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2022 Michigan Counterplan
Advantage CPs › BWC CP › Solvency extensions

The BWC effectively solves for Russia and China

Lynn C. Klotz, 11-15-2019, [(Klotz is Senior Science Fellow at the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation and a longtime member of the Scientists’ Working Group on Chemical and Biological Weapons.) "The Biological Weapons Convention protocol should be revisited," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, https://thebulletin.org/2019/11/the-biological-weapons-convention-protocol-should-be-revisited/]//MaizeDS

After its enactment in 1975, one criticism of the major international treaty banning biological weapons, the Biological Weapons Convention, was that it had no provisions to monitor whether countries were complying with it. Being, as it was, the middle of the Cold War, it was unlikely that the Soviet Union would allow international inspectors to visit its biodefense facilities. But as representatives from dozens of countries prepare to discuss the convention in Geneva this December, it would be worth their while to revisit a long-abandoned protocol that would address flaws in a treaty that some have even derided as a gentleman’s agreement. After the Soviet Union collapsed, countries sought to address this perceived weakness in the convention by pushing measures to enforce its terms by enacting a so-called protocol to the convention that provided procedures for randomly selected site visits and a rapid means to investigate weapons development, stockpiling, and use. But supporters of the proposal had their hopes dashed in 2001 when the United States pulled out of a UN ad hoc group tasked with drafting the protocol, meaning the proposed provisions never were enacted into international law. US officials were concerned that biological weapons development couldn’t be verified. Undeterred, protocol supporters held out hopes that under President Barack Obama the United States would change course. But Obama officials also refused to support the protocol–for the same reasons the previous Bush administration had cited in 2001: The legally binding additions to the convention would not achieve meaningful verification or greater security. This claim by both US presidential administrations about inability to verify misses the important point that the main goal of the protocol was transparency, not verification. But recent events serve to underscore that a protocol to the convention to address the treaty’s shortcomings is an idea that should be revisited. Unfounded Russian allegations about biological weapons development in former Soviet countries are threatening the effectiveness of the convention. This concern along with strong arguments for the high importance of transparency in international treaties calls for revisiting the protocol, which had provisions for both transparency and for dealing with allegations like Russia’s. The Russian allegations. Moscow made waves ahead of a meeting of countries in the convention in late 2018 when it alleged, without evidence, that former Soviet states harbor biological weapons laboratories. To paraphrase biosecurity researcher Filippa Lentzos: The unfounded allegations about biological weapons development carried with them dangerous consequences. Accusations like these could help sow distrust and political dissent that could even lead to a military response. They could also erode the convention by making countries more likely to develop their own biological weapons. A coalition of nongovernmental groups that work on issues related to the convention echoed these concerns in a joint statement in December, 2018. These are reasons enough to revisit the protocol. The main focus of Russia’s allegations was the biosafety-level-three laboratory built in the country of Georgia to research pathogens that cause serious human disease. Biosafety-level-three laboratories have many features designed to protect laboratory workers from infection and to reduce the probability of a release of pathogens into the surrounding community. In an attempt to dispel the Russian allegations, a group of international experts visited the Georgia facility. They concluded that it demonstrated significant transparency, and they saw nothing that would not be expected in a legitimate facility. It is surprising that Russia would take such a disruptive position and put the convention at risk. The Soviet Union was one of three countries leading support for the convention (depository states) and Russia had been active in and supportive of the protocol negotiations. But under President Vladimir Putin, the country’s position has changed; It may now be trying to undermine the convention. Two of the abandoned protocol’s major provisions were randomly selected transparency visits and investigations of alleged breaches. Had the protocol been enacted, these measures would have provided means to either deter or dispel unfounded accusations. During the intense debate 20 years ago over the protocol, it seems that no one argued, at least loudly, for its value as a tool to address allegations like Russia’s that undermine the convention’s effectiveness. The argument for the high importance of transparency lays the foundation for revisiting the protocol. In the United States, the pharmaceutical industry was adamantly against visits to their facilities, some of which manufactured antibiotics using proprietary strains of bacteria. Some in the industry felt that stealing a microbe was akin to stealing a whole factory’s operation. There were also concerns that visitors would demand to see rooms with proprietary manufacturing processes or that employees would inadvertently give out proprietary information. Furthermore, the industry was concerned about damage to its good-will from misunderstandings about the purpose of random transparency visits or from false accusations of bioweapons development. But as experience with the Chemical Weapons Convention shows, the concepts of managed access have eased some of industry’s concerns. There were US government concerns as well. Some officials argued that convention-sanctioned international teams visiting biodefense facilities posed a risk to classified information and materials, especially if the delegations included foreign intelligence agents. But the United States has already agreed to intrusive inspections under managed access for at least three other international treaties. John Bolton, appointed early in the George W. Bush administration as undersecretary of state for arms control, pulled the United States from the protocol and pressured the UN ad hoc group to abandon it as well. Even without this overt pressure, supporters of the protocol would have been hard-pressed to enact it without US support. The United States withdrew at a very late stage; the ad hoc group’s chairman’s text was completed and was ready to be submitted to the United Nations for potential approval. When Obama was elected in 2008, there was hope among protocol supporters that it would finally be enacted, especially since its sister treaty, the Chemical Weapons Convention, was enacted in 1997. This was a false hope. In 2009, Under Secretary of State Ellen Tauscher told a meeting of convention members that the Obama administration would not seek enactment of the protocol. The administration had “determined that a legally binding protocol would not achieve meaningful verification or greater security. It is extraordinarily difficult to verify compliance.” Subsequently, US Ambassador Laura Kennedy and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton made almost identical arguments about the inability to verify. The US government under Obama had become ensnared in the verification trap. Even though discovery of hidden offensive biological weapons activities is difficult, other aspects of compliance with the convention are verifiable. Unfortunately, the word “verification” leads people into drawing false parallels to nuclear arms control where weapons development is often possible to verify. Although it actually focused on transparency, the 2001 protocol was viewed by some as a verification mechanism, a misguided view that helped lead to its collapse. The word “verification” does not appear even once in the draft of the protocol and the word “transparency” appears perhaps a hundred times. The protocol collapsed in part due to this misunderstanding (or misrepresentation). As the Bioweapons Monitor eloquently argued in 2011, “Compliance with the (bioweapons) prohibition is about more than verifying the absence of biological weapons. Perhaps more importantly, it is also about verifying the peaceful nature of activities that could contribute to biological weapons development efforts.” The Monitor argued that political scientists and diplomats have consistently stressed that multilateral arms control regimes rely on transparency to be effective. Transparency serves to reassure countries that others are not conducting illicit work. “Excessive secrecy of activities in the biological field, particularly if carried out in military facilities, is likely to lead to misinterpretation and suspicion, and may result in a new biological arms race.” A revised protocol could help counter destabilizing efforts like those of Russia, whose unfounded allegations threatened to undermine confidence in the convention. By dramatically increasing transparency around biological work, a new protocol could bolster the broader convention and help stave off the potential for a biological weapons arms race.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Advantage CPs › BWC CP › A2: Russia and China won’t cooperate

Russia and China want the counterplan – means that they do not circumvent

Russian Embassy in China, 10-07-2021, ["Joint Statement by the Foreign Ministers of Russia and China on Strengthening the BWC," Foreign Policy and Political Cooperation, https://beijing.mid.ru/en/news/joint_statement_by_the_foreign_ministers_of_russia_and_china_on_strengthening_the_bwc/]//MaizeDS

The Russian Federation and China reaffirm their conviction that the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction (BWC) is essential as a pillar of the international peace and security, and their determination to safeguard the authority and effectiveness of the Convention. Today, as in 1975, its objective remains relevant: to rule completely out the possibility of biological agents being used as weapons. The Russian Federation and China reiterate the need that the BWC should be fully complied with and further strengthened, including through its institutionalization and the adoption of a legally binding protocol to the Convention with effective verification mechanism, as well as through regular consultations and cooperation in resolving any issues related to the implementation of the Convention. The Russian Federation and China emphasize that the BWC functions, including in what concerns the United Nations Security Council, should not be duplicated by other mechanisms. With a view to shaping a BWC mechanism of investigation of the alleged biological weapons incidents, they call on the BWC States Parties to develop operating standards for the mechanism, together with technical guidelines and procedures. The Russian Federation and China note with concern that over the past two decades the BWC States Parties, despite the wishes of the overwhelming majority, have failed to reach an agreement on resuming the multilateral negotiations on the Protocol to the Convention, suspended in 2001 when the United States unilaterally withdrew from this process despite the fact that the consensus was almost reached. Consequently, and also in the light of rapid advances in the field of science and technology with dual-use capabilities, the risk of biological agents being used as weapons has increased. In this context they emphasize that the United States’ and its allies’ overseas military biological activities (over 200 US biological laboratories are deployed outside its national territory, which function in opaque and non-transparent manner) cause serious concerns and questions among the international community over its compliance with the BWC. The two sides share the view that such activities pose serious risks for the national security of the Russian Federation and China, and are detrimental to the security of relevant regions. The Russian Federation and China further note that the United States’ and its allies’ military biological activities on their national territory also cause serious compliance concerns. Given the fact that the United States and its allies do not provide any meaningful information on those military biological activities that could allay concerns of the international community, the Russian Federation and China urge the United States and its allies to act in an open, transparent and responsible manner, by informing properly on its military biological activities carried out overseas and on their national territory, and supporting the resumption of negotiations on a legally binding protocol to the BWC with effective verification mechanism, so as to ensure their compliance with the BWC. In this context the Russian Federation and China note the importance of improved confidence-building measures under the Convention, inter alia, by including information on the overseas military biological activities by the BWC States Parties in the reporting form. The two sides believe that such declaration will be conducive to filling in the blank spots and fostering confidence among States Parties. The Russian Federation and China also call upon the BWC States Parties to continue joint efforts towards strengthening the Convention on a secure, legally binding basis. They welcome relevant initiatives. At the same time, they support ancillary measures to improve the current implementation of the Convention. The BWC institutional framework would be strengthened with the proposed mobile biomedical teams to render assistance in cases of biological weapons use, investigate such cases and help combat epidemics of various origins. This proposal represents a new approach to the improved BWC implementation at the international level, combining the principles of collective security and cooperation for peaceful purposes. The Russian Federation and China stress that the rapid development of science and technology in BWC-related areas call for greater attention of the BWC States Parties. There is a need to raise awareness of the risks associated with dual-use research and, simultaneously, promote the full use of the latest advances in biotechnology for peaceful purposes. In this context, the Russian Federation and China support the idea to establish a BWC scientific advisory committee to analyse scientific and technological advances relevant to the Convention and advise its States Parties accordingly. At the BWC Ninth Review Conference, the Russian Federation and China are prepared to consider any proposals capable of strengthening the Convention and improving its implementation in a non-discriminatory manner. They call upon all BWC States Parties to adopt a constructive approach to ensure that the decisions taken serve strengthening the BWC regime.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Advantage CPs › BWC CP › 1nc shell

Bioterrorism causes extinction

Nura A. Abboud, 9-21-2021, [(Nura A. Abboud is an environmental activist and Founder of the Jordanian Society for Microbial Biodiversity (JMB), the only NGO in the Middle East concerning the microbial biodiversity. Nura specializes in molecular biology, biological sciences, microbial biodiversity, genetic fingerprinting and medical technologies. Her vision is to establish an eco-research center in the astonishing desert south of Jordan. She has received several scholarships and awards including honorary doctorate in Environmental leadership.) "Catastrophic Impacts of Biological Warfare on Biodiversity," EcoMENA, /MaizeDS

Biological weapons are considered the most dangerous of all known weapons of mass destruction. They are used to deliberately cause epidemics among humans; destroy the environmental components, including water, air, and soil; and target crops and livestock. Examples of diseases used in biological warfare include anthrax, smallpox, plague, cholera, and avian flu. In addition to the catastrophic effects of biological warfare on the biodiversity and the environment, their danger lies in their low cost and rapid spread, as well as their easy preparation, transport, and use. Unlike nuclear and chemical bombs, biological bombs are without odor or color and therefore cannot be detected. Additionally, bioweapons are dangerous because of their effects on untargeted organisms in a military attack, and the clinical symptoms they create may be difficult to distinguish from normal diseases. Bioweapon pathogens remain in nature for several years and are able to survive in harsh environmental conditions. Bioweapons spread germs that contaminate air, food, water, and the environment, causing epidemiological diseases for different living organisms. Air: A wide variety of germs can contaminate air and are used in biological warfare. Fungi are the most common, and they travel by air over long distances to infect healthy plants. Food: Food contamination is also one of the most powerful methods used to carry out biological warfare attacks. Disease is transmitted either directly to humans through contaminated food or drink or indirectly by hosts. Water: Water can spread a number of lethal infectious agents as well. For example, one gram of Clostridium tetani poison is able to kill eight million people within six hours. Diseases are one of the main drivers of extinction in endangered species; therefore, disease control is fundamental to preserve biodiversity. Despite the presence of vaccines and drugs for most bioweapons, they may not be available in adequate quantities to cope with an epidemiological disease outbreak. Biological attacks pose a threat to naturally rare wild plants and animals and to species whose natural habitats have been degraded by human activities. Furthermore, diseases that humans, domestic animals, and domestic plants have been able to develop immunity to can be fatal in wild animals and plants. Bioweapons are not only having direct effects on the genetic biodiversity of indigenous species but also are having direct and indirect catastrophic effects on vital plant and animal communities. Conservation of livestock breeds is essential to maintaining genetic diversity, which in turn is vital to increasing the ability of living organisms to adapt to environmental changes. The danger of bioweapons regarding animal biodiversity is summarized in three main points: 1. The direct impact of diseases on wild species Some deadly diseases in humans or domestic animals can infect wild animals. For instance, an epidemic destructive impact on endangered species is reflected in the effects of Canine distemper, a natural viral disease that infects wild dogs and wild animals belonging to the same group. Canine distemper was also developed in bioweapon laboratories. Over the past decade, the spread of this disease has resulted in habitat loss and in the extinction of a large number of wild species in North America. Additionally, it led to the elimination of about one-third of the lion population in Tanzania and had serious impacts on the endangered leopard population. 2. Invasive species The history of rinderpest in Africa provides a model for predicting the potential effects of lethal diseases on wild species and livestock. In 1887, European colonial armies introduced the rinderpest virus to Africa through imported cattle, which led to a rinderpest outbreak among domestic cattle breeds and wild species, killing an estimated 90–95% of African cattle and buffaloes within three years. To control the epidemic, African herds and buffaloes have been destroyed in most parts of Africa. Despite efforts to combat rinderpest over the past century, the disease is still strong, and its outbreak in the region occurs frequently. 3. Elimination of animal species, hosts, and vectors Threatened species may be destroyed in areas that have been subjected to biological attacks with the aim of eradicating the disease. For example, in the United States, programs to control brucellosis in livestock have resulted in killing large numbers of wild animals, including the Bison and the white tailed deer. Microbes can be used in crop destruction. For instance, “Rice blast” is a disease affecting rice and therefore leads to crop destruction and genetic changes in the plant. The discussion about controlling destructive bioweapons is growing, as they pose a vast danger to both humanity and the environment alike. Any failure to prevent biological attacks can lead to the deterioration of genetic diversity in animals and plants, the extinction of endangered species, and the destruction of human livelihoods and traditional cultures. Biotechnology has increased the economical value of genetic diversity of living organisms; hence, it has increased the risk of eliminating genetic diversity through the use of GMO bioweapons. Most of all, the environment will be the silent victim of this war. It is not easy to put an end to the biological arms race, so global efforts must be consolidated to combat these threats. Countries must strengthen their ability to detect early attacks. Biologists and economists need to communicate with decision makers to convince them of the importance of developing defense systems to face bioweapons and limit their environmental and socioeconomical effects. Certainly, it is necessary to raise awareness regarding the dangers of biological warfare. Interdisciplinary and international efforts are required to increase the surveillance, monitoring, and identification of pathogens and to better understand the dynamics of disease transmission within human, plant, and animal populations. This will greatly enhance our ability to combat the effects of bioweapons and emerging diseases on biodiversity.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Advantage CPs › BWC CP › 1nc shell

The counterplan solves the aff, enforces international follow on, and restores BWC legitimacy, which is key to stop bioterrorism.

Braden Leach, 10-1-2021, [(Braden Leach is a J.D. Candidate at the University of California, Berkeley, School of Law) "Necessary Measures: Synthetic Biology & the Biological Weapons Convention.: EBSCOhost," Stanford Technology Law Review, p. 149-153,

The obligations created under the BWC are broad, prophylactic, and forward-looking.

B. The Biological Weapons Act Of 1989

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Advantage CPs › Smart Grids › 2NC – Smart Grids

Smart grids prevent large scale blackouts – preventative technology and real time blackout isolation solve for all impacts

Volodarsky 21 [Now., 2-11-2021, "The Smart Grid, A Smart Investment," Risk Management and Decision Processes Center, https://riskcenter.wharton.upenn.edu/lab-notes/smartgrid/, smarx, HHW]

How does one tree create a dip in America’s GDP? It falls on a transmission line, causing a 2-day blackout for 50 million people. The 2003 East Coast Blackout cost America approximately $6.4 billion. But that was 17 years ago—one would assume the US would have improved its electrical grid by now.

According to data provided by the Department of Energy, that is not the case. The number of major outages in the US nearly tripled from 2003 to 2018. America has the highest number of outage minutes of any developed nation, totaling around 6 hours annually. US outages are getting longer too. The average US power outage is 120 minutes and increasing, while the average outage of other developed nations is approximately 20 minutes and decreasing. This is unsurprising considering 70% of American transmission lines and transformers are 25 years old, and the average age of US power plants is 36 years old.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Advantage CPs › China Aggression › 2NC – China Aggression – CP

The US will aid the development of Taiwan’s asymmetrical weapon arsenal – necessary for deterring Chinese invasion

Reuters 22 [Reuters, 7-15-2022, "U.S. approves possible sale of military assistance to Taiwan," https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/us-approves-possible-sale-military-assistance-taiwan-2022-07-15/, smarx, HHW]

WASHINGTON, July 15 (Reuters) - The U.S. State Department has approved the potential sale of military technical assistance to Taiwan worth an estimated $108 million, the Pentagon said on Friday.

China has never renounced the use of force to bring Taiwan under its control, and the democratically governed island has complained of increased military pressure from Beijing to try and force it to accept its sovereignty.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Advantage CPs › China Aggression › 2NC – China Aggression – CP

Failure to deter Chinese aggression through development of asymmetrical weapons and adoption of the territorial defense force causes conflict which escalates to nukes – extinction

Tim Mcnulty 6-30 [Tim Mcnulty, 6-30-2022, "'Risk of nuclear war very high!' China clash risk ramps up as NATO slams 'hybrid threat' ," Express.co.uk, https://www.express.co.uk/news/world/1633246/China-latest-US-conflict-east-Asia-nuclear-war-south-china-sea-Taiwan-invasion-NATO-vn, smarx, HHW]

Western leaders have been warned pushing back on China's ambitions in the South China Sea could quickly escalate tensions into an all-out nuclear war. Australia National University Emeritus Professor of Strategic Studies Professor Hugh White has spoken of a return to the Cold War with the "risk of nuclear war very high."

Professor White told Sky News Australia: "We have to be realistic that we're looking at the Asia end of this global contest we do face in China, an exceptionally powerful and exceptionally determined country.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Advantage CPs › China Aggression › 2NC – China Aggression – CP

Taiwan needs development of asymmetrical weapons and a territorial defense force to counter China’s impending invasion

Meera Suresh 7-20 [Meera Suresh, 7-20-2022, "'Not Fighter Jets And Tanks': Taiwan's Ex Defense Chief Says Island Needs Cheaper, Asymmetric Weapons," International Business Times, https://www.ibtimes.com/not-fighter-jets-tanks-taiwans-ex-defense-chief-says-island-needs-cheaper-asymmetric-3580128, smarx, HHW]

Taiwan's former defense chief has said that the self-ruled island's military urgently needs cheap and asymmetric weapons if it has to counter Beijing's greater firepower.

Lee Hsi-min, a retired admiral and former chief of general staff of Taiwan's armed forces, told Nikkei Asia in an exclusive interview that Taiwan is facing an "existential threat" posed by an increasingly aggressive China.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Advantage CPs › China Aggression › 1NC – China Aggression - CP

Developing asymmetrical weapons and the overall defense concept deters China – it’s key to stopping nuclear escalation

Iain Marlow 7-13 [Iain Marlow, 7-13-2022, "Ukraine’s] Moves Against Russia Show Taiwan ‘Asymmetric’ Weapons Work, US Official Says," Bloomberg, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-07-13/ukraine-shows-taiwan-asymmetric-weapons-work-us-diplomat-says#xj4y7vzkg, smarx, HHW]

Ukraine’s countermoves against Russia’s larger military shows Taiwan that possessing advanced “asymmetric” weapons and a determination to resist invasion by a larger neighbor can be a successful combination, according to a senior US State Department official.

“One of the things that everyone is thinking about when it comes to Taiwan, and I think a lesson learned from this war, is that asymmetric works,” Jessica Lewis, assistant secretary of state for political-military affairs, said Wednesday at a Center for International and Strategic Studies event on US security assistance to Ukraine.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Advantage CPs › Russian Aggression › 2NC – China

Heavier sanctions now deter Russia from further attack AND other deter China from initiating attack in the future

Hufbauer 22 [PIIE, 3-16-2022, "How effective are sanctions against Russia?," https://www.piie.com/blogs/realtime-economic-issues-watch/how-effective-are-sanctions-against-russia, smarx, HHW]

Sanctions against Russia for invading Ukraine are the most comprehensive imposed against a major power since the Second World War. But are they effective? They plainly have not deterred Russia from making war. But answering that question in a comprehensive way requires the distinction among four stages of effectiveness, including whether they prevent something bad from happening. The classic objectives of economic sanctions can be grouped similarly to the objectives of criminal justice: do they deter bad behavior, but also can they be enforced, are their punishments effective, and do they lead to changed behavior by the targeted countries? Deterrence, enforcement, punishment, and rehabilitation are classic objectives of criminal justice, and they apply equally to economic sanctions.

Although deterrence clearly failed to stop Russia's aggression, the sanctions imposed after the Russian invasion of Ukraine could still deter other countries like China from undermining the sanctions. The sanctions may also deter China from carrying out its own aggressive acts against Taiwan. As for effectiveness, the sanctions have proven among the most powerful in modern history, largely because so many countries have gone along with them. The punishment to the Russian economy, and to rich and poor Russians individually, has also been extraordinarily severe. But nearly three weeks after Russia invaded Ukraine, there is not the slightest evidence that Moscow will change course and "rehabilitate" itself in the eyes of the West.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Advantage CPs › Russian Aggression › 2NC – Russian Aggression – CP

Further Russian aggression leads to US draw in which goes nuclear – extinction. Only banning Russia from SWIFT creates deterrence from further invasion

Aljazeera 7-21 [No Author, 7-21-2022, "Ukraine war must end to prevent nuclear ‘abyss’: Lukashenko," No Publication, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/7/21/ukraine-war-must-end-to-prevent-nuclear-war-abyss-lukashenko, smarx, HHW]

“Let’s stop and then we will figure out how to go on living … There’s no need to go further. Further lies the abyss of nuclear war. There’s no need to go there.”

Russian officials have said Moscow would only authorise the use of nuclear weapons in the event it was confronted with an “existential threat”.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Advantage CPs › Russian Aggression › 2NC – Russian Aggression – CP

The complete ban of Russia from SWIFT would decimate the economy of Russia and deter it from further aggression.

Nicholas Comfort 6-3 [Nicholas Comfort, 6-3-2022, "Analysis," Washington Post, https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/why-swift-ban-is-such-a-potent-sanction-on-russia/2022/06/03/a6809b30-e340-11ec-ae64-6b23e5155b62_story.html, smarx, HHW]

One sanction that Western allies were hesitant to impose on Russia -- for fear of blowback to their own economies -- was called a “financial nuclear weapon” by France’s finance minister. That sanction is cutting off banks from SWIFT, the messaging system used by financial institutions globally to convey instructions to carry out tens of millions of transactions each day. Most major Russian banks did end up being cut off, underscoring Russia’s isolation as a global pariah and prompting its government to try to steer business with its remaining friends to its own, much smaller version of SWIFT. China, too, has been trying to develop a SWIFT alternative as part of its campaign to decrease its dependence on the Western financial system and use of the dollar.

1. What is SWIFT?

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Advantage CPs › Russian Aggression › 1NC – Russian Aggression - CP

Deterring Russia from further invasion is key – completely removing them from SWIFT sets a precedent that shocks their economy

Charles Riley 22 [Charles Riley, Cnn Business, 1-27-2022, "What is SWIFT and why it might be the weapon Russia fears most," CNN, https://www.cnn.com/2022/01/26/investing/swift-russia-ukraine/index.html, smarx, HHW]

As Western governments threaten Russia with a package of unprecedented sanctions aimed at deterring President Vladimir Putin from ordering an invasion of Ukraine, there's one measure in particular that appears to strike fear at the heart of the Kremlin: cutting the country off from the global banking system.

US lawmakers have suggested in recent weeks that Russia could be removed from SWIFT, a high security network that connect thousands of financial institutions around the world.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Advantage CPs › Info war

Planks 2,3 and 4 solve 2nd adv

[Freedom House No date "Policy Recommendations: Strengthening Democracy", https://freedomhouse.org/policy-recommendations/strengthening-democracy-abroad// KS]

Recommendations for Democracies Democracies should work to support their core principles at home and around the world. The following recommendations are intended to provide a framework for democratic countries as they pursue this goal. Strengthen and protect core values Respect, protect, and fulfill human rights at home. Attacks by elected leaders on democratic institutions—including the press, an independent judiciary, and anti-corruption agencies—and on the rights of minorities and migrants undermine faith in democracy around the world. Democratic leaders should demonstrate respect for fundamental norms at home by adhering to domestic legislation in line with international human rights laws and standards, and refraining from rhetoric that undermines these standards. Strengthen public support for democratic principles by investing in civic education. To protect freedom domestically and build support for a foreign policy that protects democratic rights and values abroad, it is essential to foster a stronger public understanding of democratic principles, especially among young people. In the United States, new legislation could require each state to develop basic content and benchmarks of achievement for civic education, including instruction on the fundamental tenets of US democracy. In the absence of new legislation, the US Department of Education should, to the extent possible, make funding available to states for civic education that focuses on democratic principles. Guard against manipulation by authoritarian actors Increase transparency requirements for foreign state-owned propaganda outlets operating in democratic states. Outlets like Russia’s RT and China’s CGTN spread government-approved narratives without clearly disclosing that they are government financed. Measures to improve transparency could include reporting requirements for media outlets’ spending on paid advertorials (advertisements designed to resemble an independent, objective news article), ownership structures, and other economic ties to repressive state actors. Require social media companies to report foreign efforts to spread online disinformation and propaganda. Social media companies should be required to report regularly to target governments on efforts by foreign governments and nonstate actors to manipulate public opinion and undercut democratic values by spreading disinformation and propaganda on their platforms. In the United States, the government should assess which entities would be the most appropriate to receive these reports, since this information is of interest across jurisdictions, including to intelligence agencies, Congress, the US State Department’s Global Engagement Center, the Securities and Exchange Commission, and the Department of Justice. The US government should carefully decide on the types and sizes of social media companies required to comply, the data they must submit, and appropriate penalties for noncompliance. The entity receiving the information should report findings regularly to the public and make the data publicly available, while ensuring the protection of users’ privacy. Address the use of bots on social media. Bots (automated accounts pretending to be real people) can be used to distort the online media environment by rapidly spreading false information, fomenting discord, and drowning out independent reporting and factual information. Democracies should address the use of bots in social media manipulation. In the United States, the proposed Bot Disclosure and Accountability Act (S. 2125) would authorize the Federal Trade Commission to require the conspicuous and public disclosure of bots intended to replicate human activity. Preventing election interference. Efforts should include protecting elections from cyberattacks through the use of paper ballots and election audits, and improving transparency and oversight of online political advertisements. In the United States, Congress should pass and the president should sign the Honest Ads Act (S. 1356/H.R. 2592), which would modernize existing laws by applying disclosure requirements to online political advertising. Strengthening laws that guard against foreign influence over government officials. Legislative proposals requiring greater transparency about officials’ personal finances and campaign donations, more rigorous standards for the disclosure of conflicts of interest, and the establishment of a clear code of conduct for engagement with foreign officials can help insulate governments from foreign attempts to subvert democratic institutions. In the United States, this could include passing legislation to enforce the principles of the constitution’s foreign emoluments clause, closing loopholes in rules on reporting foreign influence, and modernizing financial disclosure requirements for elected officials. Preventing corrupt foreign officials from laundering stolen assets through democracies. Corrupt actors steal more than $3 trillion annually from their home countries, the effects of which undermine institutions critical to democracy and harm economic growth in these countries. Stolen funds are routinely funneled through international financial markets, laundered via seemingly legitimate purchases in democratic nations. These practices pose a risk to the reputations of companies unwittingly involved and to financial markets overall. Democracies should strengthen transparency laws to ensure that accurate identifying information about purchasers and their funding sources is available. Governments should ensure robust enforcement of laws and investigate and prosecute violators when necessary.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Advantage CPs › Info war

Polarization caused by inequality- cp key to unify Europe

Karl Aiginger, "Populism: Root Causes, Power Grabbing and Counter Strategy", Intereconomics, https://www.intereconomics.eu/contents/year/2020/number/1/article/populism-root-causes-power-grabbing-and-counter-strategy.html// KS]

A strategy for overcoming populism in four steps To stop support for populists and put an end to their power is no easy task. The root problems, which had empowered the populists, have not vanished, and the incapacity of former mainstream parties to solve problems has not been forgotten. Support for populists eventually fades if the economic situation worsens – as the electoral results in main cities in Turkey and Hungary show. However, if there is no candidate presenting an alternative or opposition is divided, the return to liberal democracy is difficult, given the new majority rules and suppression of the media. A four-stage procedure is needed. The first step is to correct the wrong framing on which today’s populism is based. It is the pessimistic interpretation that life has become bad, the economy is approaching a collapse, and moral and social relations are worse than in some golden era. In fact, in most countries and regions, living conditions were not dismal at the time the populists came to power. Incomes were higher than those of the previous generation, there was a greater ability to choose education, training and location. The best proof that an overly pessimistic story is incorrect is perhaps rising life expectancy: it increases by three years for each decade after we were born, and it is largely a healthy life expectancy that includes the ability to work, travel and seek a partner up to an age that had previously been unimaginable. In rebalancing the framework it has to be acknowledged, that not everything is positive for everyone and the potential for improvement is great. Inequality can be decreased, employment made fairer with less burnout, and leisure choices can increase. It must be made clear that these improvements will never happen through protectionism, and that past jobs and family structures will not return. Furthermore, it needs to be stressed that heterogeneity is not negative and animosity towards outsiders or foreigners does not solve problems. Redrawing the picture without whitewashing must be the starting point of a new policy. The second step is to develop a vision outlining where the country or region wants to be in the medium-term future, for example by 2030. This includes which jobs can be created, which specialisations by industry are feasible and advantageous, and which abilities and education levels for the young can be attained. The vision should specify which public services are to be provided and how living conditions can be improved. Performance should be judged based on sustainable development goals. The vision should be ambitious but within reach, shared by citizens and developed jointly with experts and political parties. The third step is to define game-changing instruments and find partners in the process of change. Changing tax systems are all-important as they can make environmental exploitation costly while supporting a circular economy and innovation. Lifelong learning and retraining should be further promoted. The strategy should be discussed and fine-tuned in a dialogue with citizens, NGOs, reform-minded trade unions and representatives of new firms. Moreover, the skills of migrants should be utilised and their children integrated. The increase in spatial divergence has to be stopped. The flocking to urban centres should be curtailed through teleworking and teleconferencing. Buying ever bigger cars fuelled by gasoline or diesel should be discouraged through better public transport, incentives for electric cars and car sharing, and the renting of unused houses should replace urban sprawl. Finally, a new strategy requires a narrative that emotionalises and unites Europe. Europe’s old peace narrative no longer moves its citizens, though each and every day we see that peace is not a guarantee. Since Europe is a small geographical region and Europe’s share of the world population is proportional in size, this must be a narrative based on quality, innovation and partnership. A probable new narrative could be that Europe is trying to make globalisation responsible, taking the lead in fighting climate change and offering a larger variety. It can further aspire to the lowest inequality for its citizens, encouraging the extension of this European way of life. Change is around the corner Fighting populism is a necessity. Populism reduces life opportunities, promising a return to non-existent past glory. It leads to lower income and higher expenditures for people unable to find jobs and a self-determined life. It increases the probability of conflict with neighbours. Under populism, government expenditures for policy, border control, environmental degradation and health problems must increase significantly, and this in turn leads to higher taxes and debt. It has multiple roots which must be addressed, but there exist numerous better solutions for these problems if they are discussed with citizens. While support for populism seems to have peaked, an active policy is still needed to ensure its continued decline. Fortunately, the new president of the European Commission and her team are addressing these problems, with the support of new leaders at the IMF, the UN and the ECB. Economists seem to have partly descended from their ivory tower to include societal and environmental problems in their agenda, with GDP substituted by Sustainable Development Goals. New interdisciplinary think tanks are on the rise, and these are connected to international networks stimulating discussion. Young people are more interested than ever in the future of the planet and infecting their parents and teachers with their concerns. New political parties are being created on a basis other than that of the old socialist-vs-conservative divide, and governments are becoming greener, more liberal and more attentive to future opportunities opportunities and partnerships with neighbours in the East and in the South.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Advantage CPs › China Tech Coop › AT: Say No

China says yes

Evelyn Cheng 10-30-20 Evelyn Cheng is CNBC.com’s Beijing correspondent, covering China’s economy and financial markets. [China talks up a future in which it needs collaboration with the U.S. and other countries, ] // DHS WAgustin 🗿

BEIJING — As Chinese authorities prepare to build up their country in the next several years, they’re keen to ensure the rest of the world will still do business with them. In a high-level press conference Friday, central government officials emphasized the need for other countries to collaborate with China, amid rising global uncertainty from the coronavirus pandemic and protectionism. The media event comes as China’s top leadership conclude an important policy meeting aimed at setting the country’s economic and social priorities for the next five years. The officials particularly pushed back against “decoupling,” or a complete separation of the U.S. and Chinese economies that President Donald Trump’s administration has advocated, beginning with technology. Chinese telecommunications giant by U.S. restrictions in the last two years. “Decoupling is basically not realistic, and there’s no benefit for China or the U.S., or the entire world,” said Han Wenxiu, deputy director at the Office of the Central Commission for Financial and Economic Affairs. That’s according to a CNBC translation of his Mandarin-language remarks. “Those who want decoupling are few. Those who want collaboration are far more,” Han said, noting that the U.S. and China are only able to be the world’s two largest economies since they complement each other and operate in an open global environment. President Xi is bracing for a ‘combative’ period ahead with China’s five-year plan The U.S. is China’s largest trade partner, but the two countries have been locked in tensions for more than two years. Each government has levied tariffs on goods worth hundreds of billions of dollars from the other country. Critics say the dominance of the state in China’s economy gives it unfair advantages over American companies and other foreign businesses. Economists expect China to become the world’s largest economy in the next few years, surpassing the U.S. In an effort to reduce economic dependency on debt-fueled investment and manufacturing of goods for export, China has been trying to increase its reliance on domestic consumption. Foreign trade still accounts for about 30% of China’s gross domestic product, according to Han, who noted a decline from 60% previously. “Looking ahead, China’s imports and exports, use of foreign capital, and scale of investment overseas will expand, and international status will rise,” he said. “This is also an important characteristic of a large country’s economy.” ‘Self-reliance’ in technology Han and four other central government officials were speaking a day after the on a also known as the 14th Five-Year Plan. This week’s meeting of the central committee of China’s ruling Communist Party also addressed goals for the year 2035. The meeting emphasized China’s need to pursue “self-reliance” in technology as a strategy for national development, according to The country has been accelerating its own development of critical technologies such as semiconductors and a Again, while describing China’s need to pursue a new phase of development, officials were quick to point out how the country needed to learn from international expertise. “China’s technological innovation has never been closed innovation, and in the future it will not close its doors to innovate on its own,” Science and Technology Minister Wang Zhigang said during Friday’s press conference, according to a CNBC translation of his Mandarin-language remarks. Aim to build a ‘modern’ society In the release about goals for 2035, China’s leaders said they would focus on building a “modern socialist China“ that includes modernization of national defense and the military. The emphasis on “modern” comes after the ruling party said Thursday it will basically achieve its promise of building a “ by next year, when the Chinese Communist Party celebrates its 100th anniversary. The release also said that Beijing expects GDP to top 100 trillion yuan (about $14.9 trillion) this year, which would imply an increase of at least 0.9% from 2019′s level. Longer term, authorities said China aims to become “a strong country in culture, education, talent, sports and health.”

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Advantage CPs › China Tech Coop › Solvency – China

Plank solves. Disables chances of a great power war and spurs innovation with China

Xiaoli Jin 3-12-20 Xiaoli Jin is an associate at Keystone Strategy. She is a prospective member of Harvard Law School’s Class of 2024. She has previously been published in YaleGlobal. [The Challenge and Necessity of US-China Technology Cooperation, ] // DHS WAgustin 🐒

With rising frictions between the United States and China in the field of science and technology, few may still remember the great accomplishments achieved when the United States and China cooperated in the field of technology over the past 40 years. During the rapprochement in the 1970s, cooperation in technology spanned over fields like energy, health, basic research in physics and chemistry, and civil industrial technology, among others that could easily be considered sensitive areas by current standards. Academic exchanges also thrived: the U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology has hosted thousands of Chinese scientists since the 1980s. The U.S. National Science Foundation also to conduct scientific research in China. Yet in recent years, this collaborative ethos has been increasingly replaced by mistrust. The U.S. to stop purchasing 5G infrastructure and equipment from China’s technology crown jewel, Huawei. Renowned scholars were for involvement in technological research sponsored by the other nation’s government. Some people may view the deterioration of the U.S.-China technology exchange simply as a trade-off between national security and innovation. However, the contesting philosophies of technological protectionism and globalism is the more fundamental issue at play. This paper discusses the past, present, and future of US-China technology cooperation in three dimensions. 1.) Why has technological cooperation deteriorated? 2.) How is reviving cooperation beneficial to both countries? 3.) Is it possible to restore trust against the backdrop of U.S.-China competition? Why has U.S.-China cooperation in technology deteriorated? The reasons for deterioration lie in the rapid development of technology in both countries. On the one hand, China’s technological capacity has been advancing rapidly. Harvard Economics Professor Richard Freeman 36 percent of global scientific articles in 2016 and 37 percent of citations to scientific articles in 2013, which is two times more than China’s share of global population or GDP. The time to turn research into commercial applications has also shortened. In November 2019, China had already 5G services in 50 cities. The companies that run 5G services are none other but China’s three state-run telecom giants--China Mobile, China Telecom, and China Unicom--reinforcing the United States’ concerns that Chinese government is closely involved in China’s cutting-edge technologies. On the other hand, technology has also developed by leaps and bounds in the United States. In the past, only a few high-stake, dual-use technologies would spark national security concerns. In addition, these technologies often had military applications. Yet as technological applications proliferated and interfaced pervasively with people’s everyday lives, even dating applications can now collect personal data that warrants regulators’ concerns. Increasingly, the United States finds itself vulnerable in many new technological fields that were not formerly considered sensitive. Most fundamentally, U.S.-China technology cooperation has shifted from unilateral to bilateral. In the past, the U.S. was typically the provider of capital and technological know-how while China was the receiver. For the United States, technological assistance to China was partly an exercise in . Since the U.S. surpassed China in technological capacity by a wide margin, exchanging technology assets for diplomatic objectives made political sense for the United States. Moreover, in the past, U.S.-China technological cooperation was often rolled out in formal settings. Cooperation usually took place between government agencies or government-affiliated research institutions, which enabled the U.S. to control the extent of the technological knowledge that was transferred to China. In recent years, however, China has started exporting capital and talent to the United States as well. Chinese technology giants Alibaba and Baidu established Artificial Intelligence research labs in California, where they collaborated with U.S. scholars and institutions. Chinese companies poured capital into U.S. technology companies. In the first quarter of 2014 alone, Chinese investors struck worth over six billion dollars, including the takeovers of Motorola Mobility and IBM’s x86 server unit. With the rise of Chinese talent and capital, the exchange of technological know-how between the United States and China now takes place among private businesses and between individuals: an exchange that is impossible for the United States to fully control. The changing nature of technological cooperation has made both countries reconsider the political costs and benefits. Meanwhile, as nationalist sentiments rise on a global scale, technology has become a convenient medium to strike a political point. Hence, it comes as no surprise that backlash against U.S.-China technological cooperation gradually comes to the mainstream. Technological protectionism has temporarily prevailed against technological globalism. Why is reviving technological cooperation beneficial to both United States and China? The United States and China should not let technological protectionism persist, as cooperation has proven valuable to both sides. These benefits are evident whether cooperation is organized through government-sponsored programs or through private companies and individuals. The (CERC) is a quintessential example of the value of technology cooperation through government-sponsored programs. Initiated at the presidential level in 2009, CERC aims to achieve a large-scale adoption of energy efficient buildings backed up by cutting-edge technologies. Through the collective effort of and researchers in the United States and China, CERC has launched high-tech products including daylight redirecting windows, trilogy integrated heat pumps and co-axial ground heat exchangers that are reported to consume 14 to 30 percent less energy than conventional products. In addition, CERC also published multiple copyrighted software applications and are on the path to file joint intellectual properties on behalf of research teams from both countries. CERC is just one example of the vast potential that U.S.-China cooperation can unleash, especially in fields that concern both countries. As acknowledged in a , the U.S. gained research access to important facilities in China and communicated with China’s leading scientists through various scientific initiatives. Needless to say, China also obtained a great amount of technological experience and know-how by collaborating with the United States. The two countries have only more to gain when their technology cooperation is carried out on a business-to-business or individual-to-individual level. The U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics a need for approximately one million more Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics (STEM) professionals than the U.S. currently produces to retain its own preeminence in technology. And over the years, China has consistently been the leading source of STEM students enrolled in the United States. Moreover, surveys of U.S. National Science Foundation 90 percent of Chinese scholars still work in the U.S. ten years after receiving their doctoral degrees in STEM. These scholars power innovation in Silicon Valley, expediting the creation of technological applications that benefit millions of people in the United States. The benefit of cooperating with the United States on a business-to-business or individual-to-individual level is also obvious for China. For instance, through joint ventures, medical companies in the United States have brought innovative treatments to China’s vast healthcare market that cover a wide array of complex diseases like influenza, diabetes, and hypertension. How do we restore trust in technology cooperation against the backdrop of U.S.-China competition? Restoring U.S.-China technological cooperation will benefit the people of both countries. As the U.S.-China relationship is currently characterized by tension and mistrust, leaders in each country need to firmly express their determination to restore cooperation with their counterpart. They must co-develop strategic solutions to achieve this shared goal. First, the U.S. and China need to identify common interests, search for shared problems, and capitalize on existing relationships in those areas. For example, as Professor Lan Xue at Tsinghua University and Denis Simon at Arizona State University , the Integrated Gas-steam Combined Cycle field could be a potential opportunity to expand ties between the two countries. In this field, China appears to have the strongest technology in coal-gas transformation, while the United States ranks first in the world in steam turbine technology. The two countries could share their technological advantages to achieve a win-win outcome. Second, the U.S. and China need to enhance bilateral agreements that address pressing issues like intellectual property protection. Such agreements should contain clear protocols that guide the handling of sensitive data, specify the process of transferring technical knowledge, and establish corresponding auditing procedures. In addition, each country needs to do its part to address the other party’s core concerns. As scholars from the Asia Society , China has to further unleash its private sector and give businesses more freedom to make investment decisions that are unconstrained by the government. If China is willing to take bold steps to empower its private enterprises, the United States will be less concerned about the politicization of Chinese investments. Meanwhile, U.S. regulators should evaluate foreign investments in technology sectors based on the investors’ compliance history rather than their nationality. While all the aforementioned suggestions are by no means easy to achieve, each small step in the right direction can go a long way to make technological exchanges between the United States and China more transparent and open. History reveals that technological protectionism and globalism often take turns to dominate the mainstream political narrative. While neither is categorically better than the other, most would agree with that rapid innovations needs a certain level of collaboration to sprout. As the world awaits the two great powers to bring more technology advancement to mankind, it behooves the United States and China to continue close cooperation.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Advantage CPs › Russian Sanctions › Solvency – Russia

Sanctions are effective in limiting Russian military capabilities – targeting specific sectors of their defense disables their military

Jack Detsch & Robbie Gramer 5-12-22 By , Foreign Policy’s Pentagon and national security reporter, and , a diplomacy and national security reporter at Foreign Policy.[Western Sanctions Are ‘Beginning to Bite’ Into Russia’s Military, ] // DHS WAgustin 🏋️‍♂️

U.S. and British officials believe that damaging international sanctions slapped on Russia over its full-scale invasion of Ukraine are hampering its ability to restock high-tech weapons, such as precision-guided munitions, though Russia still has plenty of conventional ammunition stocks at its disposal to continue to wage war. The impact of Russia’s sanctions-induced high-tech military shortages have been spotted by Western governments, as Russian President Vladimir Putin has ordered troops into the besieged steel factory in the city of Mariupol, Ukraine, while Russian pilots have rained down “dumb bombs” without advanced precision guidance kits into the city. The Russian military burned through much of its stockpile of advanced weapons in the early days of the war; the United States believes Russia may have fired as many as 12 hypersonic missiles into Ukraine. U.S.-led announced in late February sought to starve Russia of computer chips and semiconductors that could be used in advanced military equipment. “Our sanctions and export controls were designed to deny Russia the critical inputs it needs to continue the war against Ukraine and to degrade its ability to project power in the future,” said Wally Adeyemo, deputy secretary of the U.S. Treasury Department. “We have disrupted the Russian military supply chain and overall production, inhibited its defense sector from settling payments, and will continue to target Russia’s ability to restock, resupply, and rebuild.” Since late February, when Russia launched its invasion of Ukraine, the U.S. government has designated 147 entities, 35 individuals, and 74 vessels operating in Russia’s defense sector, according to data from the Treasury Department. Among the top targets of U.S. sanctions is the Tactical Missiles Corporation, known as KTRV when transliterated and abbreviated. KTRV is a Russian state-owned defense conglomerate that produces hypersonic weapons and technology used in radar systems and other multipurpose missiles. The Treasury Department has sanctioned a chief executive of KTRV, Boris Obnosov, as well as 28 subsidiaries of the conglomerate. Within Russia, there are already signs the sanctions are starting to cut into the country’s ability to restock its high-end systems. U.S. Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo told Congress on Wednesday that Ukrainian officials had told her that Russia was being forced to take semiconductors from dishwashers and refrigerators for high-tech weapons. Raimondo said U.S. technology exports to Russia had dropped by almost 70 percent since its full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Moscow set up an interdepartmental committee to sort out how to source more military equipment domestically and if so-called friendly countries—including China—might be willing to work around sanctions to provide microelectronic processors and ammunition, two of Russia’s biggest military needs. “We do believe that the sanctions and the export controls, particularly when it comes to components, electronic components, has had an effect on the Russian defense industrial base and their ability to restart [precision-guided munitions],” a senior U.S. defense official told reporters this week. “It’s definitely beginning to bite into his defense industrial capabilities.” A British Foreign, Commonwealth, and Development Office spokesperson told Foreign Policy that international sanctions had frozen 60 percent of Russia’s foreign currency reserves, nearly $340 billion. Up to 70,000 computer specialists left Russia in March, and another 100,000 were expected to. “Persistent sanctions will lead to depressed long-term GDP growth as the country is unable to access key Western technology,” the spokesperson said in an emailed statement. (Russian GDP could fall by up to 15 percent this year.) It’s difficult to track the exact extent that sanctions are hitting Russia’s ability to rearm; Western officials speak about the matter in broad terms but have not publicly offered specific numbers due the sensitivity of the information. “We cannot publicly comment on the specific impact that these measures are having on the production of particular weapons systems or munitions Russia is using to prosecute its war against Ukraine,” a State Department spokesperson said. The bite of Western sanctions seems to have forced Moscow to begin dusting off Soviet-era defense stocks and use munitions that are less accurate—and thus potentially deadlier to Ukrainian civilians caught in the crossfire of Russia’s clumsy military offensives. On Monday, the British defense ministry’s intelligence arm assessed that the depletion of Russia’s precision-guided stockpiles has “forced the use of readily available but aging munitions that are less reliable, less accurate, and more easily intercepted.” The 77-day invasion has “revealed shortcomings” in Russia’s ability to conduct precision strikes, including subjecting Ukraine’s towns and villages to intense shelling, a trend that seems to be on the rise in the offensive in the Donbas region. Even if such ammunition is inferior to precision-guided munitions, Russia has plenty of it to continue its military offensives. “They will face problems on the security of supply on their precision-guided missiles, some other high-tech elements, and weaponry,” said one senior Eastern European defense official. “But at the same time, we shouldn’t discount their ability to wage war with simpler stuff. They have enough [ammunition] for years and years for fighting on that level they’re doing,” the official added. Much of Russia’s defense industrial base has been under harsh U.S. sanctions since 2014, during Russia’s first invasion of Ukraine and illegal annexation of Crimea. In late March, the Biden administration also slapped on dozens of Russian defense companies beyond KTRV, including High Precision Systems, which produces surface-to-air missiles such as the Iskander and anti-tank missile systems, and Tekhmash, the producer of many of the Russian military’s ammunition, multiple rocket systems, and unguided bombs. The Treasury Department has also targeted neighboring Belarus’s defense sector with its own sanctions packages. Belarusian President Aleksandr Lukashenko, which has aligned his authoritarian government with Moscow, supported the invasion and allowed Russian troops to use his country to launch offensives and airstrikes across the border into northern Ukraine in the early weeks of the war, before Russia’s effort to capture Kyiv, Ukraine’s capital, failed. The U.S. Commerce Department rolled out new export control restrictions aimed at stopping Russia from getting U.S.-made technology that could be used in military hardware, even if that technology is supplied by third countries. This includes microelectronics, telecommunications, information security equipment, sensors, navigation equipment, avionics, and parts for civilian aircraft. But much of the U.S. effort to stop Russia’s military supply lines from humming relies on extensive export controls that lean on the newly made Foreign Direct Product Rule to block almost any products made with U.S. software or technology. The problem with depending on that rule, former officials told Foreign Policy, is that it leans heavily on foreign countries to make enforcement calls. And the United States has limited—if any—visibility on products that are actually reaching Russia. “My huge, huge concern is that we do not have end use checks in Russia,” said Nazak Nikakhtar, a former assistant secretary of commerce during the Trump administration and now a partner at Wiley Rein, a law firm. “We do not have U.S. officials that can go to the Russian entities to figure out even if there’s an export license that has been granted. We have nobody to go in there and do an audit to see that that’s happened.” There’s another potential end-around, Nikakhtar said: China. The U.S. rival could help supply critical minerals needed to make steel and aluminum for military equipment as well as microchips needed to help guide precision missiles to their targets. But even if Russia is able to find other suppliers for military components, as some expect, it is likely to face an increasingly steep economic cliff as the invasion of Ukraine continues. Speaking to reporters in Washington on Tuesday, British Defense Secretary Ben Wallace said Western sanctions would pose a “real challenge” to Russia’s ability to refurbish his “worn out” armed forces. And even though the Kremlin has managed to stabilize the ruble with energy exports, it is not likely to be able to stave off the financial pain for long. “Russia is probably spending almost everything it’s earning on its energy exports to prop up the ruble and, you know, do all sorts of other B.S. to make it seem like the economy is okay when it’s not,” said Brian O’Toole, a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council think tank and a former Treasury Department official. “They’re making hard choices now,” he added. “It’s frustrating for folks not to see all of the results, but this is unsustainable for the Russians. At some point, they’re just going to fall off a cliff.”

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Advantage CPs › Russian Sanctions › Solvency – Russia

Plank solves. Russian defense CEOs and companies alike have avoided Western sanctions, keeping Russia’s military alive – cutting them off at the head impairs the Russian military

Chris Kirkham & David Gauthier-Villars 7-1-22 Reporting by Chris Kirkham in Los Angeles and David Gauthier-Villars in Istanbul; Additional reporting by Tim Hepher in Paris; Editing by Marla Dickerson and Vanessa O'Connell. [Special Report: Dozens of Russian weapons tycoons have faced no Western sanctions, ] // DHS WAgustin 🍔

As Russia's military continues to pound Ukraine with missiles and other lethal weapons, Western nations have responded in part by targeting Russia's defense industry with sanctions. The latest round came on Tuesday, when the United States issued new sanctions on some arms makers and executives at the heart of what it dubbed Russian President Vladimir Putin's "war machine." But a Reuters examination of companies, executives and investors underpinning Russia's defense sector shows a sizable number of players have yet to pay a price: Nearly three dozen leaders of Russian weapons firms and at least 14 defense companies have not been sanctioned by the United States, the European Union or the United Kingdom. In addition, sanctions on Russia's arms makers and tycoons have been applied inconsistently by these NATO allies, with some governments levying penalties and others not, the Reuters review showed. Among the weapons moguls who have not been sanctioned by any of those three authorities is Alan Lushnikov, the largest shareholder of Kalashnikov Concern JSC, the original manufacturer of the well-known AK-47 assault rifle. Lushnikov owns a 75% stake in the firm, according to the most recent business records reviewed by Reuters. The company itself was sanctioned by the United States in 2014, the year Russia invaded and annexed the Ukrainian peninsula of Crimea. The EU and UK leveled their own sanctions against Kalashnikov Concern this year. The company accounts for 95% of Russia's production of machine guns, sniper rifles, pistols and other handheld firearms, and 98% of its handheld military machine guns, according to its website and most recent annual report. Its weapons include the AK-12 assault rifle, an updated version of the AK-47, some of which have been captured from Russian forces by Ukrainian soldiers. The Kalashnikov Concern also produces missiles that can be fired from aircraft or on land. A former Russian deputy transport minister, Lushnikov once worked for commodities tycoon Gennady Timchenko, a longtime friend of Putin. The United States sanctioned Timchenko in 2014 following Russia’s invasion of Crimea, naming him as a member of the Kremlin’s “inner circle.” Neither Lushnikov, Timchenko or the Kalashnikov Concern responded to requests for comment. It’s the same pattern with Almaz-Antey Concern, a Moscow-based defense company specializing in missiles and anti-aircraft systems. The company has been sanctioned by the United States, EU and UK, but CEO Yan Novikov has not been punished. Almaz-Antey’s website displays the motto “Peaceful Sky is Our Profession.” The company makes Kalibr missiles, which Russia’s Ministry of Defense has credited with destroying Ukrainian military installations. In a statement last month, the ministry said Russia had fired long-range Kalibr missiles at a Ukrainian command post near the village of Shyroka Dacha in eastern Ukraine, killing what the ministry claimed were more than 50 generals and officers of the Ukrainian military. Reuters was unable to independently verify that claim. Neither Almaz-Antey nor CEO Novikov responded to requests for comment. In response to a list of questions submitted by Reuters about Western sanctions aimed at Russia, a Kremlin spokesperson said "the consistency and logic of imposing sanctions, as well as the legality of imposing such restrictions, is a question that should be put directly to the countries that introduced them." The Reuters findings come as Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy has said that current Western sanctions against Russia “are not enough” as Russian troops make gains in their assault on Ukraine’s eastern regions of Luhansk and Donetsk. The Ukrainian military has been outgunned by Russian artillery in places such as the industrial city of Sievierodonetsk, which it ceded to Russian forces last week after weeks of intense fighting. Putin has portrayed his military’s assault on Ukraine as a “special military operation” aimed at demilitarizing and “denazifying” its democratic neighbor. On Tuesday, Russia’s Foreign Ministry announced it would bar Jill Biden and Ashley Biden, the wife and daughter of U.S. President Joe Biden, from entering Russia indefinitely in what it said was a response to “constantly expanding U.S. sanctions against Russian politicians and public figures.” U.S. National Security advisor Jake Sullivan said on Tuesday that Russia's action was not surprising because "the Russian capacity for these kinds of cynical moves is basically bottomless." The Russian invasion has killed thousands of Ukrainian soldiers and civilians, but the exact number is unknown. The United Nations human rights office said, as of Monday, that 4,731 civilians had been killed in Ukraine since Russia’s invasion began on Feb. 24, including more than 300 children, with another 5,900 civilians injured in the conflict. The agency said most of the casualties were caused by the use of “explosive weapons with a wide impact area, including shelling from heavy artillery and multiple launch rocket systems, and missile and air strikes,” and that the actual number of dead and wounded was likely far higher. The West has levied sanctions on a swath of Russia’s economy to punish Moscow, an effort that so far has done little to deter the Russian offensive. Like the bans on other Russian firms, sanctions on weapons companies are meant to hamper their ability to sell to foreign customers. These penalties limit their access to imported components and generally make it more costly and time-consuming to produce weaponry. Levying sanctions on the people behind those firms goes a step further to make the pain personal. It allows Western nations to go after any mansions, yachts and other offshore wealth of those who supply Russia’s military, and it limits where they can travel abroad. “You’re demonstrating that being a regime collaborator comes with a cost,” said Max Bergmann, a former State Department official during the Obama administration who worked on U.S. arms transfers and safeguarding U.S. military technology. “They feel it very personally. You’re creating a disgruntled class of people that are tied to the Kremlin,” said Bergmann, now director of the Europe program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a Washington-based national security think tank. AMMUNITION MAKERS UNSCATHED Other companies in Russia’s defense industry identified by Reuters that have not been sanctioned by the United States, EU or UK include the V.A. Degtyarev Plant, a facility 165 miles northeast of Moscow that makes machine guns, anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons that are sold to the Russian military. Its weapons include the Kalashnikov PKM and PKTM machine guns, as well as Kord rifles and machine guns, some of which are mounted on armored vehicles. The Degtyarev Plant did not respond to a request for comment. Also not sanctioned is the Klimovsk Specialized Ammunition Plant, south of Moscow, where “world-famous cartridges” for pistols and Kalashnikov assault rifles are produced, according to an archived version of its website. Neither is the Novosibirsk Cartridge Plant, an ammunition manufacturer that calls itself “one of the leading engineering enterprises of the military-industrial complex of Russia.” Neither ammunition plant responded to requests for comment. Last month, Reuters sought comments from sanctions officials in the UK, EU and United States regarding the news agency’s findings that they had failed to punish a raft of Russian defense firms and tycoons fueling Putin’s war effort. As part of that process, Reuters provided those Western authorities with a detailed list of more than 20 companies and more than three-dozen people that had escaped sanctions. The UK’s Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, which levies sanctions for Britain, said it could not comment on future sanctions. It added that London and its allies had levied “the largest and most severe economic sanctions that Russia has ever faced, to help cripple Putin’s war machine.” The European Commission and the U.S. Treasury Department, which handle sanctions for Brussels and Washington respectively, declined to comment on the specifics of Reuters’ findings. Elizabeth Rosenberg, assistant secretary for terrorist financing and financial crimes at the Treasury Department, said in a statement that sanctions have “made it harder for Russia to obtain what it needs to procure and produce weapons.” On Tuesday, in conjunction with a meeting of leaders of the G7 nations in the German Alps, the Treasury Department released a new round of defense-related sanctions that included eight of the weapons firms and two of the executives on the list provided earlier by Reuters. One of those newly sanctioned executives, Vladimir Artyakov, has played key roles in Russia’s weapons industry for decades, and serves as the No. 2 executive at Rostec, a military-industrial giant with hundreds of subsidiaries employing more than half a million people, according to its website and annual reports. Artyakov is also the chairman of at least five Russian weapons firms, among them Russian Helicopters JSC, which builds several lines of military helicopters including the Ka-52 "Alligator," some of which have been shot down and documented in Ukraine. He has not been sanctioned by the EU or UK. Artyakov and Russian Helicopters did not respond to requests for comment. Rostec has been sanctioned by Washington since 2014. On Tuesday the United States targeted the company again, levying sanctions on more than 40 Rostec subsidiaries and affiliates. Among those hit was Avtomatika Concern, a company linked to cyber warfare. It was on the list of Russian defense firms that Reuters had submitted to the Treasury Department last month seeking an explanation as to why the companies had not been sanctioned. Rostec and Avtomatika Concern did not respond to requests for comment. Other firms on Reuters’ list that were sanctioned just this week by the Treasury Department include PJSC Tupolev, a maker of fighter jets such as the Tu-22M3 bomber. The Ukrainian military said Tu-22M3 bombers were responsible for a missile strike at a crowded shopping center in the central Ukrainian city of Kremenchuk on Monday, which killed at least 18 people and injured about 60. PJSC Tupolev and another firm on Reuters’ list, JSC VNII Signal, have not been sanctioned by the EU or UK. JSC VNII Signal is a producer of mechanical and navigational systems that power Russian military tanks and some of the country’s most advanced missile systems. PJSC Tupolev and JSC VNII Signal did not respond to requests for comment. TOP BRASS UNTOUCHED Executives at a host of Russian weapons firms, meanwhile, have largely escaped sanctions from Western authorities. Nearly three months after a Tochka-U ballistic missile hit a train station in the eastern Ukrainian city of Kramatorsk on April 8, Russian weapons executives linked to the company that makes those missiles have yet to pay a price. The strike killed more than 50 people, including children, and injured more than 100 others. The Russian firm JSC Research and Production Corporation Konstruktorskoye Byuro Mashynostroyeniya, known as KBM, has been the primary manufacturer of Tochka-U missiles, according to a U.S. Army database of worldwide military equipment. Neither Washington, Brussels or London have sanctioned Sergey Pitikov, KBM’s chief executive. The three Western allies have likewise spared Alexander Denisov, the CEO of NPO High Precision Systems, KBM’s parent company. High Precision Systems oversees production of a wide range of missiles, artillery, grenade launchers and machine guns used by Russian troops and outfitted on military helicopters, aircraft, tanks and warships. Sanctions on Russia’s arms companies and tycoons have been applied inconsistently by the Western allies. The United States and EU have sanctioned High Precision Systems, for example, while the UK has not. The United States has sanctioned KBM, but the EU and UK have not. High Precision Systems, Pitikov and Denisov did not respond to requests for comment. KBM confirmed that Pitikov is its chief executive, but did not respond to additional questions submitted by Reuters. Europe and the United States have failed to coordinate sanctions even on makers of banned weapons. Since the outset of Russia’s invasion in late February, Western governments and human rights groups have decried its use of cluster munitions: small bombs delivered by missiles or rockets, which scatter and explode over an area as large as a city block. A 2008 international treaty bans their use or production under any circumstances because of the devastating effects on civilians. Russia used a Uragan – which translates to “Hurricane” – rocket launcher system to fire cluster bombs in Kharkiv on March 24, killing eight civilians and injuring 15 others, according to the U.N. human rights office and Ukrainian officials. The Uragan is made by JSC Scientific and Production Association Splav, a Russian firm whose systems have been sold abroad to countries including India. The company has been sanctioned by the United States, but not by the UK or EU. Its CEO, Alexander Smirnov, has escaped sanctions altogether. Splav and Smirnov did not respond to requests for comment. It’s much the same for Splav’s parent company, NPK Techmash. The United States and the EU have sanctioned the firm, but the UK has not. Techmash CEO Alexander Kochkin has not been targeted by American or European authorities. Techmash and Kochkin did not respond to requests for comment. In a June 10 statement, the European Commission said there is an effort to align sanctions lists “as much as legally possible” among allies to achieve “the maximum cumulative effect of the sanctions with all our like-minded partners.” In cases where the lists do not align, the Commission statement said, people and companies not currently on the EU’s sanctions list could be added later if there is sufficient evidence. "Nothing is off the table," the statement said. WESTERN CONNECTIONS One of the highest-profile Russian firms to escape Western sanctions is VSMPO-Avisma Corp, which is the world’s largest titanium supplier and 25% owned by Rostec. It supplies Russia’s defense industry, but also counts major Western aerospace companies among its clients. Based in Verkhnyaya Salda, in central Russia, VSMPO-Avisma has subsidiaries with facilities in the United States, Switzerland and the UK, as well as sales and distribution staff in the United States, Europe and Asia, according to its website and annual reports. That’s no doubt a factor that has allowed the company to escape punishment, according to three sanctions and Russian defense experts who spoke with Reuters. VSMPO-Avisma’s vice chairman and majority shareholder, Russian billionaire Mikhail Shelkov, ranked by Forbes this year as Russia’s 59th-richest person, likewise has not been sanctioned. According to past press releases, VSMPO-Avisma has long-term contracts to supply titanium to United Aircraft Corp, a Rostec subsidiary that oversees production of Russian fighter jets such as the Su-34 that have been shot down in Ukraine. United Aircraft has been sanctioned by the United States, EU and UK. VSMPO-Avisma also sells to Europe’s Airbus, and it supplied U.S. aerospace behemoth Boeing Co up until March, when the Arlington, Virginia-based company said it stopped purchasing titanium from Russia. Boeing had announced just months earlier, in November 2021, that VSMPO-Avisma would be its largest titanium supplier “for current and future Boeing commercial airplanes.” VSMPO-Avisma and shareholder Shelkov declined to comment. Boeing said in a statement that it has worked since 2014 to diversify its sources of titanium around the world, and that its current inventory and sources "provide sufficient supply for airplane production." Airbus did not answer specific questions about its relationship with VSMPO-Avisma. But in an emailed statement it said potential sanctions on Russian titanium “would massively damage the entire aerospace industry in Europe” while doing little to harm Russia because those sales are but a small portion of that nation's overall exports. In 2020, foreign sales accounted for about two-thirds of VSMPO-Avisma’s $1.25 billion in revenue, according to the company’s most recent annual report. That puts Western officials in a tough spot, said Richard Connolly, director of Eastern Advisory Group, a UK consultancy that advises governments and businesses on the Russian economy and its defense industry. Slapping sanctions on VSMPO-Avisma would curtail its lucrative export trade, but it would also force major players in global aviation to switch suppliers or risk sanctions themselves. “That’s the classic sanctions conundrum: If you want to hurt somebody, you’re going to hurt yourself,” Connolly said

2022 Michigan Counterplan
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Security Cooperation is administered by the DoD, Security Assistance is DoS

McLaren 14, US Air Force Captain (McKay, “Enhancing the Assessment of the Costs and Benefits of International Pilot Training (IPT) Within the U.S. Air Force: Is It Worth It?,” RAND Dissertations)//BB

U.S. Code Title 22 provides congressional authority to conduct DoS Security Assistance programs. The programs are carried out through two basic laws, the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (FAA) and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976 (AECA).24 AECA enacted congressional legislative controls over export of defense articles and services. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee are responsible for foreign assistance and Security Assistance program authorization legislation. The Senate and House Armed Services Committees are responsible for defense programs authorization legislation. The term security cooperation is used within DoD, whereas the term security assistance is used within the DoS. It is important to note that these congressional committees play a role only in FMS authorization. Although Congress maintains legislative control over exports, FMS is a nonappropriated program, external to the U.S. budget, and the president is charged with signing off on spending for the program. Through Executive Order 11958, as amended, the President delegates selected functions in the AECA to the secretaries of State and Defense. They are required to provide reports to Congress and obtain specific congressional approval on certain exports or transfers. The DoS has responsibilities relating to security assistance, which include managing the export of defense articles, services, training, and military technology.25 DoD has responsibilities relating to security cooperation, which include activities to encourage and enable international partners to work with the United States to achieve strategic objectives.26 The military departments and other DoD agencies involved in managing FMS programs are collectively called implementing agencies (IAs). The Army, Navy, and Air Force usually have the responsibility of being the IA in the process of FMS.27 The Air Force agency for all security cooperation programs is the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of the Air Force for International Affairs (SAF/IA). The Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition has oversight in the execution by virtue of having responsibility for Air Force acquisition. SAF/IA is supported by the Air Force Security Assistance Center at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, for most FMS and other logistics functions. The Air Force Security Assistance Training (AFSAT) squadron at Randolph Air Force Base (AFB), Texas, is in charge of planning and, with AETC, managing the Air Force international military training. It is organized under the authority of AETC.