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Michigan
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CP – Cease NATO – BFHR 7wk › Competition › 2NC — Exemptions Bad
Pezard & Rhoades ’20 — Stephanie Pezard is a senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation. Her research focuses on Arctic security; strategic competition; European security and transatlantic relations; measures short of war; security cooperation and security force assistance; deterrence and use of force; and French defense and security policy. Pezard received her Ph.D. in international relations (political science) from the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva, and her M.A. in contemporary history from the French School of Political Science (Sciences-Po) in Paris. Ashley Rhoades is a defense policy researcher at the RAND Corporation. At RAND, her work focuses on strategic competition, security cooperation, deterrence, terrorism and counterterrorism (with an emphasis on al Qaeda and the Islamic State), and European and Middle Eastern security issues. Ashley received her M.A. in security studies from the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. She holds a B.A. with honors in political science and a minor in art history from Stanford University. 2020; “What Provokes Putin’s Russia?”; RAND Corporation; ; //CYang
Although the United States and its allies can make every effort to send clear signals and communicate effectively with Russian leadership, there is always a risk that Russia will misinterpret U.S. and NATO actions. A variety of factors beyond the control of the deterring party — including cultural differences, cognitive biases, irrational behavior, and flawed assumptions — can cause the target state to mis-read or misjudge the actions of its adversary.99 Domestic concerns or political constraints can also color how a state perceives and reacts to the actions of its adversary. One potent example of misperception occurred in 1983, when the Russians mistook a NATO nuclear warfare exercise called “Able Archer” as a cover for an actual nuclear strike, and nearly retaliated in kind.100 Only belatedly did then-President Ronald Reagan come to the realization that
[m]any people at the top of the Soviet hierarchy were genuinely afraid of America and Americans many of us in the administration took it for granted that the Russians, like ourselves, considered it unthink-able that the United States would launch a first strike against them. But I began to realize that many Soviet officials feared us not only as adversaries but as potential aggressors who might hurl nuclear weapons at them in a first strike. . . .101
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
CP – Cease NATO – BFHR 7wk › Competition › 2NC — AT: Intrinsic Perm — Exemptions Bad
Shifrinson ’17 — Joshua; Assistant Professor of International Relations at Boston University. He earned a B.A. from Brandeis University and a Ph.D. from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. The recipient of fellowships from the Dickey Center, the Institute for Security and Conflict Studies, and the Belfer Center, Shifrinson was an Assistant Professor Government at Texas A&M University. April 26, 2017; “Time to Consolidate NATO?”; The Washington Quarterly, Volume 40, Issue 1; Accessed Online via University of Michigan Libraries; //CYang
Yet, while offering a backdoor to U.S. strategic adjustment, this second approach carries with it the aforementioned problem of allied spoilers. Facing an eroding American commitment, NATO allies on the front lines with Russia would face stark and growing incentives to force a crisis in a bid to ratchet up tensions and reverse the American withdrawal.38 This effort may not work, but the danger would exist as long as NATO's transformation was ongoing. Furthermore, it is worth recalling that it was precisely the idea that NATO after the Cold War would be a transformed alliance more political than military in nature that helped U.S. policymakers justify NATO's eastward expansion, and so helped bring about the present crisis in transatlantic credibility.39 It is therefore questionable whether policymakers, having recently decided to again treat NATO as a military vehicle, can reverse course a third time and treat NATO as a political organization at a moment when relations with Russia seemingly necessitate a military response.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
CP – Cease NATO – BFHR 7wk › Competition › 2NC — AT: Intrinsic Perm — Exemptions Bad
Binnendjik et al. ’6-24 — Dr. Hans Binnendijk is a distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. He is also an adjunct political scientist at the RAND Corporation. He received his B.A. in history from the University of Pennsylvania and his MALD and his PhD in international relations from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University. Daniel S. Hamilton is a nonresident senior fellow at the Brookings Institution’s Center on the United States and Europe, president of the Transatlantic Leadership Network, and co-leads “The United States, Europe, and World Order” postdoctoral program at Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies. Alexander Vershbow is Distinguished Fellow at The Atlantic Council, Former NATO Deputy Secretary General, Assistant Secretary of Defense and US Ambassador to NATO, Russia and South Korea. June 24, 2022; "Strategic responsibility: Rebalancing European and trans-Atlantic defense"; Brookings; https://www.brookings.edu/articles/strategic-responsibility-rebalancing-european-and-trans-atlantic-defense/; //CYang
U.S. support for greater European defense efforts has always been conditional. Successive U.S. administrations have supported European moves to bolster their defense capabilities, provided that such efforts would strengthen, rather than weaken, the political cohesion of the Atlantic alliance. Those conditions were framed most prominently in 1998 by former U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright. Following a U.K.-France meeting at St. Malo, at which London and Paris declared that the EU “must have the capacity for autonomous action,” Secretary Albright penned a piece in the Financial Times stating that U.S. support for greater European efforts would be contingent on avoiding “three D’s:” discrimination against non-EU NATO members, decoupling of European and North American security, and duplication of NATO’s operational planning system or its command structure. “No duplication” was neither defined nor intended to mean that Europe should not develop certain capabilities that already existed in the alliance; indeed, much of the Clinton administration’s efforts at the time, such as the NATO Defense Capability Initiative, sought to prod the Europeans into developing precisely such capabilities. This distinction has been lost on analysts who have posited that the United States has opposed any European moves to improve their capacity to act.[3]
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
CP – Cease NATO – BFHR 7wk › Competition › 2NC — AT: Intrinsic Perm — Exemptions Bad
Barndollar ’19 — Gil; Senior Research Fellow at CSS and a Senior Fellow at Defense Priorities. From 2018 to 2019 he was Director of Middle East Studies at the Center for the National Interest. He holds an AB in history from Bowdoin College and MPhil and PhD degrees in history from the University of Cambridge. At CSS he is working on a book examining America’s All Volunteer Force, conscription, and future national security threats. April 8, 2019; “NATO Is 70 and Past Retirement Age”; National Interest; ; //CYang
The United States, meanwhile, is committing itself to fight — four thousand miles from home — for allies who won’t fight for each other. This state of affairs, which has become increasingly clear to both friendly and hostile onlookers, does not create security or stability. Instead, this hollow alliance invites brinksmanship, escalation, and miscalculation that could lead to nuclear war. Will Americans fight and die to defend Europe, when Europeans won’t? We may find out.
European collective defense should be built on a bedrock of shared sacrifice and credible deterrence. As long as the United States remains committed to defending Europe, Europe will lack the will and the means to defend itself. Nearly three decades of post–Cold War defense welfare has made Europe militarily weak and strategically unserious. American pressure for Europe to share more of the defense burden, going back to the Kennedy administration, has had little effect. Americans are increasingly fed up with this unsustainable state of affairs. Only the shock of a U.S. withdrawal from NATO can spur the European nations to commit themselves to their own collective defense.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
CP – Cease NATO – BFHR 7wk › Competition › 2NC — AT: Intrinsic Perm — Exemptions Bad
Fix & Gingerich ’19 — Liana Fix is program director for international affairs at Körber-Stiftung’s Berlin office with a special focus on Russia and Eastern Europe. Previously, she was a doctoral fellow at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs. She holds a master’s degree in theory and history of international relations from the London School of Economics and Political Science and concluded a Ph.D. on Germany’s role in European Russia policy. Dr. Bastian Giegerich is the director of defense and military analysis at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) and leads the team that produces the annual flagship publication The Military Balance. November 29, 2019; "European Security in Crisis: What to Expect if the United States Withdraws from NATO"; War on the Rocks; https://warontherocks.com/2019/11/european-security-in-crisis-what-to-expect-if-the-united-states-withdraws-from-nato/; //CYang
At the beginning of the policy game, most European teams adopted a “wait-and-see” approach focused on persuading the United States to return to NATO, offering concessions that were unthinkable before (from trade to energy). The unfortunate message for transatlantic relations seems to be that a threat to abandon NATO might actually yield some results. Europeans started to take proactive steps only once the security situation in the scenario deteriorated significantly, and when it became clear that the U.S. withdrawal decision — at least in this simulation — was irreversible. Faced with a crisis in a NATO member state in the western Balkans (in the scenario, a pro-Russian coup d’état with Russian warships blocking access to the Mediterranean Sea), most teams anticipated that remaining NATO members would struggle to agree to invoke the principle of collective defense under Article 5 in this grey-zone scenario. Instead, the invocation of Article 4 — which involves only consultations in case the security or independence of a NATO member state is threatened — paired with sanctions on Russia and a robust response within ad-hoc coalitions were the preferred means of action. Without U.S. security guarantees, it seems, the credibility of Article 5 and the mutual defense commitment are questionable.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
CP – Cease NATO – BFHR 7wk › Competition › 2NC — AT: Perm — Bilaterally Cooperate
Tsuruoka ’10 — Michito; Senior Research Fellow, Regional Studies Department, National Institute for Defense Studies. October 2010; “Japan-Europe Security Cooperation: How to “Use” NATO and the EU”; Boei Kenkyusho Kiyo, Volume 13, Issue 1; ; //CYang
Second, this article focuses on cooperation with NATO and the EU; however, that by no means implies that security cooperation with individual countries such as the UK, France, and Germany is insignificant. For a long time, the majority of dialogue and cooperation between Japan and Europe in the areas of foreign policy, security, and defense have been conducted under bilateral frameworks with major European countries. As a result, the accumulation of knowledge and experience in Japan with regard to cooperation with NATO and the EU remain shallow compared to bilateral relations with individual countries. Against this backdrop, this article will focus on NATO and the EU.
1. NATO’s transformation and the development of Japan–NATO cooperation: How to use NATO9
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Michigan
Counterplan
CP – Cease NATO – BFHR 7wk › Competition › 2NC — AT: Perm — Bilaterally Cooperate
Johnston ’19 — Seth; Fellow of the Project on Europe and the Transatlantic Relationship at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at the Harvard Kennedy School, former chief of international security cooperation for intelligence at the U.S. Army Europe, former Task Force Commander in NATO’s Resolute Support mission in Afghanistan, PhD international relations, MA comparative politics, Oxford University. Autumn 2019; “NATO’s Lessons from Afghanistan,” The US Army War College Quarterly; ; //CYang
In contrast to national assessments, this analysis focuses on the formal institutions of the Alliance. NATO is unique among alliances in that it is not only a treaty-based agreement among member states, but also an international organization — and a highly institutionalized one at that. Since its early years, NATO has been comprised of a permanently staffed formal political headquarters supported by a network of military and civilian organizations. Particularly noteworthy is NATO’s integrated joint multinational military structure, a unique innovation without equivalent among other alliances or international organizations.
This integration, capped by the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) in Belgium, extends through various echelons and included the ISAF headquarters and other NATO structures in Afghanistan.7 Thus, for this article, “NATO” refers to the various formal institutions and not the group of allied countries. Likewise, the focus is on the collaborative conduct and not that of the United States, other allies or partners, the government of Afghanistan, or other regional actors. Nor does the article address the efficacy of counterinsurgency warfare.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
CP – Cease NATO – BFHR 7wk › 1NC › 1NC — CP: Withdraw
Barndollar ’19 — Gil; Senior Research Fellow at CSS and a Senior Fellow at Defense Priorities. From 2018 to 2019 he was Director of Middle East Studies at the Center for the National Interest. He holds an AB in history from Bowdoin College and MPhil and PhD degrees in history from the University of Cambridge. At CSS he is working on a book examining America’s All Volunteer Force, conscription, and future national security threats. April 8, 2019; “NATO Is 70 and Past Retirement Age”; National Interest; ; //CYang
The United States, meanwhile, is committing itself to fight — four thousand miles from home — for allies who won’t fight for each other. This state of affairs, which has become increasingly clear to both friendly and hostile onlookers, does not create security or stability. Instead, this hollow alliance invites brinksmanship, escalation, and miscalculation that could lead to nuclear war. Will Americans fight and die to defend Europe, when Europeans won’t? We may find out.
European collective defense should be built on a bedrock of shared sacrifice and credible deterrence. As long as the United States remains committed to defending Europe, Europe will lack the will and the means to defend itself. Nearly three decades of post–Cold War defense welfare has made Europe militarily weak and strategically unserious. American pressure for Europe to share more of the defense burden, going back to the Kennedy administration, has had little effect. Americans are increasingly fed up with this unsustainable state of affairs. Only the shock of a U.S. withdrawal from NATO can spur the European nations to commit themselves to their own collective defense.
2022
Michigan
Disadvantage
Aff Answers › Impact Answers › No Impact --- AT: DIANA Solves
Stanley-Lockman and Trabucco ’22 -- (Zoe Stanley-Lockman and Lena Trabucco, 2022, "NATO’s Role in Responsible AI Governance in Military Affairs," https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780197579329.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780197579329-e-69, accessed 6-23-2022) -- nikki
Conclusion At the core, this chapter argues that NATO is well positioned to steward the development of military AI and institute governance mechanisms towards coalition inclusion of responsible AI while simultaneously maintaining incentives for comparative advantage. Using the three pillars—ethics and values, legal norms, and safety and security—as issue areas which present AI governance challenges, we show that NATO has space to emerge as a leader in AI governance and contribute to responsible adoption of EDTs in the international security environment. This builds on foundations that derive NATO’s responsibilities to govern AI according to its values, legal obligations, and institutional interests. These foundations from both STS and military innovation studies offer ways that the Alliance can activate its existing governance mechanisms to exert influence in new ways. Not only is this influence important for the Alliance to bolster its institutional relevance in an evolving international security architecture, but it also dovetails with its capacity to shore up military effectiveness and interoperability as Allies modernize their arsenals and associated concepts into the frontier of AI. Importantly, we do not argue NATO is the only—or even the most important—actor shaping AI governance in international security. Other contributors in this Handbook impressively detail efforts at both state and regional levels. Our aim has been to convince sceptics that NATO has a role that is not replicated by other stakeholders in the international security environment. NATO has particular influence, procedures, and the competency to institute certain governance mechanisms—namely standardization and policy planning—that it can build on without needing to expend time building new institutions from scratch. Beyond just a role, NATO is incentivized to emerge as a steward of AI governance and use these mechanisms for future operations, should the Alliance wish to maintain its unique position as a leader encouraging policy alignment, defense planning, and military standardization. More broadly, this chapter illustrates that regional and international organizations have high stakes for military AI governance. As development, procurement, and implementation of AI is accelerating, it is imperative that international organizations facilitate cooperation among states and industry partners to guide responsible military AI implementation aligned with core values and legal obligations. The convening and coordinating power of international organizations, among other governance tools, is a necessary step for state cooperation and policy alignment. How exactly NATO interacts with other international organizations in the security architecture, including the UN and EU, is a political topic that will also have important implications for the composition of international technology governance regimes, and is a subject for further research. On that note NATO, or any other international organization, is not exempt from these political hurdles. As EDTs increasingly become a focal point in the geopolitical space, any approach of AI governance in the international security environment will have global political undertones. This will undoubtedly be a significant hurdle for NATO as it balances responsible AI development and Allied coordination and cooperation in a changing geopolitical landscape. And certainly, the political realities may well represent the greatest challenge and disincentivize NATO to emerge as a leader in responsible military AI. Nevertheless, the three pillars indicate that NATO is an institution with considerable opportunity to shape responsible AI governance. More specifically, this entails urging and facilitating Allied standards and policies to establish foundations for emerging military technology built on informed and ethical principles and enhance the international security environment. In any discussion of AI as an emerging military technology, it is necessary to strike a balance between acknowledging the transformative potential of AI in the security environment, while simultaneously recognizing the “hype” that may, thus far, be unfounded. But some conclusions are clear. The risks and opportunities of military AI can pose significant challenges for future military operations, and this necessarily means there are many stakeholders with a vested interest in developing, promoting, and implementing responsible military AI. As multinational coalitions and military operations are a foundational security policy for much of the world, this means NATO is also a stakeholder with a vital interest in promoting safe and secure technology among its partners, both traditional and non-traditional. As the international security environment continues to shift, there is space for NATO to pursue its agenda to maintain technological superiority not just to protect and defend its way of life, but also to build on its pillars of AI governance to steward military innovation on a responsible trajectory.
2022
Michigan
Disadvantage
Aff Answers › Impact Answers › No Impact --- AT: DIANA Solves
Stanley-Lockman and Trabucco ’22 -- (Zoe Stanley-Lockman and Lena Trabucco, 2022, "NATO’s Role in Responsible AI Governance in Military Affairs," https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780197579329.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780197579329-e-69, accessed 6-23-2022) -- nikki
Safety and security For humans to meet ethical and legal commitments when developing and deploying AI, the systems themselves must be safe, secure, and reliable. More simply put, if humans and institutions interacting with AI do not have confidence that the systems will perform as expected, then they cannot assure that its development and deployment are responsible. This makes safety and security a key pillar of responsible AI governance for any actor.82 As this section explores for NATO in particular, safety and security are indispensable to the Alliance’s stated goals to focus its approach to EDTs in the areas of “deterrence and defense, capability development, legal and ethical norms, and arms control aspects.”83 Politically, democratic militaries using AI cannot be accountable to their citizenries nor their coalition partners if they lack mechanisms to trace and explain how their systems are reliable. Accidents and interference with AI systems could likewise create political risks for the Alliance. For example, if deepfakes and micro-targeted information attacks compromise confidence in the integrity of information used to build a common operating picture, then the operational difficulties could also erode political trust between Allies in a few key ways. In the North Atlantic Council, disagreement about the integrity of information could slow the decision-making body’s ability to react to fast-changing operational realities.84 Further, compromised AI systems may not only make it harder for forces to prevent harm to non-combatants, but also to prevent friendly fire. In this way, coalition forces arguably face even higher obligations to coordinate on the reliability of their systems, relative to adversaries and near-peer competitors that tend to operate alone. As such, responsible AI governance is not purely technical; policy alignment and strategic planning are likewise necessary to draw attention to risk management above the tactical level. Even without being attacked, governability of AI in a NATO context also means understanding how AI-enabled and autonomous systems developed by the 30 Allies—and other partners—will interact with one another. NATO has expressed interest in governability as a principle of AI “to disengage or deactivate in case of unintended behavior,”85 which echoes the U.S. Department of Defense definition of governable AI.86 Disengaging adversaries is important to maintain de-escalation measures in conflict. For NATO, interoperability between systems also relates to governable AI because allies must also consider how the interactions between the 30 Allies’ own AI-enabled and autonomous systems may result in unintended or emergent behavior.87 This means that NATO has a responsibility to coordinate activities—be they technical exchanges, standardization efforts, or training and exercises—to build confidence that the systems perform as humans intend.88 Without this coordination, the lack of interoperability of allied systems could lead to accidents, and separately, the potential loss of operational effectiveness also presents vulnerabilities for adversaries to exploit. In addition to governability, NATO and its Allies are assessing the risks that bias, attacks, and lack of interpretability can introduce in relation to the anticipated uses of a given AI system.89 In security and defense, new and heightened risks include poisoning of the information environment, deception systems and techniques, uncertainty about the performance of systems in new and unknown environments, and the possibility that tensions or accidents escalate at a faster tempo than humans and institutions can process, among others. These risks can manifest either in motivated attacks or unintentional failure modes.90 In both cases, assuring and certifying that military assets are safe and secure is important given the inherently high risk in operational environments. These operational environments include the presumption that an adversary is disrupting one’s own systems, be it by directly attacking the AI systems themselves, or disrupting the broader command, control, and communications systems under which the AI systems are operating.91 Mitigating these types of risks is typically done in testing, evaluation, validation and verification (TEVV) and in experimentation activities.92 Yet AI cannot be validated and verified the way traditional software systems are because there is no guarantee that an AI system will perform in the real world as it does in a testing environment, and because lifelong-learning systems will perform differently over their lifecycle. Having robust assurance and TEVV processes in place are also important for operators to build trust in the systems they are meant to use, as well as for citizenries and coalition partners at large to see that accountability procedures still apply. As such, building institutional procedures to govern AI safety and security is necessary to build trust in the use of the technology—as well as to develop countermeasures and defensive systems that protect against adversarial threats. NATO thus has an institutional responsibility to prevent and mitigate these intentional and unintentional failures if using AI in operations and mission support.93 As Table 69.1 shows, the Alliance also has a range of relevant entities to coordinate national approaches to AI safety and security, as well as facilitate safety measures as part of responsible use in the Alliance-wide ecosystem. NATO has an important role to play in military standardization and Allied policy planning for safe, secure, and interoperable AI. This includes the coordinating role of the Conference of National Armaments Directors and the Command, Control and Consultation Board to implement complementary acquisition processes that fuse AI adoption measures with safety responsibilities. Furthermore, entities including STO and NSO have a significant role setting the technical baseline and promulgating materiel standards that provide the technical framework for safety and security. Although their staffs are themselves small, they both convene hundreds, if not thousands, of subject matter experts in working groups. As such they both offer unique technical networks to help shape safety and security in a way that minimize risk in operations. NATO’s resources and leadership are vital to using standards and coalition policy to instill safe and secure technological development, a necessary condition to interoperable and successful future operations.
2022
Michigan
Disadvantage
Aff Answers › Impact Answers › No Impact --- AT: DIANA Solves
Stanley-Lockman and Trabucco ’22 -- (Zoe Stanley-Lockman and Lena Trabucco, 2022, "NATO’s Role in Responsible AI Governance in Military Affairs," https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780197579329.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780197579329-e-69, accessed 6-23-2022) -- nikki
International legal norms In certain respects, the legal debate mirrors much of the ethical debate surrounding AI as the two address many of the same issues. International law is a values-based system embedded in certain principles and practices agreed-upon within the international system. This section certainly identifies the complementarity of the ethical discussion surrounding AI, but it also illustrates where the legal debate can depart from the ethical considerations to address different sorts of legal challenges that face the Alliance. Lawyers, researchers, and civil society grapple with existing legal regimes relevant to military operations and the uncertainty and ambiguity surrounding automated decision-making, particularly in lethal decision-making. Thus far, the legal dialogue has been heavily anchored in the applicability of international humanitarian law (IHL), and other relevant legal regimes, to lethal autonomous weapons systems.72 IHL, also known as the laws of war or the laws of armed conflict, regulate the means and methods of warfare and, as such, is pivotal to the emergence of military technology and how existing legal structures are disrupted. The legal debate often revolves around the prospect of a “treaty ban” of LAWS.73 But the legal debate is much more nuanced than the likelihood of international treaties banning any particular weapon system. Especially because NATO is not a regulatory body, it cannot institute measures to regulate emerging technology for the Allies. Instead, NATO’s function in the legal domain may be more effective outside the traditional legal debates around emerging military technology and more embedded in fostering cooperation and coordination among military partners. Other avenues of legal regulation may fall short of an international convention or prohibition, but nevertheless factor significantly in regulating and/or delineating state policies. Additionally, non-lethal applications of AI, as well as applications of AI that do not figure into autonomous systems, also raise important legal questions under international law. Arguably, norms around non-lethal applications are more urgent as their development is more advanced, harder to define, and less controversial in integration.74 Ultimately, NATO’s facilitative power can help ensure that integration of EDTs like AI into military capabilities and into multinational coalition operations is consistent with member states’ legal obligations. One vital and unique contribution for NATO is facilitating legal interoperability among the Allies to resolve some of the most pressing legal barriers for AI implementation in future Allied operations. Legal interoperability, a subset of larger coalition interoperability, refers to the operational coordination around partner legal obligations and interpretations.75 It ensures “that within a military alliance, military operations can be conducted effectively consistent with the legal obligations of each nation.”76 Legal interoperability is a critical component of multilateral operations that has thus far been under-examined, despite its centrality to successful military operations. This is largely because “legal factors have a bearing on everything in alliances and coalition operations—from determining basic ‘troop-to-task’ considerations to decisions regarding the targets to be engaged—and the types of ordinances that may be used.”77 To enhance legal interoperability, NATO can exert its influence on how Allies can develop and deploy AI consistent with their legal obligations through its unique standardization capacities. Historically, NATO has taken significant steps to bridge the legal gap between Allies on critical procedures that bridge responsible state behavior with such “troop-to-task” considerations. One instructive example from past operations is detention policies in non-international armed conflicts.78 The promulgation of detention standards illustrates the operational significance of NATO’s common legal procedures, even for coalitions of the willing that formally operate outside NATO structures. By way of background, the U.S.-led coalition in Afghanistan had internal debates regarding the 96-hour security detention time period.79 The United States advocated extending the 96-hour rule, where coalition partners insisted adhering to the NATO standard, even though it was not a NATO operation.80 Generally the detention example illustrates NATO legal standards providing clarity to non-NATO operations; in some cases, Allies adopt NATO standards as accepted thresholds that continue to inform coalition policies beyond NATO structures and operations. Implementing AI in future military operations will almost certainly complicate legal interoperability as there is a lack of uniform standards, as in the detention example. Even some of the more basic implementation measures will garner legal uncertainty and Allies will inevitably navigate with minimal legal clarity and no standard procedures. Despite the roots of the legal debate stemming from the question of lethality, the most pressing (and urgent) legal issues will address the integration of necessary AI-enablers, such as data gathering and sharing. Furthermore, NATO has coordinated initiatives to promote awareness of Allies’ legal obligations and has a dedicated office focusing on legality. This centralizes the institutional capacity to focus on alignment not only between the policies of NATO Allies, but coherence with the international community more broadly. Among others, the NATO Legal Practitioners’ Workshop and inter-organizational dialogue between NATO, the UN, and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the latter of which has a delegation to NATO that provides legal training and education to practitioners.81 The NATO Office of Legal Affairs (OLA) itself can also play a central role in navigating the challenges to legal interoperability. As the example of detention standards illustrates, NATO has been successful in implementing legal standards which translated into operational clarity and coalition policy outside NATO operations. As part of its focus on responsibility in its EDT agenda, NATO has opportunities to facilitate AI legal standard-setting and coalition policies to ensure safer and responsible use of AI in Allied operations.
2022
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Disadvantage
Aff Answers › Impact Answers › No Impact --- AT: DIANA Solves
Stanley-Lockman and Trabucco ’22 -- (Zoe Stanley-Lockman and Lena Trabucco, 2022, "NATO’s Role in Responsible AI Governance in Military Affairs," https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780197579329.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780197579329-e-69, accessed 6-23-2022) -- nikki
Ethics and values One of the vital aspects of AI which has garnered significant global attention is the ethical implications of artificial intelligence as a military technology—an issue that has divided much of the global community, including NATO member states. As a starting point, researchers and analysts have considered the implications of emerging military technology in terms of ethical responsibility and regulation, especially as states and organizations continue to release AI ethical principles, guidelines, and standards.55 We explore how NATO can operationalize the debate around ethics and values of military AI to garner coordination and continue progress of EDT harmonization among partners. Building on the theoretical discussion from STS and military innovation literature above, the adoption of technologies that reinforce values serves the strategic interest of NATO to shape technological innovation against current waves of illiberalism. Additionally, infusing AI development with certain ethical principles and values can have operational advantages and benefits, and NATO can, in particular, promote the ethical principles as operational standards for the Allies. A common critique within the ethics debate is that approaching new technology with an ethical or democratic values-driven perspective translates into comparative military disadvantage. Essentially, if your adversary develops technology without the constraints of ethical principles then there will be diminished effectiveness on the battlefield.56 We find this critique unfounded because it assumes there is a false trade-off between ethics and effectiveness; instead, we argue ethical foundations are built into the architecture of modern warfare.57 As such, ethics is a background condition for battlefield effectiveness, which is already infused in military decision-making and helping to guide the boundaries of international humanitarian law. As such, ethical guidelines do not have to detract from a military’s capacity or competency to devise means and methods of warfare that will serve their national or coalition interest.58 If anything, a first-mover advantage can incentivize an ethical and values-driven AI to establish the threshold of technological standards globally.59 The political dimension of the Alliance rests on the bedrock of a shared commitment to the “principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law,” as enshrined in the foundational North Atlantic Treaty of 1949.60 Shared values are important for NATO operations because they help constitute their legitimacy. In addition to the North Atlantic Council exerting civilian oversight over NATO operations, legitimacy also includes respect for international legal principles including the core principles of international humanitarian law, or the laws of armed conflict, distinction, proportionality, and necessity. Without political oversight and legitimacy, NATO’s military power would be less effective at shaping norms and promoting stability in the international system. The introduction of AI means that NATO has the moral and strategic imperative to adopt technologies that confer legitimacy and responsible innovation.61 Acting on a shared commitment to democratic values is vital to the political cohesion of the NATO Alliance, just as much as it is a determinant of military effectiveness in a predictable security environment. Put simply, shared values are important to both political and operational coherence between Allies. In its 2018 Framework for Future Alliance Operations, the strategic command Allied Command Transformation urged discussion of the legal and ethical dimensions of technological advancement to both know how it would impact NATO decision-making and how the Alliance would be prepared to address adversaries who do not share in that vision.62 As such, NATO is contending with the ways that ethical AI impacts its own cohesion internally and how differences between allies may project outward in the face of competitors whose ethical frameworks and commitment to the rule of law differ. Internally, there is a strong national government commitment to responsible AI. Recently, transatlantic cooperation has initiated partnerships of largely NATO states committed to advancing responsible AI with goals towards data sharing and future interoperability.63 AI defense partnerships are not restricted to military innovation but rather aim to facilitate civilian innovation cooperation for defense purposes. Externally, as AI-enabled autonomous systems enter the arsenals of more technologically advanced countries, uncoordinated ethical frameworks between Allies could pose operational risks. Without wider alignment, AI systems will have “varying technical specifications based on the legal and policy decisions made by individual governments when answering the key questions.”64 Further, although one motivation of autonomous systems is the increased safety of military personnel by removing them from dangerous situations, the lack of alignment could lead some Allies to perceive other capitals’ deployments of unmanned forces as a lack of commitment to put lives on the line, therein posing credibility risks for Allies to assure one another.65 These credibility risks can be mitigated by accountability and verification standards and procedures that NATO can implement for multinational operations, and efforts to institutionalize these procedures for AI are underway.66 While the NATO AI Strategy is expected to create a common foundation for the Alliance’s pursuit of AI, it is the implementation of principles for safe, ethical, legal, and interoperable AI that will reveal how coherent different national perspectives are. As of August 2021, only the United States and France have publicly issued their military AI strategies.67 Other allies, including Canada and the United Kingdom, have emerging views on responsible military AI, but little official information about how they implement their ethical risk assessments is publicly available.68 NATO’s influence in the functioning of joint operations and multinational military operations situates the Alliance to coordinate between how Allies implement ethical principles in their own national AI development. Specifically, NATO is well-situated to advocate for transparency, accountability, and data governance, which are also adoption factors that can translate into operational benefits, among other values.69 For example, these factors can promote coordination among Allies on ethical guidelines on the development and use of AI, as this will be a necessary foundation in any future joint operation that uses this technology. “The transatlantic partnership must focus on coordinating these core principles and systematic governance to ensure AI systems development aligns with the rule of law and democracy. In particular, this must ensure answering questions about human dignity, human control, and accountability … NATO remains the organization that can bring these two (U.S. and EU) together and establishes the ethical bottom line.”70 The issues of transparency and accountability will define the scope of future implementation. Many remaining questions and uncertainty will be addressed in NATO’s forthcoming AI ethical principles guidelines. But the guidelines adopted in 2021 do not address every ethical dilemma. Regarding accountability, especially, likely major questions will continue to affect the Alliance. As Assistant Secretary-General for Emerging Security Challenges David van Weel recently clarified, NATO will offer a framework of responsible use for the Allies—but the question of accountability for member states, as opposed to civilian technology manufacturers for example, is one principle that will not have an easy solution.71
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Stanley-Lockman and Trabucco ’22 -- (Zoe Stanley-Lockman and Lena Trabucco, 2022, "NATO’s Role in Responsible AI Governance in Military Affairs," https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780197579329.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780197579329-e-69, accessed 6-23-2022) -- nikki
NATO and Technological Change: Three Pillars of AI Governance This section considers three pillars where NATO has procedures and competency to operationalize AI governance through both mechanisms of policy alignment and standards, and enhance security in the international environment. The pillars reflect foundational issue areas constitutive of governance but are also issue areas where previous scholars have cautioned as particularly challenging in the AI governance space. The three pillars—(1) ethics and values, (2) legal norms, and (3) safety and security—are meant to illustrate three conditions for NATO to facilitate policy and standards harmonization. Importantly, these pillars are not exhaustive areas in which NATO will need to consider governance structures to responsibly implement AI technology, but rather highlight particular issues that researchers and analysts acknowledge as significant hurdles in navigating AI governance (see Table 69.2).54 Core, shared values at foundation of Alliance’s political cohesion that informs civilian oversight of operations and overall institutional effectiveness; included in principles Alignment between differing legal interpretations between Allies, particularly as affects the ability of forces to communicate and interoperate in dynamic contexts; constant calibration of policies based on legal interpretations Strategic planning for maintaining integrity of information in military operations and transparency measures that reinforce democratic accountability; setting priorities on defensive systems and countermeasures to protect from motivated attacks and intentional failure modes of AI-enabled weapon systems NATO Standardization and Certification Basis of standards reinforcing responsible state behavior (see legal norms) and responsible engineering practices (see safety and security); human-centric views of responsibility and accountability also embedded in technical adoption measures Precedents of legal standards dealing with international humanitarian law, including detention standards and training publications Certification frameworks and technical, human, and procedural standards to prevent emergent behavior and enhance robustness and resilience of systems to behave predictably in conflict environments The first pillar considers NATO’s role in the evolution of ethical and values-driven AI. One ongoing debate regarding AI as a military technology is the ethical implications and baseline values the Allies, and others, want infused in the development and adoption of AI. The Allies themselves lack uniform consensus on numerous, substantial ethical questions on the use of AI, as most clearly seen in the adjacent area of the ethics of autonomy in weapons systems including lethal autonomous weapon systems (LAWS). In this discussion, we spotlight NATO’s role in facilitating and shaping ethical harmonization as an operational requirement to ensure successful future missions. The second pillar examines legal norms as a domain wherein legal uncertainty regarding AI has tangible implications for Allied legal interoperability, a subset of larger coalition interoperability. Thus far, the legal debate regarding AI has been largely fixed on the issue of a treaty banning the use of LAWS. In this section, we advocate for a more nuanced legal picture in which NATO can facilitate legal coordination and tackle some of the foundational legal issues which will prevent successful legal interoperability in future operations. The third pillar identifies safety and security of AI systems as prerequisite to trustworthy and responsible AI in any context, but especially so for the conduct of military activity. At the NATO level, Allied forces must ensure their systems interoperate safely and predictably both to ensure effective command and control (C2) internally, and to prevent disruptions from attacks. It is a foundational facet of coordination that shows the overlap between NATO interests in military effectiveness and incentivization for responsible innovation.
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Dr. Aaron Bazin & Dr. Dominika Kunertova 18, Bazin is the Managing Director of the Donovan Strategy and Innovation Group at the U.S. Special Operations Command, Kunertova is a Senior Researcher at the Center for Security Studies at ETH Zürich, “An Alliance Divided? Five Factors That Could Fracture NATO,” Military Review, Vol. Jan–Feb 2018, No. 9, https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/military-review/Archives/English/Bazin-an-alliance-divided.pdf/micahw
Second, NATO risks losing the innovation game to the commercial defense industrial sector. In the future, private companies will continue to stay ahead of NATO in designing specifications and setting standards for platforms. This can have a major impact on readiness and interoperability among NATO nations if their innovation efforts (e.g., the U.S. Third Offset Strategy) do not materialize.31
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Samuel J. Brannen 18, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Plans and Posture in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, “Bad Idea: Expecting the Private Sector to Drive Innovation in National Security,” https://defense360.csis.org/bad-idea-expecting-the-private-sector-to-drive-innovation-in-national-security/micahw
It’s bipartisan Washington gospel that America’s private sector (“industry”) will deliver the innovation the country needs from next-generation national security technologies to future manufacturing competitiveness. Such expectation, however, is increasingly a bad idea without a far more strategic, centralized, and White House-driven approach to the challenges ahead. We are at the front-end of an era of rapid, disruptive technological change in which global competition is heating up, and first-mover advantage could prove decisive in markets and geopolitics for decades to come. National government-backed industrial policies, not markets alone, will play a decisive role in determining outcomes. The United States needs proactive strategies and not the kind of defensive, on-the-fly responses we’ve seen on artificial intelligence and 5G telecommunications.
At some point in the 1970s, Republicans and eventually Democrats began to develop an allergy to anything that resembled government direction of industry, even if it was predicated on national security grounds. The central role that government played in industrial planning and policy in the Second World War and continued to play through the early Cold War was dismissed as an aberration. With supply-side economics ascendant since the Nixon presidency, the argument for a laissez-faire approach toward industry prospered. The less government direction, the better, and the economy will organically innovate, the thinking went (and goes).
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Mishra 6/6/22 [Pankaj Mishra is a Bloomberg Opinion columnist. He is author, most recently, of “Run and Hide.”; “Western ‘Unity’ Is Making the Ukraine War Worse”; The Washington Post; June 6, 2022; https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/western-unityis-making-the-ukraine-war-worse/2022/06/05/9d5b85fe-e4a5-11ec-ae64-6b23e5155b62_story.html]//eleanor
Of course, unfocused actions bred largely of self-regard were always doomed to fail. Take, for instance, sanctions, widely hailed as projecting Western resolve against Putinism. Ineffective against even toothless regimes such as Cuba, sanctions have predictably failed to deter the Russian leader while exposing billions across the world to steep inflation and hunger. Additional punitive measures have been very selectively imposed, with more focus on maintaining unity than on the political, economic and social repercussions for a world that has barely recovered from two radically destructive years of the pandemic. It should not be surprising that most nations, including close Western allies such as India and Turkey, continue to do business with Russia, or that Putin has retaliated by blockading ports that supply the world with wheat and fertilizers. Now convinced of their own rhetoric about the strength of the Western coalition, US politicians and commentators have clamored to change the regime in Moscow and fatally weaken Russia, with no reference to how such fantasies of supreme power worked out in Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya. Meanwhile, three months into the war, these same figures seem no closer to defining realistic Western objectives in Ukraine. In fact, the options before the US and Europe have always been blindingly clear. They could throw their full support behind Ukraine’s resistance to Russia, make sanctions watertight and cut off all financial support for Putin’s war machine. Or they could bring forward the unavoidable obligation to talk to their enemies and offer incentives for both Ukraine and Russia to reach a negotiated solution. The first option is scarcely ideal. Nations that depend on Russia for its energy and food needs won’t end their relationship with the country overnight — not even Germany will do so. Also, increasingly direct military confrontation with a nuclear-armed state is unwise. Yet the second option is hardly being vigorously pursued right now. Thus, Ukraine receives from the West neither the weapons it seeks for a more fruitful war effort, nor sufficient motivation to pursue peace through diplomacy. What we do get, in copious measure, is a psychodrama — of a tiny but powerful minority of politicians and journalists who have been trying to resolve the identity crisis of the West by rhetorically exaggerating its will and resources against Putin. During his four years in power, US President Donald Trump wrecked the cold war idea of the West as free, democratic and rational. In Europe, hard-right movements and personalities that were openly admiring of Putin further blurred a Western self-image forged during the long confrontation with totalitarian Soviet communism. A brazenly imperialist Russia has now appeared to cleanse and vivify that identity just as the Soviet Union once did. Declarations that “the West must hold its nerve,” even as death and destruction stalk Ukraine, fuel the suspicion that achieving some kumbaya moment of synchronized purpose and identity has become more vital to the West than averting a global humanitarian catastrophe. Needless to say, old assumptions — of a singular West possessed of colossal power or prestige or nerve — cannot be sustained today by a profoundly fragile coalition of Western countries which are internally divided, with angry populations pursuing widely different socio-political destinies. It is true that many members of the West’s political and media elites, mostly middle-aged, white and male, fundamentally experienced the world as its hegemons. Too many disorientating things have happened since they were young — among them, the rise of China, a country nursing its sense of humiliation by Western powers, and the re-emergence of a defeated rival Russia as an energy superpower. Faced with such resentful and implacable challengers, they have naturally sought shelter in the easy certainties and slogans of their youth. But peace and stability in the world will depend on whether today’s fragmented West can find less treacherous ways of dealing with the rest.
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Dr. Aaron Bazin & Dr. Dominika Kunertova 18, Bazin is the Managing Director of the Donovan Strategy and Innovation Group at the U.S. Special Operations Command, Kunertova is a Senior Researcher at the Center for Security Studies at ETH Zürich, “An Alliance Divided? Five Factors That Could Fracture NATO,” Military Review, Vol. Jan–Feb 2018, No. 9, https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/military-review/Archives/English/Bazin-an-alliance-divided.pdf/micahw
External risks. The participants found it questionable whether allies will be able to find a common conventional threat that would be perceived as strong enough to “transcend the domestic pressures and the concept of sovereignty.” Although an absence of external threat to the Alliance is very unlikely, the future risk will lie in multiplication of external threats and a lack of common perception of those threats.
This underdeveloped common understanding of external threats, accompanied by differential threat assessments, could weaken NATO’s cohesion. To illustrate this point, although the survey participants listed the failure to activate Article 5 in case of attack as a potential risk, further discussions showed that non-Article 5 missions could constitute the real test for NATO’s cohesion. In words of the one of participants, “if there is an operation and only two nations show up, this is not cohesion.”
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Mishra 6/6/22 [Pankaj Mishra is a Bloomberg Opinion columnist. He is author, most recently, of “Run and Hide.”; “Western ‘Unity’ Is Making the Ukraine War Worse”; The Washington Post; June 6, 2022; https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/western-unityis-making-the-ukraine-war-worse/2022/06/05/9d5b85fe-e4a5-11ec-ae64-6b23e5155b62_story.html]//eleanor
A few months ago, acute divisions plagued the United States, the European Union and ties between them. Germany, Europe’s leading nation, had developed a mutually profitable relationship with Russia. Poland, a frontline state now aligned against Russia, was descending deeper into autocracy, inviting punitive measures from its EU partners. A mendacious Tory prime minister led the United Kingdom. The US, damaged by Trumpism, a mismanaged pandemic and a military debacle in Afghanistan, was debating the likelihood of civil war. French President Emmanuel Macron had declared NATO was experiencing “brain death.”
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Person 15—(Associate Professor of International Relations at the United States Military Academy). Robert Person. “6 reasons not to worry about Russia invading the Baltics”. Washington Post. November 12, 2015.
So could the Baltics be next? I don’t think so, for six reasons. 1. Vladimir Putin can’t keep the Baltics out of NATO or the E.U. International relations scholar John Mearsheimer has made a provocative argument that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine was provoked by NATO expansion in the 1990s and 2000s. Whether or not you agree, the Baltics made it into the club before Russia had the capacity to stop them. Some experts have argued that one of the main reasons Russia provoked conflict in Georgia in 2008 and in Ukraine in 2014 was to effectively veto NATO membership for those countries — because NATO would be unlikely to let in new members with open territorial disputes. Invading your neighbors may be a good strategy for keeping them out of NATO or the E.U., but it’s not so useful once they’re already members, since it would guarantee a catastrophic war between Russia and NATO. 2. Russia will never have a seat at the table in Baltic politics In my previous post on the Monkey Cage, I argued that Putin’s key strategic objective in Ukraine was to install a government in Kiev that would give Moscow a say in making Ukrainian foreign and domestic policy. But that couldn’t happen in the Baltics. Ever. The historical antagonism is too strong. My previous research on national identity in the Baltics shows that the Soviet occupation of the Baltics during WWII remains central to national memory and identity. Russia is seen as the imperial “other” against which the Baltics define themselves, and would never be allowed to interfere in domestic politics. What’s more, Putin has so far failed to achieve his strategic objective of installing a pliant pro-Russian government in Kiev. Even if he imagined it possible, there’s little reason to believe he would be any more successful in the Baltics. 3. The Baltics don’t have the same symbolic meaning as Ukraine and Crimea Ukraine has deep symbolic meaning for Russia. Citizens of both countries consider the ancient empire of Kievan Rus (and its capital, Kiev) to be the cradle of eastern Slavic civilization. Kiev’s Prince Vladimir the Great brought Orthodox Christianity to his subjects in 988, during a golden age of Slavic civilization that was the foundation for later achievements by Muscovy and the Russian empire. In fact, they just installed the cornerstone for a massive new monument to Prince Vladimir near the Kremlin in Moscow. Parts of modern-day Ukraine had been part of the Russian empire since the 16th century; Crimea became part of Russia in 1783. This deep historical connection of civilizations has long made Ukrainian independence hard for Russia to swallow. Putin once famously remarked to George Bush: “You have to understand, George. Ukraine is not even a country.” And for most of Russia’s history, he’s right: Ukraine only became a country in 1991 after centuries as the borderland of the Russian and Soviet empires. That Ukraine took Crimea with it only made things worse, as the peninsula was only “gifted” to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic by Nikita Khrushchev in 1954, a transfer that many Russians saw as illegitimate both before and after the Soviet collapse. Ukraine is special for Russia. The Baltics are a different story. My research has traced the territorial evolution of Russia in the Baltic region. While the Baltics became part of the Russian empire through the partitions of Poland in the 18th century, the Tsars were sufficiently “hands off” to allow strong national identities to flourish that opposed Russian domination. What’s more, the Baltics were independent between the world wars. When the Soviet Union forcibly annexed them again in 1940, Baltic citizens saw it as an illegitimate foreign occupation – and continued to resist for the next 51 years. Even as Gorbachev struggled in the dying days of the USSR to hold together some kind of union, he knew that it would not include the Baltic Republics, and left them out of his proposed treaty salvaging what was left of the Soviet Union. Russia and Russians have long recognized that the Baltics are culturally and historically distinct from Russia, according to surveys and interviews I’ve conducted across Russia and Latvia. Whether the historical and cultural importance of Ukraine was a motivation or just a justification for Putin’s actions in Ukraine, comparable symbolism is absent in the Baltics, making them less likely targets for Russian interference. 4. Russian access to Kaliningrad is not threatened. For now. Throughout its post-Soviet history, Ukrainian leaders used the Russian naval base in Sevastopol, Crimea, as a bargaining chip with Russia. After the Orange Revolution of 2004-5, pro-Western President Viktor Yushchenko announced that Ukraine would not renew Russia’s lease of the base after 2017. Though his successor, the ill-fated Viktor Yanukovych, reversed that decision, many have argued that permanently securing access to the base was a key strategic objective of Russia’s invasion of Crimea. Annexing the peninsula solved the strategic problem of where to locate the Black Sea Fleet once and for all. By contrast, no Baltic or Western government has ever made serious attempts to block Russian access to the exclave of Kaliningrad, though Lithuanian officials have recognized their theoretical ability to do so. But actually following through on the threat to cut railways, roadways and utilities to Kaliningrad would almost certainly provoke a Russian military response and guarantee a dangerous escalation with potentially nuclear implications. So no country even tries. Yes, Kaliningrad could conceivably emerge as a flashpoint, especially if Russia uses it for an aggressive anti-access/area denial strategy. Russian missiles based in Kaliningrad could keep NATO naval and ground forces from reaching the Baltics in the event of a Russian attack, isolating the three countries from the rest of the alliance at a critical moment. But as long as Lithuania allows Russians access to the region, war over Kaliningrad is unlikely. 5. Baltic Russians are not Crimean, Donbas or Russian Russians Much of the talk of a Russian invasion of the Baltics has centered around the ethnic Russians living there. As one reporter in Riga put it, “If Putin felt justified in his actions against Ukraine, where 17 percent of the population is ethnic Russian and 24 percent Russian-speaking, Latvia’s allegedly endangered minority would seem to provide him with a convenient pretext for action.” One social activist in Latvia warned about what many observers fear: “Military aggression in the old style — tanks crossing the border — is not likely here. … But what they call a hybrid offensive — provocations, a media war — that is very possible and hard to defend against.” Hybrid warfare combines conventional and unconventional modes of warfare, bringing the battle to new battlegrounds. As retired Col. John McCuen writes, “the decisive battles in today’s hybrid wars are fought not on conventional battlegrounds, but on asymmetric battlegrounds within the conflict zone population, the home front population and the international community population.” Thus, many have speculated that the Russian minorities of the Baltics could offer Russia a sympathetic target population to use as its launching pad for a hybrid invasion, just as it used the native separatist movements in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine as cover for hybrid warfare. I don’t think that’s likely. I recently wrote in the Moscow Times that the Baltic Russians are not particularly amenable to Russian hybrid warfare. Though they have many lingering grievances over language, cultural and citizenship policies, these grievances have not translated into separatism. More and more ethnic Russians have gained citizenship in the Baltic States and increasingly seem to hold the view of Nils Ušakovs, the ethnically Russian mayor of Latvia’s capital city, Riga: “I was born here. … I’m a Latvian national; a Russian-speaking Latvian who is a patriot of my country.” This attitude is especially prevalent among the younger generation of Baltic Russians, who increasingly see themselves as European and enjoy the benefits of living in the European Union. Even the older generations who still feel a stronger connection to Russia can see the contrast in living standards between Russia and the Baltics. Katri Raik is the director of Narva College in Estonia, which caters to Estonia’s Russian population, and compares Narva with the Russian city Ivangorod that sits just across the river: What would happen if Narva were to hold a referendum? Would its residents want to live in Estonia or in Putin’s Russia? Anyone with any common sense … would want to live in Estonia. Because life here is better, more stable, the pensions are higher, we have social welfare. People in Narva know what they would choose because they often travel to Ivangorod. Research by Ammon Cheskin confirms this point. While Baltic Russians maintain a close cultural affinity with Russia, Russia’s political and economic attraction is much lower.
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Thierry Tardy 22, Director of the Research Division at the NATO Defense College and Senior Analyst at the EUISS, “NATO’s Sub-strategic Role in the Middle East and North Africa,” https://www.gmfus.org/news/natos-sub-strategic-role-middle-east-and-north-africa/micahw
NATO’s role in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) is politically and operationally complex. That a security and defense organization would play an important role in a contiguous region from which numerous security threats emanate makes intuitive sense. As NATO seeks to adapt to the evolving security environment while revisiting its Strategic Concept, its ambition and role in the MENA need to be factored in.
The security environment on NATO’s southern periphery is challenging. From Libya to the Near East and the Persian Gulf, the MENA concentrates a fair number of threats that range from regional conflicts to state fragility, terrorism, and transnational organized crime. These also pose direct and indirect risks to the security of NATO members and their societies, including those related to uncontrolled migration, human insecurity, and climate change. More recently, the reemergence of Russia and the emergence of China in the MENA have made a NATO role there even more pertinent. If Russia is in Libya and Syria, both countries that generate insecurity for the alliance, then there is an additional rationale for some sort of presence in the region.