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2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Uniqueness › General › 1NC/2NC --- Uniqueness

NATO is developing a new strategic concept --- maintaining a delicate balance, while pushing the core strategy is critical for unity, cohesion, and effective alliance stability

Martin and Martonffy ‘21

(Garret Martin is a senior professorial lecturer at American University’s School of International Service and the co-director of the Transatlantic Policy Center. Balazs Martonffy, who received his PhD from American University, is the director of the American Studies Research Institute at Ludovika and a nonresident fellow at the International Center for Security and Leadership, “NATO is about to launch a formal strategic review. Here’s what that means,” pg online @ //um-ef)

After rocky relations with the Trump administration, NATO will be keen to project unity at its summit beginning Monday. Media reporting will pay close attention to how other leaders welcome Joe Biden to his first NATO summit as president — and whether he can start to deliver on a pledge to “repair our alliances.” Here’s some equally significant news: NATO is likely to formally launch the update of its Strategic Concept for the first time since 2009. The Strategic Concept, which articulates how NATO implements the principles of its 1949 founding treaty, has gone through seven iterations. During the Cold War, the alliance produced four classified versions, plus there have been three public ones since the fall of the Berlin Wall (1991, 1999 and 2010). This is a core text that spells out NATO’s “enduring purpose and nature, and its fundamental security tasks” — but there’s no road map to determine when the alliance should update its Strategic Concept. Our research, though, identifies the three major conditions that need to be present before NATO initiates this key review exercise. 1. Changes in the international security landscape The Strategic Concept operationalizes the alliance’s goals and tasks. As such, one would expect that major changes in the international security environment would prompt a revision of the document. The relationship between such shifts and the review, however, is more nuanced. Biden’s in Europe to reassure nervous allies. When does reassurance work? Changes in the security environment can contribute to a “widespread feeling ... it is time to take stock” among NATO allies, but they don’t necessarily immediately result in a new Strategic Concept. The lag is not unexpected. After all, an alliance with 30 members needs time to digest these changes and their implications. Moreover, member countries often have divergent threat perceptions. A major security shock can cause conflicting interpretations — that’s what happened in the aftermath of the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. NATO had to overcome disagreements about the nature and causes of terrorism, and it issued a new Strategic Concept nine years later. 2. Consensus on NATO’s current responsibilities Although a new Strategic Concept is “useful but not essential” when it comes to NATO’s day-to-day operations, the document does play a formal codifying role. NATO is a versatile organization, able over time to organically take on new tasks. And, once the alliance has taken on sufficient new responsibilities since the previous strategic review, it becomes easier to justify starting a new process; what one senior official called “akin to doing the vacuum cleaning.” At the same time, launching the revision process requires NATO to navigate delicate internal and external hurdles. Strategic Concepts are acts of public diplomacy and a key way to highlight NATO’s continued relevance. A high-level strategic review can exacerbate existing tensions among NATO members, running the risk of revealing a lack of unity about the future of the alliance as opposed to bolstering consensus around key security challenges. The U.S. and NATO promised to protect Ukraine. If Ukraine is the aggressor, all bets are off. For example, NATO faces perennial questions about its raison d’etre, be it at the end of the Cold War or in the late 2000s, with its struggles in Afghanistan. Debates in the mid-2000s about a “Global NATO,” and how this shift would affect the core task of defense of the transatlantic area, delayed the push toward a new Strategic Concept during the George W. Bush administration, despite the impact of 9/11. 3. Leaders who push for a strategic review Summoning the will for a major review isn’t an easy feat for an alliance with 30 members — often it takes senior decision-makers to push for consensus to move forward. Revising the Strategic Concept implies disrupting the day-to-day work of the alliance and overcoming bureaucratic inertia. It is also a complex political process that diverts precious resources away from fulfilling NATO’s existing mandates. Considering the political sensitivity of the Strategic Concept, only very senior officials can realistically take on the role of overcoming organizational reticence. Sometimes it takes a leader from a member country to push hard, as German Chancellor Angela Merkel, representing a broader coalition, did in 2006 when she called for a new Strategic Concept. But NATO secretary generals have also taken on ambitious and entrepreneurial roles. Thus, Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer was a strong advocate for updating the Strategic Concept in the late 2000s, seeking a crowning achievement for when his term ended in 2009. Here’s the outlook in 2021 All three conditions are present, which helps explain why NATO is about to begin the process to draft its eighth version of the Strategic Concept. The security landscape has changed significantly since 2010, and the alliance has already taken steps to adapt, be it bolstering its military readiness to deter Russia or acknowledging China as a new challenge. Moreover, the new Biden administration is more pro-NATO than the Trump administration was, while French President Emmanuel Macron’s November 2019 criticism about NATO becoming “brain dead” put pressure on the alliance to demonstrate its continued relevance. And global leaders, along with NATO, have openly pushed for a new Strategic Concept. Germany rapidly proposed, soon after Macron’s comments, the establishment of an expert group to rejuvenate NATO, an idea embraced by Jens Stoltenberg, NATO’s secretary general since 2014. NATO members also endorsed this plan when they met in London in December 2019. The eventual expert report, along with the wider consultations initiated by the secretary general as part of the NATO 2030 initiative, have helped to build consensus for the next Strategic Concept. What happens now? In a bid to show renewed unity, NATO members are widely expected to launch a revision process of the Strategic Concept at the summit Monday. But achieving consensus on a number of issues will be challenging. Defining NATO’s role toward China, and the alliance’s mandate on democratic resilience and climate change, are two areas in particular where alliance members will struggle to find agreement.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Uniqueness › General › 1NC/2NC --- Uniqueness

There is an internal battle on the future of NATO now --- defense planners want to keep the mandate narrow and focused on Russia --- expanding the mandate to include emerging tech will undermine the effectiveness

Ringsmose and Rynning ‘21

(Jens Ringsmose and Sten Rynning are both professors of war studies at the University of Southern Denmark.“NATO’s Next Strategic Concept: Prioritise or Perish,” Survival Global Politics and Strategy Volume 63, 2021 - Issue 5, pg Taylor and Francis //um-ef)

Who’s in charge? Multiple allies felt taken by surprise by the advanced nature of the thinking that went into NATO’s military strategy. When General Dunford remarked in May 2019 that NATO now had, for the first time ‘in decades’, a military strategy that ‘clearly articulates the challenges that confront NATO’ and ‘provides the framework for the various plans that will be in place if deterrence fails’, he highlighted not only the benefits of an enhanced framework for military planning but also, inadvertently, the political shortcomings of the Alliance’s strategic leadership.30 Some allies felt a need to push back. Tellingly, the United States and the United Kingdom were not among them. American and British military authorities had led the charge and considered both the new military strategy and the derivative theatre-wide DDA as having been politically approved and ready to go.31 Other allies, however, continue to have reservations with regard to the Russia-centric nature of the strategy, and attach importance to a subtle distinction whereby they have merely ‘noted’ the military strategy but explicitly ‘approved’ the DDA. In fact, these allies have sought to contain the 2019 military strategy and to control the 2020 DDA-led process. As noted, they have arrested the overarching threat assessment, pushing for an upgrade of the role of the southern flank. A revised Strategic Concept will have to find a way to balance between Russia-related collective defence and southern counter-terrorism and capacity-building. For now, the southern flank has won a stronger foothold in the DDA, which henceforth will contain a Sequenced Response Plan – which is comparable to the Russia-centric Graduated Response Plans – to address southern contingencies. This is merely a warm-up for a grander political debate, however. A wide variety of allies continue to insist that SACEUR must base theatre- wide DDA planning on compartmentalised Graduated Response Plans. Compartmentalised planning stifles military agility, but allies like to have NATO plans for their particular neighbourhoods and, moreover, the ability to leverage these plans to control SACEUR’s otherwise free rein within a 360-degree approach to NATO’s theatre of operations. Put differently, they are not about to hand SACEUR a mandate to steer the type of ‘horizontal escalation’ that is baked into the theatre-wide approach. Allies are also in control of force investment, and hence the development of the kind of ready and robust forces on which NATO plans depend. In short, SACEUR may possess a stellar military strategy, but he is limited to planning for the simultaneous activation of just two response plans at any one time, and has too few ready and capable troops on which to call. The traumatic retreat from Afghanistan in August 2021 could ultimately enhance political–military coherence and empower SACEUR’s work with the DDA, though the full implications of the withdrawal remain unclear at the time of writing. The retreat suffered from a lack of allied coordination and exposed the heralded NATO principle of ‘in together, out together’ as cover for US-driven planning. European allies found that they could regret the lack of political coordination and harbour different plans, but ultimately lacked the capabilities to resist or influence US policy. The Afghanistan retreat has thus ignited a new, probing debate on transatlantic burden- sharing that can be expected to give the Strategic Concept process a kind of unpredictable energy. What is clear is that European allies who worry about a hard-nosed turn in US policy – as exemplified by Trump’s sweeping critique of NATO allies and now the Biden administration’s actions in Afghanistan – must give thought to their own defence efforts at a level that extends far beyond the intricacies of NATO’s requirement that allies spend 2% of GDP on defence (a 2014 measure intended to increase European spending). Rebalancing NATO has become an issue that the Strategic Concept cannot ignore, but rather must define and build on. NATO has advanced military planning (MC 400/4 and the DDA) to help this process along, and no doubt SACEUR and other military authorities are hopeful that it will result in more confident political engagement with the terms of allied defence and deterrence, including the resourcing of a more robust European force contribution. To achieve this type of greater political–military coherence, NATO’s leadership must offer a corrected transatlantic vision of collective defence that explicitly delineates core lessons from Afghanistan and their implications for a rebalanced NATO. Political revival, but how? Allies have until now been catching up, having been taken by surprise firstly by forward-leaning military authorities, and then by the speed with which Stoltenberg moved to put a revised Strategic Concept on the Alliance’s agenda. In late November 2020, in the wake of the US presidential election, Stoltenberg stated that ‘the time has come to update our strategic concept’.32 A few days later, a Reflection Group appointed by the secretary-general likewise concluded that ‘NATO must update the 2010 Strategic Concept’.33 In February 2021, the secretary-general offered his condensed view of the Reflection Group’s conclusions, writing in his ‘Food for Thought Paper’: ‘At the 2021 Summit, Leaders should agree to update the Strategic Concept’ and ‘should adopt a tasking for me to lead the process’ with a view to concluding it in 2022.34 The leaders duly did so in Brussels on 14 June.35 The need for political reform had been signalled by the trauma of the divisive 2018 Brussels Summit; the decision to celebrate NATO’s 70th anniversary in April 2019 at the level of foreign ministers, rather than heads of state and government; the intensifying disagreement on how NATO should respond to crises in its vicinity, not least in Syria; and finally French President Emmanuel Macron’s November 2019 characterisation of NATO as ‘brain dead’.36 When NATO heads of state and government met in London in December 2019 not for a summit but for a quick Leaders Meeting – this being all they could handle – they readily agreed to ‘invite’ the secretary-general to steer a ‘reflection process’ to ‘further strengthen NATO’s political dimension’.37 Still, the speed with which Stoltenberg enlarged this reflection process into a ‘NATO 2030’ agenda, his bold leap in demanding a revised Strategic Concept, and his equally bold decision to push his February 2021 ‘Food for Thought Paper’ into the public arena were all surprisingly out of character. Stoltenberg had been decisive in helping NATO weather the storm unleashed by Trump, but as a consensus builder who worked behind the scenes while keeping up public appearances. Now, and for good reason, he was charging ahead. The distinct risk of this charge is that it will add to NATO’s political– military tensions. Stoltenberg’s London mandate, and therefore the work of the Reflection Group, was entirely political: there was no built-in requirement to seek political–military coherence. Moreover, even if Stoltenberg has so far confined the Strategic Concept debate to the headquarters of the North Atlantic Council, thereby avoiding extensive committee work and negotiations, he will not be able to imitate Rasmussen’s tightly controlled process in 2010. In fact, NATO leaders have stipulated that while the secretary-general should ‘lead’ the Strategic Concept process, the text ‘will be negotiated and agreed by the Council in Permanent Session and endorsed by NATO Leaders at the next Summit’.38 The upside is that allied buy-in will increase compared with 2010 and thereafter. The downside is that the temptation to be expansive in terms of priorities could grow. The 2020 Reflection Group, steered by the secretary- general, notably did not call for the slimming of NATO’s core tasks.39 In a bid to build a consensus, the secretary-general may feel tempted to lengthen the list of core tasks, perhaps by adding resilience, disruptive technology, pandemics and natural disasters. This temptation will be all the stronger given that, in the meantime, NATO has decided to ‘mainstream’ the challenges posed by China into the Alliance’s many policy portfolios.40 In short, NATO is approaching a revised Strategic Concept with, on the one hand, a political temptation to go big and, on the other, a Russia-centric approach to military planning. To steer clear of further political–military tensions and even rupture, NATO allies should 1) prioritise collective defence; 2) develop a values-based narrative; and 3) intensify its internal political–military dialogue.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Strategic Concept DA – BFHR › Top Shelf › 1NC --- Cohesion DA Shell

C --- United NATO focused on Deterrence prevents war with Russia and China

Marcus Kolga 21, Senior Fellow at the Macdonald-Laurier Institute Center for Advancing Canada’s Interests Abroad, “Improving NATO’s cohesion is critical to combat Russia and China’s threat,” [GRU = Glavnoye Razvedyvatelnoye Upravlenie]

A united NATO is critically important to projecting credible deterrence. The erosion of domestic trust and confidence in the Alliance among its member states, including Canada, represents a threat to this cohesion. A proposal to withdraw Canada from NATO was tabled at a recent policy conference for one of Canada’s three major political parties. The proposal was defeated, but it represents a fringe anti-NATO narrative within Canada’s illiberal left; if left unaddressed, such a narrative could grow.

If countries like Russia perceive NATO as an atomized collection of states with varied priorities rather than a unified front, the Alliance is exposed to a significant risk of miscalculation in which a foreign adversary might believe they can cross a red line and only face a limited response. Thus, gaps in cohesion within the alliance directly threaten to undermine political and military deterrence. The Alliance and members states must work towards improving communications strategies to foster greater basic general understanding of NATO’s purpose, its missions and its role in protecting its members against external threats.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Strategic Concept DA – BFHR › Top Shelf › 1NC --- Cohesion DA Shell

B --- The plan trades-off with NATO focus and cohesion by expanding the alliance outside of its core deterrence tasks

Larsen 22 [Henrik Larsen, Ph.D., is a senior researcher at the Center for Security Studies at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zurich.; “NATO Must Get Resilience Right to Withstand Russia and China”; Lawfare; May 22, 2022; https://www.lawfareblog.com/nato-must-get-resilience-right-withstand-russia-and-china]//eleanor

NATO’s main task in the foreseeable security environment is to adapt to the threat posed by Russia while also trying to reach a precise understanding of the challenge posed by China. At the planned Madrid Summit in June 2022, NATO will adopt a new Strategic Concept to guide the alliance’s future political and military development, which is the right starting point for a new strategy to manage renewed great power competition. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has prompted NATO to eliminate any doubts about its ability and resolve to defend its eastern territory against a Russian attack. NATO is at arguably the most important juncture in its post-Cold War history. NATO must adapt not only its military preparedness but also its approach to the nonmilitary—and specifically illiberal—challenges that Russia and China pose to its resilience and cohesion. To advance their geopolitical interests, Russia and China exploited the openness of society in NATO allies and the divisions between them over the past decade. NATO must always be wary of external challenges that could undermine its unity. This was true during the Cold War in the face of an ideological rival seeking to undermine confidence in Western democratic governments, and it remains true in the face of Russia and China today. Conversely, NATO needs to navigate its adaptation to its illiberal challenge while avoiding functional over-extension. The alliance is at risk of maladaptation, whereby it extends its own activities unnecessarily into civilian areas of security in which it lacks necessary expertise and legacy. Strong voices in the expert community call for NATO to specify resilience as a core task in the forthcoming Strategic Concept, in principle elevating it to a task of equal importance to collective defense. An influential report commissioned by Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg to inspire the Strategic Concept recommends that NATO reinvent itself as a “liberal bulwark” against Russia and China and extend the alliance’s responsibilities into the realm of democratic resilience. NATO must steer clear of the temptation to take on too many tasks and instead enhance resilience only in areas that can be reconciled with its mandate as a security and defense alliance. The encounter with illiberal powers strengthens NATO’s unity, but that does not necessarily mean that NATO is the right institution to meet the illiberal challenges that Russia and China pose. So far, the alliance’s record of responding to these threats has been uneven, and the perspectives about its role have diverged at times between the United States and its European partners. But there is a way forward, if NATO can clearly delineate what should and should not fall within its remit, be clear-eyed about its strategic environment, and prioritize international partners that share NATO’s interests and values. Containing Russia, Watching China NATO’s adaptation to Russia’s revisionist foreign policy has so far focused mostly on the military threat that the country poses. In response to Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, NATO enhanced its capacity for rapid reaction and placed multinational battlegroups in Poland and each of the Baltic states as a “tripwire” to remind Russia of NATO’s collective defense guarantee. In response to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, NATO will likely aim to demonstrate its ability and resolve to repel an attack by Russia’s forces stationed near allied territory by improving its reinforcement capability to deter major Russian military buildups like the one around Ukraine. NATO already boosted its existing forward deployments, while the rise in European defense expenditure will enable the alliance to shoulder a broader deterrence effort. Conversely, NATO has not fully found its foothold when it comes to Russia’s political warfare, by which it has attempted to diminish the alliance’s ability to act cohesively. The digital age has enhanced the opportunities for Russia to engage in information and psychological warfare, including hack-and-leak operations to influence and discredit elections. The polarization of the political landscapes on both sides of the Atlantic over the past decade has made countries more receptive to Russian disinformation and narratives seeking to discredit the democratic process. Moreover, Russian assassination and sabotage operations on NATO territory have contributed to a public sense of vulnerability to heavy-handed authoritarian methods and doubt about the coping power of democratic institutions. China does not compare to the direct threat that Russia poses but has nevertheless appeared on NATO’s strategic radar as an economic great power with a high-tech edge that Russia is unlikely to ever match. Chinese 5G network provider Huawei remains a pertinent topic for NATO, as several European countries, including Germany, Austria, Spain, the Netherlands and Hungary, are still undecided about relying on its potentially compromised technology or de facto allowing their national operators to use Chinese providers. Moreover, Chinese investments in continental Europe without conditionalities attached and targeting critical infrastructure (railway stations, ports and airports) raise suspicions about Beijing’s underlying political and military motives. Moreover, China is pressing ahead with military applications of artificial intelligence (AI), and its space ambitions are growing. Since 2014, NATO has become increasingly aware of the nonmilitary challenges to its unity and resilience but has adapted only in certain respects. It adopted the so-called baseline requirements in 2016, against which it can measure individual allies’ level of resilience regarding their provision of essential services to their domestic populations. These basics that would be necessary to withstand a crisis include access to food, water and energy supplies; maintenance of core functions of government; and resilient civil transportation systems. However, the baseline requirements are technical measurements that do not adequately grasp the political nature of the challenges that Russia and China pose to alliance unity. Moreover, their focus on civil preparedness, resource management and infrastructure does not seem to fit squarely within the competencies of a defense alliance. NATO may be on a slippery slope with the scope of its resilience concept drifting further away from its defense capabilities. NATO, as an organization and as an alliance of states, is aware of the challenges to transatlantic resilience and cohesion that Russia and China pose, but the alliance has not been able to agree on the issues to which it can bring added value. The situation today stands in contrast to the situation during the Cold War when NATO successfully calibrated resilience to the ability to resist an armed attack by focusing on civil emergency planning. Russia and China are illiberal challengers that add new meaning to transatlantic security cooperation, but NATO’s adaptation will depend on the extent to which the United States and Europe can find agreement on investment in transatlantic security.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Strategic Concept DA – BFHR › Top Shelf › 1NC --- Cohesion DA Shell

A --- Russia’s invasion of Ukraine reinvigorates NATO cohesion, but it’s not guaranteed if they don’t focus on Russia.

McRaven 4/20/22 [William H. McRaven, a Senior Adviser at Lazard, is a retired Navy Admiral and was Commander of the U.S. Special Operations Command from 2011 to 2014. Peter Orszag is the Chief Executive Officer of Financial Advisory at Lazard. He was Director of the Office of Management and Budget from 2009 to 2010 and Director of the Congressional Budget Office from 2007 to 2008. Theodore Bunzel, the head of Lazard Geopolitical Advisory, has worked in the political section of the U.S. Embassy in Moscow and at the U.S. Treasury Department.; “Made in the Alliance”; Foreign Affairs; April 20, 2022; https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/world/2022-04-20/made-alliance]//eleanor

Russian President Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine has reinvigorated the Western alliance and bolstered transatlantic solidarity. After being declared “brain dead” by French President Emmanuel Macron in 2019, NATO has sprung to life, deploying forces to its eastern flank and coordinating the provision of sophisticated weapons that have helped Ukraine impede Russia’s invasion. For the first time in its history, the European Union has financed the purchase and delivery of lethal aid. Western countries have vastly exceeded expectations in implementing coordinated financial sanctions that have crippled Russia’s economy. Even neutral Switzerland joined the fray. But no matter how remarkable this solidarity may be in the short term, there is no guarantee that it will last: if policymakers are complacent, powerful trends predating the Ukraine crisis could overwhelm and ultimately derail it. Protectionist sentiment and self-defeating trade wars have pulled at the seams of Western economic integration. Former U.S. President Donald Trump’s threats to pull out of NATO and the chaotic withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021 have chipped away at military trust between the United States and Europe. A Marine Le Pen victory later this month in France would pose additional challenges to the alliance, and looming concerns about the 2024 presidential election raise doubts about the United States’ commitment. If not managed intelligently, the reawakening of Europe as a diplomatic and military actor and the reexamination of global economic interdependence catalyzed by Russia’s invasion could result not in a strengthened transatlantic alliance but in a more worrying outcome: the emergence of three distinct blocs, one centered around the United States, a second around Europe, and a third around China (which would include Russia). Such a world—with the United States and Europe often collaborating, but also at odds when their interests diverge—would make the management of China and Russia more difficult, as the two would have opportunities to trigger and exploit U.S.-European tensions. It would also represent a major missed opportunity for the United States and Europe.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Strategic Concept DA – BFHR › Top Shelf › 1NC --- Concept DA Shell

C --- Collapse of Allied Conventional Deterrence causes full-scale nuclear war with Russia

Kroenig ‘21

(Dr. Matthew Kroenig is a professor of government and foreign service at Georgetown University and the director of the Scowcroft Strategy Initiative at the Atlantic Council, “Will Emerging Technology Cause Nuclear War?: Bringing Geopolitics Back In,” pg online @ https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/SSQ/documents/Volume-15_Issue-4/D-Kroenig.pdf)

If Moscow or Beijing attacked a vulnerable US Ally or partner in their near abroad, therefore, there would be a risk of major war with the potential for nuclear escalation. The United States has formal treaty commitments with several frontline states as well as an ambiguous defense obligation to Taiwan. If Russia or China were to attack these states, it is likely, or at least possible, that the United States would come to the defense of the victims. While many question the wisdom or credibility of America’s global commitments, it would be difficult for the United States to simply back down. Abandoning a treaty ally could cause fears that America’s global commitments would unravel. Any US president, therefore, would feel great pressure to come to an Ally’s defense and expel Russian or Chinese forces. Once the United States and Russia or China are at war, there would be a risk of nuclear escalation. As noted previously, experts assess the greatest risk of nuclear war today does not come from a bolt- out- of- the- blue strike but from nuclear escalation in a regional, conventional conflict.53 Russian leaders may believe it is in their interest to use nuclear weapons early in a conflict with the United States and NATO.54 Russia possesses a large and diverse arsenal, including thousands of nonstrategic nuclear weapons, to support this nuclear strategy. In the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review, Washington indicates it could retaliate against any Russian nuclear “de- escalation” strikes with limited nuclear strikes of its own using low- yield nuclear weapons.55 The purpose of US strategy is to deter Russian strikes. If deterrence fails, however, there is a clear pathway to nuclear war between the United States and Russia. As Henry Kissinger pointed out decades ago, there is no guarantee that, once begun, a limited nuclear war stays limited.56

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Strategic Concept DA – BFHR › Top Shelf › 1NC --- Concept DA Shell

B --- The plan crushes NATO’s strategic concept --- causes infighting, collapses cohesion and deterrence and overstretches the agenda

Dr. Tardy ‘20

(Thierry Tardy, PhD in Political Science, Director of the Research Division at the NATO Defense College (Rome), taught at Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies (HEID, Geneva), the War College in Paris, the Sorbonne, the Paris School of International Affairs (Sciences Po) and the National Institute of Oriental Languages and Civilisations (INALCO, Paris). He is also Visiting Professor at the College of Europe in Bruges., “The risks of NATO’s maladaptation,” European Security Volume 30, 2021 - Issue 1, pg Taylor and Francis //um-ef)

In the debate about congruence, one logical conclusion of the above-described elements about the character of the Russian threat is that NATO has to embrace a broader agenda than the one defined by the “deterrence and defence” mantra. To remain relevant, NATO needs to go beyond a too narrow defence-focused agenda, the argument goes. It needs to engage into a securitisation process, by which issues that were not previously belonging to its portfolio of tasks, would now appear on its agenda. As a matter of fact, the shift to security is not new. Since the end of the Cold War, the Alliance has indeed broadened its agenda through activities in the fields of crisis management, implementing mandates often closer to police tasks than to genuine military undertakings. In doing this NATO demonstrated a sense of adaptability and resilience (Menon and Welsh 2011). NATO’s role in Afghanistan’s Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), or in humanitarian relief operations, provides more specific examples of NATO operating at the frontier of military core tasks to respond to broader security needs (see Gallis 2007, Jakobsen 2010, Williams 2011). Similarly, NATO’s role in counter-terrorism, energy security (Bocse 2020), security sector reform, training, or more recently in the cyber domain, also attest to a broadening of the agenda. The entire discussion about hybrid threats and warfare epitomises this evolution. NATO has also developed expertise on these issues, both within its own staff in Brussels and through its network of Centres of Excellence. To a large extent thus, the defence agenda is subsumed into a broader security agenda and the challenge is therefore to make trade-offs between different types of activities. We believe though that not only are these activities politically and operationally less prominent than what the “deterrence and defence” agenda has implied since 2014, but a key argument of this research is also that further developing these tasks carry risks of maladaptation. Maladaptation may result from issues spanning a lack of expertise and legitimacy deficit on many of the new tasks embraced, inter-institutional duplication and competition, uneven members states’ backing, to dilution of the Alliance’s core military role. Enlarging the scope: towards security and internal threats Acquiring a mandate or a capacity to tackle a broad range of threats implies that NATO moves in two directions: towards more security-type activities as opposed to defence-focused ones; and towards more internal issues. In both directions, a more assertive role for NATO implies three levels of activity: policy development, i.e. the ability to produce policy documents that frame NATO’s role in a particular domain; capability development, i.e. the ability to acquire expertise or resources that can be used for the implementation of a particular policy; and operations, i.e. the ability to act through operational activities, be they exercises, training or actual use of NATO and member states’ capabilities placed under NATO command. These three levels allow us to distinguish between domains where NATO would only act in a coordination or information-sharing role (for which capability development and operations are not necessary), and domains where NATO would be having a more central function. Applied to the current landscape, the broadening security agenda beyond what is already done would imply a more assertive role for NATO in defensive/offensive cyber activities (with the cyberspace being an operational domain and covered by Article 5), in the fight against organised crime networks, inter alia through maritime security, as well as in the broad security sector reform (SSR) agenda of partner countries, to take just a few examples. In all these tasks coercion and military effect are not absent, yet they are less central than in traditional defence activities. The second direction of the move – inward-looking – would mean that NATO plays an increased role in the defence against internal threats, by contributing to: critical infrastructure protection and resilience building; civilian protection tasks; police-type activities such as anti-terrorist operations in European capitals; operations that aim to tackle the security consequences of (massive) migrant flows; or support to police forces facing under-the-radar hybrid-type non-conventional attacks. This would imply establishing relations with a set of national actors, from law enforcement entities to municipalities, public companies (in the energy and transport sectors among others) and the private sector (Machi 2017). The role of NATO in these various activities could vary in ambition, spanning information-sharing, awareness rising, coordination, exercises, and more operational tasks. The implied risks of task expansion Although these various tasks make sense when assessed against the broad security needs of NATO member states and societies, and may be justified for political reasons, they carry a number of risks of maladaptation. First, NATO would have to further develop or acquire an expertise on issues that can be very technical, or human resources-heavy, and for which even the member states may have a deficit (as in the cyber domain, energy security, or critical infrastructure protection). The added-value of NATO’s role would be all the more challenged as its expertise is being questioned. Second, the legitimacy of NATO’s role in some areas may be challenged due to a lack of expertise or because of the possible intrusiveness of NATO’s activities; this leads to sovereignty considerations, with states – be they NATO member states or not – having issues with any attempt from NATO to interfere with their internal sphere, in the law enforcement domain for example. Third, any task expansion would require a degree of consensus within member states on the merits of the enlarged mandate, and this will prove to be difficult, as illustrated by the sensitivities of broadening NATO’s agenda towards the South, to include counter-terrorism and migration policies for example (NATO official 2019). Even an agreement on broadening NATO’s mandate on the Eastern flank to embrace security issues would be difficult. Securitisation is inherently subjective (Buzan and Waever 2003, Sperling and Webber 2016); it is the outcome of a political choice that in turn results from an intersubjective understanding of what constitutes a threat. It follows that consensus-building on newly identified threats or policies is all the more difficult. Fourth, the broad security field is already crowded with institutions that in some areas would appear in a stronger position. NATO’s positioning on the broad field of activities would potentially duplicate existing capacities, and place it in direct competition with others, often in a weaker position. From the SSR domain in Sub-Saharan Africa to police or border tasks within European states, actors like the EU, national administrations, police forces and NGOs would not necessarily welcome a NATO role. Fifth, any broadening of NATO’s mandate would be resisted as it would carry the risk of diluting NATO’s war-fighting capability. Contemporary war-fighting is arguably politically, financially and operationally demanding; any parallel effort can, therefore, be seen as a deleterious diversion (see Stapleton 2016). Cyber security provides a good example of these risks. Cyber is arguably a key dimension of NATO’s mission. It is part of “NATO’s core task of collective defence”, and its qualification as an operational domain implies that NATO “must be able to operate as effectively in cyberspace as [it does] in the air, on land, and at sea to strengthen and support the Alliance’s overall deterrence and defence posture” (NATO 2018, para. 20) At the 2014 Wales Summit, Allies have also stated that a cyber attack could lead to the invocation of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. Furthermore, NATO has developed a fair amount of doctrinal and policy documents in that domain. Yet the extent to which NATO can play an important role in cyber security is uncertain for reasons that have to do with expertise, capabilities, the nature of the threat and of its possible targets, and therefore the nature of the response. In terms of expertise, while NATO may provide support to the states that suffer shortfalls, notably through its Cyber Rapid Reaction teams, the Alliance does not display obvious comparative advantages vis-à-vis most member states (NATO Official 2019). As for capabilities to conduct cyber attacks, NATO has so far relied exclusively on its member states, through the concept of “sovereign cyber effects, provided voluntarily by Allies”, and integrated “into Alliance operations and missions” (NATO 2018, para. 20). The fact that cyber attacks (on NATO member states) would most likely target entities that are either private actors, or in any case under the protection of domestic police forces, is also an issue. As put by a NATO official, while what can be sought is a “military outcome, it cannot be achieved solely through military means”, and “what may be a military challenge is in fact inextricably linked with both civilian government, private industry and even individuals” (Brent 2019, p. 2). These issues lead back to the question of how much NATO can deter cyber attacks, in relation to both deterrence by punishment and deterrence by denial. Those limitations apply beyond the cyber domain, to most of the current threats, for which a military response can be necessary, but very seldom sufficient nor even central.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Strategic Concept DA – BFHR › Top Shelf › 1NC --- Concept DA Shell

A --- Strategic concept will focus on deterrence – the direct nature of the Ukraine war means NATO will refocus on conventional deterrence instead of hybrid and non-state threats.

Simon 22 [Prof. Luis Simón is director of the Brussels office of the Elcano Royal Institute, and director of the Centre for Security, Diplomacy and Strategy (CSDS) at the Brussels School of Governance.; “The Madrid Strategic Concept and the future of NATO”; NATO Review; June 2, 2022; https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2022/06/02/the-madrid-strategic-concept-and-the-future-of-nato/index.html]//eleanor

Initial discussions on the next Strategic Concept revolved around the need to prepare the Alliance for a world characterised by the return of inter-state threats and great power competition. This alone marked a sharp contrast with the Alliance’s post-Cold War focus on transnational challenges and non-peer competitors. What would the return of great power competition entail for the evolving balance between NATO’s so-called three core tasks (i.e. collective defense, crisis management and cooperative security)? How should NATO balance a renewed focus on inter-state threats and great power competitors with the ongoing relevance of transnational threats and challenges, like terrorism or the climate-security nexus? When thinking about great power competition, how much emphasis should NATO put on Russia’s immediate threat to Europe, as opposed to the more systemic challenge represented by China’s strategic rise? And what should be the right balance between the military and non-military aspects of great power competition? The latter question becomes particularly relevant in light of the growing salience of “hybrid” forms of warfare and emerging disruptive technologies, which compel the Alliance to emphasise societal resilience at home and step up its efforts to innovate technologically. The war in Ukraine – and ongoing debates about how the Alliance can assist Ukraine while strengthening deterrence in Eastern Europe – have become important topics in Strategic Concept discussions. In a way, the current war vindicates the view that we do indeed live in an increasingly competitive world, and that inter-state threats are back. On the other hand, the overt and direct nature of Russia’s invasion challenges some of the pervading assumptions about how future conflict was likely to unfold in indirect and hybrid ways. The Strategic Concept from a historical perspective The current NATO Strategic Concept, adopted in Lisbon in 2010, aims to strike a balance between the Alliance’s so-called three core tasks: collective defense, crisis management and cooperative security. In many ways, the Lisbon Strategic Concept draws on the previous one (adopted in Washington in 1999). It represents a crystallisation of NATO’s experience in the post-Cold War period, an era characterised by Western military-technological supremacy, and the seeming absence of peer competitors. In the immediate post-Cold War period, the belief that former adversaries like Russia and even emerging great powers like China could somehow be integrated in the rules-based order was still widely held. This was a truly exceptional period. The power surplus enjoyed by the United States and its allies gave the West a free hand (both politically and militarily) to engage in ambitious out-of-area endeavours, and leverage crisis management operations and collective security initiatives to expand the remit of the so-called open and rules-based international order, not only in the broader Euro-Atlantic neighbourhood but also beyond. During the long-post Cold War era, collective defense and deterrence took a back seat. Even though they constituted the fundamentals of Euro-Atlantic security, they were considered almost superfluous in light of Western military-technological supremacy. Crisis management and collective security ruled the day. But this world is gone and great power competition is back. That reality was illustrated by Russia’s annexations of South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Crimea in 2008 and 2014, and even more starkly by its invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Also striking has been China’s strategic rise and growing assertiveness in East Asia and beyond. Peer competitors are once again challenging security, and geopolitical and security architecture in the important regions of Europe and East Asia, but also the institutional and normative fabric that underpins the open, rules-based international order. Adapting the Alliance to this new wave of great power competition is arguably the main challenge in the coming decade. Beyond Ukraine Since NATO’s birth in 1949 – and potentially as far back as the industrial revolution – the Euro-Atlantic region has been the undisputable centre of gravity of global politics. Developments in and around the Euro-Atlantic region typically had a profound impact upon geopolitical and strategic balances elsewhere. However, in today’s and tomorrow’s worlds, the opposite is likely to be true. As the Indo-Pacific becomes the center of gravity of global economic growth, military competition and technological innovation, dynamics emanating from that region are likely to have a growing impact on other regions, including the Euro-Atlantic. Thus, the geopolitical and security architecture of the Euro-Atlantic region is likely to be increasingly affected by exogenous factors. In a world that no longer revolves around the Euro-Atlantic region, and is increasingly defined by China’s strategic rise and the growing centrality of the Indo-Pacific region, the Alliance will need to think more globally about security. To be sure, the Euro-Atlantic region will remain NATO’s direct referent. However, the future of that region – and that of NATO itself – will likely become increasingly affected by broader geostrategic dynamics to a degree and in ways that are unfamiliar to NATO and its member countries. NATO must therefore adapt to a world in which the Euro-Atlantic region will remain important, but will probably become a secondary theatre in world politics, as well as in the context of US geostrategy. These changes should push the Alliance to develop a more global approach to security. Beyond the more specific question of whether NATO itself should act globally (e.g., by developing a presence in the Indo-Pacific region), the Allies ought to think more systematically about the main communicating vessels between Euro-Atlantic security and broader geostrategic dynamics, specifically the Indo-Pacific. Three stand out: the global implications of China’s rise; the evolution of the Sino-Russian relationship; and America’s need to prioritise between Europe and Asia, and what that may mean for NATO, European security and the longstanding debate about a transatlantic division of labour. The war in Ukraine, and Allied efforts to assist Ukraine and to bolster deterrence in the East, seem to have led to a revival of the transatlantic relationship, and a renewed focus on Europe, including for the United States. Yet contrary to what one may instinctively think, the war in Ukraine is unlikely to alter the steady shift in the centre of global strategy and politics – or, for that matter, of US geostrategy – towards the Indo-Pacific region. Rather than halt a shift towards the Indo-Pacific, the Ukraine crisis and the response to it so far, provide a powerful illustration of how European geopolitical and security dynamics are increasingly affected by extra-European ones. For one thing, China- and Asia-centric considerations have featured prominently in debates about how the United States should respond to Russia’s aggression in Europe. Some experts argue that the United States should avoid getting bogged down in a European war – lest this should distract its attention from the Indo-Pacific. Others have contended that a strong U.S. response will deter adversaries and reassure allies elsewhere, notably in the Indo-Pacific. As long as the security of Europe and the Indo-Pacific hinges largely on US power, and as long as these two regions continue to exercise significant pressure on US defense resources, their alliance and deterrence architectures will probably remain intertwined. This underscores the importance of greater political and military coordination between NATO and its key partners in the Asia-Pacific, namely Japan, Australia, the Republic of Korea and New Zealand. For another thing, it is also important that NATO and its Asia-Pacific partners have a common picture on Russia and China, and how their relationship may evolve. Without ignoring existing frictions, if the Sino-Russia relationship remains broadly cooperative, attempts to drive a wedge between them may prove challenging. The broader point, however, is that whatever the United States and its European and Asia-Pacific allies think they can do in relation to engaging Russia or China, or manipulating their relationship, they must remain aligned. Otherwise, there is a risk they may draw different conclusions about either power’s trajectory or how their relationship may evolve, and thus frame their policies on the basis of different premises. This could conceivably trigger competition between the United States and its allies, and among NATO Allies themselves. Conclusion The war in Ukraine has become an important aspect in the debate about NATO’s forthcoming Strategic Concept. Discussions on how to continue to assist Ukraine and bolster deterrence along the Eastern part of the Alliance will no doubt take center stage in Madrid in June. This is understandable: deterring a war in Europe is what NATO was created for. In fact, when it comes to the main questions informing the debate on the Strategic Concept - i.e. the balance between the three core tasks; state vs. non-state threats; military vs. non-military; Russia vs. China, etc. - the war in Ukraine may make the pendulum swing closer to the former than many would have anticipated just prior to the invasion.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Psychoanalysis › AT: Falsifiable

It is falsifiable – their indicts rely on factual errors and academic abuse that ignore randomized controlled trials, follow-up studies, control groups, and neuroscience – 54 leaders in the science field vote neg

Target and Hopkins 10 (Mary Target PhD - Professor of Psychoanalysis at University College London, Professional Director of the Anna Freud Centre, and Clinical Associate Professor in the Yale University School of Medicine, Jim Hopkins - Visiting Professor at UCL and Reader Emeritus in Philosophy at King's College London and Kohut Visiting Professor of Social Thought at the University of Chicago, “On psychoanalysis”, NewScientist, 27 October 2010, , MG s/o EMuse)

We were disappointed by Mario Bunge’s piece on the scientific status of psychoanalysis (2 October, p 22). As a senior philosopher of science, he could have offered interesting arguments, but instead he founded his criticism of the discipline on factual errors.

Psychoanalysis has developed greatly since Freud’s time, producing substantial research and productive connections to other branches of science. Many basic psychoanalytic propositions have been widely accepted, such as the formative impact of early childhood relationships on adult personality. Some of Freud’s specific propositions have been eclipsed by later formulations – as you would expect for bodies of knowledge evolving for more than a century, and certainly for any science. The basic idea of a dynamic unconscious that actively shapes conscious experience and relations with others has made productive connections with disciplines such as neuroscience.

2022 Michigan Evidence
**Framework** › NATO Debates Good – Disinformation

Debates on the topic are key to learning to spot and combat Russian disinformation

Wanless 2/24 (Alicia Wanless, director of the Partnership for Countering Influence Operations, 2-24-2022, “How Western Democracies Can Combat Russia’s Ukraine Disinformation”, Carnegie Endowment For International Peace, Accessed 7-18-2022, )//kpt

After months of amassing troops around Ukraine’s borders, Russia’s  of its neighbor was met with frantic condemnation from world leaders and an outpouring of support on social media. Russia has long been priming the information environment for this invasion, identifying and exploiting regional grievances in eastern and southern Ukraine since the country’s independence in 1991, and  for starting a war of its own making. While Russian narratives continue to be , as well as American politicians seizing the opportunity to attack opponents at home, Western democracies must not be sucked into merely refuting Russian claims. They must shift focus to the disastrous consequences of this war. At the same time, they must not lose sight of other pressure points Russia has been pushing in its digital sovereignty efforts.

Russia hasn’t exactly been subtle about its interests in Ukraine, whose proximity and overlap in populations has encouraged local in the past. Oligarchs have frequently sided with Russia for their own financial gains, often controlling  to further their agendas. Russia has been adept at understanding regional divisions in Ukraine, conducting extensive  to identify issues to exploit, such as existing political cleavages. This has been made easier in part by the  between Russia and Ukraine’s Donbas region.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
MINI-NB’S TO MILITARY AID › Entrapment

Unchecked military aid breeds terrorism, emboldens allies, and causes global war. QPQ solves.

Helton 19 [Jonathan Helton, research assistant with John E. Talbott & Associates; "Military Aid: Financing Foreign Conflict"; Strategy Bridge; Published: 8-19-2019; Accessed: 6-25-2022; https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2019/8/19/military-aid-financing-foreign-conflict; KL]

As a concept, foreign aid has existed for centuries. One country helps another—usually to their mutual benefit. The Marshall Plan solidified foreign aid as policy in the United States. The idea was to bolster its war-ravaged allies in Europe against the rising tide of communism. In Fiscal Year 2017, the United States doled out roughly $50 billion in aid, assisting nearly every country.[1] The U.S. pursues a noble goal: To promote peace and prosperity and to give a helping hand to countries in need.

Sometimes that goal becomes obscured in light of the geopolitical conflicts in which the U.S. is commonly involved. During the American Revolutionary War, the French aided the fledgling United States because they opposed Great Britain.[2] For the French, aid was more of a weapon than a parcel of food or a life-saving vaccine.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
MINI-NB’S TO MILITARY AID › Foreign Oversight/CMR

CMR solves extinction.

Golby and Feaver 21 [Jim Golby, senior fellow at the Clements Center for National Security at the University of Texas at Austin; Peter Feaver, professor of political science and public policy and director of the American Grand Strategy Program at Duke University; "Biden Inherits a Challenging Civil-Military Legacy"; War on the Rocks; Published: 1-1-2021; Accessed: 6-25-2022; https://warontherocks.com/2021/01/biden-inherits-a-challenging-civil-military-legacy/; KL]

Civil-military relationships are not an end in themselves. These relationships exist only to provide effective national security policies in a given geopolitical environment in the context of democratic accountability. Unfortunately, the environment is not benign. As they sort through the civil-military and institutional baggage — the items they bring with them and the items they inherit — Biden’s team must also navigate intensified great-power conflict, persistent instability in the broader Middle East, strained ties with key allies, and little progress on all of the other stubborn problems that have bedeviled leaders in the post-Cold War era, including: the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, transnational networks of terrorism, failed states, and ethnic rivalries. And, of course, Biden must still lead the country out of the worst pandemic in a century while recovering from all of the associated economic upheaval. There will be no strategic holiday during which the Biden team can painstakingly sort through its civil-military affairs.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
MINI-NB’S TO MILITARY AID › Foreign Oversight/CMR

SC devastates partner-nation governance. Triggers elite control.

PN = partner nation

Bushley 17 [U.S. Army Capt. Adam Bushley, Rule of Law attorney for Task Force Wolverine, 86th Infantry Brigade Combat Team; "Governance: The Missing Ingredient in Security Cooperation"; U.S. Army Command and General Staff College; Published: 2017; Accessed: 6-18-2022; https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1038564.pdf; KL]

This paper explores whether DOS can more systematically incorporate U.S. good governance strategic objectives into the oversight of DOD’s SC/SA programs. Both elements of the fifth secondary questions (existing trends within the SC/SA context and whether SA/SC programs support the foreign assistance principle of “do no harm.”) are below.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
MINI-NB’S TO MILITARY AID › Foreign Oversight/CMR

Absent Congressional oversight and democratic NATO norms, wars ensue. Say no, disunity/distrust, Russian aggression turns case.

More quals (TLDR, these people are overqualified :D)

Jonathan Katz is director of Democracy Initiatives and a senior fellow with The German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF) based in the Washington, DC, office. Prior to joining GMF from 2014-17, Katz was the deputy assistant administrator in the Europe and Eurasia bureau at the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), where he managed U.S. development policy, energy security, economic growth, and democracy, and governance programs in Europe and Eurasia. He led USAID programs in Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova, Eastern and Central Europe, the Black Sea and Caucasus Regions, the Western Balkans, and regional programs that included Russia. Katz served as the U.S. government co-chair of political, economic, trade, and development working groups with the European Union, Georgia, Ukraine, Belarus, Armenia, Poland, Romania, and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). Prior to joining USAID, from 2010-14, Katz served as a senior advisor to the assistant secretary in the International Organization Affairs Bureau at the U.S. Department of State. In that role Katz served as a speech writer and advised the assistant secretary and other senior U.S. government officials on key national security, multilateral, and development priorities at the UN and at international organizations.

Torrey Taussig was the research director for the Project on Europe and the Transatlantic Relationship at Harvard Kennedy School's Belfer Center. She was also a nonresident fellow at the Brookings Institution’s Center on the United States and Europe. From 2018-19, Taussig was a Robert Bosch Foundation Fellow based in Berlin, Germany, where she served as a foreign policy advisor in the German Bundestag and in the Transatlantic Division of the German Foreign Office. Previously, Taussig held pre-doctoral and postdoctoral fellowships at the Brookings Institution. She also held a postdoctoral fellowship at Harvard Kennedy School's Belfer Center. She received a master’s and a doctorate from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University and a bachelor’s in political science and economics from Williams College. Taussig is a term member at the Council on Foreign Relations and serves on the advisory council of the U.S.-Europe Alliance. Her research focuses on transatlantic relations, great power competition, and authoritarian challenges to democratic states and institutions.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
MINI-NB’S TO MILITARY AID › Russian Encirclement

Encirclement goes nuclear.

Rawat 22 [Vidya Bhushan Rawat, Human rights defender; "It's not Moscow-Kyiv war, but between Russia and NATO; tremors felt globally"; Counterview; Published: 2-26-2022; Accessed: 6-25-2022; https://www.counterview.net/2022/02/its-not-moscow-kyiv-war-but-between.html; KL]

After the 2014 intervention in Crimea, NATO and western allies started arming Ukraine. Given by any standard, Ukraine has fairly big armed forces and NATO provided it with all the big equipment yet it’s leadership rarely showed the strength of a matured nation while dealing with a country it belonged to once upon a time.

It was clear that Ukraine was clearly divided between ethnicities on the issue of joining the EU as the Russian origin people were happier with Russia. It is not the issue of mere sovereignty of Ukraine but also the survival question for Russia which feels threatened if NATO expands towards the Eastern Europe.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
MINI-NB’S TO MILITARY AID › Russian Encirclement

Increased NATO military assistance causes Ukraine war to go nuclear.

Chivvis 22 [Christopher S. Chivvis, senior fellow and director of the American Statecraft Program at the Carnegie Endowment. He has more than two decades of experience working on U.S. foreign policy and national security challenges. He most recently served as the U.S. national intelligence officer for Europe. At Carnegie, Chivvis leads policy-focused research aimed at developing realistic U.S. strategy for an era of great power competition and building a foreign policy that serves the needs of the American people. Chivvis’ experience with U.S. foreign policy spans government, academia, and the think tank world. Before joining the National Intelligence Council, he was the deputy head of the RAND Corporation’s international security program and worked in the Defense Department. He also has held positions at multiple universities and think tanks in the United States and Europe. Chivvis is also the author of three scholarly books and several monographs and articles. His commentary has appeared in the New York Times, Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy, the National Interest, National Public Radio, and several other outlets. Chris holds a PhD from Johns Hopkins, where he teaches courses on international history and U.S. foreign policy; "How Does This End?"; Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; Published: 3-3-2022; Accessed: 6-25-2022; https://carnegieendowment.org/2022/03/03/how-does-this-end-pub-86570; KL]

Wars sometimes start easily, but it is a tenet of strategy that they are always unpredictable and extremely hard to end. Putin’s war of choice in Ukraine is already escalating faster than most experts would have imagined just a week ago. He has now encircled major Ukrainian cities with his army and threatens to flatten them with thermobaric weapons, cluster munitions, and guided missiles. This will terrorize the civilian population and could demoralize the budding Ukrainian resistance. He could escalate the conflict to another region, such as the Balkans, where long-standing conflicts fester and Russia has an extensive network of intelligence and security services. He may turn the lights off in a major U.S. city with a cyber attack. Most frighteningly, he has raised the alert level of Russian nuclear forces and may be considering introducing martial law.

Meanwhile, NATO, the G7, and a host of other countries have turned the dial of economic punishment up to unprecedented levels. Several European nations that had previously hesitated to involve themselves militarily in the conflict have now done so, sending weapons and financing Ukraine’s resistance. A growing number of voices in Washington are clamoring for a more aggressive approach from the United States and NATO, pressuring the White House to support a Ukrainian insurgency with a broad menu of weaponry or even calling for NATO to impose a no-fly zone over Ukraine.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
MINI-NB’S TO MILITARY AID › Russian Encirclement

Security cooperation, without oversight, causes Russian miscalculation. The DoS CP avoids.

Bergmann and Schmitt 21 [Max Bergmann, a senior fellow at the Center for American Progress, where he focuses on European security and U.S.-Russia policy. From 2011 to 2017, he served in the U.S. Department of State in a number of different positions, including as a member of the secretary of state’s policy planning staff, where he focused on political-military affairs and nonproliferation; special assistant to the undersecretary for arms control and international security; speechwriter to then-Secretary of State John Kerry; and senior adviser to the assistant secretary of state for political-military affairs. Prior to serving in the State Department, he worked at CAP as a military and nonproliferation policy analyst and at the National Security Network as the deputy policy director. Bergmann received his master’s degree from the London School of Economics in comparative politics and his bachelor’s degree from Bates College; Alexandra Schmitt, a senior policy analyst on the National Security and International Policy team at the Center. She previously worked on U.S. foreign policy advocacy at Human Rights Watch and received her Master in Public Policy from the Harvard Kennedy School; "A Plan To Reform U.S. Security Assistance"; Center for American Progress; Published: 4-22-2015; Accessed: 6-20-2022; https://www.americanprogress.org/article/plan-reform-u-s-security-assistance/; KL]

Security assistance in a tense era of great power competition is extremely sensitive and can increase tension and lead to miscalculation. The risk in today’s geopolitical environment is that providing sensitive and potentially provocative assistance will not receive the same scrutiny from policymakers and will become the norm for the administering agency, the DOD. In the last era of great power competition, the Cold War, security assistance often stoked tension between the United States and the Soviet Union and led to spiraling commitments. For instance, Soviet provision of nuclear missiles to Cuba led to a nuclear standoff, while U.S. military support for Vietnam led to deepening U.S. engagement.

As competition with China and Russia increases, security assistance could once again prove a major source of tension and cause miscalculation. Providing aid in this environment is not a mere technical military matter, but ultimately a political and diplomatic concern that is highly sensitive. Yet today, it is the DOD that is driving assistance to countries such as Ukraine and regions such as Southeast Asia.13 When Russia invaded Ukraine in 2014, the National Security Council became significantly involved in policymaking and limited types of assistance that could be provided, including lethal aid.14 Such unique scrutiny was warranted because there was a crisis involving a U.S. partner and a nuclear-armed state. But the nature of White House intervention was necessary in large part because the security assistance process—for both decision-making and for providing assistance—was broken.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
MINI-NB’S TO MILITARY AID › Russian Encirclement

Ukraine has not encircled Russia. They’ll win

Davis 6-22 [Daniel Davis, Senior Fellow for Defense Priorities and a former Lt. Col. in the U.S. Army; Published: 6-22-2022; Accessed: 6-25-2022; ; KL]

On Sunday, NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg said “nobody knows” how long the Russian war in Ukraine might last, but, he added, “we need to be prepared for it to last years.” Retired Army General Jack Keane told a Fox & Friends audience on Monday that Ukraine had the ability, will, and troops to win the war. All they lacked, he claimed, “is the weapons to do it.”

The historical record and a growing mountain of evidence, however, suggest that such claims are unrealistically optimistic, as there is a growing possibility that the Ukrainian Army may be months away from losing the ability to defend the country.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
DOS CP › NB---Avoids Politics

Oversight-avoidance causes extreme Congressional backlash

Berger 19 Rick Berger, 7-16-2019, "The Pentagon should treat Congress as a partner, not an obstacle," Defense News, Rick Berger is a research fellow with the American Enterprise Institute. He previously served as a staff member on the Senate Budget Committee.

A strong U.S. military rests upon broad, bipartisan support among the American people translated through their representatives in Congress. Yet, amid the onset of great power competition and a generational conflict against jihadis, the Pentagon’s atrophied outreach to Congress has undermined support for the U.S. military. Although the Pentagon’s “” has rightly garnered a great deal of attention, the American public isn’t the only audience getting the cold shoulder from the Department of Defense. The Pentagon has failed to treat Congress as a partner in executing America’s defense strategy. In explanations both of budget choices and policy decisions, senior defense leaders have repeatedly neglected to invest in relationship building with Capitol Hill or to provide sufficient information to lawmakers and senior staff. This administration’s penchant for secrecy at the Pentagon further strains an already dysfunctional relationship based on mutual distrust. If Congress believes it hasn’t received sufficient answers to its oversight questions, it responds with public excoriations, punishments and regulatory actions that levy inefficiency on the daily operations of the Pentagon. The building, fearing such outcomes, refuses to share adequate information with Congress, hoping that such information can be kept secret, or that congressional complaints will blow over in time. If nothing else, the silence emanating from the building engenders mistrust and cynicism about the choices the military makes. Clearly, Congress understands that some of these strategic messaging and outreach snafus stem from the White House. In particular, anemic information flow about the president’s decision to border wall funding through the military or the Office of Management and Budget’s abuse of the overseas contingency operations account cannot be laid at the Pentagon’s feet. But Capitol Hill has proven much less forgiving of the Pentagon’s failures of communication and lack of outreach. The department even to provide a basic account of how the 2020 military budget request matched the new defense strategy. This year’s congressional defense legislation is  expressing severe bipartisan displeasure over the Pentagon’s lack of documentation and insufficient justifications for important acquisition decisions. In early March, Congress learned of the plan to decommission the aircraft carrier Harry S. Truman from the press, and the rationale behind the decision remained opaque for weeks.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
DOS CP › NB---Avoids Politics

Another military assistance policy after Ukraine will drain PC.

Desiderio et al. 22 [Andrew Desiderio, Lara Seligman, Connor O’Brien; "Pentagon vs. Congress tension builds over monitoring billions in Ukraine aid"; POLITICO; Published: 6-2-2022; Accessed: 6-21-2022; https://www.politico.com/news/2022/06/02/congress-pentagon-ukraine-aid-oversight-00036463; KL]

The Pentagon was already struggling to keep up with Congress’ demands for oversight of its spending. Then, lawmakers earmarked an extra $40 billion for Ukraine.

Concerns are mounting on Capitol Hill about the Biden administration’s ability to properly account for the unprecedented wave of cash and to track the thousands of U.S. weapons heading to Ukraine for its war with Russia. And given the Pentagon’s recent track record concerning congressional oversight, it’s coming under increased scrutiny from members of both parties — from progressive Elizabeth Warren to libertarian Rand Paul.