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2022 Michigan Disadvantage
DoD TRADEOFF DA › IMPACT---CHINA MECHANICS › !---Overstretch Turns Case

Strategic overstretch causes the US military to fail in both Europe and Asia

Wertheim 22, senior fellow in the American Statecraft Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. He is the author of “Tomorrow, the World: The Birth of U.S. Global Supremacy.” “Europe is showing that it could lead its own defense,” Washington Post,

Providing temporary reinforcements is the right decision today in the face of Russia’s bald aggression. But the United States should resist the inclination to revive its role as the military protector of Europe, especially since Europe is awakening to its responsibilities. Britain is sending troops to the Baltic states and Poland. France is pushing “strategic autonomy” for the European Union. And days after halting the Nord Stream 2 pipeline supplying natural gas from Russia, Germany reversed a long-standing ban on providing military assistance and sent weapons to Ukraine. Germany also vowed to spend more than 2 percent of its economy on defense, finally committing to meet NATO’s target. German Chancellor Olaf Scholz declared his country, and Europe, to have reached a “historic turning point.” Both Americans and Europeans would benefit if Scholz’s words prove true. In the coming years, European states should move to take the lead in their collective defense, and the United States should do everything possible to encourage them. To stake the defense of Europe on the United States, over the next decade and beyond, would be to answer Putin’s rash gamble with a slow-moving gamble of our own. It might seem as though the United States will remain able and willing to protect all of NATO’s 28 European countries far into the future. After all, America has orchestrated Europe’s defense for the past eight decades. Yet it did so under two markedly different conditions. During World War II and the Cold War, the United States sought to stop totalitarian powers from conquering the region. An Axis or Soviet takeover of Europe would have closed off the entire continent to liberal, American-style interaction and influence, and put the Western Hemisphere on the defensive. After the Cold War, however, as the Soviet threat collapsed, the United States recommitted to Europe not because the stakes were high but arguably because they were low. Threats were so negligible that it seemed U.S. leadership could keep things that way through modest exertion — and spread democracy to boot. Expanding NATO eastward, American officials convinced themselves that what had been a military alliance was more comparable to a political club, one that need not become an adversary of Russia. Russia’s assault on Ukraine ends that chapter and begins a new one. The prospect of further Russian aggression in Eastern Europe cannot be dismissed as negligible, as it was in the 1990s or 2000s. At the same time, Russia poses far less a threat to overrun Europe and threaten American security or prosperity than the Soviet Union did. After all, the Russian economy is roughly one-fifth the size of that of the European Union, and that was before the severe sanctions of the past week. Although Russia has built a formidable military, one that enables it to launch wars like that in Ukraine, NATO’s European members collectively outspend Russia on defense. During the Cold War, by contrast, the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact boasted land forces superior in number to those of NATO (including the U.S. share), and the gap between its economic output and that of Western Europe was several times smaller than Russia’s shortfall today. In the security environment now emerging, with Russia menacing Eastern Europe, the United States is set to face major costs and the ultimate risk: great-power war between nuclear peers. Yet the threat Russia poses remains one that Europeans could handle themselves, with America acting as a supporter rather than the leader. The United States remains a superpower. Why shouldn’t it be the main counterweight in Europe to Moscow? There are two reasons both the United States and Europe would be better off if it declined this role. One lies in Beijing, and the other in Washington. The United States has already identified China as its primary rival, embarking on “strategic competition” with the world’s number-two power. Taking on China and Russia at once would be unwise and likely impossible. True, the Pentagon has previously planned to fight two wars at once, but those wars were envisioned as “regional” conflicts against small states like Iran, Iraq or North Korea. In practice, the United States had difficulty prosecuting wars in Iraq and Afghanistan simultaneously. China and Russia represent challenges of a far greater magnitude, which explains why the Pentagon abandoned its two-war standard in 2018, even as its budget has grown. If the United States doubles down on European security while leading the charge in Asia, it may either fall short in both places or default on its commitments in Europe just when they come due.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
DoD TRADEOFF DA › IMPACT---CHINA MECHANICS › !---Comparative By Region

Asia war outweighs, threatens extinction

Mead 10, senior fellow @ the Council on Foreign Relations (Walter, American Interest, “Obama in Asia,” )

The decision to go to Asia is one that all thinking Americans can and should support regardless of either party or ideological affiliation.  East and South Asia are the places where the 21st century, for better or for worse, will most likely be shaped; economic growth, environmental progress, the destiny of democracy and success against terror are all at stake here.  American objectives in this region are clear.  While convincing China that its best interests are not served by a rash, dash for supremacy in the region, the US does not want either to isolate or contain China.  We want a strong, rich, open and free China in an Asia that is also strong, rich, open and free.  Our destiny is inextricably linked with Asia’s; Asian success will make America stronger, richer and more secure.  Asia’s failures will reverberate over here, threatening our prosperity, our security and perhaps even our survival. The world’s two most mutually hostile nuclear states, India and Pakistan, are in Asia.  The two states most likely to threaten others with nukes, North Korea and aspiring rogue nuclear power Iran, are there.  The two superpowers with a billion plus people are in Asia as well.  This is where the world’s fastest growing economies are.  It is where the worst environmental problems exist.  It is the home of the world’s largest democracy, the world’s most populous Islamic country (Indonesia — which is also among the most democratic and pluralistic of Islamic countries), and the world’s most rapidly rising non-democratic power as well.  Asia holds more oil resources than any other continent; the world’s most important and most threatened trade routes lie off its shores.  East Asia, South Asia, Central Asia (where American and NATO forces are fighting the Taliban) and West Asia (home among others to Saudi Arabia, Israel, Turkey and Iraq) are the theaters in the world today that most directly engage America’s vital interests and where our armed forces are most directly involved.  The world’s most explosive territorial disputes are in Asia as well, with islands (and the surrounding mineral and fishery resources) bitterly disputed between countries like Russia, the two Koreas, Japan, China (both from Beijing and Taipei), and Vietnam.  From the streets of Jerusalem to the beaches of Taiwan the world’s most intractable political problems are found on the Asian landmass and its surrounding seas. Whether you view the world in terms of geopolitical security, environmental sustainability, economic growth or the march of democracy, Asia is at the center of your concerns.  That is the overwhelming reality of world politics today, and that reality is what President Obama’s trip is intended to address.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
DoD TRADEOFF DA › IMPACT---CHINA MECHANICS › !---Comparative By Region

China poses a larger and more probable risk than Russia

Colby 20, co-founder and principal of The Marathon Initiative, a policy initiative focused on developing strategies to prepare the United States for an era of sustained great power competition. From 2018-2019, Colby was the Director of the Defense Program at the Center for a New American Security, where he led the Center’s work on defense issues. Before that, he served as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Force Development from 2017-2018. In that role, he served as the lead official in the development and rollout of the Department’s 2018 National Defense Strategy. (Eldridge, “How NATO Manages the “Bear” and the “Dragon”,” Elbridge A. Colby and Ian Brzezinski in Conversation with Nikolas Gvosdev, Orbis)//BB

Nikolas Gvosdev: Which is the bigger challenge, China or Russia? Or are they equivalent? Elbridge Colby is co-founder and principal of The Marathon Initiative, a policy initiative focused on developing strategies to prepare the United States for an era of sustained great power competition. From 2018-2019, Colby was the Director of the Defense Program at the Center for a New American Security, where he led the Center’s work on defense issues. Before that, he served as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Force Development from 2017-2018. In that role, he served as the lead official in the development and rollout of the Department’s 2018 National Defense Strategy. Elbridge Colby: China is by a very considerable margin the more significant challenge to U.S. interests. The fundamental U.S. interest abroad is in denying another state the ability to dominate a key region like Asia or Europe. This could allow such a state to prejudice or deny our trade, access to markets, and so forth. China is a much greater threat on both of these scores: it is a far larger economy and thus can mount a much more plausible challenge to establish hegemony over its region than Russia can over Europe, and Asia is the world’s largest economy. So, the top priority must be to deny China hegemony over Asia. That said, Russia remains a challenge in Europe, and, in particular, is a concrete military threat in Eastern NATO; ensuring Russia does not see a plausible “theory of victory” in this area needs to be the priority focus for the Atlantic Alliance.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
DoD TRADEOFF DA › INTERNAL LINK---ASSISTANCE KEY › IL---AT NATO Solves China

The US can’t wield NATO to solve Chinese aggression

McTague 22, staff writer at The Atlantic based in London, (Tom, “The West’s World War II Moment,” The Atlantic,

To work, such an entity must be built on more than simple altruism of the big for the small, but on self interest. If the U.S. genuinely sees China as a threat to the democratic order, it is in its interests to build something that protects and empowers that very order. NATO doesn’t do that, AUKUS—the naval submarine pact between Australia, Britain, and the U.S.—doesn’t do that. Even the G7, which comes closest, doesn’t quite do that, excluding South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand for starters. Deepening the Western world’s economic cooperation does not mean stifling one country over another, either. After 1950, freed of the fear of each other’s industrial success and protected militarily by the U.S., Germany and France both saw economic booms.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
DoD TRADEOFF DA › INTERNAL LINK---ASSISTANCE KEY › IL---Assistance Key---AT Post-Invasion Provision

Assistance now is key---post-hoc assistance won’t work in Taiwan

Flournoy 22, Co-Founder and Managing Partner of WestExec Advisors and Co-Founder and Chair of the Board of Directors of the Center for a New American Security. From 2009 to 2012, she served as U.S. Undersecretary of Defense for Policy (Michele, “How to Prepare for the Next Ukraine: Washington Must Ramp Up Support for Vulnerable Partners—Before It’s Too Late,” Foreign Affairs, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ukraine/2022-05-23/how-prepare-next-ukraine)//BB

If the United States and its allies and partners want to meaningfully strengthen their capacity to deter and defeat future attacks by Russia, China, and other authoritarian states, there is much they can learn from the war in Ukraine. Above all, the early trajectory of this crisis makes clear that Washington cannot and should not wait until conflict looms to start strengthening its own ability to prevent aggression and the ability of at-risk partners to defend themselves. Security assistance should be accelerated and focused on providing asymmetric capabilities that are not provocative on their own but instead turn vulnerable partners into “porcupines” that are difficult and costly to attack. These lessons can most obviously be applied in the case of Taiwan, where Chinese leadership may contemplate future military action to conquer the island. Efforts to strengthen the U.S. deterrent posture in the Indo-Pacific should go hand in hand with helping Taipei strengthen a multilayered defense, from its maritime and air approaches to its cybersecurity and the security of its major cities. Washington should ramp up its provision of key defensive capabilities, including antiship missiles, sea mines, and air and missile defenses. It should also offer more training in insurgency and popular resistance, so that in the event of a Chinese attack, Taiwan could buy time for the international community to muster an effective response. In Ukraine, Western countries were quickly able to mobilize and fill gaps with military aid after the Russian invasion began; they should not count on such favorable conditions in other conflicts. As the rest of this war plays out, the United States and its partners should be thinking carefully about how to deter and, if necessary, prevail in the next one. They can be sure that their adversaries will be learning their own lessons as well.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
DoD TRADEOFF DA › INTERNAL LINK---ASSISTANCE KEY › IL---Assistance Key---Prevents Direct Involvement

Assistance deters AND lowers the likelihood the US becomes directly involved in a future conflict

Porter and Mazarr 21, *Professor of International Security and Strategy at the University of Birmingham. He is also Senior Associate Fellow at the Royal United Services Institute, London, ** senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation. Previously he worked at the US National War College, where he was Professor and Associate Dean of Academics; and has been President of the Henry L Stimson Center; Senior Fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies; Senior Defence Aide on Capitol Hill; and a Special Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Patrick and Michael, “COUNTERING CHINA’S ADVENTURISM OVER TAIWAN: A THIRD WAY,” Lowy Institute,

We argue that the United States should reject the emerging belief that it confronts a binary choice over Taiwan — go all-in on a defence of Taiwan in the event of attack, or see its position in the Indo-Pacific crumble. This Manichean view represents an incoherent mixture of alarmist pessimism about what is at stake with a striking overconfidence in the US ability to deter or win a conflict that would represent an existential challenge to the CCP. Between these two poles, of abandonment and an unqualified US security pledge, there is a prudent middle way. The United States should act as armourer, but not guarantor. It should help prepare Taiwan to defend itself, to raise costs against any aggression, and develop means of punishing China with a range of non-military tools, but not commit in advance to wade in militarily — and consciously equip itself with a menu of options for deterring and punishing Beijing’s aggression without fighting. There are intermediate options that would allow a US administration to reserve the right to directly defend Taiwan — but also to choose not to become directly involved in a war and yet still enhance deterrence before conflict, ensure that any attack was a disaster for Beijing, and make it even more difficult for China to dominate the Indo-Pacific afterwards. We do not advocate ruling out any future policy choice.[13] We cannot forecast what a US president might decide in the event of a crisis, and we do not suggest that the United States should publicly abandon Taiwan. The chance that the United States would join any war over Taiwan will always exist. Increasingly, however, the scope of choice in the event of an attack appears to be narrowing to two extremes — either fighting, or cutting and running.[14] We argue that the United States should widen the scope of options for US presidents over Taiwan to avoid that dilemma.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
DoD TRADEOFF DA › INTERNAL LINK---ASSISTANCE KEY › IL---Assistance Key

Assistance is key to effective deterrence. Solves Chinese aggression

Mark Montgomery and Bradley Bowman 22, Retired U.S. Navy Rear Adm. Mark Montgomery is a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. He previously served as policy director of the Senate Armed Services Committee under Sen. John McCain, R-Ariz. His last Navy assignment was as director of operations for U.S. Pacific Command. Bradley Bowman is senior director of the Center on Military and Political Power at FDD. He served as a national security adviser to members of the Senate Armed Services and Foreign Relations committees, as well as an active duty U.S. Army officer, Black Hawk pilot and assistant professor at the U.S. Military Academy. (“Apply the lessons from Ukraine in the Taiwan Strait,” Defense News, https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2022/03/08/nine-lessons-from-ukraine-to-apply-in-the-taiwan-strait/)//BB

5. Provide Taiwan with security assistance funding. Given the disparity in their economies, it should come as no surprise that Taiwan spends much less on defense than China. According to the Department of Defense, China’s official defense budget was roughly 15 times larger than that of Taiwan in 2019. Taiwan just increased its defense spending to about 2.4% of its gross domestic product, which is actually high relative to most other democracies. But considering the threats Taiwan faces, a defense budget of 3% of GDP is more appropriate. The United States should incentivize and enhance Taiwan’s defense spending by providing $2 billion to $3 billion a year in security assistance funding to Taiwan on a sliding scale, with the size of the grant increasing as Taiwan increases its defense budget. This funding would be used to purchase U.S. weapons that Washington and Taipei believe are most necessary to deter or defeat a Chinese attack. 6. Prioritize arms deliveries to Taiwan. The United States has granted Taiwan access to nearly $19 billion in arms sales over the past six years. This often puts Taiwan in a line of potential foreign purchasers for a U.S. system. The United States should prioritize Taiwan’s placement in the procurement lines, especially when it comes to systems that place Chinese invasion forces at risk, such as Harpoon anti-ship cruise missiles and air-launched standoff land-attack missiles. Congress should establish an annual statutory requirement for reports from the administration focused on additional steps to speed up the delivery of arms to Taiwan and other threatened democracies. Actual arms deliveries — not announcements about future deliveries — best deter aggression. 7. Begin a U.S.-Taiwan joint exercise program. American and Taiwanese military forces are not interoperable and thus ill-prepared to fight together — a weakness well understood in Beijing. If China launched an attack today, American and Taiwanese joint operations would not operate effectively together. A low-cost means to enhance the effectiveness of both militaries would be to execute a persistent joint exercise program that develops the ability of U.S. and Taiwanese forces to operate at a coordinated or even integrated level. Building interoperability among naval and air forces can be done with a limited or no U.S. footprint in Taiwan. This program should include joint U.S.-Taiwan contingency tabletop exercises and war games. This will allow planners to maximize the effectiveness of U.S. support to Taiwanese forces, understand single-point weaknesses in American and Taiwanese plans, and inform U.S. logistics challenges in operations fought close to the adversary’s home bases. 8. Build U.S.-Taiwan combined cyber capabilities. U.S. Cyber Command has acknowledged that it conducts “hunt forward” cyber operations with allies and partners in Europe to counter Russian malicious activity. Similar, Cyber Command’s hunt-forward operations should be conducted with Taiwan’s cyber operators to help the island identify critical infrastructure vulnerabilities and existing Chinese malware, and to improve the resilience of Taiwanese cyber defense capabilities. 9. Welcome allies and partners to the effort. A final investment effort should include integrating willing allies and partners into these efforts. The United States should press Japan and Australia to commit to allowing U.S. military forces access during a crisis and to providing their own forces to counter Chinese aggression. The United States should expand this effort where possible to include Singapore, the Philippines and other possible partners who understand that Chinese expansion will not stop with Taiwan. These nine investments will help deter Chinese aggression against Taiwan. If deterrence fails — as it did in Ukraine — U.S. and Taiwanese military forces would be better prepared to defeat an attack by China. The United States acted too slowly in arming and assisting Ukraine. We should not make the same mistake with Taiwan.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
DoD TRADEOFF DA › INTERNAL LINK---ASSISTANCE KEY › IL---Assistance Key

Shifting resources to Taiwan effectively deters China

Sacks 22, research fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) and the author of a recent CFR paper, “Enhancing U.S.-Japan Coordination for a Taiwan Conflict.” (David, interviewed by Jongsoo Lee, “Taiwan Strait: What Is at Stake and How to Prevent a Conflict,” The Diplomat, https://thediplomat.com/2022/02/taiwan-strait-what-is-at-stake-and-how-to-prevent-a-conflict/)//BB

In your opinion, how can the current Taiwan Strait standoff be peacefully resolved? Is there a long-term solution to prevent a recurrence of crises?

It is hard for me to see a resolution of cross-strait differences because I cannot think of a proposal that would be acceptable to both China and Taiwan. Instead, our objective should be maintaining the status quo, which I understand is not the ideal state of affairs for the Taiwanese people, but I would argue is better than all of the other potential alternatives and has allowed Taiwan to flourish. For things to stay the same, however, a lot has to change. I am worried about eroding deterrence and the possibility that Xi Jinping will be tempted to use force against Taiwan. That is why the United States needs to focus on preparing for a conflict in the Taiwan Strait, shift military resources to the Indo-Pacific, enhance coordination with Japan, and update its declaratory policy by shifting to stratgic clarity. We often focus on the failures of U.S. foreign policy and the list is long, including the Iraq War, a chaotic withdrawal from Afghanistan, and a failure to prevent North Korea from developing nuclear weapons. But I would argue that the U.S. policy toward Taiwan has been one of the great successes of post-war foreign policy. We’ve not only avoided a war in the Taiwan Strait, but also put in place policies that allowed Taiwan to become an economic juggernaut and one of Asia’s few democratic success stories. The challenge for U.S. foreign policy now is to make the necessary adjustments to account for a more powerful and assertive China and ultimately preserve peace in the Taiwan Strait for the coming decades. In this sense, Taiwan is not so much a problem to be solved but a situation to be managed

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
DoD TRADEOFF DA › INTERNAL LINK---ASSISTANCE KEY › IL---Assistance Key

Effective security cooperation with Taiwan is the only route to peace in Asia

Walker and Sayers 22, nonresident Fellows at the American Enterprise Institute. Mr. Walker was the lead adviser to the Senate Armed Services Committee on Europe and the Indo-Pacific (2017-2020). Mr. Sayers was the lead adviser to the Senate Armed Services Committee on the Indo-Pacific (2014-16) and an adviser to the commander of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (2016-2018) (Dustin and Eric, “Send More Aid to Taiwan, Before It’s Too Late,” Defense One,

The simple fact is that the United States could and should have done more over the last eight years to aid Ukraine in its cause and in its need. We should have provided more security assistance. More of that assistance should have been lethal weaponry. And that lethal weaponry should have been provided sooner and in greater quantities to prevent an invasion, not respond to one. Ukrainians have fought well and fought bravely. But regrettably, they have done so—at least initially—with less help than they deserved. The United States must not make the same mistake when it comes to Taiwan. The most effective way to deter war and preserve peace in the Indo-Pacific is to ensure Taiwan can defend itself. That’s why for the last four decades the United States has been committed to enabling Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability. But in recent years, China’s rapid military modernization has radically altered the military balance across the Taiwan Strait and the Indo-Pacific.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
DoD TRADEOFF DA › INTERNAL LINK---ASSISTANCE KEY › IL---Assistance Key

Security cooperation is key---it’s the most powerful demonstration of the US commitment

Kanapathy 22, senior associate with the Center for Strategic and International Studies. He served on the U.S. National Security Council staff from March 2018 to July 2021 (Ivan, “Taiwan Doesn’t Need a Formal U.S. Security Guarantee,” Foreign Policy,

From an adversary’s perspective, the breadth and depth of U.S. security cooperation are perhaps the most powerful demonstration of American commitment—more so than any mere declaration of intent. As with Ukraine, the United States compelled Taiwan to give up its nuclear weapons program decades ago. Also, as with Ukraine, the United States restricts the weapons it offers to Taiwan. In hindsight, U.S. failure to provide lethal assistance to Ukraine following the 2014 Russian incursions and twice again in 2021—all intended as de-escalatory olive branches extended to Russia—had the opposite effect on Russian President Vladimir Putin. Given the imbalance of military power across the Taiwan Strait, historical U.S. resistance to offering Taiwan security assistance out of consideration for Beijing has been equally unjustified and counterproductive. Strategic clarity, however, would not solve this problem. Current U.S. law already provides ample guidance. The Taiwan Relations Act establishes U.S. policy “to maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force … that would jeopardize the security” of Taiwan. On the question of security assistance, the statute requires the U.S. government to “make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services” as needed for its self-protection. Prioritizing the U.S.-Taiwan security cooperation relationship is simply a matter of U.S. political will and bureaucratic implementation. Similarly, the U.S. president’s statutory obligations to respond to an attack are arguably already commensurate with, and in some ways stronger than, the U.S. mutual defense treaties with the Philippines and Japan, both of which are targets of China’s maritime military coercion. The latter documents obligate the United States to consider an attack on the counterpart to be “dangerous to its own peace and safety” and to “act to meet the common danger.” (This same language was used in the 1954 defense treaty with Taiwan, which the United States abrogated in 1980.) The Taiwan Relations Act, by contrast, sets a lower bar to initiate action by directing the president to consult Congress on a response to “any threat [emphasis added] to the security or the social or economic system of” Taiwan. Compared with a defense pact, the president can invoke the act earlier in a crisis—possibly even today. Haass and Sacks argue that strategic clarity should be accompanied by increased counter-China defense resources and enhanced diplomacy to signal severe economic and political costs in response to aggression. But the U.S. Defense Department has been focused on China as its top long-term priority since early 2018, and the recent implementation of U.S. and allied sanctions on Russia has instructed Beijing more than diplomacy ever could. READ MORE A man holds a Chinese flag on a Chinese navy boat A man holds a Chinese flag on a Chinese navy boat China’s Taiwan Invasion Plans May Get Faster and Deadlier Russian mistakes offer some warnings for Beijing’s ambitions. ANALYSIS | BONNY LIN, JOHN CULVER To build on this credibility, the United States must demonstrate willingness to sanction and restrict entities in China whenever appropriate—even at a cost to shorter-term U.S. economic interests. For their part, Edelman and Miller go further, suggesting that the United States deploy forces to Taiwan to train the Taiwanese military. Given revelations that U.S. force rotations to Taiwan already exist, though, no new policy declaration is needed to publicize or expand these programs. Putin’s trampling of the 1994 Budapest Memorandum on Ukraine and Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s evisceration of the 1984 Sino-British Joint Declaration on Hong Kong indicate both leaders respect hard power, not words on paper. It is concrete actions—increased military resources to counter China, demonstrated willingness to enact sanctions, and deployments of U.S. forces in Taiwan—that have and will impact Beijing’s perceptions of U.S. capability and resolve. Such actions can be taken without a U.S. defense commitment to Taiwan. Conversely, a declaration of strategic clarity could instead be counterproductive. A U.S. security guarantee would necessarily come with two caveats or conditions. The first relates to geographic scope. The Taiwan Relations Act (like the mutual defense treaty that preceded it) covers the main island and the nearby Penghu islets, leaving out Taiwan’s outer islands, which include offshore islands along China’s coast and South China Sea features. With very little warning, the Chinese military could annex one or more of these isles in a matter of hours—presenting a fait accompli before the United States could respond. And with China’s unparalleled anti-access defenses, not even the U.S. Marines would attempt to reclaim islands within China’s coastal territories. Therefore, a U.S. security guarantee cannot credibly include these outlying islands. But even if they are not covered under a defense pact, by annexing them Beijing would diminish U.S. credibility and sow division in Taiwan, just as it has in the Philippines, a longtime U.S. treaty ally. Ten years ago, Beijing ran such a playbook in the South China Sea, leveraging its superior maritime power. China’s armed vessels escalated a jurisdictional fishing dispute at the Philippines-controlled Scarborough Shoal, which China also claims and which is technically not covered by the U.S.-Philippines defense treaty. Washington stepped in to mediate, but Beijing reportedly reneged on an agreement for both claimants to withdraw. Following the Philippines’ withdrawal, the United States did not challenge China’s remaining vessels, effectively ceding control of the shoal to China. In the decade following this incident, many in the Philippines, including its president, have expressed resignation to China’s regional dominance and questioned the credibility of the U.S.-Philippines defense pact. Furthermore, the Philippines government delayed key U.S. security cooperation programs that would have enhanced allied deterrence posture vis-à-vis China. Given how Beijing’s 2012 aggression undermined the U.S.-Philippines alliance in Manila, if Washington were to adopt strategic clarity for Taiwan, Beijing might be incentivized to attempt a similar gambit with Taipei by seizing one of its outlying islands. A second condition of strategic clarity would be a “no Taiwan independence” clause, wherein a U.S. pledge “to come to Taiwan’s aid [would not be] unconditional and would not necessarily cover a crisis initiated by Taipei,” as Haass and Sacks write. But the assignment of blame for initiating a conflict is in the eye of the beholder. Such a caveat would be welcomed by Beijing, which argues that all its coercive measures are in response to provocations by Taipei and Washington. In Beijing’s view, Washington threatens China’s sovereignty by encouraging Taiwan along its steady march toward independence. With Ukraine, Chinese officials and media adopted Russia’s narrative that the United States is to blame for having broken a purported promise to not expand NATO eastward. In this reading, Putin was forced to invade Ukraine to block NATO from reaching Russia’s doorstep. Beijing also claims that Washington is acting equally as dangerously in the Indo-Pacific—so presumably Xi will be compelled to prevent Taiwanese independence. Considering Taipei’s assertions that Taiwan is “an independent country already,” a conditional U.S. promise to intervene would only provide fodder for China’s global propaganda organs, casting the United States as again reneging on a commitment not to interfere in China’s internal affairs. In practice, the “no independence” condition removes clarity from strategic clarity and enhances China’s propaganda narratives. Like most Americans, many Taiwanese people naively assume that the U.S. military can save them from subjugation. In truth, however, Taiwan’s inherent capacity to resist an invasion until partners can come to its aid is likely a decisive factor in mounting a successful defense, and therefore in deterring an attack in the first place. According to the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission (USCC), “Taiwan faces significant challenges from decades of underinvestment in defense.” In 2020, Taiwan spent just under 2 percent of its GDP on its military, while many other so-called front-line democracies, including South Korea, India, the Baltic states, Poland, and Israel, all spent more than 2 percent. While Taiwan’s defense budget has inched upward in recent years, a U.S. security guarantee would be counterproductive to overall military deterrence, because it would reduce pressure on the Taiwanese government to further increase defense spending, marginalizing effective capability enhancements such as additional defensive munitions and drones. Lastly, the argument for strategic clarity is premised on the notion that China currently believes the United States will not intervene militarily to defend Taiwan. While Beijing’s propaganda denigrates Washington’s commitment to the region, there is scant evidence that China’s leaders actually believe it. The Chinese Communist Party’s internal doctrine frames the United States as China’s greatest threat, and China’s military likewise assumes U.S. intervention in its planning. In China, U.S. President Joe Biden’s invocations of a commitment to defend Taiwan are viewed as intentional signaling, not as unscripted commentary. As the USCC concluded, “The perceived lack of clarity … may be less relevant to deterrence failure than other factors … given that Chinese leaders already assume U.S. intervention.” The instinct to provide a security guarantee to Taiwan arises from deeply held American values. But U.S. adversaries hold different values and are swayed by alternative propositions. Beijing would likely exploit a declaration of strategic clarity and seek to create divisions between Washington and Taipei. From China’s point of view, a decision to invade Taiwan would not be tied to a U.S. security guarantee—Beijing already assumes that Washington will intervene. To enhance military deterrence, Washington must advance credible U.S., Taiwanese, and allied defense postures and capabilities. To increase economic and political deterrence, the United States must demonstrate willingness to hold China accountable and build coalitions to do the same. Given the high stakes, Washington must lead from the front without delay to effectively deter cross-strait aggression.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
DoD TRADEOFF DA › INTERNAL LINK---ASSISTANCE KEY › IL---Assistance Key

Assistance to Taiwan is key to deters invasion

Porter and Mazarr 21, *Professor of International Security and Strategy at the University of Birmingham. He is also Senior Associate Fellow at the Royal United Services Institute, London, ** senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation. Previously he worked at the US National War College, where he was Professor and Associate Dean of Academics; and has been President of the Henry L Stimson Center; Senior Fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies; Senior Defence Aide on Capitol Hill; and a Special Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Patrick and Michael, “COUNTERING CHINA’S ADVENTURISM OVER TAIWAN: A THIRD WAY,” Lowy Institute, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/countering-china-s-adventurism-over-taiwan-third-way)//BB

The first and most important component of such a US approach would be for the United States to serve as armourer rather than guarantor, to help Taiwan strengthen its own ability to defeat an invasion. Taiwan is, in fact, an eminently defensible nation. Both geography and weather are unfriendly to aggressors and tend to channel possible invasions into narrow apertures of space and time. Surprise is nearly impossible: China would need to build up massive forces in ways that would provide Taiwan with ample warning time.[60] If Taiwan acquires, over roughly the next five years, large numbers of additional anti-ship missiles, more extensive ground-based air defence capabilities, smart mines, better trained and more effective reserve forces, a significantly bolstered capacity for offensive cyber warfare, a large suite of unmanned intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and strike systems, and counterstrike capabilities able to hit coastal targets on the mainland, it will continually increase the price China will have to pay to win a war.[61] Taiwan is gradually embracing such an approach, but even given recent increases, it does not yet spend enough on defence to give such a strategy teeth.[62] This has been a problem for some time: Taiwan’s defence cuts prior to 2018, one analyst argued then, after earlier cuts between 1993 and 2002, suggested “either a state of denial about the threat, a gridlocked political system, misplaced faith in current systems and geographic advantages, or perhaps most disturbingly, a belief that the United States is certain to provide timely military assistance.”[63] This is now changing, but slowly. Taiwan’s military reserves, which ought to be a leading tool of an island nation’s self-defence strategy, are poorly trained and equipped.[64] Open sources suggested that as of 2018, Taiwan was only able to fill 153 000 of 188 000 active-duty billets; reports suggest that even frontline units are only manned at 60 to 80 per cent strength. Taiwanese military exercises are rigid, scripted, and of low value.[65] Logistics shortfalls have reportedly even led to suicides by despondent Taiwanese soldiers.[66] Taiwan needs a serious domestic debate over the steps required to more fully provide for its own defence. President Tsai Ing-wen posted this image to her Twitter account on 24 March 2020, accompanied by the text, "As the world grapples with the severity of the #COVID19 pandemic, China's military maneuvers around #Taiwan have continued unabated. Whether it's national defence or preventing the spread of disease, our armed forces remain as vigilant as ever." Image: Tsai Ing-wen/Twitter. Just as important as the amount Taiwan spends on defence is how it spends those funds. Military analysts almost universally agree that Taipei has over-invested in large, expensive, exquisite combat systems. Weapons like modern fighter aircraft, large surface combatants, and even large anti-aircraft missile systems like the Patriot will be vulnerable to the barrage of Chinese air and missile attack.[67] Happily, this is now changing: Taiwan’s 2017 Overall Defense Concept (ODC) pointed the country in the direction of what has been termed a “porcupine strategy” with a shift away from legacy systems to smaller, cheaper, more numerous and survivable, and more explicitly defensive capabilities.[68] This new approach has been manifest in some recent arms purchases[69] and will reportedly be confirmed in Taiwan’s 2021 Quadrennial Defense Review.[70] The United States could encourage Taiwan’s planned evolution to such asymmetric capabilities in more direct ways. It could offer advice and direct aid to help Taiwan with purely defensive steps, such as national infrastructure resilience, stockpiles of key materials to deal with a potential blockade, and cyber resilience. More ambitiously, it could encourage and directly support development of technologies geared less towards power projection and more towards repelling invasion, such as cheap anti-ship missiles and UAVs,[71] the potential for which was again recently demonstrated in the fighting over Nagorno-Karabakh.[72] China would object, but the United States could argue that this cooperation on lower-technology systems is fully in line with its long-term commitments to reduce arms transfers.

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Effective US assistance to Taiwan deters Chinese aggression

Gramm and Wicker 5-4-2022, *former chairman of the Senate Banking Committee and a nonresident senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, **a U.S. senator from Mississippi, is in line to become the chairman of the Armed Services Committee if Republicans control the Senate next year. (Phil and Roger, “Deter China by Turning Taiwan Into a Porcupine,” Wall Street Journal, )

The paramount lesson from the Russian invasion of Ukraine is that repeated threats of economic sanctions didn’t deter Vladimir Putin from launching an all-out invasion. This offers a warning for Taiwan, the U.S. and their allies as threats from China loom. The long history of sanctions, embargoes and economic blockades strongly suggests they are difficult to enforce, entail significant costs to the nations imposing them, and trigger market forces that eventually override them. Benefits flow to countries that don’t enforce the sanctions. The enforcement challenges grow significantly if the economy of the targeted nation is large, and as the size of the target country increases, the deterrent effect of threatening sanctions loses credibility. Since the Chinese economy—one-sixth of the world’s economy—is 10 times as large as the Russian economy, effective sanctions would be virtually impossible to enforce. Relying on threatened sanctions to deter a Chinese attack on Taiwan could therefore entice aggression that could pull the U.S. into a war with China, an event that would alter the course of world history. Thankfully, there is a far more effective deterrent. Taiwan is an island roughly 100 miles off the coast of mainland China. Unlike Ukraine, a large land army can’t be massed along its border. But because it is an island, supplies also can’t be delivered to an adjacent neighbor and clandestinely driven across the border. Any supplies delivered after an attack would have to be flown in or delivered by ship, putting the supplier directly in harm’s way. Supplying Taiwan on anything like the scale we have supplied Ukraine during a Chinese attack would be a logistical nightmare. When China was an economic basket case, 100 miles of ocean was more than enough deterrent. But with China now an economic and military powerhouse, Taiwan’s lack of preparedness is increasingly dangerous. Taiwan’s economy is two-thirds larger than Israel’s, but Taiwan spends almost two-thirds less as a percentage of gross domestic product on defense. U.S. support can’t be allowed to abet Taiwan’s neglect of its own defense. As Machiavelli observed, “nothing is so weak and unsustainable as a reputation for power which is not based on one’s own strength.” The good news is that modern technology makes it relatively easy for Taiwan to afford weapons that would make the cost of invasion exceed any reasonable benefit. Ukraine’s valiant resistance has shown how highly motivated defenders with high-tech weapons can scramble the calculus of military power. Like David’s smooth stone that slew Goliath, two Ukrainian Neptune missiles sank the flagship of the Russian navy in the Black Sea. With 400 U.S. Harpoon missiles, costing only 0.3% of its GDP, Taiwan could imperil any Chinese warship in the Taiwan Strait. Modern sea mines are even less expensive, and Turkish Bayraktar drones, which have been so effective in Ukraine, cost less than $2 million each. Two hundred fifty million dollars would buy 5,000 Switchblade drones, which could devastate landing craft, armored vehicles, and small assault ships. Taiwan already has two Patriot missile battalions and for $3 billion could double its air and missile defense. Stinger missiles, used to great effect in Ukraine, cost only $400 million for 1,000 missiles. Taiwan will have more than 200 F-16 fighter jets by 2026, including almost 70 of the newest Block 70 aircraft. With additional F-16s and other aircraft being retired from the U.S. Air Force, more aircraft could be made available at their depreciated value. If the U.S. and its allies are willing to accelerate the sale of these and other force-multiplier weapons at cost, Taiwan could totally upgrade and harden its defenses by simply raising its defense budget from 2% to 3% of GDP. At that level, Taiwan could fund all these weapon purchases over a five-year period. Sustaining its defense outlays at 3% of GDP would allow Taiwan to continue modernizing its defenses while spending at a level roughly equal to Israel’s defense expenditures in real dollar terms. With these investments, Taiwan should focus heavily on training for new weapons systems. It should also consider transforming its army from the current conscript system into a smaller voluntary force that would better accommodate a defense system based on the power of modern technology. Citizens who would have otherwise been drafted could be trained in high-end weaponry and kept in reserve or home-guard forces that could be activated in emergencies. The primary objective of the U.S., its allies and Taiwan isn’t to repel a Chinese attack but to prevent it from ever occurring. Effective deterrence is the key to national security. Any wolf has the ability to kill a gentle porcupine. And yet such an attack virtually never occurs in nature. The defense of the porcupine’s quills, which can rip through the predator’s mouth and throat, is the deterrent that protects the small creature in the violent woods. Through the force-multiplying miracle of modern weapons, we can help make Taiwan a porcupine and deter aggression that could have profoundly negative consequences for Taiwan, China and the world.

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Funding for Taiwan requires tradeoffs from other areas

Porter and Mazarr 21, *Professor of International Security and Strategy at the University of Birmingham. He is also Senior Associate Fellow at the Royal United Services Institute, London, ** senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation. Previously he worked at the US National War College, where he was Professor and Associate Dean of Academics; and has been President of the Henry L Stimson Center; Senior Fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies; Senior Defence Aide on Capitol Hill; and a Special Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Patrick and Michael, “COUNTERING CHINA’S ADVENTURISM OVER TAIWAN: A THIRD WAY,” Lowy Institute, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/countering-china-s-adventurism-over-taiwan-third-way)//BB

Finally, the hefty price tag of an unqualified commitment to protect Taiwan would need to be traded off against other potential investments. The United States must keep its eye firmly on the larger contest: the broad-based competition of systems and societies emerging with the PRC. Historical lessons on the character of such competitions,[53] the geo-economic character of a wider contest defined by the difficulty of military conquest, and China’s emphasis on gradual, non-military tools of influence suggest that global economic engagement, technological rivalries, investments in diplomatic capability, and information security and cyber capabilities will be more important to the outcome of the larger competition than the status of Taiwan. At a time, for example, when the central office charged with overseeing US cybersecurity has been described as “underfunded, outmatched and exhausted”,[54] it does not make sense to pour tens of billions into capabilities oriented for the defence of Taiwan.

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Defense budgets are flat---tradeoffs are required for the plan

Burns 21 (Robert, “Pentagon rethinking how to array forces to focus on China,” Associated Press,

The Biden administration faces a conundrum as it rethinks the positioning of military forces around the world: How to focus more on China and Russia without retreating from longstanding Mideast threats — and to make this shift with potentially leaner Pentagon budgets. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin ordered a monthslong “global posture” review just days after taking office. It will assess how the United States can best arrange and support its far-flung network of troops, weapons, bases and alliances to buttress President Joe Biden’s foreign policy. The review is part of the administration’s effort to chart a path for a military still caught in decades-old Mideast conflicts, facing flat or declining budgets and grappling with internal problems like racism and extremism. Its outcome could have a long-lasting impact on the military’s first priority: ensuring it is ready for war in an era of uncertain arms control. Also at stake are relations with allies and partners, weakened in some cases by the Trump administration’s “America first” approach to diplomacy. Austin’s review is closely related to a pending administration decision on whether to fulfill the prior administration’s promise to fully withdraw from Afghanistan this spring. And it is advancing separately from big-dollar questions about modernizing the strategic nuclear force. Like the Trump administration, Biden’s national security team views China, not militant extremists like al-Qaida or the Islamic State group, as the No. 1 long-term security challenge. Unlike his predecessor, Biden sees great value in U.S. commitments to European nations in the NATO alliance. That could lead to significant shifts in the U.S. military “footprint” in the Middle East, Europe and the Asia-Pacific, although such changes have been tried before with limited success. The Trump administration, for example, felt compelled to send thousands of extra air and naval forces to the Persian Gulf area in 2019 in an effort to deter what it called threats to regional stability. Biden has seen reminders of this problem in recent days with violence in Iraq and Afghanistan. It might also mean a Biden embrace of recent efforts by military commanders to seek innovative ways to deploy forces, untethered from permanent bases that carry political, financial and security costs. A recent example was a U.S. aircraft carrier visit to a Vietnamese port. Commanders see value in deploying forces in smaller groups on less predictable cycles to keep China off balance. Hints of change were surfacing before Biden took office. In December, Gen. Mark Milley, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, spoke of his own view that technological and geopolitical change argue for rethinking old ways of organizing and positioning forces. The very survival of U.S. forces will depend on adapting to the rise of China, the spread of technologies like artificial intelligence and robotics, and the emergence of unconventional threats like pandemics and climate change, Milley said. “Smaller will be better in the future. A small force that is nearly invisible and undetectable, that’s in a constant state of movement, and is widely distributed — that would be a force that is survivable,” he told a Washington conference. “You’re not going to accomplish any objective if you’re dead.” Austin made a similar, narrower point last month about the positioning of U.S. forces in Asia and the Pacific. “There’s no question that we need a more resilient and distributed force posture in the Indo-Pacific in response to China’s counter-intervention capabilities and approaches, supported by new operational concepts,” Austin wrote in response to Senate questions posed in advance of his confirmation hearing. Austin also noted his concern about competing with Russia in the Arctic. “This is fast becoming a region of geopolitical competition, and I have serious concerns about the Russian military buildup and aggressive behavior in the Arctic — and around the world,” he wrote. “Likewise, I am deeply concerned about Chinese intentions in the region.” That doesn’t argue for abandoning the U.S. military’s large hubs overseas. But it suggests more emphasis on deployments of smaller groups of troops on shorter rotations to nontraditional destinations. This shift already is underway. The Army, for example, is developing what it calls an “Arctic-capable brigade” of soldiers as part of an increased focus on the High North. That area is seen as a potential flashpoint as big powers compete for natural resources that are more accessible as ice packs recede. Similarly, the Air Force is sending B-1 long-range bombers to Norway, a NATO ally and neighbor of Russia, for the first time. China considers itself an Arctic nation, but the main U.S. concern with Beijing is its growing assertiveness in Asia and the Pacific. In the U.S. view, China aims to build the military strength to deter or block any U.S. effort to intervene in Taiwan, the semi-autonomous democracy that Beijing views as a renegade province that must eventually return to the communist fold. A Council on Foreign Relations report this month called Taiwan the most likely spark for a U.S.-China war, a prospect with dire human consequences that it said “should preoccupy the Biden team.” “Millions of Americans could die in the first war in human history between two nuclear weapons states,” the report said. Washington also cites concern about China’s efforts to modernize and potentially expand its nuclear arsenal while it declines to participate in any international nuclear arms control negotiations. The sharpened focus on China began during the Obama administration. The Trump administration went further by formally declaring that China and Russia, not global terrorism, were the top threats to U.S. national security. Some now question whether this shift has gone too far. Christopher Miller, who served as acting secretary of defense for the final two months of Donald Trump’s presidency, said in an interview that he agrees China is the key national security threat. But he said U.S. commanders elsewhere in the world told him the China focus was costing them needed resources.

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Military resources are finite. New expenditures require a draw-down from other regions

Wasser 20, fellow in the Defense Program and co-lead of the Gaming Lab at the Center for a New American Security (Becca, “Making Critical Choices for Better Posture Approaches,” Center for New American Security,

The 2018 NDS was widely lauded for acknowledging that the United States has finite resources and therefore must prioritize its activities. A key element of the strategic guidance was the elevation of China and Russia as top threats to the United States. This move raised the importance of Asia and Europe to U.S. defense strategy.2 While creating a clear hierarchy of threats was commendable, the details of how the DoD would implement this guidance was and continues to be unclear and has resulted in haphazard attempts to adjust posture. U.S. posture in Asia—with the exception of a reported planned troop reduction in the Republic of Korea and increased freedom of navigation operations—has remained remarkably stagnant for the top geographic priority.3 Europe, on the other hand, has seen significant plans to alter the U.S. footprint and establish a new base in Poland, with the intent to better address the Russian threat.4 The Middle East, despite being an implied region of lesser importance, has received an influx of U.S. forces and capabilities since the strategy was published.5 High-demand, low-density assets that the United States had previously removed from there for use in Asia and Europe have since been returned, along with additional capabilities.6 Moreover, while the DoD has undertaken combatant command–level posture reviews, only minimal force reductions have been made in Africa and South America, areas where the U.S. footprint is already relatively small.7 Although the elevation of China and Russia in the NDS had obvious implications for U.S. posture, actualizing these changes has been difficult. This is in part because the prioritization within the last NDS still does not go far enough in forcing DoD policymakers to make difficult posture choices. Altering posture using finite resources, manpower, and capabilities involves a dynamic similar to that of a seesaw—to reinforce forces and capabilities in one region, forces and the same capabilities in another region will have to be restrained in order to balance things out. With the United States facing further resource constraints as a result of COVID-19, the next NDS[National Defense Strategy] must further prioritize adversaries and geographic regions to help determine a more aligned posture—one that better prepares the nation to prevail against other great powers while deterring lesser opponents.

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Inter-regional tradeoff is the reason US commitments to Europe are capped now

Colby 20, co-founder and principal of The Marathon Initiative, a policy initiative focused on developing strategies to prepare the United States for an era of sustained great power competition. From 2018-2019, Colby was the Director of the Defense Program at the Center for a New American Security, where he led the Center’s work on defense issues. Before that, he served as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Force Development from 2017-2018. In that role, he served as the lead official in the development and rollout of the Department’s 2018 National Defense Strategy. (Eldridge, “How NATO Manages the “Bear” and the “Dragon”,” Elbridge A. Colby and Ian Brzezinski in Conversation with Nikolas Gvosdev, Orbis)//BB

Elbridge Colby: The primary mission for European NATO should be to ensure the effective defense of the NATO area. From the U.S. perspective, Europe remains a vital interest, and NATO is a critical alliance. But the top U.S. priority is ensuring the effective defense of its allies and partners in the Asia-Pacific, including Taiwan, from Chinese attack—not only because of the strategic reasons mentioned above, but also due to the breathtakingly rapid and impressive growth of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Thus, dealing with the PLA will continue to be priority #1 for the U.S. military, as the 2018 National Defense Strategy and U.S. Secretary of Defense Mark Esper made clear. This means that the U.S. military contributions to Europe will necessarily have a ceiling, especially as budget pressures are likely in the 2020s.

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Resources for Europe directly tradeoff with resources dedicated to Asian power projection

Simon, Desmaele and Becker 21, *head of international security at the Institute for European Studies (Vrije Universiteit Brussel) and director of the Brussels office of the Elcano Royal Institute, **doctoral fellow at the Institute for European Studies at the Vrije Universiteit Brussel, ***currently the US liaison to the French Joint Staff. He was previously a senior transatlantic fellow at the Institute for European Studies (Luise, Linde and Jordan, “Europe as a Secondary Theater? Competition with China and the Future of America’s European Strategy,” Strategic Studies Quarterly,

Because outcompeting China has become its most pressing strategic challenge, Washington is adjusting its policies and relationships elsewhere in the world to ensure that they support competition with Beijing. While the shift has been gradual, it is now apparent; it represents a significant change from the twentieth century when the US went to war twice in Europe and conflicts elsewhere were often driven by the logic of European security. Whereas during the Cold War the US enlisted European allies in a global struggle against a European power, today the US seeks to enlist European allies in a global competition with a non-European power. To be sure, neither competition with China nor the preservation of a favorable regional balance in the Indo-Pacific fully monopolizes US global strategy. Both the 2017 NSS and the declassified synopsis of the 2018 NDS emphasize America’s ongoing commitment to the preservation of “favorable balances of power in Europe and the Middle East.”31 The NSS even refers to Europe as the United States’ most “significant trading partner” and notes that America is “safer when Europe is prosperous and stable.”32 Yet there is growing concern in Washington about how China’s rise might affect European security. In this regard, the NSS warns about Beijing’s supposed efforts to “gain a strategic foothold in Europe by expanding its unfair trade practices and investing in key industries, sensitive technologies and infrastructure.”33 A 2019 task force report published by the bipartisan Asia Society similarly identifies “China’s pursuit of a mercantilist high-tech import-substitution industrial policy” and its “economic and diplomatic statecraft to gain a military foothold beyond Asia,” including in Europe, as key grand strategic challenges.34 In other words, because US strategic objectives in Asia and Europe are increasingly interdependent, China and Asia are also becoming increasingly relevant in Washington’s dealings with and in Europe. This interdependence complicates America’s European strategy in two ways: by underscoring the problem resource trade-offs and by pushing the US to reconcile competing interests across the two regions.

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The plan specifically trades off with resources needed to deter China

[the counterplan defuses threats to NATO without requiring military spending]

Blackwill and Fontaine 22, senior fellow at the Council of Foreign Relations, **Chief Executive Officer of the Center for a New American Security (Robert and Richard, “Ukraine War Should Slow But Not Stop the U.S. Pivot to Asia,” Bloomberg,

Russian President Vladimir Putin’s brutal and unprovoked invasion of Ukraine has upended this approach. Now Washington must deal with revisionist great powers in two regions, while the Middle East also continues to demand attention. The U.S. should continue a long-term shift to Asia, but in a way that better balances resources and engagements across the three strategic theaters. Paradoxically, Putin’s aggression demonstrates how this should be done. First, policy makers should absorb the enduring strategic logic behind a pivot to Asia. China combines the greatest capability and will to upend the international order. The Indo-Pacific represents the primary, but not the only, regional theater in which U.S.-China competition takes place. But a sustainable pivot to Asia is possible only in the absence of serious national security crises in Europe and the Middle East. No U.S. president will ignore a Russian-induced emergency in Europe, a major terrorist threat, or a nuclear and/or hegemonic Iran. America remains a global and not a regional power. The central challenge is allocating national security resources across all three regions, without either weakening vital U.S. national interests in one or imagining that America can do everything, everywhere. That problem is most acute in the military sphere. An increase in defense spending will be required, but how that money is spent is equally important. In the Middle East, for example, regular troops should relieve the burden placed on elite special operations forces in security cooperation missions. Washington should move expensive military equipment — like F-35 and F-22 aircraft — to the two arenas of great-power competition, employing less-capable aircraft, including unmanned systems, for counterterrorism missions. A combination of regional diplomacy and continued deterrence could limit Iran's regional ambitions, freeing up some of the forces that have deployed to the Middle East in recent years to deter a potential Iran threat. In Europe, the U.S. should build on its allies’ newfound willingness to enhance their military capabilities and deter further Russian aggression. This should involve moving American troops currently stationed in Europe further east, to countries such as Poland, Romania and the Baltics. Washington should also capitalize on the recent increase in intelligence sharing – including to NATO non-members – by eliminating barriers to sharing defense technology with allies newly willing to invest. For the Indo-Pacific, Washington should reserve the lion's share of military resources that matter most, including smaller naval surface ships, long-range missiles and next-generation fighter aircraft. Building on efforts like the Aukus security arrangement with Australia and the U.K. would give regional allies more leverage to strengthen their own defense, helping them better deter China and serve as the frontline in daily competition with it. Diplomatic resources are less zero-sum than military power, and economic engagement less still. Intense diplomatic work in Europe and the Middle East could bolster the coalitions in each that are willing and able to deal with threats there, and potentially reduce some of the threats themselves. Washington should couple this with an affirmative economic agenda, beginning with re-entry to or renegotiation of the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade agreement.

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The plan requires a forced choice to sacrifice resources and focus needed to defend Taiwan

Colby 22, co-founder and principal of The Marathon Initiative, a policy initiative focused on developing strategies to prepare the United States for an era of sustained great power competition. From 2018-2019, Colby was the Director of the Defense Program at the Center for a New American Security, where he led the Center’s work on defense issues. Before that, he served as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Force Development from 2017-2018. In that role, he served as the lead official in the development and rollout of the Department’s 2018 National Defense Strategy (Eldridge, “The U.S. Must Support Ukraine, But China Must Be Our Priority,” TIME Magazine, )

How should America respond to Russia’s abominable invasion of Ukraine? This is a question of immense importance. Right now, there is more heat than light in the discussion. Given the momentous stakes, Americans must respond to this crisis with clarity of mind and sobriety. Moscow’s invasion is likely to be a hinge point in history. If nothing else, it lays to rest the idea that history is over, that power politics and the threat of war are gone from the developed areas of the world. This is sad, but it is a reality. In developing our response to Russia’s brazen act, we must face and adapt to this reality. For too long, we have discounted the hard facts of international politics. But now America must look at the world situation much more soberly and strategically, proceeding from these hard facts rather than ignoring them or wishing them away. Above all, our response must be strategic—it must match our response to the threats we face in light of our resources and the risks we are willing to take on. The reality is that we face multiple serious threats in different parts of the world. The danger Russia poses, including to our NATO allies, is now very clear. But others have not gone away. We also must consider Iran, North Korea, transnational terrorists like al Qaeda, and, above all, the threat of a China that seeks first hegemony over Asia and then global preeminence. So far this is familiar. Less familiar but absolutely critical is the fact that we do not have a military large or capable enough to fight major wars against Russia and China in even roughly concurrent timelines. It is true that Europe is mainly a land theater and the Western Pacific is mainly a maritime one. But many of the things our forces would need to defeat Russia or China are needed in both theaters—like heavy penetrating bombers, attack submarines, advanced munitions, air defenses, and survivable intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) systems. Even certain assets once thought most appropriate or necessary for Europe may well play a critical role in a fight against China, such as Army long-range missiles and artillery. These and other capabilities like them would be just as vital for beating back a Russian assault as they would be for denying a Chinese fait accompli against Taiwan—and are already in short supply. Unfortunately, this is not a problem that we can solve easily, quickly, or cheaply. We should seek to redress it, but, even if we muster the will, it will take years and a significantly larger defense budget to build more of the things we need to fight a major war, like penetrating heavy bombers and nuclear-powered attack submarines. In the meantime, what we do have can only be used in one place at a time. A missile used in Europe can’t be used in Asia, and a bomber lost over Europe will take years to be replaced. We do also have an unparalleled network of allies. But a similar problem confronts us here. In theory our alliance network is far stronger than the threats we face. But in reality few of our allies have significant militaries, and it will take those that don’t significant time to develop their armed forces even if they gather the resolve. Over the long term, then, our strategy should be clear. We should reshape our military to field far more of the kinds of systems needed to fight a great power war and, with a few exceptions like sustaining our ongoing counterterrorism efforts, dispense with those elements that are ill-suited for it. Meantime, we should press and encourage our allies, especially Japan, Germany, and Taiwan, to build up their conventional defenses, and fully enable those, like Poland, Australia, and the United Kingdom, willing to do more for their and others’ defense. But this strategy will take time to bear fruit. This is the strategy the 2018 National Defense Strategy called for—yet four years later, due to factors ranging from inertia through political and bureaucratic resistance to allied footdragging, we still have a long way to go. In the coming years, then, we face what Henry Kissinger called “the necessity for choice.” We don’t have enough of the right military might to cover all the threats to our interests. So we must prioritize. This is far from unprecedented. The U.S. and Britain faced this dilemma in 1941, and elected a “Europe first” strategy, prioritizing defeating much stronger Nazi Germany before Imperial Japan. Similarly today, America must prioritize addressing the threat China poses in Asia. Asia is the world’s “decisive theater” and China by far the most powerful other state in the world. If China attains its goal of becoming dominant over Asia, it will control over half of the global economy. Americans’ fundamental liberties and prosperity will suffer grievously. This is the most dangerous outcome for Americans, and preventing it must be the priority of our foreign policy. In practical military terms, this means that we must ensure enough of the right military forces—bombers, submarines, munitions, ISR, and the like—are ready and available to defend Taiwan, and on relatively short notice. Taiwan is China’s best target for breaking apart the anti-hegemonic coalition that is the only way we can prevent Beijing from dominating Asia. If China seizes Taiwan, it will deal this coalition a huge—possibly mortal—blow. We cannot allow this. And, crucially, this is a problem right now. We don’t know Beijing’s assessment of the People’s Liberation Army’s ability to seize Taiwan. But we do know that America’s ability to defeat a Chinese invasion of Taiwan has eroded very substantially in recent years, that it is continuing to erode, and that Beijing’s perceptions of its ability to take the island would rise dramatically if it knew we had expended or tied down critical parts of our military in or for Europe. In other words, we are in or very close to the window where a successful Chinese attack on Taiwan is possible, and we must hedge against this risk.

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Washington has internalized a zero-sum relationship between Europe and Asia. They will trade-off resources, even if it’s not legally required.

Simon, Desmaele and Becker 21, *head of international security at the Institute for European Studies (Vrije Universiteit Brussel) and director of the Brussels office of the Elcano Royal Institute, **doctoral fellow at the Institute for European Studies at the Vrije Universiteit Brussel, ***currently the US liaison to the French Joint Staff. He was previously a senior transatlantic fellow at the Institute for European Studies (Luise, Linde and Jordan, “Europe as a Secondary Theater? Competition with China and the Future of America’s European Strategy,” Strategic Studies Quarterly,

First, to influence and maintain a favorable balance of power in Europe, Washington has traditionally relied on a strategy of forward military presence coupled with economic and diplomatic engagement. But US resources are limited, and increasing demand for them in Asia raises new questions about whether Washington can preserve a favorable European regional balance at a lower cost than in the past. In this context, Washington must consider how much influence it is willing to cede to European actors, including Germany, Russia, Britain, France and the European Union (EU). Second, as Europe becomes a secondary theater in US grand strategy, Washington is compelled to ensure that Europe’s key powers and institutions support US interests when it comes to competition with Beijing, or at least that they do not undermine US efforts in this regard. In reframing its relationship with Europe, the US is paying increasing attention to Europe’s positions toward China and Asia. Washington recently warned Europeans, for example, about China’s efforts to leverage investments and trade to gain technological and related strategic advantages relative to the United States.9 China-related considerations are also likely to gain relevance in the context of America’s calculations vis-à-vis Russia, a country that can play a direct—if limited—strategic role in China’s immediate periphery: Central Asia, Northeast Asia, and the Western Pacific. For now, the US continues to look at Russia (primarily) through a European lens and worries about Moscow’s potential to threaten US regional interests and upset the European balance. However, as competition with China becomes the focus of US grand strategy, Washington may increasingly consider how Russia can affect that competition—whether through its relationship with China, its ability to strain the European balance of power, or its propensity to create challenges elsewhere in the world. While it is certainly conceivable that the United States could retain such overwhelming advantages vis-à-vis all its peer competitors, or that China’s rise could organically slow or reverse, the US does not seem to be betting on either scenario.10 The centrality of China in US grand strategy appears to be structural, driven by the broader eastward shift in the distribution of global economic power. It is therefore unsurprising that as the United States becomes increasingly preoccupied with China’s rise, it adjusts strategy in other regions accordingly. The fact that Washington has labelled China as a “global” competitor makes it difficult to isolate SinoAmerican competition in Asia and the broader Indo-Pacific area from what happens in other theaters, particularly Europe.