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2022 Michigan Topicality
**T Supplement – FMPS 22** › **Cybersecurity** › Cybersecurity = Defense

Cybersecurity is the protecting networks from unproved use or the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of information

CISA 19 [The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency is a United States federal agency, an operational component under Department of Homeland Security oversight; “What is Cybersecurity?”; 11/14/19; ] //CH

Cybersecurity is the art of protecting networks, devices, and data from unauthorized access or criminal use and the practice of ensuring confidentiality, integrity, and availability of information. It seems that everything relies on computers and the internet now—communication (e.g., email, smartphones, tablets), entertainment (e.g., interactive video games, social media, apps ), transportation (e.g., navigation systems), shopping (e.g., online shopping, credit cards), medicine (e.g., medical equipment, medical records), and the list goes on. How much of your daily life relies on technology? How much of your personal information is stored either on your own computer, smartphone, tablet or on someone else's system?

2022 Michigan Topicality
**T Supplement – FMPS 22** › **Cybersecurity** › Cybersecurity = Defense

Cybersecurity is digital protection from internal and external threats

IBM ND [International Business Machines Corporation is an American multinational technology corporation with operations in over 171 countries; “What is cybersecurity?”; No date; ] //CH

Cybersecurity is the practice of protecting critical systems and sensitive information from digital attacks. Also known as information technology (IT) security, cybersecurity measures are designed to combat threats against networked systems and applications, whether those threats originate from inside or outside of an organization.

2022 Michigan Topicality
**T Supplement – FMPS 22** › **Cybersecurity** › Cybersecurity =/= Information Security

The confidentiality, integrity, and availability of data is information security – that’s distinct from cybersecurity which is data protection

Holmes 22 [Rachael Holmes is a Senior Content Marketing Specialist for BitSight; “Cybersecurity vs. Information Security: Is There A Difference?”; 1/6/22; ] //CH

Information security is another way of saying “data security.” If you are an information security specialist, your concern is for the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of your data (this is often referred to as the “CIA”). Most modern business data resides electronically on servers, desktops, laptops, or in the cloud—but before all confidential information migrated online, it was sitting in a filing cabinet. And some confidential information still is. Information security is concerned with making sure data in any form is kept secure.

Cybersecurity is all about protecting data that is found in electronic form (such as computers, servers, networks, mobile devices, etc.) from being compromised or attacked. Cybersecurity involves identifying what the critical data is, where it resides, its risk exposure, and the technology you have to implement in order to protect it.

2022 Michigan Topicality
**T Supplement – FMPS 22** › **Cybersecurity** › CIA Triad – Precision

CIA triad is key to define the scope of cybersecurity law

Jeff Kosseff, 2018, "Defining Cybersecurity Law," Iowa Law Review, https://ilr.law.uiowa.edu/print/volume-103-issue-3/defining-cybersecurity-law/, accessed 7-16-2022//cpd

In short, the U.S. legal system lacks a consistent definition of the term “cybersecurity law.” This Article aims to fill that gap by defining “cybersecurity law.” Although “cybersecurity” is a commonly used term in legal circles, no scholarship has stepped back to define exactly what “cybersecurity law” is and the goals of statutes and regulations that aim to promote “cybersecurity.” By defining the scope and goals of this new legal field, policymakers can then examine how lawmakers could improve existing laws. Part II of this Article briefly describes the cybersecurity challenges that the United States faces by examining the cyberattack on Sony Pictures Entertainment. Part III broadly examines current cybersecurity threats to the United States and defines “cybersecurity law” as a legal framework that “promotes the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of public and private information, systems, and networks, through the use of forward-looking regulations and incentives, with the goal of protecting individual rights and privacy, economic interests, and national security.” Part IV of this Article explains the current U.S. legal regime for cybersecurity and concludes that many of the most prominent cybersecurity laws only address a small portion of the broader legal framework. Part V examines the gaps in current U.S. cybersecurity law and suggests which areas of cybersecurity law policymakers could better address.

2022 Michigan Topicality
**T Supplement – FMPS 22** › **Security Cooperation** › 2AC C/I – MoU is part of SC

It’s legally binding – it meets specific standards

Munoz 18 [Eugenia Munoz is a Legal Content Writer and paralegal at LegalVision, with a particular interest in startups and intellectual property; “Is a Memorandum of Understanding Legally Binding?”; 8/17/18/https://legalvision.com.au/memorandum-of-understanding-legally-binding/] //CH

A memorandum of understanding (MOU), also referred to as a letter of intent, heads of agreement or term sheet, can be an extremely useful commercial tool. Parties use MOUs to quickly and inexpensively set out the commercial terms of a transaction. They do this ahead of entering into a formal contract to get the deal moving. However, is a MOU legally binding? In this article, we outline some indicators that your MOU is legally binding.

It’s legally binding if it meets these circumstances

2022 Michigan Topicality
**T Supplement – FMPS 22** › **Security Cooperation** › 2AC C/I – MoU is part of SC

Memorandum of Understandings can be part of security cooperation

ANI 22 [Asian News International is an Indian news agency that offers syndicated multimedia news feed to news-bureaus in India and elsewhere; “China sings MoU on security cooperation with Solomon Islands”; 3/29/22; ] //CH

Beijing [China], March 29 (ANI): China has signed the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the Solomon Islands on “security cooperation” which allow Beijing to send law enforcement forces to the Islands.

The MoU on security cooperation between China and Solomon Islands was signed on March 18. It will allow China to send police, Armed Police, military personnel and other law enforcement forces to the Solomon Islands, on request, to assist in maintaining social order and accomplish other tasks agreed upon by both countries, said the report.

2022 Michigan Topicality
**T Supplement – FMPS 22** › **Security Cooperation** › 1NC SC – Must be Binding vs MoUs

Security cooperation is legally binding

JCS 17 [The Joint Chiefs of Staff is the body of the most senior uniformed leaders within the United States Department of Defense, that advises the president of the United States, the secretary of defense, the Homeland Security Council and the National Security Council on military matters; “Security Cooperation”; 5/23/17; ] //CH

Throughout the execution of SC activities, CCDRs and their staffs continually direct, assess, monitor, evaluate, and adjust the SC activities when possible and the CSCSs/country plans as required, while the component commands do the same with their supporting plans. However, once resourced, execution of specific SC activities occurs as planned unless a crisis affecting US forces and/or the PN precludes completion of those SC activities. SC activities normally take place through bilateral agreements that constitute binding legal obligations for both the USG and PN. As a result, any deviation from the terms of a bilateral agreement likely requires the consent of both governments. Consequently, major changes are unlikely during the execution of a specific SC activity. However, in the absence of a governing bilateral agreement and with several FYs of SC activities at various stages of planning, programming, and budgeting during any given calendar year, this process can make changes for the future.

2022 Michigan Topicality
**T Supplement – FMPS 22** › **Security Cooperation** › 2NC – No Frameworks!

Security cooperation includes building partner capacity, education, and training. Establishing frameworks is not security cooperation itself but a method of PREPARING security cooperation, which is distinct!

Taliaferro 18 (Aaron C. Taliaferro, Project Leader - International Defense Consultant, “A Framework for Security Cooperation Planning”, The Institute for Defense Analyses, Aug 2018, ) // EL

"Building partner capacity has been a key component of U.S. defense strategy since the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review was issued. However, but for a few exceptions, the Military Departments of the U.S. Armed Forces that have responsibility to organize, train, equip, and provide forces to U.S. Combatant Commands have not prepared their people to be good or even adequate at planning for steady-state, peacetime security cooperation activities, which is the principal way the Department of Defense (DOD) builds partner capacity. Rather, the focus of military education and training primarily remains on contingency and warfare planning. While useful in those contexts, it is not useful for steady-state, peacetime security cooperation planning. Not only are people poorly prepared, the DOD lacks a framework for security cooperation planning. This paper’s intent is to propose a framework for security cooperation planning that helps the DOD and its Military Departments understand how to adaptively influence, plan, and resource security cooperation activities carried out in various foreign nations and with members of foreign security forces."

2022 Michigan Topicality
**T Supplement – FMPS 22** › **Security Cooperation** › 1NC – SC =/= Frameworks

Security cooperation involves training, equipping, and supporting foreign military forces. Frameworks are tools used to assess, monitor, and evaluate those security cooperation activities but ARE NOT security cooperation activities themselves

CRS 17 (Congressional Research Service, informing the legislative debate since 1914, “DOD Security Cooperation: Assessment, Monitoring, and Evaluation”, 6/23/17, ) // EL

As part of recent efforts to modify existing security cooperation authorities, the FY2017 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) (P.L. 114-328) enacted several new provisions that modify the budgeting, execution, administration, and evaluation of Department of Defense (DOD) security cooperation programs and activities. To date, the Department of Defense (DOD) has spent billions of dollars on efforts to train, equip, and otherwise support foreign military and security forces. In the 114th Congress, both the House and Senate Armed Services Committees examined various aspects of DOD security cooperation efforts. Yet, prior to this year, there has been no comprehensive, standardized framework to judge the effectiveness of security cooperation programs, as authorized by various security cooperation authorities (see CRS Report R44602, DOD Security Cooperation: An Overview of Authorities and Issues). In the conference report accompanying the FY2017 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), the conferees noted that although there has been an increase in security cooperation activities over the past 15 years, DOD “has not applied sufficient emphasis and resources to develop a comprehensive framework to assess, monitor, and evaluate its security cooperation programs and activities,” commonly referred to as AM&E.

2022 Michigan Topicality
**T Supplement – FMPS 22** › **Security Cooperation** › SC Includes Info-sharing

Security cooperation includes info sharing

Scott 17—Kevin D. Scott, vice admiral in the US Navy and Director of Joint Force Development, 5-23-17, Security Cooperation Joint Publican 3-20,

Security cooperation (SC) encompasses all Department of Defense (DOD) interactions, programs, and activities with foreign security forces (FSF) and their institutions to build relationships that help promote US interests; enable partner nations (PNs) to provide the US access to territory, infrastructure, information, and resources; and/or to build and apply their capacity and capabilities consistent with US defense objectives. It includes, but is not limited to, military engagements with foreign defense and security establishments (including those governmental organizations that primarily perform disaster or emergency response functions), DOD-administered security assistance (SA) programs, combined exercises, international armaments cooperation, and information sharing and collaboration.

2022 Michigan Topicality
**T Supplement – FMPS 22** › **Security Cooperation** › SC Includes Arms Sales

Security Cooperation includes FMS, DCS, hybrid sales, leases, and EDA

DSCA 10 [The Defense Security Cooperation Agency is a part of the United States Department of Defense; “SECURITY COOPERATION OVERVIEW”; 2010 (Uses US Code 2010 Edition); ] //CH

The U.S. conducts Security Cooperation business with over 200 countries and international organizations around the world. We typically refer to specific Security Cooperation activities, such as sales of defense articles and services, as “programs” and conduct them under two primary U.S. legislative authorities: The Arms Export Control Act (AECA) (22 U.S.C. 2751 et seq.), as amended, and the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (FAA), as amended (22 U.S.C 2151 et seq.). Under these authorities, there are several methods available to provide foreign partners with U.S. defense articles and services. The most commonly used method is Foreign Military Sales (FMS) - but other alternatives might also be available to meet your country’s requirements. For any given purchase your country may be considering, there are benefits, limitations, and trade-offs associated with each of these methods.

Foreign Military Sales (FMS)

2022 Michigan Topicality
**T Supplement – FMPS 22** › **Security Cooperation** › AT: Can’t Include Security Assistance

There is no legal distinction between “security cooperation” and “security assistance”

Nina M. Serafino 05-26-2-16, Specialist in International Security Affairs, “Security Assistance and Cooperation: Shared Responsibility of the Departments of State and Defense”, Congressional Research Service. accessed 7-16-22//cpd

The discussion of U.S. assistance to foreign military and other security forces is complicated by the lack of a standard and adequate terminology. “Military assistance,” “security assistance,” “security cooperation,” “security sector assistance,” “security force assistance,” and “defense articles and services” are all terms used in connection with the supply of weapons, equipment, supplies, and training to such forces and, in some cases, engagement with them. Some of these terms are defined by policy documents or in law (see Appendix A). Some authorities are labeled with two more informal terms—“build partner capacity” or “train and equip”—which are used in the discussion of specific authorities below.7

Terminology The two terms most commonly used today for assistance to foreign military and security forces are “security assistance” and “security cooperation.” Security assistance is the term most frequently used, regardless of the agency providing that assistance. There is no State Department definition for security assistance. The annual State Department congressional budget justification (CBJ), however, lists six budget accounts under the heading “International Security Assistance.” These accounts, with their underlying Title 22 authorities (the 1961 FAA and the AECA), are commonly regarded as the State Department’s security assistance portfolio.

2022 Michigan Topicality
**T Supplement – FMPS 22** › **Security Cooperation** › Must Be DoD

DoD is the only predictable limit to security cooperation, anything else proves limits explosion is inevitable

Sally Sleeper 2021, Select RAND Research on Security Cooperation: 2006-2019, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, CP-A614-3, 2021. As of July 16, 2022: https://www.rand.org/pubs/corporate_pubs/CPA614-3.html//cpd

Security cooperation is an important and expanding instrument of U.S. foreign policy that is employed widely to accomplish a diverse set of objectives. Security cooperation goals vary depending on current U.S. strategic and operational objectives and the partner nation that is being engaged. Goals can include building the capacity of partner security forces to improve the security environment, strengthening relationships with foreign militaries and governments, and securing access for U.S. military forces so they can more effectively operate abroad.

The type of security cooperation that DoD deploys depends on the objective at hand and capabilities of the partner nation. DoD tends to deploy building partner capacity programs and security force assistance to less developed partner nations in an effort to improve their tactical and operational capabilities, while defense institution building initiatives are used in similar contexts to strengthen ministries of defense at the strategic level. On the other hand, programs aimed at interoperability tend to be targeted at more-developed allies. DoD conducts about 3,000 to 4,000 security cooperation events each year in more than 130 countries, while total U.S. assistance to foreign militaries and police forces runs from $15 billion to $20 billion per year. Security cooperation activities touch tens of thousands of foreign security forces around the world every year. What do we know about security cooperation? Are the strategic and operational goals of the enterprise being met? Does security cooperation "work"? If so, under what conditions?

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Turkey DA › Turkey UQ

Turkey diplomatic with Russia now, but fissures are showing

Turkey is key mediator

Erlanger 7-20 (Steven Erlanger, graduated from the Taft School in Watertown, Conn., and received an A.B. degree, magna cum laude, Phi Beta Kappa, from Harvard College in 1974. He majored in political philosophy in the government department. He also studied Russian as a senior fellow at St. Antony’s College, Oxford. Steven Erlanger is the chief diplomatic correspondent in Europe for The New York Times, a position he assumed in 2017. He is based in Brussels. From 1975 to 1983, Mr. Erlanger was a teaching fellow at Harvard University, first in the College and then at the Harvard's Kennedy School of Government. He also was the assistant editor of the Nieman Reports, the journal of Harvard's Nieman Foundation for Journalism, in 1975. Mr. Erlanger shared the 2017 Pulitzer Prize for international reporting for a series about Russia, and was part of a team awarded the 2002 Pulitzer Prize for explanatory reporting, for his work on Al Qaeda. In 2016, Mr. Erlanger was made a chevalier of the Légion d’Honneur by the French government for his long career in journalism. He shared and received the American Society of News Editors’ Jesse Laventhol prize for deadline reporting on 2001 for his work in the former Yugoslavia. He received the German Marshall Fund’s Peter Weitz Prize in 2000 for excellence and originality in reporting and analyzing European and transatlantic affairs and the Robert Livingston Award for international reporting in 1981 for a series of articles about Eastern Europe. “Seeking ‘Axis of Good’ Against U.S., Russia Taps Allies of Convenience”, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/07/20/world/europe/russia-turkey-iran-axis.html)LR

BRUSSELS — Commenting on the visit of Vladimir V. Putin to Iran, a member of the Russian Parliament and television talking head, Yevgeny G. Popov, said that the two countries hoped to form an “axis of good,” mocking former President George W. Bush’s description of Iran, Iraq and North Korea as an “axis of evil.” Trolling American foreign-policy blunders and rhetoric is a popular sport in Russia, from Mr. Putin, the president, on down, but the growing affection between Russia and Iran is that of two isolated, sanctions-stricken countries whose main connection is their active opposition to the United States, its allies and its domination of the multilateral world order. While the United States likes to wrap its alliances in grandiloquent words about shared values and democracy, Russia, Iran and China, Moscow’s other openly supportive pal and American rival, are far more transactional in their connections. But transactional relations do not make for lasting alliances or disguise the strains within them. “Russia is isolated on the global stage in a way it’s never been,” said Charles A. Kupchan, a former American official who is a professor at Georgetown University. “Putin is looking for recognition and acceptance wherever he can get it, and that he can get it in Tehran speaks volumes.” Even China, which has stood by its anti-American partnership with Russia, “has carefully kept its distance from the war in Ukraine,” Mr. Kupchan said. “And even though the lion’s share of the world’s countries aren’t enforcing the sanctions regime against Russia, they get it: that Russia’s invasion was a bald act of aggression.” Turkey has no interest in being part of any new axis or alliance with Russia or Iran. Instead, Ankara has very artfully managed a foreign policy that is diversified and open to all sides and that gives it considerable leverage with both Moscow and Washington. “Turkey is skillfully walking a middle path, signaling to the Americans that it won’t just be a compliant ally and do what we want, but they’re signaling the same thing to the Russians,” Mr. Shapiro said. Mr. Heisbourg agreed. “The Turks continue to play both sides against the middle and they are in a very strong position to do so,” he said. “It’s a highly profitable game politically, economically and strategically — but that excludes any new alliance.” Turkey has created a vital role for itself as the mediator between Russia and Ukraine — effectively the mediator between Washington, NATO and Russia. It has worked with all sides, including the United Nations, to try to get Ukrainian (and Russian) grain exports out through the Black Sea to the developing world. Mr. Erdogan has bought Russian antiaircraft missiles and has not joined Western sanctions against Russia, which has irked Washington. But Turkey remains a key NATO ally of the United States, signed a tough anti-Russian communiqué at the NATO summit in Madrid, has sold Ukraine weapons and drones that are helping to kill Russians, and has removed its block on the entry of Finland and Sweden into NATO, at least for now. Turkey’s mediation may bring even more benefits, Mr. Kupchan said. Mr. Erdogan has credibility and channels to both Moscow and Washington, as well as to Kyiv, and “if he can broker a deal to get Ukrainian grain flowing again, that might be the first step to pivot to diplomacy, a confidence-building measure that would require concessions by both Russia and Ukraine, but could be done under the rubric of humanitarian aid,” Mr. Kupchan said. What Turkey clearly wanted from this trilateral summit, however, was narrower — a green light to conduct a new military incursion into northern Syria against the Syrian Kurds, who Mr. Erdogan says are allies with the P.K.K., or Kurdistan Workers’ Party, which he and the West consider terrorists. Attacking the Kurds is popular in Turkey, even among Mr. Erdogan’s opposition, and is part of his effort to win re-election next year, Mr. Heisbourg said. And Syria is the only issue where the policies of all three countries intersect, even though their interests are different. Iran and Russia have been the firmest allies of Mr. Assad. But Turkey has backed armed groups fighting for his removal; has sent its troops into northern Syria; and has kept Syrian, Iranian and Russian troops from conquering Idlib Province, still mostly controlled by anti-Assad rebels. “With so much leverage, now is a great time for Erdogan to beat up on the Kurds,” Mr. Heisbourg said. While Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran’s supreme leader, warned Turkey against further attacks in Syria, Mr. Erdogan was unfazed. And it’s likely that Russia does not much care, so long as the Turkish intervention is limited to the north. More likely, Mr. Heisbourg suggested, Mr. Erdogan used the meeting in Tehran to inform Russia and Iran of his plans and to try to avoid unnecessary confrontation.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Aff Answers › Defense Autonomy INB › 2AC --- No Impact – EU Soft Power

Soft power is impossible

Wunsch 19—(post-doctoral researcher in the European Politics Group at the Center for Comparative and International Studies). Natasha Wunsch. Sept 7 2019, "The European Union in Times of Crisis: Internal Challenges and a Changing Global Order", European Consortium for Political Research, )

Since 2009, the EU appears to be operating in a context of permanent crises. Internally, it is grappling with the crisis of the Eurozone and economic governance, the migration crisis, the negotiations surrounding Brexit, and a creeping but no less dangerous challenge to democracy as the core of the Union’s shared values. The manifestations of these crises have been so prolonged and recurring that they raise the question whether they represent systemic flaws that call into question the long-term prospects of European integration. This question has been posed with relation to European economic and eurozone governance, but is equally relevant when it comes to Eurosceptic trends among EU citizens and the rise of populist and nationalist governments that explicitly challenge core institutions and values of the Union. Brexit negotiations and the enduring difficulties in finding a workable form of future cooperation with the UK after the deadline for leaving the Union further illustrate how some of the core tenets of the EU’s order, including the free movement of people in the internal market, are coming under pressure. At the same time, the EU faces a multitude of external challenges. These range from the strained transatlantic relationship due to the increasingly isolationist stance of the United States, the rise of a stronger China, and an increasingly assertive Russia. The EU’s ability to bring positive change to its neighbourhood is challenged by the enduring instability and outright political crises in the countries of the Eastern Partnership and those that experienced the Arab Spring. These multiple crises challenge the EU’s emphasis on soft power as its privileged mode of engagement with third countries and risk fostering ever deeper Euroscepticism among the EU’s citizens.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Aff Answers › Defense Autonomy INB › 2AC --- No Impact – China War

No China war

Shifrinson 19—(assistant professor of international relations at Boston University). Joshua Shifrinson. 2/8/19. The ‘new Cold War’ with China is way overblown. Here’s why. February 8, 2019. )

Is a new Cold War looming — or already present — between the United States and China? Many analysts argue that a combination of geopolitics, ideology and competing visions of “global order” are driving the two countries toward emulating the Soviet-U.S. rivalry that dominated world politics from 1947 through 1990. But such concerns are overblown. Here are four big reasons why. 1. The historical backdrops of the two relationships are very different When the Cold War began, the U.S.-Soviet relationship was fragile and tenuous. Bilateral diplomatic relations were barely a decade old, U.S. intervention in the Russian Revolution was a recent memory, and the Soviet Union had called for the overthrow of capitalist governments into the 1940s. Despite their Grand Alliance against Nazi Germany, the two countries shared few meaningful diplomatic, economic or institutional links. In 2019, the situation between the United States and China is very different. Since the 1970s, diplomatic interactions, institutional ties and economic flows have all exploded. Although each side has criticized the other for domestic interference (such as U.S. demands for journalist access to Tibet and China’s espionage against U.S. corporations), these issues did not prevent cooperation on a host of other issues. Yes, there were tensions over the past decade, but these occurred against a generally cooperative backdrop. 2. Geography and powers’ nuclear postures suggest East Asia is more stable than Cold War-era Europe The Cold War was shaped by an intense arms race, nuclear posturing and crises, especially in continental Europe. Given Europe’s political geography, the United States feared a “bolt from the blue” attack would allow the Soviet Union to conquer the continent. Accordingly, the United States prepared to defend Europe with conventional forces, and to deter Soviet aggrandizement using nuclear weapons. Unsurprisingly, the Soviet Union also feared that the United States might attack and wanted to deter U.S. adventurism. Concerns that the other superpower might use force and that crises could quickly escalate colored Cold War politics. Today, the United States and China spend proportionally far less on their militaries than the United States and the Soviet Union did. Though an arms race may be emerging, U.S. and Chinese nuclear postures are not nearly as large or threatening: Arsenals remain far below the size and scope witnessed in the Cold War, and are kept at a lower state of alert. As for geography, East Asia is not primed for tensions akin to those in Cold War Europe. China can threaten to coerce its neighbors, but the water barriers separating China from most of Asia’s strategically important states make outright conquest significantly harder. Of course, as scholars such as Caitlin Talmadge and Avery Goldstein note, crises may still erupt, and each side may face pressures to escalate. Unlike the Cold War, however, U.S.-Chinese confrontations occur at sea with relatively limited forces and without clear territorial boundaries. This suggests there are countervailing factors that may give the two sides room to negotiate — and limit the speed with which a crisis unfolds. 3. The Cold War had just two major powers The Cold War took place in a bipolar system, with the United States and Soviet Union uniquely powerful, compared with other nations. This dynamic often pushed the United States and the U.S.S.R. toward confrontation and contributed to more or less fixed alliances; moreover, it encouraged efforts to suppress prospective great powers, such as Germany. In 2019, it’s not at all clear we are back to bipolarity. Analysts remain divided over whether the U.S. unipolar era is waning (or is already over) — and, if so, whether we are heading for a new period of bipolarity, modern-day multipolarity or something else. Regardless, most analysts accept that other countries will play a central role in East Asian security affairs. Russia, for example, still benefits from legacy military investments, India is developing economically and militarily, and Japan is beginning to build highly capable military forces to complement its still-significant economic might. Even if these nations aren’t as powerful as the United States or China, their presence makes for more fluid diplomatic arrangements and more diffuse security concerns than during the U.S.-Soviet competition. The resulting security dynamics are therefore likely to look very different. 4. Ideology plays less of a role in U.S.-Chinese relations Many people see the Cold War as an ideological contest between U.S.-backed liberalism and Soviet-backed communism. But that’s not the whole story. The early 20th century saw liberalism, communism and fascism vie for ideological preeminence. With fascism defeated alongside Nazi Germany, the postwar stage was set for a struggle between communism and liberalism to reinforce the U.S.-Soviet contest. That each ideology claimed universal scope ensured that the ideologies served as rallying cries for Third World conflicts, which were subsequently associated with the U.S.-Soviet struggle. The respective “ideologies” of the United States and China do not favor this type of contest today. Indeed, analysts calling for a hard-line stance against China have faced difficulties even identifying a coherent Chinese ideological alternative. And while some researchers claim that a nascent ideological contest pitting an “autocratic” China against the “liberal” United States is emerging, this narrative ignores the political contests that shape Chinese politics (and have parallels in U.S. politics). Autocracies and democracies often cooperate. And on one important ideological issue — how they organize their economic lives — China and the United States have both embraced economic growth via trade, the private sector and semi-free markets.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Aff Answers › Defense Autonomy INB › 2AC --- No Impact – NoKo War

No noko war

Campbell 17 (Charlie Campbell - Beijing Correspondent for TIME – “North Korea's Nuclear Weapons Are Not Reason Enough to Start a War” – 4/28/17 - http://time.com/4759066/north-korea-kim-jong-un-donald-trump-nuclear-weapons/)/TK

But even if North Korea were not to retaliate, there’s no guarantee strikes would achieve their goal of permanently retarding the regime’s nuclear program. Plus there would be dire strategic consequences. Beijing would be livid. The U.S. would have started yet another 21st Century war, utterly alienating international public opinion, tearing up its hard-fought Asian security alliance and inviting Chinese hardliners to push it out of the region. According to an August 2016 study by Brown University, the wars in Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan — in which the U.S. military has been involved — have directly cost 370,000 lives since 2001. (Not that we’ve stopped counting.) Read More: Can North Korea Actually Hit the U.S. With a Nuclear Missile? However, the broader point is that North Korea, for all its many and egregious faults, is a state hell-bent on survival. It might have nuclear weapons, but the regime cannot use them without guaranteeing its own destruction. That’s how nuclear deterrents work. North Korea is not ISIS with an “end of days” deathwish, wreaking jihad across the globe in its quest for a global caliphate.“Why are people panicking about North Korea?” asks Daniel Pinkston, an East Asia expert at South Korea's Troy University. “It’s secular, they want to survive and they are very cognizant of power balances. They are not suicidal.”

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Aff Answers › Defense Autonomy INB › 2AC --- No Impact – Latin Am War

No Latin America war

Cárdenas 11 (Mauricio, senior fellow and director of the Latin America Initiative at the Brookings Institution, was cabinet minister during the Gaviria and Pastrana administrations in Colombia. Think Again Latin America, Foreign Policy, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/03/17/think_again_latin_america?page=full)

"Latin America is violent and dangerous." Yes, but not unstable. Latin American countries have among the world's highest rates of crime, murder, and kidnapping. Pockets of abnormal levels of violence have emerged in countries such as Colombia -- and more recently, in Mexico, Central America, and some large cities such as Caracas. With 140,000 homicides in 2010, it is understandable how Latin America got this reputation. Each of the countries in Central America's "Northern Triangle" (Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador) had more murders in 2010 than the entire European Union combined. Violence in Latin America is strongly related to poverty and inequality. When combined with the insatiable international appetite for the illegal drugs produced in the region, it's a noxious brew. As strongly argued by a number of prominent regional leaders -- including Brazil's former president, Fernando H. Cardoso, and Colombia's former president, Cesar Gaviria -- a strategy based on demand reduction, rather than supply, is the only way to reduce crime in Latin America. Although some fear the Mexican drug violence could spill over into the southern United States, Latin America poses little to no threat to international peace or stability. The major global security concerns today are the proliferation of nuclear weapons and terrorism. No country in the region is in possession of nuclear weapons -- nor has expressed an interest in having them. Latin American countries, on the whole, do not have much history of engaging in cross-border wars. Despite the recent tensions on the Venezuela-Colombia border, it should be pointed out that Venezuela has never taken part in an international armed conflict. Ethnic and religious conflicts are very uncommon in Latin America. Although the region has not been immune to radical jihadist attacks -- the 1994 attack on a Jewish Community Center in Buenos Aires, for instance -- they have been rare. Terrorist attacks on the civilian population have been limited to a large extent to the FARC organization in Colombia, a tactic which contributed in large part to the organization's loss of popular support.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Aff Answers › Defense Autonomy INB › 2AC --- No Impact – Africa War

No African War

Burbach and Fettweis 14 – [David T. Burbach, Associate Professor of National Security Affairs at the Naval War College, B.A. in Government from Pomona College, and earned a Ph.D. in Political Science from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Christopher Fettweis, Associate Professor in International Relations at Tulane University, 2014, The Coming Stability? The Decline of Warfare in Africa and Implications for International Security, http://www.contemporarysecuritypolicy.org/assets/CSP-35-3%20Burbach%20and%20Fettweis.pdf] Jeong

Anarchy has not come to Africa – at least not in the expanding, all-encompassing way meant by the pessimists of a decade or two ago. The continent is far from uniformly peaceful, and current outbreaks of violence are reminders of the need for more progress. On the whole, however, Africa is less war-torn than at any time in the past, which runs contrary to widespread perceptions that exist even among foreign policy experts. Kaplan remains unchanged, claiming recently that his most important predictions have actually been borne out.95 However, the evidence suggests that despite neo-Malthusians fears, by most measures life on the continent is improving. War is becoming less of a threat to the life of the average African than emerging middleincome threats like traffic accidents or diabetes. Nor have realist fears of predatory wars and wholesale remaking of the map of Africa come to pass. That is not meant to dismiss the suffering of residents of the Central African Republic, South Sudan or northern Nigeria, nor to suggest that all is well. There are hundreds of millions of Africans who do not face as great a threat of armed conflict as they once did, however. It is important to see Africa as more than 50 distinct countries, some – and by historical standards, relatively few – of which are beset by warfare, even if they continue to face other, even greater challenges. Nothing guarantees that these trends will continue. Indeed, several require active maintenance. If the outside world stops responding to African hotspots, at least with diplomatic resources and avoiding support to plunder-financed armed groups, conflict becomes more likely. Intense American –Chinese competition could encourage internal conflict or spur vicious circles of tension between neighbours. The United Nations, former colonizers and AFRICOM have all been useful in helping to bring stability to the continent, but their long-term interest is hardly assured. A global recession or a wave of protectionism could dash optimism about economic growth. But for now, for the first time in quite some time, there is reason for optimism about the decline of warfare in Africa. What the United States and other outsiders should not do, however, is continue to look at Africa though a lens that overemphasizes conflict and a few crisis-afflicted nations. Additional American support for African peacekeeping capability is welcome, but an increase in American investment in African economies would do even more good for more people. Policymakers should emphasize to the business community how much is now going right in Africa. The Obama Administration has taken useful steps in that direction, but at other times shows signs of the ‘Africa-as-Anarchy’ mindset. Programmes to help African governments build capacity outside the military-security sphere could be expanded, such as police and judicial systems, or the infrastructure and service delivery needs of large cities in which a growing share of Africans live. Africa faces many problems. Peace does not necessarily bring freedom, justice, or prosperity. But today a far greater percentage of people on the continent live without serious risk of dying due to warfare than pessimists expected. On the contrary, ‘end of war’ optimists may prove to be right about Africa too, if on a slower time scale than most of the world. Perhaps a rising generation of leaders and citizens are being influenced by both global norms and expectations of greater opportunities. Africa is surely the hardest test of the global trend away from international conflict. If conflict can no longer find a home there, will it be welcome anywhere?

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Aff Answers › Defense Autonomy INB › 2AC --- AT: Europe leads

Europe can’t lead---the US is irreplaceable

Ana Palacio 11/20/20, former minister of foreign affairs of Spain and former senior vice president and general counsel of the World Bank Group and a visiting lecturer at Georgetown University, “ America, Heal Thyself,” Project Syndicate, https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/joe-biden-heal-divided-america-liberal-world-order-by-ana-palacio-2020-11

The stakes are high. If the pole around which the international order was built continues to weaken, the dangerous drift of recent years – exemplified by the absence of a coordinated global response to the COVID-19 pandemic – will continue. Even the diplomatic muscle memory that has enabled the limited recent examples of cooperation will fade.

Why shouldn’t someone else lead? Simply put, because no one else can. There is no single actor, or even a collection of actors, that is ready to take America’s place.