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2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Links › Links --- Cyber › Links --- Cyber Time Consuming

Cyber policy changes are slow and cause divisive reactions within NATO

Lonergan and Moller ’22 -- (Erica D. Lonergan and Sara B. Moller, 4-27-2022, "Opinion: NATO’s Credibility Is on the Line with Cyber Defense Pledge. That’s a Bad Idea." POLITICO, https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2022/04/27/nato-credibility-cyber-defense-pledge-russia-ukraine-00027829, accessed 6-18-2022) -- nikki

President Joe Biden has issued grave warnings that Russia might launch a cyberattack against the United States in retaliation for the punishing sanctions levied after Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine. He’s advised American companies to “accelerate efforts to lock their digital doors,” and many officials expect an attack against critical U.S. infrastructure to be inevitable. One way Biden and other Western leaders are attempting to deter potential Russian cyber retaliation during the Ukraine crisis is through NATO’s Article 5 collective defense pledge — that an attack on one is an attack against all. That’s because since the 2014 NATO summit in Wales (which, coincidentally, took place following another Russia-Ukraine crisis), the alliance has affirmed that Article 5 extends to cyberspace. In other words, a cyberattack against any NATO member could conceivably represent an attack against the entire alliance. The pledge is the embodiment of the allies’ security guarantee to each other and the beating heart of NATO. After Russia invaded Ukraine, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg confirmed that NATO policy on collective defense and cyberspace holds strong, noting that NATO has “decided to make clear that a cyberattack can trigger Article 5.” And following an extraordinary meeting of heads of state and government on March 24, the alliance reinforced that it is “ready to impose costs on those who harm us in cyberspace.” But despite this rhetoric, exactly how and when Article 5 applies to cyberspace remains unclear. This ambiguity is a problem — with potentially disastrous consequences. Staking the credibility of Article 5 to what are often murky activities in cyberspace threatens to undermine the broader principle of collective defense. We can’t risk fracturing the transatlantic alliance at a critical juncture in its history over a debate on what constitutes a major or minor cyberattack. For that reason, NATO should move quickly to clarify its policy on cyberattacks and explicitly state the threshold for what would trigger an Article 5 response. Furthermore, NATO members should commit to treating cyberattacks that do not rise to the level of a major attack as a national matter — not one for the alliance. Such a shift might face some initial resistance, particularly in light of the Kremlin’s history of malicious cyber activities. One of the first state-initiated cyberattacks was perpetrated by Russia against Estonia, a NATO member, in 2007. In the intervening years, Moscow has increased its malicious cyber activities, such as the SolarWinds breach uncovered in December 2020 in which Russia gained access to a treasure trove of U.S. data. Russian President Vladimir Putin’s maneuvers against NATO members, along with the annexation of Crimea in 2014, spurred the alliance to adopt a Cyber Defense Pledge in 2016 that recognized cyberspace as a military domain. Two years later, NATO created a Cyberspace Operations Center in Mons, Belgium to improve situational awareness and coordinate cyber operations. Since then, the alliance has consistently reaffirmed the application of Article 5 to cyberspace. At the 2021 summit in Brussels, NATO committed to a new Comprehensive Cyber Defense Policy, with allies agreeing to employ the “full range of capabilities” at all times to “deter, defend against, and counter the full spectrum of cyber threats.” Notably, NATO refined its language with last summer’s summit communique to account for the fact that some cyber incidents may not be individually decisive, but nevertheless significant when viewed in the aggregate. Specifically, the allies recognized “the impact of significant malicious cumulative cyber activities might, in certain circumstances, be considered as amounting to an armed attack.” In practice, however, NATO leaders have avoided clarifying the conditions under which a cyberattack would trigger Article 5 and how NATO would respond. When pressed about Russian cyberattacks in the Ukraine context, Stoltenberg cautioned that, “we have never gone into the position where we give a potential adversary the privilege of defining exactly when we trigger Article 5.” This equivocation is not surprising, for several reasons. The nature of cyberspace often confounds unequivocal deterrence declarations. States tend to operate in cyberspace with plausible deniability, which can make it difficult to rapidly ascertain responsibility for cyber incidents. Also, it can be challenging to understand the intent behind observed cyber behavior, and there is often a substantial time lag between when an initial penetration of a network occurs and when the target even realizes the breach. And the vast majority of cyber operations cause virtual, not physical, damage, complicating efforts to assess and evaluate the implications of the costs inflicted. Moreover, it can take time to develop and identify a way to infiltrate a network as well as the computer code that takes advantage of a vulnerability for malicious ends. This means states may lack a palatable cyber response option for retaliatory purposes at the desired time. This creates a slew of practical problems if Article 5 were to be invoked for a cyberattack. From an implementation perspective, it would trigger deliberations within the North Atlantic Council, NATO’s primary decision-making body. Decisions made within the NAC require unanimity, which can be difficult to achieve for many issues but is especially burdensome for cyber ones, given all of the ambiguities outlined above. The most likely outcome of this process would be a long, drawn-out deliberation resulting in a divided alliance unable to agree on how or whether to respond. Quite simply, some allies are unlikely to want to risk World War III for a cyberattack that disrupts the financial infrastructure, for instance, of another country but doesn’t lead to loss of life or sustained damage. These challenges have major strategic implications for NATO. After years of publicly and repeatedly linking Article 5 to cyberspace and reinforcing that policy in response to the Ukraine conflict, a failure to achieve consensus and respond to a Russian cyberattack against a NATO member could imperil Article 5 in other areas. The disunity that is likely to be revealed during NAC deliberations would then undermine the broader political cohesion that has, for the most part, been remarkably strong throughout the war in Ukraine. This would make it more difficult for the alliance to respond to other forms of Russian behavior. As Biden emphasized at a press conference last month, “the single-most important thing is for us to stay unified … We have to stay fully, totally, thoroughly unified.” NATO has achieved some strategic ambiguity with its current cyber policy, which may help to deter high-stakes Russian assaults during the present crisis. However, rather than an all-out Russian cyberattack, a far more plausible scenario is a lower-level attack carried out by the Russian government or a proxy group against one or more allies. In this case, the alliance’s interests — not to mention transatlantic security — would be better served by adopting nationally-tailored responses rather than pulling the Article 5 lever. Additionally, to prevent further escalation and reinforce the implicit firebreak that currently exists between cyber and conventional military operations, NATO allies should also agree to restrict any retaliatory response against Moscow to the cyber realm or non-military instruments of power. With little chance of improved NATO-Russian relations any time soon, time is of the essence to get this right. The allies should begin the hard political legwork now to ensure members get on the same page before NATO’s June summit, if not sooner. Achieving consensus on significant cyber issues has previously taken time. NATO’s attribution of the Microsoft Exchange hack last summer to China was an important step for the alliance and sent a strong signal to our adversaries. But it took months to reach agreement on the statement; the hack was uncovered in March 2021 and the NATO statement was not made public until July. In the current crisis, the alliance will not have the luxury of waiting four (or more) months to agree on a response. To avoid incurring damaging costs to NATO’s credibility and its deterrent powers, the allies should refine their cyber policy, now. We live in an age in which more people have access to highly sophisticated technologies and almost every social, economic or military asset has become ‘securitized’ or vulnerable to disruption – whether temporary or more lasting – from an outside attacker or even an inside source.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Links › Links --- Cyber › Links --- Cyber Time Consuming

Cybersecurity cooperation is difficult and time-consuming for the alliance.

Jacobsen 21 [Jeppe T. Jacobsen is a Ph.D. candidate at the Danish Institute for International Studies and the Center for War Studies at the University of Southern Denmark. His primary focus is U.S. cyber armament, its motivation and consequences to international security. Jacobsen worked as cyber coordinator at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark where he coordinated Denmark’s cyber diplomacy. ; “Cyber offense in NATO: challenges and opportunities”; International Affairs; May 10, 2021; https://academic.oup.com/ia/article-abstract/97/3/703/6205395]//eleanor

The abovementioned incidents have led cyber-conflict scholars to point to several technical and practical difficulties in the operational integration of cyber effects.29 In the interviews and background conversations that contributed to this study, three of these difficulties were continuously reiterated when discussing successful integration of cyber effects into NATO operational planning: the temporal dimension of developing exploits; the assessment of battle damage; and the problem of confliction. Developing exploits—a matter of time One of the characteristics of cyber attacks that receives most attention is the fact that they hit suddenly and without warning.30 While this is often the case, the central question for operational integration is not the speed at which they hit their target, but the speed with which the tools and techniques that exploit IT vulnerabilities in order to deliver cyber effects can be developed. Like conventional weapons, the cyber tools—the exploits or cyber weapons—take time to develop. However, an exploit is often harder to reuse than a conventional weapon, as it is more dependent on a meticulous analysis and target preparation—in this case, specifically, the target’s IT infrastructure. Without knowing the adversary’s IT systems and its vulnerabilities better than the adversary itself, meaningful cyber weapons are impossible to develop. The fact that knowledge about the target is linked not only to the deployment of a weapon but also to its development influences the extent to which it can be used and reused. Stuxnet, for example, required years of development, testing and perfecting before it could deliver the intended effect on the Iranian centrifuges. Despite the techniques used in the Stuxnet malware having been found in other malware,31 Stuxnet lost its ability to destroy the centrifuges when it was discovered and the IT vulnerabilities that enabled it were patched. Importantly, part of the complexity of Stuxnet relates to the US–Israeli intention to keep the effect secret. In a hot conflict, secrecy in terms of the effect is often less important, and thus the development and deployment of cyber effects do not necessarily have to be as complex and time-consuming. This observation does not necessarily change the fact that the development of exploits often has to precede the military confrontation in which they are intended to be used. NATO states that want to deliver cyber effects in NATO operations must try to gain access to Russia’s or other potential adversaries’ critical military networks to identify and exploit IT vulnerabilities. As several informants emphasized, if states wait for a conflict to escalate before they begin the development of exploits, it is most likely to be already too late.32 The alternative to penetrating adversary networks in peacetime is for states to rely on the exploitation of vulnerabilities in as many commercial off-the-shelf products as possible. This can be done, for example, by purchasing exploits from private companies offering this service, in the hope that it will then be possible to quickly create an overview of the enemy’s IT infrastructure and adapt the exploits to this environment when a conflict escalates. The latter approach is more likely to succeed against adversaries with low network security, which does not apply in the case of Russia, or in contexts where less sophisticated and less closely targeted cyber effects are required. Whether member states develop sophisticated exploits for future targeted effects or stockpile well-known exploits to cause more minor effects, they cannot—as several informants indicated—be certain that they will be able to deliver the cyber effect at the specific time it is requested by CYOC. This is because the IT vulnerabilities upon which exploits depend might not exist for ever. Cyberspace is a dynamic environment: vulnerabilities are patched, systems are updated or replaced and bad IT security practices are identified and improved. This means that exploits are temporary in nature and cannot be stored for later use.33 States must constantly ensure that the exploits still work, which requires minor adjustments when updates take place. As a consequence, the larger the military ‘cyber arsenal’, the more technically skilled human resources are needed for its maintenance. In the current labour market, where recruitment and retention of a cyber workforce is difficult, extensive investment is required for states to be able to stand ready with cyber effects available when requested. In short, if a state is to offer a cyber effect in a NATO operation, then the state is likely to have to be able, first, to predict what Russian IT systems it is going to target months or years in advance, and second, to marshal the necessary resources to develop and maintain a large array of exploits that can be used against these systems. Even if this is successfully done, the state still faces difficulty in ensuring that an effect is delivered as promised.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Links › Cohesion/Backlash Links › Links --- New Tasks = In-fighting

The plan causes in-fighting and disrupts cohesion --- some members don’t want changes to the status quo priorities

Kunz ‘21

(Barbara, PhD from Stockholm University/Sweden and a Master's degree from the Institut d'Etudes Politiques de Paris. She is a Member of the steering committee OSCE Network of Think Tanks and Academic Institutions., “NATO 2030: Towards a New Strategic Concept and Beyond.,” Ch. 7 pg Muse //um-ef)

Analyses of transatlantic relations, and security relations in particular, often focus on differences between the United States and its European allies. This clearly is an important factor. Given Europe’s dependence on US security guarantees, the United States’ continued willingness to engage in the continent’s security is the condition sine qua non for NATO’s survival. US dissatisfaction with European engagement and defense spending has consequently been a key item on intra-Alliance agendas since 1949. US concerns about NATO and its European allies’ engagement were indeed voiced openly long before Donald Trump.1 Debates about burden sharing also trickle down to domestic politics in member states and thus contribute to shaping the general climate within the Alliance, as for instance the 2 percent objective that has featured in several German electoral campaigns. It is, however, equally important not to overlook structural differences among European Allies. When the Reflection Group appointed by Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg published its report on “NATO 2030” in late 2020, it was no coincidence that Alliance cohesion was among the key points.2 Indeed, disagreements among Allies have increased in recent years—to the point of famously prompting French president Emmanuel Macron to declare NATO “brain dead” because it is no longer able to adopt common views on key strategic matters.3 This notably pertains to the role Turkey has been playing in recent years and intra-Alliance rivalries. Other examples include Allies’ difficulties to develop a common stance on Libya and different views on NATO’s potential role in the Arctic. The latter example is linked to what is certainly the single most important aspect for Euro-Atlantic security in the 21st century: the Alliance and its members’ relationship 157158 nato 2030: towards a new strategic concept and beyond with Russia. Yet, regarding Russia in particular, ideas on the way ahead vary widely across NATO capitals. What is ultimately at stake are diverging approaches to European and Euro-Atlantic security at large, based on different interpretations of the future direction of the global security environment. The three most relevant issues most likely to trouble NATO in the coming decade may thus be summarized as, first, disagreements among member states on concrete policy issues, most prominently illustrated by Turkey’s current foreign policies and its consequences for Alliance cohesion. Second, Allies continue and will continue to hold divergent threat perceptions and consequently place different emphases on security challenges and defense priorities. Third, there is no consensus among European Allies on whether US security guarantees can be considered a viable option in the years and decades to come. Against this backdrop, this chapter aims at showing that ‘Europe’ is by no means a monolithic bloc or actor in its own right, but rather a group of states sometimes pursuing different and even incompatible perspectives. In particular, on the Western side of the Atlantic, references to ‘Europe’ as an actor in transatlantic security relations are a frequent phenomenon. Any analysis or future policy based on the assumption that Europeans are unified in security will, however, be erroneous and impracticable. As the ongoing debate on European strategic autonomy has notably revealed, the primary reason is that Europeans lack a joint vision on how to ensure their continent’s security in the future. As this chapter argues, insights gained from this debate pertain to the very fundamentals of European security, beyond petty debates on semantics. Allies’ increased difficulties to come to shared views in fact stem from very different takes on the foundational features of European security and divergent readings of structural evolutions in the international system. However, the problem is not only that diverging visions confront each other. Rather, some European governments simply do not have such a vision, cling to the status quo, and sometimes even refuse to think about the possibility that things may have to evolve. These differences come on top of other divergences on issues such as democracy and the rule of law, including within the European Union, involving Hungary and Poland.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Links › Cohesion/Backlash Links › Links --- Backlash/Consensus

The plan must go through the consensus process --- that slows the adoption and ensures a fight over the specifics

Cook and Dowd ‘22

(Cynthia, directs the Center for Strategic and International Studies’ Defense-Industrial Initiatives Group, which researches acquisition policy, defense spending, international defense industrial cooperation, and emerging technologies. She formerly spent 25 years at the RAND Corporation, where she worked on and oversaw a wide range of acquisition studies for components across the U.S. Department of Defense, along with the Australian and U.K. defense departments and NATO., Anna M. Dowd is a senior international security and defense policy expert, an adjunct at the RAND Corporation, and co-founder of the Digital Innovation Engine. From 2014 to 2020, she served as principal officer and head of industry relations at the NATO Communications and Information Agency. Prior to joining NATO, she was a fellow at the European Union Institute for Security Studies in Paris, and served as senior policy officer at the European Defense Agency and senior analyst at the Polish Ministry of Defense., “How To Get NATO Forces The Technology They Need,” pg online @ //um-ef)

These are valuable steps, but they do not address the fundamental challenge of rapidly acquiring common capabilities. There are still many residual processes where consensus-based control is inherently prioritized over speed, flexibility, innovation, and the deployment of prototypes at the end of their development phases. NATO leaders recognize the ongoing challenge. In a recent speech to the North Atlantic Council, the supreme allied commander transformation, Gen. Philippe Lavigne, stressed that one of his key priorities is to ensure the timely delivery of new and critical capabilities, adding that “we need to change the rules and make them work for us, not against us.” But NATO leaders cannot fix this alone — the alliance’s 30 member nations are the ones that will have to agree on the solution. Exploring alternatives and getting the allies to agree on a solution will be difficult. It can happen on a NATO-wide basis, or some subset of member nations can take on the challenge and lead the effort, which may then be adopted by others.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Links › Cohesion/Backlash Links › Links --- Divided priorities

Plan is a long-term priority --- allies won’t sign-on --- they have short-term higher priorities

Aronsson ‘18

(Lisa, Analyst in International Affairs April 24, 2018, “Transatlantic Perspectives on Defense Innovation: Issues for Congress,” pg online @ //um-ef)

Political Challenges NATO’s member states are unique in their historical experiences and security priorities, and they will likely only invest in capabilities that they see as addressing their security needs. For the United States, the primary drivers for defense innovation are Chinese and Russian military modernization and a sense of strategic competition for technology and innovation. While many European allies broadly accept U.S. assessments of the global security environment, including the rise of China, their assessments of China’s rise differ from those of the United States. France and Germany, for example, are more focused on managing Chinese investments in Europe, and Europeans are generally much more concerned by challenges from Russia and the Middle East. NATO allies are also divided over whether they see Russia as more of a conventional or a hybrid challenge, and over balancing NATO focus on the east with efforts to address challenges in the south. NATO has tried to communicate the indivisibility of Euro-Atlantic security through the “360 Degree Approach” outlined at the Warsaw Summit, but its efforts face continuing challenges.152 Others point to a transatlantic rift or a “wearing down” of a sense of collective identity in NATO with U.S. public opinion appearing uncommitted and European public perceptions of a “wider Atlantic” than in the past.153 While studies show diversity can be a driver for innovation in the workplace,154 it could restrict a NATO agenda if the allies cannot achieve a common understanding of the threat environment and a shared vision for how technology and innovation can address security challenges. European leaders are under pressure to address the immediate security challenges that concern their constituencies, which for some European allies include Russia and Ukraine and for others include refugees, migration, and the spread of terrorism. Generally speaking, short-term priorities take precedent in Europe. Discussions about technology and future warfare are beginning to take place in some national governments and in NATO institutions. According to a senior NATO official, however, these discussions need to take place at the strategic level in the North Atlantic Council, and political leadership from one or more of the major allies is likely to be required to foster cohesion and drive change at the NATO level.155

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Links › General Links › Links --- Democratic/Civilian Tasks

NATO must not expand its mandate beyond defense --- taking on too many tasks and ‘enhancing resilience’ trades-off with war-fighting and strategic cohesion

Larson 5/22/22

(Henrik, Ph.D., is a senior researcher at the Center for Security Studies at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zurich., “NATO Must Get Resilience Right to Withstand Russia and China,” pg online @ //pg online @ //

NATO is at arguably the most important juncture in its post-Cold War history. NATO must adapt not only its military preparedness but also its approach to the nonmilitary—and specifically illiberal—challenges that Russia and China pose to its resilience and cohesion. To advance their geopolitical interests, Russia and China exploited the openness of society in NATO allies and the divisions between them over the past decade. NATO must always be wary of external challenges that could undermine its unity. This was true during the Cold War in the face of an ideological rival seeking to undermine confidence in Western democratic governments, and it remains true in the face of Russia and China today. Conversely, NATO needs to navigate its adaptation to its illiberal challenge while avoiding functional over-extension. The alliance is at risk of maladaptation, whereby it extends its own activities unnecessarily into civilian areas of security in which it lacks necessary expertise and legacy. Strong voices in the expert community call for NATO to specify resilience as a core task in the forthcoming Strategic Concept, in principle elevating it to a task of equal importance to collective defense. An influential report commissioned by Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg to inspire the Strategic Concept recommends that NATO reinvent itself as a “liberal bulwark” against Russia and China and extend the alliance’s responsibilities into the realm of democratic resilience. NATO must steer clear of the temptation to take on too many tasks and instead enhance resilience only in areas that can be reconciled with its mandate as a security and defense alliance. The encounter with illiberal powers strengthens NATO’s unity, but that does not necessarily mean that NATO is the right institution to meet the illiberal challenges that Russia and China pose. So far, the alliance’s record of responding to these threats has been uneven, and the perspectives about its role have diverged at times between the United States and its European partners. But there is a way forward, if NATO can clearly delineate what should and should not fall within its remit, be clear-eyed about its strategic environment, and prioritize international partners that share NATO’s interests and values.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Links › General Links › Links --- Unpredictability

Unpredictable, bolt from the blue actions anger allies – that matters more than the substance of any policy.

Lesser 20 [Ian Lesser is vice president at The German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF) and a member of GMF’s executive team, managing programs across the organization. He serves as executive director of the Brussels office of GMF, and leads GMF’s work on the Mediterranean, Turkey, and the wider Atlantic. He also served as interim president of GMF from September-December 2021.; “Great Optimism in the EU and NATO as Brussels Looks to Biden”; The German Marshall Fund of the United States; November 12, 2020; https://www.gmfus.org/news/great-optimism-eu-and-nato-brussels-looks-biden]//eleanor

After years of transatlantic stress, officials and observers in Brussels believe that a Biden administration holds the prospect of profound change in style and policy. There will continue to be areas of disagreement. But the overall approach from Washington is sure to be more engaging and closer to mainstream European policy preferences. From economics to security, Europe values predictability in U.S. leadership, something that has been in remarkably short supply under the Trump administration. The anticipated shift is likely to be most profound from the perspective of the EU and its institutions. Among member states, there was always a spectrum of views about Donald Trump. The outgoing administration’s approach enjoyed a degree of support in right-wing and nationalist circles, including several governments in Central and Eastern Europe. For some, this was a matter of ideology. For others it was a cooler geopolitical calculus. In general, however, the Trump administration was derided for its brash unilateral style as much as its policy choices, most of which were at odds with EU preferences. The list of sharp differences ranged from climate policy to trade, from Iran to the World Health Organization. Above all, Trump and his key advisors were seen as dismissive of, or even opposed to, the idea of the EU itself. For them, international politics seemed to be about nation states, often individual leaders—some seen positively, most seen negatively. The traditional U.S. attachment to the “European project” had become the preserve of a foreign policy elite with little influence on Trump and his circle. A Biden administration should spell a return to the traditional balance in transatlantic relations, with the EU itself taken seriously again alongside relations with France, Germany, and others. On substance, there is a realization that it may not all be smooth sailing across the Atlantic. Trade and digital policy are widely assumed to be the most challenging areas. Indeed, there is some concern that Biden may find it difficult to move away from the protectionist stance that has taken hold in recent years, against the backdrop of similar pressures in Europe and elsewhere. On other fronts, the outlook is for closer consultation and convergence. EU leaders will welcome a U.S. return to the Paris climate accords and the World Health Organization. Biden has signaled a desire to bring the United States back into the multilateral nuclear agreement with Iran. A Biden administration is assumed to be more interested in and willing to assist with a host of problems on Europe’s periphery, from Africa to the Eastern Mediterranean. In some respects, NATO was one of the areas least affected by Trump’s approach to the world. The U.S. military presence in Europe has grown modestly but steadily; a trend that began under President Barack Obama. U.S. complaints about defense burden-sharing were nothing new, even if the style was more abrasive. But from the start, Trump spread anxiety about the solidity of the U.S. commitment to European defense. It never quite came to a disavowal of Article V, and Trump would have faced a very tough bipartisan battle if he ever wished to leave NATO as he hinted on more than one occasion. By contrast, it is assumed that a Biden administration would put NATO back at the core of U.S. strategy. In policy terms, the emphasis on increased European defense spending will surely continue. There will be a tougher and more predictable line on Russia, coupled with an interest in new arms-control arrangements. Biden is a well-known figure in NATO circles. For the alliance, a Biden administration will be a return to the known world and an energizing element for the institution.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Links › General Links › Links --- Unexpected Changes

Concept key opportunity to integrate cyber and tech capabilities

Speranza 12/1/21

(Lauren Speranza, Director of the Transatlantic Defense and Security Program at the Center for European Policy Analysis, “American Leadership in NATO: A Rocky Return but a Firm Future,” pg online @ // um-ef)

Nevertheless, the Biden administration remains committed to NATO. President Joe Biden and his team believe America and its allies are at a historical inflection point. In the strategic competition with China and Russia, they view NATO as a great advantage. They see the strategic concept drafting process as a critical opportunity to make NATO work better in this environment—to serve not only US interests, but the shared interests of its allies and partners. For the US, adapting NATO for strategic competition will mean closing a decades-long chapter of out-of-area operations in favour of investing more in cyber and technological capabilities. It will require empowering Europe to be a more equal partner in defence, as well as creating more global partnership platforms to support allied objectives beyond the Euro-Atlantic sphere. It will also involve reinforcing the shared democratic values that unite NATO allies against their authoritarian challengers. To these ends, the US has a robust list of priorities for NATO’s next Strategic Concept.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Links › General Links › Links --- Unexpected Changes

U.S. acting unpredictably undermines the Concept and guts cohesion

Speranza 12/1/21

(Lauren Speranza, Director of the Transatlantic Defense and Security Program at the Center for European Policy Analysis, “American Leadership in NATO: A Rocky Return but a Firm Future,” pg online @ // um-ef)

Although America is ‘back’ at NATO, Europe remains unsettled about the credibility and longevity of US commitments to the alliance. A cloud of uncertainty hangs over the alliance’s next Strategic Concept and how the two sides will craft a common agenda to endure the coming decade. The Biden administration, despite a few recent transatlantic missteps, recognises the gravity of this moment and has come prepared with a focused set of priorities for NATO’s future. Following his successful first trip to Europe, a string of recent US decisions has undermined President Biden’s early pledges to strengthen cooperation with NATO allies. Whether the tacit approval of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, the chaotic withdrawal from Afghanistan, or the controversial announcement of the AUKUS security pact, these disjointed moves have begun to sow doubt in Europe about America’s willingness and ability to work jointly with Europe, even under an Atlanticist president. While the Biden administration has acknowledged and sought to address these slipups, such unpredictability in the transatlantic relationship has weakened the political cohesion required for building NATO’s next Strategic Concept.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Links › General Links › Links --- Small Affs/Small Changes

Smaller policies like the plan get codified in NATO’s strategic concept – failure to prioritize overstretches the alliance and makes it ineffective.

Ringsmose and Rynning 21 [Jens Ringsmose, Dean of the Faculty of Business and Social Sciences at SDU, has been appointed as the new Rector of the University of Southern Denmark from 1 November 2021. Sten Rynning is Professor in the Center for War Studies at the University of Southern Denmark.; “NATO’s Next Strategic Concept: Prioritise or Perish”; Survival; September 28, 2021; https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00396338.2021.1982203]//eleanor

Historically, NATO’s Strategic Concepts have served multiple purposes. Firstly and most importantly, they have provided the Alliance with strategic direction: they have prioritised threats, fundamental tasks and geographical points of concern, and established guidelines for the force posture of tomorrow. Secondly, NATO’s Strategic Concepts have codified lesser, piecemeal decisions and appraisals of the strategic environment most often articulated in ministerial communiqués and summit declarations. As such, the concepts have been backward-looking, justifying past decisions and choices. Thirdly, the unclassified post-Cold War concepts have been vehicles of public diplomacy, conveying the purpose of the Alliance. NATO has adopted three concepts since 1989, and all have consciously been crafted to sell the Alliance to the public. Finally, NATO’s Strategic Concepts have served an important processual purpose. By compelling allies to confront and discuss vexing strategic issues, the process leading to the approval of a new concept – at its best – facilitates compromise and a unity of thought and purpose.3 In February 2021, Stoltenberg outlined seven broad areas he sees as key to the process of renovating the Strategic Concept.4 His ‘Food for Thought Paper’ may be seen as an opening shot, but our assessment is that an Atlantic Alliance committed to a new Strategic Concept must make bold decisions both to confront a new world order and to correct past weaknesses. Given that Russia and China have become the chief threats to NATO, the Strategic Concept should focus on these two countries and lay out the implications of their policies and activities for NATO priorities across tasks and regions. Put differently, a future concept without a hierarchy of threats and tasks will be unfit for purpose. Yet NATO comes to this project with a distinct degree of in-house political–military tension. Since 2017, the Alliance’s military authorities have crafted significant new strategic documents without clear political or grand-strategic guidance. To be sure, ministerial and summit communiqués have guided the military,5 but the political–military dialogue stopped short in 2016 and now needs to be revitalised. The new concept should not only address these issues but do so in a form that offers a compelling strategic narrative of why the citizens of NATO countries are well served by an alliance whose members collectively spend more than $1,000 billion on defence.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Links › General Links › Links --- Small Affs/Small Changes

Smaller decisions like the plan get codified in NATO’s strategic concept.

Ringsmose and Rynning 09 [Jens Ringsmose, Dean of the Faculty of Business and Social Sciences at SDU, has been appointed as the new Rector of the University of Southern Denmark from 1 November 2021. Sten Rynning is Professor in the Center for War Studies at the University of Southern Denmark; “Come Home NATO? The Atlantic Alliance’s New Strategic Concept; Danish Institute for International Studies; 2009; https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/97584/DIIS_report_200904_RingmoseRynning_NATO_web.pdf]//eleanor

NATO's first Strategic Concept Of 1949 always served more than just one purpose. Today, we argue, the document has at least three major functions: two internal and one external. One Of its internal functions is to codify past decisions and practices and thus solidify the Alliance's foundation. Codification is akin to vacuum-clean- ing, as one senior NATO official put it: a new Strategic Concept summarizes and formalizes the string Of ministerial communiqués and lesser decisions that have emerged since the last Strategic Concept. 5 Every ministerial communiqué is in fact a miniature Strategic Concepts the official argued, and from time to time real world events will have driven NATO so far down new paths that it is necessary to gather all the miniatures and combine them in one overarching document. The exercise is meant to provide coherence to a record of decisions and engagements that may not always be coherent at first sight. "This points us to another internal function, namely that of providing new strategic direction — Of laying down the foundation for future coherence. Strategic direction was a crucial purpose of the Cold War Concepts, of course, and it remains essential, albeit in a new context of public diplomacy (see below) and codifica- tion. It is in fact difficult to disentangle these functions. Strategic direction concerns most fundamentally the basic values Of the Washington Treaty and their defense in global and regional contexts, which is also where this section began. "The allies must basically provide strategic direction by defining the balance between regional and global engagements, the type of threats the alliance is likely to encounter, and what it can do about them. In providing answers to these questions, and thus providing strategic direction, the Alliance inevitably conducts public diplomacy. Moreover, to move the world, the Alliance needs a place to stand, and so strategic direction begins where codification ends.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Links › General Links › Links --- Limited Mandate

Limited security guarantees are KEY, overstretching NATO directly hurts deterrence efforts.

Petersson 22 [Eivind Vad Petersson is the State Secretary to Anniken Huitfeldt, the Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs, 5-23-2022, Transatlantic Unity in Times of War, Government.no, https://www.regjeringen.no/en/aktuelt/transatlantic_unity/id2913989/] Eric

Sixth take-away: The war in Ukraine has laid bare the risk that Russian expansionism poses to Nato partners, and especially those who aspire for membership. Our Open Door policy is not credible if Russia is ready to close the door at any time. Now, the Alliance cannot extend security guarantees to non-members. But we can tailor our partnerships to this new reality, by putting more emphasis on defence and interoperability. Enabling partners to better protect themselves. And I see no reason why we shouldn’t resort to more common funding to achieve this end. We need to be more agile, and we must be able to muster the necessary resources on short notice.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Links › General Links › Links --- Standardization/Regs

U.S. and Europe divided over emerging tech standard-setting --- will fight over the plan to protect their domestic industries

Goodman ‘21

(Matthew P. Goodman is senior vice president for economics and holds the Simon Chair in Political Economy at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. Brooke Roberts is a research associate with the Economics Program at CSIS, “Toward a T12: Putting Allied Technology Cooperation into Practice,” pg online @ //um-ef)

WHERE TO FOCUS COOPERATION? After agreeing on the technologies to prioritize, allies will need to decide how to direct their efforts along the technology development chain and what substantive issues to focus on. There are opportunities to expand cooperation across a range of activities, from research collaboration to joint financing. In roundtables and conversations with experts conducted by the CSIS Economics Program as part of this project, two cross-cutting issues repeatedly came up: data and standards. Focusing allied efforts on aligning approaches in these two areas would make a significant contribution to joint promotion of critical technologies. After agreeing on the technologies to prioritize, allies will need to decide how to direct their efforts along the technology development chain and what substantive issues to focus on. Data In 2020, the world generated some 44 zettabytes of data—“40 times more bytes than there are stars in the observable universe.” Data are everywhere, fueling technology and informing our decisions and innovation choices. In biotechnology, for example, data analytics help biopharmaceutical researchers identify drug candidates for early-stage testing and drug development. Progress in AI development is largely a function of data and the computing power to process it. These and similar innovations are dependent on data quantity, quality, and diversity—how much data one has, how accurate and usable those data are, and how many different types of data are available. As the Global Data Alliance, an industry coalition, notes, greater data quantity allows researchers and firms to “identify meaningful insights, patterns, and connections that can aid R&D teams in discovering and developing novel solutions to scientific and technical challenges.” Access to high-quality data enables faster, more reliable discoveries. Data diversity helps researchers and firms broaden these discoveries, applying them to new products, patients, and processes. Data are essential to allied technology efforts for the seemingly simple reason that sharing data is beneficial. Sharing increases the quantity of data and therefore the potential for new discoveries. But it also improves the quality of data, by allowing entities to verify their data against data held by others and to inform, supplement, and complement their data. Sharing data can also increase the diversity of data sets, allowing researchers and producers to apply their results to a wider range of products and demographics. This is especially important in the development of AI, where access to different types of data allows machines to make better decisions. For all the benefits of data sharing, a number of frictions impede allied cooperation in this area. These include national laws and policies to protect the privacy and security of sensitive data. Every government has a legitimate interest in ensuring that sensitive personal, business, and government information does not get into the wrong hands, and law and policy in this area nearly always restrict the use and sharing of this data in some ways. The problem is when these restrictions inhibit reasonable, responsible, and ethical data sharing with organizations in like-minded countries involved in joint research projects. There are emerging differences in national philosophies and regulatory approaches to data privacy and security that complicate, or may preclude, allied data sharing in support of joint promotion of critical technologies. As mentioned earlier, the European Union considers personal data privacy a human right and has put into law what is arguably the global standard for data protection in its General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). Several other countries have enacted data laws based on GDPR, including South Korea and India. For its part, the United States has a patchwork of privacy rules at the state and sectoral level but no comprehensive federal legislation in this area. By contrast, data security has taken on new salience in Washington, as highlighted by President Biden’s signing of an executive order in this area in June. How this will affect Washington’s historic position that data should generally flow freely across borders remains to be seen. Meanwhile, several allied and partner countries have also enacted data localization policies, which require data to be stored domestically. This can silo data within states, impede data flows, and undermine innovation. According to a report by the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation (ITIF), as of 2020, 62 countries had enacted 144 data localization policies. Many governments such as the European Union and South Korea claim that data localization is necessary to protect “important” or “sensitive” data from being shared; U.S. financial regulators take a similar view with respect to financial data. However, localization policies are often broadly applied and seem to be less about legitimate protection than about protectionism. Efforts to bridge the differences among allies on data flows, privacy, and security have so far had mixed success. Japan has usefully put forward the concept of “data free flow with trust (DFFT)” and won both G7 and G20 endorsement of the idea, but it has yet to be turned into an agreed set of rules and practices. To facilitate data flows across the Atlantic, the United States and the European Union negotiated a “privacy shield” in 2016, providing a mechanism for companies to comply with GDPR regulations when transferring data from Europe to the United States. However, in 2020, the European Court of Justice found that the framework failed to meet GDPR standards and subsequently invalidated the policy. Without a replacement framework, transatlantic technology cooperation will be constrained. More positively, as detailed in a CSIS report in April 2021, there has been useful work on developing agreed approaches to data governance in a number of recent trade agreements, particularly among U.S. partners in the Asia-Pacific region. The U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) incorporates and builds on commitments to substantially free cross-border data flows and other rules the United States won agreement to in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) before it pulled out in early 2017. Similar provisions were included in the U.S.-Japan Digital Trade Agreement concluded in 2019. And Singapore has been a leader in aligning data governance policies through its bilateral trade agreements, in the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum and through its innovative DEPA arrangement. Moving forward, to capitalize on the innovation gains that come from sharing data and promote meaningful allied technology cooperation, the Biden administration should focus on several lines of effort to reconcile the divergent approaches to data governance among its key allies. First, it should work with Congress to enact comprehensive federal privacy legislation. Second, it should use the new TTC forum with the European Union to align transatlantic positions on data privacy, security, and flows. Third, it should embrace the work on data governance in the Asia-Pacific region, starting by docking onto DEPA. And fourth, it should work to identify areas where U.S. agencies can pool data with like-minded countries in the interest of conducting joint research on issues of mutual concern. (For example, NIST could combine data with UK or EU counterparts to improve the accuracy of facial recognition tests.) These efforts will help improve the quantity, quality, and diversity of allied data sets, enabling greater innovation opportunities for allied researchers and firms in critical sectors such as AI, biotech, semiconductors, and telecommunications. Standards The term “standards” is used to describe a broad array of rules, metrics, and norms, ranging from ubiquitous technical specifications like Bluetooth to safety requirements such as the warning labels found on lawn mowers to expected approaches that establish a certain baseline such as in accounting standards. In all these variations, standards convey a sense of expectation of performance. There are broadly two types of standards: consensus standards and technical regulations. Consensus standards are the outcomes of processes where general agreement rather than unanimity is sought and the development of such outcomes is voluntary. Technical regulations refer to the use of standards by the government to meet a specific policy objective and where conformance with the standard is mandatory. Standards are critical to innovation for two reasons: first, they provide a foundation for technology development upon which product differentiation can be made, which makes it easier to deploy competitive products, including by leveraging first-mover advantages; and second, they boost product interoperability and consumer confidence in technologies, expanding existing technology markets and helping to create new ones. The focus here is mainly on voluntary standards because, as with data governance, there is arguably more work to be done to align allied approaches. Global standards are typically set in a broad range of bodies that are open to participation by all interested stakeholders and where decisionmaking is done by consensus. Examples of such as bodies include the International Organization for Standardization (ISO), the Third Generation Partnership Project (3GPP), and the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE). Participants in these bodies include a mix of government and private-sector researchers and other experts from the member countries. The process for reaching agreement on standards varies by organization, with different thresholds in balloting that help establish consensus. As is the case with data governance, the United States and its allies have different approaches to standard setting. While government agencies such as the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), the Department of Defense, and the Department of Transportation participate in many standard-setting bodies, Washington does not lead in setting technical standards. It is the long-standing policy of the United States to allow the private sector to take the lead, leveraging the extensive technical expertise and experience available in industry and its knowledge of market need and demands. This private-sector–led approach—in which the U.S. government participates as a contributor, user, and enforcer—has helped establish and maintain U.S. industrial and technological leadership since World War II. By contrast, governments in Europe and Asia tend to have a top-down approach to standard setting, establishing standardization priorities and attempting to develop and protect domestic champions. In order to achieve these objectives, these governments often send a large number of officials to push for preferred national outcomes. While there is a strong case for the U.S. government to step up its long-term game in international standard setting—for example, by investing in and adequately resourcing government experts to participate in global standards work—the likelihood that the United States and its allies will align their approaches in standard-setting bodies is low. In addition to the philosophical differences, these countries are also competitors and want their own companies and technologies to “win” in the marketplace. There are numerous examples of such competition in emerging technologies such as cloud computing, cybersecurity, and advanced manufacturing. Moreover, the industry-led U.S. approach, with its competitive dynamics among actors who have a better sense of the market potential of new technologies than governments, arguably has real advantages over the top-down approach used by Europe and other allies.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Links › General Links › Links --- Standardization/Regulation

Technology regulation causes NATO to pursue a “broad and shallow” approach that overextends and dilutes the alliance.

Moller and Rynning 21 [Sara Bjerg Moller is Assistant Professor in the School of Diplomacy and International Relations at Seton Hall University. Sten Rynning is Professor in the Center for War Studies at the University of Southern Denmark.; “Revitalizing Transatlantic Relations: NATO 2030 and Beyond”; The Washington Quarterly; March 23, 2021; https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/0163660X.2021.1896133?journalCode=rwaq20#:~:text=If%20the%20allies%20are%20not,before%20it%20has%20even%20begun.]//eleanor

If the allies are not careful, domestic contentions and international disputes over trade and technology regulation could consume their political energy, breaking the promise of transatlantic renewal before it has even begun. To stave off this dim prospect, NATO is embarking on a strategy of transatlantic renewal, the centerpiece of which will be a new Strategic Concept—its first in a decade. NATO’s current Strategic Concept dates back to 2010 and reflects NATO’s thinking on how to cope with the divisive nature of the War on Terror, and it is inadequate for a changed world of great power rivalry. A new Strategic Concept has long been on the agenda in the corridors of NATO diplomacy, but no one dared open this Pandora’s Box during the Trump presidency. Following the November 2020 US presidential elections, NATO’s Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg stepped forward to sketch a calendar for strategic change: a mandate for a Strategic Concept review from the NATO heads of state and government in mid-2021, leading to their agreement on a new Strategic Concept in mid-2022.2 The virtue of this calendar is that it runs with the positive momentum of change inherent in the Biden presidency and concludes after German (October 2021) and French (April–May 2022) elections, with the timing ending before Stoltenberg’s mandate as Secretary General expires in September 2022. Stoltenberg has in fact been building up this momentum for change through 2020, having gained a mandate from a NATO Leaders Meeting in December 2019 to frame a “forward-looking reflection process” to strengthen NATO’s political dimension and consultation mechanisms.3 The reflection process—run by 10 experts under Stoltenberg’s guidance—was rebranded as the NATO 2030 initiative last March, complete with a slick new promotional campaign to spur public debate and interest in the alliance’s work. The experts’ report was made public in early December 2020: it too called for a review of the Strategic Concept, including a significant upgrade to NATO’s “political dimension.” 4 NATO is thus confronted with the choice of whether to merely update its old Strategic Concept from 2010 or do a 360 degree top-to-bottom review of it. A simple update would entail a broad focus on a growing range of “core tasks” running on parallel tracks. Stoltenberg has indicated a preference for this option, which is reflective of a complex and unwieldy security environment.5 But more of the same carries a risk of diluting NATO both politically and militarily: it would fragment NATO’s political focus, leave the deterrence of Russia incomplete, and fail to define collective defense interests in regard to China. In other words, there is a real risk that NATO will seek the wrong kind of renewal: going “broad and shallow” by taking on more tasks and/or elevating existing missions, like counterterrorism, to sit alongside collective defense, crisis management, and cooperative security as “core tasks” of equal importance, as it did when it elevated the latter two mandates in 2010.6 NATO should instead go “narrow and deep” on collective defense, recommitting itself to its original purpose of deterring and defending against systemic rivals.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Links › General Links › Links --- Standardization/Regulation

Plan causes fights between allies to safeguard and prioritize their domestic industries --- undermines and slows the plan

Goodman ‘21

(Matthew P. Goodman is senior vice president for economics and holds the Simon Chair in Political Economy at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. Brooke Roberts is a research associate with the Economics Program at CSIS, “Toward a T12: Putting Allied Technology Cooperation into Practice,” pg online @ //um-ef)

Moreover, while the United States and its allies share many values and interests, they are also economic competitors. U.S., European, and Asian companies compete globally for profits and market shares. Their willingness to collaborate only goes as far as will benefit them commercially, or as far as government incentives can sway them to collaborate through subsidies or other incentives. And for political, national security, and other reasons, governments naturally prioritize the interests of their own companies over those in other countries. In addition to impeding collaboration, national efforts to promote onshore production in critical technologies could lead to redundancy and global overcapacity.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Links › General Links › Links --- General Tech/U.S. Push

U.S. security cooperation undermines cohesion and interoperability --- ensures U.S.-driven tech lead and European backlash over tech control

Aronsson ‘18

(Lisa, Analyst in International Affairs April 24, 2018, “Transatlantic Perspectives on Defense Innovation: Issues for Congress,” pg online @ //um-ef)

NATO’s Innovation Challenges Even as some NATO allies develop defense innovation strategies, NATO faces a series of obstacles to coordinating these initiatives, aligning national perspectives, and forging a unified approach. Without legal or financial mechanisms to steer the allies in a particular direction, or the ability to effect a step change across the alliance, NATO relies on its efforts to build and share knowledge among the allies, set agendas, establish priorities, and promote multinational cooperation. Generally speaking, NATO’s innovation challenges relate to  securing resources for innovation and engaging commercial industry;  balancing short-term priorities with preparations for the future;  preserving interoperability and transatlantic burden-sharing;  harmonizing defense planning processes, including with the EU; and  using allies’ diversity to foster more effective innovation. Resources for Innovation During the Cold War, the United States and its NATO allies maintained defense spending and investment levels sufficient to ensure their military technological superiority. Large U.S. public investment programs in technology and innovation supported U.S. economic success and spurred innovation. 128 The U.S. government was a driver for innovation through the internet, biotech, and shale gas, for example, in part because of its willingness to invest in early stages of the innovation cycle.129 Analysts have concluded that long-term government funding for defense and civilian R&D are key ingredients for the development of dual-use technology. 130 Since the end of the Cold War, however, the United States shifted attention away from government-led innovation and toward “consumption markets.”131 As a result it faces new challenges that relate to cost pressures, limited budgets, the shift from “defense spin-offs to consumer-market spin-ons” in technology, and rising international competition. 132 Since 2014, NATO allies have been increasing their defense spending and investment budgets, with Canada and the European allies spending more on defense in 2017 for the third consecutive year.133 In addition to more funding, NATO has other strengths to leverage, including hosting high-performing universities and research labs as well as dynamic and open economies that attract talent. These strengths could potentially give NATO access to a wide network of innovative entrepreneurs and ideas. At the same time, however, European governments continue to be constrained by relatively limited budget environments and resources for defense R&D. The budgetary context that allowed for the Third Offset Strategy in the United States, for example, does not exist anywhere in Europe. For some European governments, relatively small increases in defense spending require a convincing political narrative. Even then, the resources devoted to defense are often allocated toward more pressing short-term priorities such as readiness and current operations. Relatively limited budgets combined with NATO’s bureaucratic processes and a risk-averse culture are likely to continue to present challenges for NATO in its efforts to build relationships with large technology companies or other sources of innovation. NATO’s capacity has also been reduced over time through reductions to the command structure.134 Defense Ministers recently agreed to reverse the downsizing trend by introducing two new military command centers, but the new staff is expected to focus on maritime security, troop movements, and contingency planning for Eastern and Southern Europe. Transatlantic burden-sharing continues to be a priority for the Trump Administration. While European allies are increasing their defense budgets, they are unlikely to close the capabilities gap with the United States any time soon because that gap reflects decades of spending patterns as well as historical experience and strategic culture. 140 The risk is that the gap could deepen if the United States continues to pursue a technology-driven strategy and Europeans do not, or if the United States moves faster than its NATO allies on fielding new technologies. 141 In particular, a technology gap could present challenges to the interoperability of NATO forces, especially if the future battlefield demands faster decisionmaking, more rapid troop movements, or an immediate response to a crisis situation in close proximity to or even inside NATO territory. NATO officials are working on processes to integrate national technologies and assets into NATO networks and structures, and they are evaluating how those networks could be tested in a crisis situation.142 As technology advances and international competition grows, this challenge could become both more difficult and more important for NATO. It could also increase the pressure on NATO to ensure that technology transfer moves in both directions across the Atlantic, as there is a conviction in Europe that not only should European militaries “buy American,” but NATO should help European companies gain access to the U.S. defense market, too. 143

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Links › General Links › Links --- General Tech/U.S. Push

Plan disrupts cohesion and interoperability --- U.S. moves too fast

Aronsson ‘18

(Lisa, Analyst in International Affairs April 24, 2018, “Transatlantic Perspectives on Defense Innovation: Issues for Congress,” pg online @ //um-ef)

Congress may consider what role the United States can play to support NATO’s adaptation, and what channels Congress could pursue to exert influence over NATO’s direction. There are both risks and opportunities associated with sharing technology or developing it jointly with NATO allies, and there are questions about what the United States and its allies expect from one another in terms of technology and innovation. Technology has the potential to enhance NATO’s effectiveness, but it also has the potential to undermine interoperability or political cohesion if the United States develops a technology-driven strategy and its NATO allies either do not keep pace, or do not adapt to strategic, political, and technological change.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Links › General Links › Links --- Focus

Concept key to reinforce deterrence --- adding new issues to the NATO menu trades-off with focus

Speranza 12/1/21

(Lauren Speranza, Director of the Transatlantic Defense and Security Program at the Center for European Policy Analysis, “American Leadership in NATO: A Rocky Return but a Firm Future,” pg online @ // um-ef)

Balancing Russia and China First and foremost, the US will want the Strategic Concept, last updated in 2010, to more accurately reflect today’s threat environment. This requires acknowledging that NATO is up against not one, but two strategic challengers—Russia and China—and getting the balance right between the two. Step one is to recast Russia, which is no longer the possible partner envisioned in the last concept but now an adversarial force. The aim should be to provide a clear mandate and a unified threat assessment to better enable the alliance to address the Kremlin’s persistent probing and aggression in Europe. While some allies have accused the Biden administration of trying to “park” the Russia issue in favour of other priorities (China), Washington has kept a focus on Moscow in respect to arms control, cyber threats, authoritarianism, disinformation and foreign malign influence. US Defense Secretary Austin’s recent visit to the Black Sea reinforced US commitment to countering Russia’s conventional military threat in Europe and NATO’s fundamental role in deterring and defending against it. Step two is to add China, which is not even mentioned in the last concept. Reflecting its own geostrategic shift to the Indo-Pacific, which elevates China as the “pacing” challenge over a Russia in relative decline, the US has spent the last few years pushing NATO to do more about China. Washington has met resistance from some allies who view China primarily as a US problem with a military threat too far from NATO’s borders; or prefer to maintain cautious cooperation with China in favour of lucrative economic opportunities; or argue Russia remains the most pressing threat, more squarely in NATO’s wheelhouse. In the 2021 Brussels Summit Communique, allies carefully cited both the challenges and opportunities posed by China’s rise for the first time in a NATO document. From here, the US wants the new concept to clarify NATO’s role and approach. But a robust debate is ongoing, even in Washington, on whether NATO should focus on countering China in the European theatre (primarily through building resilience to cyber threats, technological penetration, and political and economic subversion) or branch out to more conventional military activities with key allies in the Indo-Pacific (though not necessarily under a NATO flag). Hoping to leverage its closest allies against both its major challengers, the US will want the alliance to help address the “strategic simultaneity” problem. Given that the US and its allies could face two crises at once—one in Europe’s East with Russia and another in the Indo-Pacific with China—who will go where, what will they bring and what role will NATO itself have? Answering these questions will require frank conversations among the US and its allies about division of labour, expectations and assumptions that will be baked into the Strategic Concept. Boosting Defence, Deterrence and Burden Sharing Another top priority for the US in the concept will be bolstering the basics—i.e., ensuring NATO can fulfil its core function of defence and deterrence—whether against Russia, China or any other actor. Some in Washington worry NATO’s recent efforts to take on new issues like climate security could distract from the alliance’s baseline tasks. The US will push to keep a focus on filling key capability gaps; improving mobility, readiness and exercises; designating forces to implement NATO’s new defence plans; enhancing interoperability; and speeding up decision-making.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Links › General Links › Links --- Focus

Narrow focus is key.

Moller and Rynning 21 [Sara Bjerg Moller is Assistant Professor in the School of Diplomacy and International Relations at Seton Hall University. Sten Rynning is Professor in the Center for War Studies at the University of Southern Denmark.; “Revitalizing Transatlantic Relations: NATO 2030 and Beyond”; The Washington Quarterly; March 23, 2021; https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/0163660X.2021.1896133?journalCode=rwaq20#:~:text=If%20the%20allies%20are%20not,before%20it%20has%20even%20begun.]//eleanor

NATO’s continued transformation in the coming years seems all but certain; less certain is what it will transform into. The alliance has survived this long by adapting. But unlike during previous rounds of adaptation that involved the alliance taking on more responsibilities and tasks, the coming decades—whose defining feature will be the continued rise of China—will require a much more narrowly focused alliance. For nigh on three decades, NATO had the luxury of pondering what kind of alliance it wanted to be as it searched for a new raison d’etre in the reduced threat environment following the end of the Cold War. But the contrast between the 1990s and today’s deluge of challenges and threats is stark, and NATO no longer has the luxury of time. To ensure the alliance’s future operational utility, the alliance must embrace its original collective defense identity and look for ways to streamline, and where possible reduce, its existing collective security and crisis management activities. In addition to offloading existing responsibilities to the EU and UN, NATO should think twice before taking on new mandates and avoid elevating new tasks like resiliency or counterterrorism missions and assigning them equal importance to Article 5. The alternative to the vision outlined here is an alliance increasingly weighed down by a myriad of tasks, unable to prioritize among them, and lacking both the political will and financial resources to perform its main function. An overburdened NATO risks being unable to fulfill its chief purpose of collective defense, thereby increasing the risk of further fracturing within the alliance. The proposed course of action will by no means be an easy one. But it provides the best chance to guarantee that the transatlantic alliance will have the capabilities and assets needed to meet the challenges posed by China’s rise.