this new system. Therefore, it had no choice but to continue cooperating with the MHP. Hale points out that in the American presidential system, if a president lacks the majority in Congress, then a ‘log-rolling’ method is utilized, which requires compromise and individual persuasion.49 Under the new presidential system, the AKP adopted a log-rolling strategy to maintain its parliamentary majority. The AKP gained the MHP’s support after the failed coup attempt, but following the June 2018 election, it became dependent on the MHP’s support in the National Assembly. Along with the mobilization strategy, the AKP also adopted insulation and accommodation strategies against its ostensible ally. The AKP-MHP alliance is a nationalistic partnership, and it is based on the creation of external problems and military engagement abroad like the ‘forever war’ where conflicts constantly remain in the political background. Neack describes this as Hagan’s ‘insulation strategy with a twist’ where the coalition of elites wants to stay in power by creating ‘an external situation that diverts attention from them, insulating them from critical domestic opponents and popular demands.’ 50 The MHP exerted a greater influence on Turkish politics as the AKP needed its help to pass legislation. Thus, the alliance empowered the MHP to actively participate in the country’s foreign policymaking process. However, this alliance has been faced with challenges and a clash of interests. The MHP proposed a partial amnesty law in May 2018, but the AKP chose to insulate the MHP by overriding this request and rejected the proposal (this was before the election in June and the AKP’s dependency on the MHP). The Student Oath issue became another divisive problem between the AKP-MHP partnership that led the MHP to suspend the People’s Alliance during the local elections in March 2019. Bahçeli announced that his party would not use the alliance to propose joint candidates. Later, he agreed not to nominate any candidate for big cities and announced his party’s support for the AKP’s candidate in Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir. This example illustrates how the AKP utilized an insulation strategy along with a mobilization strategy where policymaking elites gained support for their policies, but also coopted the MHP to achieve a dual agenda of staying at power and building a coalition. At this point, insulation and mobilization strategies were entwined, making it difficult to indicate where insulation ends and mobilization begins. Neack’s statement of ‘insulation with a twist’ points out the complexity and difficulty of implicitly separating these two strategies from each other. In February and March 2019, the TAF launched the ‘Blue Homeland’ naval exercise simultaneously in the Black Sea, Aegean Sea, and Mediterranean. This action allowed the AKP-MHP coalition to pursue coercive policies and gunboat diplomacy against Greece, but was also intended to regain domestic support to achieve their policy objectives. The word ‘homeland’ has a strong meaning for the Turkish population, which is oversensitive about national sovereignty, especially due to the failed coup attempt. Military training was also held a few weeks before the 2019 local elections. However, despite the MHP’s support and naval training that appealed to nationalists, the AKP lost to CHP candidates in all of the big cities. In response, the AKP applied to the Supreme Electoral Council to annul election in Istanbul, while also launching a cross-border military operation, ‘Operation Claw’, in Northern Iraq against Kurdish separatists before the June 23rd re-run election election in Istanbul, which was similar to its 2015 general re-election strategy. In addition, in May, the government also announced that Turkish ships would drill for natural gas off the southern coast of the RoC and sent two drill ships that were accompanied by Turkish naval frigates and three gunboats.51 Nevertheless, this mobilization strategy and manipulation of Turkish foreign policy in the Eastern Mediterranean and cross-border operations in Iraq failed to bring the desired result. The CHP’s candidate, Ekrem İmamoğlu won again by increasing his margin from 13,000 to nearly 775,000 votes.52 The CHP’s victory in Istanbul demonstrated declining support for the AKP’s policies and ended the 25-year rule of Erdoğan in Istanbul. Despite this failure, it is clear that Turkey’s cross-border operations to address security concerns and assertive policies in the Eastern Mediterranean correlate with general/local election dates. Therefore, the timing of these policies/operations further strengthens suspicions that the AKPMHP alliance intentionally exploits and manipulates Turkey’s national security and national interest related issues to suppress and prevail over domestic opposition. Economic problems have become the most important domestic challenge to the AKP. The Turkish lira (TL) has dramatically lost value, falling against the US dollar from 4.70 on July 2018–18.05 by December 2021. Weak institutions, declining rule of law, growing political influence over the judiciary, and failed monetary policies have negatively affected foreign direct investments (FDI) in Turkey. According to the World Investment Report, FDI inflow to Turkey was reported at $19 billion in 2015, fell to $13.5 billion in 2016, $11 billion in 2017, and dropped to $9.2 billion in 2019.53 The failed coup attempt, political instability, deepening problems with the West over the Kurdish issue, and the snap elections in 2018 contributed to declining FDI inflows and Turkish economic performance. Erdoğan portrayed the economic crisis as an economic war against ‘the devil’s triangle of interest and exchange rates and inflation.’ 54 He compared current economic problems with the War of Independence that Turkey fought against the Western imperialist powers almost a century ago. In this way, he identified this new ‘war’ as another historical fight against those who want to divide the Turkish nation through terror attacks, coup attempts, and economic restrictions.55 Erdoğan framed the country’s struggles as ‘us vs them’ or ‘Turkey vs the West’, which allegedly tries to weaken and destabilize Turkey.56 Through anti-Western rhetoric, Erdoğan not only found a means to exploit nationalism, but also portrayed the AKP-MHP alliance as an ultimate force to fight against foreign enemies. The ongoing anti-terror operations in Syria and Iraq, and Turkish military activism abroad were also presented as a part of Turkey’s historical fight against its enemies. The nationalistic rhetoric and military operations, while appealing to the nationalist base at home, also discourage foreign investors and further deepen the country’s economic problems. However, the parties in the Nation Alliance were hesitant to oppose Turkey’s military operations. They did not want to be labeled as being against Turkey’s national security interests or pro-American and pro-Western, which would only strengthen the AKP-MHP alliance’s hand domestically. Turkey’s military activism against Kurdish militias to contain domestic opposition also weakened domestic support for pro-Kurdish HDP. Following the US withdrawal from Syria in the fall of 2019, the TAF launched largest operation in Syria, ‘Operation Peace Spring’, to create a 32km (20-mile) safe zone along the Syrian border. With this operation, Turkey aimed to eliminate terror corridors in northeastern Syria, push the Kurdish militia forces back from the Turkish border, and resettle Syrian refugees in the safe zone. The mobilization strategy as a risk-taking strategy escalated the conflict in Syria, and resulted produced costs for Turkey, notably when dozens of Turkish soldiers were killed by Russian-backed Syrian Air Forces in Idlib in February 2020. The government reacted to the incident by lifting the Western sea and land border controls, which allowed refugees to cross into Europe through Greece. The AKP’s reaction was also the result of the EU’s lack of financial commitment to Syrian refugees in Turkey as part of the 2016 migration deal, as well as a lack of support for Turkey’s policies and military operations in Syria. In this way, the government attempted to contain possible negative blowback from the Turkish public, which was increasingly critical of Syrian refugees and less supportive of Turkey’s military operations in Syria. In addition, to prevent domestic opposition and conceal Turkey’s inability to respond to the Russian-backed Assad regime, Turkish elites manipulated the country’s foreign policy and further escalated tension with Greece. Thus, they have aimed to divert people’s attention away from the Idlib incident and foreign policy failures in Syria. 16 M. KARA The AKP has also shifted its insulation strategy vis-à-vis the MHP to one of cooptation with political favors and policy concessions. This shift became visible during the summer of 2020. The AKP agreed to pass the previously rejected amnesty law as a policy concession to contain the MHP and a recognition that ignoring the MHP’s demands and challenges was no longer an option since it did not have a parliamentary majority to rule on its own. The convicted former mafia leader, Alaattin Çakıcı, was released from prison by benefiting from the partial amnesty law.57 Soon thereafter, he posted a threatening letter on Twitter targeting the CHP leader, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, as a response to Kılıçdaroğlu’s criticism of Bahçeli during the party parliamentary group meeting. AKP policymakers initially remained silent to protect their alliance with the MHP, but later initiated a probe against Çakıcı. Bahçeli backed Çakıcı and described him as a ‘son of an ‘Ülkücü’ (an ultra-nationalist) who loves his country and nation.’ 58 Since the AKP’s political survival depends on maintaining an alliance with the MHP, it combined its insulation strategy accommodation by avoiding conflict on this issue. Another example of the accommodation strategy is the AKP’s adoption of the ultra-nationalist rhetoric to show unity with the MHP. This strategy raises an important problem for the AKP’s authority because it provides disproportionate power for the MHP compared to its size in parliament and may lead to unintended consequences.59 Based on the idea of the extremity of coalitions’ foreign policy choices, coalition governments are usually vulnerable to being hijacked by junior parties and are more likely to adopt extreme foreign policy behaviors than single-party governments.60 The hijacking is more likely if the government’s survival depends on the junior party and if the junior party’s ideology is more extreme than the larger parties within the coalition government.61 The MHP offers a life vest for the AKP, but in return, hijacks the government, receives policy concessions, and finds an opportunity to implement its hawkish/nationalist policies. By 2021, Bahçeli was seen as a very powerful person in Ankara, and he pulled Erdoğan toward ultranationalism.62 The AKP-MHP alliance constantly underlines its capacity to provide security and protect Turkey’s national interests against all forms of enemies. Erdoğan claimed that ‘We [the AKP] continue to collaborate with MHP on issues regarding our country’s survival and future.’ 63 His statement stresses that cooperation between the two parties is necessary for a country’s survival rather than party survival. The nationalist approach in the alliance aims to gain support for the government’s policies. Bahçeli uses similar rhetoric and underlines that the People’s Alliance ‘will be the main protector of Turkey’s future.’ 64 He claims that the alliance is‘Turkey’s only hope, its only guarantee against the world.’ 65 He creates imaginary enemies and a ‘Turkey versus the rest’ perception. To this end, the AKP-MHP alliance is no longer only targets opposition figures, journalists, or foreign countries/nationals as the enemy of the state, but anyone who opposes any of their decisions regardless of the issue. Being in opposition or a dissident to the AKP or the alliance is equated with being a terrorist or an enemy of the state who seeks to undermine the country’s prosperity and stability. From university students who protest state-appointed rectors to medical workers who claim that official figures of actual COVID19 cases were manipulated, everyone and anyone can be labeled as an enemy of the state. In addition to military operations, Turkey has also deployed military troops abroad as part of the government’s mobilization strategy. Turkey’s pro-Qatari stance in Qatar dispute with its Gulf neighbors facilitated the deployment of Turkish troops on Qatari soil in June 2017. Turkey also opened its biggest overseas military base in the Somali capital, Mogadishu, in September 2017. Nearly 1,500 Turkish troops have been training Somali soldiers to help rebuild the country. Turkey’s commitment to the Somalis is part of the country’s policy to expand its influence in the Horn of Africa. In November 2019, Turkey signed a memorandum with the UNbacked GNA government in Libya to cooperate on various areas including military, maritime rules, and drilling rights in the Mediterranean.66 The Turkish parliament also approved military assistance and the deployment of Turkish troops in Libya. Turkey’s presence in Libya is a part of the Blue Homeland doctrine and is important for maintaining a country’s assertive policies in the Eastern Mediterranean. Turkey’s cooperation with Libya is also an act of retaliation against the alliance of the RoC, Greece, Egypt, and Israel, which was created to limit Turkey’s regional maneuvers and isolate Turkey from regional issues. Thus, the AKP-MHP alliance portrays the Blue Homeland doctrine from the nationalist narrative and describes it as ‘striking a balance’ that has transformed Turkey into a ‘game setter’ in the Eastern Mediterranean.67 To divert people’s attention from economic problems and the COVID-19 pandemic, Erdoğan also announced the discovery of a total of 405 billion cubic meters of natural gas reserves in the Black Sea, the largest hydrocarbon resource discovery in Turkish history.68 These discoveries were announced as a way to reduce the country’s external dependency on natural gas by appealing to nationalist sentiments. Through this, the AKP-MHP alliance would like to validate the country’s Blue Homeland doctrine and gain support for its adventurous policies. This new doctrine offers an new area of manipulation for Turkish foreign policymakers to contain domestic opposition and change the narrative to something other than Turkey’s somewhat failed policies in Syria. The AKP’s alliance with the MHP is necessary to retain power, but, notably, it also limits the AKP’s foreign policy options on several issues. The AKP’s conflict avoidance strategy on the Çakıcı issue (the AKP initiated the probe case late and is likely to stall the case for years) demonstrates the AKP’s dependency on the MHP. As the accommodation strategy suggests, any significant 18 M. KARA changes in Turkish foreign policy behavior without the MHP’s consent is almost impossible. For instance, it is difficult to initiate a new phase in the Kurdish peace process, make a deal with Greece and the RoC, change policies in Syria, and normalize Turkey’s relations with the US without the MHP’s support or consent. Clashing statements from both sides of the alliance over the recent crisis with Greece highlights this problem. The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mevlut Çavuşoğlu, emphasized Turkey’s openness to negotiations in settling differences with Greece. However, Bahçeli claimed that ‘Turkey will not negotiate its interests.’ 69 His statement restricts the AKP’s ability to de-escalate the crisis. Although the AKP and MHP leaders insist on solidarity for the upcoming general election (set to be held in 2023), ongoing economic problems and domestic instabilities continue to undermine constituents’ support for both parties and the alliance.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Erdoğan Disadvantage › Impact › AT: Other Divisionary War Scenarios

War against Greece is the most likely scenario for diversion

Atlamazoglou 21 — Atlamazoglou, Defense journalist specializing in special operations, a Hellenic Army, and a Johns Hopkins University graduate. “What A War Between Greece And Turkey Would Look Like” October 18th. 2021. WMK

A conflict between Greece and Turkey could spark in several different—intentional and accidental—ways. The two countries could go to war over an islet dispute—of which there are hundreds in the Aegean Sea, which borders the two countries—after an escalation following an air or naval accident—there have been several over the years—or in an attempt to placate domestic unrest—in the case of Turkey.

It’s important to note that in all of the above scenarios, Turkey would be the aggressor. Contrary to Ankara, Athens has no revisionist or expansionist aspirations. Greece doesn’t weaponize illegal immigrants to pressure Turkey into concessions. Greece doesn’t violate Turkey’s air space with armed fighter jets multiple times a day. Greece doesn’t send survey ships, accompanied by warships, in the exclusive economic zones of other countries.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Erdoğan Disadvantage › Impact › AT: No Greece Divisionary War

The probability of war has never been higher—its try or die to prevent Erdogan popular support collapse

Rubin 20 — Michael Rubin Michael Rubin is a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), "War Between Greece and Turkey Is Now a Real Possibility," National Interest, 7-24-2020, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/war-between-greece-and-turkey-now-real-possibility-165465, accessed 6-20-2022 WMK

There has never been any love lost between Turkey and Greece, but the danger of war between the two NATO members has not been this high since the Cyprus conflict more than forty-five years ago. In the past, Turkey and Greece have gone to the brink, but policies initiated by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan may very much push the two neighbors over the edge.

Greek and Turkish fighter jets engaged in mock dogfights this week over the Greek island of Kastellorizo, just a mile and a half from the Turkish coast, causing tourists to flee. Meanwhile, there is a growing risk that the Turkish and Greek navies will clash, hundreds of miles to the west if Turkey pushes forward with its plans to survey for has in Greece’s exclusive economic zone. Greek officials say that all options are on the table, and German Chancellor Angela Merkel has rushed to mediate as U.S. officials remain largely absent.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Erdoğan Disadvantage › Impact › AT: No Greece Divisionary War

Erdogan uses Greece as a diversionary target

Ellis 6-22-2022, international advisor at RIEAS (Research Institute for European and Amerian Studies) in Athens (Robert, “Is Turkey a Committed NATO Member?,” National Interest, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/turkey-committed-nato-member-203153)//BB

Facing presidential and parliamentary elections next June, it is essentially Erdogan’s future that hangs in the balance, not to speak of Turkey’s. Sagging behind in the polls, Erdogan faces defeat from two of his rivals, Kemal Kilicdaroglu, leader of the CHP (Republican People’s Party), Atatürk’s old party, and Ekrem Imamoglu, the mayor of Istanbul. It was Imamoglu who three years ago defeated the AKP’s candidate in a re-run of the mayoral election, engineered by Erdogan. Now an attempt is being made to nobble Imamoglu’s candidacy with a charge of “insult,” carrying a four-year jail sentence. Ten years ago, Erdogan declared it was the government’s intention to raise “a pious generation,” but already the following year his plan backfired with the Gezi Park protests, which spread to most of Turkey. Therefore, it must come as a disappointment that more than half of Turkey’s first-time voters have declared they will never vote for him. The overriding issue for most Turkish voters is the economy, which in the view of former Turkish economy minister, Ali Babacan, is on the verge of bankruptcy. The Turkish lira is in free fall and raging inflation, which in May reached 73 percent, has left 90 percent of the population struggling to make ends meet. As the Bipartisan Policy Center earlier pointed out, Erdogan relied on the narrative of a booming economy for electoral success but now he is facing the backlash. Russian economist Sergei Gurlev writes of a similar pattern in Putin’s Russia, when Russia’s GDP growth slowed to almost zero and Vladimir Putin’s approval ratings dropped. According to Gurlev, Putin decided to address an economic problem with a non-economic solution, the annexation of Crimea, which boosted his popularity. Erdogan has followed the same recipe. For example, when Turkey invaded and occupied Afrin, a Kurdish enclave in northwestern Syria, in 2018, it gained him support from almost 90 percent of the electorate. Now he is playing the same card again, using security concerns to justify a new incursion into northern Syria and block Finland and Sweden’s NATO membership. A “special operation” targeting Greece’s Aegean islands would also be grist to Erdogan’s mill.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Erdoğan Disadvantage › Impact › AT: No Greece Divisionary War

Erdogan starts a war with Greece if there is voter backlash to his policies

Solomou 6/13 — John Solomou "Erdogan escalates rhetoric against Greece and mobilizes Imams in his re-election bid," ThePrint, 06-13-2022, https://theprint.in/world/erdogan-escalates-rhetoric-against-greece-and-mobilizes-imams-in-his-re-election-bid/994307/, accessed 6-25-2022, WMK

As Turkey is facing a serious economic crisis, Erdogan, seeing his popularity falling rapidly in repeated opinion polls, is trying to win votes by escalating his rhetoric against Greece and by mobilizing the big network of imams to persuade Turkish expatriates to vote for him.

Speaking after watching military exercises in Izmir, on the same day he confirmed that he will run in the June 2023 elections, Erdogan increased tensions with Turkey's neighbour Greece, warning Athens to stop arming Aegean islands that do not have a military status.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Erdoğan Disadvantage › Impact › AT: No Greece Divisionary War

Erdogan divisionary war escalates and collapses NATO

Cropsey 6/23 — Seth Cropsey is founder and president of Yorktown Institute. He served as a naval officer and as deputy undersecretary of the Navy Seth Cropsey , "Diversionary war: Turkey’s actions against Greece are a growing threat to NATO," Hill, 6-23-2022, https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/3534155-diversionary-war-turkeys-actions-against-greece-are-a-growing-threat-to-nato/, accessed 6-24-2022, WMK

Turkish obstructionism against Swedish and Finnish NATO membership, its limited offensive in Iraq, and its prospective offensive in Syria have grabbed international attention. But more significant is Turkey’s growing diplomatic tension with Greece, an ever-festering lesion that threatens to burst.

Considering Turkey’s domestic situation and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the United States must be wary. Turkish President Recip Tayyip Erdogan could capitalize on international distraction and wage a diversionary war to boost his popularity, a conflict that would disrupt NATO’s cohesion and threaten the alliance.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Erdoğan Disadvantage › Impact › Turns Case — Cohesion

Even if it doesn’t escalate it destroys NATO cohesion

Salacanin 20 — Stasa Salacanin, Author for Inside Arabia. 10/21/2020. “NATO’s Dilemma Over Greece-Turkey Friction”, Inside Arabia, https://insidearabia.com/natos-dilemma-over-greece-turkey-friction/ WMK

Tensions between Turkey and Greece have increased after a series of disputes over the interpretation of international maritime law and territorial waters in the Eastern Mediterranean, where rich gas deposits have been found. Last month, Greek and Turkish military ships collided in contested waters near the Greek island of Kastellorizo, which lies just 2 km (1.2 miles) from the Turkish coast. Turkish military vessels guarded the country’s seismic research ship. This flexing of military muscles has raised concerns of confrontation between the two NATO members, who share a long history of disputes.

In short, while Greece has insisted that a country’s continental shelf should be measured from islands that belong to a particular state – an interpretation that has been supported by the UN Law of the Sea –Turkey builds its case by claiming that a nation’s continental shelf should be measured from its mainland coast.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Erdoğan Disadvantage › Impact › Impact — Draws in US

Turkey-Greece war escalates and the US gets drawn-in

Stratfor 20, Shadow CIA, iykyk, “What's Driving Turkish Aggression in the Mediterranean Sea,” 9/9/20,

Turkey is putting its 50-year view on maritime rights into practice through its Blue Homeland Doctrine, growing its naval and commercial presence in Mediterranean waters that it claims are part of its exclusive economic zones (EEZs). Oil and gas exploration is becoming a crucial tool in implementing this strategy. But Ankara's attempts to claim extensive maritime resource rights risk broadening to a wider conflict with Greece and other NATO allies that would bring foreign energy projects, and potentially the United States, into the fray. Turkey's Maritime Ambitions Turkey claims that all of its neighboring waters in the Aegean, Black and Mediterranean seas deserve special treatment under international law, and that the islands in the Aegean Sea (which Greece controls the majority of) should not enjoy the same rights as large countries like Turkey with lengthy coastlines. The international community never adopted these distinctions, which is why Turkey is not a signatory to the United Nations Convention for the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and prefers to resolve disputes through bilateral negotiations in lieu of not international arbitration. This has so far led to two major disputes with Greece in the Aegean and Mediterranean seas, as well as a major dispute with Cyprus in the eastern Mediterranean. Turkey's most important dispute is in the Aegean Sea, where thousands of Greek islands help boost Greece's maritime claims over Turkey's, and where the two countries disagree on how to even start drawing a maritime border due to the disparity in the number of islands between them. Turkey has just three islands in the Aegean Sea, while Greece claims more than 3,000. Given the higher number of Greek islands, Turkey has long maintained that any expansion of Greek maritime claims from six nautical miles (nm) to 12 nm off Greece's shores would constitute a "casus belli," or cause of war. While Greece and Turkey have nearly gone to war several times over disputes in the Aegean Sea, the two countries have so far avoided declaring full EEZs in the region, as well as claiming territorial waters beyond six nautical miles. But that doesn't mean they can't do so in the future. Ankara has argued that if both Greece and Turkey extended their claims beyond 12 nm, Turkey's percent ownership of the territory would only marginally increase, while Greece would see its territorial control reach nearly three-quarters of the entire Aegean Sea. The use of Greece's islands in the Aegean Sea to demarcate a maritime border for EEZs, which extend up to 200 nm from the coast, would also leave Turkey with virtually no rights to the natural resources and fisheries in the Aegean Sea. Turkey has argued that a more equitable way to split the sea's resources would be by ignoring the islands altogether and starting off with an equidistant line between the Greek and Turkish mainlands. Ankara Takes Action By more aggressively flexing its claims through energy exploration and naval exercises in the eastern Mediterranean, Turkey is trying to both legitimize its declared EEZ claim, as well as delegitimize any potential EEZ claims in the region that Greece has through its islands of Crete, Rhodes and Kastellorizo. Kastellorizo, in particular, has the potential to generate a significant EEZ claim for Greece that could connect to Cyprus's own claimed EEZ, thus significantly limiting Turkish claims to resources between Crete and Cyprus. Further escalation could result in Greece finally claiming its full EEZ in the eastern Mediterranean, which Athens has so far been reluctant to do for fear of spurring a wider conflict. Protected by a Turkish naval convoy, Turkey's Oruc Reis surveying vessel has been active throughout the Mediterranean Sea since the beginning of the year. Turkey's December 2019 maritime agreement with Libya's Government of National Accord aims to legitimize Turkey's claims by establishing a border between Turkish and Libyan waters that ignores Crete and Kastellorizo. On Aug. 27, the Greek parliament ratified a maritime border agreement with Egypt aimed at countering Turkey's pact with Libya by legitimizing a potential EEZ border generated via its control of Crete with Egypt. Greece's deal with Egypt is a first step in potentially declaring a full EEZ in the eastern Mediterranean, but the agreement with Egypt does not legitimize potential claims that Kastellorizo could give Greece rights to. Turkey has also been actively attempting to delegitimize Cyprus' claimed EEZ in the eastern Mediterranean by both conducting energy exploration in waters that Cyprus directly claims, as well as harassing foreign companies that are operating on behalf of the Cypriot government. Turkey has argued that Cyprus' claimed EEZ is not legal because it was not done in coordination with the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, which Ankara recognizes as a legitimate government for all of Cyprus. Turkey also argues that, as an island, Cyprus cannot claim a full EEZ. Turkey's Yavuz vessel is currently drilling off the coast of Western Cyprus. Turkey's Barbados vessel is also currently researching in the Northern Cyprus territorial waters that Turkey recognizes as a part of an oil exploration block held by the state-owned Turkish Petroleum Corporation. In 2018, the Turkish navy prevented the Italian oil firm Eni from drilling on its Cuttlefish prospect in an exploration block the company received from Cyprus. The Specter of War Turkey's increased provocations will continue to drive the United States and other NATO countries, including France and Greece, to boost their own naval presence in the eastern Mediterranean. Both Turkey and Greece will try to refrain from crossing red lines that could spur a larger confrontation that neither wants, but the higher presence of ships in the eastern Mediterranean will nonetheless increase the possibility of incidents, as evidenced by the Aug. 10 collision between the Greek frigate Limnos and the Turkish frigate Kemal Reis. International mediation would likely avoid further escalation to a military conflict between Greece and Turkey, but is unlikely to result in a diplomatic solution to their dispute. In the case of a wider crisis, most NATO members would view Turkey as the aggressor and would likely back Greece. This would likely reinforce Ankara's overall pursuit of its maritime strategy and intensifying national security push by offering Turkey further proof that NATO does not prioritize its national security priorities. Countries can only leave NATO on their own accord, which Turkey remains is unlikely to do. Instead, Ankara would probably continue to reduce collaboration with NATO countries. Despite Cyprus and Greece's calls for a more significant response to deter Turkey's behavior, the European Union will likely be hesitant to impose more drastic measures for fear of prompting Ankara to reduce cooperation on migration and other EU priorities. Unless Turkey starts to more directly protect its claims in the Aegean Sea, fires upon a Greek or another European vessel, or conducts drilling or exploration activities around Crete, Brussels will likely limit its sanctions pressure to companies and individuals supporting Turkish activities in the Mediterranean. Decisions on implementing EU sanctions require unanimity among the bloc's member states. And some countries, such as Germany, are more concerned about aggressive sanctions only inflaming Brussels' tensions with Turkey. If the European Union does not take significant action on Turkey, Cyprus is now threatening to veto proposed EU sanctions against Belarus amid the country's ongoing political crisis. This may result in slightly stronger EU sanctions that target more Turkish individuals and companies, but more broad-based economic sanctions against the Turkish government remain unlikely. Energy Projects in the Crossfire The United States will likely let the European Union continue to take the lead in responding to Turkey's attempts to delegitimize Greek and Cypriot maritime claims, but Chevron's recent entry into the eastern Mediterranean could eventually draw Washington more directly into the conflict. On July 20, Chevron announced an agreement to acquire the Houston-based oil and gas firm Noble Energy, which operates both the Leviathan gas field off the coast of Israel and the Aphrodite gas field off the coast of Cyprus. Ankara, however, will likely adopt a more hands-off approach to U.S. companies operating in the region, as the United States would be more willing to impose hardline sanctions in response to American firms being drawn into its maritime disputes. By continuing to increase the cost of developing resources in Cypriot waters, Turkey's ongoing harassment of foreign energy firms will drive its neighbors closer together on both maritime security and energy exploration issues. But it could also potentially halt their construction of the proposed East Med pipeline. Cyprus, Egypt, Greece and Israel created the East Mediterranean Gas Forum in 2019. The quartet has since collaborated to construct the roughly $6 billion pipeline project, which would carry natural gas from the eastern Mediterranean to Europe. Under international law, Turkey is technically required to allow other countries to build pipelines through its EEZ. But Ankara retains the power to demand that any constructors of the East Med pipeline adhere to its environmental reviews and oversight, which would be de facto recognition of Turkey's EEZ. Otherwise, Turkey could send its navy to harass or intercept vessels involved with construction as Ankara did in 2018 with a drillship planning to spud a well in Cypriot waters.