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2022 Michigan Counterplan
Neg › Solvency › 2NC Say Yes—Carrot—AT: Not Big Enough

Making support conditional is more likely to induce states to join US-led efforts

Gannon and Kent 21, PhD in Political Science @ UC-San Diego, **PhD in Political Science @ Ohio State (“Keeping Your Friends Close, but Acquaintances Closer: Why Weakly Allied States Make Committed Coalition Partners,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 65.5)//BB

Because alliance membership is a club good, not a pure public good, worries about being excluded from the security benefits of an alliance can incentivize a state to try to shore up the alliance by sending a costly signal of their commitment to their alliance partners. “Today, we should expect the European allies to find that the best way to strengthen (or avoid weakening) their bonds with the United States is to contribute to out-of-area operations like ISAF. According to this line of reasoning, the allies who put the highest premium on NATO’s traditional products should be the ones—together with the United States—shouldering the heaviest burdens in Afghanistan” (Ringsmose 2010, 331). Yet the Afghanistan case demonstrates this is not just a story about club goods in formal alliances, but security cooperation more generally. States may use war efforts as a signal of their willingness to accept large costs in the hopes that this will improve their relationship with the coalition leader in the future. States use conflicts that are not of immediate strategic importance to— hopefully—gain the attention and respect of important international players. Closer alignments may be valued inherently, for unspecified reasons, or to help the state acquire side payments or policy concessions on unrelated issues. Henke (2019a) argues that states contribute to coalition conflicts when the “pivotal state”— what we call the coalition leader—provides side payments as incentives to contribute. This highlights our broader logic about variation in club goods and public goods in alliances and coalitions. States contribute to coalition warfare when there are benefits to contributing troops that fall outside the traditionally understood alliance mandates or security concerns. In US-led conflicts since the Korean War, Henke (2019a) find that future benefits offered by pivotal states can induce coalition participation. We extend upon this finding by arguing that states with unrealized alliance potential are most likely to be moved by that logic. Furthermore, they will go above and beyond in their coalition participation to try to secure future benefits— whether side payments or unrelated payments—that extend from a closer relationship with the coalition leader.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Neg › Solvency › 2NC Say Yes—Carrot—Want SC over Tech

Say yes --- allies recognize the need for cohesive framework and unity on emerging tech in order to combat adversaries

Soare, 21 [Simona R. Soare, PhD in political science, US DoS fellowship on US Grand Strategy, served as advisor to the Vice-President of the European Parliament, research focusing on US security policy, transatlantic security and EU-NATO relations, 6-11-2021, German Marshall Fund of the US, ‘Innovations as Adaptation: NATO and Emerging Technologies’, https://www.gmfus.org/news/innovation-adaptation-nato-and-emerging-technologies /alundy]

Throughout NATO’s history, defense innovation has been critical to its technological edge and its deterrence and defense posture against multiple threats. The unprecedented progress in emerging and disruptive technologies (EDTs) offers the prospect and challenge of transformative defense innovation for allied armed forces and societies at large. Technological progress in artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning, advanced robotics, biotechnologies and human enhancement, quantum technologies, big-data analytics, and fifth-generation telecommunication systems, as well as growing autonomy in the critical functions of military systems, promise to change how wars are fought, how fast, where, and by whom. These technologies enable new forms of military presence, coercive action, and power projection in and across old and new domains (for example, cyberspace and outer space) and below and above the conventional threshold of armed conflict.

However, NATO and the transatlantic allies are neither the only nor the most agile actors investing in emerging and disruptive technologies. China and Russia already invest substantially in and have accelerated their adoption of these technologies in military applications. To maintain its strategic advantage against China and Russia, NATO needs to become an agent of innovation and be more agile and strategic in supporting allies to jointly exploit new technologies for deterrence, defense, and resilience purposes. NATO has prioritized EDTs and signaled it has joined “the technological adoption race” against China and Russia.1 Much work remains to be done. Allies remain divided on the ethical and legal specifics of the military use of EDTs and by their national-industrial preferences. Technological capacity across the alliance also varies significantly and, as always, funding is in short supply. Concrete decisions on how to consolidate innovation in EDTs, a critical task for NATO’s mission and future adaptation, are expected at this month’s Brussels summit. Specifically, allies will respond to calls for a “strategic surge” in EDTs2 innovation by establishing a Defense Innovation Accelerator, an opt-in instrument funded through dedicated national contributions, which NATO hopes will incentivize innovation and transatlantic cooperation on emerging technologies.3

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Neg › Solvency › 2NC Say Yes—Carrot—Want SC Over Cyber

Say yes---Security cooperation in cyber is key to NATO operations

Efthymiopoulos, 19 [Marios Panagiotis Efthymiopoulos, Designated Dean and Associate Professor of International Security and Strategy of the College of Security and Global Studies, at the American University in the Emirates AUE, advisor to the President of Cyprus through the Geostrategic Council of the Republic of Cyprus and CEO of Strategy International, 6-20-2019, Journal of Innovation and Entrepreneurship, ‘A cyber-security framework for development, defense and innovation at NATO’, /alundy]

Vulnerabilities and threats considering multidimensional challenges such as cyber-security require NATO to be truly, strategically and operationally agile. It requires NATO to be adaptable to conditions unforeseen. Considering technological advancements, we are yet to acquaint ourselves, our institutions, governments, and international organizations with true phenomena of a new, yet networked global society. In this borderless society, where electric grids, information, or installations failures may have in the past solely affect a country, now affect a region and possibly a larger area. Our abilities are limitless to point out challenges and face them. We also have the ability to innovate through methodological approaches and security cooperation utilizing the constant upgrade of technology. However, when decisions come to being, this may not be easy. Lack of sound and constant decision making may affect global financial systems and social structures. Current financial situations in regions and areas, such as in the Balkans or South of Europe, like Greece, Italy, and Portugal among others, affect the larger European Union as a community of union states. Conflict areas, such as Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan, do surely provide the impetus for NATO’s direct involvement and or cooperation with external allies, yet does not seem to positively affect leadership in taking decisions that are so much needed for the benefit of security resilience and business continuity. Humanitarian issues, such as the refugee issue and the fear of mass illegal migration, deriving from current wars in Syria, Iraq, and other areas such as Afghanistan, affect countries, giving rise to suspicion on cooperative effectiveness, participation in defense against threats and challenges. Even more so, when a global society is e-wired, in which education, training, health but also security are part of this “grid,” the threats and challenges are greater. In this new virtual world of things, where the internet has managed to innovate, eliminate, distances and borders but also time, NATO should be set to comply with the new “global rules and standards of operational business-minded and political efficiency.” It should create agile and limitless policies, security basic and specialized military and civilian installation if NATO is to continue to be a crisis management institution.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Neg › Solvency › 2NC Say Yes—Carrot—Want SC Over Cyber

Ukraine means cybersecurity coop is high priority

Roussi & Cerulus ’22 (Antoaneta Roussi, Cybersecurity Reporter for POLITICO, Laurens Cerulus, Leader of POLITICO’s cybersecurity reporting team “NATO aims to take on Russia with its own cyber military-industrial complex” ) //sethlee

Western military allies want cybersecurity and defense technology firms to step up in countering digital threats from Russia. The war in Ukraine has put technology front and center of armed conflict. Satellite network firms like , drone-makers like , and a have shaped the war since its start in February. Now, NATO leaders want to set out a plan to win the war for tech supremacy and cyber defenses in the long run. The defense alliance meets Wednesday to Thursday for a summit in Madrid and will present a “Strategic Concept” for how it plans to protect the bloc from threats and attacks for the next few years, including in cyberspace. According to several officials who spoke to POLITICO on the condition of anonymity because talks are ongoing, that strategy would include: — Ways to directly involve the private-sector cybersecurity industry in NATO’s responses to Russian hacking groups and security services, including by setting up a platform to share cyberattack information and intelligence; — Funding of over a $1 billion to go into emerging technologies like quantum computing, artificial intelligence and space tech, including through a “transatlantic DARPA” called the , or DIANA, and through a new investment fund that will go toward “deep tech and startups” on defense technology; — And setting up virtual joint cybersecurity teams to deploy in the event of a large-scale cyberattack and to go into member countries to help protect networks. “The Strategic Concept quite clearly puts cyber also into the context of Russia as a threat to allies’ security, and that cyber is one of the means it uses to threaten our partners,” a NATO official said, adding that the text of the strategy is still to be finalized. Ukraine has been under “a nonstop attack, on government services, on military command-and-control, on regular internet and internet communication,” the official said. “The fact that they weren't successful in knocking it all out doesn't mean they didn't try.” The was agreed upon in 2010, and only touched on cyber, stressing the need for NATO countries to increase cooperation and coordination to face evolving cyber threats. Since then, the new version of the document, which lays out threats to NATO and strategies to address these concerns, is certain to include language on cyber deterrence. Following a summit in Brussels last year, NATO that recognized that a major cyberattack against a member state would be considered an attack against all on a “case-by-case basis.” Cybersecurity coordinators for NATO nations met in Brussels last month for a special cyber session of NATO’s North Atlantic Council. Anne Neuberger, the White House deputy national security adviser for cyber and emerging technology, at the time the need for better coordination among NATO countries to confront cyber threats. In the days leading up to the summit, NATO member Lithuania of distributed denial-of-service attacks from pro-Kremlin hacktivist group Killnet, which brought down some government websites by sending an excess of internet traffic to their servers. To counter the online threat coming from Russia, the alliance wants to set up a “more structured relationship between the civilian and the military world,” the official said. Ahead of and in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, U.S. and Western government services and cybersecurity giants like Microsoft were heavily involved in the response to Russian cyberattacks, with Microsoft engineers in Washington state detecting the first cyberattack launched against Ukraine well before any Russian tanks crossed the border. “How they can bring [the] industry together to do threat-monitoring and awareness and possibly even advise on responses for cyber defense will definitely be a multiplier effect,” said Fabrice Pothier, chief executive officer of consultancy Rasmussen Global, which was founded by former NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen. “Cyber is so privatized now, you need to bring the big players together,” Pothier said. Kenneth Lasoen, a specialist on security and intelligence at Clingendael Institute, said NATO members could form a consortium to negotiate support with private companies on offensive strategies — something the alliance has suggested . “More countries are looking into bolstering their cyber capabilities, and a lot of the companies helping them are based in the U.S.,” said Lasoen. “Of course, it would be advisable for the EU to have its own know-how, but for now it is in the U.S.”

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Neg › Solvency › 2NC Say Yes—Carrot—Want SC Over Cyber

European Leaders want SC over cyber BUT burden sharing is key

Brzozowski ’21 (Alexandra Brzozowski, “EU and NATO leaders aim to expand cooperation, despite dreams of ‘strategic autonomy’”,) //sethlee

“We are committed to cooperating closely with NATO,” EU leaders stated in a joint summit declaration, reiterating their intention to strengthen the EU’s partnership with NATO and work closely with the new US President Joe Biden. According to a senior EU official, EU and NATO leaders in the meeting reiterated that “EU-NATO cooperation is of strategic importance” on areas such as reinforcing capabilities, military mobility, cybersecurity and hybrid threats as well as challenges in the immediate neighbourhood. NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg joined the video summit to lay emphasis on cooperation in the face of worries from some member states that the EU’s push could undermine the US-backed alliance as President Biden is looking to rebuild it. “I’m totally convinced that the new Biden administration offers a unique opportunity to renew the strong alliance between Europe and the United States,” European Council President Charles Michel said ahead of the talks. “A strong partnership requires strong partners – that’s why I’m convinced that a stronger EU is a stronger NATO,” he added. “We share very much the same population, the same members and the same neighbourhood and the same challenges,” said Stoltenberg, speaking alongside Michell. He added that this cooperation had already reached “an unprecedented level” in the past few years and could be expanded further in areas such as cyber threats, climate change and migration issues. However, the conflict over Cyprus remains one of the main stumbling blocks towards closer cooperation between the two institutions. EU leaders stressed that their aim is to reaffirm the goal of “increasing the EU’s capacity to act autonomously” in defence and that “in the face of increased global instability, the EU must take on more responsibility for its security.” Debate has raged for decades over what role EU institutions should play on defence, while confusion remains what the word “strategic autonomy” actually means in practice. Security and defence policies remain largely in the hands of member states, which have often been reluctant to agree on moves to integrate military capabilities at European level and transfer competencies in the policy field. “Security and defence will be kept under regular review by the European Council,” EU leaders pointed out, what can be seen as a reaffirmation of their intention to keep capitals’ grip on the policy area. France, in particular, has been the most vocal proponent of the bloc’s push for “strategic autonomy”, arguing that a resurgent Russia and China and former US President Donald Trump’s threats to withdraw security guarantees from Europe over defence spending show Europe has to be able to stand alone. However, initial signals from Washington have already indicated that Biden’s government is also likely to make demands on the Europeans to make a greater contribution to their own security. Senior EU officials admit the push for European autonomy has worried some in the bloc – especially Eastern European and Baltic states – who look towards NATO as a bulwark against a more aggressive Moscow. “The capacity for the EU to act in a more autonomous way unnerves member states on the front line against Russia because they fear a disengagement from NATO,” one official said. R&D and new threats “We need to continue reinforcing European military capabilities, under the European Defence Union. Because the global technological race is on and I want Europe to lead,” European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen told reporters. EU leaders said they want to focus on a ‘drive-by’ Europe to better protect itself from cyberattacks, and ask Brussels to come up with a roadmap on the development of strategic technologies.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Neg › Solvency › 2NC Say Yes—Carrot—Want SC Over AI

European Countries are pushing for increased AI cooperation

Arcuri ’22 (Gregory Arcuri, Research Assistant at the Renewing American Innovation Project, “How Is the U.S. Cooperating with Its European Allies on Issues of Technology?”, ) //sethlee

Optimism for meaningful cooperation, though, is still warranted. The TTC is the most promising forum for technology and innovation collaboration in recent memory. Launched in June 2021, the TTC’s is “to lead global, like-minded [democratic] partners in promoting an open, interoperable, secure, and reliable digital space, and to remain leaders in developing and protecting tomorrow’s technology.” Importantly, the Council’s agenda intentionally avoids topics of long-standing disagreement and tension between the U.S. and Europe (so-called “”) which have doomed previous forums for negotiation, such as agricultural subsidies, the Boeing-Airbus dispute, and Trump-era steel and aluminum tariffs. The Council established ten working groups to promote high-level dialogue on a variety of issues where collaboration appears possible, including: Technology standards Climate and green technology Secure supply chains Information and communications technology and services security and competitiveness Data governance and tech platform regulation Misuse of technology threatening security and human rights Export controls Investment screening Promoting access to and use of digital technologies among small and medium enterprises Global trade challenges The Council’s first meeting in September 2021 led to a series of notable outcomes on issues where significant agreement already exists. For example, on the issue of the , both sides are committed to “identify[ing] gaps in the semiconductor value chain” and enhancing their respective semiconductor ecosystems. The U.S. and Europe have already begun taking important steps towards this shared goal. Of note, the European Commission has to mobilize over €43 billion in public and private funds to double its share of the global semiconductor manufacturing market by 2030. Meanwhile, in the United States, lawmakers continue to debate the and the , which provide lump-sum and tax-based incentives for chip manufacturers to “onshore” their operations. While these appear to be self-serving initiatives, the two sides view them as critical to ensuring mutual resiliency in a critical strategic industry. In artificial intelligence (AI), the U.S. and E.U. affirmed their commitment to responsibly developing AI which is used in a way that respects democratic values and universal human rights. The European Union has already proposed sweeping legislation, known as , which would serve as the first comprehensive law on artificial intelligence use and development worldwide. While the U.S. has no similar legislation making its way through Congress, the White House has established through U.S. embassies and federal agencies with European partners to promote “democracy-affirming technologies” and responsible artificial intelligence and machine learning. The next TTC meeting is scheduled for May 15-16, 2022, and this event will be the first dialogue since the Russian invasion, providing the TTC with a sense of urgency and seriousness that some analysts suggest might instill a spirit of compromise. Already on March 25, the President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen released with President Biden announcing “an agreement in principle on a new framework for transatlantic data flows,” an agreement that the TTC will likely be tasked with fleshing out. Kenneth Propp with the Atlantic Council argues that this could mean a on the issue of data privacy, acknowledging that the biggest threat to European data security is Russia, not U.S. tech companies. This could represent a significant breakthrough in cooperation on an issue where the two sides have struggled to find common ground, possibly heralding a wave of collaborative activity across a variety of other domains as well. Putin’s wanton aggression in Ukraine has united a previously fractured Western world in a way that appeared impossible just months ago. The May meeting of the TTC provides a chance to build upon previous points of compromise. The United States and its European allies have a remarkable opportunity to harness the current political momentum to forge cooperation in securing their shared leadership in the technologies of the future.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Neg › Solvency › 2NC Say Yes—Carrot—Want SC Over AI

NATO countries want AI – econ and military benefits

Edward Christie et al, 6-10-2022, non-resident Senior Fellow with PSSI's E&F Threat Program An economist by training, he has held roles in research, industry, and the government sector. He served as a NATO official from 2014 to 2020, including as Defence Economist and Deputy Head of NATO’s Innovation Unit;"NATO and Artificial Intelligence," Routledge Companion to Artificial Intelligence and National Security Policy, pg. 4-5 EZAY

3. Military AI and its strategic implications for NATO . AI is a general purpose technology, that is, “a single generic technology, recognizable as such over its whole lifetime, that initially has much scope for improvement and eventually comes to be widely used, to have many uses, and to have many [positive economic] spillover effects”, see Lipsey, Carlaw, and Bekar (2005, p.98). Like previous general purpose technologies (such as the steam engine or aviation or computers), AI holds great promise for enhancing both economic productivity and military capabilities. As with computing and information and telecommunications technology (ICT) more broadly, the current development of AI is dominated by the civilian corporate sector. This inverts the traditional relationship between state institutions and the civilian corporate sector: technologies that have comparatively narrow uses or that are quite immature are typically dependent on extended periods of state support before they may be spun off into commercial applications. GPS is a typical example of a successful traditional transfer from the military to the civilian sector (Schroeer, 2018). With ICT, and with the current wave of AI, the technology is of general purpose and at a high level of maturity. This allows for mass production and diffusion to the civilian sector, indeed internationally, leading to a strong dominance of civilian private revenues over state and military revenues in the total sales volumes of leading producers of these technologies, and ultimately to a dominance of the latter in R&D and innovation. As a result, the state sector, including defence institutions, are dependent on and have to follow the technology frontier that emerges from the civilian corporate sector to a far greater degree than is the case with narrower purpose or less mature technologies (Christie, Buts & Du Bois, 2021). In many respects, the drive to adopt AI can be seen as an opportunity to improve and enhance capabilities in ways that mirror developments in the civilian economy (Fischer, 2021; Sayler, 2019). AI-enhanced software applications already enrich people’s lives in direct ways, from auto-completion of emails to helpful recommendations on social media platforms. In the corporate world, a large range of back-office applications and business function support applications are already quite well developed. Predictive analytics for business functions such as maintenance, inventory management, and logistics are common – as is the ability to sift through and analyse vast volumes of data of all kinds, including audio, image, and video data. For defence institutions, failing to “adapt to adopt” such obviously efficiency-enhancing opportunities would be difficult to justify in any international security landscape. In addition, the rise of AI is occurring in a context of revived great power competition. From a global perspective, China has already overtaken the United States on certain metrics of economic and industrial power (O’Rourke, 2021), and it is rational to expect that power to translate increasingly into potential military power and foreign policy influence (Kania, 2017). From the perspective of European security, Russia is back on the world stage, with large, modernised and capable armed forces. Both powers have clearly signaled that they understand the potential of AI and both are taking active steps to adopt AI for multiple uses, including defence and security (Schmidt et al., 2021; Soare, 2021). Due to its digital nature, AI diffuses extremely rapidly across sectors of activity as well as across borders. In practice, it is difficult to see how any great power in the international system could prevent other nations, or indeed non-state actors, from adopting AI for a wide range of purposes, including potentially hostile purposes. This poses serious challenges for traditional security policy efforts in areas such as non-proliferation and export controls. From a strategic perspective, it is also clear that every major power faces a strong incentive to adopt AI rapidly for all purposes, including for defence and security purposes. This general dynamic is a race of a particular kind – not an arms race, since AI is not a type of armament – but rather a technology race, or a “technological adoption race”, as expressed by NATO’s Head of Innovation (Murray, 2020).

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Neg › 1NC › 1NC QPQ

That deters war with Russia and China—lack of burden sharing exploits US inability to respond to a two-front war

Binnendijk et al 22 (Hans Binnendijk, Distinguished Fellow - The Atlantic Council; Daniel S. Hamilton, Nonresident Senior Fellow - Foreign Policy, Center on the United States and Europe; Alexander Vershbow Distinguished Fellow - The Atlantic Council Former NATO Deputy Secretary General (2012-16), Assistant Secretary of Defense (2009-12) and US Ambassador to NATO, Russia and South Korea. “Strategic responsibility: Rebalancing European and trans-Atlantic defense” 6/24/22 )

Taken together, these developments underscore the need for Europe and the United States to find a new path forward. Europe’s long-standing aspiration to develop more effective ways to act militarily is now intersecting with the long-standing U.S. aspiration that Europeans shoulder more of the common burden. Stated simply, Europe has wanted autonomy without providing adequate defense resources, while the United States has wanted greater European defense contributions without diminishing NATO and U.S. political influence. Now it is time to unite these two debates and find a new balance for both. As Europe grapples with new and complex strategic realities, it can no longer afford its excessive reliance on the United States, either for collective defense or for crisis management and cooperative security missions beyond Europe’s borders. The U.S. will have to pay increasing attention to China and limit its involvement in the wider Middle East. The United States will therefore increasingly look to European allies to shoulder more of the common burden and encourage greater contributions to security by the European Union.[8] Of course, European allies have already shouldered considerable burdens in the context of the war in Ukraine. They have been coping with the quickest and largest flow of displaced people in Europe since World War II. They have ramped up economic assistance to Ukraine, and are likely to take on the lion’s share of the eventual task of recovery and reconstruction. They are managing an historic effort to wean themselves off their dependence on Russian energy. Many European allies have also stepped up their defense investments considerably in the wake of Russia’s renewed aggression, with Germany the most dramatic example in establishing a special 100 billion euro fund to upgrade its armed forces and finally committing to meet the 2%-of-GDP goal that allies set after Russia’s first invasion of Ukraine in 2014. In the short term, much of these funds are needed to address immediate issues related to Ukraine or to simply replenish depleted European militaries. Longer-term, however, these pledges of enhanced spending must be tied to clear and ambitious goals. Over the next decade, the trans-Atlantic partners must rebalance their relationship so that Europe assumes greater strategic responsibility, even as both parties work to reinforce the trans-Atlantic link. Setting the goal of a rebalanced partnership would move the United States and its European allies and partners beyond contentious arguments over burden-sharing and embrace Europe’s longstanding ambition to play a larger role in its own defense, while sidestepping semantic sideshows over the meaning of “strategic autonomy.” Advancing greater European strategic responsibility starts by defining the concept in a way designed to strengthen the Atlantic alliance. It should focus on two military goals: The first should be to enhance the European allies’ conventional military capabilities to a level that would provide half of the forces and capabilities, including the strategic enablers, required for deterrence and collective defense against major-power aggression. Should a conflict simultaneously break out with China in Asia and Russia in Europe, the United States may not be able to deploy adequate reinforcements to Europe. European allies need to be able to pick up the slack. The second goal should be to develop European capabilities to conduct crisis management operations in Europe’s neighborhood without today’s heavy reliance on U.S. enablers such as strategic lift, refueling, and C4ISR. The EU’s goal in its Strategic Compass released in March of this year of developing the capacity to generate an “intervention force” of 5,000 individuals who could deploy beyond EU boundaries is a small yet useful start. Meeting these two goals would allow Europe to become the first responder to most crises in its neighborhood, acting through NATO, through the EU, or through ad hoc coalitions of the willing. It would permit the United States to shift some of its forces and strategic focus to the Indo-Pacific region without any significant reduction in the capabilities needed to deter Russia. Given Russia’s poor initial showing during its 2022 assault on Ukraine, some may believe that Russia is weaker than expected, that its strength will be sapped by the war, and that stronger European defense is therefore not needed. This would be a dangerous conclusion. Despite Moscow’s missteps, the Russian military will be able to reconstitute its losses quickly and learn from its mistakes. Russian military capabilities remain formidable, and Moscow has demonstrated repeatedly its intent not only to intervene militarily in other countries but to weaponize food, energy, digital, and other flows connecting it to various countries. Russia’s ongoing revanchist threat, and the more robust forward presence of allied forces being prepared for approval at NATO’s June 29-30 Madrid summit, will place increasing demands on all allies for high-readiness forces. This will add to the urgency of European allies assuming a greater share of the burden across the board — greater numbers of forces, higher readiness, and enhanced mobility, all with critical enablers. Finally, one critical lesson emerging from the war is the importance of sustainability. A drawn-out conflict will drain and ultimately deplete Ukraine’s resources — unless it receives ongoing assistance. The United States is carrying the largest sustainability load when it comes to resupplying Ukraine. Strategic responsibility must include the ability not just to be ready and have the mobility to get to the fight, but to sustain it. Europe is weak here. Should the United States be caught in an Asian war, sustainability would be a critical issue for European forces, and is thus key to European strategic responsibility.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Neg › 1NC › 1NC QPQ

Say yes—alliance contribution rating is politically palatable and encourages effective European defense

Martin et al. 17, *Garret Martin is a Professorial Lecturer at the School of International Service of American University. He specializes in transatlantic security, NATO, the European Union and E.U. foreign policy. *Balazs Martonffy formerly served as a civilian defense official in the Hungarian Ministry of Defense, working on NATO policy and transatlantic security issues. He is currently pursuing his doctorate in international relations at American University in Washington, D.C. (May 19th, 2017, “Abandon the 2 Percent Obsession: A New Rating for Pulling Your Weight in NATO”, https://warontherocks.com/2017/05/abandon-the-2-percent-obsession-a-new-rating-for-pulling-your-weight-in-nato/)

These alternative proposals and metrics are a start, but they present their own set of problems. Where von der Leyen’s idea lacks in precision, Ischinger’s suggestion would downplay the importance of building adequate military capabilities. Intense political horse-trading likely played as much as a role as pure military considerations when it came to choosing the internal metrics, and those do not completely address all of NATO’s core tasks. The input/output metrics remain, in any case, . In other words, the search for a better metric to replace the 2 percent guideline continues. From our standpoint, any credible alternative should a) be simple and intelligible, b) provide a more nuanced assessment of the contribution of states to NATO’s three core tasks, and c) be politically acceptable.

Our proposal starts from the assumption that no single metric is sufficient to capture allied member states’ contributions to NATO, and complex ones, such as , have failed to gather political momentum. We suggest instead a composite metric as a solution: the Alliance Contribution Rating. This rating, similar to the credit assessment used by Moody’s and others in the financial world, would provide a differentiated and nuanced picture of each state’s contributions to NATO.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Neg › 1NC › 1NC QPQ

Conditioning cooperation increases burden sharing—empirics prove it convinces allies to increase defense spending

Blankenship ’18 [Brian; Then PhD Candidate, now Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Miami. Ph.D. in Political Science from Columbia University, B.A. in Political Science from Indiana University, Bloomington; 2018; "Promises under Pressure: Reassurance and Burden-Sharing in Asymmetric Alliances"; Columbia University; https://www.proquest.com/openview/661c7c6284955ee055ca12745326b485/1?cbl=18750&pq-origsite=gscholar; Accessed 7-5-2022; AW]

Great power patrons frequently reassure allies of their protection, whether by stationing troops abroad, visiting allied countries, or making public statements. In the case of the United States, observers and practitioners alike have emphasized the need to instill confidence in U.S. allies. However, allied reassurance is fundamentally puzzling because it gives away a key source of bargaining leverage: the threat of abandonment. Patrons should ideally strive to limit the extent to which they are perceived as committed to allies, lest they encourage allies to free-ride on their protection and contribute little to the common defense. Existing literature tends to either treat reassurance as a secondary effect of deterrence, or to focus on understanding how patrons can reassure their allies rather than why. Studies that do provide explanations for reassurance, for their part, often regard reassurance as strategically suboptimal, and emphasize domestic political factors that drive reassurance. The causes of reassurance are thus poorly understood. I argue that although reassurance can have adverse consequences, patrons have incentives to reassure to the extent that allies have the capacity to exit the alliance. The more credible an ally’s threat to pursue outside options, and the more costs that doing so would impose on the patron, the more reassurance it will receive. Patrons thus face a dilemma, trading off between withholding reassurance to drive hard bargains with allies and reassuring allies to dissuade them from exiting the alliance. This dilemma may be mitigated, however, if a patron can make its assurances conditional on allied burden sharing by combining its assurances with threats of abandonment. These threats are more potent to the extent that a patron faces domestic pressure to retrench from its foreign commitments, and that allies face severe threat environments. I test the theory using a mixed-method approach that combines statistical analysis of an original dataset on American reassurance and allied burden-sharing between 1950 and 2010 with qualitative historical case studies. In Chapters 1 and 2, I introduce the concepts of alliance reassurance and burden-sharing and review the literature on both concepts. I argue that reassurance is puzzling in light of existing theories of alliance bargaining which stress the threat of abandonment as a source of leverage. The “reassurance dilemma” that patrons face, however, is that withholding reassurance may encourage allies to distance themselves from the alliance and seek outside options. In Chapter 3, I present a theory of bargaining leverage in asymmetric alliances in order to identify the conditions under which this dilemma is most severe—and thus to explain variation in patron reassurance and allied burden-sharing. I posit that reassurance serves the purpose of discouraging allies from leaving the alliance; the more credible allies’ threats of exit, the more reassurance they will receive. However, patrons can make their assurances conditional on allies’ burden-sharing efforts if their own threat of exiting the alliance is credible as well. I present a simple formal model illustrating both the tradeoffs between reassurance and burden-sharing, as well as the conditions under which patrons are more likely to reassure and allies are more likely to increase their contributions to the alliance. I then introduce hypotheses for testing the theory’s observable implications. Chapter 4 presents the quantitative analysis on the determinants of patron reassurance and allied burden-sharing. First, using an original dataset of U.S. reassurance collected and analyzed with automated text analysis, I use statistical models to identify correlates of U.S. willingness to offer reassurances. Second, I study allied burden-sharing using data on allies’ military spending, support for U.S. military bases, and participation in U.S. foreign military interventions. In Chapters 5-8, I conduct case studies on U.S. reassurance and burden-sharing pressure toward West Germany, Japan, South Korea, and the United Kingdom during the 1960s and 1970s. Process-tracing of these cases shows that the United States saw reassurance as a way of discouraging its allies from pursuing outside options—in particular nuclear weapons and rapprochement with the Soviet Union. However, the United States was simultaneously able to extract significant burden-sharing efforts, especially from West Germany and South Korea owing to their geographic vulnerability, and during the early 1970s due to doubts about U.S. reliability in the aftermath of the Vietnam War. Finally, Chapter 9 concludes with a summary of the analysis, as well as a discussion of implications and avenues for future research. My findings suggest that by withholding reassurance and deliberately casting doubt on its protection, a patron makes its allies prone to reconsidering their reliance on it and to instead pursue outside options.

2022 Michigan Evidence
AT: Turkey PIC › AT: HR INB

Torture, police brutality, and poor prison conditions undermine human rights

HRW 21 – Human Rights Watch, International NGO that exposes and studies human rights violations and petitions for governmental action [HRW. “World Report 2021: Turkey.” Human Rights Watch. 2021. ]

Torture and Ill-Treatment in Custody, Enforced Disappearances

A rise in allegations of torture, ill-treatment, and cruel and inhuman or degrading treatment in police and military custody and prison over the past four years has set back Turkey’s earlier progress in this area. Those targeted include people accused of political and common crimes. Prosecutors do not conduct meaningful investigations into such allegations and there is a pervasive culture of impunity for members of the security forces and public officials implicated.

2022 Michigan Evidence
AT: Turkey PIC › AT: HR INB

Turkey is horrible for human rights – lack of judicial independence and authoritarian rule greenlight violence is Syria, Kurds

HRW 21 – Human Rights Watch, International NGO that exposes and studies human rights violations and petitions for governmental action [HRW. “World Report 2021: Turkey.” Human Rights Watch. 2021. ]

The assault on human rights and the rule of law presided over by Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan continued during the Covid-19 pandemic. The president’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) and an allied far-right party enjoy a parliamentary majority enabling them to consolidate authoritarian rule by passing rushed legislation that contravenes international human rights obligations. Opposition parties remain sidelined under Turkey’s presidential system and the government has reshaped public and state institutions to remove checks on power and to ensure benefits for its own supporters. The political opposition nevertheless controls the municipalities of Istanbul and Ankara.

Executive interference in the judiciary and in prosecutorial decisions are entrenched problems, reflected in the authorities’ systematic practice of detaining, prosecuting, and convicting on bogus and overbroad terrorism and other charges, individuals the Erdoğan government regards as critics or political opponents. Among those targeted are journalists, opposition politicians, and activists—in particular members of the pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP). The largest targeted group consists of those alleged to have links with the movement headed by US-based Sunni cleric Fethullah Gülen which Turkey deems a terrorist organization and calls FETÖ and holds responsible for the July 2016 coup attempt.

2022 Michigan Evidence
AT: Turkey PIC › AT: HR INB

Extradition and arms sales concessions from NATO over Sweden and Finland undermine the counterplan.

Sharma 7/2 – chief sub-Editor at News18, covers foreign affairs and geopolitics. [Shubhangi. “As NATO Capitulates Before Turkey, Western Hypocrisy on Human Rights Enters New Low.” News 18. July 2, 2022. https://www.news18.com/news/opinion/as-nato-capitulates-before-turkey-western-hypocrisy-on-human-rights-enters-new-low-5477755.html.]

Amid the Russia-Ukraine war, Sweden and Finland are all set to join the Nato alliance overcoming a major hurdle. Sweden and Finland’s Nato bid was nearly torpedoed by Turkey, a Nato member itself, which used its veto powers to block their entry. Now, however, Turkey has lifted the veto but only after imposing humiliating conditions on the two Nordic nations.

Nato members are in a celebratory mood ever since this “breakthrough” but tough questions are catching up because in reality, the Nato meeting in Madrid and the three-way deal signed by the Nordic nations and Ankara, simply reaffirmed the fact that the West is ready to kneel before the rogue Nato member that has no love lost for its peers in the alliance. Wildly inappropriate concessions have been made to win over the Erdogan-led regime in Ankara by self-appointed guardians of human rights and democracy. Kurdish dissidents have been thrown under the bus to fulfil Nato’s expansionist agenda. To simplify, the bellicose regime of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has been handed over a major diplomatic and strategic victory on a platter. To add to that, Sweden will be lifting its arms export embargo on Turkey, and the United States has expressed a newfound willingness to cater to Turkey’s demands for the F16 aircraft, after nearly four years of what was seen as a silent, unannounced embargo.

2022 Michigan Evidence
AT: Turkey PIC › AT: HR INB

Turkish human rights violations are inevitable. Previous pressure campaigns have failed and US support in other areas thumps.

Kosta-Foti 21 – history student at Kings College London. [Alexandra. “Turkey’s War on Kurds: Kurdish Refugees Threatened At Makhmour Refugee Camp.” Human Rights Pulse. Sept 13, 2021.

On 1 June 2021, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan threatened to launch an operation to “cleanse” the Makhmour refugee camp, home to over 13,000 Kurdish refugees. The self-defence forces of the democratically elected assembly that have been fighting off ISIS now find themselves threatened by another of Turkey’s attempts at ethnic cleansing. Amidst worldwide silence and a failure to stop Turkish aggression, a human rights crisis that has been going on for over a century needs to be finally recognised and spoken about.

IMPERIAL AMBITIONS, SYSTEMATIC OPPRESSION, AND A REFUGEE CRISIS

2022 Michigan Topicality
**T Supplement – FMPS 22** › **NATO** › NATO = Organization

Even Canada agrees

Canada 22 [The government of Canada is the body responsible for the federal administration of Canada; “Canada and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization”; 06/21/22; ] //CH

The North Atlantic Treaty was signed in Washington on April 4, 1949, establishing the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). This political and military alliance was formed to promote the stability of the North Atlantic area and to safeguard the freedom of its peoples, based on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law.

Overview of North Atlantic Treaty Organization

2022 Michigan Topicality
**T Supplement – FMPS 22** › **NATO** › NATO = Organization

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is a group of 30 countries – that’s external from individual member-states

NATO 22 [The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is an intergovernmental military alliance; “10 things you need to know about NATO”; 5/10/22; ] //CH

Collective defence: The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was founded in 1949 and is a group of 30 countries from Europe and North America that exists to protect the people and territory of its members. The Alliance is founded on the principle of collective defence, meaning that if one NATO Ally is attacked, then all NATO Allies are attacked. For example, when terrorists attacked the United States on 9/11 2001, all NATO Allies stood with America as though they had also been attacked.

2022 Michigan Topicality
**T Supplement – FMPS 22** › **NATO** › NATO = Organization

NATO is a political and military security alliance formed in 1949

NATO 20 [The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is an intergovernmental military alliance; “ABOUT NATO”; Last changed 2020 (addition of 30th country); ] //CH

Formed in 1949 with the signing of the Washington Treaty, NATO is a security alliance of 30 countries from North America and Europe. NATO’s fundamental goal is to safeguard the Allies’ freedom and security by political and military means. NATO remains the principal security instrument of the transatlantic community and expression of its common democratic values. It is the practical means through which the security of North America and Europe are permanently tied together. NATO enlargement has furthered the U.S. goal of a Europe whole, free, and at peace.

2022 Michigan Topicality
**T Supplement – FMPS 22** › **Cybersecurity** › AT: Property Rights Interp (OCOs aff)

We meet – DOD uses OCOS to protect property rights

Crowther and Ghori ‘15 [G. Alexander Crowther and Shaheen Ghori, Alex Crowther is a visiting research professor with a dual appointment in both the Jack D. Gordon Institute for Public Policy and the Department of Criminology and Criminal Justice, both within the Steven J. Green School of International and Public Affairs at FIU. Dr. Crowther is also an integral part of FIU’s Emerging Preeminent Program Cybersecurity@FIU, Shaheen Ghori is a research assistant at National Defense University. She has a B.A. from American University and a masters in cybersecurity from George Mason University, “Detangling the Web A Screenshot of U.S. Government Cyber Activity”, National Defense University Press, July 1 2015, https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/jfq/jfq-78/jfq-78_75-83_Crowther-Ghori.pdf]@RA

The Offices of the U.S. Attorneys is the last major part of Justice that works cyber issues. One of their 10 priority areas is cyber crime.38 Their three areas of concentration are Internet stalking, computer hacking, intellectual property rights and forensics. They also assist the National Computer Forensics Institute.

Department of Defense

2022 Michigan Topicality
**T Supplement – FMPS 22** › **Cybersecurity** › AT: CIA Triad Interp (OCOs aff)

The DOD says we meet all three!

DOD ‘15 [Department of Defense, The United States Department of Defense is an executive branch department of the federal government charged with coordinating and supervising all agencies and functions of the government directly related to national security and the United States Armed Forces, “Developing a Tactical Environment Cyber Operations Training Program,” TECO Study, September 15 2015, https://www.sans.org/media/security-training/TECO-Study.pdf]@RA

ICT includes systems or applications associated with computer and network hardware, software, and communication medium [5]. The technology encompasses computers, enterprise software, middleware , and data storage, which enable users to access, store, transmit, and manipulate information. Military cyber operations (DoDIN Ops, DCO, and OCO) focus primarily on ICT systems and their integration with military operations [1]. Exploitation FX3RD-35014 7 of ICT systems can result in loss of intelligence and proprietary information, degraded communication, loss of data processing and computing systems, and manipulation of data. Indeed, compromise of ICT systems effects the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of data that command and control decisions and daily operations depend on.

2022 Michigan Topicality
**T Supplement – FMPS 22** › **Cybersecurity** › Cybersecurity = Digital Defense Spending

Cooperation with NATO on cybersecurity requires digital defense spending

This is like not a good card at all

Maigre 22 [Merle Maigre is a Senior Fellow with CEPA's Transatlantic Leadership Program and CEPA's Digital Innovation Initiative, and the Senior Cyber Security Expert at Estonia's e-Governance Academy; “NATO’s Role in Global Cyber Security”; 4/06/22; ]

This should come with obvious financial and investment implications. Public debates on burden sharing within NATO for too long have focused on how much member states spend on defense in isolation, without adequate prioritizing where those funds are going. Member states should be rethink defense spending relative to emerging threats and collective security challenges. To ensure funding for cyber security is appropriately prioritized, NATO should strengthen a commitment to digital defense spending, building on the strong base it has developed in terms of doctrine, standards, and requirements.