2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Aff – Biotech – Starter Packet › Advantage – Leadership › Heg Sustainable
Tooze ’21 - Shelby Cullom Davis chair of History at Columbia University
[Adam; Sep 8; “The new age of American power;” ]
In August 2021, the dismaying scenes at Kabul airport stirred a number of gloomy pronouncements about the decline of American power. The anguished tone of these reactions reflects not just the horror on the ground, but a sense of personal betrayal felt by the pundit class. For anyone with a historical imagination, the dishonourable retreat is the latest act in the grand drama of Western decline. The wreck in Central Asia set against China’s rising GDP makes for a bitter mix. China will supplant the US as the world’s ascendant power. The One Belt One Road initiative that already stretches from Shanghai to Karachi will subsume Afghanistan as well. We are headed for a post-American age.
Compelling though this declinist verdict may be, it is misleading. In two key ways, American power continues to define the world order.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Aff – Biotech – Starter Packet › Advantage – Leadership › AT: Afghanistan
Tooze ’21 - Shelby Cullom Davis chair of History at Columbia University
[Adam; Sep 8; “The new age of American power;” ]
Since the withdrawal, there has been a lot of talk of the US’s lost credibility. But what credibility did it have to lose? Credibility is not about saying you are committed. It is not even about sending troops. It is about your antagonist believing that your public pronouncements are aligned with your interests, so that you will stick with them even when the going gets rough. The problem for the US in Afghanistan was that its reluctance to stay for the truly long haul was obvious.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Aff – Biotech – Starter Packet › Advantage – Leadership › AT: Security Ks
Hamid '22 - Senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, and assistant research professor of Islamic studies at Fuller Seminary [Shadi, 3/6/22, "There Are Many Things Worse Than American Power," https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2022/03/putin-kremlin-imperialism-ukraine-american-power/624180/]
If there was any doubt before, the answer is now clear. Vladimir Putin is showing that a world without American power—or, for that matter, Western power—is not a better world.
For the generation of Americans who came of age in the shadow of the September 11 attacks, the world America had made came with a question mark. Their formative experiences were the ones in which American power had been used for ill, in Iraq and Afghanistan. In the Middle East more broadly, and for much longer, the United States had built a security architecture around some of the world’s most repressive regimes. For those on the left, this was nothing new, and it was all too obvious. I spent my college years reading Noam Chomsky and other leftist critics of U.S. foreign policy, and they weren’t entirely wrong. On balance, the U.S. may have been a force for good, but in particular regions and at particular times, it had been anything but.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Aff – Biotech – Starter Packet › Advantage – Leadership › AT: American Dominance Locked In
Trump '21 – PhD, a research social scientist for the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and served as a Strategic Planner and public health subject-matter expert for FEMA Region 1’s Data Analytics Task Force [Benjamin D, Marie-Valentie Florin, Edward Perkins, and Igor Linkov," Biosecurity for Synthetic Biology and Emerging Biotechnologies: Critical Challenges for Governance” in Emerging Threats of Synthetic Biology and Biotechnology]
The increasingly globalized, distributed, and dispersed nature of synthetic biology products and research worsens challenges arising from differing practices of biosecurity governance globally. Advanced biological research is no longer overwhelmingly dominated by Europe and the US, and this may introduce different approaches to, or priorities for, biosecurity. Russia’s Federal Research Programme for Genetic Technologies Development for 2019–2027, for instance, intends to “implement a comprehensive solution to the task of the accelerated development of genetic technologies, including genetic editing; to establish scientific and technological groundwork for medicine, agriculture and industry; to improve the system of preventing biological emergencies and monitoring in this area” (Ministry of Science and Higher Education of the Russian Federation 2019). Similarly, Saudi Arabia is funding research related to the development of microbial cell factories to produce fuels and chemicals, while the Singaporean government is investing considerable resources into the funding of life and environmental sciences researchat Nanyang Technological University, the National University of Singapore, and the Agency for Science, Technology and Research (A*STAR). The Chinese Academy of Sciences is establishing an Institute of Synthetic Biology, which is tasked with the dual responsibilities of fostering roadmaps for the future development of Chinese synthetic biology while also establishing safety and security norms for researchers at Chinese institutions. There are no top-down efforts beyond existing mechanisms like the BWC or the CWC (The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction) that standardize global governance and usage of synthetic biology, and bottom-up efforts are not coordinated in their reach or messaging.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Aff – Biotech – Starter Packet › Advantage – Dual-Use › AT: No Food Wars
Cuesta 2014 - Senior Economist at the World Bank [Jose, "Food Price Watch," May, www.worldbank.org/content/dam/Worldbank/document/Poverty%20documents/FPW_May%202014_final.pdf]
Dozens of violent episodes across the world were reported during the food price hikes of 2007 and 2008.55 And others have since followed. Casualties associated with such episodes—popularly known as “food riots” (yet somewhat arbitrarily defined, box 1)—in Argentina, Cameroon, Haiti and India, to cite a few, made world headlines. There have been violent episodes also associated with low prices, such as those involving coffee producers in Vietnam (or cotton producers in Burkina Faso).56 These episodes remind us about the close relationship between food insecurity and conflict. Furthermore, the world has grown accustomed to seeing a different angle of the food-conflict nexus: foodrelated humanitarian disaster and famines were—and continue to be—associated with civil conflict and interstate wars, for example, the recent Somalia famine. But the other link, the food-to-conflict connection is hardly news, and, as the father of the Green Revolution and Nobel Laureate Norman Borlaug eloquently put it: “we cannot build world peace on empty stomachs and human misery.” The interrelated and bidirectional connection between food and war has also been emphasized in the works of Amartya Sen, Jean Drèze, and anthropologist Ellen Messner, who coined the term “food wars.”57 Food price shocks can be responsible for the origination and continuation of conflict and, more generally, political instability. Increasing empirical evidence shows that international food prices and the domestic pass through to local markets of these international prices has a significant role in all types of conflict, from interstate wars to civil wars, regime breakdowns, and communal violence.58 Food price shocks may cause spontaneous and largely urban sociopolitical instability, with urban food consumers as the primary protesters.59 In these cases, price shocks can trigger sociopolitical unrest, fueling preexisting grievances—including poverty and other disparities—and highlighting the lack of adequate social safety nets and other compensating policies.60 This is the case, for example, with protests in Guinea and Mauritania in 2007 and Haiti in 2008.61 Yet, some argue that poverty is not a precondition for such protests, and, in fact, some of these protests did not necessarily always engage the poorest or hungriest individuals nor countries (for example, protests organized by consumers’ associations in Senegal and trade unions in Burkina Faso in 2008).62 Either way, those shocks reduce a country’s capability of producing, purchasing, and providing access to food, thus increasing the risk of food insecurity and, consequently, the likelihood of protests and escalated conflict.63 But food prices are not the only cause or contributor to violent protests associated with food.64 More structural pressures, such as competition— intra or interstate—over natural resources such as land, water, fisheries, labor, or capital may well cause political instability and unrest. Farmers and farm workers become, in such cases, the main agitators, more likely developing into social movements than riots from price shocks in urban settings.65 This is the case, for example, in land grabs in Madagascar that in 2009 were reported to contribute to a coup that ousted then President Ravalomanana, or the violent protests concerning genetically modified food in the Philippines in 2013.66 Consequently, the attention given to conflict jeopardizing food security (by reducing agricultural production and forcing displacement of people) during the last decades needs to be expanded. A more encompassing view should also incorporate the fact that food insecurity in general, and food price shocks in particular, also contribute to instability and conflict. Monitoring food prices (table 3 and figure 2) responds not only to food security and welfare interests, but also to serious political instability and conflict motivations. As a result, a proper monitoring constitutes a first step in addressing the interactions between food insecurity and conflict.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Aff – Biotech – Starter Packet › Advantage – Dual-Use › AT: Too Many Barriers
Trump '21 – PhD, a research social scientist for the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and served as a Strategic Planner and public health subject-matter expert for FEMA Region 1’s Data Analytics Task Force [Benjamin D, Marie-Valentie Florin, Edward Perkins, and Igor Linkov," Biosecurity for Synthetic Biology and Emerging Biotechnologies: Critical Challenges for Governance” in Emerging Threats of Synthetic Biology and Biotechnology]
Because emerging biotechnologies are dual-use, governance must weigh the risk of misuse with the potential for beneficial use in innovation and development. Unfortunately, biosecurity attempts are mired in uncertainty around both the actual capabilities of synthetic biology, as well as the motivations of actors given the increasing number of contexts in which synthetic biology is used. Modern governments are still relying on old rules to regulate a new technology, clearly an insufficient strategy for ensuring security in the coming decades.
Building an effective biosecurity strategy to encompass twenty-first century biotechnologies requires understanding the novelties that sciences like synthetic biology create in the biosecurity threat space, as well as the structural vulnerabilities these sciences can exploit and the likely causes of inadequate biosecurity practices. Synthetic biology’s novel biosecurity concerns arise from its broad scope, wider availability, complexity, and uncertainty over current and future capabilities. For example, critical developments such as gene editing via CRISPR gene editing vastly improve upon previous genetic engineering processes and may yield a revolution in human and environmental health research, but may also cause substantial and irreversible harms. One application of gene editing is the gene drive, which can rapidly propagate a certain set of genes or alleles through a population, circumventing Mendelian inheritance laws and increasing the chance that this set of genes is passed on. While gene drives are an exciting new technology, their ability to rapidly alter the genetic makeup of a population is cause for concern. Other potential negative consequences of gene editing may include the unconstrained diffusion of gene-edited material throughout the environment, the disruption of ecologies with genetically-modified organisms (in particular engineered gene drive systems), and off-target impacts from genome editing. These techniques could also be used maliciously, with an actor purposely targeting humans and/or the environment.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Aff – Biotech – Starter Packet › Advantage – Dual-Use › AT: No Bioterror Threat
Cummings '21 [Christopher L., Kaitlin M. Volk, Anna A. Ulanova, Do Thuy Uyen Ha Lam & Pei Rou Ng, “Emerging Biosecurity Threats and Responses: A Review of Published and Gray Literature” in Emerging Threats of Synthetic Biology and Biotechnology, pp 13–36]
Bioweapons were the second most frequently mentioned threat, appearing in 28% of the articles analyzed. Franconi et al. (2018) define bioweapons as “deadly pathogens – bacteria or viruses – or toxins that can be deliberately released in order to cause harm to people or animals and plants.” Generally, when a bioweapon is used by a state sponsored entity it is considered an act of biowarfare, while the use of a bioweapon by a non-state sponsored entity or individual is considered an act of bioterrorism (Jamil 2015), the latter of which was mentioned in 17% of articles. Unaltered organisms can and have been used as bioweapons in the past, such as in the 2001 anthrax attacks. Biotechnology opens the door to creating enhanced or novel pathogens and new avenues for toxin production. Cross (2018) identifies three ways in which biotechnology can be used to create bioweapons: (1) “recreating pathogenic viruses such as Ebola, SARS, or smallpox,” (2) “engineering bacteria to make them more dangerous, which could be easily accomplished by inserting genes to confer antibiotic resistance,” and (3) “engineering microbes to produce and release toxic biochemicals.” Researchers have already demonstrated capabilities in all three of these avenues. Horsepox, a close relative of smallpox, has been synthesized from mail-ordered DNA (Noyce et al. 2018), avian influenza has been engineered to allow for airborne transmission between mammals (Linster et al. 2014), and botulinum toxin has been produced using yeast cells (Fonfria et al. 2018). These three cases are also prime examples of dual use research, as they were carried out for beneficial purposes (vaccine development, study of transmission, and enhanced therapeutics, respectively) but also provide a clear avenue towards weaponization.
Bioweapons and bioterrorism are mainly concerned with the deliberate release of an engineered pathogen or toxin with the purpose of causing harm, but the literature also identified accidental releases of modified organisms as a threat. Accidental releases are often cited as a concern for biosafety and not biosecurity. Pastorino et al. (2017) delineates the two terms in a laboratory setting as follows:
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Aff – Biotech – Starter Packet › Advantage – Dual-Use › AO – Drug Resistance
Fischbach 2013 - UCSF Center for Systems and Synthetic Biology, University of California, San Francisco
Michael A, Jeffrey A Bluestone, and Wendell A Lim, "Cell-Based Therapeutics: The Next Pillar of Medicine," Science Translational Medicine 03 Apr 2013: Vol. 5, Issue 179, pp. 179ps7
Today, biomedical science sits on the cusp of another revolution: the use of human and microbial cells as therapeutic entities (1). In principle, cells have therapeutic capabilities that are distinct from those of small molecules and biologics and that extend beyond the regenerative-medicine arena. Part drug and part device, cells can sense diverse signals, move to specific sites in the body, integrate inputs to make decisions, and execute complex response behaviors—all in the context of a specific tissue environment. These attributes could potentially be harnessed to treat infections, autoimmunity, cancers, metabolic diseases, and tissue degeneration as well as realizing tissue repair and regeneration. Indeed, pioneering clinical trials have highlighted the benefits of using cells as therapeutic agents (2–7). However, the complexity of cells and the challenge of controlling their actions in a therapeutic setting provide daunting scientific, regulatory, economic, and cultural obstacles to the establishment of cells as a widespread and viable pharmaceutical platform.
With our deep mechanistic understanding of cellular systems biology, researchers are poised to harness these intricate behaviors in new ways to generate an array of precisely regulated weapons against a broad range of diseases. However, a critical step that will enable the emergence of cells as the next therapeutic pillar is the development of cellular engineering as a foundational science. This will include mechanisms for editing and recoding genomes, the assembly of a toolkit of molecular parts and regulatory modules that behave predictably, and a systems-based theoretical framework that can provide strategies for tuning and optimizing cellular behaviors.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Aff – Biotech – Starter Packet › 1AC › 1AC – Solvency
Jankowski '21 – Political Adviser and Head of the Political Section at the Permanent Delegation of the Republic of Poland to NATO [Dominik, " NATO and the Emerging and Disruptive Technologies Challenge” in NATO in the Era of Unpeace: Defending Against Known Unknowns, pp 99-102]
While the suggestion that EDTs will enable a new class of weapons that will modify the strategic landscape remains to be realised, a number of unresolved security puzzles underlying the emergence of these new technology areas have implications for NATO. As one looks to the future, new adversaries and new science and technology will emerge. The extent to which these EDTs may exacerbate or mitigate the global security and governance challenges that Russia currently poses to NATO Allies will remain an integral question as policy-makers navigate the complex global environment.
NATO is a natural forum for deliberations about EDTs, especially in a transatlantic context. It also has vast experience, going back to the Cold War, in working towards standardisation and interoperability among Allies. However, the results achieved have been mixed, which underscores the challenges the Alliance now faces – there are not only 30 Allies with disparate levels of capability, but also a backdrop of rapid technological advances where some of its competitors and adversaries may hold significant advantages.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Aff – Biotech – Starter Packet › 1AC › 1AC – Solvency
Soare '21 [Simona R, Jun 11, "Innovation as Adaptation: NATO and Emerging Technologies," https://www.gmfus.org/news/innovation-adaptation-nato-and-emerging-technologies]
*EDT: emerging and disruptive technologies
The third driver is to foster the interoperability of military capabilities that are enabled by emerging technologies13 and to incentivize transatlantic defense cooperation on EDTs to avoid or bridge technology gaps between allies. This goes to the core of NATO’s mission to deter and defend against threats, but it is an enduring challenge. Streamlining standardization and testing, evaluation, verification, and validation procedures remains important. However, NATO should also double down on its efforts to ensure greater compliance with interoperability and baseline requirements for the security of critical infrastructure. Recent challenges in relation to national compliance with the 2019 NATO requirements for security of telecommunications infrastructure are a case in point, but there are wider and enduring challenges with hardware and communications interoperability.14 While the plans for the new Defence Innovation Accelerator promise to contribute to maintaining NATO’s technological edge, it also remains to be seen whether they will contribute sufficiently to building technology capacity among some of the smaller and more vulnerable allies. As they establish governance procedures and participation rules, allies need to mitigate the risk that the accelerator could contribute to a two-speed, two-tier alliance, dividing the technology haves from the technology have-nots.
The fourth driver is a desire to lead in setting global, normative EDTs governance. The Advisory Group on Emerging and Disruptive Technologies, for example, has emphasized that NATO “is exceptionally well placed to be a global driver of a values-based innovation agenda.”15 Democratic values are at the core of what defines security for transatlantic allies and the target of adversarial subversive measures. Consequently, embedding democratic values into the development, adoption, and use of EDTs by the allies is key to NATO’s mission. Thus, innovation efforts need to be closer linked to NATO’s democracy-centered tech diplomacy with like-minded global partners, some of whom could be invited to join the Defence Innovation Accelerator.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Aff – Biotech – Starter Packet › 1AC › 1AC - Leadership
Brands '22 - The Henry Kissinger Distinguished Professor at Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies [Hal, Jun1, "The World Doesn’t Need a More Restrained America,"https://www.aei.org/op-eds/the-world-doesnt-need-a-more-restrained-america/]
It has been a bumpy year for the restraint coalition — that loose network of analysts, advocates and politicians calling for a sharply reduced US role in the world. Having reached peak influence with the withdrawal from Afghanistan, this group initially found itself marginalized by Russia’s war in Ukraine. Now, the restraint crowd is offering a renewed critique of US policy, one that will probably prove to be persistent, though not persuasive.
Restraint is a broad church. It features anti-interventionist academics, who often style themselves as non-ideological “realists,” alongside well-funded think tanks such as the Quincy Institute. It includes libertarians such as Senator Rand Paul who deplore the financial costs of US foreign policy and progressives who contend that American globalism is a cover for imperialism and neoliberalism. There are pacifists who believe that all wars are criminal, as well as nationalists such as Senator Josh Hawley who argue that being appropriately hawkish on China requires being more dovish on nearly everything else.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Aff – Biotech – Starter Packet › 1AC › 1AC - Leadership
Carlson '21 – affiliate professor in the Paul G Allen School of Computer Science & Engineering at the University of Washington and earned a doctorate in physics from Princeton [Rob, Chad Sbragia, and Kate Sixt, Sep 14, "BEYOND BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE: MAINTAINING THE U.S. BIOTECHNOLOGY ADVANTAGE," ]
China, by contrast, has been integrating biotechnology into its strategic development and elevating biotechnology to a key component of national security. China’s military-civil fusion development strategy makes biotechnology a core priority for the People’s Liberation Army. This strategy has one goal: to bring together China’s civilian and military industrial bases in order to better project power. To that end, China has cornered supply chains in multiple sectors, including pharmaceuticals ingredients and other important chemicals.
Stephanie Rogers, the Defense Department’s acting principal director for biotechnology, recently declared that “the nation that leads the world in biotechnology will accrue enduring economic, societal, and defense gains.” Unfortunately, this awareness has yet to be reflected in government policy. Biotechnology security is national security — for the United States and for China. The Department of Defense should recognize biotechnology’s role as a foundational technology and make biotechnology development and supply chain security a priority.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Aff – Biotech – Starter Packet › 1AC › 1AC - Leadership
Cheng '18 [Yangyang, Apr 13, "China Will Always Be Bad at Bioethics," https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/04/13/china-will-always-be-bad-at-bioethics/]
This April, potential sperm donors at one of Beijing’s top hospitals found themselves facing a set of tough new standards. Listed as the first criteria, before any mention of infectious or hereditary diseases, was the requirement that potential donors have “a love for socialism and the motherland” and be “supportive of the leadership of the party.”
By itself, this would be just one more incident of political excess in a country where full-blown Chinese Communist Party ideology is making a fierce comeback. But unlike the demands that students dump “Western” textbooks or that singers parrot their love for President Xi Jinping, China’s bioethical standards are more than a curiosity for outsiders. They may shape the future of humanity.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Aff – Biotech – Starter Packet › 1AC › 1AC - Leadership
Jain ’20 [Ash; 2020; Senior fellow with the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security; Strategic Studies Quarterly; “Present at the Re-Creation: A Global Strategy for Revitalizing, Adapting, and Defending a Rules-Based International System,” ]
The system must also be adapted to deal with new issues that were not envisioned when the existing order was designed. Foremost among these issues is emerging and disruptive technology, including AI, additive manufacturing (or 3D printing), quantum computing, genetic engineering, robotics, directed energy, the Internet of things (IOT), 5G, space, cyber, and many others. Like other disruptive technologies before them, these innovations promise great benefits, but also carry serious downside risks. For example, AI is already resulting in massive efficiencies and cost savings in the private sector. Routine tasks and other more complicated jobs, such as radiology, are already being automated. In the future, autonomous weapons systems may go to war against each other as human soldiers remain out of harm’s way.
Yet, AI is also transforming economies and societies, and generating new security challenges. Automation will lead to widespread unemployment. The final realization of driverless cars, for example, will put out of work millions of taxi, Uber, and long-haul truck drivers. Populist movements in the West have been driven by those disaffected by globalization and technology, and mass unemployment caused by automation will further grow those ranks and provide new fuel to grievance politics. Moreover, some fear that autonomous weapons systems will become “killer robots” that select and engage targets without human input, and could eventually turn on their creators, resulting in human extinction. The other technologies on this lisgt similarly balance great potential upside with great downside risk. 3D printing, for example, can be used to “make anything anywhere,” reducing costs for a wide range of manufactured goods and encouraging a return of local manufacturing industries.61 At the same time, advanced 3D printers can also be used by revisionist and rogue states to print component parts for advanced weapons systems or even WMD programs, spurring arms races and weapons proliferation.62 Genetic engineering can wipe out entire classes of disease through improved medicine, or wipe out entire classes of people through genetically engineered superbugs. Directed-energy missile defenses may defend against incoming missile attacks, while also undermining global strategic stability.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Aff – Biotech – Starter Packet › 1AC › 1AC - Leadership
Darby '21 - is CEO of IQT, a not-for-profit investment firm working on behalf of the U.S. national security community [Christopher and Sarah Sewall, "The Innovation Wars America’s Eroding Technological Advantage," https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2021-02-10/technology-innovation-wars]
China’s hunger for data extends to some of the most personal information imaginable: our own DNA. Since the COVID-19 pandemic began, BGI—a Chinese genome-sequencing company that began as a government-funded research group—has broken ground on some 50 new laboratories abroad designed to help governments test for the virus. China has legitimate reasons to build these labs, but it also has an ugly record of forcibly collecting DNA data from Tibetans and Uighurs as part of its efforts to monitor these minorities. Given that BGI runs China’s national library of genomics data, it is conceivable that through BGI testing, foreigners’ biological data might end up in that repository.
Indeed, China has shown great interest in biotechnology, even if it has yet to catch up to the United States. Combined with massive computing power and artificial intelligence, innovations in biotechnology could help solve some of humanity’s most vexing challenges, from disease and famine to energy production and climate change. Researchers have mastered the gene-editing tool CRISPR, allowing them to grow wheat that resists disease, and have managed to encode video in the DNA of bacteria, raising the possibility of a new, cost-effective method of data storage. Specialists in synthetic biology have invented a new way of producing nylon—with genetically engineered microorganisms instead of petrochemicals. The economic implications of the coming biotechnology revolution are staggering: the McKinsey Global Institute has estimated the value of biotechnology’s many potential applications at up to $4 trillion over the next ten to 20 years.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Aff – Biotech – Starter Packet › 1AC › 1AC – Dual-Use
Cummings '21 [Christopher L., Kaitlin M. Volk, Anna A. Ulanova, Do Thuy Uyen Ha Lam & Pei Rou Ng, “Emerging Biosecurity Threats and Responses: A Review of Published and Gray Literature” in Emerging Threats of Synthetic Biology and Biotechnology, pp 13–36]
Biosecurity threats include biological weapons and accidental releases as demonstrated in the Sverdlovsk anthrax event, but they have also become more diversified and complicated as researchers develop and utilize advanced biotechnology techniques for the betterment of society across other sectors. Gene drives for mosquito population control, engineered algae for biofuel creation, and recreation of extinct pathogens for novel vaccine development have unique and potentially unknown associated risks. The envisioned coordinated biosecurity framework would allow for beneficial innovation to proliferate while simultaneously reducing anticipated and unanticipated risk of harm to humans, animals, agricultural, and the environment (Trump et al. 2020b; Wells et al. 2020).
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Aff – Biotech – Starter Packet › 1AC › 1AC – Dual-Use
Brinkman and Hendrix 2011
Henk-Jan [Chief, Policy, Planning and Application in the Peacebuilding Support Office of the United Nations] and Cullen S. [Assistant Professor, The College of William & Mary, and Fellow, Robert S. Strauss Center for International Security and Law,]; Food Insecurity and Violent Conflict: Causes, Consequences, and Addressing the Challenges; World Food Programme, Occassional Paper 24; July
Rising food prices contribute to food insecurity, which is a clear and serious threat to human security. Interest in food security as a catalyst for political instability and conflict has grown rapidly since 2007–2008, when food protests and riots broke out in 48 countries as a result of record world prices. In February 2011, the food price index of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) reached a new historic peak, and the rise in food prices contributed to the wave of protests across North Africa and the Middle East that toppled Tunisian president Zine El Abidine Ben Ali and Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak. Among major development organizations, the unchallenged consensus is that war and conflict are development issues: conflict ravages local economies, often leading to forced migration, refugee populations, disease, a collapse of social trust, and acute food insecurity. But is food insecurity itself a cause of conflict? Based on a review of recent research, the answer is a highly qualified yes. Food insecurity, especially when caused by higher food prices, heightens the risk of democratic breakdown, civil conflict, protest, rioting, and communal conflict. The evidence linking food insecurity to interstate conflict is less strong, though there is some historical evidence linking declining agricultural yields to periods of regional conflict in Europe and Asia. These links are highly context-specific: they are contingent on existing political institutions, levels of economic development, social safety nets and demographic pressures. Food insecurity is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for acute political violence and conflict. Generally, the risk of violent conflict is higher where political regimes intermingle democratic and authoritarian institutions or when a youth bulge, low levels of development, deteriorating economic conditions, or high inequalities among groups are present. Fragile states (which have a high share of food imports), and the households within them (who must spend a large share of their income on food), are particularly vulnerable to higher food prices. Moreover, this vulnerability has increased over time. On the other hand, violent conflicts have also contributed to higher food prices and food insecurity, contributing to a vicious cycle. While the situation seems bleak, the contingent nature of food insecurity’s effect on conflict suggests that governments, international organizations (IOs), and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) can take positive steps to reduce food insecurity and break the relationship between food insecurity and conflict. Governments can act to shield their citizens from higher prices and volatility in world markets by initiating measures to stabilize food prices and by establishing social protection systems that mitigate the impact of high food prices on vulnerable groups. Unfortunately, the capacity of fragile states to do that is limited. The World Food Programme and NGOs can assist in times of acute crisis to provide relief. Finally, governments, IOs and NGOs can work to make food security a part of the post-conflict peacebuilding and reconstruction process. The challenges are great, but the potential social, economic, and political costs of inaction are even greater.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Aff – Biotech – Starter Packet › 1AC › 1AC – Dual-Use
Langer '20 - Scoville Fellow working with Michael Nelson in the Technology and International Affairs Program [Ronit and Shruti Sharma, Nov 20, "The Blessing and Curse of Biotechnology: A Primer on Biosafety and Biosecurity," https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/11/20/blessing-and-curse-of-biotechnology-primer-on-biosafety-and-biosecurity-pub-83252]
Scientific developments in biotechnology can offer solutions to address global challenges such as combating the spread of infectious diseases, reducing hunger, and remediating environmental degradation.
Biotechnology has the potential to create novel diagnostics, vaccines, drugs, and other medical countermeasures needed to detect, prevent, and treat infectious diseases. For example, the coronavirus pandemic has highlighted the promising role that biotechnology can play in this way. Researchers around the globe are actively working to combat the pandemic. They have been using different technologies to develop cheap diagnostics, repurpose existing antivirals, discover new drugs, and create safe and effective vaccines. In addition, biotechnology can be used to create genetically engineered organisms that can be deliberately introduced into the environment for purposes such as mosquito control. As an example, advances in genome engineering technologies—such as clustered regularly interspaced short palindromic repeats (CRISPR) and CRISPR-associated protein 9 (Cas9)—have enabled the development of gene drives, a technology that allows desired genetic alterations to spread faster through a population over many generations. This technique can be used to cure vector-borne human diseases such as malaria and dengue fever by either making mosquitoes resistant to the parasites that cause these diseases or by completely wiping out disease-carrying mosquito populations.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Aff – Biotech – Starter Packet › 1AC › 1AC – Dual-Use
Torres 2016 -the founder of the X-Risks Institute, an affiliate scholar at the Institute for Ethics and Emerging Technologies [Phil, "Biodiversity loss: An existential risk comparable to climate change," Apr 11, thebulletin.org/biodiversity-loss-existential-risk-comparable-climate-change9329]
According to the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, the two greatest existential threats to human civilization stem from climate change and nuclear weapons. Both pose clear and present dangers to the perpetuation of our species, and the increasingly dire climate situation and nuclear arsenal modernizations in the United States and Russia were the most significant reasons why the Bulletin decided to keep the Doomsday Clock set at three minutes before midnight earlier this year. But there is another existential threat that the Bulletin overlooked in its Doomsday Clock announcement: biodiversity loss. This phenomenon is often identified as one of the many consequences of climate change, and this is of course correct. But biodiversity loss is also a contributing factor behind climate change. For example, deforestation in the Amazon rainforest and elsewhere reduces the amount of carbon dioxide removed from the atmosphere by plants, a natural process that mitigates the effects of climate change. So the causal relation between climate change and biodiversity loss is bidirectional. Furthermore, there are myriad phenomena that are driving biodiversity loss in addition to climate change. Other causes include ecosystem fragmentation, invasive species, pollution, oxygen depletion caused by fertilizers running off into ponds and streams, overfishing, human overpopulation, and overconsumption. All of these phenomena have a direct impact on the health of the biosphere, and all would conceivably persist even if the problem of climate change were somehow immediately solved. Such considerations warrant decoupling biodiversity loss from climate change, because the former has been consistently subsumed by the latter as a mere effect. Biodiversity loss is a distinct environmental crisis with its own unique syndrome of causes, consequences, and solutions—such as restoring habitats, creating protected areas (“biodiversity parks”), and practicing sustainable agriculture. The sixth extinction. The repercussions of biodiversity loss are potentially as severe as those anticipated from climate change, or even a nuclear conflict. For example, according to a 2015 study published in Science Advances, the best available evidence reveals “an exceptionally rapid loss of biodiversity over the last few centuries, indicating that a sixth mass extinction is already under way.” This conclusion holds, even on the most optimistic assumptions about the background rate of species losses and the current rate of vertebrate extinctions. The group classified as “vertebrates” includes mammals, birds, reptiles, fish, and all other creatures with a backbone. The article argues that, using its conservative figures, the average loss of vertebrate species was 100 times higher in the past century relative to the background rate of extinction. (Other scientists have suggested that the current extinction rate could be as much as 10,000 times higher than normal.) As the authors write, “The evidence is incontrovertible that recent extinction rates are unprecedented in human history and highly unusual in Earth’s history.” Perhaps the term “Big Six” should enter the popular lexicon—to add the current extinction to the previous “Big Five,” the last of which wiped out the dinosaurs 66 million years ago. But the concept of biodiversity encompasses more than just the total number of species on the planet. It also refers to the size of different populations of species. With respect to this phenomenon, multiple studies have confirmed that wild populations around the world are dwindling and disappearing at an alarming rate. For example, the 2010 Global Biodiversity Outlook report found that the population of wild vertebrates living in the tropics dropped by 59 percent between 1970 and 2006. The report also found that the population of farmland birds in Europe has dropped by 50 percent since 1980; bird populations in the grasslands of North America declined by almost 40 percent between 1968 and 2003; and the population of birds in North American arid lands has fallen by almost 30 percent since the 1960s. Similarly, 42 percent of all amphibian species (a type of vertebrate that is sometimes called an “ecological indicator”) are undergoing population declines, and 23 percent of all plant species “are estimated to be threatened with extinction.” Other studies have found that some 20 percent of all reptile species, 48 percent of the world’s primates, and 50 percent of freshwater turtles are threatened. Underwater, about 10 percent of all coral reefs are now dead, and another 60 percent are in danger of dying. Consistent with these data, the 2014 Living Planet Report shows that the global population of wild vertebrates dropped by 52 percent in only four decades—from 1970 to 2010. While biologists often avoid projecting historical trends into the future because of the complexity of ecological systems, it’s tempting to extrapolate this figure to, say, the year 2050, which is four decades from 2010. As it happens, a 2006 study published in Science does precisely this: It projects past trends of marine biodiversity loss into the 21st century, concluding that, unless significant changes are made to patterns of human activity, there will be virtually no more wild-caught seafood by 2048. Catastrophic consequences for civilization. The consequences of this rapid pruning of the evolutionary tree of life extend beyond the obvious. There could be surprising effects of biodiversity loss that scientists are unable to fully anticipate in advance. For example, prior research has shown that localized ecosystems can undergo abrupt and irreversible shifts when they reach a tipping point. According to a 2012 paper published in Nature, there are reasons for thinking that we may be approaching a tipping point of this sort in the global ecosystem, beyond which the consequences could be catastrophic for civilization. As the authors write, a planetary-scale transition could precipitate “substantial losses of ecosystem services required to sustain the human population.” An ecosystem service is any ecological process that benefits humanity, such as food production and crop pollination. If the global ecosystem were to cross a tipping point and substantial ecosystem services were lost, the results could be “widespread social unrest, economic instability, and loss of human life.” According to Missouri Botanical Garden ecologist Adam Smith, one of the paper’s co-authors, this could occur in a matter of decades—far more quickly than most of the expected consequences of climate change, yet equally destructive. Biodiversity loss is a “threat multiplier” that, by pushing societies to the brink of collapse, will exacerbate existing conflicts and introduce entirely new struggles between state and non-state actors. Indeed, it could even fuel the rise of terrorism. (After all, climate change has been linked to the emergence of ISIS in Syria, and multiple high-ranking US officials, such as former US Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel and CIA director John Brennan, have affirmed that climate change and terrorism are connected.) The reality is that we are entering the sixth mass extinction in the 3.8-billion-year history of life on Earth, and the impact of this event could be felt by civilization “in as little as three human lifetimes,” as the aforementioned 2012 Nature paper notes. Furthermore, the widespread decline of biological populations could plausibly initiate a dramatic transformation of the global ecosystem on an even faster timescale: perhaps a single human lifetime. The unavoidable conclusion is that biodiversity loss constitutes an existential threat in its own right. As such, it ought to be considered alongside climate change and nuclear weapons as one of the most significant contemporary risks to human prosperity and survival.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Aff – Biotech – Starter Packet › 1AC › 1AC – Dual-Use
Gutmann '18 -President of the University of Pennsylvania and Christopher H. Browne Distinguished Professor of Political Science and Professor of Communication [Amy and Jonthan D Moreno, Apr 16, "Keep CRISPR Safe," https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2018-04-16/keep-crispr-safe]
The goal of a gene drive is to spread or suppress certain genes in a wild population of organisms. It works by exploiting a quirk of nature. In sexually reproducing species, most genes have a 50 percent chance of being passed from parent to child, as offspring receive half their genes from each parent. As a result, genetic mutations normally spread only if they make an organism more likely to survive or breed. But some genes have evolved mechanisms that give them better than 50 percent odds of being passed on. That allows changes in those genes to proliferate quickly even if they have no effect on evolutionary fitness. Scientists can exploit this tendency by using CRISPR to insert genetic material into the “selfish” part of an organism’s genome, ensuring that the new trait will be passed on to most offspring, eventually spreading through large populations.
This process could be exploited both to improve public health and to promote economic development. Scientists could use gene drives to break disease transmission chains, eliminating the need to use costly and harmful insecticides. For example, researchers are looking at using the technology to inhibit the transmission of Lyme bacteria from mice to ticks, a move that could wipe out Lyme disease among humans, since humans can catch the disease only from tick bites. In agriculture, gene drives could immunize plants against many kinds of pathogens and curb or eliminate populations of invasive animals, such as mice, that destroy crops. Researchers are working to develop a house mouse that can give birth only to male offspring. If the altered mice were released into the wild, female mice would gradually disappear and the species would die off within the area in which the altered mice were introduced.