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2022 Michigan Kritik
WARREN AFF › 2AC—Definition: AFRICOM

AFRICOM is a direct product of U.S./NATO cooperation

Sobukwe 22 (Djibo Sobukwe; Djibo Sobukwe is on the Research and Political Education Team of the Black Alliance for Peace. He is also a former Central Committee member of the All African People’s Revolutionary Party who worked with Kwame Ture on the political Education Committee; "NATO And Africa: A Relationship Of Colonial Violence And Structural White Supremacy | MR Online". MR Online, 2022, https://mronline.org/2022/03/01/nato-and-africa/. Accessed 19 July 2022. Originally published: Black Agenda Report on February 23, 2022) Dōgen

AFRICOM is actually a direct product of NATO via EUCOM, the U.S. European command. EUCOM is a central part of NATO and originally also took responsibility for 42 African states. In 2004 NATO ended a five-year period of expansion; in 2007 the EUCOM commander proposed the creation of AFRICOM. James L. Jones Jr. explains how he came to make the proposal for AFRICOM from his position as commander of EUCOM as well as commander of operational forces of NATO. The U.S./NATO role in the destruction of Libya in 2011 is important to highlight because it offers some important lessons. First, U.S. imperialism and its western lackies do not accept any country that decides to be an independent force outside of its sphere of influence. Secondly, it also demonstrates how NATO can work hand in hand with other U.S./western dominated world structures like the UN. In 2011 the UN (resolution 1973) gave political authorization for a “no fly zone” and blockade of Libya purportedly to “protect” its citizens but which ultimately resulted in the destruction of Africa’s most prosperous country with the highest Human Development Index. U.S. led NATO forces launched a bombing campaign that killed thousands of civilians and caused tens of billions of property and infrastructure damage. This shows that although U.S.-led NATO sometimes uses the UN for political cover, it has no problem illegally overstepping its UN mandate to commit its crimes against humanity and achieve its regime change goals. Even a few countries that abstained from the UN vote like China said they did so as not to offend the reactionary Arab League and the African Union which approved of the resolution. In this case indirect and direct cooperation between NATO, the UN, the AU, and the Arab League (which includes the GCC countries) shows the expansive and deeply woven web of U.S. and NATO reach. The book The Illegal War on Libya edited by Cynthia McKinney, includes the chapter titled “NATO’s Libya War, A Nuremberg Level Crime” in which Stephen Ledman writes: “The U.S.-led NATO war on Libya will be remembered as one of history’s greatest crimes, violating the letter and spirit of international law and America’s Constitution. The Nuremberg Tribunal’s Chief Justice Robert Jackson (a Supreme Court justice) called Nazi war crimes ‘the supreme international crime against peace.’ Here are his November 21, 1945 opening remarks: The wrongs which we seek to condemn and punish have been so calculated, so malignant, and so devastating, that civilization cannot tolerate their being ignored, because it cannot survive their being repeated. Jackson called aggressive war “the greatest menace of our times.” International law defines crimes against peace as “planning, preparation, initiation, or waging of wars of aggression, or a war in violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances, or participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing.” All U.S. post-WWII wars fall under this definition. Since then, America [U.S.] has waged direct and proxy premeditated, aggressive wars worldwide. It has killed millions in East and Central Asia, North and other parts of Africa, the Middle East, and Europe, as well as in Central and South America.8 Those mentioned here are but a small sampling of NATO/AFRICOM’s bloody works in Africa’s past. NATO continues to operate under guise the of “training” and “humanitarian” peacekeeping assistance. Jihadist terrorist violence on the continent has increased since the founding of AFRICOM and NATO’s destruction of Libya resulting in civilian casualties and instability which the west has used as pretext and justification for the continued need for AFRICOM. As the Black Alliance for Peace’s AFRICOM watch bulletin reported, since the founding of AFRICOM there has also been an increase in coups by AFRICOM trained soldiers. Consistent with what Nkrumah, Rodney and others warned of in the 1960’s and 1970’s NATO continues today in the form of AFRICOM facilitating wars, instability, and the corporate pillage of Africa. The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) for example is continuously plundered for its strategic raw materials such as cobalt, tantalum, chromium, coltan, and uranium etc. These minerals are strategically important not only for electronic devices but also for the technologies that drive the military industrial complex. AFRICOM continues to rely on its neocolonial African proxies to fight wars on its behalf in the DRC and throughout Africa to achieve its objectives. With the rise of China, the U.S./NATO now seek to ensure full spectrum dominance that seeks to shut China or any other country out of the competition to control global capital.

2022 Michigan Kritik
WARREN AFF › 2AC––Ruse of Analogy

The Settler/Native/Slave triad relegates the position of the slave into an empty signifier to be filled by any track towards liberation–––blackness is resistant to projects of recovery

Garba, T., & Sorentino, S. (2020).[ Assistant Professor of Gender & Race Studies, University of Alabama, Independent Scholar, “Slavery is a Metaphor: A Critical Commentary on Eve Tuck and K. Wayne Yang’s “Decolonization is Not a Metaphor.” Antipode. doi:10.1111/anti.12615]//sheima

Slavery The positivist affirmation of land is not methodologically innocent. Its implications can best be understood in how it indents the political ontology of slavery and the methods of Black studies. As we have noted, by framing the “settler-native-slave” triad through the presumptive totality of settler colonialism, Tuck and Yang bring the slave into the fold only to disavow its premises.12 Slavery can be a component of settler colonialism, but when consigned to the “labor theory of slavery”, the constituent elements of the slave position (and the possibility that slavery might be in excess to the demand for labour) can never be broached. Further, the Indigenous quilting point—land—enables a chain of meaningful struggle and recovery unavailable to the enslaved. Indigenous peoples have protection against the threat of their struggle being “turned into an empty signifier to be filled by any track towards liberation” (Tuck and Yang 2012:7) through access to the physical object of land which, even if understood relationally and through remembrance, can only be returned in its total physical presence. Tuck and Yang’s analysis and citational practices demonstrate that while land rescues Indigenous peoples from the condition of interminable metaphoricity (the driving thesis of their essay), Black people are in the singular position of beginning and ending their “track towards Liberation” as empty signifiers. Land is the signifier that secures the impossibility of Indigenous fungibility.¶ Take the telling seventh footnote, in which Tuck and Yang clarify the structural logics of their triad—a footnote worth quoting in full because, if brought into the body of the text, it would wreak havoc on its premises: ... although the setter-native-slave triad structures settler colonialism, this does not mean that settler, native, and slave are analogs that can be used to describe corresponding identities, structural locations, worldviews, and behaviors. Nor do they mutually constitute one another. For example, Indigenous is an identity independent of the triad, and also an ascribed structural location within the triad. Chattel slave is an ascribed structural position, but not an identity. Settler describes a set of behaviors, as well as a structural location, but is eschewed as an identity. (Tuck and Yang 2012:7n7)13¶ Whereas the native, we are told, can claim both “an identity independent of the triad” and “an ascribed structural location within the triad”, the slave is positioned through “an ascribed structural position, but not an identity”. It is the native’s independent identity, always stabilised by the relationship with land, that can stop what would otherwise be a runaway chain of signification. It is clear that by this differentiation Tuck and Yang want to preempt falling prey to Wilderson’s (2010) “ruse of analogy”. 14 As we will see, Tuck and Yang (2012:17) mobilise a similar refrain, “colonial equivocation”, to guard against coalitional appropriations of colonialism. What their metaphysical commitment to positivism misses, however, is the doubled valence of the ruse. Slavery is resistant to the project of recovery—there is no hidden material, neither land nor identity, to be recovered. The slave’s lack of identity, as postulated by Tuck and Yang, also doubles to expose a lack in their theorisation of slavery because of the problem at the constitutive core of slavery: not the presence of land, appropriated identity, or alienated labour, but, as we will argue, the lack of anything to lack. Their method cannot accede this aporetic possibility.¶ “Decolonization is Not a Metaphor” instead intensifies the difference formulated by Wolfe between (1) Blackness as “expansive”, “inherited” through the one-drop rule “by an expanding number of ‘black’ descendants”; and (2) Indigenous peoples “racialized” as “subtractive”: “Native Americans are constructed to become fewer in number and less Native, but never exactly white, over time” (Tuck and Yang 2012:12; see also Wolfe 2006:387).15 This subtractive logic is propelled, not surprisingly, by the priority of land: “Native American is a racialisation that portrays contemporary Indigenous generations to be less authentic, less Indigenous than every prior generation in order to ultimately phase out Indigenous claims to land and usher in settler claims to property” (Tuck and Yang 2012:12). What might animate the anti-Black logics of the one-drop rule dissolves except in a synthetic analysis that would collapse both “the racializations of Indigenous people and Black people in the US settler colonial nation-state” as “geared to ensure the ascendancy of white settlers as the true and rightful owners and occupiers of the land” (Tuck and Yang 2012:12), which is to say both Indigenous and Black peoples are structured by a common settler-colonial project, even as Black people (insofar as “the US government promised 40 acres of Indian land as reparations for plantation slavery” [Tuck and Yang 2012:29]) are also figured as proto-settlers.16 The grounding “settler” concept frays further when considering that (1) the “Indian Removal Act” also rendered native peoples unwilling settlers by relocating them to already Indigenous populated territories (Smithers 2015:117–128); (2) Indigenous peoples remain Indigenous when they move or are forcibly moved, because indigeneity expresses relationality, not possession (Blackwell et al. 2017:127; Radcliffe 2017); (3) in Latin America, creolisation has, complexly, been referred to as an “indigenizing process” (Castellanos 2017:777; Jackson 2012:42–44); and (4) African indigeneity meant a unique intensification of structures of slavery on the African continent through settler colonialism (Kelley 2017).17 The last two points also serve to underscore the Anglo-centrism of Tuck and Yang’s argument, as Canada and the United States remain their point of departure for understanding of the relation between Blackness and Indigeneity, rather than the Western hemisphere as a whole.¶ Consider too how the asymmetry between native and slave operates within Tuck and Yang’s discussion of “playing Indian” (Tuck and Yang 2012:8–9), which in Tuck et al. (2014b:16) means not only tribal garb but also those “alternative” settler cultures of “communalism and counterculturalism, such as in rural communes, permaculture, squatting, hoboing, foraging, and neo-pagan, earth-based, and New Age spirituality ... formed by occupying and traversing stolen Indigenous land and often by practicing cultural and spiritual appropriation”. 18 “Playing Indian” involves putting on the accoutrements of Indianness in much the same way that Blackness is performatively appropriated—the difference is that the decolonization metaphor is never theorised as central to the struggle over land. In “Decolonization is Not a Metaphor”, the impulse to “go native” is instead nonessential to the subject-formation of the native. It is a late, superstructural practice meant to relieve settler anxiety, to provide “some mercy or relief in face of the relentlessness of settler guilt and haunting” (Tuck and Yang 2012:9), but whose embrace of a kumbaya sensibility, while advocating a “reinhabitation” of the environment on ethical grounds, actually tends towards the replacement of Indigeneity.19 “[J]ust as relentless as the desire to disappear the Native”, playing Indian (“the desire to become without becoming [Indian]” [Tuck and Yang 2012:14]) “is a desire to not have to deal with this (Indian) problem anymore” (Tuck and Yang 2012:9). As the performative expression of the metaphorical conceit, playing Indian is a secondary (not constitutive) strategy en route to extermination.20 It drives towards “moves to innocence”, from the invention of long-lost ancestors (Elizabeth Warren comes to mind)21 to settler adoption fantasies (Dances with Wolves and The Last of the Mohicans [Tuck and Yang 2012:13–17]) to the “colonial equivocation” of coalitions that proclaim “We are all colonized” (behind which is the implication “None of us are settlers” [Tuck and Yang 2012:17]).¶ Unlike the late origins of the decolonization metaphor, we argue that the slave metaphor is central to the structuring logics of slavery, not an after-effect. While Tuck and Yang see “colonial equivocation” as an erasure of what is distinct about settler colonialism (land), Wilderson’s “ruse of analogy” registers the distinction of racial slavery as the absence of anything to claim. This means that, as “a crucial and fungible conceptual possession of civil society” (Wilderson 2010:21), slavery is only ever available as semantic displacement. Slavery-as-metaphor is the beingof-slavery, what Wilderson (2010) calls its “political ontology”. Tuck and Yang’s mis-reading of this ruse is replicated in J. Kehaulani Kauanui’s (2017) critique of Afro-pessimism. For Kauanui, the political-ontological approach, which would make Blackness-as-slaveness immanent and essential to a violent political determination of being (rather than exogenous and contingent), is a symptom of what it means to critique: “to assert blackness as ontological is to recapitulate colonising thought, to take colonial ideology as truth” (2017:258).22 In order to extract Blackness from its colonial-ontological confines, Kauanui proposes a turn to the historical and concrete. By identifying the contingency of racial slavery as “rooted in historicizing race” (2017:259), Kauanui searches for a non-ontological Blackness. She finds it in a twist to the (by now much disputed) origin story ascribed to late 17th century Virginia and Bacon’s Rebellion, arguing that slaves and indentured servants were not only equally (and economically) oppressed but also united in “efforts to commit genocide against indigenous peoples” (Kauanui 2017:261).23 This reading renders race an “additional pliant” (Kauanui 2017:260) to the conquest of native lands, which is to say that slavery is internal to settler colonialism.We offer an alternative structural history, one that neither cedes to the pressures of empiricism as grounds for critique nor falls prey to the obfuscation of metaphor that Tuck and Yang charge non-land-based struggle with. By centralising political ontology precisely as the problem of the relationship between history and contingency, materiality and the symbolic, we attempt to account for the genesis and structure of modernity, and propose slavery as the code that functions as “the a priori or ground of the history to which it gives rise” (Scott and Wynter 2000:197; see also Warren 2018). For Tuck and Yang, the “current colonial era goes back to 1492, when colonial imaginary goes global” (2012:4n2). For Sylvia Wynter (1995, 2003), by contrast, the basis of the triadic political ontology of the post-1492 Americas was well established prior to the Columbian expedition (see also King 2019:15–21).24 Black slaves—as they crossed from the “old world” sugar-complex to the new world—would play a central role in the formulation of what we recognise as the modern world. If slavery is essential to the grounding logics of capitalism, it also needs to be situated in the political-economic geography of the Mediterranean within which the conquest of the New World was conceived. The Columbian expedition would not have been possible without the inauguration of slavery earlier in the 15th century, as “the Portuguese landing on the shores of today’s Senegal and their drawing of areas of West Africa into a mercantile network and trading system” (Wynter 1995:10) challenged the geographical and technological orthodoxy of late medieval scholasticism, and solidified the political-economic relations that would blossom into global civil society. The position of the slave was both materially and symbolically significant, for the reification of Africans as the only “legitimately enslaveable population” enabled the emerging discourses of republicanism and civic humanism, and thereby sutured the “moral and philosophical foundations of post-1492 polities” (Wynter 1995:35; see also Wynter 2003:309). Likewise, McKittrick argues that the “‘naturalization’ of difference” was “bolstered by the ideological weight of transparent space, the idea that space ‘just is’” (McKittrick 2006:xv). The political-symbolic structures of slavery are essential to the production of space and its meanings. By condensing this lattice into “forced labor” in extremis, Tuck and Yang miss how the conceptual density of slavery might always already condition the positivism of land. Slavery cannot be added as an afterthought without diminishing the historical-geographical scope of modernity and leaving the constitution of the material and symbolic conditions of conquest unthought.¶ With the “labor theory of slavery”, slavery has been drawn into the whirlpool of Marxist critique (e.g. Beckert and Rockman 2016; Tomich 2004). And while Marxism certainly has methodological and political purchase, we argue that the now perennial and unsolved problem of how race connects to class (and slavery to capitalism) points to the need to call upon and develop new frameworks of approach (Bledsoe and Wright 2019; Sorentino 2019; Wilderson 2010). Drawing from a tradition of theorising interested in the non-economic utility of the slave (Sexton 2010, 2014; Spillers 2003a; Wilderson 2010; Wynter 1995, 2003), we are interested in what becomes available for critique when identifying the constitution of slavery through its “metaphorical aptitude”, the way the slave operates as “the imaginative surface upon which the master and the nation came to understand themselves” (Hartman 1997:7). Focus on formlessness or, as Hartman calls it, the “figurative capacities of blackness” (1997:7) complicates critiques of colonial sovereignty, property, and land acquisition. The metaphoricity of the slave is a feature of the global fungibility of the slave—its interchangeability and replaceability. Fungibility renders the slave a vessel through which the settler-master regenerates their position: “The dispossessed body of the enslaved is the surrogate for the master’s body since it guarantees his disembodied universality and acts as the sign of his power and dominion” (Hartman 1997:21). Hartman’s reading of fungibility provides a possible reading of the constitution of settler’s capacity to undertake the settler-colonial project in ways that don’t simply take for granted Lockean conceptions of history and property. King does precisely that, identifying how the slave’s role in signifying “expansion and spatial possibility became a feature of the spatial imagination of the conquistador-settler” (2019:120). Taken further, as “an open sign that can be arranged and rearranged for infinite kinds of use” (King 2019:104), the slave enables the very possibility for the settler to accumulate land and wealth. Blackness is rendered “a-spatial” (Bledsoe and Wright 2019:12–13) and “unsovereign” (Sexton 2014:11) such that slavery provides the “enabling postulates” for the “social and discursive practices” of the post-1492 world (Spillers 2003a:18; Walcott 2014). ¶

2022 Michigan Kritik
AFF ANSWERS › Alt DA – Collapse Bad

Alternative produces a collapse of the international system

Hunt ‘07 (Michael H., The American Ascendancy: How the United States Gained & Wielded Global Dominance, p320-324, The University of North Carolina Press, Michael H. Hunt is Everett H. Emerson Professor of History Emeritus at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.) //Doof

While U.S. hegemony entails perplexities and burdens, an abandonment of hegemony may carry risks. Diminished U.S. leadership could prove dangerously disruptive of the international system and imperil the well-being of peoples everywhere, Americans included. A U.S. retreat could undermine an international economy that has generated impressive global abundance and peace beneficial to many. Simply consider the resources now available today (an annual worldwide output of $30 trillion at the end of the twentieth century) compared to fifty years earlier when it was a tenth that figure. Imagine what this amazing, unprecedented leap in global productivity has meant to health and welfare in all lands. Without U.S. leadership, so the defenders of hegemony claim, these gains might well have been limited, even nonexistent. A future of diminished abundance might prove distinctly unpleasant: greater discord among states and peoples leading to rising cultural intolerance, flaring nationalist fervor and rivalry, deepening international divisions, and fraying economic ties that would slow growth and press down longevity and health in wide swaths of the human population. This would be a world of narrower horizons, fewer choices, and less interaction among peoples and cultures. It would also be a world with diminished capacity for addressing mounting global problems. Advocates for maintaining U.S. dominance along current neoliberal lines hold the ideological high ground. The predominant version of American nationalism took a distinctly activist turn in the course of the twentieth century. From the 1890s to the 1920s the notion of the United States as a dynamic republic with the vision and energy to manage the world’s affairs began to come into its own. Republicans dedicated to an assertive policy along a broad front contributed to this shift in thinking. So too did Woodrow Wilson with his fervent support for the ideal of a progressive international society. In 1941 Henry Luce blended this set of nationalist ideas in his vision of an American century marked by the advance of political freedom, unhampered commerce, and general economic abundance. The most activist U.S. leaders after World War II drew from this creed, as appealing to visionary Wilsonians such as Harry Truman as to corporate-minded Republicans such as Ronald Reagan and the younger Bush. Over the past half century it has become an orthodoxy so potent in its appeal that challengers risk exile from membership in the foreign policy establishment and exclusion from government posts. Such is the allegiance commanded by the one true faith. Or as John Adams observed pungently, “Power always thinks it has a great Soul, and vast Views.”¹⁰ Even so, a good case can be made for a U.S. retreat from hegemony and toward a more modest and sustainable role in the world. A searching critique has no reason to linger on matters of style, particularly such easy targets as a policy governed by restless unilateralism or simplistic assumptions. Such a critique should instead turn to the hegemonic project itself. The place to begin a critical evaluation is with the tendency of the champions of hegemony to oversell the product. They point to its historical achievements to the neglect of the costs it has imposed on others. The leaders of the United States have managed hegemony with a lamentably heavy hand—with scant respect for human life and scant respect for human diversity. Millions died and many societies suffered profound disruption as a result of the U.S. interventions that dot the pages of this account. To those costs would have to be added an intolerance of views on markets and the state that diverge from U.S. preferences. As a result, U.S. pressure has in some cases blocked or disrupted socioeconomic and political experiments favored by others, especially in Latin America, Africa, and the Middle East. In other cases, an insistence on an American way has generated tensions with major states such as China or regions such as western Europe with divergent interests and values; that insistence has also strained ties with genuinely international organizations such as the UN. On virtually every front U.S. leaders have left themselves open to charges of hypocrisy—of ignoring if not violating the ideals of democracy and self-determination that they publicly profess. A look into the future reveals more grounds for doubts about the hegemonic project. Put simply, the time for U.S. hegemony may have passed. As the relative U.S. advantage in economic might and cultural appeal slips, attempts to exercise hegemony may prove increasingly counterproductive, doing more to further undermine than to confirm U.S. dominance. The U.S. economy labors under limits. Persistent structural problems include oil dependency, low domestic savings, and deep trade and federal budget deficits. The core U.S. cultural model—a faith in unending corporate-driven growth and the unending delights of consumerism—may be fading at least in the developed world. Western Europe and Japan have both drawn alongside the United States in their technological capacity, their income levels, their capital resources, and the depth and integration of their home markets. They need no longer look to the United States as a model in any of these areas. The consumer revolution led by Americans may have at least in these two regions run its course. Rising per capita income beyond a point (in the range of $15,000 in a fair sampling of countries recently surveyed) seems to produce no greater individual satisfaction while imposing costs captured not by conventional GDP data but by social GDP estimates.¹¹ In military affairs, the United States has retained, even increased, its dominance. But to what end? Its massive nuclear stockpile can be used only at the risk of profound and widespread moral revulsion and in some circumstances of devastating counterstrikes. Its high-tech forces may be the wonder of the world. But they are effective only against the most peripheral and isolated of states (in what one observer has dismissed as “theatrical micromilitarism”), and they have limited capacity to rebuild what they have destroyed.¹² The exercise of military might has proven a poor substitute for the intricacies of diplomatic negotiation, the trade-offs indispensable to international comity, and the long-term commitment of resources to economic development and human welfare. Finally, hegemony may hurt the hegemon. Evidence can be found in the privileging of corporate interests harmful to popular welfare, a fixation with military power that amounts to a national obsession, an increasingly infantilized and inert public, and the rise of an imperial presidency antithetical to genuine democracy. These trends validate a sharply critical view of foreign adventures that prevailed during the country’s first century. Proponents of republicanism claimed that crusades, even crusades conducted in the name of freedom, threatened freedom at home. The history of republican experiments across history showed that foreign entanglements and adventures created dangerous concentrations of political power within and undermined the very civic virtues on which the survival of any republic depended. Vindicating this republican fear is the rise of the imperial president and the concomitant atrophy of the democratic process. While most Americans today may not see hegemony through this anxious republican lens, many have voiced their discontent with the outward thrust of U.S. policy. Some express it in frustration and chagrin directed not against U.S. leaders but against a seemingly ungrateful, unyielding, dangerous world and call for scaling back international commitments. The most restive have contended that a more isolated, less burdened America would be better off— less vulnerable to attack, less dependent on fickle friends, less likely to get entangled in distant quarrels, and more secure in its homeland and its domestic liberties. Others refuse to go this far and instead put the blame squarely on U.S. leaders—political and corporate—whose free-market, environmental, and human rights policies have betrayed values as important at home as in the international community. Taken together, these critical reactions suggest a broad-based skepticism about hegemony. But the critics may be so fundamentally divided philosophically, politically, regionally, and socially that they cannot cobble together a common program to serve as an alternative to hegemony. A retreat from hegemony need not lead to isolationism. This myth about the nature of U.S. foreign relations in the past, which was constructed in the first place for the very purpose of justifying U.S. dominance, is likely to figure prominently in any defense of the status quo. But the notion of isolation is flawed as history and as a source of lessons. Today as earlier, the United States has a major stake in a productive, peaceful, and just global society. By extension, the United States has an obligation rooted in self-interest if not calculations of altruism and long-term human welfare to help mobilize a collective international response to the problems generated by that society. A retreat implies that the United States would act in world affairs not as the leader but as a leader, perhaps in some circumstances the first among equals. Engaging in a genuinely collaborative relationship with other states and taking international institutions and norms seriously may hold out the best hope of extending the considerable achievements of the previous fifty years and in the bargain maintaining U.S. influence and advancing U.S. well-being. The historical case for the efficacy of collaboration is compelling. The U.S. role after World War I calmed, for a time at least, the arms race, gave the Europeans a chance to sort out their monetary tangle, and sustained the turn-of-the-century drive to create humane standards of international conduct. The post–World War II record is even more striking. The achievements in setting norms (such as outlawing genocide), rehabilitating defeated Germany and Japan, and creating a framework for global prosperity were the result of collaboration richly repaid in international support and respect, not to mention enhanced U.S. security. This collaborative element helped not only to distinguish the U.S. from the Soviet side during the Cold War, but also to determine the outcome of a competition that was as much about systems and values as military might. International cooperation is not an illusion; it yields results far better than a course defined by narrow self-interest and pursued by brute force. Whatever the attractions of a more modest, collaborative internationalism, winning broad acceptance of such an approach faces serious difficulties. It requires that Americans think about their role in the world in a fresh, genuinely global way quite distinct from the cautious opportunism familiar from the first U.S. century and the rising assertiveness that has marked recent decades. It also requires a sensitivity to the intricacies of the global system and the cultural diversity of its parts. That sensitivity will not come easily to today’s body politic, which features a disengaged, ill-schooled public and a political class beholden to interest groups and trapped by shallow rhetoric and narrow, short-term calculations. Above all, the middle way offers nothing heroic to a country of individualists that may be dependent on civic nationalism as one of the few sources of collective identity. Indeed, calls for serious, long-term support for economic development programs, genuine respect for international norms, and tolerance for regional diversity collide with prevailing nationalist and neoliberal notions, which continue to inspire bold dreams of global transformation under the American aegis and in the American image. A retreat from hegemony would require a lot: a more cosmopolitan understanding of other cultures, a more sophisticated grasp of U.S. limits, a genuinely democratic electoral system responsive to popular preferences, and a better informed electorate able to think through those preferences. The fate of the current ascendancy with its hegemonic dimensions may well hang on how Americans measure up to these high standards and how rapidly structural problems eat away at the foundations of our hegemony. What the next page of the national story has to say may depend on how well we take into account the possibilities and constraints created by a history of burgeoning state power, strong nationalism, and intrusive global forces.

2022 Michigan Kritik
AFF ANSWERS › Alt Fails

The alt fails to solve, only incremental changes at the nation-state level can solve, while sweeping global reforms solving is nothing but a utopian pipe dream.

Fukuyama ‘04 (Francis, 7/25/2004, An Antidote To Empire, The New York Times, https://www.nytimes.com/2004/07/25/books/an-antidote-to-empire.html (Accessed 7/14/2022) Yoshihiro Francis Fukuyama is an American political scientist, political economist, and writer.) //Doof

Well before 9/11 and the Iraq war put the idea in everybody's mind, Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri had popularized the notion of a modern empire. Four years ago, they argued in a widely discussed book -- titled, as it happens, ''Empire'' -- that the globe was ruled by a new imperial order, different from earlier ones, which were based on overt military domination. This one had no center; it was managed by the world's wealthy nation-states (particularly the United States), by multinational corporations and by international institutions like the World Trade Organization and the International Monetary Fund. This empire -- a k a globalization -- was exploitative, undemocratic and repressive, not only for developing countries but also for the excluded in the rich West. Hardt and Negri's new book, ''Multitude,'' argues that the antidote to empire is the realization of true democracy, ''the rule of everyone by everyone, a democracy without qualifiers.'' They say that the left needs to leave behind outdated concepts like the proletariat and the working class, which vastly oversimplify the gender/racial/ethnic/ class diversities of today's world. In their place they propose the term ''multitude,'' to capture the ''commonality and singularity'' of those who stand in opposition to the wealthy and powerful. This book -- which lurches from analyses of intellectual property rules for genetically engineered animals to discourses on Dostoyevsky and the myth of the golem -- deals with an imaginary problem and a real problem. Unfortunately, it provides us with an imaginary solution to the real problem. The imaginary problem stems from the authors' basic understanding of economics and politics, which remains at its core unreconstructedly Marxist. For them, there is no such thing as voluntary economic exchange, only coercive political hierarchy: any unequal division of rewards is prima facie evidence of exploitation. Private property is a form of theft. Globalization has no redeeming benefits whatsoever. (East Asia's rise from third- to first-world status in the last 50 years seems not to have registered on their mental map.) Similarly, democracy is not embodied in constitutions, political parties or elections, which are simply manipulated to benefit elites. The half of the country that votes Republican is evidently not part of the book's multitude. To all this Hardt and Negri add an extremely confused theory, their take on what Daniel Bell labeled postindustrial society, and what has more recently been called the ''knowledge economy.'' The ''immaterial labor'' of knowledge workers differs from labor in the industrial era, Hardt and Negri say, because it produces not objects but social relations. It is inherently communal, which implies that no one can legitimately appropriate it for private gain. Programmers at Microsoft may be surprised to discover that because they collaborate with one another, their programs belong to everybody. It's hard to know even how to engage this set of assertions. Globalization is a complex phenomenon; it produces winners and losers among rich and poor alike. But you would never learn about the complexities from reading ''Multitude.'' So let's move on to Hardt and Negri's real problem, which has to do with global governance. We have at this point in human history evolved fairly good democratic political institutions, but only at the level of the nation-state. With globalization -- and increased flows of information, goods, money and people across borders -- countries are now better able to help, but also to harm, one another. In the 1990's, the harm was felt primarily through financial shocks and job losses, and since 9/11 it has acquired a military dimension as well. As the authors state, ''one result of the current form of globalization is that certain national leaders, both elected and unelected, gain greater powers over populations outside their own nation-states.'' The United States is uniquely implicated in this charge because of its enormous military, economic and cultural power. What drove people around the world crazy about the Bush administration's unilateral approach to the Iraq war was its assertion that it was accountable to no one but American voters for what it did in distant parts of the globe. And since institutions like the United Nations are woefully ill equipped to deal with democratic legitimacy, this democracy deficit is a real and abiding challenge at the international level. The authors are conscious of the charge that they, like the Seattle anti-globalization protesters they celebrate, don't have any real solutions to these matters, so they spend some time discussing how to fix the present international institutions. Their problem is that any fixes are politically difficult if not impossible to bring about, and promise only marginal benefits. Democratic institutions that work at the nation-state level don't work at global levels. A true global democracy, in which all of the earth's billions of people actually vote, is an impossible dream, while existing proposals to modify the United Nations Security Council or change the balance of power between it and the General Assembly are political nonstarters. Making the World Bank and I.M.F. more transparent are worthy projects, but hardly solutions to the underlying issue of democratic accountability. The United States, meanwhile, has stood in the way of new institutions like the International Criminal Court. It is at this point that Hardt and Negri take leave of reality -- arriving at an imaginary solution to their real problem. They argue that instead of ''repeating old rituals and tired solutions'' we need to begin ''a new investigation in order to formulate a new science of society and politics.'' The woolliness of the subsequent analysis is hard to overstate. According to them, the fundamental obstacle to true democracy is not just the monopoly of legitimate force held by nation-states, but the dominance implied in virtually all hierarchies, which give certain individuals authority over others. The authors dress up Marx's old utopia of the withering away of the state in the contemporary language of chaos theory and biological systems, suggesting that hierarchies should be replaced with networks that reflect the diversity and commonality of the ''multitude.'' The difficulty with this line of reasoning is that there is a whole class of issues networks can't resolve. This is why hierarchies, from nation-states to corporations to university departments, persist, and why so many left-wing movements claiming to speak on behalf of the people have ended up monopolizing power. Indeed, the powerlessness and poverty in today's world are due not to the excessive power of nation-states, but to their weakness. The solution is not to undermine sovereignty but to build stronger states in the developing world. To illustrate, take the very different growth trajectories of East Asia and sub-Saharan Africa over the past generation. Two of the fastest growing economies in the world today happen to be in the two most populous countries, China and India; sub-Saharan Africa, by contrast, has tragically seen declining per capita incomes over the same period. At least part of this difference is the result of globalization: China and India have integrated themselves into the global economy, while sub-Saharan Africa is the one part of the world barely touched by globalization or multinational corporations. But this raises the question of why India and China have been able to take advantage of globalization, while Africa has not. The answer has largely to do with the fact that the former have strong, well-developed state institutions providing basic stability and public goods. They had only to get out of the way of private markets to trigger growth. By contrast, modern states were virtually unknown in most of sub-Saharan Africa before European colonialism, and the weakness of states in the region has been the source of its woes ever since. Any project, then, to fix the ills of ''empire'' has to begin with the strengthening, not the dismantling, of institutions at the nation-state level. This will not solve the problems of global governance, but surely any real advance here will come only through slow, patient innovation and the reform of international institutions. Hardt and Negri should remember the old insight of the Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci, taken up later by the German Greens: progress is to be achieved not with utopian dreaming, but with a ''long march through institutions.''

2022 Michigan Kritik
AFF ANSWERS › Turn – Anthro

Turn - Empire’s concept of biopower is anthropocentric and reductionist.

Youatt ‘08 (R, August 2008, Counting Species: Biopower and the Global Biodiversity Census, (Accessed 7/14/2022), Department of Political Science Reed College Environmental Values Vol. 17 No. 3) //Doof

Driven both by the global loss of biodiversity and by the lack of knowledge about the vast majority of species that are being lost, conservation biologists and some of their allies in the environmental movement have called for and started a massive global census of biodiversity.1 Most prominently, E.O. Wilson has proposed a new mobilisation of scientific resources to complete a global survey of species.2 The identification of biodiversity ʻhotspotsʼ is the first step in a cascade of biodiversity investigation, Wilson hopes, which will culminate in a full inventory of global biodiversity and of the places where it is being lost. With complete information about the global population of biological species, Wilson is optimistic that we can undertake more refined conservation measures and ultimately move towards greater sustainability. In this article, I take the position that the global biodiversity census is as much about power and political life and the boundaries between nature and society as it is about scientific information gathering for conservationist ends. Drawing on Foucaultʼs concept of biopower, I suggest that the biodiversity census provokes us to think about the ways that biological nonhumans are embroiled in, and challenge, the technologies of power that see life itself as a political object. To the extent that the ʻactionʼ in the biodiversity census seems to rest largely with the human scientists who do the categorising, naming, counting, and labelling of nonhuman species, one analytic stance towards this scientific practice is an anthropocentric one. Here, the focus is on considering the field of social power in which scientific efforts take place, and asking questions about the discourses, resources and networks that make a biodiversity census plausible and possible. But what if nonhumans can be legitimately considered to be active participants in the field of biopower, just as human subjects who are censused are? Can nonhumans be sites of resistance to biopower, and disrupt its governing impulses? I argue that it is possible, and indeed necessary in the context of biodiversity, to extend the idea of biopower to include nonhumans as participants. Like human subjects, nonhumans are regulated and rationalised in matrices of knowledge and science, through which they are readied as productive resources for capitalism and mined as repositories of genetic information. Nonhuman participation in an ecological field of biopower also involves being part of an array of authority in environmental discourses, with effects for both humans and nonhumans, and constructing new possibilities for biosocial collectives. However, because nonhumans generally lack the capacity to be self-regulating subjects but are nonetheless necessary authorities in figuring biodiversity truth discourses, I suggest that they hold a different kind of place in biopower than self-regulating human subjects do. More specifically, because nonhumans constitutionally (rather than intentionally) refuse to internalise the meanings of human language, they are able to resist becoming self-regulating subjects to a significant extent, relying instead on their own semiotic interpretations of the environment and acting accordingly: for example, through migrating, reproduc- ing, consuming resources and filling ecological niches in unexpected ways, biotic nonhumans are constantly challenging the normalising will of biopower. At the same time, because environmental interventions to save species come to be justified on the grounds of global environmental well-being, the health and continued existence of nonhumans becomes an increasing imperative. In spite of the fact the biodiversity census may extend the reach of an ecologically unfriendly capitalism, I conclude that it will, on balance, reap important ecological goods in hybridising political practice and acknowledging extra-human locations of power. The article proceeds as follows. I start in Section 1 by reviewing the global biodiversity census proposal. In section 2, I consider how scientific power is extended through the census and what sources of power it draws on to do so. The science of censusing nonhumans requires a significant mobilisation of social power – financial, technological, institutional and discursive – in order to succeed. But because knowledge projects like demography have effects and techniques that reach beyond these sources of social power into life itself, I suggest that we cannot fully explain the importance of the biodiversity census through these means. In section 3, therefore, I extend Foucaultʼs concept of biopower into the nonhuman world as a means to explain the productive power and regulatory qualities of the census. Because the subjects of the biodiversity census are mostly nonhuman, however, I also consider how the concept of biopower mutates in light of their participation. 1. THE GLOBAL BIODIVERSITY CENSUS PROPOSAL Spurred by the problem of a major extinction event in which we do not even know what or how much is being lost, the basic knowledge-problem that the global biodiversity census is aimed at addressing is counting and describing all the species that currently exist in the world. According to the United Nations Environmental Programʼs (UNEP) Global Biodiversity Assessment, the best ecological estimates of extant species range from 3.5 million all the way to 111.5 million species, with the most likely figure at around 13.5 million.3 Only 1.75 million of those species are currently identified and described, however, or about 13 per cent.4 Each year, only 13,000 new species are formally described, a snailʼs pace given the magnitude of the task.5 Even when species have been described, the data often remains limited. Some species may have become extinct since being identified. May et al., for example, estimate that about 40 per cent of identified beetle species are known from a single examination in a single locality, sometimes an observation made decades ago.6 E.O. Wilsonʼs census proposal includes training and deploying a cadre of thousands of specialists in systematics, taxonomy and classification. He calculates that given 40 years of productive classification work per scientist, at the pace of ten species identified per year, approximately 25,000 professional lifetimes are needed, a number which ʻfalls well short of the number of enlisted men in the standing armed forces of Mongolia, not to mention the trade and retail personnel of Hinds County, Mississippiʼ.7 In the perfectly rational system that he hopes for, each expert would be assigned to a specific classificatory activity. While there are currently only three people in the world who are sufficiently expert in classifying termites, for example, Wilson would up their number proportionally to match the fact that termites comprise ten per cent of the total biomass of tropical regions. Wilson also champions investment in new computer technology that can combine scanning-electron microscopes with image-recognition software. Its goal would be to process and identify species instantly and to flag new specimens as they are passed through. The data held in the GenBank project, a computer database aimed at collecting information on all known DNA and RNA sequences, could be folded into this process. Given the massive numbers of species and the difficulty of resource mobilisation, other proposals suggest sampling procedures to get representative data on the global biopopulation. For example, Terry Erwin suggests that we aim for ʻmassive but achievable biotic inventoriesʼ that give us a relative fix on biodiversity.8 While it may not achieve Wilsonʼs goal of describing all species, targeting specific taxa and sampling certain species would have the effect of rationalising what is currently an ad hoc process. In the face of an ever larger human population, the United States census now makes limited use of representative sampling procedures, which its proponents argue make it more accurate than a large-scale but flawed collection of data about every individual.9 A global biodiversity census would aim to do the same. Some of the questions that surround the biodiversity census are scientific ones, such as concerns over the basic species concepts it employs and the problems of scale involved in identifying micro-species like bacteria.10 Given that the activities of science are not self-contained but always embedded in social relations, additional kinds of questions need to be asked, however. Yet little scholarly attention has been paid to what this biodiversity censusing effort means in political or social terms. Political ecologists have usefully inquired into the general effects of biodiversity discourses and the ways in which they are intertwined with regimes of power and governmentality,11 but they have not asked whether there is anything specific about the language and practice of censusing nonhuman bio-entities that is politically important. Environmental ethicists seem to have ignored the ethical dimensions of the topic altogether.12 Anthropologists and ethnobotanists have looked increasingly at the relationship between biological and cultural diversity, finding strong geographical and evolutionary correlations between the two and suggesting that a broader biocultural value linking nature and humans might be found in diversity complexes.13 However, they have not inquired into the importance of censusing as a technique by which the differences in biocultures might be constituted. Political scientists have written extensively and insightfully about the practice and effects of censusing human populations,14 but have not taken up how censusing nonhumans relates to political questions about power. The rest of the article aims to fill some of these gaps, particularly with respect to questions of how power functions in contemporary environmental science and politics. 2. THE BIODIVERSITY CENSUS AND THE SOCIAL POWER OF SCIENTISTS Taken as a socially-embedded activity, the production of successful scientific knowledge necessarily requires mobilisation of economic resources, expansion of institutional power, and discursive legitimation.15 Successful science, in other words, must be socially forged. This point does not suggest that the status of scientific truth-claims is fully dependent on social interests; rather, the point is that thinking about a scientific activity like the biodiversity census requires attending not only to activities of classification and arguments over species concepts, but also to how those activities are made possible in the first place. In short, what kind of social power does the biodiversity census draw on, depend on and reproduce? What makes the use of a biodiversity census seem intuitively obvious as the right tool to address biodiversity loss? Here, I consider two forms of social power, both crucial to the census project. First, I ask what financial and institutional resources are necessary to allow agenda-setting power and the capacity to steer future resources in advantageous ways.16 Second, I suggest the allure of the census rests partly on the way that biodiversity scientists are able to tap into discursive power, particularly the seductive power of discourses like panopticism and discovery.17 I consider these forms of power in turn. The institutional push for a global biodiversity census is centred in the United States, where it has harnessed major sources of funding, including the National Science Foundation (a $14 million fund for ʻplanetary biodiversity inventoriesʼ), the Packard Foundation and Harvard University. It has created a network of scientific-political organisations mainly based in the United States and Europe dedicated to censusing different parts of the natural world and promoting the ʻcompletion of the Linnaean enterpriseʼ18 into a ʻCatalogue of Lifeʼ – the Census of Marine Life, NatureServe, the Global Taxonomy Initiative of the Convention on Biodiversity, Species 2000 and the All-Species Foundation. There has been increased funding for the academic fields of taxonomy and bioinformatics.19 New professional lives have opened up around these resources – ʻeach species merits careers of scientific study and celebration by historians and poetsʼ, as Wilson puts it.20 The biodiversity census makes these possible first through the act of species identification and then through the subsequent study of species behaviour, ecological roles and potential uses for humanity. The key institutions of the global biodiversity census are organised around information and communications technologies, which worm their way right into the names and missions of the organisations involved. The Global Biodiversity Information Facility (GBIF) and the Integrated Taxonomic Information System (ITIS) (in partnership with US federal agencies including the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA)) are two of the global clearinghouses for establishing quality specieslevel data, aiming to be ʻopen portalsʼ of biodiversity data.21 GBIFʼs mission is to ʻdevelop methods for sustainably using biodiversity … [by] rapidly, openly, and freely delivering primary data about biodiversity to everyone in the global community, using digital technologiesʼ.22 The political intent is universal access, while its method of delivery is technological. The universally-wired nature of ʻtheʼ global community is taken for granted, even as a global digital divide and the barriers of expertise suggest that no such community exists. One critical role that information technology plays in organising the global biodiversity census is in its ability to suggest a panoptic biological future.23 ʻImagine an electronic page for each species of organism on Earthʼ, Wilson asks us, ʻavailable everywhere by single access on commandʼ.24 Genealogically related to projects like Diderotʼs Encylopedie, the modern ʻEncyclopedia of Lifeʼ is the endpoint and ultimate goal of the censusing project, organised in a technology that claims to outrun space and time. The rhetoric of ʻachievingʼ a global biodiversity census also taps into complex Western narratives of discovery and conquest of nature (ironically, since the conservation agenda of the census is aimed in part at preserving the wildness of nature). This rhetoric also draws on the position of social power held by the modern sciences to reveal the unknown to human publics. Wilson exhorts supporters of the census to have ʻfaith in the sprint to the finish of the global censusʼ, promising that ʻunknown microorganisms ... will be revealedʼ and that ʻnever again, with fuller knowledge of such extent, need we overlook so many golden opportunities in the living world around usʼ.25 Similarly, the All-Species Foundation tells us that the global biodiversity census ʻoffers an unsurpassable adventure: the exploration of a little-known planetʼ.26 Finally, the discursive power of the census is connected to economic life, in the way that it renders nonhuman agents ready for postmodern capitalism as semiotic constructions (as in genetic codes for bioprospectors or images in nature videos).27 As Arturo Escobar argues, whereas ʻnatureʼ marked modern capitalismʼs attitude towards the nonhuman, ʻbiodiversityʼ is a term of postmodern capitalism, in the way that it readies nonhuman nature for semiotic use rather than material use.28 Indeed, postmodern capitalism may protect nature materially even as it commodifies it semiotically, as in the case of protecting the Amazon rainforest for its pharmaceutical potentials.29 Yet, as Escobar argues, ʻonce the semiotic conquest of nature is completed, the sustainable and rational use of the environment becomes imperativeʼ.30 That is, once biodiversity discourses help conserve an area as a biodiversity reserve which is made valuable in terms of code-commodity, it also becomes part of a political system of global environmental governance that continues to manage it for capitalism. Thus, conservation biologists have mobilised an expanding pool of financial and institutional resources, drawing in part on the seductive qualities of the dream of panopticism and the historical glory of exploration. To the extent that the agenda of global environmental governance is steered by their expertise, consensus and public statements,31 they have also garnered increased authority in speaking about matters of conservation, ecotourism and economic development. While these forms of social power (institutional, financial, technological, discursive) explain some of what is at stake in the biodiversity census, I want to suggest that the power of a global biodiversity census also rests in its hybridising force. It introduces nonhumans into the discursive heart of an otherwise anthropocentric modern human politics, economy and knowledge that has generally denied that nonhumans have formed a part of these projects.32 It creates a framework through which humans interact with, pattern and position the diversity of natural nonhumans. Understanding the importance of the biodiversity census therefore extends questions of power past its traditional human context into an ecological context. The important questions, then, are: for whom does this extended politics and power work?33 What happens to anthropocentric understandings of power upon the participation of nonhumans in the process? Does the (re)introduction of nonhumans tell us anything about the ʻwhereabouts of powerʼ, to use John Allenʼs phrase?34 Can power be nearly everywhere, or does it have a specifically local character in relations between things and thus an uneven distribution? To answer these questions, I turn to the idea of Foucaultian biopower, which considers how power works at the micro-levels of individual life, in relation to the more traditional forms of power considered thus far. 3. BIOPOWER AND THE CENSUS In this section, I start by considering how human censuses are understood to relate to politics and governing institutions, specifically through the Foucaultian idea of biopower. Because biopower is concerned with the ways that techniques like censusing operate on the terrain of ʻlife itselfʼ, it is particularly suited to thinking about the biodiversity census, which similarly involves a strategy for administering and rationalising life in ways that reach into nonhuman biological life as such.35 The consideration of censusing nonhuman life through the lens of biopower involves a basic trade-off. On one hand, the extension of biopower into nonhuman realms raises the spectre of a more subtle, but nonetheless corrosive, form of human power over the natural world. On the other hand, because power and resistance are always co-existent, nonhumans may disrupt the functioning of environmental governance in new and distinct ways. Specifically, biopower faces difficulty in creating self-regulating nonhuman subjects who internalise conditions of subjection. 3.1 Self-regulating subjects and the justification of power In contrast to absolute power commanded by the Hobbesian sovereign to ʻtake life or to let liveʼ, Michel Foucault argues that the modern form of biopower which replaced it in the nineteenth century was a regulatory and disciplinary form of power that involved ʻthe administration of bodies and the calculated management of lifeʼ.36 Biopower organised and administered life, through a variety of techniques or methods of power that dragged human life itself into the grid of power-knowledge. Institutions such as universities, public health agencies and the army, and regulatory forms of knowledge, such as demography and modern medicine, not only analysed life-processes but permeated them as well. Yet it was not just the use of these techniques or the presence of these institutions that characterised nineteenth-century biopower. Two parallel political shifts made biopower distinct from sovereign power. The first shift was that the right of the sovereign to have power over life and death was no longer justified based on protecting the sovereign from external threat (as in conscription in cases of war) or internal threat (as in the death penalty). Rather, the power over life and death was now justified in terms of the population itself, in modern democratic language. When war was waged, it was not to protect the sovereign, but in the name of the people and their continued existence. The justification for biopowerʼs interventions into the details of life – reproductive health, the ways in which we die, normalising vaccinations – was similarly made in the name of the population. One effect of this shift, Foucault notes, is that the death penalty became more difficult to sustain logically: ʻhow could power exercise its highest prerogatives by putting people to death, when its main role was to ensure, sustain, and multiply life, to put this life in order?ʼ37 In other words, the justifications for powerʼs activities have social effects that exceed the justifications themselves. What effect, then, will extending ʻprotecting lifeʼ to ʻprotecting biodiversityʼ have, if we consider the biodiversity census as an extended example of the logic of biopower? Part of the answer is that direct resource exploitation becomes more difficult, since power over life/death of animals, plants, insects or trees can no longer be justified by needs of the human population/sovereign to fight natural necessity with all its might.38 Ecological biopower thus involves both broader social trends like the rise of modern ecological consciousness and the emergence of conservationist ethics as part of it structural logic. At the same time, what becomes easier is both the management and regulation of nonhuman biological life by humans and the direct intervention in, and mutation of, biological and ecological life-processes, all in the name of bio- or eco-systemic ʻhealthʼ. Here, biopower can be understood as a logic of eco-governance that simultaneously subverts the resource-driven agenda of modern capital by trying to conserve material nature1 and enables and rationalises an entirely new form of intervention in life itself. The ecological sciences, on this reading, are one of the crucial institutions through which interventions into life are enacted, and the biodiversity census is one of its primary power-knowledge techniques. Thinking about biopower as involving nonhumans also has the consequence of changing the population in whose name powerʼs exercise is justified. If the idea of biopower adequately describes the intrusion of scientific, economic and regulatory techniques into the lives of nonhumans, then administering nonhuman life must be justified in the name of an expanded population as well – in this case, in the name of a global ecological population of species (and their genes), guided by an ethic of preserving and fostering biodiversity. In sum, in the name of planetary health (a metaphorical extension of modern biopowerʼs concern with human public health to a planetary scale), a new population is configured into which biopower intervenes, one explicitly composed of human and nonhuman members participating in ecosystemic communities. The second, parallel shift that Foucault notes was involved in the move from sovereign to regulatory power was that there was an unsettling effect on the practice of governing. Unlike sovereign power, regulatory biopower had the imperative to promote life, to ʻoptimise forces, aptitudes, and life in generalʼ, and its ʻhighest function was perhaps no longer to kill, but to invest life through and throughʼ.39 Yet, crucially, it had to do so in ways that did not make the population more difficult to govern.40 In other words, however life was politically managed, it had to be done in ways that ensured governability. This aspect of biopower was aimed at producing self-regulating subjects who internalised the qualities that promoted life but did not fundamentally disrupt social functioning. Self-regulating subjects were both efficient for power (since subjects did powerʼs work for it) and governable. Yet in this respect, the movement of nonhuman entities into the population in whose name biopower acts represents a potential location of freedom, or at least resistance, precisely because many nonhumans are constitutionally incapable of being self-regulating subjects who can internalise the conditions of subjection in biopowerʼs own terms. Nonhumans do not ʻknowʼ that they are a species or a member of a specific phylum, in those terms, or that they have a particular gene-sequence; rather, they have their own frameworks of understanding the moments of interaction with scientists and modes of environmental experience that guide their actions. In this respect, biotic nonhumans differ from the human subjects of biopower, who, as Foucaultʼs analysis suggests, become self-regulating subjects partly in virtue of the way that their consciousness is structured by biopower – by its language, its categories, and the techniques of self-making. When one looks at the minority of bio-entities that could be made partially self-regulating – genetically modified crops, pet clones, lab-grown tissue replacement, gene therapy and pre-selection, regulated game preserves in which species are fenced in or are trained to learn the boundaries of safe haven from human predators – they form a small fraction of the bio-population. Even in those cases, moreover, there are significant doubts over whether they can be made into self-regulating subjects in the same sense as humans. Their ability to accede to and internalise the normalising effects of power is limited by their biological constitution. Though they have varying kinds of subjective experience, they cannot be said to have the self-reflexive kind of subjectivity that humans do. Whereas human subjectivity is marked by the dual ability to be a distinct Self in contrast to the environment and to have the reflexive thought that ʻI am a Selfʼ, nonhumans are generally limited to the former possibility. If biopower cannot make most nonhumans into self-regulating subjects, then their governability rests solely on whether they can be controlled indirectly through the patterned grids of scientific prediction. Yet as groups and individuals, biological nonhumans routinely confound predictability, within their own kinds of subjectivities. They respond to ecological change by unexpectedly shifting migration patterns and locations. They expand in unanticipated ways into ecological niches that humans open directly (e.g., suburbs as feeding grounds for raccoons; rabbits introduced in Australia for hunting who subsequently overran the countryside; garbage dumps as sources of food for omnivorous bears) and indirectly (e.g., red-tailed deer population explosions in New England upon the over-hunting of deer-predators, causing substantial economic damage and fatal car accidents). Some species mutate at evolutionary speeds that far exceed those of humans (e.g., pesticide resistant strains of bugs or penicillin-resistant viruses). They sometimes form new relations with other species to the detriment of humans (e.g., birds as carriers of Asian bird flu). They remake ecosystems into new stabilities and undermine others. In short, while the lack of subjectivity and reflexivity in nonhuman populations is usually read as a source of acquiescence to human interrogation, it seems to also have an opposite effect, in that it constitutes them as ready sources of resistance and disruption to the desires of biopower to establish governable populations. Foucault says of biopower: ʻit is not that life has been totally integrated into techniques that govern and administer it; it constantly escapes themʼ.41 Nonhuman agents effect some of the very same escapes simply by living. Life itself escapes biopower. 3.2. Array of authorities A second component of biopower is ʻone or more truth discourses about the “vital” character of living human beings, and an array of authorities competent to speak that truthʼ.42 In the context of the nineteenth-century societies that Foucault was analysing, these truth discourses about living beings included fields like demography and medicine. In the context of twenty-first-century biopower, Paul Rabinow and Nikolas Rose suggest that they might be extended to include fields like genomics, cloning and reproduction.43 What is critical to the truth discourses surrounding these fields is that there be an array of authorities, like the human sciences, public health agencies or social theorists, that both problematise a certain issue and endeavor to intervene in the field raised by that problematisation. These authorities both render the issue socially visible and strive to rationalise solutions. Just as scientists play a central role as authorities in the truth discourses of human sciences, so too are they central to the truth discourses of biodiversity loss. The project of the biodiversity census involves conservation biologists as a critical part of the authorities competent to create a truth discourse around species loss and conservation, through the rationalisation of species into an ordered catalogue of nonhuman life. But the involvement of nonhumans in this truth discourse exceeds a simple presence as scientific objects, and raises questions about whether we can think of biopower as authoritative about nonhumans without any account of how nonhumans might themselves testify to those truth claims, resist them, or actively participate to some degree in the making of scientific knowledge. An alternative account of scientific practice that moves towards such a distributed model of authority comes from Bruno Latour and others involved in theorising an actor-network approach, in which human and nonhuman agents are seen as collaboratively involved in the construction of scientific truth claims.44 On this account, scientific authority depends in part on the (nonlinguistic) ʻtestimonyʼ of nonhumans who are marshalled by scientists to establish the veracity of scientific accounts.45 While it is still human scientists who problematise the field of biodiversity loss, then, the array of authorities competent to ʻspeakʼ the truth discourses surrounding that field is distributed among both human and nonhuman. This line of argument about authority has three consequences. First, it speaks to the question of the ʻwhereabouts of powerʼ. One of the criticisms of Foucaultʼs analytic of power is that once it is taken past a specific institutional site into the broader practices of governing, it seems to be everywhere and nowhere.46 In a broader sense, space and place themselves seem to disappear from power. In the case of biodiversity sciences, at least, extending the participants in the biopower formation to nonhumans gives power concrete locations – in the places where data is collected, in the laboratories where representative samples are brought under the microscope, and in the bodies of species who experience different life-possibilities and pathways because of the process of classification. What makes biodiversity discourses potent at all, in other words, is the marshalling of human and nonhuman authorities to its truth-claims in particular places and particular biological bodies. Second, the intrusion of nonhuman life into authority-generating processes like the biodiversity census disrupts the human subject at the centre of modern biopower by forcing a new set of constituents into the political field who cannot quite be captured by it in the same way. Because the biopower depends on the relative flourishing of life, biopower cannot speak and act authoritatively on behalf of the health of global biopopulations and simultaneously extinguish them. The necessity of nonhuman life for biopower both enables its extension and increases the living things that disrupt biopowerʼs desire for smooth governing. To return to Foucaultʼs analysis of the death penalty, if biopower (in contrast with sovereign power) complicated the state killing its own citizens, then so too should ecological biopower be seen to complicate the domination of nonhumans (in modern relations with nature), including the ongoing anthropogenic species extinction event. Finally, if the Latourian understanding of authority as distributed between both scientists and scientific objects is correct, this critique should also apply to humans, in the human sciences that Foucault was considering. The authority of scientific claims depends not only on scientists, academics and public servants, but on the very human subjects that make authoritative claims possible. Not only is resistance coexistent with power within human subjectivity, as Foucault claimed,47 but a more distributed kind of authority also resides in the practices of biopower, among the subjects who take part in its data collections, experiments and interventions. 3.3. Biosocial collectivities In Foucaultʼs historical analysis, the formation of biopower occurs within the context of the rise of the modern nation-state. Yet the biodiversity crisis, which I have been thinking of here in terms of an extension of human biopower into biodiversity-power, presents a political situation in which there is a veritable state of emergency (species loss), and yet there is no state in which to declare such a state of emergency. This observation is true in two senses. It is true, first, in a spatial sense, in that the biodiversity crisis is global, yet there is no global state in which such a crisis could effectively be addressed.48 While a layer of global environmental governance may be growing and even using environmental problems as a way through which its expansion is made plausible,49 it does not yet have the logical or practical means to resolve the wider problems of social justice and development involved in the biodiversity crisis.50 In a second sense, there is also no political formation that accepts the participation of nonhumans within its confines. The nation-state is a modern, secular and thoroughly human mode of organisation, one that is based around a community of humans who in turn decide what is right or good for themselves and their environment. Its reasoning is decidedly and openly anthropocentric, as ecologists who advance biodiversityʼs cause almost all accept as a necessary part of communicating the biodiversity crisis to human publics.51 Similarly, the discourses of global governance draw on a thin kind of global political community,52 but they do not grasp nonhumans as participants in their ideological vision. Global governance is hardly democratic with respect to humans, much less politically inclusive of nonhumans.53 Understood in this way, when global governance discourses address biodiversity loss, they do so either as the next logical step in the postcolonial mission (moving from ʻcivilisation, progress, poverty, [to] environmental sustainabilityʼ),54 or as simply another problem area for governance to address.55 In the context of biopower that I have been considering, what then is the effect of global biodiversity census without a global state? If the modern census was part of a power-knowledge formation that was both organised by and constitutive of the nation-state as part of biopower, then a global biodiversity census should have some transformative effects in constituting political forms. The hypothesis that I want to suggest is that a biodiversity census will help construct new ideas of a multi-layered and multi-species global community. As a way into this hypothesis, consider the effect of the modern human population census on ideas of community. Benedict Anderson, for example, argues that the modern census was integrally related to the creation of the categories necessary for the creation of postcolonial nation-states. Anderson argues that the ʻ(confusedly) classifying mind of the colonial stateʼ created identities through the census that might not have been recognised as such by those who were censused and classified.56 The census involved a ʻtotalising classificatory grid, which could be applied with endless flexibility to anything under the stateʼs real or contemplated controlʼ.57 Yet by undertaking this project, the conditions of postcolonial nationalism were shaped and forms of intelligibility were constructed (and imposed) that were not otherwise there. For present-day aspirants to statehood, a census remains an important marker of a consolidated national citizenry, as in the push for a Palestinian census as a way towards achieving a de facto Palestinian state.58 Similarly, then, a global biodiversity census might be understood as part of constructing a global biocitizenry and in forming a global ecopolitical community. Rabinow and Rose suggest that biopower must include ʻstrategies for intervention in the name of life or health, initially addressed to populations that may or may not be territorialised upon the nation, society or pre-given communities, but may also be specified in terms of emergent bio-social collectivitiesʼ.59 Like Foucault, Rabinow and Rose are concerned with human populations, but their use of ʻbio-social collectivitiesʼ that are not necessarily dependent on a territorial population suggests the possibility of forms of community that are not tied to the nation-state. If the nation-state is not necessarily the right analogy for biosocial collectivities of humans and nonhumans, then Michael Hardt and Antonio Negriʼs expansion of biopower past Foucaultʼs state-bound apparatuses of governing points towards how a de-territorialised collectivity might be theorised.60 If Foucaultʼs use of biopower was used in the concrete historical analysis of the transition in nineteenth-century Europe from the sovereign state of absolute power over life and death to one ʻin the name of the peopleʼ of disciplinary and regulatory power, Hardt and Negri push the historical analysis forward another step by drawing from Gilles Deleuze the idea of a transition from a Foucaultian disciplinary society to a society of control. Disciplinary society exists in relation to individual subjects, setting the parameters of what is normal and deviant, prescribing the rules of social behaviour, and constructing the boundaries of the social space in which its citizens rattle around. Power in disciplinary society is concentrated in institutions. By contrast, a society of control moves into the very interior of its subjects. It regulates not from outside but through its distribution and internalisation into ʻbrains and bodiesʼ.61 It is a form of power that exists in networked interiorities (i.e., the linked, self-regulating consciousness of subjects), not in external impositions, limits, sanctions or structurings. Power in a society of control is also unique in the way that it is able to make biopower its exclusive terrain of reference. For Hardt and Negri, it is also a more totalising form of power than disciplinary power – it ʻextends throughout the depths of the consciousness and bodies of the population – and at the same time across the entirety of social relationsʼ.62 It is such an organising power that Hardt and Negri see as globally operative in the social production of subjects. But Hardt and Negri are critical of the way in which the global society of control has been considered in a disembodied way. They argue that the abstractions of language, communication, and intellectual ideas have been given productive precedence over the material and corporeal. 63 In their neo-Marxist reading, the potential of a biopolitical analysis rests with its study at the level of labour, production and bodies. If Marxist analysis of modern capitalism understood communication as external or secondary to the material relations of production, Hardt and Negri want to read it as internal and immanent to production in postmodern capitalism. The semiotic reconfiguration of postmodern capital that Escobar suggests is thus the very productive activity in Hardt and Negriʼs framework, and biopower is a Foucaultian/Marxist hybrid.64 In such a framework, biodiversity is something produced, and the ʻthingsʼ of biodiversity – the individuals, the species, the communicative fabric of science around which knowledge of them is built, the development projects of which biodiversity is a component – are implicated in a global society of control. Like Foucaultʼs conceptualisation of power, Hardt and Negriʼs vision of biopower as a field or fabric of social and capitalist production is an image that makes us see a total matrix of power. Yet their relative exclusion of nonhumans is curious, since there is a slew of nonhuman agents outside of that productive field. There is a multitude of nonhumans, so to speak, that includes the ʻbacterial proletariatʼ, in E.O. Wilsonʼs colourful metaphor and the nomadic animal populations who routinely exceed national borders.

2022 Michigan Kritik
AFF ANSWERS › Thesis – Empire = Wrong

Empire fails to account for 9/11 and events afterwards, making it useless in a contemporary context.

Moore ‘03 (David, Hardt and Negri's Empire and Real Empire: The Terrors of 9-11 and After, (Accessed 7/14/22) Economic History and Development Studies Programme, University of Natal, Durban, South Africa 4041.) //Doof

Are We All New Yorkers? It is ironic for Empire readers that the horror of 9-11 happened in the centre of the empire so vividly portrayed in that book. The Twin Towers symbolised everything Empire discussed. From the earth-encompassing power of finance capital, to internet capitalism’s connection and compression of space and time, and to the cosmopolitan nature of the workers there, the towers were the epitome of everything Empire loved and hated about the world today. Antonio Negri said ‘we are all New Yorkers’ in an interview after 9-11 (Cocco and Lazarrato 2002) and it is clear that the book he and Michael Hardt produced really does see the whole world as if it was New York. For Hardt and Negri, the global ‘multitude’ is composed of urban (and urbane) citizens whose autonomy and hybridity make institutions such as states, and ideologies such as religions, evaporate into the mists of the immaterial labour that now drive the world. The multitude’s labour is impossible to measure, so all of its members have equal value (cf. Resnick and Wolff 2001; Dyer-Witherford 2001) and they all really want the same thing. Be they waiters in the Greenwich Village cafés, analysts for the currency speculators on Wall Street, or professors at Columbia University – or at similar sites in New York’s image anywhere in the world – sometime soon they will all oppose capitalist exploitation and national oppression, replacing them with the joys of being a communist. The kind of resistance that brought the Twin Towers down, however, forces the irony to take an awkward and bitter twist. Al-Queda hardly represents the postmodern enemies of post-imperialism envisaged (for the most part) in Empire. Empire’s sweep is so vast and so fast that religion, nationalism and any of the other forces inspiring Osama bin-Laden and his many followers are in the dustbin. When these forces revisit the postmodern world their aspirations are ‘incommunicable’ (Hardt and Negri 2000, 54, Hardt and Negri 2001a; Negri 2002): it is as if they have arisen from the dead. Contrary to Empire, however, they dealt New York and – more importantly but also almost erased from the book – the state within which the city is ensconced a blow that catalysed a form of empire Hardt and Negri thought had disappeared. A ‘one state beats all’ form of imperial power has arisen from the ashes of Twin Towers. It is now wreaking terror in places such as Afghanistan and Iraq and chilling the hearts of European politicians and United Nations multilateralists – and it inspired 15 million members of the ‘multitude’ to demonstrate. But the people who guided their passenger-packed planes into the Twin Towers were not ‘New Yorkers’ in the mold of Hardt and Negri’s multitude. Nor were most of those in Iraq on whom bombs rained and American troops shot in March and April 2003. Neither are the Americans who supported the campaign. The actions, beliefs and structures of the world in the post 9-11 era are significantly different from those inscribed in Hardt and Negri’s Empire – as is the etiology of the event. There are three ways to assess Empire’s inability to foresee the world in the wake of 9-11. I list and analyse them in reverse order of theoretical priority (indicated in the abstract) because the spectacle of such an event as 9-11 demands that in this instance the ‘epiphenomenal’ comes first (Campbell 2001). Firstly, the act of terrorism that destroyed the Twin Towers and killed the approximately 3,000 people within it must be analysed in terms of the way in which Hardt and Negri understand the nature of resistance to global capitalism (or, in their lexicon, ‘the informational mode of production’). Their uncertainty about the agents and strategies of resistance lends ambiguity to their thinking about 9-11 and similar events. Secondly, the importance of the ‘state’ as a structure within both core and peripheral components of global society must be re-stated and theorised in the light of Empire’s elision of that task. The contradictions inherent in state formation in the third world combined with those of the construction and maintenance of American empire in the current global conjuncture create both the terror of ‘resistance’ from below and ‘régime change’ from above. Hardt and Negri tend to wish these complexities away in their construction of a world full of libertarian flows of desire and capital. The ‘terror from above’ that has been visited on Afghanistan and Iraq in the wake of 9-11 suggests the increasing dominance of American state power qua state power, instead of the erasure of such authority as predicted in Empire. Thirdly – and most critically in terms of structural fundamentals – it is necessary to undertake a foundational ‘political economy’ critique deconstructing Hardt and Negri’s assessment of the nature of the global capitalist system. Their hasty ironing out of the fundamentally uneven development of the global complex of state-society formations is simply unsustainable when one gets down to the ‘nitty-gritty’ of political economy. Empire smoothes out all of the contradictions of ‘third world’ development in spite of itself. This myopia regarding the underdeveloped world is at the root of Hardt and Negri’s too exuberant celebration of global cyber-capitalism – and thus also at the centre of their erasure of the state and their misunderstanding of the resistanceterror nexus. This essay will thus reposition empire on the ‘real world’ rather than the ethereal one created in Empire – while acknowledging that much of the required rethinking has been inspired by the simultaneously frustrating and stimulating book.

2022 Michigan Kritik
AFF ANSWERS › Thesis – NOT an Empire

The US works with independent nation states and its model of global leadership is not like traditional empires

Ikenberry ‘04 (G John, 2004, Illusions of Empire: Defining the New American Order, Council on Foreign Relations, (Accessed 7/14/22), G. John Ikenberry is Peter F. Krogh Professor of Geopolitics and Global Justice at Georgetown University and Transatlantic Fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the United States.) //Doof

The debate on empire is back. This is not surprising, as the United States dominates the world as no state ever has. It emerged from the Cold War the only superpower, and no geopolitical or ideological contenders are in sight. Europe is drawn inward, and Japan is stagnant. A half century after their occupation, the United States still provides security for Japan and Germany-the world's second- and third-largest economies. U.S. military bases and carrier battle groups ring the world. Russia is in a quasi-formal security partnership with the United States, and China has accommodated itself to U.S. dominance, at least for the moment. For the first time in the modern era, the world's most powerful state can operate on the global stage without the constraints of other great powers. We have entered the American unipolar age. The Bush administration's war on terrorism, invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, expanded military budget, and controversial 2002 National Security Strategy have thrust American power into the light of day-and, in doing so, deeply unsettled much of the world. Worry about the implications of American uni polarity is the not-so-hidden subtext of recent U.S.-European tension and has figured prominently in recent presidential elections in Germany, Brazil, and South Korea. The most fundamental questions about the nature of global politics-who commands and who benefits-are now the subject of conversation among long-time allies and adversaries alike. Power is often muted or disguised, but when it is exposed and perceived as domination, it inevitably invites response. One recalls the comment of Georges Clemenceau, who as a young politician said of the settlement ending the Franco Prussian War, "Germany believes that the logic of her victory means domination, while we do not believe that the logic of our defeat is serfdom." At Versailles a half-century later, he would impose just as harsh a peace on a defeated Germany. The current debate over empire is an attempt to make sense of the new uni polar reality. The assertion that the United States is bent on empire is, of course, not new. The British writer and labor politician Harold Laski evoked the looming Amer ican empire in 1947 when he said that "America bestrides the world like a colossus; neither Rome at the height of its power nor Great Britain in the period of economic supremacy enjoyed an influence so direct, so profound, or so pervasive...." And in deed, Dean Acheson and other architects of the postwar order were great admirers of the British Empire. Later, during the Vietnam War, left-wing thinkers and revisionist historians traced the same deep-rooted impulse toward militarism and empire through the history of U.S. foreign policy. The dean of this school, William Appleton Williams, argued in The Tragedy of American Diplomacy that the nation's genuine idealism had been subverted by the imperial pursuit of power and capitalist greed. Today, the "American empire" is a term of approval and optimism for some and disparagement and danger for others. Neoconservatives celebrate the imperial exercise of U.S. power, which, in a modern version of Rudyard Kipling's "white man's burden," is a liberal force that promotes democracy and undercuts tyranny, terrorism, military aggression, and weapons proliferation. Critics who identify an emerging American empire, meanwhile, worry about its unacceptable financial costs, its corrosive effect on democracy, and the threat it poses to the institutions and alliances that have secured U.S. national interests since World War II. THE "E" WORD No one disagrees that U.S. power is extraordinary. It is the character and logic of U.S. domination that is at issue in the debate over empire. The United States is not just a superpower pursuing its interest; it is a producer of world order. Over the decades-with more support than resistance from other nations-it has fashioned a distinctively open and rule-based international order. Its dynamic bundle of oversized capacities, interests, and ideals constitutes an "American project" with unprecedented global reach. For better or worse, other states must come to terms with or work around this protean order. Scholars often characterize international relations as the interaction of sovereign states in an anarchic world. In the classic Westphalian world order, states hold a monopoly on the use of force in their own territory while order at the international level is maintained through the diffusion of power among states. Today's unipolar world turns the Westphalian image on its head. The United States possesses a near-monopoly on the use of force internationally; on the domestic level, meanwhile, the institutions and behaviors of states are increasingly open to global-that is, American-scrutiny. Since September 11th, the Bush administration's assertion of "contingent sovereignty" and the right of preemption have made this transformation abundantly clear. The rise of unipolarity and the simultaneous unbundling of state sovereignty is a new and volatile brew. But is the resulting political formation an empire? And if so, will the American empire suffer the fate of great empires of the past: ravaging the world with its ambitions and excesses until overextension, miscalculation, and mounting opposition hasten its collapse? The term "empire" refers to the political control by a dominant country of the domestic and foreign policies of weaker countries. The European colonial empires of the late nineteenth century were the most direct, formal kind. The Soviet "sphere of influence" in Eastern Europe entailed an equally coercive but less direct form of control. The British Empire included both direct colonial rule and "informal empire." If empire is defined loosely, as a hierarchical system of political relationships in which the most powerful state exercises decisive influence, then the United States today indeed qualifies. If the United States is an empire, how ever, it is like no other before it. To be sure, it has a long tradition of pursuing crude imperial policies, most notably in Latin America and the Middle East. But for most countries, the U.S.-led order is a negotiated system wherein the United States has sought participation by other states on terms that are mutually agreeable. This is true in three respects. First, the United States has provided public goods particularly the extension of security and the support for an open trade regime in exchange for the cooperation of other states. Second, power in the U.S. system is exercised through rules and institutions; power politics still exist, but arbitrary and indiscriminate power is reigned in. Finally, weaker states in the U.S.-led order are given "voice opportunities"-informal access to the policymaking processes of the United States and the intergovernmental institutions that make up the international system. It is these features of the post-194S international order that have led historians such as Charles Maier to talk about a "consensual empire" and Geir Lundestad to talk about an "empire of invitation." The American order is hierarchical and ultimately sustained by economic and military power, but it is put at the service of an expanding system of democracy and capitalism.Fundamentally, then, the debate over the new American empire hinges on how extensive and deeply rooted these characteristics are-and whether its assertion of power since September 11 constitutes a fundamental break with this liberal past. THE GLOBAL RACKET In The Sorrows of Empire, Chalmers Johnson advances the disturbing claim that the United States' Cold War-era military power and far-flung base system have, in the last decade, been consolidated in a new form of global imperial rule. The United States, according to Johnson has become "a military juggernaut intent on world domination." Driven by a triumphalist ideology, an exaggerated sense of threats, and a self serving military-industrial complex, this juggernaut is tightening its grip on much of the world. The Pentagon has replaced the State Department as the primary shaper of foreign policy. Military commanders in regional headquarters are modern-day proconsuls, warrior-diplomats who direct the United States' imperial reach. Johnson fears that this military empire will corrode democracy, bankrupt the nation, spark opposition, and ultimately end in a Soviet-style collapse. In this rendering, the American military empire is a novel form of domination. Johnson describes it as an "international protection racket: mutual defense treaties, military advisory groups, and military forces stationed in foreign countries to 'defend' against often poorly defined, overblown, or nonexistent threats." These arrangements create "satellites"-Ostensibly independent countries whose foreign relations revolve around the imperial state. Johnson argues that this variety of empire was pioneered during the Cold War by the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe and the United States in East Asia. Great empires of the past-the Romans and the Han Dynasty Chinese-ruled their domains with permanent military encampments that garrisoned conquered territory. The American empire is innovative because it is not based on the acquisition of territory; it is an empire of bases. Johnson's previous polemic, Blowback, asserted that post-1945 U.S. spheres of influence in East Asia and Latin America were as coercive and exploitative as their Soviet counterparts. The Sorrows of Empire continues this dubious line. Echoing 1960s revisionism, Johnson asserts that the United States' Cold War security system of alliances and bases was built on manufactured threats and driven by expansionary impulses. The United States was not acting in its own defense; it was exploiting opportunities to build an empire. The Soviet Union and the United States, according to this argument, were more alike than different: both militarized their societies and foreign policies and expanded outward, establishing imperial rule through "hub and spoke" systems of client states and political dependencies. In Johnson's view, the end of the Cold War represented both an opportunity and a crisis for U.S. global rule-an opportunity because the Soviet sphere of influence was now open for imperial expansion, a crisis because the fall of the Soviet Union ended the justification for the global system of naval bases, airfields, army garrisons, espionage listening posts, and strategic enclaves. Only with the terrorist attacks of September 11th was this crisis resolved. Bush suddenly had an excuse to expand U.S. military domination. September 11 also allowed the United States to remove the fig leaf of alliance partnership. Washington could now disentangle itself from international commitments, treaties, and law and launch direct imperial rule. Unfortunately, Johnson offers no coherent theory of why the United States seeks empire. At one point, he suggests that the American military empire is founded on "a vast complex of interests, commitments, and projects." The empire of bases has become institutionalized in the military establishment and has taken on a life of its own. There is no discussion, however, of the forces within U.S. politics that resist or reject empire. As a result, Johnson finds imperialism everywhere and in everything the United States does, in its embrace of open markets and global economic integration as much as in its pursuit of narrow economic gains. Johnson also offers little beyond passing mention about the societies presumed to be under Washington's thumb. Domination and exploitation are, of course, not always self-evident. Military pacts and security partnerships are clearly part of the structure of U.S. global power, and they often rein force fragile and corrupt governments in order to project U.S. influence. But countries can also use security ties with the United States to their own advantage. Japan may be a subordinate security part ner, but the U.S.-Japan alliance also allows Tokyo to forgo a costly buildup of military capacity that would destabilize East Asia. Moreover, countries do have other options: they can, and often do, escape U.S. domination simply by asking the United States to leave. The Philippines did so, and South Korea may be next. The variety and complexity of U.S. security ties with other states makes Johnson's simplistic view of military hegemony misleading. In fact, the U.S. alliance system remarkably intact after half a century-has helped create a stable, open political space. Cooperative security is not just an instrument of U.S. domination; it is also a tool of political architecture. But Johnson neglects the broader complex of U.S.-supported multilateral rules and institutions that give depth and complexity to the international order. Ultimately, it is not clear what the United States could do-short of retreating into its borders or ceasing to exist-that would save it from Johnson's condemnation. PAX AMERICANA In Colossus, Niall Ferguson argues that the United States is indeed an empire and has been for a long time. To Ferguson, however, it is a liberal empire that upholds rules and institutions and underwrites public goods by maintaining peace, ensuring freedom of the seas and skies, and managing a system of international trade and finance. The United States is the imperfect but natural inheritor of the British system of global governance; it is open and integrative and inclined toward informal rule. Accordingly, Ferguson's worry is not that the world will get too much American empire but that it will not get enough. U.S. leaders, for all their benign intent, have unusually short attention spans and tend to go "wobbly." In Ferguson's view, the United States shares many characteristics with past empires. Like Rome, it has remarkably open citizenship. "Purple Hearts and U.S. citizenship were conferred simultaneously on a number of the soldiers serving in Iraq last year, just as service in the legions was once a route to becoming a civis romanus," Ferguson writes. "Indeed, with the classical architecture of its capital and the republican structure of its constitution, the United States is perhaps more like a 'new Rome' than any previous empire-albeit a Rome in which the Senate has thus far retained its grip on would-be emperors." The spread of America's language, ideas, and culture also invites comparison to Rome at its zenith. But Ferguson is even more taken by parallels with the British Empire. U.S. presidents, from Woodrow Wilson, Franklin Roosevelt, and John F. Kennedy to Ronald Reagan, Bill Clinton, and George W. Bush, have put their power work promoting the great liberal ideals of economic openness, democracy, limited government, human dignity, and the rule of law-a "strategy of openness" that is remarkably similar, Ferguson argues, to the aspirations of the British Empire in the second half of the nineteenth century. After all, it was a young Winston Churchill who argued that the aim of British imperialism was to "give peace to warring tribes, to administer justice where all was violence, to strike the chains off the slave, to draw the richness from the soil, to place the earliest seeds of commerce and learning, to increase in whole peoples their capacities for pleasure and diminish their chances of pain.... " Most of Colossus retells the familiar story of the rise of U.S. global dominance as an exercise in liberal empire. What is distinctive about American imperialism, according to Ferguson, is that it has been pursued in the name of anti-imperialism. For each phase of U.S. history, Ferguson nicely illuminates the tensions between republican ideals and the exercise of global power and shows how those tensions are often resolved. The Cold War-and George Kennan's doctrine of containment-provides the ultimate example of this fusion of anti-imperialism and hard power. Security, openness, democratic community, political commitment, and the mobilization of U.S. power went together. The core of U.S. global rule involved the enforcement of rules of economic openness, but the United States was also willing to act forcefully to integrate countries into the liberal order. Ferguson's most interesting claim is that the world needs more of this liberal American empire. This argument stems in part from the uncontroversial claim that the current international order needs enlightened leadership and that only Washington can provide it. (Ferguson holds little hope that Europe will ever overcome its preoccupation with the internal contradictions of its enlargement.) It is especially the wider system of sovereign but failed states that needs imperial supervision by Washington. In vast swatches of Africa, Asia, and the Middle East national self determination has led to much grief. Ferguson argues without qualification that "the experiment with political independence-especially in Africa-has been a disaster for most poor countries." To Ferguson, the extension of liberal empire into these regions (even involving some form of colonial rule) is necessary. What precisely these imperial arrangements would look like, however, remains unclear. When Ferguson says that he is "fundamentally in favor of empire," he is to some extent pulling a conceptual sleight of hand. What Ferguson means by "liberal empire" scholars have previously called "liberal hegemony": a hierarchical order that is still very different from traditional forms of empire. By virtue of its power, the liberal hegemon can act on its long-term interests rather than squabble over short-term gains with other states; it can identify its own national interests with the openness and stability of the larger system. The United States thus shapes and dominates the international order while guaranteeing a flow of benefits to other governments that earns their acquiescence. In contrast to empire, this negotiated order depends on agreement over the rules of the system between the leading state and everyone else. In this way, the norms and institutions that have developed around U.S. hegemony both limit the actual coercive exercise of U.S. power and draw other states into the management of the system. Ferguson's case for the virtues of American empire hinges on his claim that in the aftermath of the Soviet Union's collapse, the world could have gone one of two ways: international order organized around independent nations or an American imperium. He maintains that a world of decentralized, competing states, many of which are not democracies, would result in chaos. This may be true; he is certainly right that stability and open markets are not easily sustained without the support of powerful states. But the notion of liberal empire conflates very different types of U.S.-led order. One in which Washington coerces other states into obedience is very different from a system of multilateral rules and close partnerships. The challenges of peace and economic development that Ferguson identifies are best pursued by advanced democracies working together. Ultimately, such a cooperative order would require that Washington transcend the atavistic habits of empire rather than pursue a more complete realization of it. In the end, Ferguson finds invoking the image of empire useful for political reasons. Unlike the British, Americans do not believe that they operate an empire. As a result, the United States makes a flighty and impatient imperial power (in contrast to the British, who acquired a cultural mentality for global rule). Ferguson thinks that speaking honestly about the reality of American empire will foster understanding of its duties and obligations. Yet precisely the opposite is true. The United States does not need to view the world as its Raj and deploy a colonial service to the vast periphery; it needs to find ways to exercise its power in sustained, legitimate ways, working with others and developing more complex forms of cooperative international governance. It is also extremely doubtful that the American people would accept such a massive imperial undertaking: last September, as soon as President Bush revealed the price tag for occupying Iraq, public support plummeted immediately.

2022 Michigan Kritik
FRAMEWORK › DA – Martial Politics

Martial Politics DA: Academia is deeply intertwined with the logics of militarization. Their model of “switch side debate” and “predictability” isn’t neutral but based in a fundamentally militarist starting point, and you should heavily err [x] on substance due to the bias of the university.

Howell 18 [Alison Howell (2018), Associate Professor of Political Science at Rutgers University, Forget “militarization”: race, disability and the “martial politics” of the police and of the university, International Feminist Journal of Politics, 20:2, 117-136, DOI: 10.1080/14616742.2018.1447310]

Just as “militarization” has guided inquiry into contemporary police violence, it has also been used to call attention to worrying connections between the university and the US national security apparatus. One prominent example is the series of Vice News reports exposing the “100 Most Militarized Universities in America” (Arkin and O’Brien 2015a, 2015b). The authors of the study note that initially they were reluctant to use the term “militarization,” which was not meant to simply evoke … ROTC [Reserve Officer Training Corps] drills held on a campus quad. It was also a measure of university labs funded by US intelligence agencies, administrators with strong ties to those same agencies, and, most importantly, the educational backgrounds of the approximately 1.4 million people who hold Top Secret clearance. (Arkin and O’Brien 2015a) But “militarization” leads us to underestimate the depth and extent of national security ties to the university, past and present, and to assume that universities can revert to some non-militarized past. This limitation is also evident in scholarly literature. One of the central scholarly texts on the so-called “militarization” of the university is Giroux’s The University in Chains (2007). Cited hundreds of times, and reported on in popular media, it argues that the post-9/11 period saw a significant acceleration of the corporatization and militarization of the university (Giroux 2007, 2008). Giroux goes so far as to say that while corporatization had previously taken root in the university, “it is only in the aftermath of 9/11 that the university has also become an intense site of militarization” (Giroux 2008, 58). Furthermore, “militarization” of the university begins for Giroux only after World War II (see also Chomsky et al. 1998). These popular and scholarly works identify important changes in the nature of military involvement in universities. For example, the Vice report notes that funding now flows to intelligence-gathering disciplines (e.g., computer science) rather than solely weapons-oriented ones (e.g., physics). Yet research guided by the concept of “militarization” falls into the trap of imagining military encroachment on previously civil institutions: “the idea of the university as a site of critical thinking, public service and socially responsible research appears to have been usurped” (Giroux 2008, 63). This is a fantasy. The university was never such a pure site. Many American universities were built with slave labor or its proceeds (Brown University Committee on Slavery and Justice n.d.), and from the outset have contributed vitally to colonization and White supremacy. By positing a purely civilian “before” to a military “after,” “militarization” accounts wrongfully elide this history. In the American university no such “before” exists. This is not to say nothing has changed. Seeing the university as a site of “martial politics” allows us to provide a historical account attuned to the ways in which politics is shaped by the precise forms warfare takes. Most academic disciplines – the very categories by which we organize knowledge – were fundamentally shaped by conquest, warfare and military funding. This is not only true for IR, a discipline born out of colonialism and war (Vitalis 126 A. HOWELL 2015), but for any number of other disciplines from physics (Gusterson 1998, 2011) to business (Cowen 2014) to neuroscience (Howell 2017). Excavating these histories gives us a sense of how thoroughly we live with “martial politics.” Several disciplines were said to have been “militarized” after 9/11. Most controversially, medicine, psychiatry, psychology and anthropology all had major debates about involvement in torture and warfare in their professional associations. In anthropology, for example, this debate concerned the 2008 establishment of Project Minerva (which provided $50 million in defense funding to social sciences) and the recruitment of anthropologists in counterinsurgency warfare through the Human Terrain Program (Gusterson 2009). To describe this as the “militarization” of anthropology, however, is to ignore that anthropology is foundationally a colonial discipline set up to catalog “primitive” subject peoples, with a long history of entanglement with the security state, not least in Cold War-era counterinsurgency operations in Latin America and Asia (Gusterson 2009). The concept of “martial politics” allows us to pose new questions about the historical relationship between formal knowledge production and forms of warfare, rather than just relations between the university and the military. It allows us to ask how certain forms of warfare are produced by, and produce, academic disciplines. The nature of this mutual production will differ depending on the particular military strategy undertaken at any historical moment. The case of psychology is instructive here. After psychologists were implicated in devising, administering and overseeing torture at the US naval base at Guantánamo Bay (Howell 2007), concern was raised about the “militarization” of psychology (Ariggo, Eidelson, and Bennett 2012). Again, this concern assumes that the discipline was once free from involvement in war or colonialism, and that an unusual trespass occurred after 9/11. Not so. Since almost its very foundation, psychology has been tied to forms of military strategy. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, psychology was a fledgling discipline and was understood as a humanistic form of knowledge. That changed drastically in World War I. At that time Robert Yerkes, a eugenics proponent and professor of psychology, was President of the American Psychological Association. Convinced that psychologists could be of service in the war, and that war could be useful to psychologists, Yerkes approached the US Army with a proposition: he could help the Army with its personnel problem (of appropriately placing the massive number of new recruits) in return for funding and access to an unprecedented number of subjects on which to experiment: soldiers. World War I enabled the first mass scientific experiment in psychology in the form of intelligence testing. The data accumulated provided fodder for a generation of psychologists, establishing the experiment as the primary methodology of psychology and massively reshaping the discipline from a philosophical/humanistic one into an (American) science. This constitutes a symbiotic relationship: psychology was not “militarized” in World War I. Rather, it propelled a particular kind of warfare: industrial warfare conducted on frontlines, involving mass mobilization and requiring new personnel management techniques. Wartime support, in return, worked to reshape psychology into a science. The academy is not the victim of military breach but has foundationally been produced and formed, in its specificities, through warfare – and has formed warfare in return as a technology of security (Howell 2011). Psychology was already well steeped in the racist and ableist science of eugenics prior to World War I (Mitchell and Snyder 2003; Carey 2009; Thomson 2010), but through military funding it was able to systematize its eugenicism as a science of “intelligence.” This martial entanglement did not end with the war and the return of psychology to “domestic” applications. Intelligence data not only established psychology as a science but went on to practical applications in war-like relations of disability and race both within the US and other colonial settings. Three examples follow that demonstrate this move. First, the data from the Army experiment produced results that “proved” that the average American had the intelligence level of a 13-year-old, just above the level of “moron” (an ableist construct). This contributed to a moral panic about the degeneration of the “stock” of the American nation due to Southern European immigrants, and led to some of the first sweeping US immigration restrictions. It also bolstered mental hygiene and eugenics movements, promoting the sterilization of disabled, racialized, Indigenous or “promiscuous” women who were labeled feeble-minded (Carey 2003). This form of martial politics perpetrates violence especially on women’s bodies, managing their sexuality and reproductive capacities for the purposes of extirpating “dangerous” or degenerate populations. Second, since they were constructed by White men who saw “intelligence” in their own image, the Army tests unsurprisingly placed the “negro” at the bottom of a racist (and sexist) hierarchy of intelligence (Mensh and Mensh 1991; Gould 1999). With their sheen of objective science, these very same Army tests were administered in South Africa and other colonies, justifying colonial rule and later Apartheid. Finally, Carl Brigham, who was part of the Army experiment team, and later a Princeton University professor and member of the advisory council of the American Eugenics Society, went on to create the high school Scholastic Aptitude Tests (SATs). The SATs remain the cornerstone of one of the most pernicious and racist aspects of the Army tests’ afterlife: standardized testing. This regime, to this day, outrageously ranks African American students as having 128 A. HOWELL lower intelligence, or aptitude, significantly reducing access to higher education and thus economic mobility. All this history, all these contributions of the discipline of psychology to unjust dynamics surrounding race, disability, poverty and gender, are shuttered by a “militarization” framework because it assumes that when psychology is used in war (e.g., in torture) that this is an aberration rather than part of a broad history of violence done to marginalized people, citizens and enemies alike. In thinking through the “martial politics” of the university, any number of disciplines could be subjected to this kind of analysis. Returning to Maneuvers, consider the case of nursing, to which Enloe (2000) directs her attention in assessing the “militarization” of women’s lives. The chapter in question perceptively begins with Florence Nightingale, who is widely considered to be the “mother” of nursing, a pioneer in statistical visualization and a major figure in the reform of public health and medical care in both the Crimean War and Victorian workhouses. Yet Nightingale sits uneasily in a framework that inquires into the “militarization” of women’s lives because, as Enloe (2000, 204) shows, as a patriotic upper-class White English woman, she herself was active in propelling “militarization.” Because of its “militarization” framework, Enloe’s account misses the fact that warfare and nursing were both modernized and professionalized through their mutual encounter. Nightingale’s innovations transformed siege warfare, helping ensure British victory in the Crimea, and laid the foundations for World War I industrial warfare. After Nightingale returned from the war she was instrumental in creating nursing as a profession and discipline of study, using techniques developed for military purposes in “domestic” settings such as workhouses. The story here is not one of military encroachment on nursing; rather, nursing became a discipline and profession initially through war, and subsequently through war-like relations with the poor. This symbiosis between war and academic disciplines such as nursing, psychology and – for that matter – IR should make it unsurprising when war-like relations are propelled through knowledge created in these disciplines. When we view academic disciplines, or indeed the university as a whole, through the lens of “martial politics” it becomes clear they are not innocent domains sullied by military values. Rather, like the can of soup, their form and function are embedded in how they emerge out of and simultaneously shape warfare. Even when “militarization” accounts are historical, they lead us to misconstrue the importance and nature of that history. When there is violence in domestic political life – whether the outright violence of killer cops or the structural violence of the SATs – it is not that “war” is encroaching on “peace,” and it is not that “the military” is trespassing on the “civilian.” Rather, “martial politics” are fundamental to the constitution and continued production of liberal democracies such as the US. This is not directed equally at all parts of the population but targets those who are constituted as a threat to the nation’s strength or civil order.

2022 Michigan Kritik
FRAMEWORK › DA – Militarism

Militarism DA: the ideology of empire is not just within the military itself, but maintained through a subtler hum of the machine within education, making it a critical site for the resistance of imperialism.

Johnson 18 [Brooke, Deakin, Jo; Taylor, Emmeline; Kupchik, Aaron (2018). The Palgrave International Handbook of School Discipline, Surveillance, and Social Control || Educating for War: Militarization and the Manufacturing of Consent Through Public Schooling. , 10.1007/978-3-319-71559-9(Chapter 4), 65–86. doi:10.1007/978-3-319-71559-9_4 ] <jericho>

After several years living abroad, I returned to Southern California in late 2003. One afternoon, I was stuck in traffic behind a pickup truck and seeing little else from my compact car but the back of the truck, a black and white bumper sticker defiantly asked me, “Got War?” I stared at that bumper sticker modeled after a 90s “Got Milk?” ad for the next 16 miles and thought of little else. Got War? I was curious, what is this bumper sticker trying to tell me? What message is it trying to send? Do we not already have war? Do we need war? The original milk advertisement was silly, grown adults with childish milk mustaches staring into the camera. Is war as frivolous as a milk mustache? Something to be consumed and enjoyed? Something nostalgic even? This bumper sticker was stuck to the back of that pickup truck at the height of the Iraq War, and undoubtedly the USA was a nation at war, but then as it is now, the USA is also a nation of war. Hardt and Negri (2004) argue that we have entered an era of “perpetual war” where militarized aggression and war are no longer the exception, but rather the “normal state of affairs” (21). The USA has engaged in some type of military action for over 80% of its total history (Torreon 2015). The USA is not only the largest global arms exporter (SIPRI 2016), but it also leads the world in military expenditures ($596 billion in 2015); is responsible for 36% of the total world military spending (Perlo-Freeman et al. 2016); and spends almost three times more than the next biggest spender China ($215 billion) B. Johnson (*) Northeastern Illinois University, Chicago, IL, USA 66 and more than the next top seven countries combined (Perlo-Freeman et al. 2016). The US military employs 3.5 million people and is the single largest employer of US youth (Dickinson 2012) and the single largest general employer in the USA (Department of Defense 2014) and astoundingly the world (Taylor 2015). Such statistics are easy to point out, clear examples of the influence and power of the US military globally and domestically, but what about the subtler, quieter hum of the military machine? Camouflage popping up in children’s clothing? Boot camp fitness classes at the gym? Humvees on grocery runs in the suburbs? Retired military personnel running schools? Flyovers at football games? “Got War?” bumper stickers? The reach of military influence is vast and varied, quietly infiltrating the minutia of our everyday lives. In fact, the culture of militarism seeps into so many different aspects of our lives that it is taken for granted and largely unnoticed (Finley 2012; Lutz 2012). The “step-by-step process by which a person or a thinking gradually comes to be controlled by the military or comes to depend for its well-being on militaristic ideas” is militarization (Enloe 2000, 3). It is a process of aligning cultural, institutional, economic, and social processes with militaristic values, beliefs, and practices. The more inline a society is with militaristic values and practices, the more accepted military action and the process of militarization itself becomes to the point where militarization is ordinary and even blandly normal (Enloe 2000). Militarization becomes as normal as a milk mustache and as easy as attaching a “Got War?” tagline. In a militarized society, a solution to any number of social problems is militarized including inner-city crime and violence, troubled youth, national security, and even struggling public schools. Military personnel are viewed as wielding the smart weapons of discipline and leadership to right any tilting ship. High-ranking military personnel are sent to negotiate international alliances in place of seasoned diplomats. Bravery is not diplomacy, compromise, or compassion, but martial aggression. Video games, children’s toys, films, and television programs glorify the military and martial ideals, and militaristic violence is another form of Friday night entertainment (Lenoir and Lowood 2000; Stahl 2010; Vavrus 2013). Military recruiters freely roam the halls of public schools argued to be important role models for “at risk” youth (read working class or poor kids of color). For example, The Troops to Teachers program pushes military personnel through the teacher credentialing process placing these teachers in “high need” schools. Military personnel are placed atop corporations and large organizations regardless of experience or expertise.1 B. Johnson 67 Militarization is more than just the dominance of military values across different aspects of civil society; it is also nestled within social inequalities. Domestic militarization is found in the violence focused on and against people of color, such as militarized policing (Gilmore 2000). It is “seen in the rise of the prison-industrial complex, the passing of retrograde legislation that targets immigrants, the appearance of gated communities, the widespread use of racial profiling by the police and the ongoing attacks on the welfare state” (Giroux 2003, 39). Militarization is situational and bound by social context. The militarization of children is normalized within the USA (JROTC and Boy and Girl Scout programs), but criticized heavily when it occurs abroad, especially in non-Western countries such as Somalia or Uganda (Macmillan 2011). The organized violence of military service by young people is respected, valued, and constructed in direct opposition to the disorganized violence of youth gangs or social justice groups—viewed as dangerous especially if these groups comprise poor and working-class youth of color (Basham 2011). But the militarization of public education is complicated. On the one hand, schools in the USA are locations of intense militarization pushing uncritical nationalism and blind obedience, both of which buttress militarization and permanent war (Elmore 2012). Schools are also one of the most important institutional sites for resistance of militarization and the simultaneous fostering of democracy as schools can provide the necessary skills for a critically conscious citizenry. It is important then to understand how public education is militarized as well as how militarization can be and is resisted. This chapter focuses on the justifications and implications of the militarization of public education in the USA, specifically in the Kindergarten to 12th-grade levels. There are two major periods of intensification of militarization in public education. Militarization increased dramatically beginning in the 1970s alongside the growing influence of neoliberalism and again after the events of 9/11 as fear and disdain for critical inquiry and dissent took hold of national subjectivity. This chapter illustrates how militarization works in tandem with neoliberalism and a culture of fear to discipline, control, and produce militarized consent through education policies, programs, and institutions.

2022 Michigan Kritik
FRAMEWORK › FW – Epistemology First

Evaluate epistemology first – Empire is constructed through various self-legitimating hegemonic discourses, but under each is an alternative ontology of liberation which can only be revealed through a priori deconstruction

Hardt/Negri ‘2K (Michael Hardt; professor of literature at Duke University. Antonio Negri; independent researcher and philosopher, previously a professor of political science at University of Padua. “Empire” pg 46-49 2000) // ELog

The legacy of modernity is a legacy of fratricidal wars, devastating ‘‘development,’’ cruel ‘‘civilization,’’ and previously unimagined violence. Erich Auerbach once wrote that tragedy is the only genre that can properly claim realism in Western literature, and perhaps this is true precisely because of the tragedy Western modernity has imposed on the world.5 Concentration camps, nuclear weapons, genocidal wars, slavery, apartheid: it is not difficult to enumerate the various scenes of the tragedy. By insisting on the tragic character of modernity, however, we certainly do not mean to follow the ‘‘tragic’’ philosophers of Europe, from Schopenhauer to Heidegger, who turn these real destructions into metaphysical narratives about the negativity of being, as if these actual tragedies were merely an illusion, or rather as if they were our ultimate destiny! Modern negativity is located not in any transcendent realm but in the hard reality before us: the fields of patriotic battles in the First and Second World Wars, from the killing fields at Verdun to the Nazi furnaces and the swift annihilation of thousands in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the carpet bombing of Vietnam and Cambodia, the massacres from Se´tifand Soweto to Sabra and Shatila, and the list goes on and on. There is no Job who can sustain such suffering! (And anyone who starts compiling such a list quickly realizes how inadequate it is to the quantity and quality of the tragedies.) Well, if that modernity has come to an end, and if the modern nation-state that served as the ineluctable condition for imperialist domination and innumerable wars is disappearing from the world scene, then good riddance! We must cleanse ourselves of any misplaced nostalgia for the belle e´poque of that modernity. We cannot be satisfied, however, with that political condemnation of modern power that relies on the historia rerum gestarum, the objective history we have inherited. We need to consider also the power of the res gestae, the power of the multitude to make history that continues and is reconfigured today within Empire. It is a question of transforming a necessity imposed on the multitude—a necessity that was to a certain extent solicited by the multitude itself throughout modernity as a line of flight from localized misery and exploitation—into a condition of possibility of liberation, a new possibility on this new terrain of humanity. This is when the ontological drama begins, when the curtain goes up on a scene in which the development of Empire becomes its own critique and its process of construction becomes the process of its overturning. This drama is ontological in the sense that here, in these processes, being is produced and reproduced. This drama will have to be clarified and articulated much further as our study proceeds, but we should insist right from the outset that this is not simply another variant of dialectical enlightenment. We are not proposing the umpteenth version of the inevitable passage through purgatory (here in the guise of the new imperial machine) in order to offer a glimmer of hope for radiant futures. We are not repeating the schema of an ideal teleology that justifies any passage in the name of a promised end. On the contrary, our reasoning here is based on two methodological approaches that are intended to be nondialectical and absolutely immanent: the first is critical and deconstructive, aiming to subvert the hegemonic languages and social structures and thereby reveal an alternative ontological basis that resides in the creative and productive practices of the multitude; the second is constructive and ethico-political, seeking to lead the processes of the production of subjectivity toward the constitution of an effective social, political alternative, a new constituent power.6 Our critical approach addresses the need for a real ideological and material deconstruction of the imperial order. In the postmodern world, the ruling spectacle of Empire is constructed through a variety of self-legitimating discourses and structures. Long ago authors as diverse as Lenin, Horkheimer and Adorno, and Debord recognized this spectacle as the destiny of triumphant capitalism. Despite their important differences, such authors offer us real anticipations of the path of capitalist development.7 Our deconstruction of this spectacle cannot be textual alone, but must seek continually to focus its powers on the nature of events and the real determinations of the imperial processes in motion today. The critical approach is thus intended to bring to light the contradictions, cycles, and crises of the process because in each of these moments the imagined necessity of the historical development can open toward alternative possibilities. In other words, the deconstruction of the historia rerum gestarum, of the spectral reign of globalized capitalism, reveals the possibility of alternative social organizations. This is perhaps as far as we can go with the methodological scaffolding of a critical and materialist deconstructionism—but this is already an enormous contribution!8 This is where the first methodological approach has to pass the baton to the second, the constructive and ethico-political approach. Here we must delve into the ontological substrate of the concrete alternatives continually pushed forward by the res gestae, the subjective forces acting in the historical context. What appears here is not a new rationality but a new scenario of different rational acts—a horizon of activities, resistances, wills, and desires that refuse the hegemonic order, propose lines of flight, and forge alternative constitutive itineraries. This real substrate, open to critique, revised by the ethico-political approach, represents the real ontological referent of philosophy, or really the field proper to a philosophy of liberation. This approach breaks methodologically with every philosophy of history insofar as it refuses any deterministic conception of historical development and any ‘‘rational’’ celebration of the result. It demonstrates, on the contrary, how the historical event resides in potentiality. ‘‘It is not the two that recompose in one, but the one that opens into two,’’ according to the beautiful anti-Confucian (and anti-Platonic) formula of the Chinese revolutionaries.9 Philosophy is not the owl of Minerva that takes flight after history has been realized in order to celebrate its happy ending; rather, philosophy is subjective proposition, desire, and praxis that are applied to the event.

2022 Michigan Kritik
FRAMEWORK › AT: Realism

Realism serves as a globalist framing to homogenize all experience to a western conception of the world -- reject it

COLEBROOK 14 (Clare Colebrook - cultural theorist, currently appointed Edwin Erle Sparks Professor of English at Pennsylvania State University. She has published numerous works on Gilles Deleuze, visual art, poetry, queer theory, film studies, contemporary literature, theory, cultural studies and visual culture) (2014). Death of the PostHuman : Essays on Extinction, Vol. 1. Ann Arbor: Open Humanities Press. doi: 10.3998/ohp.12329362.0001.001//vivi

The word ‘globalism’ along with the word ‘biopolitics’ suffers from a curious double valence. As a descriptive term globalism can refer to the lost autonomy and destroyed difference among worlds: the formation of global media, markets and communications eliminated what was once a panorama of difference. Once upon a time the globe enjoyed divergent timelines and worldviews. Even if it was central to the colonialist imagination to romanticize the extent to which ‘other’ worlds were exotically untranslatable, mystical and embedded in a non-linear time, there is nevertheless a very real sense in which globalism has created an earth of a single time, single market and single polity. Globalism would be a mode of homogenization, disenchantment or rendering quantifiable that one could lament as having displaced an earlier world of distinct places for the sake of one quantifiable space. This reduction of distinction has significant material consequences; today, any particular country’s environmental or wage policies will directly alter the day to day life of bodies elsewhere on the globe. But global inclusion and simultaneity also trigger a series of imaginary ramifications. In positive terms this has been described by Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri in terms of a new multitude. Liberated from nation states and physical locales there can now be a humanity as such, a self-creating living labor that has no body other than that which it gives itself through its own immaterial productive powers (Hardt and Negri 2004). Thought less optimistically, one might say that the physical ability to occupy converging and synchronized worlds and times is coupled with a cognitive paralysis to think of any future that would not be one more chapter in a familiar collective narrative. This is evident in the terms that are used to describe the predicament of the globe. It is not only the case that events are materially and systemically linked, so that the volatile economies of even the smallest countries may precipitate global crises; it is also typical today to see all of financial history as similarly continuous and interconnected. This occurs both in short-term and long-term thinking; recent events have prompted the publication of a series of histories and genealogies, including the histories of debt, of money, of corporations, bonds and markets: all suggesting that the present is an expression and extension of a single history of something like ‘the’ globe (Ferguson 2008; Cashill 2010; Graeber 2011; Coggan 2012; Bakan 2005). Economic events are considered in relation to a past that we have been unable to think as anything other than differing by degree. Despite the new global conditions and linkages the 2008 cascade of economic crises were gauged to be either as bad as or worse than the great depression, while terms such as ‘recovery,’ ‘recession,’ ‘depression,’ and ‘crisis’ place the current state of play as a continuation of a past, a past that varies and recovers always in terms of one easily comprehended cycle. The lexicon deployed to assess and gauge the environment is similarly comforting in terms of its linear temporality and delimitation: Australia still refers to its condition as one of ‘drought,’ even when the period of insufficient rain and increasing desertification exceeds a decade; climate change policy refers to ‘mitigation,’ ‘adaptation,’ ‘sustainability’ and ‘viability’—all of which enable one to think of management (however difficult) rather than cessation, rupture or incomprehension. One might say that the imaginary is, indeed, global. A literal globalism—the stark reality of there being no escape, no outside, nowhere else to flee now that the earth has been forced to yield ever more to the human desire for life—is coupled with an incompatible global figuration. Things will cycle back to recovery. The globe can be taken and assessed as an object and managed, saved, revived or given the respect and care that it deserves. If where we are is a globe, then it can be imagined as delimited, bounded, organically self-referring and unified.

2022 Michigan Kritik
ALTERNATIVE › Alt – AT: Perm

Alternative approach is the only way to break from the squo – aff’s reformism and lesser evil mentality forces binaries that prevent fundamental change

Weizman, 2011. (Eyal, professor of spatial and visual cultures at Goldsmiths University of London, founder of the collective Decolonizing Architecture Art Residency in Bethleham. The Least of All Possible Evils: Humanitarian Violence from Arendt to Gaza. Verso Publishers, Print copy, page 21-24)

Behind the present use of the term 'lesser evil' is a rich history and various intellectual trajectories. What may otherwise seem to be a perennial problem, endemic to ethics and political practice, a dilemma that recurs in different moments in time in the same shape and form, might in fact reveal something peculiar about each moment and situation. The various political, theological and philosophical uses of the lesser evil idiom may suggest that it meant different things to different people in different periods and situations. Every political tradition and form of political practice developed its own ways of engaging with the lesser evil argument - and much has subsequently been lost in translation. For example, unlike the tradition of liberal ethics that would invoke him centuries later, Augustine was never content with lesser evils. Indeed, a significant aspect of the idea of the lesser evil has been lost in its process of secularization from early Christian theology into the utilitarian foundations of liberal ethics. For the original Christian toleration of the lesser evil was understood in relation to the telos of redemption that is ultimately in excess of all calculations. For Augustine, the name for this state beyond calculations was 'the kingdom of heaven'. In contrast to the teachings of the Christian theologians that they invoked, and locked within a perpetual economy of immanence, liberal ethics can be interpreted as a drive for the 'optimization' of a system of government. But what is the sense in optimizing those regimes when they perpetuate intolerable injustice? Even those of us without much use for a 'kingdom of heaven' and without much patience for the systems of pastoral government that should guide us to it, can still see in Augustine's argument an important challenge: how to engage in political practice within the complex existing force-fields of the present in a way that also aims to break away from them? This challenge is particularly acute for those who operate within or in relation to situations they deem intolerable and want to fundamentally change rather than reform. The practices of human rights could be used as effective tools against close societies and tyrannies, and were indeed often used in struggles that ended up replacing those regimes, they lend themselves easily for manipulation in the context of liberal democracies. At different times, Marx, Lenin, Kautski, Luxemburg, Trotsky and Gramsci grappled with the problem of the lesser evil in fighting for gains here and now, while also fighting for a different and better world on the other. At various points they advocated struggles for immediate gains - for example, proposing trade unions, whose function was to win a better deal for workers in an exploitative system. None of them, however, thought that trade unions were all that was possible, and none was satisfied with simply winning a better deal within an existing system. Unlike the revolutionary and militant communists who protested the drift towards a timid, reformist politics of choosing the lesser evil and of making compromises with capital, Marx thought that winning a ten-hour day was a considerable victory for the English proletariat. Marx's argument shifted the attention from the ten hours of work to the fourteen hours of non-work time. These he thought provided the opportunity to build an organizational platform, as well as the consciousness and experience needed to take over the means of production. To show that it is futile to object to all lesser evil compromises on principle, we could even enlist Lenin himself. In his attempt to explain the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk that lead to Soviet Russia's exit from World War I in 1918 after making an agreement with the western powers, Lenin returned to a scene of a road robbery described by Augustine. 'To reject compromises "on principle", to reject the permissibility of compromises in general, no matter of what kind', said Lenin, 'is childishness ... One must be able to analyze the situation and the concrete conditions of each compromise, or of each variety of compromise. One must learn to distinguish between a man who has given up his money and firearms to bandits so as to lessen the evil they can do and to facilitate their capture and execution, and a man who gives his money and firearms to bandits so as to share in the loot.'34 The deliberation of a political thought-practice must indeed insist on uncovering the force-field within which each of the dilemmas of the lesser evil exists, seeking to identify more extended and intricate political connections; looking further into the future, it should insist on political goals and the means of their achievement. At one end of the spectrum, in which the lesser evil argument occupies the middle ground, stand those who believe that every possible gain at present is insignificant in light of the essentially compromised state of the world. Part of the structure of this argument is found the principle of the politique du pire- the politics of making things worse. This line of thought believes in the redemptive potential of misery- or in its theological-political incarnation as dolorism: pain as a spiritual experience that allows people to see more clearly. Every form of improvement is necessarily seen as the normalization of exploitation or the pacification of injustice. Opting for the worst is, therefore, an attempt to undermine the field of alternatives of a pre-given choice and overcome its terms. But are the horrific spectacles of greater evils preferable to the incremental damage of lesser ones? Is the choice only between squabbling with power about the correct measure of its violence, helping to calibrate it and tend to its wounded, or on the other hand a call for its amplification in order to 'expose its contradictions' (contradictions seem only to sustain power's march) to shock a complacent population into rising up? Between refusal and tactical embrace the difficulty of the dilemma of the lesser evil is equally in practising and in avoiding it. The Greeks thought of the dilemma as one of the elements of tragedy. Each of the options that a tragic hero faces necessarily leads to different forms of horrific suffering: the dilemma was presented as a choice between the two horns of an angry bull. But the options must not only be about which of the horns to choose. Robert Pirsig has suggested several ways to subvert this complicity of the opposites: one can 'refuse to enter the arena', 'throw sand in the hull's eyes', or 'sing the bull to sleep' .35 The contemporary forms of power unpacked in this book are no longer so singular and unified. Rather than a bull, they may appear to take on the shape of a multiplicity, a diffuse field of forces simultaneously aggressive and benign. It is a form of power that not only charges forward; it surrounds, immerses and embeds. Political activists must constantly invent new forms of struggle that are recognisant of this paradigm of power, but which also evade and subvert its embrace, attempt to rewire its webs in order to escape its calculation. The characters that inhabit the chapters of this book have stepped right into the thick of this web of forces: their movement through them offer valuable examples and lessons. Some paths must be avoided at all costs; others illuminate possible courses of action within the intricate workings of the humanitarian present.

2022 Michigan Kritik
ALTERNATIVE › Alt – AT: Perm

The final instance is never really the final instance – Empire is constructed on the marginal event which guarantees its justification is effective and justified – the sole exception of the AFF constitutes infinite further construction

Hardt/Negri ‘2K (Michael Hardt; professor of literature at Duke University. Antonio Negri; independent researcher and philosopher, previously a professor of political science at University of Padua. “Empire” pg 38-40 2000) // ELog

What were traditionally called the royal prerogatives of sovereignty seem in effect to be repeated and even substantially renewed in the construction of Empire. If we were to remain within the conceptual framework of classic domestic and international law, we might be tempted to say that a supranational quasi-state is being formed. That does not seem to us, however, an accurate characterization of the situation. When the royal prerogatives of modern sovereignty reappear in Empire, they take on a completely different form. For example, the sovereign function of deploying military forces was carried out by the modern nation-states and is now conducted by Empire, but, as we have seen, the justification for such deployments now rests on a state of permanent exception, and the deployments themselves take the form of police actions. Other royal prerogatives such as carrying out justice and imposing taxes also have the same kind of liminal existence. We have already discussed the marginal position of judicial authority in the constitutive process of Empire, and one could also argue that imposing taxes occupies a marginal position in that it is increasingly linked to specific and local urgencies. In effect, one might say that the sovereignty of Empire itself is realized at the margins, where borders are flexible and identities are hybrid and fluid. It would be difficult to say which is more important to Empire, the center or the margins. In fact, center and margin seem continually to be shifting positions, fleeing any determinate locations. We could even say that the process itself is virtual and that its power resides in the power of the virtual. One could nonetheless object at this point that even while being virtual and acting at the margins, the process of constructing imperial sovereignty is in many respects very real! We certainly do not mean to deny that fact. Our claim, rather, is that we are dealing here with a special kind of sovereignty—a discontinuous form of sovereignty that should be considered liminal or marginal insofar as it acts ‘‘in the final instance,’’ a sovereignty that locates its only point of reference in the definitive absoluteness of the power that it can exercise. Empire thus appears in the form of a very high tech machine: it is virtual, built to control the marginal event, and organized to dominate and when necessary intervene in the breakdowns of the system (in line with the most advanced technologies of robotic production). The virtuality and discontinuity of imperial sovereignty, however, do not minimize the effectiveness of its force; on the contrary, those very characteristics serve to reinforce its apparatus, demonstrating its effectiveness in the contemporary historical context and its legitimate force to resolve world problems in the final instance.

2022 Michigan Kritik
ALTERNATIVE › Alt – AT: Movements Fail

Movements have staggered horizontally but exploded vertically – Empire’s decentralized and expanding nature means movements with a clarified common enemy can strike at its heart

Hardt/Negri ‘2K (Michael Hardt; professor of literature at Duke University. Antonio Negri; independent researcher and philosopher, previously a professor of political science at University of Padua. “Empire” pg 54-58 2000) // ELog

Consider the most radical and powerful struggles of the final years of the twentieth century: the Tiananmen Square events in 1989, the Intifada against Israeli state authority, the May 1992 revolt in Los Angeles, the uprising in Chiapas that began in 1994, and the series of strikes that paralyzed France in December 1995, and those that crippled South Korea in 1996. Each of these struggles was specific and based on immediate regional concerns in such a way that they could in no respect be linked together as a globally expanding chain of revolt. None of these events inspired a cycle of struggles, because the desires and needs they expressed could not be translated into different contexts. In other words, (potential) revolutionaries in other parts of the world did not hear of the events in Beijing, Nablus, Los Angeles, Chiapas, Paris, or Seoul and immediately recognize them as their own struggles. Furthermore, these struggles not only fail to communicate to other contexts but also lack even a local communication, and thus often have a very brief duration where they are born, burning out in a flash. This is certainly one of the central and most urgent political paradoxes of our time: in our much celebrated age of communication, struggles have become all but incommunicable. This paradox of incommunicability makes it extremely difficult to grasp and express the new power posed by the struggles that have emerged. We ought to be able to recognize that what the struggles have lost in extension, duration, and communicability they have gained in intensity. We ought to be able to recognize that although all of these struggles focused on their own local and immediate circumstances, they all nonetheless posed problems of supranational relevance, problems that are proper to the new figure of imperial capitalist regulation. In Los Angeles, for example, the riots were fueled by local racial antagonisms and patterns of social and economic exclusion that are in many respects particular to that (post-)urban territory, but the events were also immediately catapulted to a general level insofar as they expressed a refusal of the post-Fordist regime of social control. Like the Intifada in certain respects, the Los Angeles riots demonstrated how the decline of Fordist bargaining regimes and mechanisms of social mediation has made the management of racially and socially diverse metropolitan territories and populations so precarious. The looting of commodities and burning of property were not just metaphors but the real global condition of the mobility and volatility of post-Fordist social mediations.14 In Chiapas, too, the insurrection focused primarily on local concerns: problems of exclusion and lack of representation specific to Mexican society and the Mexican state, which have also to a limited degree long been common to the racial hierarchies throughout much of Latin American. The Zapatista rebellion, however, was also immediately a struggle against the social regime imposed by NAFTA and more generally the systematic exclusion and subordination in the regional construction of the world market.15 Finally, like those in Seoul, the massive strikes in Paris and throughout France in late 1995 were aimed at specific local and national labor issues (such as pensions, wages, and unemployment), but the struggle was also immediately recognized as a clear contestation of the new social and economic construction of Europe. The French strikes called above all for a new notion of the public, a new construction of public space against the neoliberal mechanisms of privatization that accompany more or less everywhere the project of capitalist globalization.16 Perhaps precisely because all these struggles are incommunicable and thus blocked from traveling horizontally in the form of a cycle, they are forced instead to leap vertically and touch immediately on the global level. We ought to be able to recognize that this is not the appearance of a new cycle of internationalist struggles, but rather the emergence of a new quality of social movements. We ought to be able to recognize, in other words, the fundamentally new characteristics these struggles all present, despite their radical diversity. First, each struggle, though firmly rooted in local conditions, leaps immediately to the global level and attacks the imperial constitution in its generality. Second, all the struggles destroy the traditional distinction between economic and political struggles. The struggles are at once economic, political, and cultural—and hence they are biopolitical struggles, struggles over the form of life. They are constituent struggles, creating new public spaces and new forms of community. We ought to be able to recognize all this, but it is not that easy. We must admit, in fact, that even when trying to individuate the real novelty of these situations, we are hampered by the nagging impression that these struggles are always already old, outdated, and anachronistic. The struggles at Tiananmen Square spoke a language of democracy that seemed long out of fashion; the guitars, headbands, tents, and slogans all looked like a weak echo of Berkeley in the 1960s. The Los Angeles riots, too, seemed like an aftershock of the earthquake of racial conflicts that shook the United States in the 1960s. The strikes in Paris and Seoul seemed to take us back to the era of the mass factory worker, as if they were the last gasp of a dying working class. All these struggles, which pose really new elements, appear from the beginning to be already old and outdated—precisely because they cannot communicate, because their languages cannot be translated. The struggles do not communicate despite their being hypermediatized, on television, the Internet, and every other imaginable medium. Once again we are confronted by the paradox of incommunicability. We can certainly recognize real obstacles that block the communication of struggles. One such obstacle is the absence of a recognition of a common enemy against which the struggles are directed. Beijing, Los Angeles, Nablus, Chiapas, Paris, Seoul: the situations all seem utterly particular, but in fact they all directly attack the global order of Empire and seek a real alternative. Clarifying the nature of the common enemy is thus an essential political task. A second obstacle, which is really corollary to the first, is that there is no common language of struggles that could ‘‘translate’’ the particular language of each into a cosmopolitan language. Struggles in other parts of the world and even our own struggles seem to be written in an incomprehensible foreign language. This too points toward an important political task: to construct a new common language that facilitates communication, as the languages of antiimperialism and proletarian internationalism did for the struggles of a previous era. Perhaps this needs to be a new type of communication that functions not on the basis of resemblances but on the basis of differences: a communication of singularities. Recognizing a common enemy and inventing a common language of struggles are certainly important political tasks, and we will advance them as far as we can in this book, but our intuition tells us that this line of analysis finally fails to grasp the real potential presented by the new struggles. Our intuition tells us, in other words, that the model of the horizontal articulation of struggles in a cycle is no longer adequate for recognizing the way in which contemporary struggles achieve global significance. Such a model in fact blinds us to their real new potential. Marx tried to understand the continuity of the cycle of proletarian struggles that were emerging in nineteenth-century Europe in terms of a mole and its subterranean tunnels. Marx’s mole would surface in times of open class conflict and then retreat underground again—not to hibernate passively but to burrow its tunnels, moving along with the times, pushing forward with history so that when the time was right (1830, 1848, 1870), it would spring to the surface again. ‘‘Well grubbed old mole!’’ 17 Well, we suspect that Marx’s old mole has finally died. It seems to us, in fact, that in the contemporary passage to Empire, the structured tunnels of the mole have been replaced by the infinite undulations of the snake.18 The depths of the modern world and its subterranean passageways have in postmodernity all become superficial. Today’s struggles slither si-lently across these superficial, imperial landscapes. Perhaps the incommunicability of struggles, the lack of well-structured, communicating tunnels, is in fact a strength rather than a weakness—a strength because all of the movements are immediately subversive in themselves and do not wait on any sort of external aid or extension to guarantee their effectiveness. Perhaps the more capital extends its global networks of production and control, the more powerful any singular point of revolt can be. Simply by focusing their own powers, concentrating their energies in a tense and compact coil, these serpentine struggles strike directly at the highest articulations of imperial order. Empire presents a superficial world, the virtual center of which can be accessed immediately from any point across the surface. If these points were to constitute something like a new cycle of struggles, it would be a cycle defined not by the communicative extension of the struggles but rather by their singular emergence, by the intensity that characterizes them one by one. In short, this new phase is defined by the fact that these struggles do not link horizontally, but each one leaps vertically, directly to the virtual center of Empire.

2022 Michigan Kritik
ALTERNATIVE › Alt – Techno-Opacity

In response to the 1AC’s call for transparency, the alternative is to embrace an algorithmic ethic of opacity as a precondition for political action. The alt is generative of ethical algorithmic governance.

Amoore 20 - Louise Amoore is Professor of Political Geography at Durham University and author of The Politics of Possibility: Risk and Security beyond Probability, also published by Duke University Press, (2020), Cloud Ethics: Algorithms and the Attributes of Ourselves and Others, Duke University Press, eshaan

Amid the widespread moral panic surrounding the black box of the algorithm and the political demands for transparency, accountability, and explainability, in this book I make a counter case for opacity and the giving of partial accounts. I have argued that responsibility for algorithmic decisions can never take the form of a clear-sighted account of the action. “Responsibility,” as Thomas Keenan writes, “is not a moment of security or cognitive certainty” in which one makes a “choice between yes and no, this or that.”26 To establish a moment of cognitive certainty regarding the algorithm—to demand its transparency and accountability—is not at all the politics of a responsibility worthy of the name. Indeed, with its new forms of cognitive computing and cloud reasoning, as I discuss in chapter 1, the contemporary algorithm is well attuned to generating clear-sighted precise outputs from otherwise occluded situations. Contra the demand for transparency, then, the opacity of the scene, and the undecidability of its salient features and attributes, is the precondition for politics and ethics. “What could responsibility mean,” asks Keenan, “without the risk of exposure to chance, without vulnerability,” without the undecidability of what is taking place in a scene?27 Running against the grain of algorithmic logics that show, attend, and tell the meaning of a situation, responsibility means that one cannot see a clear path ahead because the meaning of the situation is undecidable. The multiple branching points of the decision tree or random forest algorithm do in fact carry the risk of exposure to chance and vulnerability. A different kind of responsibility dwells at these forks in the path, bearing the opacity of future consequences of the weighting of one route over another. In this book I differentiate the search for an encoded ethical framework for algorithms from an ethicopolitics that is already present within the algorithm’s arrangements. In so doing, I draw a distinction between a moral code of prohibition and permission (what algorithms may or may not do) and an ethics of the orientation one has to oneself and to others (how algorithms are generating relations of self to self, and self to others).28 This distinction follows Spinoza’s broader philosophical concern that “ethics has nothing to do with a morality.”29 Our ethicopolitical relations do not follow strictly from some already formulated moral code, for we never have the security of these grounds from which to act. As Deleuze has reflected on Spinoza’s ethics, “You do not know beforehand what good or bad you are capable of; you do not know beforehand what a body or a mind can do, in a given encounter, a given arrangement, a given combination.”30 Similarly, for Isabelle Stengers, “every time we use the term ‘ethics’ we must obviously distinguish it from the term ‘morality,’” so that her speculative ambition is ethical in the sense of ethos or habit.31 Just as Spinoza’s ethics are ever in formation, forged through ethos, encounters, arrangements, and combinations, so a cloud ethics is located in the encounters, arrangements, and combinations through which the algorithm is generated. Some of these encounters and arrangements involve human beings; others are between unsupervised algorithms and a corpus of data; and more still involve algorithms interacting with other algorithms. This is an ethics, then, that puts into question the authority of the knowing subject and opens onto the plural and distributed forms of the writing of algorithms. Understood in this way, “ethics is able to exceed its traditional determination” and be “displaced” and considered “anew” in the relations forged with other beings.32 The possibility of what Derrida calls “the opening of another ethics” is a different kind of opening to the imagination of the prizing open of a black box or the illumination of a dark calculus with moral oversight.33 It is an opening onto the edges and limits of an iterative writing that is profoundly political, each one of us drawn into the proximities of the output. Algorithms engage in writing in and through their dense relations with people and things in a data scene, their authorship uncertain and their emergence opaque. Here, in the opacity of not knowing in advance what the relations could be, we have found an opening for taking responsibility. If an ethical response to algorithmic decisions is to begin from opacity and not from the demand for transparency, then what does this mean for the strategies of a cloud ethics? Where the political demands for transparency reassert the objective vision of a disembodied observer, to stay with opacity is to insist on the situated, embodied, and partial perspective of all forms of scientific knowledge.34 Understood in Donna Haraway’s terms, to confront opacity would not be a matter of failing to open the black box or to see something, but rather it would acknowledge that “the knowing self is partial in all its guises,” that practices of visuality necessarily enroll the opacity of ourselves and others.35 Far from a lack of transparency limiting accountability, the condition of opacity “allows us to become answerable for what we learn how to see.”36 This “we” who learns, as I discuss in the machine learning practices of chapter 2, is a composite figure, “stitched together imperfectly” from the iterative learning of humans and machines.37 In the chapters of this book, I have been concerned to show how machine learning algorithms generate their outputs through the opaque relations of selves to selves, and selves to others, and how these outputs then annul and disavow the opacity of their underlying relations in the name of a crystalline clarity of the output. One mode of resistance to the clarity of the algorithmic decision resides within the opacity of the subjects and what cannot be known of their relations. Let us consider a practical example of such a strategy. In the experimental development of the neural networks for show, attend, and tell, the algorithm designers explain that when their model makes a mistake, they are able to “exploit” what it manifests to gain “intuition into what the model saw.”38 This kind of seeing on behalf of the algorithm sustains the god’s-eye vision of a computer scientist who may redistribute their way of seeing at will. A cloud ethics can stay with the difficulty of intuiting what the model saw as a form of partial, situated, and locally specific account. Among the examples of the mistakes used to productively generate new learning is “a woman holding a clock in her hand” and “a man wearing a hat and a hat on a skateboard.” The algorithms have learned to recognize a clock and a hat, even when these are absent in the scene, via their exposure to a corpus of data that has supplied the feature vectors for these objects. The algorithm’s relations with a contingent and opaque set of multiple other gradients have generated the mistaken presence of a clock and a hat (figures 6.4 and 6.5). The cnns have generated an output of attentiveness to the focus of the scene (shown in the images as an area of white light)—this output itself contingent on millions of past parameters—which enters the rnn as a data input. The rnn then generates the “tell,” or the natural language description of the scene, assigning a probability for each word in the descriptor. In the (mis)recognition of “A man is talking on his cell phone while another man watches,” the algorithm has assigned a probability of 1.00 (or a certainty) to the indefinite article A, for example, but probabilities of 0.46, 0.24, and 0.17 to the nouns man, cell, and phone. These likelihood scores—low and yet apparently the most probable—are entirely contingent on multiple algorithms’ past relations with unknown other scenes. As I explain in chapter 4, the mistaken recognition of the algorithm is not merely error or errancy, for the output is entirely reasonable given the algorithm’s relations with a data world. In terms of resistant practices, a cloud ethics is concerned not with fixing the algorithm or eradicating its errancy, but rather with attending to how these moments give accounts of algorithmic reason. What will take place when the recognition of a clock that is not present becomes the recognition of a weapon? What will be authorized by the most likely cell phone that is an absent presence in the scene? To be clear, a cloud ethics will point to the moments when partial and situated algorithmic reason is sheltered as “mistake” or “error” and will reopen what is incomputable in the making of a likelihood score. Such a strategy is not the same as making a calculation transparent or accountable because it recognizes that the 0.14 assigned to child or 0.46 and 0.37 to border and fence are contingent on a vast multiplicity of necessarily opaque relations between other people, algorithms, things, data, gradients, features, and images. When the algorithm “tells” us that this is what matters in a scene, one could never have a transparent account of how the story has been made tellable. Instead, there are only the intransigent political relations that persist in the scene, the moments of nonclosure that reopen the problem and the politics.

2022 Michigan Kritik
ALTERNATIVE › Alt – Self-Security

The alternative is a form of self-security – a bottom-up relationality that unsettles the securitized narratives in the postcolonial LIO. This allows us to imagine futures outside liberal institutions in a decolonial frame.

Darby 09 - Phillip Darby is co-founder of the independent Institute of Postcolonial Studies based in Melbourne, and a principal fellow of the School of Social and Political Sciences at the University of Melbourne, (2009) Rolling Back the Frontiers of Empire: Practising the Postcolonial, International Peacekeeping, 16:5, 699-716, DOI: 10.1080/13533310903303347 // eshaan

If the critique of the liberal peace project advanced here has any credibility, a fundamental change is called for in our mode of thinking about peacekeeping. As a rule of thumb, it might be said that any postcolonial approach worthy of the name must go beyond highlighting the shortcomings of the present system to showing how things might be done differently. This is hardly possible within the framework of liberal peacebuilding. It is hard to imagine how a postcolonial take could be given to what is essentially a colonial undertaking. For this reason, I advance some thoughts about a preferred security schema within which an alternative to peacekeeping could emerge – rather than tinkering with the dominant framework of thought that informs the making of policy. Accordingly, this section will not take up issues such as ‘institutionalization before liberalization’42 which leaves the structure of the peacekeeping project intact, or localization through regional bodies such the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) which remains an essentially top-down, state-centric approach.43 We might start with the increasing recognition, even in international relations and other discourses of the international, that to change the existing structure of things we need to modify traditional scholarly procedures to bring out the heterogeneity of knowledge and the messiness of its construction. The Gulbenkian Commission on the Restructuring of Social Sciences stresses that contemporary social science must break with mechanical models and open itself to complexity, uncertainty and creativity.44 Robert Cox argues similarly: social sciences should set aside the approaches of the past that sought to define persisting structures and laws, and adopt less deterministic approaches ‘by being sensitive to emerging and declining historical structures and movements of self-organisation in social and political relations’.45 Picking up on self-organization, it is my argument that the most promising approach is assumed to be anchored in the concept of self-securing. The idea of securing the self dovetails nicely with postcolonial thought – though postcolonialism has no proprietary claim on it. It addresses several of the lines of critique of the liberal peacekeeping project advanced earlier in the essay. Self-securing unsettles the understanding that security is best handled from ‘above’, traditionally by the state and now, quite often, by the state acting together with the United Nations. Following the thrust of complexity theory, it challenges hierarchy, centralization, linearity and separation (borders). It would harness the social, so downgraded since the advent of neoliberalism, and thereby make evident alternative ways of building better relationships with others. Of its very nature, self-securing looks to the everyday. An archive needs to be developed on neighbourhood and more dispersed practices of self-securing, the shaping and use of public space to provide meeting places, and the role of dissent as a form of community-building. Good use could be made of documented cases of popular responses to natural disasters and financial collapse in various parts of the world which show the capacity for self-organization. In such ways, people who are mostly the objects of security policies could be brought into the discourse: victims, the poor, those in pain and suffering. Clearly, pursuing these ideas is a research venture of a wide-ranging nature. One such project goes forward under the aegis of the Institute of Postcolonial Studies in Melbourne;46 others are working on similar material, some in related fields.47 A first step towards putting flesh on the bones of these arguments is to examine the pre-colonial practices of non-European peoples which helped regulate self –other relations. Frequently expressed in ritual, ceremonial exchange, and gifting, they broaden our understanding of the role of performance in the business of securing. This is not to romanticize the past or to imagine that earlier practices could somehow be transposed to the present, but rather to ask whether in modified form they might have a contemporary relevance. Account should also be taken of the variety and ingenuity of the adaptation of nonEuropean concepts and practices to the compulsions and inducements of the colonial order. A particular significance attaches to the experience of Aboriginal peoples, Karina Shaw has argued, because it provides a microcosm of the struggles faced by a large percentage of the world’s population and is revealing of the character of modern politics.48 Then there is the rich tradition of alternative security practices developed on the Indian subcontinent during the colonial struggle and, on the diplomatic front, in the years immediately following decolonization. There is also a growing body of contemporary work being done that takes its lead from complexity theory. The study of networks is a case in point. It has not made much headway in security studies except in relation to terrorist groups and criminal networks trafficking in drugs, but it might yet. Indeed, it could serve as a platform for putting security on a new footing. In other areas such as cyberspace, globalization and new transnational actors, the network metaphor and the relationality involved have figured large in debates about the changing politics of the international. Despite its association with postmodernity, Morgan Brigg points out that local people in many parts of the world have long used notions of tangled nets, and their untangling, as metaphors for managing and resolving conflicts.49 For many years networks have also been central to attempts to change the trajectory of development. In a classic article published in 1992 which appears on every development reading guide – or should – Arturo Escobar wrote of networks as part of the submerged cultural background from which social movements emerged. Stressing the centrality of everyday life to an understanding of social movements, he went on to point to the transformative potential of such movements because of their ‘self-producing and self-organizing’ character.50 Escobar has recently returned to this theme, showing how complexity theory and cyberspace strengthen the case for the principle of self-organization being the way to a more equitable global order.51 These last remarks lead into the question of how far the development constituency – or parts thereof – might connect with a revisioning of security along the lines we have been considering. Here I am thinking not so much of development networks that might be expected to be well disposed to self-organization in related fields, but to the development community more generally. It has been argued in this essay that NGOs have come to accept the close linkage between development and security, thus falling into line with the prescriptions of states and the World Bank. It has also been suggested that despite humanitarian motivations the involvement of NGOs in the non-European world has often functioned to legitimize the present international system. Tomohisa Hattoni has in fact argued that the extension and acceptance of gifts is a mechanism of consent to the capitalist order,52 and, moreover, that foreign aid works to confirm the existing material hierarchies between North and South.53 Duffield’s argument should also be kept in mind that the NGO movement did not expand politically by supporting peoples’ struggles against imperial domination or racial oppression but on the basis of emergency.54 Clearly, humanitarianism needs separate and sustained treatment, but the humanitarian urge should not be discounted because it is tinged with pragmatism and at times it is channelled to support unworthy causes. The question for us is: how can it be better directed to advance constructive social change? There is a strong case to be argued that humanitarianism as it relates to development could be so redirected by connecting with peacekeeping reconceived in terms of self-securing. If, as policy-makers now insist, development and security go together, recasting one should facilitate recasting the other. There is much in the practice of development that stands in need of overhauling. For one thing, less emphasis on immediate relief work and more on fostering self reliance in the longer term. Almost certainly this would mean elevating the social and downgrading the economic. Recently the renowned development economist Kari Polanyi Levitt spoke of her commitment to reclaim development, by which she meant ‘the right of a society to define its priorities on its own terms’.55 She went on: I used to make complicated development plans. I don’t really believe in that anymore. I believe development has to do with how people relate to each other, whether co-operatively and with synergy or competitively, with conflict. The one will produce development, the other will produce chaos.56 Working along these lines would bring development into a parallel track with the security agenda canvassed here. Advocacy is another area that could bring the reform agendas of development and security into a closer relationship. It has been aptly said that NGOs have tended to follow rather than lead public opinion. Nearly two decades ago, John Clark declared that the challenge facing NGOs was to shift attention from expanding their projects and increasing their turnover to marshalling their influence to effect changes in ‘attitudes, institutions and policies’.57 That there has been so little change, except in a few instances, must in large measure be attributed to the reluctance to speak out for fear of losing state and World Bank project money and putting at risk charitable and tax-deductability status. There is also the belief that representations of starving people and, to take a less common case, child sponsorship are more effective in bringing in funds from the general public. Yet if NGOs remain more intent on toeing the line with established authority and urging people to donate than to thinking critically about development issues, the consequences are very serious. The linkage between development and security provides a window of opportunity for the NGO sector to strengthen its educational and advocacy role. With established approaches to security increasingly in question, the case for NGO activism is more persuasive than at any point in the past three decades. This brings us to a point that I think has been implicit in much of the argument of this paper. Rather than being regarded as a discrete field, perhaps peacekeeping should be understood as but one of an ensemble of approaches to the problem of conflict, sitting alongside not only development but international political economy, world order studies, conflict resolution and similar. Peacekeeping might then become part of a consortium that addresses conflict with an awareness of the need for change in the structural relationship between North and South (remembering that there is a North in the South and a South in the North). I suggested above that peacekeeping needed to go out into the world and connect with the everyday. It is increasingly apparent – if as yet insufficiently acted upon – that in the South this involves listening to and taking bearings from people outside what is usually understood to be the formal political process. One thinks of members of social movements, squatter communities or ordinary people whose lives have been disrupted by violence: perhaps non-combatants unable to live up to the model of masculinity into which they have been socialized because they cannot provide for and protect their families;58 or women who find that the borders created by the state and the violence that results are refracted in their family relationships.59 In many situations, whether a peace can be made or maintained may depend more on these grounded, personalized understandings – experiential knowledge – than on the geopolitical calculations and theoretical postulates of those skilled in state-building and diplomatic negotiation. What is perhaps less appreciated is that peacekeeping must connect with the everyday in the North as well as in the South. Over the past two decades various writers have drawn attention to the culture of self-satisfaction that permeates Western societies, which is often accompanied by a marked impatience with the developing world and its problems.60 Taking account of the revival of interest in ideas about empire and the emergence of what has been called the ‘new racism’, one might speak of a culture of insecurity that drives forward the search for security in the formerly colonized world. The contention is persuasive that, at least in part, this insecurity goes back to imperial times.61 Now insecurity can be politically enabling if it is channelled in such a way as to establish commonalities with others.62 But it can also be very damaging if it is harnessed to the pursuit of overbearing external policies – as it mostly is. Here it is worth recalling Slavoj Zˇ izˇek’s point: ‘ruling ideas are never directly the ideas of the ruling class’.63 This is why it is so important to engage with the culture of the everyday; it is drawn upon selectively by the state to advance the interests of the state and of those who manage the state. Surveying the experience of peacekeeping and promoting development, it is striking that invariably the problems are located ‘out there’ in the otherness of the non-European world. Very seldom has analysis and prescription been related back to the role of the First World and what could be done within metropolitan societies or with regard to the structure of the international system. One of the objects of studying other peoples and cultures is surely to better understand ourselves, but it is not much in evidence in the debates about peacekeeping. Somehow, it appears, the discourse has failed to make significant use of knowledge about the part the West has played – and continues to play – in creating instability and insecurity in the Third World, together with widespread poverty. Colonial rule deepened existing divisions in the non-European world; it solidified religious and ethnic identifications; it eroded earlier ways of managing conflict. After decolonization the ruling security and development paradigms cut across the grain of politics as practised. At the same time, the structural violence of the leading powers and global agencies ensured the continued subordination of the Third World to the First. On a charitable reading, perhaps this was not so much by design as by default. Knowledges that could have made a difference were devalued or simply not taken up. On the first count, there was the dismissal of much non-European knowledge – as the World Bank infamously declaimed: ‘Poor countries – and poor people – differ from rich ones not only because they have less capital but because they have less knowledge’.64 On the second count, knowledge that is part of the Western canon – in imperial history, in postcolonial studies, in international political economy and in international law – was allowed to remain in separate compartments. Thus deeply troubling aspects of the politics of the First World were screened from view and characterizations of the many ‘lacks’ of the other were given free rein. The need now is to challenge conceptualizations of both violence and underdevelopment as a problem embedded in the difference of the non-European world. Or to put it another way, to carry out a spatial reorientation, focusing for a bit on here and not there and showing how ‘we’ are heavily implicated in ‘their’ predicament. The question then becomes: what can be done at home about fixing the processes of international exchange to provide the conditions for self-reliance to flourish?

2022 Michigan Kritik
ALTERNATIVE › Alt – Refusal

The alternative is refusal – Empire is sustainable only through a complete hegemony over the mind of the subject, but its decentralized nature enables a withdrawal from its soon-to-be universalized values and towards liberation

Csicsery-Ronay ‘3 (Istvan Csicsery-Ronay, Jr; professor of English at DePauw University with Ph.D. in comparative literature from Princeton University. “Science Fiction and Empire” ) // ELog

Empire appears in the form of a very high-tech machine: it is virtual, built to control the marginal event, and organized to dominate and when necessary intervene in the breakdowns of the system (in line with the most advanced technologies of robotic production). (39) The imperial order is formed not only on the basis of its powers of accumulation and global extension, but also on the basis of its capacity to develop itself more deeply, to be reborn, and to extend itself throughout the biopolitical latticework of world society. (41) The empire's institutional structure is like a software program that carries a virus along with it, so that it is continually modulating and corrupting the institutional forms around it. (197-98) This is the imperial Sprawl, ruled not through decrees and armies (well, mostly not through armies) but through communication/control networks that distribute virtual power. This power is internalized by imperial citizens as surely as if they had chips embedded in their brains. In Empire, subjectivity is multicentered, produced through institutions that are terminally unstable, always breaking down. As the integrity of social institutions (such as schools, families, courts, and prisons) fragments, and the once-clear subject-positions associated with them weaken, the call for imperial comprehensiveness is strengthened, inaugurating a comprehensive ideology, a finely distributed pragmatic myth of networked, globally interlocking power. This is the twenty-minutes-into-the-future of Philip K. Dick, J.G. Ballard, William Gibson, Pat Cadigan, and Mamom Oshii, where computerized communications operate 24/7, generating a mindscape of consuming subjects into which capitalist ideology feeds directly. It perpetually breaks down and reconstructs human consciousness, as in a Cadigan novel, into provisional target-identities to which the nostalgic, Utopian dream of wholeness can be sold and resold perpetually in variant, sometimes mutually contradictory forms, and which can be hired to convey its fictions of sovereignty ever deeper into the self that once imagined it was itself sovereign. In this empire, there are infinite possibilities of projection, but only one reality. The most natural thing in the world is that the world appears to be politically united, that the market is global, and that power is organized throughout its universality. Imperial politics articulates being in its global extension—a great sea that only the winds and the current move. The neutralization of the transcendental imagination is thus the first sense in which the political in the imperial domain is ontological. (354) Since contemporary imperial power does not emanate from one center, but rather from the cyberspatial ganglia of postmodern metropoli, resistance manifests itself in the daily refusal on the part of "the multitude" to follow commands. For Hardt and Negri, revolution is neither possible nor desirable, since no class can act as the self-conscious agent of history. Freedom rests, as in Gibson's world, in finding one's own uses for things. In contrast with sabotage, the resistance strategy of national modernism, resistance under Empire consists of withdrawing consent, of desertion (212). Even the greatest rebels are refuseniks, choosing to withdraw, leaving behind them, like the fused AIs in Neuromancer (1984), a world in which "things are things" (270). Although this strategy hardly promises much as a way of landing blows against the empire, it is a dominant motif in the countercultural "Lost in Space" (or alternatively, "Lost in the Urban Labyrinth") subgenre. (Ironically, Lost in Space [tv series, 1965-68; film 1998] itself is as hysterically conservative as Robinson Crusoe.) Where the overtly imperial mode accepts the hierarchical network of administration—Starfleet commanders still representing the Federation—even mainstream popular works such as Farscape (1999-2003) and Star Trek: Voyager (1995-2001) try to establish a de-centralized web of relationships in the uncharted territories, now just a wormhole away from the past (and the politics of empire).

2022 Michigan Kritik
ALTERNATIVE › Alt – Disruption

Debate as a game is one that operates under a systemic approach that allows us to conceive of alternative futures. The role of debate should be to conceptualize the best schema for disrupting systems of Empire and the colonialist legacy that structures modern IR. This allows us to imagine worlds outside the confines of western sociality.

Fordyce 21, Robbie Fordyce completed his PhD, Radical Platforms, at the University of Melbourne, graduating in 2019. His thesis engaged in a critique of autonomist Marxist theories of imperialism.. “Play, History and Politics: Conceiving Futures Beyond Empire.” Games and Culture, vol. 16, no. 3, May 2021, pp. 294–304, doi:. // eshaan

This article revisits the intellectual history behind Nick Dyer-Witheford and Greig de Peuter’s Games of Empire (2009) and builds on their work to think further about how we might politically analyse games, especially in relationship to new forms of social organisation in the future. The worlds of games are important places for us to think about time, as demonstrated by historical game studies in evaluating the past, but there is a role for games to help us consider the future as well. Because games are, to some extent, systems, they facilitate a systems thinking approach that connects the material to the immaterial. Because games also tend to be action-based, they allow thinking through of acts as well as representations. Games allow us to think about a time and place that is different from the present and how it might operate as a system that we could live in. Our speculation on the future can make use of games that both do and do not align with our individual politics. We do not need to see games as representing only the world we want to live in but also to think about worlds to avoid, as both utopian and dystopian projections of the future can shape our acts in the present. The role that Games of Empire (2009) plays in this picture is to expose the alignments and disjunctures between the ideologies that a game presents and the means by which games are produced. The possible futures offered by different games can be critiqued in relationship to their conditions of production. Games of Empire emerges out of games studies, but perhaps, it owes a greater intellectual debt to the history of post-autonomist Marxist scholarship. Dyer-Witheford was among the first anglophone interlocutors of autonomism in media studies with his work Cyber-Marx (1999), and this trajectory continues into Games of Empire with de Peuter. Unlike Cyber-Marx, which draws a great deal on the Italian autonomia movements of Italy in the 1960s and 1970s, Games of Empire takes the post-autonomist work of Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri’s Empire trilogy (2000, 2004, 2009) as its reference point. The question raised is simply worded but impossibly complex: what is the future we are after? In this article, I argue that the historical game studies framework of experimenting with history through games can also be used to open up politically useful gaming experiments for the future. Indeed, as I will show, the post-autonomist lineage that Dyer-Witheford and de Peuter draw upon is predicated on theories of political resistance that are developed through experimentation in new social forms. I argue that games can be a component for thinking about the possibilities that the future might hold, both for understanding how we might organise economically but also for thinking about what problems we might face. Like video games, post-autonomism concerns itself with a practical focus on the future. I argue that a post-autonomist method of games analysis requires an explicitly political interpretation that is focused on trying to imagine a political future through experiments in gaming. Marxist Theoretical Lineages for Games of Empire Dyer-Witheford and de Peuter draw primarily on the work of Hardt and Negri’s Empire trilogy (2000, 2004, 2009) as their core theoretical background and also make use of key works by other Italian Marxists such as Virno (2004), Lazzarato (1996) and Tronti (1966/2019). These scholars can be broadly categorised as post-autonomists, as they are inheritors of the autonomia movement of the 1970s, itself largely drawing on prior Italian Marxists such as Antonio Gramsci (see also Dyer-Witheford, 1999; Wright, 2002). Autonomia formed in response to the roboticisation of Italian automobile factories; this reduced wages and the need for specialised labour, while also undermining the union movement’s bargaining power. Traditional forms of factory-based strikes were no longer sufficient as mass skilled workers were replaced by machines. Instead work was reframed around informational, affective and intellectual forms of labour and the creation of social or cultural commodities, accordingly new forms of social resistance became necessary. Autonomia experimented with new forms of social organisation both inside and outside the factory walls. The autonomia movement was defined by a core Gramscian framework and the significant influence of feminist scholarship from Lotta Feminista. These approaches drew attention to how labour was arranged outside the space of the factory through a particular attention to social reproduction, that is the focus on the creation of social subjects within capitalism, especially in gendered forms of labour. This is accounted for in works by Dalla Costa and James (1971), Federici (1984/2004), Fortunati (1996) and more recently Terranova (2000). A wide array of unique theoretical positions and crises emerged over this time within Italian Marxism that led to numerous splits and divisions (see Bologna, 1980; Tronti, 2012; Wright, 2002, p. 11–21). From this period, Italian Marxism was defined by an interest in networked, affective, militant and collaborative approaches that tended to reject institutions, including unions and political parties (see Lotringer & Marazzi, 2007). Autonomia was defined by a new community of activism that – however incomplete or partial – included a diverse collection of identities recognising a common problem. Hardt and Negri’s Empire trilogy responds to this period and is post-autonomist insofar as the autonomist tendency significantly shifted in terms of its idea of the subject and in terms of its idea of the factory. Not least of which is the fact that the autonomist focuses on the changes in the workplace due to robotics, computers and a shift towards valorising intellectual work over manual labour has found a great deal of purchase in explaining contemporary trends in technology and work. Their thesis is that the world had been organised by a political rationality that had reorganised nation states into a single system that facilitated these changes, a world order they call ‘Empire’. Empire was to politics what capitalism was to the economy, and they worked hand in glove to expand and accumulate. Empire is not found in a single source but is present in a diverse array of state bodies and international treaties and fostered through practices such as trade liberalisation and expansion of property systems. Dyer-Witheford and de Peuter thoroughly demonstrate the value of postautonomist language in unpacking the multilayered, intertwined cultural, ideological and political economic components in digital video games. They have drawn on the autonomist and post-autonomist histories of language and globalisation, material and immaterial labour, and imperialist expansion and ideology. Dyer-Witheford and de Peuter see gaming as having a potential role in an emancipatory praxis; video gaming’s status as exemplary media of Empire (2009, p. xxix) means that it is ideal for representing imperial systems and also for submitting them to critique. My contribution to this discussion is to note that games provide an important form of critique: alternatives to Empire. Experimentation and imagination about the future are political necessities within post-autonomist scholarship. In their critique of Empire, Hardt and Negri (2009) note that while it is all well and good to critique what we have, there needs to be some sort of orienting positive force that allows us to create the world after Empire. The problem with the present moment is that it not only suffuses material politics but has also infected our imagination of the future. We need to develop new ideas about how we might live and think together and to identify new social and economic systems for living. Problem of Imagining a Future In each of their books, Hardt and Negri ask ‘what is to be done’ to move past Empire. This recalls the post-autonomist theory of exodus: the idea of transiting from a present crisis into a new, real space that may provide us with better conditions of existence (see Virno, 1996). If we are to move past the space of Empire, then we must have a model or idea of what we are going to build. The problem of imagining the future of the world past capitalism has been articulated in academic contexts at least since the 1970s by Franklin (1979) in an evaluation of Ballard. Franklin critiques Ballard’s ‘The Subliminal Man’ (1963) as misapprehending the end of capitalism as the end of the world itself that Ballard himself could not think of a world past capitalism and that capitalism’s absence could only be accepted if it also meant the end of everything. Later interlocutors such as Jameson (1994) and Zi ˇ zek (1994) ˇ generalised the problem from an individual pathology to a social one: the population at large struggles to conceive of a world past capitalism, where capitalism cannot be seen to thrive, hence the quote that it is easier to imagine the end of the world than the end of capitalism. The ideological nature of the problem is posed by Fisher (2009) who notes that capitalism, like all ideological systems, contains within it an assertion of its own natural continuation. This problem – the inability to think of a future that is substantively different – is difficult to resolve. For Hardt and Negri, Empire infects everything so profoundly that we cannot think of its responses. This does not mean that games naturally produce a new political horizon. As Hutchins (2008) has noted, the goal of a politics built from play cannot be left to ideas of fraternity or camaraderie naturally emerging out of an ‘Olympism’, where controlled competition would necessarily lead to a form of community. Hutchins critiques the idea that a natural liberal politics might harmoniously emerge from institutional play, even when such institutions have strongly didactic positions on what should emerge from play; something new emerges but not necessarily in a predictable way. We cannot leave our analysis of games to only address the apparent, didactic and marketised presentation of what the future might look like. What is necessary are forms of experimentation that allow us to think beyond the present moment. The post autonomist theory provides the concept of the laboratory (Hardt, 1996) as a way of thinking on the new forms of social organisation that might help us move into the future. This is a task that, by its nature as an evaluation of a situation that does not yet exist, is accomplished through speculation, the application of theory and the inspirations of fiction. Other scholars, such as Jameson (1984) and Hage (2012), note the centrality of the imagination of the future as a core issue for political action. Hage states that a mental projection of the future is necessary in order to take political action in the present: ideas of the future are ‘not just a conception of the world but an investment in it’ (2012, p. 291). Games can productively contribute, as ‘laboratories’, to the experimentation for the future by allowing us to think about other times and places so that we might think politically about the present. Games can contribute to this by allowing us to think, experiment and reflect of different social orders that we might bring to light. Games are not the only way that this could happen, and building from Games of Empire, they have a unique capacity to help think about life beyond Empire. Imagining Gaming in the Present Games of Empire adds to the political analysis of gaming by establishing connections between the internal narrative, subjective, aesthetic, affective and ludic elements of a particular game with the conditions of production, especially with regard to the labour of those who make the game possible. The way that these conditions make games possible also shapes what kind of possibilities we can imagine for the future. Within this paradigm, Dyer-Witheford and de Peuter align individual video games against two primary categories: games of multitude and games of empire, with these terms drawn from the Empire trilogy. The two categories are determined by what kind of future they permit, either a self-determining alter-globalisation or a continuation of military imperialism. This is the frame that Games of Empire takes: to understand how to locate games within post-autonomist discourse. Dyer-Witheford and de Peuter fold the questions of content and form together under a rubric of consumption and production that pulls in the whole of the imperialist system. They note how the conditions of game development are not separated from the narratives, stories and futures that they produce: these very concerns are built into and are expressed within production and consumption in reciprocal ways. The conditions of these forms of labour are present in the case study of ‘EA Spouse’ (2009, p. 59–65) through to the extractive, slave-based labour necessary to obtain the coltan used in console development (p. 222–224). These examples take the hegemonic impact of informational labour from simply being a top-down system as Hardt and Negri propose, whereby intellectual labour shapes industrial labour, which in turn shapes agricultural labour in a pyramidic structure with intellectual labour at the peak. Dyer-Witheford and de Peuter make clear that the nature of industrial and extractive labour in itself shapes the conditions of intellectual labour as well, influencing the stories and identities that games can tell. As they state, [Fictional] subject positions may be utterly fantastic, quite realistic, or somewhere in between. But such in- game identities are never entirely separated from the options provided by the actual social formations in which the games are set, from which their virtualities derive and into which they flow back. Game virtualities remove us from, but also prepare us for, these actual subject positions. Mostly, as we have discussed at length, they simulate the normalized subjectivities of a global capitalist order – consumer, commander, commanded, cyborg, criminal – not to mention the rapid shedding and swapping between identities that is such an important aptitude of workers (DyerWitheford & de Peuter, 2009, p. 192) It would be a mistake to read the political value of the gaming avatar or a gaming identity as allowing someone to ‘live in another’s shoes’. There are numerous cases where games fail to achieve this because individual lives, especially the lives marginalised people whose experiences are ‘dipped into’ temporarily, are always more complex than can be represented in games, and the consequence is always more severe that can be represented. From a political perspective, we can re-read the above quote as suggesting that we take on others’subject positions not just to work towards new social formations. We can take this further to critique our current moment, addressing the forms of labour that define not just game production but capitalism more generally. Histories of Future Games There is a wealth of scholarship on the way that games allow us to think across time, predominantly historical societies. This scholarship has focused on historically themed games that allow us to think differently about the past, in historical game studies. Games have a different relationship to the representation of other times and places than other media forms: Chapman, Foka, and Westin (2017) locate the work of Uricchio (2005) as the starting point for the consideration of games as presenting a medium-specific form of historicity. Uricchio focuses on how historical research has often been shaped by the question of mediation of particular histories, with a long history of media being poorly received in the discipline (2005, p. 328). Historical games enable a reinforcing or disruption of colonialist ideologies of the past (Chapman et al. 2017, p. 415); Spring (2015) notes that games allow for methods of representation that are not as available to other media forms; Metzger and Paxton (2016) note that games allow a new kind of interaction with the past. Postcolonial studies of gaming in particular expose how games make alternative conceptions of history possible. The work of Souvik Mukherjee has explored cases of what we might describe as ‘alter-empire’ in historical games (2016) and also how we might frame the complexity of ‘tourism’ as resistant historical subjects of imperial forces (2017, p. 59–62, p. 70–71). Emil Lundedal Hammar has explored the complex relationship between history, memory, individuality and race within a context of political activism (2017) and in politically decontextualised revenge fantasies (2020) in a way that addresses how contexts of other times and places allow for playful reactions to political complications of the present. The theme of interaction is one that Apperley (2013) and Chapman (2016) both locate as being an important attribute of the way we think about the past that games allow both a connection to history and a departure from it, and through this, the rethinking of history becomes possible. The flipside to the investigation of the past is those analyses that explore a presentation of the future or at least ‘a’ future. This literature includes a focus on the aesthetics of the future and alternative presents and also research into the way that some games that frame their futures in procedurality allow for a type of emergent future. Abraham and Jayemanne (2017) have called attention to the way that games could aesthetically present a vision of a future of ecological sustainability and survival for the planet, an approach that Abraham deploys in the analysis of military shooters (2018). My own work has looked at the way that games allow people to rethink homes and domestic economies through Dwarf Fortress (2006) and the homesteading mechanic of many games (Fordyce, 2018). McClancy’s (2018) analysis of the Fallout franchise also exposes the concern around possible futures, specifically noting that the narrative of the Fallout series is what stakes a claim about how desirable any such future might be. Ruffino (2019) has identified a strand of procedural games that mimic Franklin’s (1979) analysis of capitalist futures, specifically noting that incremental games in particular offer a logic of infinite expansion and that players respond by withdrawing from the prospect of an ‘end’. Conversely, there is also scholarship that attempts to address the nature of what survival itself might look like, post-capitalism, such as van Ryn’s (2020) account of survival without an economy of exchange in Don’t Starve (2013). There is also game scholarship that takes the notion of utopia to task in itself, often framed around the analysis of the Bioshock (2007) series. The Bioshock games focus on intensified notions of political ideologies from the real world hybridised with hyperbolic visions of capitalist consumption habits (see Nyman & Teten, 2018; Perez-Latorre & Oliva, ´ 2017; Schulzke, 2014). The only thing to be wary of is when our imaginaries of the future are themselves stultifying and we are left without energy or investment to move forward. This is one of the dangers that the imaginaries presented in Bioshock truly risk that all futures that diverge from centrism are awful, so any change is disastrous. The same tools through which we reimagine the past can reimagine the future. Reading Games Politically In 10 years, I have found only one quote by Negri that is a sideline reference to video games. Squeezed between complaints about broadcast TV and pop music, Negri states: ‘Now, television has become interactive, producing trash culture and constructing an appropriate audience!’ (Negri, 2007, p. 48). Yet, video game experimentation can contribute to imagining past Empire; we can see in games a space that allows exploration and experimentation of future worlds. A game can display a new economic arrangement, it can consider alternative political configurations, it can enable experiments in subjectivity and community and all of these attributes are important for a political consideration of the future. While games do not do this equally, all games can contribute something to these debates in some respect. While the scholarship above has mostly focused on the role of the action, rules, play and narrative, there remains space within the autonomist tradition to consider games in terms of alternative subjectivities for political action.

2022 Michigan Kritik
ALTERNATIVE › Alt – Class Prime – Solves Empire

The movement of the multitude is constitutive of Empire, which serves as a mere apparatus of capture – the productive movement of the alt solves

Hardt/Negri ‘2K (Michael Hardt; professor of literature at Duke University. Antonio Negri; independent researcher and philosopher, previously a professor of political science at University of Padua. “Empire” pg 60-63 2000) // ELog

The other head of the imperial eagle is the plural multitude of productive, creative subjectivities of globalization that have learned to sail on this enormous sea. They are in perpetual motion and they form constellations of singularities and events that impose continual global reconfigurations on the system. This perpetual motion can be geographical, but it can refer also to modulations of form and processes of mixture and hybridization. The relationship between ‘‘system’’ and ‘‘asystemic movements’’ cannot be flattened onto any logic of correspondence in this perpetually modulating atopia.21 Even the asystemic elements produced by the new multitude are in fact global forces that cannot have a commensurate relationship, even an inverted one, with the system. Every insurrectional event that erupts within the order of the imperial system provokes a shock to the system in its entirety. From this perspective, the institutional frame in which we live is characterized by its radical contingency and precariousness, or really by the unforeseeability of the sequences of events—sequences that are always more brief or more compact temporally and thus ever less controllable.22 It becomes ever more difficult for Empire to intervene in the unforeseeable temporal sequences of events when they accelerate their temporality. The most relevant aspect that the struggles have demonstrated may be sudden accelerations, often cumulative, that can become virtually simultaneous, explosions that reveal a properly ontological power and unforeseeable attack on the most central equilibria of Empire. Just as Empire in the spectacle of its force continually determines systemic recompositions, so too new figures of resistance are composed through the sequences of the events of struggle. This is another fundamental characteristic of the existence of the multitude today, within Empire and against Empire. New figures of struggle and new subjectivities are produced in the conjuncture of events, in the universal nomadism, in the general mixture and miscegenation of individuals and populations, and in the technological metamorphoses of the imperial biopolitical machine. These new figures and subjectivities are produced because, although the struggles are indeed antisystemic, they are not posed merely against the imperial system—they are not simply negative forces. They also express, nourish, and develop positively their own constituent projects; they work toward the liberation of living labor, creating constellations of powerful singularities. This constituent aspect of the movement of the multitude, in its myriad faces, is really the positive terrain of the historical construction of Empire. This is not a historicist positivity but, on the contrary, a positivity of the res gestae of the multitude, an antagonistic and creative positivity. The deterritorializing power of the multitude is the productive force that sustains Empire and at the same time the force that calls for and makes necessary its destruction. At this point, however, we should recognize that our metaphor breaks down and that the two-headed eagle is not really an adequate representation of the relationship between Empire and the multitude, because it poses the two on the same level and thus does not recognize the real hierarchies and discontinuities that define their relationship. From one perspective Empire stands clearly over the multitude and subjects it to the rule of its overarching machine, as a new Leviathan. At the same time, however, from the perspective of social productivity and creativity, from what we have been calling the ontological perspective, the hierarchy is reversed. The multitude is the real productive force of our social world, whereas Empire is a mere apparatus of capture that lives only off the vitality of the multitude—as Marx would say, a vampire regime of accumulated dead labor that survives only by sucking off the blood of the living. Once we adopt this ontological standpoint, we can return to the juridical framework we investigated earlier and recognize the reasons for the real deficit that plagues the transition from international public law to the new public law of Empire, that is, the new conception of right that defines Empire. In other words, the frustration and the continual instability suffered by imperial right as it attempts to destroy the old values that served as reference points for international public law (the nation-states, the international order of Westphalia, the United Nations, and so forth) along with the so-called turbulence that accompanies this process are all symptoms of a properly ontological lack. As it constructs its supranational figure, power seems to be deprived of any real ground beneath it, or rather, it is lacking the motor that propels its movement. The rule of the biopolitical imperial context should thus be seen in the first instance as an empty machine, a spectacular machine, a parasitical machine. A new sense of being is imposed on the constitution of Empire by the creative movement of the multitude, or really it is continually present in this process as an alternative paradigm. It is internal to Empire and pushes forward its constitution, not as a negative that constructs a positive or any such dialectical resolution. Rather it acts as an absolutely positive force that pushes the dominating power toward an abstract and empty unification, to which it appears as the distinct alternative. From this perspective, when the constituted power of Empire appears merely as privation of being and produc-tion, as a simple abstract and empty trace of the constituent power ofthe multitude, then we will be able to recognize the real standpoint of our analysis. It is a standpoint that is both strategic and tactical, when the two are no longer different.

2022 Michigan Kritik
ALTERNATIVE › Alt – Class Prime

The alternative is class prime – the unified notion of class has dissolved into an intersectional multitude, yet effective change requires organization – class prime is a class of the multitude built on internal and interlocking bonds of solidarity that enables the deconstruction of Empire

Hardt/Negri ’19 (Michael Hardt; professor of literature at Duke University. Antonio Negri; independent researcher and philosopher, previously a professor of political science at University of Padua. “Empire, Twenty Years On” ) // ELog

Multiplicity is becoming the exclusive horizon of our political imagination. The most inspiring movements of the past decades, from Cochabamba to Standing Rock, Ferguson to Cape Town, Cairo to Madrid, have been animated by multitudes. Leaderlessness is the label often given to these uprisings, especially by the media: and indeed, they reject traditional forms of centralized leadership, attempting to create new democratic forms of expression. But rather than describing them as leaderless, it is more useful to understand them as multitude struggles—useful, in part, because it allows us to grasp both their virtues and the challenges they face. These movements have achieved important results; they have often alluded to an alternative, better world. But they have generally been short-lived and many have suffered defeat, with some witnessing their gains brutally reversed. Something more is needed; and, as militants of various stripes will tell you, creative and original thinking about political organization is urgently required. We have no interest in lecturing these movements about the need to abandon their multiplicity and construct a unified political subject, be it a centralized leadership council, an electoral party or ‘a people’. A return to traditional forms of organization is not likely to result in more lasting or effective movements; in any case, they have been explicitly repudiated by the democratic sensibilities of the activists themselves. Furthermore, we do not believe, to put it in abstract terms, that only ‘the one’ can decide. The most important question for us is: how can a multiplicity act politically, with the sustained power to bring about real social transformation? It may be helpful here to step back twenty years and approach our contemporary situation from that vantage point. To explore the potential of today’s movements, we trace two historical and theoretical passages: from class to multitude and from multitude to class. This may at first appear as a pendulum action, a simple round trip; but we intend it to mark a theoretical and political advance, since the ‘class’ at the departure is not the same as that at arrival: the passage through multitude transforms its meaning. The general formula of organization we propose, then, is C–M–C', class–multitude–class prime. As in Marx’s formula, the importance rests on the transformation undergone at the centre of the process. Class prime must be a multitudinous class, an intersectional class. From class to multitude The movement from class to multitude names, in part, the general recognition over the last several decades that the working class must be understood in terms of multiplicity, both within and outside its domain—a shift that corresponds to the emptying-out of claims to represent the working class by traditional parties and syndicalist institutions. As an empirical formation, of course, the working class has never ceased to exist. But since its internal composition has changed—with novel forms of work, new labouring conditions and wage relations—new investigations of class composition are required. In particular, these should explore the powers of social cooperation and the common. In addition, the differences among labouring populations, which have always existed, now increasingly refuse unitary representation. Differences among sectors of labour—for instance, between waged and unwaged work, stable and precarious employment, documented and undocumented workers—along with differences of gender, race and nationality, which to some extent map on to those differences of work status, all demand expression. Any investigation of class composition at this point—and any proposition of class-political projects—has to be embedded in intersectional analysis. This is not a class, one might say, if by class one understands a subject that is internally unified, or can be represented as a unified whole; it is a multitude, an irreducible multiplicity. At the same time, the passage from class to multitude means that the struggles of the working class, and anticapitalist struggles in general, must be cast together and on an equal basis with struggles against other axes of domination: feminist, antiracist, decolonial, queer, anti-ablist and others (theorists of multiplicity are not troubled by open sets and unending lists). In this sense, the concept of the multitude is closely allied with—and, indeed, profoundly indebted to—intersectional analysis and practice, which emerges from the theoretical practice of us black feminism. Intersectionality, at the most basic level, is a political theory of multiplicity. It aims to counter traditional single-axis frameworks of political analysis by recognizing the interlocking nature of race, class, sex, gender and national hierarchies. This means, first, that no one structure of domination is primary to (or reducible to) the others. Instead, they are relatively autonomous, have equal significance and are mutually constitutive. Second, just as structures of domination are characterized by multiplicity, so too are the subjectivities that stand in relation to them. This does not imply either a rejection of identity or a cumulative, additive conception of many identities; rather, it requires a rethinking of subjectivity in the key of multiplicity. The call for intersectional multitudes is not merely an appeal for greater inclusion but rather, as Jennifer Nash says, ‘an antisubordination project’—that is, a combative, revolutionary strategy on multiple fronts simultaneously. It may be helpful at this point to consider the passage from class to multitude through the concept of precarity, in two senses. The first sense of precarity, mainly developed among European theorists and activists, is conceived primarily in terms of wage and labour relations. Precarity in this sense marks a contrast to the stable employment contracts that served as a regulative ideal in the Fordist economy of the mid-20th century—a regulative ideal that existed as a reality only for a limited number of (generally male) industrial workers in the dominant countries. Guaranteed labour contracts and laws that protect workers’ rights have been progressively eroded, and workers have been forced to accept informal, short-term labour contracts. These labour arrangements have always been raced and gendered, of course; but all sectors of the workforce are being affected by this trend, albeit in different ways and measures. This precaritization of labour is a powerful weapon in the grand arsenal of neoliberalism. Another sense of precarity, more developed by us writers, provides a useful complement, and again serves as part of an interpretation of—and challenge to—neoliberalism, but from a much broader perspective. Precarity, writes Judith Butler, ‘designates that politically induced condition in which certain populations suffer from failing social and economic networks of support more than others, and become differentially exposed to injury, violence and death.’ Labour precarity is certainly part of the mix, but the notion of precarious life aims to grasp how legal, economic and governmental changes have increased the insecurity of a wide range of already subordinated populations—women, trans people, gay and lesbian populations, people of colour, migrants, the disabled and others. There is thus one notion of precarity that speaks the language of the working class and another that promotes an intersectional vision. Put them together and you have a good foundation for theorizing the multitude. We do not pose this movement from class to multitude (or from the people to the multitude) as a political mandate. That is not necessary, because it is already an accomplished fact that has manifested itself over the past twenty years in different countries and social contexts. We understand that many regard the historical shift from class to multitude as a decline and a loss, beginning with the diminished power and membership of institutional trade unions and working-class parties (and, indeed, not every multiplicity is politically progressive; crowds and mobs are just as likely to be reactionary). But we should also recognize all that has been gained in the process. At the level of analysis, it should be obvious that the multiplicity of mutually constituting structures of domination offers a superior lens for grasping our social reality, and this requires supplementing our brief investigation of capitalist rule with equal analyses of the institutional structures of race, gender and sexual hierarchies. But it is most crucial at the level of practice: there will be no successful and sustained project of class politics today that is not also feminist, antiracist and queer. Rethinking class Yet to theorize multiplicity, or even to recognize existing multiplicities, is not enough—especially if by multiplicity one means simply fracturing and separation. To be politically effective, organization is required. And when dealing with multiplicities, that pressure is even more intense. To respond to our initial question—how can a multiplicity decide and act politically?—simply by saying that it needs to organize, is not yet very helpful. The next step, then, requires a return to the concept of class—but class conceived differently now—in order to explore more fully what a multitude can become and how it can act politically. One obvious objection to the proposal of this second movement, from multitude to class, is that it unravels all the advantages achieved in the previous movement, from a unified political conception based on a single axis of domination, that determined by capital, to a multiplicity, which also engages patriarchy, white supremacy and other axes. Our intention, however, is to develop a conception of class that refers not only to the working class but is itself a multiplicity, a political formation that makes good on the gains of the multitude. It may be helpful, first of all, simply to note authors who use the concept of class beyond reference to the working class, in order to address race, gender domination and struggle. Achille Mbembe, for instance, analyses the contemporary modes of control deployed against Africans migrating to Europe in terms of a ‘racial class’: Europe has decided not only to militarize its frontiers but to extend them into the far distance . . . [its borders] are now located all along the shifting routes and torturous paths trodden by the candidates for migration, relocating to keep on top of their trajectories . . . In reality, it is the body of the African, of every African taken individually, and of all Africans as a racial class that constitutes today the borders of Europe. This new type of human body is not only the skin-body and the abject body of epidermal racism, that of segregation. It is also the border-body, which traces the limit between those who are ‘us’ and those who are not, and whom one can maltreat with impunity. In the new global regime of mobility, Mbembe claims, Africans will be transformed into ‘a stigmatized racial class’. For him, the concept of class here is not, or not only, a socio-economic category. It serves instead as a means to think collective racial difference that is not merely based on skin colour; this racial class is born in the racist structures and institutions of Europe. Mbembe’s references here echo 1970s feminists like Christine Delphy, who employed the concept ‘sex class’ to understand patriarchal domination and to designate a basis of feminist struggle. To other feminists who challenged her usage, Delphy responded that the concept of class could grasp better than any other how subordinate social subjects are created by relations of domination. From this perspective, Delphy writes, ‘one cannot consider each group separate from the other because they are united by a relation of domination . . . The groups are not . . . constituted before they are put in relation. On the contrary, their relation is what constitutes them as such.’ Here, then, relations of domination are prior to and constitutive of social subjects. In Delphy’s usage, again, class refers not exclusively to economic status, but instead involves an analytical procedure that can be deployed with respect to any axis of domination. Our interest in these analyses of Mbembe and Delphy is, first, to highlight this point—that the concept of class can be used to grasp the effects of subjection created by relations of domination, not only with respect to capital but also with respect to white supremacy and patriarchy, in the interests of not only the working class but also the racial class, the sex class and others. Second, it is important to stress that the concept of class is employed here not only as a descriptive claim but as a political call to those subjected to patriarchal or racial hierarchies to struggle together, as a class. Finally, and this is the point most difficult to confront: to recognize a plurality of classes dominated and struggling in parallel fashion is a step forward, but is not enough. The notion of ‘multitudinous class’ or ‘intersectional class’ that we seek requires a further step: an internal articulation of these different subjectivities—working class, racial class, sex class—in struggle. Intersectional analyses commonly address the need for articulation between the subordinated subjectivities in terms of solidarity and coalition. Often this repeats an additive strategy: working-class plus feminist plus antiracist plus lgbtq struggle, plus . . . In other words, even when intersectional analysis refuses additive notions of identity, an additive logic can still govern activist imaginaries. One weakness of this approach is that the bonds of solidarity are external. What is needed are internal bonds of solidarity—that is, a different mode of articulation, going beyond standard conceptions of coalition. Let us illustrate this key condition—the internal relations of solidarity in this multitudinous class—with three theoretical examples. First, Rosa Luxemburg: after the failed 1905 insurrection in Russia, Luxemburg criticized the German proletariat and its party for their expressions of sympathy and support for their Russian cousins, whether tinged with condescension or admiration. Luxemburg was not, of course, advocating that German workers disengage from, or pay less attention to, the Russian struggles—exactly the opposite. The problem for her was that such expressions of ‘international class solidarity’ posed merely an external relation: German revolutionaries needed to recognize instead that the Russian events were their own affair and internal to their struggle, ‘a chapter of their own social and political history’. A second theoretical example: Iris Young in the early 1980s challenged male socialists who profess solidarity with the feminist movement. ‘By and large’, she writes, ‘socialists do not consider fighting women’s oppression as a central aspect of the struggle against capitalism itself.’ Note that Young is not addressing the misogynist and anti-feminist male socialists, of whom there were many, but instead the supportive male comrades who offer solidarity to feminists, or who see feminist struggle as allied with but separate from their own. Like Luxemburg, Young charges that such solidarity is not enough. She exhorts male socialists, in effect, to recognize feminist struggle against patriarchy as a chapter of their own social and political history. You cannot really be anticapitalist without also being feminist because, since they are mutually constitutive, capital cannot be defeated without also defeating patriarchy. A third example: Keeanga-Yamahtta Taylor makes a parallel argument addressing antiracist activists in the us who do not also focus on class domination. Too often, she maintains, there is a kind of segregation of struggles, such that anticapitalist struggles are assumed to be the task of white people, while people of colour must conduct antiracist struggles. ‘No serious socialist current in the last hundred years’, Taylor writes, ‘has ever demanded that Black or Latino/a workers put their struggles on the back burner while some other class struggle is waged first. This assumption rests on the mistaken idea that the working class is white and male, and therefore incapable of taking up issues of race, class and gender. In fact, the American working class is female, immigrant, Black, white, Latino/a and more. Immigrant issues, gender issues and antiracisms are working-class issues.’ This is not a matter of accepting the participation of allies or expressing solidarity; the struggle against white supremacy and that against capital must be understood as internal to one another. The objection at this point might be: yes, they all need to struggle together because they are all precarious in the two senses discussed earlier; but such a projection of sameness is not helpful, because the modes of precarity and domination are different. We need to maintain the conception of multiplicity—capitalist domination is not the same as gender or race domination, and one cannot be subsumed under another. Instead of a reduction to sameness, this argument requires an articulation among the subjectivities in struggle. This is why class—a multitudinous class—rather than coalition seems to us the appropriate concept. But this is a notion of class that is not only composed of a multiplicity, and grounded in forms of social cooperation and the common, but also articulated by internal bonds of solidarity and intersection among struggles, each recognizing that the others are ‘a chapter of their own social and political history’. That is its mode of articulation, its mode of assembly. This is why we call this transformed notion ‘class prime’, so that instead of class–multitude–class, the entire movement we are trying to sketch is class–multitude–class prime: C–M–C'. This serves at least as an initial theoretical response to our earlier question: can a multiplicity act politically? Yes, it can do so as class prime, as an internally articulated multiplicity oriented equally in struggle against capital, patriarchy, white supremacy and other axes of domination. Granted, it is merely a formal, conceptual response, but perhaps it can offer a framework for thinking and pursuing that political project. 6. in praise of alterglobalization On 1 January 1994, the day that nafta went into effect, the Zapatista Army of National Liberation launched an insurrection in Chiapas, Mexico; on 30 November 1999, protesters in Seattle blocked the meetings of the World Trade Organization; on 25 January 2001, the World Social Forum was inaugurated in Porto Alegre, Brazil, counterposing itself to the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland; and on 21 July 2001, multitudes flooded the streets of Genoa to protest the G8 summit. The international cycle of alterglobalization struggles that developed in the Americas and Europe had numerous defects: their nomadic nature and the practices of ‘summit-hopping’ in many cases eclipsed engagement with local, sustained organizing; they were frequently criticized, most strongly by activists within the movements themselves, for failing to develop sufficiently the intersectional characteristics we have just outlined; and the season of struggles proved relatively short, due in part to their own organizational weaknesses. One should keep in mind, of course, that the movements were also closed down by the severe security regimes installed after September 11th; activists had to shift their focus from alterglobalization to anti-war movements. The extraordinary virtue of these protests was their theoretical practice. They constructed a global critical vision and were able, through their orchestrated events, to render legible the political significance of the relatively obscure realm of the global economic institutions. Rather than a movement, then, they might be better understood as a vast collective co-research investigation into the nature of the emerging global order. Activists knew that the major corporations and dominant nation-states, the United States first among them, had enormous power; but they also had the intuition that the global order was something more—and that it was here, at the global level, that the contemporary structures of domination must be understood. Each event illuminated another node of the emerging network of the global power structure: the wto, World Bank, imf, G8, trade agreements and so forth. The cycle of alterglobalization movements was thus a massive pedagogical project for those who participated in them—and for anyone else who was willing to learn. Since then, although the relative positions of the various powers within its mixed constitution have risen and fallen, the forces of domination and control of the global order have by no means lessened, despite the braying of the ideologues of national sovereignty. They have instead merely receded from view and become less legible, as if they had discovered an invisibility potion. We need today an international cycle of struggles with the intelligence to investigate the structures of the ruling global order. Sometimes, after all, the theoretical work done in social movements teaches us more than that written in libraries. Reversing their invisibility is the first step toward being able to challenge and eventually overthrow the structures of Empire.