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2022 Michigan Counterplan
CIVIL-MILITARY COUNTERPLAN › NEG › Solvency---Complexity

PPPs are key to address complexity.

Nadja El Fertasi 06-22-2019 [El Fertasi has built a career path in NATO over the past seventeen years taking on a variety of posts in different fields within large multinational NATO institutions. She holds a Master’s degree in International relations from the University of Cambridge and is an alumna of the NATO-wide Executive Development Program, Information and Security, “Why Digital Ecosystems of Civil-Military Partnerships Are a Game Changer for International Security and Defence,” https://procon.bg/system/files/4202_elfertasi_digital_ecosystems.pdf//ZW]

Digital Ecosystems of Civil-Military Partnerships are no Longer a Luxury, but a Necessity Working with traditional and non-traditional partners, training military leaders and soldiers to become digitally literate is essential in an era marked by information warfare for superiority, and where data is the new oil and a strategic resource. Numerous actors in the defence and security sector have been arguing for a digital approach in protecting data while fully harnessing its full potential in bringing civil-military partnerships to the next level. During his speech at the NATO Science and Technology Organization conference, NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander for Transformation General Denis Mercier argued that homogenous partnerships are part of the past. 6 Traditional and homogeneous partnerships are no longer keeping us safe from the dark side of technology as peer state competitors, and non-state actors tap into cutting-edge technology at low cost posing highly complex challenges to both military and civil infrastructures. Technology has become the world’s nervous system making networks across the globe increasingly vulnerable to a vast array of threats. Bringing in experts from a broad spectrum of disciplines and across generations will help develop innovative and sustainable solutions to technology threats in an era where information superiority prevails. The Case of Public-Private Partnerships in the United States The United States has understood the value of establishing public-private partnerships with tech giants to address some of the most complex security challenges digital transformation brings. In his speech to Stanford University, former United States Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter emphasized that a strong partnership between military strategists and technologies would establish a strong pact in an era marked by digital transformation. He added: The same Internet that enables Wikipedia also allows terrorists to learn how to build a bomb. And the same technologies we use to target cruise missiles and jam enemy air defenses can be used against our own forces – and they’re now available to the highest bidder. This is why, he said, the Pentagon must rebuild the bridge between Washington and Silicon Valley. “Renewing our partnership is the only way we can do this right.”

2022 Michigan Counterplan
CIVIL-MILITARY COUNTERPLAN › NEG › Solvency---Ethical Tech

Inclusion of private actors solves downside risks

Nadja El Fertasi 06-22-2019 [El Fertasi has built a career path in NATO over the past seventeen years taking on a variety of posts in different fields within large multinational NATO institutions. She holds a Master’s degree in International relations from the University of Cambridge and is an alumna of the NATO-wide Executive Development Program, Information and Security, “Why Digital Ecosystems of Civil-Military Partnerships Are a Game Changer for International Security and Defence,” https://procon.bg/system/files/4202_elfertasi_digital_ecosystems.pdf//ZW]

Fostering understanding, sharing best practices and lessons learned through dialogue is crucial for keeping pace with digital transformation on both sides of the Atlantic. This forum, focused on digital transformation at large in the defence sector, can help identify problems which need collaborative approaches across the civil-military spectrum. Understanding the problem first from multiple angles will create a vision all stakeholders stand behind. Establishing this dialogue to foster this shared understanding is one of the essential steps for building inclusive public-private partnerships in keeping pace with the challenges of digital disruption. NATO has excellent resources that take innovation to the next level fit for the defence sector. The NATO Industry Advisory Group 21 is the primary forum that serves as an industry advisory hub for NATO and has a transatlantic focus. Building on this forum and expanding its focus from information technology to technology at large to include all five domains of air, maritime, land, space, and cyber will reinvigorate transatlantic-public private partnerships in the digital age. Focusing on disruptive technology that is driving digital transformation in the current era is a necessity. However, the dark side of technology does not recognise civil-military boundaries; thus, involving non-traditional actors is crucial. Rethinking military doctrine and civil-military cooperation in the digital age to maintain information superiority is what will provide ultimate security. Forging partnerships within inhouse NATO expertise (e.g., Allied Command Transformation, Science and Technology Organization, NATO Communications and Information Agency) with the civil sector to include prime contractors, small and medium enterprise, startups, academia and research and development bodies will bring civil-military cooperation into the digital age. A forum for developing a shared understanding on what disruptive technology means for different member states on both sides of the Atlantic will set the scene for bridging the widening innovation gap. Anderson and Townsend argue that disruptive technologies have different meanings in the United States and Europe. 22 Add to that the innovation gap both across the Atlantic and within Europe between various member states, understanding how digital transformation impacts the different security landscapes and interests are paramount for closing this gap. A final aspect to consider is to include all institutional stakeholders from legal, finance, military officers – both users and commanders, the full spectrum of the industry from prime contractors to start-ups, and other non-traditional stakeholders. In particular seen from the recent implementation of Europe’s GDPR regulation which impacts transatlantic digital cooperation. 23 A frank and open dialogue on moving forward in ensuring Europe’s innovation culture does not fall behind in the bigger world scene is warranted. By establishing this dialogue, institutional blindness across the Alliance will diminish, and more focus on finding opportunities within existing bureaucracies will prevail.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
CIVIL-MILITARY COUNTERPLAN › NEG › Solvency---Interoperability

Solves interoperability.

Rose Gottemoeller et al. 06-26-2022 [Gottemoeller served as the Secretary General of NATO from 2016 to 2019. Prior to NATO, she served as the Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security at the U.S. Department of State. Gottemoeller was also the chief U.S. negotiator of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) with the Russian Federation Maj. Kathryn Hedgecock, U.S. Army, is an assistant professor in the Department of Social Sciences at West Point. She holds a Ph.D. and M.A. from Stanford University in Political Science. Maj. Justin Magula, U.S. Army, is an Army strategist in the Strategic Landpower and Futures Group at the U.S. Army War College. Paul Poast is an associate professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Chicago. Paul received his PhD from the University of Michigan, Defense Studies, “Engaging with emerged and emerging domains: cyber, space, and technology in the 2022 NATO strategic concept,” https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14702436.2022.2082955//ZW]

In discussions of Cooperative Security, NATO must distinguish between emerged and emerging technologies, categorizing cyber operations as an emerged technology (Kosal 2022). NATO should strive to remain on the “bleeding edge” of scientific development by continuing to establish cooperative partnerships with private industry, including support of start-up organizations to enhance NATO’s competitive edge. NATO can enhance collective defense among member states by fostering partnerships through science diplomacy oriented toward emerging threats (Breedlove and Kosal 2019). Finally, NATO must mitigate risks associated with interoperable emerging technologies that rely on the cyber and space domains.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
CIVIL-MILITARY COUNTERPLAN › NEG › Solvency---Deterrence

Public-private partnerships solve deterrence.

John Allen et al 12-14-21 [General John Allen, President of Brookings and former Commander of NATO’s International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan

Dr. Heiko Borchert, Director of Borchert Consulting & Research AG

Marcin Zaborowski, Policy Director of the Future of Security Programme, GLOBSEC, “Emerging technology, the geo-economic Achilles’ heel NATO needs to address,” https://www.globsec.org/news/emerging-technology-the-geo-economic-achilles-heel-nato-needs-to-address///ZW]

2022 Michigan Counterplan
CIVIL-MILITARY COUNTERPLAN › NEG › Solvency---Cyber

Collaboration is key to promoting good norms in cyberspace.

Eugenia Lostri, James Andrew Lewis, and Georgia Wood 03-22-22 [Eugenia Lostri is an associate fellow with the Strategic Technologies Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. James Andrew Lewis is senior vice president and director of the CSIS Strategic Technologies Program. Georgia Wood is a program coordinator and research assistant with the CSIS Strategic Technologies Program, CSIS, “A Shared Responsibility: Public-Private Cooperation or Cybersecurity,” https://www.csis.org/analysis/shared-responsibility-public-private-cooperation-cybersecurity//ZW]

9. Expand Enforcement Cooperation with Allies Cybersecurity is becoming a key part of the foreign policy agenda. To continue progress, participants believed that the United States, its allies, and partners should pursue the implementation of international norms for cyberspace to enhance accountability and responsible action. Supporting and promoting norms of responsible behavior and international law should be a priority, as well as raising the profile and stressing the urgency in diplomatic spheres. Collaboration between national CERTs during an incident was found to be valuable by many of the participants from global companies, who drew on resources in more than their home country. A global company will have relationships with several national CERTs. Support and communication from more experienced CERTs can make a big difference for smaller company teams, who may be dealing with an overwhelming workload. Another area participants believed would be useful to expanding collaboration is the arrest of bad actors. Some participants called attention to the FBI legal attachés in other countries. In a related vein, in October 2021, the United States convened the Counter Ransomware Initiative, which included representatives from 30 countries and the European Union to discuss the security threat posed by ransomware. One of the discussion points was, precisely, how to reinforce “timely and consistent collaboration across law enforcement, national security authorities, cybersecurity agencies, and financial intelligence units,” recognizing the transnational nature of the threat to improving enforcement.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
CIVIL-MILITARY COUNTERPLAN › NEG › Solvency---Ethical AI

Engaging NATO with the public-private sector solves ethical AI.

Michèle Flournoy and Anshu Roy 06-29-22 [Michèle Fournoy  is former US Undersecretary of Defense for Policy and an advisor to Rhombus, Dr. Anshu Roy is a Life Member of the Council on Foreign Relations and CEO of Rhombus, Just Security, “NATO Must Tackle Digital Authoritarianism,” https://www.justsecurity.org/82139/nato-must-tackle-digital-authoritarianism///ZW]

NATO leaders are gathered in Madrid this week to mark the reinvigoration of the transatlantic alliance and to discuss its ongoing challenges. After the fall of the Soviet Union, some dismissed NATO as a relic. Vladimir Putin’s brutal and unjustified war against Ukraine to expand Russia’s sphere of influence and reclaim its former glory stands as a stark reminder that hegemonic fantasies backed by brute force remain a threat to the international order, even in the 21st century. In response to Putin’s aggression, NATO has recovered its sense of purpose and relevance. It is also learning some important lessons regarding the future nature of warfare, from the criticality of adaptive leadership and robust logistics to the importance of asymmetric approaches. One of the most crucial lessons is that information dominance is essential, especially when confronting authoritarian powers like a revanchist Russia or a rising China who are willing to manufacture “facts” and create false narratives in order to undermine the political will and unity of their adversaries. As we look to the future, NATO must ask itself: How can we strengthen post-Westphalian institutions for a Wiki-world? In the last century, the United States and our allies sacrificed lives and treasure to defend the liberal world order, vanquishing the Axis Powers in World War II and Soviet Communism in the Cold War. In this century, traditional reliance on kinetic force is not enough. The ability to control, process, disseminate and protect information is critical. Malign actors are investing in a host of digital technologies without any restraint or regulation, preparing for the day when artificial intelligence (AI) becomes a dominant force on the battlefield. Digital authoritarianism – using technology for disinformation, ubiquitous surveillance and oppression of populations at home, and coercion abroad – is not the way of democracies, nor can it ever become our way. Instead, we need to reinvent our alliances and our own frameworks for information dominance consistent with our values. A coalition of like-minded nations could shape international technical and ethical standards, promote alignment on technology export controls, increase AI talent exchanges and technology investment, and importantly, facilitate cross-border data sharing. Creating an Artificial Intelligence Network in collaboration with our allies shouldn’t be just a hortatory statement or a commitment to compete on this turf with actors who don’t share our values. Instead, establishing information dominance through establishing such a network should be a strategic imperative. We have strengths, as do our allies, that authoritarian powers can only dream of, starting with free and open institutions that generate creativity and innovation across all intellectual and military disciplines. We can fully engage allied research universities and private sector companies to accelerate the development and integration of ethical AI that will give us an edge in everything from predictive warning of crises to better, faster human decision-making. For years, we’ve been fixated on whether countries are meeting their commitments under NATO to spend 2% of their GDP on defense. While more and more allies are meeting this goal, particularly in the wake of Putin’s aggression in the heart of Europe, the more provocative and consequential question for the long term is: Are we, together, investing in the development of the right new technologies and concepts? And are we adopting them with adequate speed and scale to be able to deter and, if necessary, defeat future aggression? The United States invested $4 billion in government-led, unclassified AI-related R&D in 2019 alone and remains the leading destination for global AI investments. Counting the private sector, America’s annual investment in AI is over $40 billion, with more than 2,000 American AI firms, including startups and large private companies. But making AI a strategic priority for NATO would be an enormous force multiplier. To date, Europe has lagged behind in AI. The MIT Sloan Management Review surveyed cross-industry AI practices and found 97% of Chinese companies have a strategy for AI, compared with just 62% of their European counterparts. Putting AI at the heart of the NATO Alliance could be a catalyst to addressing Europe’s growing AI gap. It could also create valuable synergies with U.S. efforts. After all, this is the playbook that won the Cold War: creating public-private synergy and bringing a network of trusted allies with shared values and tremendous talent and intellectual capacity into direct partnership with the innovation and creativity of America’s entrepreneurial centers and our capital markets. Alliances are about more than talking points or traditions–their value comes from what they can do now to shape a better future for us all. In the case of NATO, that means shaping a dynamic security environment in a period of intensifying great power competition and profound technological disruption. If NATO wants to stay relevant and be prepared for a very different future, it is time to modernize the alliance by working with allies today to triumph with tomorrow’s technology. That’s a conversation that should be front and center in Madrid.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
CIVIL-MILITARY COUNTERPLAN › NEG › Solvency---Space

P3s solve space--- incentivize innovation and datasharing.

Karen Jones 04-2018 [Karen L. Jones is a senior project leader with The Aerospace Corporation’s Center for Space Policy and Strategy, The Aerospace Corporation, “Public-Private Partnerships: Stimulating Innovation in the Space Sector,” ]

The space economy, once the sole domain of wealthy countries, has rapidly transitioned to a complex ecosystem of public and private entities. Along the way, government and commercial sectors have learned by doing, recognizing and incorporating key successes and lessons learned from past partnerships. Stakeholders must sort through a myriad of complexities, conflicts, and contingencies to shape an acceptable agreement. Most stakeholders recognize that this process is more art than science. Yet there is potential to achieve greater efficiency without sacrificing transparency and accountability by utilizing a decision framework supported by a broad understanding of past experiences in multiple sectors. As the space sector engages in more P3s, more lessons will emerge as partners strategize, plan, and implement. In the meantime, the following lessons, from the case studies discussed above, should continue to resonate with future P3 arrangements: • The government partner must conduct a comprehensive review of a commercial partner’s business plan including market projections, market risk, and related cost projections. These factors may impact the ability to reliably deliver on time and within budget. Avoid business models that are overly optimistic or uncertain. • Create a shared vision among stakeholders. • Establish contingencies for changing requirements. Strategically leverage seed money for private sector development and encourage healthy competition by selecting multiple partners. • Use the partnership to incentivize industry to meet the more stringent demands of the government partner. • Scale contracts to the mission’s longevity and extended success. Be wary of commitments that are longer than technology refresh or capital reinvestment cycles. • Use success to fuel incremental growth and to build longer term trusted partnerships with commercial sector partners. • Carefully structure technical and financial milestones and measure success criteria for meeting milestones, including adjusting payment schedules to reflect any slippage. • Optimize value through shared data agreements between the public and private partners – focusing on a range of intended applications and niche markets. P3s will continue to test traditional approaches to space acquisition and operations. They can demonstrate significant advantages such as improving delivery schedules, quality of service, and innovation. Capitalintensive P3s will continue to experience successes and failures as both the public and private sector become more adept at crafting optimal arrangements. The future also holds great promise for public-private datasharing models as this type of arrangement will begin to spur innovation and extract the most utility from space-derived data products.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
CIVIL-MILITARY COUNTERPLAN › NEG › Solvency---Companies Say Yes

Companies say yes

Marian L. Lawson 10-28-13 [Specialist in Foreign Assistance Policy, Congressional Research Service, “Foreign Assistance: Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs),” https://sgp.fas.org/crs/misc/R41880.pdf//ZW]

Potential Benefits of Public-Private Partnerships PPPs have become more common because both public and private partners believe PPPs achieve shared goals more effectively than each partner could by acting alone. Commonly cited advantages of PPPs include the following: • Shared Risks and Resources. While development officials are quick to point out that PPPs are not primarily a means of saving taxpayer dollars, sharing the cost and financial risks of development activities is a key attraction of modern partnerships that involve joint resource contributions. Both the government and private entities are sometimes willing to participate as partners in a project they would not be able or willing to support in its entirety. Partnership may also allow for project implementation on a larger scale, and for cost savings based on scale, resulting in each partner achieving a greater development return on its investment (or a diluted cost of failure). • Sustainability. A common criticism of traditional development activities is that they never become self-sustaining and fade away when government funding ends. PPPs attempt to avoid this problem by tapping into core business interests and making sustainability profitable. In the SUCCESS Alliance, for example, small Vietnamese cocoa farmers were integrated into Mars’s global supply chain, having elevated their cocoa production and processing to international standards with assistance from USAID, Mars, and the World Cocoa Foundation. In theory, market demand should sustain the partnership and the improved farmer incomes. While the sustainability argument seems logical and is supported by anecdotal evidence, there has been no comprehensive study of how PPP sustainability compares to that of non-PPP approaches. • Market Access/Networks. Corporations and private entities often have networks of customers, suppliers, supporters, and employees that can broaden the reach of a development program beyond where a development agency could go. By partnering with MTV in several regional alliances, for example, USAID tapped into a vast global audience of young people for its messages against human trafficking and promoting HIV/AIDS prevention in the EXIT alliance. MTV, for its part, saw an opportunity for positive public relations and an association with USAID that could potentially enhance its reputation in developing countries. • Technology and Intellectual Property. Effective use of technology, which many experts believe is crucial to economic development, can be a daunting challenge in developing countries. Through partnering with Cisco, Microsoft, and other global technology companies, development agencies are able to overcome technical, legal, and financial barriers to accessing certain technology. The technology companies, in turn, are developing relationships and support infrastructure to position themselves to compete for the next generation of technology consumers, many of whom will live in developing countries. • Cutting-Edge Business Practices. While USAID and other federal aid agencies can provide technical expertise in a wide range of development sectors, they often do not have the specialized industry knowledge that a private company has. In Guatemala’s Inclusive Market Alliance for Rural Entrepreneurs (IMARE), for example, Walmart supplies crucial market information that augments the impact of technical assistance and access to credit provided through NGO partners by enabling better farm planning and quality control of targeted crops. More than 600 rural small-scale farmers earned higher incomes by selling to the region’s largest retailer, while Walmart strengthened its supply chain.39 In partnering with Sesame Street, USAID gained access to advanced pedagogy and production capacity, while Sesame Street was able to extend its global reach into more developing countries. Reputation Enhancement. Positive public relations are often a significant consideration for corporate entities entering into PPPs. Partnering with a U.S. government entity can lend legitimacy to a private entity, and association with development activities can enhance a corporation’s reputation for being socially responsible. The Small Export Vegetable Alliance in Zambia, for example, was inspired in part by private sector partner Agroflora’s desire to project a more populist image. The company was concerned that land seizures in neighboring Zimbabwe could spread to Zambia and affect its business if it was not seen as benefitting smallholder Zambian farmers.40 Participating organizations and corporations may also anticipate that partnerships will improve their relationships with national and community leaders.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
CIVIL-MILITARY COUNTERPLAN › NEG › Solvency

PPP is the answer to cyber governance.

Kristoffer Kjærgaard Christensen and Karen Lund Petersen 11-2017 [Kristoffer Kjærgaard Christensen is PhD from the University of Copenhagen, Department of Political Science. His research is on the significance of cyber security for contemporary security politics, looking at how cyber security involves new security actors and contributes to creating new political spaces and understandings of (security) politics and democracy, Karen Lund Peteresen is a PhD from the University of Copenhagen. Her research focuses on the transnationalisation of private sector responsibilities on security; political risk; intelligence; and new forms of strategic thinking in the management of international threats, International Affairs Volume 93 Issue 6, pgs. 1435-1452, “Public-private partnerships on cyber security: a practice of loyalty,” https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iix189//ZW]

Owing to the complex, dynamic and dispersed nature of information and communication technology (ICT), cyber-security risks are not easily managed. ICT is everywhere. It not only transcends national jurisdictions but has found its way into nearly all spheres of modern life. Critical infrastructure, private businesses and the most intimate aspects of our daily lives are all affected by ICT, not least through the expanding internet of things.5 This development drastically increases the potential vectors of vulnerability and expands their scope to a plethora of different actors—from states to private companies and individual users. Moreover, the networked nature of ICT means that cyber-security risks are not limited to a particular physical location. Cyber attacks may potentially come from anywhere. In short, cyber security is characterized by a fundamental uncertainty. This uncertainty and the diversity of actors affected pose a great challenge to the governance of cyber-security risks and call for new modes of organizing security practices. In this regard public–private partnerships (PPPs) are often seen as ‘the answer’ to many of the challenges related to cyber-security governance: PPPs are, in policy as well as academic circles, often considered a mode of organization that can enhance flexibility and robustness by including a broader range of civil and private actors. In partnership meetings private businesses are called upon to voluntarily share knowledge on national security and to assume responsibility for ensuring an effective management of cyber threats.6 Despite a strong agreement about the characterization of cyber-security risk as a ‘shared risk’, the turn to partnerships does not itself establish what kind of knowledge the different partners should share with each other. Rather, the fundamental uncertainty associated with cyber security seems to have opened up the space for contestation over ‘what to counter’, and thus what counts as cyber-security knowledge.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
CIVIL-MILITARY COUNTERPLAN › NEG › Solvency

NATO P3 coop solves democracy and disinformation.

Brittany Beaulieu and David Salvo 07-2018 [David Salvo is deputy director of the Alliance for Securing Democracy at The German Marshall Fund of the United States, Brittany Beaulieu is a fellow and program officer at the Alliance for Securing Democracy at The German Marshall Fund of the United States, Alliance for Securing Democracy, “NATO and Asymmetric Threats: A Blueprint for Defense and Deterrence,” https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/resrep18856.pdf//ZW]

NATO should further develop public-private partnerships with civil society. NATO should increase its efforts to develop partnerships with local civil society organizations that can combat disinformation, play the role of the “watch dog” in holding political elites to standards of transparency, and advocate for democratic ideals and principles at the grassroots level. It should also devote additional resources to public diplomacy campaigns, such as the #WeAreNATO campaign, and engage all member states in their coordination. New campaigns could target citizens in rural areas who do not use Facebook or Twitter by engaging them at schools, libraries, and community and retirement centers.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
CIVIL-MILITARY COUNTERPLAN › NEG › Solvency

Public-private partnership solves.

James Stavridis and Evelyn N. Farkas 03-19-2012 [Admiral James Stavridis is the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) and Commander, U.S. European Command (EUCOM), Evelyn N. Farkas is his Senior Advisor for Public–Private Partnership. Any reference to non-Federal entities in this article should not be construed as an endorsement by the U.S. Department of Defense of these entities, their products, or services, The Washington Quarterly Volume 35, Issue 2, “The 21st Century Force Multiplier: Public-Private Collaboration,” https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2012.665336//ZW]

The Case for Collaboration: Effectiveness and Efficiency Public–private collaboration generally falls into several broad categories of activities: 1) sharing expertise; 2) exchanging information; and 3) executing projects and operations. Both parties benefit in tangible and intangible ways. For the government, the key advantage is access to expertise, analysis, skills, perspective, and resources not always available in the public sector. In the current fiscally-constrained environment, the benefits of such collaboration to the government are obvious. Efficiency—saving money and other resources—accrues, and with the added private sector skills, insights, and resulting innovation, so does effectiveness. Like their business counterparts, these public-sector practitioners manage people, finances, organizational change, and “back office” operations every day. Sharing best practices—or in some cases, the worst ones—can be educational for those who manage our national security entities. The private sector also offers an agility not often found in government. One NGO representative working to help veterans explains, “If NGO programs prove less effective or [the] needs shift, NGO programs are easier to end than a government program.”7 As President Ronald Reagan quipped, “A government bureau is the nearest thing to eternal life we'll ever see on this Earth.”8 Businesses can often “fail” faster than their public counterparts, adopting lessons learned and forging ahead. It used to be that the government drove innovation across all sectors; that is no longer true. It used to be that the government drove innovation across all sectors in its defense and science laboratories, reducing the incentive for collaboration. That is no longer true. Much of the cutting edge work is now being done in the private sector. This is most obvious today in the field of computer and information technology, but extends to energy and nanotechnology, among other areas. As a result, the government relies on private sector expertise to maintain its lead in defense, space, and other endeavors related to national security. This dependency means that the government is also affected by private sector vulnerabilities—probably even beyond areas where the private sector has the technological lead. Through collaboration regarding, for example, shared threats on financial fraud and economic espionage, both government and industry can keep abreast of developing challenges. The QDDR speaks for the State Department, USAID, and beyond when it asserts, “Private sector partners can add value to our missions through their resources, their capacity to establish presence in places we cannot, through the technologies, networks and contacts they can tap, and through their specialized expertise or knowledge.”9 For corporate or non-profit entities, collaboration with the government may offer access to information and sometimes intelligence, as well as legitimacy. The private sector often lacks the necessary information and/or ability to coordinate entities that often value their privacy and autonomy over concerted effective action. This is why protection of critical infrastructure—both brick-and-mortar and virtual—is a public–private effort. The government can serve as the honest broker to which corporations may safely disclose vulnerabilities or proprietary information, which the government can use to devise appropriate means to protect all corporations and society. Other issues, such as caring for wounded veterans, are best addressed through a comprehensive approach—which entails responsibilities for the government to provide health care and other support as well as for private organizations and individuals to provide employment and social support. And operating overseas, the government often has long-term international networks via its embassies, which even older corporations cannot replicate. Finally, of course, governments can offer access to funding. In order to tap into the best minds and technology, the government must pay for it, or appeal to American philanthropy and patriotism. The appeal and response bring another benefit to government and society: promoting social service and responsibility. Organizations that team up with the government—especially when there is no direct business or personal gain involved—can foster patriotism, civic participation, and even raise public support for government and good governance. Individuals who engage with government in this manner gain a sense of accomplishment, lending their knowledge to our foreign-policy and national-security goals. Businesses can also bolster their public image through collaboration billed as “pro bono,” or “corporate social responsibility.” Neville Isdell, the former Chairman and CEO of The Coca Cola Company, advocates “connected capitalism,” a system whereby businesses connect with governments, non-profits, and civic society to shape their core business strategies in ways that foster sustainable and profitable commercial growth and contribute to addressing social problems. He works to recruit corporations that pledge to partner with governments, communities, and NGOs to simultaneously further corporate interests and improve society. His motivation, in part, is a desire to help capitalism—which he perceives as currently under attack worldwide—evolve in order to survive.10 Executives from General Electric, Sun Trust Bank, and United Parcel Service have signed up to Isdell's effort and their partners include CARE and USAID. Non-profit research institutes, universities, advocacy organizations, and humanitarian organizations can also benefit from an association with the government by burnishing their credentials as purveyors of knowledge and expertise, or as agile, relevant actors. To the extent that the public views the government or its representatives, such as military officers, favorably and trusts it to seek qualified collaborators who have skill and integrity, private entities and individuals can elevate their public image. Despite this, sometimes private entities and individuals prefer to work in collaboration with the government as separate entities, as opposed to joining the government as employees or contractors. This is true for Blue Star Families (BSF), a non-profit supporting and advocating for military families. “Public–private partnerships are key to BSF's philosophy. Military families serve and sacrifice because we parents, spouses, and children love our service member, and love our country, not because we love the Pentagon. In fact, many families prefer not to interact with ‘official channels.’ So it is right and fitting that the responsibility for helping families falls not only to the Pentagon or the individual services, but to the larger society as well.”11

2022 Michigan Counterplan
CIVIL-MILITARY COUNTERPLAN › NEG › #

Adversary innovation-lead causes nuclear war

Kroenig & Gopalaswamy 18, *Associate Professor of Government and Foreign Service at Georgetown University and Deputy Director for Strategy in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security at the Atlantic Council **Associate Professor of Government and Foreign Service at Georgetown University and Deputy Director for Strategy in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security at the Atlantic Council (*Matthew Kroenig **Bharath Gopalaswamy, 11-12-2018, "Will disruptive technology cause nuclear war?," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, )

Recently, analysts have argued that emerging technologies with military applications may undermine nuclear stability (see here, here, and here), but the logic of these arguments is debatable and overlooks a more straightforward reason why new technology might cause nuclear conflict: by upending the existing balance of power among nuclear-armed states. This latter concern is more probable and dangerous and demands an immediate policy response. For more than 70 years, the world has avoided major power conflict, and many attribute this era of peace to nuclear weapons. In situations of mutually assured destruction (MAD), neither side has an incentive to start a conflict because doing so will only result in its own annihilation. The key to this model of deterrence is the maintenance of secure second-strike capabilities—the ability to absorb an enemy nuclear attack and respond with a devastating counterattack. Recently analysts have begun to worry, however, that new strategic military technologies may make it possible for a state to conduct a successful first strike on an enemy. For example, Chinese colleagues have complained to me in Track II dialogues that the United States may decide to launch a sophisticated cyberattack against Chinese nuclear command and control, essentially turning off China’s nuclear forces. Then, Washington will follow up with a massive strike with conventional cruise and hypersonic missiles to destroy China’s nuclear weapons. Finally, if any Chinese forces happen to survive, the United States can simply mop up China’s ragged retaliatory strike with advanced missile defenses. China will be disarmed and US nuclear weapons will still be sitting on the shelf, untouched. If the United States, or any other state acquires such a first-strike capability, then the logic of MAD would be undermined. Washington may be tempted to launch a nuclear first strike. Or China may choose instead to use its nuclear weapons early in a conflict before they can be wiped out—the so-called “use ‘em or lose ‘em” problem. According to this logic, therefore, the appropriate policy response would be to ban outright or control any new weapon systems that might threaten second-strike capabilities. This way of thinking about new technology and stability, however, is open to question. Would any US president truly decide to launch a massive, bolt-out-of-the-blue nuclear attack because he or she thought s/he could get away with it? And why does it make sense for the country in the inferior position, in this case China, to intentionally start a nuclear war that it will almost certainly lose? More important, this conceptualization of how new technology affects stability is too narrow, focused exclusively on how new military technologies might be used against nuclear forces directly. Rather, we should think more broadly about how new technology might affect global politics, and, for this, it is helpful to turn to scholarly international relations theory. The dominant theory of the causes of war in the academy is the “bargaining model of war.” This theory identifies rapid shifts in the balance of power as a primary cause of conflict. International politics often presents states with conflicts that they can settle through peaceful bargaining, but when bargaining breaks down, war results. Shifts in the balance of power are problematic because they undermine effective bargaining. After all, why agree to a deal today if your bargaining position will be stronger tomorrow? And, a clear understanding of the military balance of power can contribute to peace. (Why start a war you are likely to lose?) But shifts in the balance of power muddy understandings of which states have the advantage. You may see where this is going. New technologies threaten to create potentially destabilizing shifts in the balance of power. For decades, stability in Europe and Asia has been supported by US military power. In recent years, however, the balance of power in Asia has begun to shift, as China has increased its military capabilities. Already, Beijing has become more assertive in the region, claiming contested territory in the South China Sea. And the results of Russia’s military modernization have been on full display in its ongoing intervention in Ukraine. Moreover, China may have the lead over the United States in emerging technologies that could be decisive for the future of military acquisitions and warfare, including 3D printing, hypersonic missiles, quantum computing, 5G wireless connectivity, and artificial intelligence (AI). And Russian President Vladimir Putin is building new unmanned vehicles while ominously declaring, “Whoever leads in AI will rule the world.” If China or Russia are able to incorporate new technologies into their militaries before the United States, then this could lead to the kind of rapid shift in the balance of power that often causes war. If Beijing believes emerging technologies provide it with a newfound, local military advantage over the United States, for example, it may be more willing than previously to initiate conflict over Taiwan. And if Putin thinks new tech has strengthened his hand, he may be more tempted to launch a Ukraine-style invasion of a NATO member. Either scenario could bring these nuclear powers into direct conflict with the United States, and once nuclear armed states are at war, there is an inherent risk of nuclear conflict through limited nuclear war strategies, nuclear brinkmanship, or simple accident or inadvertent escalation. This framing of the problem leads to a different set of policy implications. The concern is not simply technologies that threaten to undermine nuclear second-strike capabilities directly, but, rather, any technologies that can result in a meaningful shift in the broader balance of power. And the solution is not to preserve second-strike capabilities, but to preserve prevailing power balances more broadly. When it comes to new technology, this means that the United States should seek to maintain an innovation edge. Washington should also work with other states, including its nuclear-armed rivals, to develop a new set of arms control and nonproliferation agreements and export controls to deny these newer and potentially destabilizing technologies to potentially hostile states. These are no easy tasks, but the consequences of Washington losing the race for technological superiority to its autocratic challengers just might mean nuclear Armageddon.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
CIVIL-MILITARY COUNTERPLAN › NEG › #

Effective P3’s are key to outpace adversary innovation

Justin Magula and Paula Alvarez-Couceiro 09-30-2019 [Justin Magula is an Army Strategist with four combat deployments, serving in the Strategic Landpower and Futures Group at the U.S. Army War College, Paula Alvarez-Couceiro is a recent graduate of Strategic Studies at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, Wavell Room, “Maintaining and Improving NATO’s Technical Edge,” https://wavellroom.com/2021/09/30/maintaining-improving-natos-technological-edge-technology///ZW]

What happens when an alliance’s competitors quickly improve their technology and capabilities to place the alliance at increased risk? The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) addressed this dilemma during a recent summit in Brussels. At the summit, the North Atlantic Council built upon NATO’s 2030 strategic outline and presented targets for increased technological collaboration to counter growing threats from Russia, China, and non-state actors. While NATO’s scientific and technical superiority has historically allowed it to outpace competitors, its adversaries are quickly closing the gap. NATO members still hold advantages in their development of new technologies. According to the Global Innovation Index, seven of the top ten most innovative countries globally are part of NATO, while the other three are key NATO partners. Even so, NATO can do more to harness the alliance’s combined technological prowess to better compete and win in a future conflict. As China seeks to become the world’s innovation leader and Russia continues to undermine the alliance’s security, NATO will need to out-innovate its competitors and prepare for an uncertain future. Four areas where NATO can focus on improving its competitive edge are developing its formal organizations, increasing public and private sector collaboration, harnessing and countering Emerging Disruptive Technologies (EDTs), and improving conventional military equipment. NATO must maintain its relative lead in technology sectors to defend its people and enhance its long-term strategic position. Improving science and technology (S&T) innovation will increase alliance collaboration, strengthen public and private sector cooperation, counter hybrid threats, deter adversaries, and harden defenses against attacks. NATO’s effectiveness in the future will heavily depend on its ability to maintain and improve its science and technology capabilities. A Changing Environment The global geopolitical situation has changed significantly over the past decade. Although NATO remains the world’s most successful and powerful alliance, China and other adversaries are quickly reducing NATO’s military and scientific advantages. In just the past year, China raised its defense budget by 6.8 percent and continues to build global power projection capabilities in addition to its regional defenses. As part of what some call a Fourth Industrial Revolution,Beijing is rapidly investing in AI, biotechnology, robotics, and other new technologies. Russia is also developing new technologies, especially in areas where it can exploit NATO’s weaknesses. Russia’s ballistic missiles can reach anywhere in Europe, and Russia has placed renewed emphasis on improved missile technology, such as recent hypersonic advances. Russia has built a robust Anti-Access Area Denial (A2AD) network on Europe’s eastern flank while simultaneously expanding military capabilities into its Arctic region. Both areas pose direct security challenges to NATO, which the alliance’s S&T efforts can help mitigate. Over the past decade, NATO has recognized the need for increased innovation and technological advancements. In 2012, the alliance created the Science and Technology Organization, taking on the former roles of the NATO Research and Technology Organization, including its executive function. It also incorporated the former NATO Undersea Research Center, established the NATO Chief Scientist position, and outlined the unified governance of NATO S&T. In 2020, NATO created an Innovation Board and an Advisory Group on Emerging and Disruptive Technologies to provide external advice to NATO on optimizing its innovation efforts. At the 2021 Brussels Summit, NATO agreed to launch a civil-military Defense Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic (DIANA) to “foster transatlantic cooperation on critical technologies, promote interoperability and harness civilian innovation by engaging with academia and the private sector, including start-ups.” There are plans to establish a NATO Innovation Fund (NIF), where allies “can support start-ups working on dual-use emerging and disruptive technologies in areas key to Allied security.” These are steps in the right direction, but NATO can do more. Expanding Technological Organizations In conjunction with its newest additions, the DIANA and NIF, NATO can expand the capacities of its Science and Technology Organization (STO) to boost research and development (R&D) in artificial intelligence (AI), missile and missile defense technology, space, cyber, and other EDTs. The STO is the world’s largest defense and security research forum, employing over 6,000 scientists from allied nations. However, the STO does not turn NATO defense spending into tangible products or equipment for the alliance. NATO could use the STO to streamline research and product development, ensuring all allies are working toward a common goal and not spending resources on identical R&D. For instance, each country could allocate part of its defense budget to develop standardized systems like integrated air, missile, and cyber defenses. Whether using the STO or DIANA as its main innovation driver, NATO must continue developing its formal institutions to harness solutions that benefit the entire alliance and help it achieve its three core tasks of collective defense, crisis management, and cooperative security. Public and Private Sector Collaboration The Brussels Summit Communique also recommends continuing the R&D of AI technologies and identifying alliance gaps in this critical focus area. Many of these advancements occur in the private sector, and NATO must find ways to use those technologies for the alliance. The U.S. National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence’s March 2021 report states that AI-enabled warfare is part of the near future. While the United States and NATO are currently ahead in these technologies, other countries will soon pass them unless they increase their R&D efforts. In addition to boosting research through the STO and DIANA, NATO can streamline the acquisition of commercial sector AI-focused technologies for national security purposes and create an alliance-wide process that acquires emerging technologies from the private sector. The rapidly changing nature of emerging technologies and the quantity and depth of innovation seen in the private sector require an acquisitions system that is not only fast but allows for the rapid integration of updated product iterations and innovations. Autocratic competitors excel in private and public sector integration, given the nature of their systems. Improving its ability to apply privately developed technology for military uses rapidly will ensure that NATO retains its competitive edge over its predominantly autocratic adversaries. Harnessing and Countering Emerging Disruptive Technologies While emerging and disruptive technologies (EDTs) touch all aspects of life and present exciting opportunities for the alliance, they also present threats. Many of NATO’s adversaries use EDTs against alliance personnel and infrastructure, such as recent cyberattacks targeting Polish politicians and the Colonial Pipeline. Enhancing its innovation processes will allow NATO to improve its military technology across all domains and boost its deterrence and defense capabilities. NATO could then better deter Russian and Chinese hybrid threats in cyber, space, electronic warfare, and information domains. For instance, NATO can use its forthcoming Cyber Command to take collective action and demonstrate cyberspace thresholds that will result in unified offensive cyber or conventional responses if crossed by its adversaries. By strengthening its cyber abilities and adding new capabilities, NATO can deter adversaries in the information space and take the offensive against them. NATO would then rob Russia and China of success in areas where they currently excel, and better protect the alliance’s people and infrastructure. Conventional Military Improvements NATO can also use its technological advancements to improve its conventional military capabilities. One critical area where NATO must focus is its integrated air and missile defense. Russian nuclear weapons can reach anywhere in Europe and NATO cannot adequately defend against new technologies like swarm warfare or hypersonic missiles. Two of NATO’s high-visibility modernization programs focus on combating air and missile threats, but NATO must do more to combat emerging and future adversary weapons. As the United States continues R&D on a Patriot missile system replacement, NATO countries could ingrate into its supply chain, like that of the F-35 aircraft, or develop complementary systems that fill gaps in the U.S. air defense system’s effectiveness. The current NATO Integrated Air and Missile Defense system uses mainly American-made radars and missiles stationed in NATO countries. While effective, NATO could harden its defenses by fielding European-developed systems that are compatible with current and future U.S. systems, thus expanding its anti-access area denial (A2/AD) bubble while simultaneously reducing air and missile threats. Furthermore, the alliance can conduct more combined military exercises to test new equipment and boost unit proficiency. Improving its deterrence and defenses in critical areas will reduce the military threats from NATO’s adversaries as they seek to sow division and destabilize the alliance. When it couples military advances with other areas of technological improvement, NATO gains the best chance of maintaining its competitive edge. NATO will still need to overcome bureaucratic hurdles across its 30-member alliance. As Nicholas Nelson of the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA) notes, for the DIANA and NIF “to succeed, they must address authority and budget concerns, and then bring in the right personnel to lead and staff them.” Even so, NATO is taking the proper steps to improve its scientific and technological capabilities. Its strategic documents reflect the importance it is placing in these areas. By creating new institutions, NATO is setting the foundation for further development and expanded capabilities. Given the threats that adversaries pose to the alliance, maintaining and improving its scientific and technological prowess will be vital to NATO’s future success. Strengthening these areas will boost military effectiveness, deterrence, and defense and enhance private and public cooperative advancements. It will ultimately give the alliance more strategic flexibility while improving NATO’s defenses in areas beyond the military, such as energy and cybersecurity in the private sector. By continuing to out-innovate its competitors, NATO will protect its people and infrastructure, and ensure that the alliance remains prepared to combat any challenges from Russia or China.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
CIVIL-MILITARY COUNTERPLAN › NEG › #

Public-private partnerships are key to emerging tech integration.

Nadja El Fertasi 06-22-2019 [El Fertasi has built a career path in NATO over the past seventeen years taking on a variety of posts in different fields within large multinational NATO institutions. She holds a Master’s degree in International relations from the University of Cambridge and is an alumna of the NATO-wide Executive Development Program, Information and Security, “Why Digital Ecosystems of Civil-Military Partnerships Are a Game Changer for International Security and Defence,” https://procon.bg/system/files/4202_elfertasi_digital_ecosystems.pdf//ZW]

Institutional Challenges Facing NATO NATO as an institution continues to face a myriad of challenges trying to adapt to a digital era. NCI Agency’s General Manager vision “NATO’s Digital Endeavour” goes a long way in articulating these challenges and implementing solutions through a phased approach and help bring NATO amongst the digital natives.16 Some core issues are still likely to hamper any progress if not addressed. First, if we look at a multinational security institution consisting of 29 member nations which have different interests and pace of technological innovation, the gap between the USA and its Allies in Europe is still prevalent.17 Change and progress will happen but is likely to be slower as large and traditional multinational security institutions are not driven by the same business models as corporate organizations in the private sector. Furthermore, digital transformation should be seen as a journey rather than an end state for it to be successfully implemented. Second, adopting an end-to-end approach in any digital endeavour requires partnerships and agreements between public and private sectors as ownership of digital assets are fragmented across the civil-military spectrum. Finally, the private sector, especially small and medium-sized enterprises and start-ups have a lot to offer in developing niche, cutting-edge, disruptive technology. Working with next-generation technology can bring information superiority for the defence sector to another level. Still, large institutions like NATO remain a black box for these industries to work with.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
1AR QPQ – AT: Turkey Cooperates Now

Turkey only agreed to let Sweden and Finland join NATO b/c they agreed to help Turkey fight terrorists, not because Turkey wanted to strengthen its relationship with NATO

Fazeli 22 Mahmoud Fazeli (Analyst of International Affairs), 07-2022, "Reasons of Turkey’s U-Turn to Admit Sweden & Finland Membership in NATO," Strategic Council on Foreign Relations (Iran), https://www.scfr.ir/en/strategic-perspective/note/144983/reasons-of-turkeys-u-turn-to-admit-sweden-finland-membership-in-nato/

Immediate demands of Turkey in order to show her green light for joining of Sweden and Finland to NATO were to “recognize YPK as a terrorist organization, putting an end to PKK/YPG activities, admitting the very same demand by Sweden and Finland, and if possible, to generalize the demand to NATO level, extradition of a number of terrorists whose names had already been given to the said countries and ultimately, lifting arms embargo of the said countries against Turkey”. From Turkey’s point of view, “NATO should end its rising opposition against Turkey, which has been increased with strengthening relations between the U.S. and Greece. Achieving a fair and just solution on militarized island of Aegean Sea, delivering of F-16 fighters to Turkey and considering security concerns of Turkey in its probable operations in Syria” should also be taken into consideration. While before leaving for Madrid to attend in NATO Summit meeting, Erdogan was not showing any willingness to lift his veto on admission of Sweden and Finland, but a few hours after his arrival to Madrid he confirmed the membership of the two countries. Turkey reminded the two countries of the conditions to be met. Only after taking promises from Sweden and Finland to assist fighting against Kurd groups, Erdogan accepted that the two countries become NATO members. Turkey’s measure to agree the membership of the two countries in NATO was a big surprise to all. With signing a trilateral agreement among Turkey, Sweden and Finland, Ankara dropped her opposition on the membership of the two Nordic countries in NATO, instead, Finland and Sweden will address to Turkey’s concerns in connection with terrorism. The two countries pledged not to assist YPD/YPG terrorist groups as well as Gulen. Likewise, there will be no arms embargo applied to Turkey, Sweden and Finland. Sweden promised to adjust its national stances concerning arms export to NATO allies. Article 9 is one of the important points of the agreement according to which a Permanent Joint Mechanism will be established to monitor the aforementioned issues. Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Justice Ministers as well as intelligent services will jointly be active in the said mechanism and will monitor their performance. Other NATO member countries as well as the EU members may also attend in the joint mechanism.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
2AC – AT: QPQ – No Leverage

Turkey doesn’t need the US’ security guarantees b/c they have Russian arms sales

Jones 21 Dorian Jones (Dorian Jones reports for VOA from Istanbul. He was worked for a variety of outlets including BBC Sky News, Deutsche Welle, and CBC), 5-17-2021, "Turkey to Go Ahead with Russian Weapons Purchases Despite US Objections," VOA, https://www.voanews.com/a/europe_turkey-go-ahead-russian-weapons-purchases-despite-us-objections/6205910.html

Turkey is threatening to go ahead with Russian military purchases despite warnings from Washington. The threat comes as the impasse between the NATO members deepens over Ankara's purchase of a Russian missile system. With Washington stepping up its pressure on Ankara to reverse its purchase of the Russian S 400 missile defense systems, Turkish defense minister Hulusi Akar this month defended its intentions, dismissing American concerns. This is not an offensive system, Akar said, adding, this system can't threaten anyone in any way where it is deployed. It is not a risk, threat, or danger to anyone, the official said. Washington says the S 400 missiles advanced radar poses a threat to NATO defense systems and calls for its removal. But Ankara has said it is considering purchasing more batches of the Russian missiles. One source close to the government says Turkey has already struck a deal with Moscow. Russian S-400 surface-to-air missile launchers take part in a second night of rehearsals for the WWII Victory Parade in Moscow on June 18, 2020. Last month, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken warned Turkey could face sanctions if it bought other Russian weaponry, including additional S 400 missile systems. Concerns over the S 400 have already resulted in Washington’s blocking Turkey from modernizing its aging combat aircraft with America's advanced F-35. But Turkish presidential advisor Mesut Casin warns Washington is forcing Turkey only further to deepen its military ties with Russia. "We need 200 combat aircraft. This is the reality on the table, but the US don't give the combat aircraft. And so you (the US) pressure (Turkey) to buy the Russian combat aircraft; we don't want to buy it," said Casin. "But if the US don't give the combat aircraft, we can buy the Russian combat aircraft, because we need the combat aircraft."

2022 Michigan Counterplan
2AC – AT: QPQ – No Leverage

Turkey has leverage over the US, not the other way around. Turkey also doesn’t solely rely on the US b/c they have Russia and Iran.

Erlanger 22 Steven Erlanger (Steven Erlanger is the chief diplomatic correspondent in Europe for The New York Times, a position he assumed in 2017), 7-20-2022, "Seeking ‘Axis of Good’ Against U.S., Russia Taps Allies of Convenience," New York Times, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/07/20/world/europe/russia-turkey-iran-axis.html

Seeking ‘Axis of Good’ Against U.S., Russia Taps Allies of Convenience A trilateral meeting of the leaders of Iran, Russia and Turkey seemed to suggest a new anti-American alliance. But there are major fissures between the countries, too. President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia, left; President Ebrahim Raisi of Iran, center; and President Recep Tayyip Erdogan of Turkey at the talks in Tehran on Tuesday. Sign up for the Russia-Ukraine War Briefing. Every evening, we'll send you a summary of the day's biggest news. Get it sent to your inbox. BRUSSELS — Commenting on the visit of Vladimir V. Putin to Iran, a member of the Russian Parliament and television talking head, Yevgeny G. Popov, said that the two countries hoped to form an “axis of good,” mocking former President George W. Bush’s description of Iran, Iraq and North Korea as an “axis of evil.” Trolling American foreign-policy blunders and rhetoric is a popular sport in Russia, from Mr. Putin, the president, on down, but the growing affection between Russia and Iran is that of two isolated, sanctions-stricken countries whose main connection is their active opposition to the United States, its allies and its domination of the multilateral world order. While the United States likes to wrap its alliances in grandiloquent words about shared values and democracy, Russia, Iran and China, Moscow’s other openly supportive pal and American rival, are far more transactional in their connections. But transactional relations do not make for lasting alliances or disguise the strains within them. “Russia is isolated on the global stage in a way it’s never been,” said Charles A. Kupchan, a former American official who is a professor at Georgetown University. “Putin is looking for recognition and acceptance wherever he can get it, and that he can get it in Tehran speaks volumes.” Even China, which has stood by its anti-American partnership with Russia, “has carefully kept its distance from the war in Ukraine,” Mr. Kupchan said. “And even though the lion’s share of the world’s countries aren’t enforcing the sanctions regime against Russia, they get it: that Russia’s invasion was a bald act of aggression.” Damage from a rocket strike in Sloviansk, Ukraine, on Tuesday. As the war grinds on, Turkey has created a vital role for itself as the mediator between Moscow and Kyiv. Neither Russia nor China has eager allies or much soft power, said Jeremy Shapiro, a former State Department official who is research director for the Berlin-based European Council on Foreign Relations. “No one really likes China, but everyone understands their power,” Mr. Shapiro said. “Russia is worse — they have the soft power of a drunken porcupine. But they have a lot of assets, too, including energy, and the will to use their military.” Most of the world just wants to stay out of what it sees as a superpower conflict being fought over Ukraine, said François Heisbourg, a French defense analyst with the Foundation for Strategic Research in Paris. If half the world’s population is staying publicly out of this war, half of that half is India and China, Mr. Heisbourg said, and the United States has been largely successful in keeping China from aiding Russia militarily in Ukraine and in not heavily pushing India, which is no friend of China’s and remains dependent on Russian arms. With Western sanctions having a “colossal” impact on Russia, in Mr. Putin’s own words, Moscow needs places to do business, especially as the sanctions bite harder over time. Iran, isolated by even tougher American economic sanctions over its nuclear program, is happy to do business with Russia, Mr. Kupchan said. Russia also needs more surveillance of the battleground in Ukraine, and Washington has revealed Moscow’s interest in buying both armed drones and observation drones from Tehran. Russia and Iran have a long and complicated history. Ties and trade improved after the collapse of the Soviet Union, which was the first country to recognize the Islamic Republic after the country’s 1979 revolution, though Moscow went on to back Iraq in the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s. In general, the two countries have had a mutual interest in pushing back American power in places such as Iraq, Syria and Afghanistan. Relations improved with the deterioration of Russia’s ties to the West and the steady imposition of sanctions on Russia after its annexation of Crimea in 2014. In 2021, mutual trade hit record levels, though at a relatively modest amount of about $3.5 billion. Hassan Rouhani, left, then the president of Iran, with Mr. Putin at a meeting in Russia in 2014. Moscow has been largely helpful in negotiations to restore the 2015 nuclear deal with Tehran. Hassan Rouhani, left, then the president of Iran, with Mr. Putin at a meeting in Russia in 2014. Moscow has been largely helpful in negotiations to restore the 2015 nuclear deal with Tehran.Credit...Pool photo by Alexey Nikolsky But there are important fissures, too. Russia does not share Iran’s enmity toward Israel and does not want Tehran to develop a nuclear weapon. Moscow has been largely helpful in negotiations to restore the 2015 nuclear deal between six world powers and Iran that former President Donald J. Trump abandoned in 2018, and that President Biden has been trying fitfully to resurrect. ADVERTISEMENT Continue reading the main story Mr. Biden and Israeli leaders repeated their promises last week to do everything necessary to prevent Iran from getting a nuclear bomb, including military action. And Russia has no interest in a Western military campaign against Iran, which becomes a real possibility if there is no renewed nuclear deal. Russia and Iran are also competing to sell their sanctioned and discounted oil to China and other countries. Though the quality of the crude is different in both countries, it is difficult to imagine them forming some sort of cartel to sell sanctioned oil, Mr. Shapiro said. On Syria, however, they are largely aligned in their longtime support of the regime of President Bashar al-Assad. And Syria was the stated focus of the summit in Tehran, which included the Turkish president, Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Image A joint Russian-Turkish patrol in northeastern Syria in 2020. Turkey has been seeking a green light from Iran and Russia to conduct a new military incursion against the Syrian Kurds. A joint Russian-Turkish patrol in northeastern Syria in 2020. Turkey has been seeking a green light from Iran and Russia to conduct a new military incursion against the Syrian Kurds.Credit...Delil Souleiman/Agence France-Presse — Getty Images Turkey has no interest in being part of any new axis or alliance with Russia or Iran. Instead, Ankara has very artfully managed a foreign policy that is diversified and open to all sides and that gives it considerable leverage with both Moscow and Washington. “Turkey is skillfully walking a middle path, signaling to the Americans that it won’t just be a compliant ally and do what we want, but they’re signaling the same thing to the Russians,” Mr. Shapiro said. Mr. Heisbourg agreed. “The Turks continue to play both sides against the middle and they are in a very strong position to do so,” he said. “It’s a highly profitable game politically, economically and strategically — but that excludes any new alliance.” Turkey has created a vital role for itself as the mediator between Russia and Ukraine — effectively the mediator between Washington, NATO and Russia. It has worked with all sides, including the United Nations, to try to get Ukrainian (and Russian) grain exports out through the Black Sea to the developing world. Mr. Erdogan has bought Russian antiaircraft missiles and has not joined Western sanctions against Russia, which has irked Washington. But Turkey remains a key NATO ally of the United States, signed a tough anti-Russian communiqué at the NATO summit in Madrid, has sold Ukraine weapons and drones that are helping to kill Russians, and has removed its block on the entry of Finland and Sweden into NATO, at least for now. Turkey’s mediation may bring even more benefits, Mr. Kupchan said. Mr. Erdogan has credibility and channels to both Moscow and Washington, as well as to Kyiv, and “if he can broker a deal to get Ukrainian grain flowing again, that might be the first step to pivot to diplomacy, a confidence-building measure that would require concessions by both Russia and Ukraine, but could be done under the rubric of humanitarian aid,” Mr. Kupchan said. Mr. Erdogan at talks in Istanbul in March between Ukrainian and Russian representatives during the early days of Moscow’s invasion. Mr. Erdogan at talks in Istanbul in March between Ukrainian and Russian representatives during the early days of Moscow’s invasion.Credit...Turkish Presidential Press Service, via Agence France-Presse — Getty Images What Turkey clearly wanted from this trilateral summit, however, was narrower — a green light to conduct a new military incursion into northern Syria against the Syrian Kurds, who Mr. Erdogan says are allies with the P.K.K., or Kurdistan Workers’ Party, which he and the West consider terrorists. Attacking the Kurds is popular in Turkey, even among Mr. Erdogan’s opposition, and is part of his effort to win re-election next year, Mr. Heisbourg said. And Syria is the only issue where the policies of all three countries intersect, even though their interests are different. Iran and Russia have been the firmest allies of Mr. Assad. But Turkey has backed armed groups fighting for his removal; has sent its troops into northern Syria; and has kept Syrian, Iranian and Russian troops from conquering Idlib Province, still mostly controlled by anti-Assad rebels. “With so much leverage, now is a great time for Erdogan to beat up on the Kurds,” Mr. Heisbourg said. While Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran’s supreme leader, warned Turkey against further attacks in Syria, Mr. Erdogan was unfazed. And it’s likely that Russia does not much care, so long as the Turkish intervention is limited to the north. More likely, Mr. Heisbourg suggested, Mr. Erdogan used the meeting in Tehran to inform Russia and Iran of his plans and to try to avoid unnecessary confrontation.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
2AC – AT: QPQ – No Leverage

NATO can’t afford to upset Turkey – they’re geostrategically important in the southern bloc and have Russia as an ally

Alkan 22 Abdulmelik Alkan (He is a doctoral researcher focusing on Foreign Policy Analysis, South Caucus, diaspora and ethnic minorities.), 6-28-2022, "A perspective on souring Turkey-NATO relationship," Politurco,

Turkey will not leave NATO, but press for its interests — expert Head of the Russian International Affairs Council Andrey Kortunov noted that without Turkey "NATO's southern flank will lose a lot, if not everything" MOSCOW, May 30. /TASS/. Turkey will continue to pursue an independent military policy, but will refrain from "challenging" the United States or quitting the North Atlantic alliance, the head of the Russian International Affairs Council, Andrey Kortunov, told TASS on Monday. "Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, while being a full-fledged member of the North Atlantic Alliance, pursues an independent, externally unrestrained military policy. The way I see it, he will continue like this this further on," Kortunov said. Erdogan "firmly defends his interests, for he is well aware that Turkey will not be expelled from NATO, while he will not leave on his own," the analyst said. At the same time, Kortunov predicts Ankara’s conflicts with NATO. "There will be harsh statements and threats from both sides, but I don't think it will come to Turkey's withdrawal or expulsion from NATO. It would cost both sides too much." Turkey’s interests Without Turkey, Kortunov explained, "NATO's southern flank will lose a lot, if not everything," since the country is the bloc’s leading member and its armed forces are inferior only to those of the US. For this reason, he continued, the Turkish leadership will be pressing for concessions from the US and EU countries, "but it will never challenge them." Erdogan has a whole list of complaints against the United States, Kortunov recalled. For instance, Turkey wants the lifting sanctions related to its purchase of Russia’s S-400 air defense systems and its return to the US F-35 fighter program. "There is as great deal to bargain about. Clearly, Erdogan will not get everything, but he will be able to get something in the end," he believes. The expert also suggested that the Turkish side might be able to defend its interests on the issue of Finland and Sweden joining NATO. For one, the Turkish leadership wants these countries to curtail their traditional support for the Kurdish opposition. "I think they will eventually come to an agreement. Here, concessions are expected not only from Stockholm, but also from Brussels," Kortunov explained. While commenting on the Turkish leader's contacts with Russian President Vladimir Putin, the expert noted: "In the alliance, no one would want Erdogan to play his own game with Moscow behind its back. But it be impossible to prevent it, so they will have to leave everything as it is." The analyst stressed that Turkey had long had a very special relationship with the North Atlantic Alliance and declared certain interests that often do not coincide with the stance of other NATO members. The Turkish leadership, Kortunov forecasts, will continue to pursue a policy that, in a sense, might violate the unity of the bloc. "However, in this regard, Erdogan will go as far as he will be allowed to," he stressed. "He will be declaring his special interests in Libya or the Eastern Mediterranean, he will put himself in opposition to some European countries, or position himself as a global advocate of Islam, but I don't think he will go to extremes."

2022 Michigan Evidence
Negative › Squo Solves – Hybrid Article V

Solves hybrid war

NATO, 6-30-2022, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the people from the topic, “2022 strategic concept” No Publication, https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2022/6/pdf/290622-strategic-concept.pdf//DG

We will invest in our ability to prepare for, deter, and defend against the coercive use of political, economic, energy, information and other hybrid tactics by states and nonstate actors. Hybrid operations against Allies could reach the level of armed attack and could lead the North Atlantic Council to invoke Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. We will continue to support our partners to counter hybrid challenges and seek to maximise synergies with other relevant actors, such as the European Union.

2022 Michigan Evidence
Negative › Squo Solves – Transatlantic Relations

Concepts reflects shared threat perceptions – China focus is a key sign of transatlantic alignment

Leah Scheunemann, 6-30-2022, Deputy director at the Transatlantic Security Initiative "Our experts decipher NATO’s new Strategic Concept," Atlantic Council https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/our-experts-decipher-natos-new-strategic-concept//DG

While not specified, it's clear that Russia is the primary "actor" outlined here. But of course, China has also engaged in hybrid warfare against NATO members through cyber attacks and espionage, economic coercion, and other means. Leaving the "actors" unnamed here provides NATO the space to consider how it will deal with any growing aggression from China in the longer term, which is a very welcome step forward for the Alliance. Importantly, this language reflects the rhetoric from the Biden administration, too, and is an important sign of alignment across the Atlantic. It is also in line with NATO's 2030 agenda, which recognizes the critical political role that NATO plays as a values-based organization.