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2022 Michigan Affirmative
Aff – PGMs 2 – BFHR › CPs › *2AC---A2: Turkey PIC

Iceland can’t.

Nato 49 [Nato, 4-1-1949, "Iceland and NATO", NATO, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/declassified_162083.htm, DOA: 7-4-2022 //ArchanSen]

Iceland, unique among NATO Allies, does not have a military. Icelanders have long been proud of their country’s pacifist tradition, which goes back further than its independence from Denmark in 1944. So the decision to join the Alliance as a founding member in 1949 was controversial. Throughout the Cold War, Iceland had several national debates about whether or not to withdraw from NATO. But despite this internal ambivalence, Iceland has continuously contributed as a valuable member of NATO, based on shared values and unity, democracy and freedom. During the Cold War, Iceland allowed NATO Allies to station troops on its strategically critical island and volunteered the Icelandic Coast Guard to assist the Organization, activities that were pursued after the fall of the Berlin Wall.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Aff – PGMs 2 – BFHR › CPs › *2AC---A2: Turkey PIC

Turkey won’t leave.

The Economist 22 [The Economist, 06-16-2022, "Is Turkey more trouble to NATO than it is worth?", Economist, https://www.economist.com/europe/2022/06/16/is-turkey-more-trouble-to-nato-than-it-is-worth, DOA: 7-2-2022 //ArchanSen]

None of this spells doom for the relationship between Turkey and NATO. Western countries will try to work round Turkey’s veto by providing Finland and Sweden with security guarantees. This may leave Turkey sidelined within the alliance. But its departure or eviction from NATO is still fantasy. Turkey is on the front line of the war in Syria and close to other conflicts in the Middle East; it controls access to the Black Sea, which has been central to all of Russia’s recent wars; and it serves as a corridor for trade between Central Asia and Europe, especially in energy, notes Ben Hodges, a former commander of American forces in Europe. “I don’t even want to think of NATO without Turkey,” he says.

Especially in the wake of Russia’s war in Ukraine, Turkey also has no interest in surrendering the power of deterrence that nato membership offers. “I don’t believe it will ever happen,” says Tacan Ildem, Turkey’s former permanent representative to NATO. There is no credible alternative, he says. Turkey will probably remain a headache for the alliance, even when Mr Erdogan is out of the picture. But it is a headache nato will have to live with.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Aff – PGMs 2 – BFHR › CPs › 1AR---A2: Process CPs

The delay is too late – Russia will win the war.

Milburn 6-27 [Andrew Milburn, 6-27-2022, "Time Is Not on Kyiv’s Side: Training, Weapons, and Attrition in Ukraine", Modern War Institute, https://mwi.usma.edu/time-is-not-on-kyivs-side-training-weapons-and-attrition-in-ukraine/, DOA: 7-1-2022 //ArchanSen]

Some might say that this commentary paints an overly gloomy picture for Ukraine—that game-changing weapons are on their way, and these will be enough to turn the tide. It is true that the US-made High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS), already operating in Ukraine, is a formidable weapon and a welcome improvement on the Ukrainians’ over-used Soviet howitzers and even the recently supplied M777 lightweight 155-millimeter howitzer, whose deficiencies I have written about recently. Even lacking the long-range Army Tactical Missile System, HIMARS can bring accurate fires to bear at ranges exceeding forty miles within minutes of receiving data.

It will be weeks, however, before HIMARS is fielded in sufficient quantity to have a significant effect—maybe too late to reverse the Russian advance. The logistical exigencies of getting more into theater and then bringing Ukrainian artillery personnel to Germany or Poland for training stand in the way. Meanwhile the hemorrhage of casualties continues. And even when fielded, the HIMARS will not have the same effect for the Ukrainians as when employed by the US military, because of a shortfall in Ukrainian task organization. The tactical units we trained lacked forward observers, personnel trained to locate and report targets in a manner that can be rapidly transferred into firing data. The extremely centralized execution of artillery fire in the Ukrainian army makes for some effective fires for effect, such as the recent one that struck several Russian generals, but is not very responsive to the needs of frontline units.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Aff – PGMs 2 – BFHR › CPs › 2AC---A2: Process CPs

Timeframe DA – every hour is critical – any delay should be prevented.

Detsch and Mackinnon 6-2 [Jack Detsch, Amy Mackinnon, 6-2-2022, "Ukraine Wants Longer-Range Ammunition for Donbas Gunfight", Foreign Policy, https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/06/02/ukraine-donbas-us-military-aid-long-range-missiles/, DOA: 7-1-2022 //ArchanSen]

“We are knowingly providing a less capable system despite the fact that they pledged they wouldn’t use the more capable system in ways we didn’t like,” one U.S. source briefed on the aid package told Foreign Policy, speaking on condition of anonymity to discuss ongoing weapons transfers. “We’re still not giving them what they want.”

A source close to the Ukrainian government, speaking on condition of anonymity, said that there was “frustration” and “disappointment” at the decision not to arm the country with longer-range weapons. “Each hour, let alone each day and week, is critical for Ukraine,” they said.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Aff – PGMs 2 – BFHR › CPs › 2AC---A2: States CP

The federal government has exclusive authority.

Lucas and Vassalotti 20 [Nathan J. Lucas, Section Research Manager, and Michael J. Vassalotti, Section Research Manager, April 30 2020. CRS. “Transfer of Defense Articles: Sale and Export of U.S.-Made Arms to Foreign Entities”. DOA: 07-05-2022 //ArchanSen]

The sale and export of U.S.-origin weapons to foreign countries (“defense articles and defense services,” officially) are governed by an extensive set of laws, regulations, policies, and procedures. Congress has authorized such sales under two laws:

The Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) of 1961, 22 U.S.C. §2151, et seq.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Aff – PGMs 2 – BFHR › T › 2AC---A2: No Arms to Ukraine

Baltic transfers solve.

CBS 22 [No Author, 1-22-2022, "Baltic nations to send missiles to Ukraine with U.S. support", No Publication, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/baltic-nations-missiles-ukraine-us-support-russia-crisis/, DOA: 7-1-2022 //ArchanSen]

The Baltic nations of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania will send U.S.-made anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles to Ukraine in a move that Washington says it is fully endorsing amid Kyiv's escalating tensions with Russia.

U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken said in a tweet Saturday that Washington saluted the three NATO nations and former Soviet republics "for their longstanding support to Ukraine".

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Aff – PGMs 2 – BFHR › T › 2AC---C/I

NATO is a multi-tiered alliance. Partner countries are included.

Matláry 14 [Matláry, J.H. (2014). Partners versus Members? NATO as an Arena for Coalitions. In: Mayer, S. (eds) NATO’s Post-Cold War Politics. New Security Challenges Series. Palgrave Macmillan, London. DOA: 6/20/2022 //ArchanSen]

In this chapter, I discuss the importance of burden-sharing partnerships with NATO as a development that is, as I argue, symptomatic of the evolution of the Alliance into becoming an arena or platform for coalitions of the ‘willing and able’. After the end of the Cold War, we live in an era where armed attacks against one or several Alliance members, obliging others to respond immediately (although not necessarily by military means), have become rare and unlikely. As a result, the organization has increasingly turned into a ‘two-tiered’ or ‘multi-tiered’ alliance. Current operations are mostly Article 4 and hence, unlike Article 5 cases, voluntary. This implies that partners, as well as members, may contribute. Moreover, few members seem to be willing and able to make a contribution,1 something that inter alia the Libya operation has shown — only eight allies were actually willing to contribute combat capabilities. In other operations, like ISAF, all members contribute, but only a few with risk-willing capabilities. All ‘show the flag’, but few are willing and able to contribute to sharp operations that require top skill and risk-willingness.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Aff – PGMs 2 – BFHR › Case › 1AC---Israel

Middle East war goes global AND nuclear.

Pleasance 20, senior foreign news reporter with dailymail (Chris, January 3rd, 2020, “How could Iran crisis lead to World War Three? Tehran could hit back with cyber-attacks or terror attacks on US forces and Israel - provoking Donald Trump to retaliate in tit-for-tat that could drag in Saudi Arabia, Russia, China and Turkey”, )

Iran has vowed to exact a 'crushing revenge' on American forces in retaliation for the killing of Quds commander Qassem Soleimani - leaving the Middle East on the brink of a conflict that could quickly spiral into World War 3. The Iranian National Security Council is currently meeting in Tehran - chaired by Ayatollah Khamenei himself for the first time ever - to consider its response. At their disposal is the world's 13th most powerful military, a host of militia groups spread across the Middle East, proxy-forces such as Lebanon's Hezbollah and Yemen's Houthi rebels, and allies like Syria's Bashar al-Assad. Targets in their crosshairs are likely to include US troops and military bases in Iraq and Syria, Israeli forces in the Golan Heights, tankers in the Strait of Hormuz, and Saudi Arabia's oil infrastructure. While initial strikes are likely to be limited, they could herald a tit-for-tat series of events - drawing in Russian forces stationed in Syria defending a key Iranian ally in Bashar al-Assad, and Turkish forces fighting in the country's north. China also has ships stationed in the Gulf of Oman and recently carried out joint naval drill with both Iran and Russia, raising the prospect that they could also become involved. Saudi Arabia is already engaged in a conflict with Iran-backed Houthi rebels in Yemen, and any escalation by Tehran would be met with a response from Riyadh. Turkish strongman Recep Erdogan's troops are deployed in northern Syria and he is close to Russia and Iran as well as being a member of NATO - making his actions unpredictable if a conflict escalates across the region. The US, China, Russia and Israel all have nuclear weapons - with at least three of those possessing next-generation hypersonic missiles capable of breaching all defense systems. Israel is also armed with nuclear weapons and is an obvious target for any Iranian attacks, but Benjamin Netanyahu and the IDF will not hesitate to defend themselves and have recently struck Iran-backed Hezbollah forces in Syria. If Iran decides to blockade the Strait of Hormuz, as it has often threatened to do in the past, a host of world powers including European nations which rely on the oil which flows through the waterway could find themselves having to defend their interests. Ultimately, if the tit-for-tat exchanges between these countries escalated far enough it is conceivable but unlikely that it would end with a nuclear exchange - and destruction on a global scale.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Aff – PGMs 2 – BFHR › Case › 1AC---Israel

Key to deter ME adversaries.

Makovsky 20 [Michael Makovsky, Phd and Gen Charles “Chuck” Wald, Usaf (Ret.), 10-23-2020, "How the U.S. Can Help Israel Maintain its Military Edge", JINSA, https://jinsa.org/how-the-u-s-can-help-israel-maintain-its-military-edge/, DOA: 7-4-2022 //ArchanSen]

Ensuring Israel’s military edge is in America’s basic self-interest and commands overwhelming bipartisan support. It means assisting Israel in maintaining military superiority over its neighbors, so that it can defend itself by itself.

As the United States retrenches from the Middle East, the value of a strong and capable Israel has only grown. Israel has shouldered the burden of countering U.S. enemies (Iran, ISIS, Hezbollah and the Muslim Brotherhood) while strengthening the security of U.S. partners (Jordan and Egypt), without requiring American boots on the ground.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Aff – PGMs 2 – BFHR › Case › 1AC---Lockheed Scenario

Each scenario goes global, it’s most probable, and it implodes any arms control

Michael Richardson 13, Visiting Senior Research Fellow at the Institute of South East Asian Studies in Singapore, Former South-East Asia Correspondent of The Age, “Cruise Missile Threat in Asia”, Japan Times, 6/18/2013, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2013/06/18/commentary/world-commentary/cruise-missile-threat-in-asia/#.XYY4IkZJFwB

Cruise missiles that are difficult to detect, increasingly fast and capable of carrying nuclear warheads are spreading, especially in Asia, complicating arms control and raising the risk of catastrophic conflict.

Until recently, most concerns have focused on the actual or potential spread of nuclear-tipped ballistic missiles in China, North Korea, India and Pakistan — the four Asian states known to have atomic arms. Ballistic missiles, launched by rocket engines, follow an arc-like trajectory, attaining hypersonic speeds on the downward leg of their guided journey towards a target.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Aff – PGMs 2 – BFHR › Case › 1AC---Lockheed Scenario

Global nuclear war

Dr. Richard H. Speier 17, Adjunct Staff with the RAND Corp, Founded the Office of Non- Proliferation Policy at the DOD, Recipient of the Meritorious Civilian Service Medal as the “Father of the MTCR,” now Consults in the Washington DC area; George Nacouzi, Senior Engineer at the RAND Corporation, Supports Projects within PAF (Project Air Force) and NSRD (National Security Research Division), Carrie A. Lee, Researcher at RAND, and Richard M. Moore, Researcher at RAND. 2017. “Hypersonic Missile Nonproliferation: Hindering the Spread of a New Class of Weapons.” RAND. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2137.html

Strategic Implications of Hypersonic Weapons Compressed Timelines The U.S. military uses an acronym to describe the decisionmaking and action process cycle: OODA (Observe, Orient, Decide, Act). These four steps take time, and hypersonic missiles compress available response time to the point that a lesser nation’s strategic forces might be disarmed before acting. As an illustration of the time required to act with respect to an existential missile threat, the Nuclear Threat Initiative organization estimated a timeline for a U.S. response to a massive Russian intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) attack, as follows:9 • 0 minutes—Russia launches missiles • 1 minute—U.S. satellite detects missiles • 2 minutes—U.S. radar detects missiles • 3 minutes—North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) assesses information (2 minutes max) • 4 minutes—NORAD alerts White House • 5 minutes—first detonations of submarine-launched ballistic missiles • 7 minutes—locate president and advisers, assemble them, brief them, get decision (8 minutes max) • 13 minutes—decision • 15 minutes—transmit orders to start launch sequence • 20 minutes—launch officers receive, decode, and authenticate orders • 23 minutes—complete launch sequence (2 minutes max) • 25 minutes—Russian ICBM detonations. This timeline is not, of course, representative of two hostile parties in closer proximity or with less effective warning systems than Russia and the United States. Nor is it representative of less-than-Armageddon possibilities. However, for adjacent enemies within a 1,000-km range, a hypersonic missile traveling at ten times the speed of sound could cover that distance and reduce response times to about six minutes.10 Targets As discussed earlier, hypersonic missiles increase the threat over current generations of missiles in cases where the target nation has missile defenses. The targets in such nations would primarily be high value and heavily defended. Prime targets could include destroying a nation’s leadership and command and control, referred to as “decapitation,” to prevent the target nation from responding with an effective follow-on attack. Other key targets could be carrier strike groups, with the objective of striking a key blow or pushing the naval formation further from the coast. And, because of their time sensitivity, strategic forces and storage facilities for weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) could warrant hypersonic attack. Implications for Targeted Nations Any government faced with the possibility that hypersonic missiles would be employed against it—particularly in a decapitating attack— would plan countermeasures, many of which could be destabilizing. For example, countermeasures could include devolution of strategic forces’ command and control so that lower levels of authority could execute a strategic strike, which would obviously increase the risk of accidental strategic war; or strategic forces could be more widely dispersed— a tactic risking greater exposure to subnational capture. An obvious measure would be a launch-on-warning posture—a hair-trigger tactic that would increase crisis instability. Or the target nation could adopt a policy of preemption during a crisis—guaranteeing highly destructive military action. To be sure, such measures could be invoked against threats from current types of missiles.11 But, for nations with effective ballistic mis- sile and/or cruise missile defenses in the time frame when hypersonic missiles might proliferate, the hard choices would be forced when facing hypersonic threats. Advanced nations with adequate resources could take other steps against hypersonic threats. They could strengthen the resilience of their command and control, harden the siting of their strategic forces, and make a deterrent force mobile or sea-based. These tactics may or may not be effective, especially for lesser nations. And they certainly will be expensive—putting them out of reach of some. Even for major powers, the proliferation of hypersonic missiles will create new threats by allowing lesser powers to hold them at risk of effective missile attacks especially against “unhardened” targets, e.g., cities. Over the coming decades, the ability of a lesser nation with a handful of ICBMs to threaten major powers will continue to decrease as wide area missile defenses continue to improve. However, HGVs and HCMs will be more difficult to defend against. Implications for Major Powers The ability of hypersonic missiles to penetrate advanced missile defenses will increase the risks for nations with such defenses. Lesser powers with hypersonic weapons may see these weapons as a deterrent against greater power intervention, and feel free to pursue potentially destabilizing regional agendas. Moreover, lesser nations with hypersonic missiles could affect the force deployments of major powers. As noted above, carrier strike groups might be pushed further out to sea or an intervening power’s regional military bases might become exposed to more effective attacks. The Broader Picture of Increased Risk The ability of hypersonic forces to penetrate defenses and compress decision time could aggravate the instabilities in regions that are already tense—for example, Iran-Israel and North Korea–Japan. Conflicts in these regions could evolve to include major powers aligned on opposite sides. An Israel-Iran conflict, with the United States and much of Europe aligned with Israel and Russia and perhaps China aligned with Iran, would create new paths for escalation to an even-larger conflict. The basic roles of external actors would not necessarily change—the alignments would stay the same—but external powers might suddenly find themselves in a more-unstable situation in which their patron states are increasingly trigger-happy. As noted previously, lesser powers could gain influence over major powers by threatening a hypersonic attack. At the least, lesser powers might be emboldened if they saw themselves as possessing a deterrent against major power intervention. Finally, because hypersonic weapons increase the expectation of a disarming attack, they lower the threshold for military action.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Aff – PGMs 2 – BFHR › Case › 1AC---Lockheed Scenario

It collapses deterrence, there’s no norms or arms control, and causes accidents---nothing checks

R. Jeffrey Smith 19, Managing Editor for National Security at the Center for Public Integrity, Former Editor and Correspondent for The Washington Post who won the Pulitzer Prize for Investigative Reporting, Master of Science Degree from the Columbia University School of Journalism, Awarded a Fellowship at Stanford University’s Center for International Security and Arms Control, “Hypersonic Missiles Are Unstoppable. And They’re Starting a New Global Arms Race.”, The New York Times, 6/19/2019, Lexis

Development of hypersonics is moving so quickly, however, that it threatens to outpace any real discussion about the potential perils of such weapons, including how they may disrupt efforts to avoid accidental conflict, especially during crises. There are currently no international agreements on how or when hypersonic missiles can be used, nor are there any plans between any countries to start those discussions. Instead, the rush to possess weapons of incredible speed and maneuverability has pushed the United States into a new arms race with Russia and China — one that could, some experts worry, upend existing norms of deterrence and renew Cold War-era tensions.

Although hypersonic missiles can in theory carry nuclear warheads, those being developed by the United States will only be equipped with small conventional explosives. With a length between just five and 10 feet, weighing about 500 pounds and encased in materials like ceramic and carbon fiber composites or nickel-chromium superalloys, the missiles function like nearly invisible power drills that smash holes in their targets, to catastrophic effect. After their launch — whether from the ground, from airplanes or from submarines — they are pulled by gravity as they descend from a powered ascent, or propelled by highly advanced engines. The missiles’ kinetic energy at the time of impact, at speeds of at least 1,150 miles per hour, makes them powerful enough to penetrate any building material or armored plating with the force of three to four tons of TNT.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Aff – PGMs 2 – BFHR › Case › 1AC---Lockheed Scenario

We’re down to ONE prototyping effort – budget is tight.

Pawlyk 20 – Oriana Pawlyk, reporter, citing Ann Stefanek, USAF service spokeswoman. [Air Force Cancels 'Hacksaw' Hypersonic Weapons Program, 2-11-20, https://www.military.com/daily-news/2020/02/11/air-force-cancels-hacksaw-hypersonic-weapons-program.html]//BPS

As the global race for hypersonic weapons intensifies, the U.S. military just decided to abandon one of its fundamental prototype programs.

The U.S. Air Force on Monday said it will cancel its Hypersonic Conventional Strike Weapon, known as HCSW (pronounced "Hacksaw"), in order to shift resources to its other program, the Air-launched Rapid Response Weapon (ARRW). Both prototypes are designed by Lockheed Martin Corp.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Aff – PGMs 2 – BFHR › Case › 1AC---Lockheed Scenario

AND it rips apart diplomatic options in Asia

Henderson 19 – Mark Henderson, a colonel in the U.S. Army. [HYPERSONICS: THE NEW 'SPUTNIK' MOMENT? 9-6-2019, https://warroom.armywarcollege.edu/articles/hypersonics-new-sputnik-moment/]//BPS

Consider how hypersonics in the hands of adversaries could make it difficult for the United States and its allies to respond with diplomatic levers to developing situations in the international environment. An article posted in The Hill suggests that hypersonic weapons armed with conventional warheads could avoid detection and travel exceptionally quickly, inducing great confusion and critical lags in a defender’s ability to respond. The strategic shock of exploiting this activity gets worse: experts suggest the “effects could be so destructive that they would mimic… nuclear use, without the actual risk of employing nuclear weapons.” This kind of attack could lead to a scenario where preemption may be the only way to counter the capability. Such preemption risks immediate escalation, precluding a more measured diplomatic response. A RAND Corporation study determined that “threatened nations [would] take such actions as… a launch-on-warning posture, or policy of preemption during a crisis.” The high rate of speed these weapons travel after launch would lead to even more challenges with how to counter the threat.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Aff – PGMs 2 – BFHR › Case › 1AC---Lockheed Scenario

Funding’s critical – winning the hypersonic race prevents nuclear war.

Tirpak 18 – John A. Tirpak, Editorial Director of Air Force Magazine, Post-Graduate Aviation Researcher at the Smithsonian Institution National Air & Space Museum, citing Michael D. Griffin, the former head of NASA, now Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering and Aerospace Engineer, Mark J. Lewis, director of IDA’s Science and Technology Policy Institute, a former chief scientist of the Air Force, and a leading expert in hypersonics, and Kevin G. Bowcutt, Boeing hypersonics expert. [The Great Hypersonic Race, 6-27-2018, https://www.airforcemag.com/article/the-great-hypersonic-race/]//BPS

China, the US, and Russia are each striving to be the first nation to develop hypersonic systems: aircraft and missiles that can cruise and maneuver at five times the speed of sound (Mach 5) or faster. The winner of this technology contest will have daunting military advantages. Such weapons promise the ability to hit targets from very long ranges, yet with such speed and surprise that defending against them is extremely difficult. Hypersonic weapons could give those that possess them tactical capabilities with potentially strategic effects. Its potential disruptive effect on military operations—the ability to fly at a mile a second at Mach 5—is most often compared to that of stealth and precision weapons when those technologies appeared in the 1980s. The consensus view is that China, so far, is winning the hypersonics race, largely through financial brute force. USAF Gen. Paul J. Selva, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said in January that China has made hypersonics research “a national program”—a kind of Manhattan Project—and it is “willing to spend … up to hundreds of billions to solve the problems of hypersonic flight, hypersonic target designation and then, ultimately, engagement.” Chinese state media announced in March, for example, that China is building a 265-meter long wind tunnel to simulate the environment from Mach 10 to Mach 25, which is to be complete by 2020. It already has tunnels capable of simulating conditions between Mach 5 to 9. Though the US has hypersonic tunnels, most are quite small, for tests lasting less than a few seconds. Russia, meanwhile, announced in March that it is testing the “Kinzhal” missile, which president Vladimir Putin boasted can fly at Mach 10, has a range beyond 2,000 kilometers, can carry conventional or nuclear warheads, and can defeat any existing “or prospective” air defense system. Although many leading US technologists scoffed at the claim, US Strategic Command chief Gen. John E. Hyten confirmed to reporters at a Colorado space conference in April that both China and Russia are flight-testing hypersonic concepts, saying “you should believe Vladimir Putin about everything he said he’s working on.” While Hyten said it’s a “different issue” as to whether those systems are deployed, “we … listen to what they say very closely, and none of what he did … [or] said surprised me.” TORTOISE AND THE HARE The US is believed to have had a commanding lead toward fielding hypersonic systems until about five years ago. In 2013, the X-51 program, building on several previous projects, achieved more than 200 seconds of air-breathing Mach 5 flight, proving it could be done. The program then concluded and wasn’t immediately followed up. A number of US successor programs were either terminated for budgetary reasons or cancelled for experiencing failures, even though the technology is in many ways still in its infancy. Pentagon and congressional leaders in the last two years have decried the risk-averse defense acquisition culture that favors only “sure things” instead of gambling on chancy but potentially high-payoff research. Most hypersonic research follows one of two main avenues. One leads to a “boost-glide” vehicle in which an aerodynamic shape is mounted on a rocket and accelerated to hypersonic speed. The vehicle then detaches and coasts to its target, able to maneuver but gradually bleeding off its energy as it flies. The other main approach aims for an air-breathing vehicle also propelled to hypersonic speed by a rocket, but then an internal supersonic combustion ramjet—or scramjet—takes over. The vehicle separates from the rocket and propels itself through the atmosphere, taking in air to mix with and burn internal fuel and creating thrust, but without the rotors and compressors of a turbine engine. Complex shaping of the inlet, exhaust and combustion chamber, along with highly precise holes, ducts, and bypasses is necessary to make this approach work. Underlying technologies for hypersonics include advanced computers that can calculate shapes and airflow, additive or 3-D manufacturing that can make the exotic shapes necessary for the inlets and ducting, and materials—metals and ceramics—that can withstand the extreme temperatures and pressures of hypersonic flight. There will also need to be guidance mechanisms that can function under those same stresses without being crushed or melted. Leading US technologists believe either the boost-glide or air-breathing approaches will yield operational missile systems in under five years, and more test flights akin to the X-51—possibly secret—are forecast to take place this year. A more advanced concept, generally considered 10 years away or more, would make use of a “combined cycle engine” approach. The objective vehicle would take off from a runway, accelerate through Mach 1, achieve hypersonic speed, carry out a mission—spying, show of force, or delivering weapons—and return to base for reuse. This goal is challenging because the qualities that make for an efficient engine in the subsonic and transonic regimes simply won’t work in the hypersonic regime, because of the different way that air behaves at those speeds. Meanwhile, China is plowing ahead. The Pentagon’s new research and engineering czar, Michael D. Griffin, said in March that China has made 20 times as many hypersonic technology tests as the US has in the last five years. Speaking at a McAleese/Credit Suisse defense conference just days after taking the top Pentagon R&E job, Griffin, the former head of NASA, said the US must demonstrate its resolve to lead in hypersonics. If the Chinese are unchallenged in this area, they could “hold at risk our carrier battle groups … [and] our entire surface fleet,” Griffin warned. “They hold at risk our forward-deployed forces and land-based forces.” Lacking either a defense or an ability to respond in-kind, the US faces poor choices. “Our only response is either to let them have their way, or go nuclear.” And that, he said, is “an unacceptable situation for the United States.” Hypersonic technology, Griffin declared, is his “No. 1 priority.” In a discussion at the Hudson Institute in April, Griffin said there are ways to defend against hypersonics, but there’s only a brief window for doing so. Such missiles “are relatively fragile during their long phase of cruise flight” and are “fairly easy to destabilize,” Griffin noted. They also glow brightly in the infrared, because of the heat they generate, and “yes, they can maneuver, but they can’t maneuver in their cruise phase as easily as an interceptor.” DEAD MEAT However, “if you let [hypersonic weapons] get into terminal phase, where we’ve observed that they can pull many G’s, then that becomes a hard target,” Griffin allowed. “If you allow an attacking vehicle to get close enough to begin its terminal dive …and [that] might be from 100,000 feet … you’re probably dead meat because that’s a very hard intercept problem… at that point.” He noted that hypersonic weapons “overfly our air defense systems and underfly our missile defense systems. So China has, over the last decade, with great care, [become] capable of … holding our forward-based assets at risk.” Those carriers and forward-based forces are strategic assets and the “means by which we project strategic power short of nuclear deterrence.” Without countering it, “we allow their tactical systems to leverage our ability to project strategic power.” The US will have to develop means to defend against hypersonic missiles soon, Griffin said. The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) will have that responsiblity, not the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA). By July, Griffin was expected to finish a new hypersonics roadmap that would rationalize and coordinate at least a half dozen projects within and between the Air Force, Army and Navy, DARPA, the Pentagon’s Strategic Capabilities Office, NASA, and defense contractors. Deputy Defense Secretary Patrick M. Shanahan told reporters in April that Griffin had just delivered “80 percent” of the plan and was working on the final version. “The overlap of the technical challenges is pretty high,” Shanahan said of the various approaches being taken. The basic physics of getting to hypersonic speed and maintaining it, while preserving maneuvering capability, are common to the various approaches underway, he asserted. The Pentagon will look for synergy between the programs, seeking to consolidate them where practical, saving money but also sharing information. The services would integrate their own unique requirements as to whether their specific vehicles are air-, land- or sea-launched. The roadmap, Shanahan said, will cross “10 technical domains” and determine the critical tests that must be conducted in the next five years “to achieve capability within the next decade.” The document might just as well be called a “hypersonic prototype plan,” Shanahan said. The roadmap will also inform the Pentagon’s five-year spending plan. Mark J. Lewis, director of IDA’s Science and Technology Policy Institute, a former chief scientist of the Air Force and a leading expert in hypersonics, said there are “a couple of characteristics I would want to see in a generic [hypersonics] roadmap.” Lewis is not involved in developing the plan, which is likely classified. He spoke to Air Force Magazine as a sidebar to an AFA technology podcast. DON’T RULE ANYTHING OUT First, Lewis said the plan should “build directly on past successes. Meaning, stop reinventing the wheel.” At least one successor program to the X-51, he said, largely repeats what that project already achieved, with some minor additions. Second, he said, the roadmap “shouldn’t zero-in to a single technology solution. It shouldn’t be just air-breathing or just boost-glide. They have different strengths [and] weaknesses and different applications.” Necking down to a single, quick-and-dirty approach “to me, would be a wrong answer.” He also advised that while hypersonics as a conventional strategic weapon may very well be what China is looking for, it doesn’t have to be that and, for the US, “the winning applications are not the strategic applications.” The US could develop hypersonic air-to-air missiles, for example, that could destroy enemy aircraft at great distances, before they could pose a threat. There is also the potential for air-to-ground missiles covering 100 miles in as many seconds, offering opportunities to destroy enemy air defenses from standoff range. Given the extreme destructive force of an impacting vehicle traveling at Mach 6, a warhead might not even be necessary. Such applications “are the ones most likely to be useful to the United States, frankly,” Lewis asserted. Air Force Research Laboratory chief Maj. Gen. William T. Cooley, in a February interview, took issue with the characterization of some post-X-51 efforts as a virtual repeat of that program. “I would say that’s not true and largely because of the people,” Cooley averred. “The same scientists and engineers who had been working on the X-51 are continuing to advance our hypersonics portfolio, and so they are well aware … of the data that was collected” on that program. “We’re advancing the ball forward,” he added, saying the X-51 was “a point design …to prove out our understanding and we’re building on that.” The Pentagon is taking hypersonics much more seriously—budget-wise—than it did in the past. Boeing hypersonics expert Kevin G. Bowcutt, whose experience stretches back to the National Aerospace Plane project of the early 1980s, said in an interview that Pentagon funding for hypersonics after NASP “has had an oscillatory funding profile,” going up and down between $50 and $100 million a year. In Fiscal 2017, the Defense Department funded hypersonics to the tune of just $85.5 million, and that rose to $108.6 million in Fiscal 2018, but exploded to $256.7 million in the 2019 budget request. Congress has indicated its willingness to support that figure, and even add to it. “This may be a ‘Sputnik moment,’?” Bowcutt said of the sudden turnaround in both interest and financial support of hypersonics, driven by the prospect of being behind China and maybe Russia. ACRONYM MENAGERIE The Air Force has been working with DARPA for several years on two hypersonic projects. One is the Hypersonic Air-breathing Weapon Concept, or HAWC, and the other is the Tactical Boost-Glide program, or TBG. The Air Force chose Lockheed Martin and Raytheon to develop its HAWC concept, while Lockheed is the prime contractor for TBG. Additionally, the Air Force is launching two new prototyping efforts in the Fiscal 2019 budget, with $260 million: the Air-Launched Rapid Response Weapon, or ARRW, and the Hypersonic Conventional Strike Weapon, HCSW, which USAF pronounces as “Hacksaw.” The service awarded Lockheed Martin the HCSW contract in late April; it has an

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Aff – PGMs 2 – BFHR › Case › 1AC---Lockheed Scenario

Lockheed’s growth is key to hypersonics.

Whiteman 18 – Lou Whiteman, financial reporter, citing official government reports. [Is Lockheed Martin Winning the Hypersonic Race? 8-18-2018, https://www.fool.com/investing/2018/08/18/is-lockheed-martin-winning-the-hypersonic-race.aspx]//BPS

Hypersonic technology -- weapons and interceptors able to travel at least five times the speed of sound -- are a top Pentagon priority and an area where China and Russia are perceived to be ahead of U.S. military efforts. The Defense Department has committed to spend aggressively to catch up. Based on initial contract awards, it's becoming clear that Lockheed Martin (NYSE:LMT) is outpacing the competition in the battle to win the lion's share of those awards. Lockheed Martin earlier this month was awarded a $480 million contract to develop a hypersonic air-launched, rapid response weapon (ARRW). The award could be worth as much as $780 million over five years, assuming the company is authorized to move into low-rate initial production. Lockheed beat out Boeing (NYSE:BA), Raytheon (NYSE:RTN), and Northrop Grumman (NYSE:NOC) for the award. It's the second major hypersonic win for Lockheed Martin in recent months, following a $928 million award back in April to develop a separate hypersonic conventional strike weapon (HCSW). Lockheed has also been working with NASA since 2014 to create a hypersonic version of its SR-72 spy plane, an award worth $892 million, and is developing a high-speed commercial prototype. The Air Force views the HCSW approach as using existing technologies that have not been integrated for air-launched hypersonic weapons, while the ARRW approach is focused on developing new technologies. A clear leader If the awards offer the impression that Lockheed Martin is out ahead of its rivals in hypersonic development, the commentary accompanying the decision leaves little doubt. In a "justification and approval" document announcing the latest contract, military officials said that Lockheed alone is already far along in developing the air-launched booster and ordnance subsystems necessary for the ARRW program, adding that "Lockheed Martin has also already overcome industrywide staffing challenges." In short, "no other contractor has this level of design maturity," according to the document. The government concluded it would have had to absorb up to $118 million in duplicate development costs had it selected a company other than Lockheed Martin. Secretary of the Air Force Heather A. Wilson, in a statement announcing the latest award, made it clear that contractor readiness is an important factor. "We are going to go fast and leverage the best technology available to get hypersonic capability to the warfighter as soon as possible," Wilson said. Is there time to catch up? All is not lost for the other contractors. Northrop, for example, is a subcontractor on the Lockheed Martin Tactical Boost Glide program that is now part of the ARRW. And while the exact size of the potential opportunity for the industry is not yet known, these awards that Lockheed Martin has won are likely to be just the beginning. The fiscal 2018 omnibus spending bill passed by Congress included more than $16 billion for munitions, about $2 billion more than requested, and fiscal 2019 spending will rise to $20 billion. Only a fraction of that is for hypersonic research and development. But with Russia claiming to have already deployed a hypersonic system, and China said to be nearing that point, it seems like a mini arms race has begun. It's likely the Pentagon will do what it can to make sure the domestic hypersonic competition does not become a one-horse race. Military officials in the documentation supporting the ARRW award said that "potential competition may become available" as other contracts are awarded in hypersonics, suggesting that there are still opportunities for Northrop, Raytheon, and Boeing to get involved. More than just the F-35 Regardless of whether others catch up, hypersonics should go a long way toward making a bull case for shares of Lockheed Martin. Hypersonics are part of a broader missile and missile-defense operation that is developing into a powerful second leg for the company. Its growth should help counter fears over the company's reliance on the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, which currently accounts for about 30% of total company revenue and is only now beginning to ramp toward maturity. Lockheed Martin's THAAD anti-ballistic-missile system is the deterrent of choice for the United States and its allies for dealing with potential hostile ballistic launches from North Korea and elsewhere. Lockheed also was recently awarded up to $2.9 billion to develop and begin manufacturing a fleet of infrared satellites to replace an existing system put in place to provide early detection and warning. The company's second-quarter results came in ahead of expectations in part because, the company says, it is currently winning a lot more competitions than it had forecast. During the conference call to discuss results, management said that some of those wins were in classified areas, which likely include a healthy amount of missile and missile defense work. Combine missiles with the F-35 ramp and add in other opportunities --including the potential for increased sales from its Sikorsky helicopter unit, an F-22 update, and even continued interest in the aging F-16 -- and it's clear Lockheed Martin is working on a powerful arsenal. Its shares aren't cheap, up more than 50% over the past three years and trading at a defense-high 35 times earnings. But it increasingly appears the company's operations have the growth potential needed to justify its share price. Expect shares of Lockheed Martin to maintain cruise velocity.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Aff – PGMs 2 – BFHR › Case › 1AC---Lockheed Scenario

PGMs boost Lockheed.

M&MR 6-28 [Markets and markets Research, 6-28-2022, "Precision Guided Munition Market Projected to Reach $41.0 billion by 2026", No Publication, https://www.yahoo.com/now/precision-guided-munition-market-projected-133000314.html, DOA: 7-3-2022 //ArchanSen]

According to MarketsandMarkets™ research report, the "Precision Guided Munition Market by Speed (Subsonic, Supersonic, and Hypersonic), Product, Technology, Mode of Operation (Semi-autonomous and Autonomous), Launch Platform (Land, Airborne and Naval) and Region - Forecast to 2026", is projected to grow from USD 32.8 billion in 2021 to USD 41.0 billion by 2026, at a CAGR of 4.5% from 2021 to 2026. The growing demand for surveillance activities along the attack-prone borders, rising defense spending of emerging economy, increasing incidences of terror attacks and rising number of ongoing inter-country conflicts have led to the growth of Precision guided munitions market.

The precision guided munition market includes major players

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Aff – PGMs 2 – BFHR › Case › 1AC---Lockheed Scenario

Lockheed is down.

Zacks 6-29 [Zacks Equity, 6-29-2022, "Lockheed Martin (LMT) Dips More Than Broader Markets: What You Should Know", No Publication, https://sg.news.yahoo.com/lockheed-martin-lmt-dips-more-214509816.html, DOA: 7-3-2022 //ArchanSen]

Lockheed Martin (LMT) closed the most recent trading day at $418.89, moving -0.43% from the previous trading session. This change lagged the S&P 500's 0.07% loss on the day. At the same time, the Dow added 0.27%, and the tech-heavy Nasdaq gained 0.02%.

Coming into today, shares of the aerospace and defense company had lost 4.41% in the past month. In that same time, the Aerospace sector lost 3.69%, while the S&P 500 lost 7.99%.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Aff – PGMs 2 – BFHR › Case › 1AC---Arms K2 DIB

Economies of scale---contracts build resiliency into defense industry supply chains AND reduce domestic production costs, that’s Key to readiness

Eugene Gholz, 2019 Associate professor of political science at the University of Notre Dame, and he was awarded the US Department of Defense Exceptional Public Service Medal for his service as senior advisor to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manufacturing and Industrial Base Policy, “Conventional Arms Transfers and US Economic Security” https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/SSQ/documents/Volume-13_Issue-1/Gholz.pdf

CATs have a clearer, direct effect on economic security via their effect on US defense manufacturing. Because weapon systems tend to stay in the US military inventory for so long, they often require spare parts for maintenance years after the initial production run is complete. DOD needs to pay the overhead cost of maintaining the production capacity for those spare parts, even when the production rate for spares is much slower than the initial production rate during original manufacture of the defense system. That slower rate tends to drive the unit cost of spare parts dramatically upward. In some cases, demand for spare parts drops below the minimum technical sustaining rate, meaning that the workers lose the ability to maintain quality standards even when the buyer is willing to pay very high unit costs. In other cases, the government does not realize how much the cost of production has risen over time and does not invest enough to keep the supplier interested or able to produce the part profitably, so production drops below the minimum economic sustaining rate. These situations create potentially very costly Diminishing Manufacturing Sources or Material Shortage (DMSMS) problems.20 Arms exports and the expanded demand for future spare parts business that they create can help reduce the unit cost of spares production by keeping up production rates, maintaining workers’ skills, and ameliorating the risk of DMSMS by bolstering revenue for critical and fragile niches in the supply chain. These effects have been observed in recent years in export sales of M-1 Abrams tanks and M-2 Bradley infantry fighting vehicles, among others. Assessing these manufacturing effects of arms sales requires detailed knowledge of the defense supply chain, including the technical characteristics of the components that suppliers make, the financial status of each of those suppliers, and the business strategy of the executives at each supplier—knowledge that is not often available to the government or defense industry prime contractors. Finally, CATs can contribute economic benefits to the United States through the economies of scale that are often available in defense systems production. If foreign sales are figured into the cost estimates from the start of a project, and foreign buyers contribute to development and capital investment spending, the cost of a project to the US defense budget will be proportionately reduced, benefiting US economic security. For example, the F-35 program claims to have benefited from this dynamic, although the higher overhead cost of managing a multinational development program and the redundancies of building extra final assembly and sustainment facilities overseas cut against the economies of scale benefits.21 In some European multinational aircraft development programs, governments have presumed that programs would gain very large benefits from economies of scale that have not materialized. This is due to technical and management challenges in the programs or the countries’ failure to follow through on their initial purchase commitments. The result in those cases was that including projected economy of scale benefits of foreign sales in a program’s management baseline added to rather than reduced program instability and hurt economic security.22 Estimating the net economic effect of expected economies of scale as part of a CAT decision would require sophisticated, reliable understanding of program dynamics that might be beyond what the US government should reasonably count on in its decision making. Overall, the new economic assessment in the CAT policy could meaningfully consider two separate types of economic benefits that might derive from arms sales: first, macroeconomic effects, especially via effects on employment, and second, microeconomic effects on specific firms and products, such as funding for component upgrades and prevention of DMSMS challenges. The methods for assessing these two types of effects would likely differ, and each would present its own challenges to the data collection and analysis process.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Aff – PGMs 2 – BFHR › Case › 2AC---A2: NATO Withdraw

NATO prevents existential risks – solves terror and both Russia and China.

Røseth and Weaver 6-27 [Tom Røseth is an associate professor and head of the Ukraine Program, Oslo, Norway at the Norwegian Defense College. John Weaver is an associate professor of intelligence analysis at York College of Pennsylvania. 6-27-2022, "Questioning NATO relevance is misguided and dangerous", Hill, https://thehill.com/opinion/international/3538664-questioning-nato-relevance-is-misguided-and-dangerous/, DOA: 7-2-2022 //ArchanSen]

This week, leaders of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the longest enduring alliance in history, will gather in Madrid for their annual summit. Yet, despite its longevity and success — or perhaps because of it — many people question NATO’s relevance today, even as Russia occupies 20 percent of Ukraine and threatens other European states. Others have called for the U.S. to withdraw from NATO, preferring an isolationist approach to global conflicts. These attitudes are misguided and dangerous. NATO is not only still relevant to the United States and the other members, it’s necessary, and here is why.

NATO came to the aid of the United States following the 9/11 attacks. Many Americans fail to realize that NATO invoked Article 5 (an attack on one is akin to an attack on all) and provided airborne warning and control systems (AWACS) to help assist in monitoring aerial activity over the United States. This support helped protect the U.S. against a possible second wave of attacks. This was the first and only time Article 5 was enacted and built upon alliance activity in which the United States and other NATO members were involved during the 1990s and included the likes of peace-keeping operations in Bosnia, Kosovo and North Macedonia.