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2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Politics › 2NC – Floor time?

Test vote proves broad swaths of support for the bill, they want to get something done before recess – passage is likely, BUT rushing through other priorities prompts McConnell to block the bill – Absent passage, the US loses the tech race – Debates make us better advocates and train us to be better policymakers so we can go to congress and use our skills to pass the bill ourselves, this debate is KEY

Fromer 7/20 (Jacob Fromer, reported from Beijing and Washington, has a master’s degree from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, 7-20-2022, "Senate vote shows support for bill providing $52 billion to US semiconductor industry," South China Morning Post, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/3185873/senate-test-vote-shows-support-bill-providing-52-billion-us, DOA: 7-20-2022//Smarx Ahsan)

The US Senate appears likely to pass legislation that would deliver billions of dollars of federal funding to the American semiconductor industry, a top priority in the Biden administration’s continuing efforts to out-compete China, after a preliminary vote on Tuesday.

The Senate’s procedural vote passed 64 to 34, but the legislation will still require additional voting rounds before final passage in the chamber.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Politics › 1NC – UQ – PC Key

Competitiveness passes – Bidens spending PC to navigate progressive concerns

Dillon 7/25 (Jeremy Dillon, covers energy policy, a beat that includes Capitol Hill, the Department of Energy, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 7-25-2022, "Congress nears passage of innovation, research bill," E&E News, https://www.eenews.net/articles/congress-nears-passage-of-innovation-research-bill/, DOA: 7-25-2022//Smarx Ahsan)

After months of work, Congress is looking to pass an innovation and economic competitiveness package this week with large authorizations for the Department of Energy.

The legislation would inject more than $50 billion to spur a domestic semiconductor manufacturing renaissance while also retooling the nation’s innovation engines to better address emerging 21st-century technologies.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Politics › 1NC – UQ – General

Congress works to pass the CHIPS act – ensures the US wins the tech race

Seddiq 7/23 (Oma Seddiq, politics reporter for Insider, where she covers Congress, the White House and the Supreme Court, 7-22-2022, "A bipartisan bill years in the making to boost the US semiconductor industry and competition with China will soon hit the Senate floor for a final vote," Business Insider, https://www.businessinsider.com/chips-act-bill-to-boost-us-chipmaking-competition-with-china-2022-7, DOA: 7-23-2022//Smarx Ahsan)

As soon as next week, the Senate is expected to hold a vote on a bipartisan bill that would provide billions of dollars in federal funding to rebuild the US semiconductor industry. It's an effort years in the making designed to boost competition with China, home to one of the fastest-growing chip markets in the world.

The Senate on Tuesday held an important procedural vote that passed 64-34 to clear the way for the legislation to be considered for a final vote. The bill, known as the CHIPS Act, would provide around $52 billion in subsidies and tax breaks to American chip manufacturers to incentivize them to build new factories and bolster production in the country.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Politics › 1NC – UQ – General

Competitiveness passes – companies are helping policymakers AND details of the bill are being negotiated

Flatley & Wasson 7/20 (Daniel Flatley, National Security Reporter, Erik Wasson, Congressional Reporter, 7-20-2022, "Senate Moves Forward With $52 Billion in Semiconductor Funding," Bloomberg, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-07-20/senate-moves-forward-with-52-billion-in-semiconductor-funding, DOA: 7-20-2022//Smarx Ahsan)

The US Senate voted by a wide margin to begin debate on legislation to provide more than $52 billion in grants and incentives for the American semiconductor industry, a major milestone for the long-stalled package that proponents say is vital to national security.

The 64-34 procedural vote on Tuesday night met the criteria set by Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer to add research and development initiatives circulated by Republican Todd Young and Democrat Kyrsten Sinema to the legislation, which could be passed by the Senate next week.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Updates — NATO Bad › AT: Deterrence › 1NC — AT: Deterrence

Deterrence theory is wrong.

Walt ’22 — Stephen; columnist at Foreign Policy and the Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University. June 2, 2022; "Will Teaching Aggressors a Lesson Deter Future Wars?"; Foreign Policy; https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/06/02/will-teaching-aggressors-a-lesson-deter-future-wars/; //CYang

Arguments of this sort have been a staple of hard-line (and especially neoconservative) discourse for decades. Like the domino theory, which refuses to die no matter how often it is disproved, such claims transform the outcome of a single conflict into a struggle for the fate of the entire planet. The choice we are said to face is stark. Down one path: a revitalized liberal order led by a unified alliance of powerful, peace-loving democracies, and a future where war is rare and prosperity reigns. Down the other path: a world of rising autocracy, eroding human rights, and more war. According to this view, Ukraine must win big, or all is lost.

Framing the issue in this way stacks the deck in favor of always doing more and rejecting any sort of compromise, but is the choice as stark as hard-liners make out? Does defeating an aggressor really teach others to behave better? It would be a more benign world if this were the case, but a quick glance at the past century or so suggests otherwise.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Updates — NATO Bad › Deterrence › 1NC — Deterernce

Retrenchment is a false promise — causes global nuclear war.

Wright ’20 — Thomas; Director of the Center on the United States and Europe and a Senior Fellow in the Project on International Order and Strategy at the Brookings Institution. April 2020; “The Folly of Retrenchment”; Foreign Affairs; ; //CYang

The realists and the progressives arguing for retrenchment differ in their assumptions, logic, and intentions. The realists tend to be more pessimistic about the prospects for peace and frame their arguments in hardheaded terms, whereas the progressives downplay the consequences of American withdrawal and make a moral case against the current grand strategy. But they share a common claim: that the United States would be better off if it dramatically reduced its global military footprint and security commitments. 

This is a false promise, for a number of reasons. First, retrenchment would worsen regional security competition in Europe and Asia. The realists recognize that the U.S. military presence in Europe and Asia does dampen security competition, but they claim that it does so at  — and one that, at any rate, should be paid by U.S. allies in the regions themselves. Although pulling back would invite regional security competition, realist retrenchers admit, the United States could be safer in a more dangerous world because regional rivals would check one another. This is a perilous gambit, however, because regional conflicts often end up implicating U.S. interests. They might thus end up drawing the United States back in after it has left — resulting in a much more dangerous venture than heading off the conflict in the first place by staying. Realist retrenchment reveals a hubris that the United States can control consequences and prevent crises from erupting into war. 

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Updates — NATO Bad › AT: Assurance › 1NC — AT: Assurance — Offense

The nuclear umbrella is unsustainable and fails to prevent proliferation or solve deterrence.

Walt ’21 — Stephen; columnist at Foreign Policy and the Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University. March 23, 2021; "It’s Time to Fold America’s Nuclear Umbrella"; Foreign Policy; ; //CYang

Why is this statement so intriguing? Because it shows the authors of this report recognize that Europe as a whole might be more secure if it could rely on a locally based deterrent instead of continuing to shelter under the U.S. nuclear umbrella. And if that is true for the nations of Europe, then it might well be true for others. Although the report’s authors are opposed to new states joining the nuclear club (Britain and France are already members), their statement clearly implies that deterrence would be strengthened if states facing serious external threats had a nuclear guarantee that didn’t depend on Uncle Sam.

This is hardly a new issue. Since fairly early in the nuclear age, the United States has used nuclear weapons to “extend deterrence” and shield some of its allies. It sought to convince potential adversaries that the United States might use its formidable nuclear arsenal if these allies were attacked, even if the United States was not. Of course, there was always some chance that a war involving one of the United States’ allies might escalate to the nuclear level, either by accident, through inadvertence, or via deliberate decision, no matter what U.S. leaders said in advance. Even so, Washington went to considerable lengths to make its nuclear umbrella credible, partly to discourage enemies from attacking but also to convince its allies not to get nuclear weapons themselves.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Updates — NATO Bad › AT: Assurance › 1NC — AT: Assurance — Defense

Allies don’t believe in credibility theory.

Henry ’20 — Iain; Lecturer in the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at the Australian National University. April 13, 2020; “What Allies Want: Reconsidering Loyalty, Reliability, and Alliance Interdependence”; International Security, Volume 44, Issue 4; Accessed Online via University of Michigan Libraries; //CYang

Leaders believe that if their state abandons one ally during a crisis, then their state's other allies will expect similar disloyalty in the future. Thus, a single instance of disloyalty can damage, or even destroy, alliances with other states. Because of this belief in interdependence — that developments in one alliance will also affect other alliances — the desire to demonstrate loyalty has exercised a tremendous influence on U.S. policy. But is indiscriminate loyalty what allies want? The First Taiwan Strait Crisis (1954–55) case study suggests that allies do not desire U.S. loyalty in all situations. Instead, they want the [US] United States to be a reliable ally, posing no risk of abandonment or entrapment. In the First Taiwan Strait Crisis, several allies worried that U.S. loyalty to the Republic of China increased the risk of unwanted conflict, and as the crisis persisted, these allies sought to restrain the United States and thus reduce the likelihood of war. Although U.S. leaders were reluctant to coerce the Republic of China into backing down during this territorial dispute with the People's Republic of China, other U.S. allies actively encouraged such disloyalty. These findings have significance for theories of alliance politics and international reputation, as well as contemporary alliance management.

Introduction

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Updates — NATO Bad › Assurance › 2NC — Credibility Theory

Other studies are garbage.

Bleek & Lorber ’14 — Philipp C. Bleek, Nonproliferation and Terrorism Studies Professor at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies. Eric B. Lorber, Political Science PhD at Duke University, Adjunct Fellow at the Center for a New American Security. 2014; “Security Guarantees and Allied Nuclear Proliferation”; The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Special Issue: Nuclear Posture, Nonproliferation Policy, and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons; Accessed Online via University of Michigan Libraries; //CYang

The academic literature on guarantees also has shortcomings. Some argue guarantees do not stem allied proliferation because they are incredible (Goldstein 2000), but base the conclusion on analysis of a few cases in which allies chose to proliferate. A modest but growing quantitative literature addresses the question of why states do and do not proliferate, but reaches contradictory conclusions on security guarantees (see Table 1). And none of these studies focused narrowly on guarantees — they were either "garbage can" approaches that sought to test a host of potentially relevant variables or focused on other independent variables — and therefore did not subject their security guarantee findings to robustness checks.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Updates — NATO Bad › Assurance › 1NC — Assurance

Prolif causes nuclear war.

Kroenig ’15 — Matthew; Associate Professor and International Relations Field Chair in the Department of Government at Georgetown University and a Nonresident Senior Fellow in the Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security at The Atlantic Council. He is an expert on US national security policy and strategy, international relations theory, nuclear deterrence, arms control, nuclear nonproliferation, Iran, and counterterrorism. 2015; “The History of Proliferation Optimism: Does It Have a Future?”; Journal of Strategic Studies, Volume 38, Issue 1-2; Accessed Online via University of Michigan Libraries; //CYang

The spread of nuclear weapons poses at least six severe threats to international peace and security including: nuclear war, nuclear terrorism, global and regional instability, constrained US freedom of action, weakened alliances, and further nuclear proliferation. Each of these threats has received extensive treatment elsewhere and this review is not intended to replicate or even necessarily to improve upon these previous efforts. Rather the goals of this section are more modest: to usefully bring together and recap the many reasons why we should be pessimistic about the likely consequences of nuclear proliferation. Many of these threats will be illuminated with a discussion of a case of much contemporary concern: Iran’s advanced nuclear program.

Nuclear War

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Updates — NATO Bad › Assurance › 1NC — Assurance

Credibility of NATO is key to assurance and deterrence globally — alliance commitments spill over.

Beauchamp ’18 — Zach; senior reporter at Vox, where he covers global politics and ideology, and a host of Worldly, Vox's podcast on covering foreign policy and international relations. June 12, 2018; “How Trump is killing America’s alliances”; Vox; ; //CYang

Thankfully, those predictions turned out to be wrong. There are multiple reasons for that, but one big one — one that also helped keep relations between other historical enemies, like South Korea and Japan, peaceful — is a shared participation in US alliance networks. The US serves as the ultimate security blanket, preventing these countries from having to build up their own armaments and thus risk a replay of World War I. But if American alliance commitments become and remain less credible, it’s possible this order could crack up. America’s partners aren’t stupid. They understand that Trump is the product of deep forces in American politics, and that his victory might not be a one-off. If they think that this won’t be the last “America First” president in modern history, depending on America the way that they have in the past could quickly become a nightmare. The worst-case scenarios for a collapse in the US alliance system are terrible. Imagine full Japanese and German rearmament, alongside rapid-fire proliferation of nuclear weapons. Imagine a crack-up of NATO, with European powers at loggerheads while Russia gobbles up the Baltic states and the rest of Ukraine. Imagine South Korea’s historical tensions with Japan reigniting, and a war between those two countries or any combination of them and China. All of this seems impossible to imagine now, almost absurd. And indeed, in the short run, it is. There is no risk — zero — of American allies turning on each other in the foreseeable future. And it’s possible that the next president after Trump could reassure American allies that nothing like this could ever happen again. But the truth is that there’s just no way to know. When a fundamental force for world peace starts to weaken, no one can really be sure how well the system will hold up.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
CP – Cease NATO – BFHR 7wk › Competition › AT: Global Times Indict

This is Western conflation.

Fish ’17 — Eric; journalist and author of the book China's Millennials. April 28, 2017; “China’s Angriest Newspaper Doesn’t Speak for China”; Foreign Policy;

[TITLE]: “China’s Angriest Newspaper Doesn’t Speak for China”

But that nickname is revealing in more ways than one. By its own admission, the paper’s actual relationship with China’s levers of power is tangential at best. And while the Global Times and the Chinese government have interests that overlap, they aren’t nearly identical. Several current and former editors at the paper say business incentives drive it to be intentionally provocative whenever possible. Provocations that involve straying from the official line of the Chinese government are welcome, so long as they don’t entirely sever the illusion of a tight connection between it and the newspaper.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
CP – Cease NATO – BFHR 7wk › Competition › 2NC — Exemptions Bad — Cyber

Security cooperation with NATO over cyber uniquely provokes Russia.

Zhiping ’22 — Qi; observer on international affairs. April 22, 2022; "US sets dangerous precedents in cyberspace"; Global Times; https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202204/1260039.shtml; //CYang

In the context of a hot war, situations won’t exactly follow the US script that whether engagement in cyberspace would be considered armed engagement or whether it would provoke another nuclear weapon state to escalate the conflict. Against the backdrop of Russia’s announcement to raise its nuclear preparedness and unspecified cyberattacks on Russian nuclear facilities, US direct engagement in cyber conflict with Russia will easily lead to a strategic miscalculation. The Russian Foreign Ministry condemned the US and NATO in a statement for waging a cyber war against Russia involving a broader scale of hackers. This is a stern warning against the US’ “dangerous game” in cyberspace which would possibly trigger a conflict between nuclear-weapon states.

The second precedent the US sets is a proxy war in cyberspace. The US uses China and Russia as imaginary enemies to promote its cyber strategy of “hunt-forward” and “persistent engagement.” The US is deeply involved in building the cyber power of Ukraine, using it as a bridgehead for close reconnaissance, network penetration and cyber attacks against Russia, preparing for its cyber confrontation with Russia. Apart from Ukraine, the US is also doing the same in the Asia-Pacific region, hyping China’s cybersecurity threats to China’s neighbors and thus luring them into “cybersecurity cooperation” in an attempt to bring the US cyber tentacles to China’s doorstep. This is similar to US intention of deploying its missile and anti-missile systems in the vicinity of China and Russia, which not only enhances the US deterrence and offensive capabilities, but also takes the opportunity to force China and Russia’s neighboring countries to the US’ chariot.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
CP – Cease NATO – BFHR 7wk › Competition › 2NC — Exemptions Bad — AI

Specifically, US-NATO military cooperation over AI sends an escalatory message to Russia.

Nadibaidze ’21— Anna; PhD Fellow at the Center for War Studies and the Department of Political Science and Public Management, University of Southern Denmark. Her doctoral research is supported by the AutoNorms project, funded by the European Research Council (ERC). “RUSSIAN PERCEPTIONS OF MILITARY AI, AUTOMATION, AND AUTONOMY”; Foreign Policy Research Institute, Eurasia Program; ; //CYang

International factors play a key role in the Russian reasoning. The whole security apparatus closely monitors developments in other countries, including but not limited to the U.S., China, Israel, and South Korea. In the current atmosphere of distrust between Russia and the U.S./NATO, the feeling of competition22 and a global AI or tech race may appear inescapable.23 Thus, demonstrating capabilities in AI, autonomy, and automation becomes important for sending the message that Russia is entering, or already part of, the global competition. As Vadim Kozyulin from the PIR Center think tank notes, for Russia, “combat robots have become one of the symbols of the renaissance of armed forces, a promising export product and a signal to the world of the country’s readiness to challenge the technological leadership of the United States.”24

At the same time, Russia’s pursuit of weaponized AI should not only be associated with strategic motivations. Ideology and beliefs about Russia’s state identity and its role in the world are important features of the discourse relating to AI. As Putin has said, he is convinced that Russia “must, and can, become one of the global leaders in the sphere of AI. This is a question of our future, the place of Russia in the world.”25

2022 Michigan Counterplan
CP – Cease NATO – BFHR 7wk › Competition › 2NC — Exemptions Bad

Shifrinson ‘21

(Joshua, PhD in political science/international relations from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Non-Resident Fellow at the Quincy Institute and Assistant Professor with the Pardee School of Global Studies at Boston University and a term member of the Council on Foreign Relations. Shifrinson’s research focuses on U.S. foreign policy and grand strategy, European and Asian security, alliance politics, and diplomatic history, “The Dominance Dilemma: The American Approach to NATO and its Future,” pg online @  //um-ef)

Although Trump has now left office, NATO is nonetheless in for difficult times, as strategic circumstances change and China’s rise draws American attention toward East Asia. Though some European NATO members now express interest in helping to counter Beijing, and the alliance itself is working to stake out a position on China’s rise, as the NATO Reflection Group Report underscored in November 2020, the United States will inevitably be more invested in Asian developments than will other NATO members.16 The net result presents two possible avenues for deeper, substantive divides in the alliance. First, if competition with Beijing escalates, the United States may be impelled to devote fewer resources and attention to European affairs. This would invert the Cold War experience, creating the potential for the alliance to wither away as American attention moves elsewhere and NATO’s European members seek alternatives for their security. Alliances, after all, usually change as new threats appear; as American priorities change, NATO cohesion may decline as well. Then, too, European actors might also be expected to complain about prospective American “abandonment.” Mounting Chinese–American competition may also encourage NATO’s European members to distance themselves, perhaps dramatically, from the United States. During the contest with the Soviet Union, European allies regularly feared that Soviet–American tensions might entangle them in a conflict with Moscow at times and places beyond their control. A U.S.–China contest would carry even greater risks. With less at stake in Asia, NATO’s European members can be expected to separate themselves from U.S. policy. If the United States were to respond by pressuring its European allies to assist against Beijing, an alliance rupture would become possible. President Biden’s path forward Recognizing these limits, what are the options for the United States under the Biden administration? Any policy must start from a recognition that America’s postwar mission in Europe has reached a natural end-state born of overwhelming success. Great powers no longer pose threats to dominate the region’s security or deny the independence of most countries therein. China, of course, is making economic and political inroads in the area, but is also encountering increasing opposition as it overplays its hand and, in any case, does not threaten the survival or sovereignty of European states. Russia, on the other hand, has notable military capabilities that can threaten neighbors along its immediate perimeter, but it lacks the wherewithal to imperil countries much beyond that. Moreover, its force structure seems designed to raise the costs for any U.S.–led NATO operation near Russia’s own borders, just as Europe’s member states have the economic and military capacity to oppose any Russian designs. As a result, a stable European balance of power can exist. This is a sea-change from the postwar, or even post–Cold War periods. NATO’s original purpose has been vindicated; the victory is won. Any policy must start from a recognition that America’s postwar mission in Europe has reached a natural end-state born of overwhelming success. In addition, the United States faces diminishing returns, and several negative results, from continuing its present approach to NATO. The alliance has now been enlarged to the point where few strategically meaningful European actors exist outside of NATO’s orbit, even as those that exist, such as Ukraine, would constitute a net loss for U.S. national security by risking a direct conflict with Moscow. In short, little can be gained from continued expansion. Likewise, as European leaders continue pressing for greater autonomy from the United States and NATO, the U.S. will generate increased friction with its allies if it continues to suppress their initiatives in this direction. This tension, meanwhile, comes at a time when Europe itself is of diminishing relative importance to an American grand strategy increasingly fixed on Asia, as most of the actors involved recognize. As the U.S.–led alliance continues moving toward Russia’s borders, it may play some role in driving Moscow and Beijing to cooperate in international affairs. In short, U.S. policy in Asia complicates U.S. strategy in Europe, and vice-versa. The United States requires a course correction. U.S. policy toward NATO now injects a large degree of instability and unsustainability into the region, which ironically possesses the preconditions for an unprecedented degree of stability thanks in part to prior U.S. efforts. In consequence, the Biden administration should consider proceeding along four tracks, with the goal of significantly reducing the U.S. security presence via NATO. Ending enlargement In coordination with its partners, the United States should credibly renounce further NATO enlargement. Whatever one makes of the merits of America’s post–1945 presence in Europe, the gains from further enlargement are few and the risks substantial. Several pathways exist to develop a policy of ceasing enlargement. Most directly, the U.S. government could simply declare it will not support the alliance’s further growth; thanks to NATO’s “one state, one vote” procedures, this would be enough to scuttle a further expansion push. Less unilaterally, U.S. planners could attempt to craft an intra–NATO consensus that expansion is no longer worth the costs. Given that many alliance members have long been skeptical of the merits of expansion — German policymakers, for example, were famously ambivalent over the Bucharest Declaration of 2008, which embraced Ukraine’s and Georgia’s interest in NATO membership — forging a broad front on this agenda ought not be difficult. Along the way, U.S. and allied diplomats should also seek to dampen the membership aspirations of those states still outside the alliance. Cutting troop commitments Second, the U.S. government should forgo permanently stationing combat forces in the Eastern European states admitted to NATO since the Cold War. Amid mounting calls to bolster the alliance’s presence along the so-called “eastern flank” due to collapsing relations with Moscow, the U.S. government should encourage European NATO members to bear primary responsibility for defense obligations east of the Oder–Neisse line. Not only have NATO’s European members taken an active role in the alliance’s ongoing “Enhanced Forward Presence” in Poland and the Baltic States; there is more than enough latent military capability in the European portion of the alliance to see this task through.17 For example, the former members of the Warsaw Pact (excluding Albania and the Baltic States) that have joined NATO since 1995 have nearly the same gross domestic product ($1.55 trillion, measured in 2010 dollars) as Russia ($1.76 trillion). Their population, 92 million people versus Russia’s 144 million, is also significant. Add in the other European members of NATO, and the numbers shift decisively against Russia. Although non–U.S. military investments in NATO remain underwhelming, even limited growth in non–U.S. NATO defense capabilities could thus provide a significant force able to take the lead in Eastern Europe. The United States should promote this result, with the goal of shifting the defense burden in Europe to the highly capable states in the area to reduce U.S. defense obligations. Rebalancing trans–Atlantic politics The United States ought to prepare for a broader recalibration of political responsibilities in Europe. Precisely because the United States has other domestic and international obligations, and because NATO’s European members are increasingly disenchanted with U.S. predominance, conditions are ripe to empower the European allies. The objective should be to strengthen intra–European solidarity and cooperation while the United States steps back from active management of European security. The United States should pivot toward becoming the pacifier of last resort rather than the manager of early squabbles. 

2022 Michigan Counterplan
CP – Cease NATO – BFHR 7wk › Competition › 2NC — Exemptions Bad

The CP maintains its potential---outweighs intentions

Mitch Potterstaff 08. Reporter at The Star. "Putin questions existence of NATO". thestar. https://www.thestar.com/news/2008/04/05/putin_questions_existence_of_nato.html

BUCHAREST–Describing his two terms in power as "the resurrection of Russia," Vladimir Putin yesterday delivered a bracing broadside to the NATO summit, warning that while there is no danger of another Cold War, there is also no possibility of global security without full Russian engagement.

Addressing reporters in the wake of candid closed-door meetings with NATO heads of state, the Russian president prefaced his criticisms with an assurance that it is in nobody's interest to plunge back into the "murky waters of Cold Wars."

2022 Michigan Counterplan
CP – Cease NATO – BFHR 7wk › Competition › 2NC — Exemptions Bad

Existence of NATO is a threat---“security guarantee” is code for denying SOI

per Concordiam 19. Professional journal published quarterly by the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies. "Review: Hybrid War in the Lands in Between". per Concordiam. 12-10-2019. https://perconcordiam.com/hybrid-war-in-the-lands-in-between/

Although the Soviet Union is dead, Orenstein explains that for a Russian government determined to win back the former Soviet empire, the very existence of NATO and its security guarantees to member states constitute a threat. An enlarged NATO alliance threatens Russia’s attempts to [re]establish itself as a great power with a legitimate sphere of influence — whether or not the lands in between acknowledge or accept that influence.

Or, to put it in more plain terms, “where the West sees democracy promotion as a strategy for promoting peace in Europe, Putin sees it as an act of war against Russia and his regime in particular. … Russia regards the battle for influence in the lands in between as a zero-sum game, to be won or lost.” This conflict of visions has led to a conflict in reality as Russia conducts hybrid war and operates in a gray area, daring Western nations to stop it.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
CP – Cease NATO – BFHR 7wk › Competition › 2NC — Exemptions Bad

Seen as camouflage---only treaty exit solves

CNN 14. "Why Russia will never trust NATO". Graphic Online. https://www.graphic.com.gh/international/international-news/why-russia-will-never-trust-nato.html

According to the official Russian version of the call, his American counterpart assured him the alliance did not have "provocative or expansionist" intentions -- and that Russia should know this.

But it hardly seems to matter how often NATO makes these assurances. The Kremlin will never trust them. Fear of the Western military alliance's steady march east is deep-rooted. It strikes at the very heart of Russia's national sense of security, a relic of Cold War enmity which has seeped down to post-Soviet generations.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
CP – Cease NATO – BFHR 7wk › Competition › 2NC — Exemptions Bad

Russia hates the institution of NATO---withdrawal is key

Evan Kerrane 9/23/20. PhD candidate, Swansea University, UK; Major, U.S. Army. "Russian Insecurities: How Fear Drives Perception in the Near Abroad". Sciendo. 9-23-2020. https://content.sciendo.com/view/journals/jobs/ahead-of-print/article-10.2478-jobs-2020-0004/article-10.2478-jobs-2020-0004.xml?language=en

Moscow has remained sceptical of the security alliance, once aimed at defending Western Europe from the Soviet Union remaining in existence following its collapse. Richard Sakwa (2016) argued that NATO’s very being is ‘justified by the need to manage the security threats provoked by its enlargement’ (4). While this commentary ignores why the former Warsaw Pact and Baltic states would perceive Moscow as a threat, it still serves to represent the alternative viewpoint, not of a benevolent NATO seeking peace and justice, but of a menacing military alliance taking over strategic territory through membership.

Furthermore, NATO is viewed as a lingering tool of U.S. dominance in Europe. For many realists, the survival of NATO following the Cold War says more about American power and influence over Europe than multilateral institutions (Waltz 2000, 20). Waltz argued, ‘that international institutions serve primarily national rather than international interests’ (21). In other words, NATO survived because it was in the national interest of the United States and its expansion continues to be a policy pursued for American interests. Moscow, therefore, perceives NATO as an imperial weapon of an expansionist, unchecked U.S. power.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
CP – Cease NATO – BFHR 7wk › Competition › 2NC — Exemptions Bad

Aff evidence that says “it’s fine” is American stubbornness. Ukraine is a brink, not a thumper.

Carpenter ’22 — senior fellow for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute. Carpenter served as Cato’s director of foreign policy studies from 1986 to 1995 and as vice president for defense and foreign policy studies from 1995 to 2011. May 3, 2022; "This Time, NATO Better Take Putin's Ukraine Warnings Seriously"; Cato Institute; https://www.cato.org/commentary/time-nato-better-take-putins-ukraine-warnings-seriously; //CYang

Worse, Western officials typically insisted that Russia would have nothing to say about the matter. Jens Stoltenberg, NATO’s Secretary General, was especially blunt and arrogant on that score. He summarily rejected Moscow’s demands in late 2021 that NATO provide binding security guarantees to Russia, including a commitment that Ukraine would never be offered membership, and that NATO military forces would not be deployed in that country. Stoltenberg’s response could not have been more uncompromising. “NATO has an open‐​door policy. This is enshrined in NATO’s founding treaty … The message today to Russia is that it is for Ukraine as a sovereign nation to decide its own path. And for the 30 NATO allies to decide when Ukraine is ready to become a member.”

Western officials implicitly assumed that Russia could be intimidated and eventually compelled to accept Ukraine as part of NATO. They dismissed the Kremlin’s increasingly pointed warnings that efforts to make Kyiv an Alliance asset would cross a red line that violated Russia’s security. Their assumption that Moscow would tamely accept a NATO presence inside Russia’s core security zone proved to be spectacularly wrong, and Ukraine is now paying a very high price in treasure and blood for their miscalculation.