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2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Erdoğan Disadvantage › Link › Link — Generic — Cooperation

Erdogan is dependent on anti-Americanism to divert attention from economic problems—the AFF’s cooperation him to flip which alienates the Turkish electorate and outweighs the economy

Bekdil 17 — Burak Bekdil is a Fellow at the Middle East Forum and has covered Turkey for the U.S. weekly Defense News since 1997, "The Turkish Love-Hate Relationship with America," Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, 10-10-2017, https://besacenter.org/turkey-america-relationship/, accessed 6-20-2022 WMK

Turks often expose degrees of confusion when asked about their foreign policy preferences. A public opinion poll in the mid-2000s found that most Turks viewed the US as a threat to world security – but the same poll found that Turks expected the US, before every other ally, to come to Turkey’s help if needed.

Conspiracy theories have always been abundant in the Turkish psyche. Schoolchildren grow up hearing maxims like “A Turk’s only friend is another Turk” and “Our Ottoman ancestors had to fight seven worlds (the big powers).” According to this worldview, the world’s major powers construct intricate conspiracies as they tirelessly plot to stop Turkey’s rise.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Erdoğan Disadvantage › Link › Link — Must Read — 2NC

Erdogan needs an absolute stand-off with the West to ensure his popularity

AP 22 — Associated Press, "Explainer: Why is Turkey wary of Nordic states’ NATO bid?," Al Arabiya English, 3-24-2022, https://english.alarabiya.net/News/world/2022/05/17/Explainer-Why-is-Turkey-wary-of-Nordic-states-NATO-bid-, accessed 6-21-2022 WMK

The Turkish leader is seeing a decline in his domestic support due to a faltering economy, skyrocketing inflation and a cost of living crisis.

A standoff with Western nations over the emotional issue of perceived support to the PKK could help Erdogan boost his support and rally the nationalist vote before elections that are currently scheduled for June 2023.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Erdoğan Disadvantage › Link › Link — Must Read — 2NC

Erdogan will cut cooperation with the West now to divert attention from economic failures—anti-West is his last political escape hatch BECAUSE he is cooperating with everyone else—the AFF makes him change his tactics — independently the PIC avoids and solves

Ghosh 6/20 — Bobby Ghosh is a Bloomberg Opinion columnist covering foreign affairs. Previously, he was editor in chief at Hindustan Times, managing editor at Quartz and international editor at Time. Bobby Ghosh, " US Should Brace for More Pushback From Erdogan," Washington Post, 6-20-2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/us-should-brace-for-more-pushback-from-erdogan/2022/06/17/88e89f1e-ee03-11ec-9f90-79df1fb28296_story.html, accessed 6-25-2022, WMK

Turkey’s allies and rivals, along with Turks themselves, might want to buckle up for 12 months of turbulence. The US and Europe should brace themselves for even more mudslinging and contrariness from Erdogan at a time when they need his cooperation in containing Russian adventurism.

Ornery in the best of times, Erdogan has grown even more quarrelsome with the West as he has become politically vulnerable at home. His fortunes are now at their lowest ebb since he first took the reins in Ankara in 2003. He and his party have slipped in opinion polls over the past couple of years, as Turkey’s economy has been hammered by a combination of the pandemic and the president’s economic policies.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Erdoğan Disadvantage › Uniqueness › UQ — AT: Erdogan Won’t Run 2023

He just announced he’s running

Hacaglu 6/9 — Selcan Hacaoglu, Reporter for Bloomberg News, "Turkey’s Erdogan Declares His Bid for President in 2023 Election," Bloomberg, 6-9-2022, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-06-09/turkey-s-erdogan-declares-his-bid-for-president-in-2023-election, accessed 6-20-2022 WMK

Turkey’s longest serving leader, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, all but kicked off his bid for re-election in a year’s time, as the popularity of his ruling party is hit by a cost-of-living crisis with inflation at its highest in nearly a quarter century.

Erdogan, who has dominated Turkish politics for almost two decades, has turned the once-ceremonial post of president into the nexus of executive power. His AK Party controls parliament along with its ally, the nationalist MHP.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Erdoğan Disadvantage › Uniqueness › UQ — AT: Erdogan Alienates Kurds

He’s making peace with Kurdish people in Turkey to focus on nationalism

Duran 6/11 — Burhanettin Duran is General Coordinator of SETA Foundation and a professor at Ibn Haldun University. He is also a member of Turkish Presidency Security and Foreign Policies Council. Burhanettin Duran, Burhanettin Duran, "Identity politics or national identity debate?," Daily Sabah, 6-11-2022, https://www.dailysabah.com/opinion/columns/identity-politics-or-national-identity-debate, accessed 6-25-2022, WMK

Indeed, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan delivered a strong message at a public ceremony in Van regarding the Kurdish community’s rights and his stance during the resolution process: “For me, there is absolutely no difference between my Kurdish brothers and sisters and my Turkish brothers and sisters. For we love the created due to the creator. We cannot engage in discrimination. We haven’t discriminated in the past. We are not discriminating today. Nor will we discriminate in the future. Whereas some people hid behind terrorist groups and exploited democracy, we fought to grant you the rights and liberties that you deserved without question. Wherever you see those, who exploit your identity when they open their mouth, grab them by the collar and ask them: Who asked you to re-embrace the guns and end the resolution process?”

On the second level of the identity debate – the national identity – we will witness intense discussions.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Erdoğan Disadvantage › Uniqueness › UQ — AT: “Any Rival Wins”

The rival matters—its dead even

BIA 4/28 — Poll: The margin between Erdoğan and his rivals narrows," 04-28-2022, https://bianet.org/english/society/261168-poll-the-margin-between-erdogan-and-his-rivals-narrows, accessed 6-25-2022, WMK

The Metropoll Research company has measured the margin of votes between President and ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) Chair Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his potential rival in Presidential elections.

In the March poll of the company, the respondents were asked, "Would you vote for Erdoğan or his rivals in the Presidential elections?"

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Erdoğan Disadvantage › Uniqueness › UQ — AT: Base Low

His base support is strong despite bad polls

Tremblay 22 — Pinar Tremblay Professor in the Economics department at California State Polytechnic University - Pomona (Brendan Tremblays mom lol) "How Erdogan could emerge stronger from war in Ukraine," Al-Monitor: The Pulse of the Middle East, 3-15-2022, https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2022/03/how-erdogan-could-emerge-stronger-war-ukraine, accessed 6-24-2022, WMK

Indeed, for the first time in years, Turkey’s prominent pollsters show a steady decline in AKP support. In the June 2018 elections, the AKP’s vote share was 42.56%; now it ranges in polls between 25-35%. But while the AKP is on a losing streak, it has a solidified base of die-hard supporters.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Erdoğan Disadvantage › Uniqueness › UQ — AT: Election Reform

It’s uniqueness for us—it stabilizes his lower polling

Fraser 22 — Correspondent for AP. Suzan Fraser, "Turkish parliament approves contentious election law changes," AP NEWS, 3-31-2022, https://apnews.com/article/europe-middle-east-elections-turkey-recep-tayyip-erdogan-9029c293f9cec436e72a69a5c15179b3, accessed 6-24-2022, WMK

Turkey’s parliament on Thursday approved electoral law amendments that critics maintain could pave the way to election fraud and aim to curtail an opposition alliance’s chances of wresting control of the house in the next elections.

Parliament endorsed the changes by a show of hands after a three-day debate. The reforms were approved by legislators from President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s ruling party and his nationalist allies, which have a majority in parliament.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Erdoğan Disadvantage › Uniqueness › UQ — AT: Low Polls

Low polls is our argument — Erdogan needs to appeal to anti-Western nationalism to overcome them

Abdelbary 6/3 — Mohammed Abdelbary, Journalist at CNN. "Why Turkey changed its name: populism, polls and a bird," CNN, 6-3-2022, https://www.cnn.com/2022/06/03/middleeast/turkey-name-change-mime-intl/index.html, accessed 6-24-2022, WMK

There may be political motivations behind the move as Turks return to the polls next June amid a biting economic crisis.

This is "another strategy deployed by the Turkish government to reach out to the nationalist voters in a crucial year for Turkish politics," said Francesco Siccardi, senior program manager at the Carnegie Europe think tank.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Erdoğan Disadvantage › Uniqueness › UQ — US-Turkey Coop Low

Biden is giving Erdogan the cold shoulder

Soylu 21 — MEE’s Turkey correspondent based in Ankara. Previously he was a correspondent for Turkish media outlets Daily Sabah and ATV from both Washington DC and London. He has also contributed work to various news organisations, including CNN and Foreign Policy. Ragip Soylu, "Biden cold shoulders Erdogan as request for call left unanswered," Middle East Eye, 1-14-2021, https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/us-turkey-biden-erdogan-call-unanswered, accessed 6-25-2022, WMK

With just seven days until Joe Biden assumes office, the US president-elect is yet to respond to Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan's offer of a phone call, an unusual snub for a powerful Nato ally.

Three people familiar with the issue told Middle East Eye that Erdogan's office requested a call with Biden last month, but weeks later no conversation has been arranged.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Erdoğan Disadvantage › Uniqueness › UQ — US-Turkey Coop Low

Cooperation is low now—Biden won’t even visit

Al-monitor 5/27 — "Biden didn’t go to Turkey, and things aren’t okay with Erdogan ," Al-Monitor: The Pulse of the Middle East, 5-27-2022, https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2022/05/biden-didnt-go-turkey-and-things-arent-okay-erdogan, accessed 6-25-2022, WMK

Asked on May 18 how he would convince Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan to agree to Finland and Sweden joining NATO, US President Joe Biden said, "I’m not going to Turkey, but I think we’re going to be OK."

Nine days later, all is not yet OK. Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu said on May 27 that “an approach of ‘we’ll convince Turkey in time anyway, we are friends and allies’ would not be correct," and that Sweden and Finland "need to take concrete steps.”

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Erdoğan Disadvantage › Uniqueness › UQ — US-Turkey Coop Low

US-Turkey cooperation is low but malleable

Bechev 21 — Dimitar Bechev is Visiting Scholar at Carnegie Europe as well as lecturer at the Oxford School of Global and Area Studies, University of Oxford. Dimitar Bechev, "US and Turkey: It is not over yet," Aljazeera, 10-31-2021, https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2021/11/13/us-and-turkey-it-is-not-over-yet, accessed 6-21-2022 WMK

On October 31, US President Joe Biden and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan met on the margins of the G20 gathering in Rome, ending weeks of speculation about whether such a summit would take place. Earlier that month, a short-lived diplomatic crisis had demonstrated just how strained ties between the two countries are.

The US ambassador to Ankara David Satterfield and nine other Western envoys had been threatened with expulsion after they called for the release of jailed Turkish philanthropist Osman Kavala – an act the Turkish government perceived as meddling in its internal affairs.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Erdoğan Disadvantage › Uniqueness › UQ — US-Turkey Coop Low

Erdogan is not cooperating now—Finland and Sweden proves—throw-out old evidence this is a new start

bne IntelIiNews 6/16 — "‘Election mode’ Erdogan ain’t for budging over Finland and Sweden’s Nato applications," bne IntelIiNews, 6-16-2022, https://www.intellinews.com/election-mode-erdogan-ain-t-for-budging-over-finland-and-sweden-s-nato-applications-247669/, accessed 6-24-2022, WMK

The big suspicion that Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is playing hardball in refusing to accept the Nato applications of Finland and Sweden because he needs to reassert his nationalist credentials ahead of his country’s national elections is not something Western diplomats are likely to point to as things stand, with difficult negotiations aimed at getting Ankara on board at a delicate stage. However, that explanation for Erdogan’s intransigence looked even more like the right explanation by the end of June 15, a day in which Turkey rejected invitations by Nato to participate in trilateral talks with Finland and Sweden.

If set up, the talks would be aimed at finding a solution to Turkey’s threat to veto the Nordic countries’ applications to join the Western military alliance, which are supported by all other Nato countries. But Erdogan’s domestic woes are immense. The president of nearly three decades is accused by many Turks mired in their country’s excruciating economic crisis of having mismanaged the economy. His opinion poll ratings are dire and his bid for re-election must take place by June next year at the latest. Erdogan is likely to do far more muscle-flexing on the Nato expansion issue before giving ground, while – as the authoritarian cranks up the hard power politics he perceives as attractive to his core voters – a Turkish invasion of northern Syria in pursuit of Kurdish militants remains on the cards and Ankara’s war of words with Greece over certain Aegean islands could grow ever more alarming.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Erdoğan Disadvantage › Uniqueness › UQ — US-Turkey Coop Low

They’re going through a messy divorce now but cooperation is still possible

Tekines 6/11 — M. Hasim Tekines worked in the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He now regularly writes about Turkey and Middle Eastern politics. Hasim Tekines, "Can the United States and Turkey Avoid a Messy Split?," National Interest, 6-11-2022, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/can-united-states-and-turkey-avoid-messy-split-202895, accessed 6-25-2022, WMK

A transactional relationship is increasingly seen as the only solution for the future of U.S.-Turkey relations. As the relationship has lost its values-based spirit and diplomatic crises have exhausted both sides, a business-like understanding has emerged as a last attempt to keep the relationship alive. Yet, as even transactional relations have significant shortcomings, Washington and Ankara should be prepared for a messy divorce.

The last decade has seen an unprecedented decline in U.S.-Turkey relations, going from a model of strategic partnership to the level of “so-called allies.” America’s partnership with the Kurdish People's Protection Units (YPG) in northern Syria, Turkey’s relations with radical groups and its purchase of Russian S-400 air defense systems, and democratic backsliding in Turkey are only some of the issues that have harmed the relationship.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Erdoğan Disadvantage › Uniqueness › UQ — US-Turkey Coop Low

Biden is keeping his distance from Turkey—relations are low

Evans and Coskun 6/11 — Dominic Evans and Orhan Coskun, "Erdogan's summit with Biden clouded by bitter disputes," Reuters, 6-11-2021, https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/erdogans-summit-with-biden-clouded-by-bitter-disputes-2021-06-11/, accessed 6-25-2022, WMK

No stranger to rocky relations with Washington, President Tayyip Erdogan holds his first meeting with President Joe Biden next week overshadowed by bitter disputes and by the new U.2. "Will it be an easy meeting? Not very much, but nobody is without hope either."

The United States has also sanctioned Turkish defence industry officials over the S-400 deal. Rejecting U.S. concerns, Turkish officials say they will keep the equipment and have called for a joint examination of the issue.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Erdoğan Disadvantage › Uniqueness › UQ — Turkey = Anti American

Structural Anti-American Turkish sentiment — ensures backlash

Grigoriadis 10 — Dr. Ioannis N. Grigoriadis is an Assistant Professor at the Department of Political Science, Bilkent University Ioannis N. Grigoriadis Middle East Journal , Winter, 2010, Vol. 64, No. 1 (Winter, 2010), pp. 51-66 Published by: Middle East Institute Stable URL: WMK

Anti-Americanism in Turkey failed — until recently — to produce an enduring effect on Turkish politics. Unlike other Mediterranean countries where a legacy of anti Americanism grew out of historical reasons and had a persistent negative effect on their relations with the United States, such a trend did not appear in Turkey's case.8 With regard to Spain, a long historical rivalry in Latin America and the Pacific, along with US support for the authoritarian Franco regime in the aftermath of World War II, created a legacy of anti-Americanism. In the case of Greece, US involvement in the civil war (1946-9) and firm US support for the 1967-74 military regime created a strong popular predisposition against the United States. Despite the rise of the Turkish left in the 1960s and 1970s, such a legacy of persistent anti-Americanism did not find fertile ground. This was prob ably because the United States also had strong allies within Turkey who wielded clout disproportionate to their numbers, as Turkey's influential military and bureaucratic elites maintained a clear pro-US position. They prioritized Turkey's strategic alliance with the United States and saw it as the strongest security guarantee for the country as well as its best link to the West. This became more pronounced after the September 1980 military coup, which dealt a heavy blow against the Turkish left and political Islam, and meant that opposition to US policies and the improvement of US-Turkey relations would be dispersed and politically ineffective. As Turkey's democratic consolidation remained un finished, elites could afford to dismiss public opinion. The US-Turkey strategic alliance developed to the point of Turkey forming a regional alliance with Israel in the 1990s, de spite the opposition of a large segment of the Turkish public, spearheaded by supporters of the Welfare Party (Refah Partisi), which won a plurality of votes in 1995. This reaction was not considered more important than the strategic benefits which this alliance would garner Turkey — mainly the consolidation of the US-Turkey alliance, access to military technology, intelligence, and training, improved economic relations, and a strengthening of its strategic position vis-a-vis Greece, Syria, Iraq, and Armenia. US policies in the Middle East were not always popular within Turkish public opinion. Many Turks felt sympathy for the Palestinians and opposed what they saw as an overtly pro-Israeli US stance in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Nonetheless, this did not seriously affect the formation of Turkish regional strategy and policymaking. Stra egic alliance and cooperation between the United States and Turkey meant that Turkey would support US strategic priorities in the Middle East, even when this came to the point of forging a strategic alliance with Israel and thus alienating the Arab states and Iran. This equilibrium was disturbed by what followed the terror attacks of September 11, 2001. The relapse of violence in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the rise of the Jus tice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi, AKP) to power in 2002, and the US invasion of Iraq in 20039 brought this alliance under considerable pressure. As the interests of US foreign policy shifted towards the Middle East, it became increasingly clear that the strategic and tactical aims of both states could diverge in some of the region's conflicts. The situation became further complicated with the occupation of Iraq by the United States and its allies. The expansion of the Kurdish-controlled zone in northern Iraq and the subsequent creation of a Kurdish federal entity there facilitated the re-emergence of the PKK as a significant security threat for Turkey. A milestone in the deterioration of US-Turkey relations was the refusal of the Turkish Parliament on March 1, 2003 to allow US troops the use of Turkish territory in preparation for their invasion of Iraq.10 As the United States was preparing an invasion of Iraq in early 2003, it became clear that the chances of a swift victory over Saddam Husayn's armed forces would drastically increase if a second front was opened on the Turkish-Iraqi border. This led to a formal US request for the deployment of US military forces within Turkish territory. Many in Turkey felt that the country would have to pay the price of US adventurism in the Middle East for a second time ? the first being in 1991. While Turkish public opinion was firmly against the US invasion of Iraq,11 the AKP government, led by Abdullah Giil, decided to support the US request, trying to trade agreement for a generous US military and monetary aid package. As time was pressing, a major logistics operation was already on its way when the Turkish Parliament voted on March 1,2003 on a bill permitting the use of Turkish territory by US troops. Despite the wide parliamentary majority which the AKP enjoyed in the Parliament, the bill failed to collect the necessary majority of votes and was thus rejected. About 90 AKP delegates took advantage of the secret character of the vote to express their opposition to the bill and US policies in the region in general. They apparently included in their ranks delegates as high-ranking as the Speaker of Parliament Biilent Anng and Deputy Prime Minister Ertugrul Yalgmbayir.12 The blow against US war planning and prestige was heavy. The US troops ready to de ploy on Turkish territory had to abandon their operations after weeks of preparations, and the planning of the US invasion of Iraq was upset. The war followed suit without a second front in the north. It was only due to the unexpectedly weak resistance of Iraqi troops and the relatively easy victory of US forces on the battlegrounds of southern Iraq that the issue received less attention. This refusal of the Turkish Parliament has been considered a case where anti-Americanism produced tangible effects which harmed US interests. While Keohane and Katzenstein argue that anti-Americanism has failed to pro duce strong global effects on US diplomacy, they add that the March 1, 2003 vote showed how anti-Americanism can be consequential in specific conjunctures.13 Such a change of Turkish policy could not go unattended in the United States. In fact, it alienated Turkey from many of its longstanding allies within US policymaking circles. Prominent Neoconservative figures and think tanks which had traditionally supported Turkish positions and constituted a key part of the US Turkish lobby felt betrayed and exposed by Turkey's decision.14 What made the situation even harder to accept was that opposition to the US campaign did not emanate solely from the AKP government, but also from the Turkish military and bureaucratic elites, old and trusted partners of the United States. While the AKP government had formally endorsed the bill, the military failed to take an open position in favor of US operations. At the critical meet ing of the National Security Council (Milli G?venlik Kurulu, MGK), on February 28, 2003, just a few days before the March 1, 2003 voting, no clear support for the US request was expressed. In the words of the then-US Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz: [M]any of the institutions in Turkey that we think of as the traditional strong sup ort ... were not as forceful in leading in that direction. ... particularly the military. I think for whatever reason they did not play the strong leadership role on that issue that we would have expected.15 Turkey's refusal to join the US "coalition of the willing" had a major consequence. The absence of Turkish troops meant that the leverage Turkey had to influence devel opments in post-war Iraq was limited. In contrast, Iraqi Kurds gained increasing sig nificance due to their role as the most stable and trustworthy ally of the United States in Iraq. In addition, the proclamation of the new Iraqi Constitution turned the country into a federal state with a predominantly Kurdish Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in the north. The growing relative significance of the Iraqi Kurds as key regional allies of the United States also meant that US-Turkey interests found a new point of contention. While Turkey initially had opposed any plans for Kurdish autonomy in Iraq, it later moderated its stance to conform with post-war reality. On the one hand, it accepted the prospect of a federal system, while stressing its full opposition to any partition plan. On the other hand, it included support for Turcomans in its Iraq agenda.16 By assuming the role of the guard ian of Iraq's Turcoman minority, Ankara hoped to gain additional leverage in domestic Iraqi politics. This became evident when Turkey openly took sides in the domestic Iraqi dispute over the future status of the city of Kirkuk. However, playing the Turcoman card yielded little to Turkish foreign policy, as many of the Turcomans ? particularly those who were Shi'ites ? remained indifferent to Turkish sponsorship. Ankara's involvement in Kirkuk became an additional thorn in US-Turkey talks over Iraq.17 The Kirkuk province, in which the second biggest oilfield in the world is located, was claimed by the Iraqi Kurds who pointed at Saddam's intensive and violent efforts to alter the demographic balance of the city in favor of Sunni Arabs. In the aftermath of the 2003 war, Kurds started repopulating it, allegedly in an effort to restore the previous demographic balance.18 Consequently they claimed it for the Iraqi Kurdistan Regional Government. Controlling oil-rich Kirkuk was thought to be a crucial lifeline for the Kurdish federal entity, and potentially could financially support an independent Kurdish state. Turkey vehemently objected to these plans, fearing that such a development would destabilize Turkey's Kurdish-inhabited southeastern and eastern provinces. Instead, it championed the rights of Kirkuk's sizable Turcoman minority. While the future status of Kirkuk was set to be decided by a referendum, Turkey objected to any measure which could lead to the incorporation of Kirkuk into the KRG. An event whose details still remain unclear triggered a major crisis in US-Turkey relations and further fueled anti-Americanism. On July 4, 2003, US soldiers arrested 11 Turkish special forces officers in the northern Iraqi city of Sulaymaniya, who were suspected of planning the assassination of a local Kurdish politician.19 The arrested Turkish officers were hooded and led away from their headquarters for questioning. When this news became public, the media and popular reaction was unprecedented. Such treatment was deemed disgraceful and a national insult coming from a traditional ally.20 The fact that the victim of the insult was the Turkish army made things even worse for US-Turkey relations. The military has traditionally enjoyed high popularity and esteem in Turkish public opinion, and it also was among the most pro-US actors in Turkish domestic politics. The Sulaymaniya incident alienated even some of the most loyal supporters of the US-Turkish strategic alliance. It was added to claims that the United States was considering partition plans of Iraq and the establishment of a fully independent Kurdish state in the north of the country, or even a large-scale redrawing of the map of the Middle East which would entail territorial losses for Turkey. These added fuel to existing nationalist conspiracy theories and further aroused anti-US feel ings in Turkey, which for the first time appeared significantly among secularist elites. This shift was clearly documented in opinion surveys.21 According to the 2006 Pew Global Attitudes Survey, the number of Turks who had a favorable view of the United States fell from 32% in 2004 to 23% in 2005 and to a mere 17% in 2006. The corresponding numbers were 27% in Pakistan, 36% in Indonesia and Egypt, and 38% in Jordan.22 Support for the US-led War on Terror fell from 37% in 2004 to 17% in 2005, and 14% in 2006.23 At 3%, Turkey recorded the lowest level of confidence in President George W. Bush among the 15 countries of the survey.24 In 2007, the results of the same survey were even more telling. The number of Turks who had a favorable view of the United States fell to a tiny 9%, the lowest among all states and considerably less than even the Palestinians, of whom 13% expressed a favorable view of the United States.25 Eighty-one percent of Turks expressed their dis like of US ideas about democracy, while 83% expressed their opposition to US "ways of doing business" in international affairs.26 Twenty-two percent expressed positive views of US movies, music, and television, 37% for US science and technology, but only 4% for the spread of US ideas.27 The situation slightly improved in the following years. The election of Barack Obama to the US presidency was a primary reason for that. As in most countries, Turkish public opinion favored Obama, who was seen as a harbinger of change in US foreign policy, particularly in the Middle East. His decision to visit Ankara in early April 2009 made Turkey the first Muslim country that he visited. This was well received in Turkey. In his address to the Turkish Grand National Assembly, Obama took the opportunity to send a message to the Muslim world. He argued that The United States is not and will never be at war with Islam. In fact, our partnership with the Muslim world is critical not just in rolling back the violent ideologies that people of all faiths reject but also to strengthen opportunity for its people. ... America's relationship with the Muslim community, the Muslim world, cannot be based just on the opposition to terrorism. We seek broader engagement based on mutual interest and mutual respect.28 Nonetheless, the visit proved to be of little avail regarding the restoration of the US image in Turkey. According to the 2009 Pew Global Attitudes Survey, the number of Turks with a favorable view of the United States rose to 14% in 2009 — up from 12% in 2008.29 These were still the worst ratings for the United States among all sur veyed countries. According to the same survey, 40% of Turks saw the United States as an enemy while only 18% saw it as a friend.30 Mistrust of US foreign policy remained strong. Only 19% of Turks expressed the view that Obama would be fair in the Middle East, while 52% argued the opposite.31 Although 33% of Turks expressed confidence in President Obama ? compared to only 2% for President Bush in 2008 ? 52% showed little or no confidence in Obama.32 These findings seem to confirm that anti-American ism in Turkey is not ephemeral, but tends to establish its position33 and is becoming an important component of contemporary Turkish nationalism. ANTI-AMERICANISM IN MEDIA AND POPULAR CULTURE The rise of anti-Americanism in Turkish society also can be documented in the media and popular culture. Beyond the legitimate reaction to US wrongdoings in Iraq, wide publicity was given to unfounded claims or conspiracy theories regarding the US role in the Middle East and the actions of US troops in the region. The Abu Ghraib prison scandal of 2003 was presented as evidence of the evil character of the US occupation and of the United States itself. Accusations that US soldiers were harvesting organs from Iraqi prisoners and insurgents and selling them abroad found a following in Turkey.34 Scathing attacks against the United States during the bloody operations for the recapture of the city of Fallujah in November 2004 were followed by the publication of official statements in which US operations were called genocide and compared to the Holocaust.35 The alleged role of Israel in post-war Iraq also stirred the ire of the Turkish press. Widespread claims appeared that Israel was actively involved in northern Iraq36 to support Iraqi Kurds and the creation of a Kurdish state as an Israeli client between Turkey, Iran, and the Arab world. This often resulted in the coupling of anti-American and anti-Semitic feelings in parts of Turkish society. These attacks were not only limited to the Islamist media. Anti Americanism was crossing political and ideological lines.37 In the field of popular culture, books and films in which Turkey came into direct — and successful — military confrontation with the United States met with unprece dented commercial success.38 The fictional book Metal Storm (Metal Firtina), narrated a war between Turkey and the United States in the near future.39 According to the plot, the United States invades Turkey from Iraq. Operation "Metal Storm" results in the occupation of Turkey's large cities. In a second phase, Operation "Sevres,"40 Turkey's archenemies — Greece, Armenia, and the Kurds — plan the partition of the country. The Turks then forge a global anti-US alliance with China, Russia, and Germany, while a Turkish agent detonates a nuclear device in Washington, DC. This brings the occupation to an end, and Turkey triumphs.41 The book, which ran to ten editions and sold about 500,000 copies in the first 18 months of its publication in late 2004, was a prominent example of a best-selling book characterized by rampant anti-Americanism. The authors skillfully capitalized on emerging anti-American feelings and existing phobias in Turkish society. They created a nationalist epic, in which Turkey defeats new — the United States — and the Kurds — and old enemies — Armenia and Greece – to trium phantly reclaim its independence. The commercial success of the book led to the pub lication of a sequel, which also was well-received by the public.42 The commercial success of a movie based on a popular TV series was an addi tional manifestation of rising anti-Americanism in Turkey. The Valley of Wolves: Iraq (Kurtlar Vadisi: Irak) was, at the time of its release, the most expensive production in the history of Turkish cinema and eventually became its biggest commercial success as well. It featured the adventures of Polat Alemdar, a Turkish intelligence agent who operates in Iraq, defending justice, restoring Turkish honor, and avenging American atrocities in Iraq. The movie combines nationalist, Orientalist, and Occidentalist stereo types.43 Alongside anti-American and anti-Semitic tones, the movie depicts the Iraqis as backward, cowardly, overtly religious, and clearly inferior to Turks. The only groups that enjoy a positive portrayal are the Turcomans, Turkey's alleged ethnic brethren in Iraq, and those Kurds who collaborated with Turks. Positive critiques of the film were found not only in the nationalist media but also came from high-ranking ministers and MPs.44 The spectacular commercial success and popular appeal of a book and a movie replete with nationalistic and anti-American messages comprised a clear signal of the growing popular anti-American nationalism in Turkey.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Erdoğan Disadvantage › Uniqueness › UQ — Turkey = Anti American

There are strong anti-Western sentiments in Turkey because of opposition to US domination

SWP 22 — Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP"Deciphering Turkey’s Geopolitical Balancing and Anti-Westernism in Its Relations with Russia," May 20th, 2022. WMK

Anti-Imperialism, Anti-Westernism: Varieties of Discontent with the West

As a major driver of Turkey’s geopolitical balancing policy, anti-Westernism or dis­content with the West has come to mean different things during different times for Turkey. However, nuance is called for: Dis­content with the West and anti-Westernism are not necessarily interchangeable. Dis­content tends to be issue-based, whereas anti-Westernism describes a more comprehensive political and ideological stance. Yet an accumulation of discontents, as is the case in Turkey, feeds into and sustains the broader anti-Westernism at the elite and societal levels. This can make these two terms indistinguishable at times. Addition­ally, elites can exploit discontent on indi­vidual issues to serve wider anti-Western political and ideological outlooks. While there are similarities between the Turkish and Russian anti-Western narratives, their policy responses and geopolitical aspirations differ. And that prevents their respective anti-Westernism morphing into a shared vision of and stance on the global order.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Erdoğan Disadvantage › Uniqueness › UQ — Turkey = Anti American

Erdogan is strongly anti-American now in order to appease his base BUT its not set in stone — the AFF would be a sudden reversal in policy which

Ward 19 — National Security Reporter at POLITICO Ward, Alex. “How America’s relationship with Turkey fell apart” April 11th, 2019. WMK

And Erdoğan’s rhetoric during local elections last week stoked anti-American sentiment among his base throughout the campaign. There has long been anti-US feeling within the Turkish government and public — partly because of rampant conspiracy theories about America secretly plotting to crush Turkey, and Washington’s much-disliked Middle East policies — but the autocrat ratcheted up the language to a whole new level.

“What’s unique now is that even when US-Turkish relations were turbulent, there was never such a systematic attempt to smear the US from the highest levels of the Turkish government or state-run media,” Erdemir, who is now at the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies think tank, told me. “There has never been this level of conspiracy theories spread by government circles or such a level of threat against US officials and troops.”

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Erdoğan Disadvantage › Uniqueness › UQ — Erdogan Support Fine

Erdogan is a shrewd politician who can set an agenda—don’t count him out

Duran 22 — Burhanettin Duran is General Coordinator of SETA Foundation and a professor at Ibn Haldun University. He is also a member of Turkish Presidency Security and Foreign Policies Council. Burhanettin Duran, "Dangerous myths ahead of the Turkish election process," Daily Sabah, 01-08-2022, https://www.dailysabah.com/opinion/columns/dangerous-myths-ahead-of-the-turkish-election-process, accessed 6-25-2022, WMK

The 2019 municipal elections, coupled with Turkey’s economic hardship over the last couple of months, notably boosted the opposition’s confidence. It is perfectly normal for any political party (or alliance) to aspire to win the next election. I maintain, however, that two phenomena have devastated the psychology of opposition voters: Primarily, those folks, who engaged in a harsh brand of opposition and ignored the government’s accomplishments, have turned their supporters into fanatics. One could observe that situation by glancing at pro-opposition news websites: From their perspective, everything is horrible! Let aside the critique of inflation or those columnists whose job is to insult others or be "doomsday preachers." Opposition outlets even portray major projects such as the indigenously developed electric car Togg and the COVID-19 vaccine Turkovac, or the armed drone program’s success and normalization in foreign policy, as negative developments. Needless to say, the opposition’s propaganda of uncertainty, concern and imminent devastation, which incessantly references negative points, undermines the spirit of its own base.

Misplaced confidence

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Erdoğan Disadvantage › Uniqueness › UQ — Erdogan Support Fine

It’s close—the thinnest margins matter

KirişCi and Esen 21 — Kemal KirişCi and Berk Esen, "Might the Turkish Electorate Be Ready to Say Goodbye to Erdoğan After Two Decades in Power?," Just Security, 11-22-2021, https://www.justsecurity.org/79306/might-the-turkish-electorate-be-ready-to-say-goodbye-to-erdogan-after-two-decades-in-power/, accessed 6-25-2022, WMK

However, there also are obstacles in the way of opposition parties winning the next elections. There still is not a common presidential candidate against Erdoğan. Akşener is the only leader who has openly stated that she would not be a presidential candidate and that she prefers becoming the prime minister in the new parliamentary system. As the leader of the main opposition party, Kılıçdaroğlu is the opposition’s most likely candidate who could be trusted to oversee the dismantlement of Erdoğan’s presidential system and its replacement with a parliamentary one. However, in a country that is heavily polarized and impacted by Erdoğan’s narratives emphasizing Sunni Islam, Kılıçdaroğlu’s Alevi identity (Alevis are considered by many from the Sunni majority as a heterodox group somewhat like the Shia) makes him a questionable candidate for conservative Sunnis. The popular mayor of Istanbul, Ekrem Imamoğlu, appears to be interested in presenting himself as a candidate, while the mayor of Ankara, Mansur Yavaş, is also cited as a potential contender. Both names performed better than Kılıçdaroğlu or Erdoğan in recent polls. While the existence of several viable candidates could be an asset for the opposition, the candidate selection process may open rifts between the CHP and İYİ Party.

Another challenge arises from the fact that there is a large pool of undecided voters, many of whom supported AKP and MHP in the past. Although these voters are hurt by the economic crisis and the government’s limited social assistance during the pandemic, the opposition parties have not yet secured their support. Erdoğan still enjoys considerable popularity among older voters with a pious background who are worried about losing the benefits and privileges they have received under AKP rule. In a polarized country where elections are won or lost with small margins, these voters may determine whether the opposition is able to defeat Erdoğan and win a sufficient number of seats to secure a transition to the “strengthened and improved” parliamentary system.