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2022 Michigan Counterplan
Unilat Non-SC CPs › Solvency---Unilateral › Solvency---ASW

Unilateral US deployment of ASW solves deterrence.

Bryan Clark 20. Senior fellow at the Hudson Institute. He is an expert in naval operations, electronic warfare, autonomous systems, military competitions and war gaming. “US Navy should turn to unmanned systems to track and destroy submarines.” Defense News. 4-10-2020. https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2020/04/13/us-navy-should-turn-to-unmanned-systems-to-track-and-destroy-submarines/ //EM

Anti-submarine warfare, or ASW, is one of a navy’s most difficult missions. Sonars detect submarines with only a fraction of the range and precision possible using radars or visual sensors against ships above the water. Submarines can carry missiles able to hit targets hundreds of miles away, requiring searches to cover potentially vast areas. And the torpedoes that aircraft and surface ships use to sink submarines need to be dropped right on the submarine to have any chance of sinking it.

These challenges led the Cold War-era U.S. Navy to rely on a sequential approach for tracking enemy submarines. Electronic or visual intelligence sources would report when an opposing sub was leaving port, and it would hopefully get picked up by sound surveillance, or SOSUS — sonar arrays on the sea floor — as it entered chokepoints, like that between Iceland and the United Kingdom.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Unilat Non-SC CPs › Solvency---Unilateral › Solvency---Baltics---Generic

Robust American presence alone deters Russia from invasion.

Jen Judson 19. Land warfare reporter for Defense News. She has covered defense in the Washington area for over six years. She was previously a reporter at Politico Pro Defense and InsideDefense.com. At InsideDefense.com, Judson specialized in Army aviation and missile defense. “Do the Baltics need more US military support to deter Russia?” Defense News. 7-15-2019. https://www.defensenews.com/land/2019/07/15/do-the-baltics-need-more-us-military-support-to-deter-russia/ //EM

VILNIUS, Lithuania — For the Baltic states, the desire for steadier and more robust American presence to deter Russia is high.

Ever since Russia annexed Crimea in 2014, NATO and the U.S. military have drastically bolstered their presence in Eastern Europe to include deploying NATO rapid response forces, embedding units under the command of Baltic states’ forces, building up arsenals of equipment, deploying a heel-to-toe rotational U.S. armored brigade combat team and conducting increasingly complex exercises.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Unilat Non-SC CPs › Solvency---Unilateral › Solvency---Baltics---Generic

US unilateral action solves.

John B. Gilliam & Ryan C. Van Wie 22. Federal Executive Fellow at the Brookings Institution; International Affairs Instructor, Social Sciences Department at the United States Military Academy. “Feasible US steps to strengthen NATO deterrence in the Baltics and Poland.” Brookings. March 2022. https://www.brookings.edu/research/feasible-us-steps-to-strengthen-nato-deterrence-in-the-baltics-and-poland/ //EM

With Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, a renewed assessment of efforts by the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to deter Russia from taking military action on NATO’s eastern flank has become particularly salient. In the coming weeks, NATO leadership will meet to discuss what longer term force posture adjustments are required to create such a deterrent.[1] This paper proposes several modest policy recommendations which will help inform the discussion and ultimately strengthen NATO’s conventional deterrence posture.

Contemporary academic research on conventional deterrence highlights clear gaps in the deterrence capacity of the United States and NATO, despite their concerted efforts to strengthen conventional military capability since Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea. For example, studies indicate that the rotational military forces established by the United States’ Operation Atlantic Resolve and NATO’s enhanced Forward Presence, still lack the requisite conventional capability to prevent a Russian fait accompli in the Baltic states, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. However, these studies lack a well-defined formula for what constitutes adequate capability and say little about what adjustments the United States and NATO must make to strengthen NATO’s deterrence posture in the Baltics and Poland.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Unilat Carrots CPs › Aff › Inducements CP---Fails---Bureaucracy

X.

Jeremy Gwinn 22. U.S. Army infantry officer currently in the Office of Security Cooperation – Iraq. His previous experiences include multiple tours in Afghanistan and Iraq conducting counter-insurgency and security force assistance as well as teaching economics in the Department of Social Sciences at West Point. “Sweeter Carrots and Harder Sticks: Rethinking U.S. Security Assistance.” War on the Rocks. 4-19-2022. https://warontherocks.com/2022/04/sweeter-carrots-and-harder-sticks-rethinking-u-s-security-assistance/ //EM

Security Assistance as Incentive Security assistance generates a classic principal-agent problem. In such relationships between a principal and its agent or proxy, there exists an information asymmetry where the agent inherently has more information about their own capabilities, activities, and interests than the principal. Agents, being rational actors, place their own interests above those of the principal and, in the absence of other incentives, behave accordingly. The greater the degree of misalignment, the more problematic this becomes. U.S. frustration during its 20-year war in Afghanistan over Pakistan’s perceived failure to adequately confront extremist groups, despite significant military aid, is an example of principal-agent problems at work. Fortunately, these are not insurmountable obstacles. Security assistance in the form of arms, equipment, or other support can be an effective incentive when it is used as a carrot to reward desired behavior, such as achieving a specific reform or taking some other action aligned with the interests of the principal. Alternately, such aid becomes a stick when it is withheld. An example of this carrot-and-stick approach being used effectively is described in Walter Ladwig’s study of U.S. assistance to the Philippines to combat the Hukbalahap rebellion in the decade following World War II. Heavy-handed tactics used by the local constabulary forces were a major factor driving support for the rebels. Recognizing this problem, U.S. advisors insisted on a series of reforms within the security forces as a precondition for further aid. These measures, along with the appointment of the reform-minded Ramon Magsaysay as defense chief, contributed to a far more effective counterinsurgency campaign and the eventual defeat of the rebel movement. This approach of using aid as an incentive stands in sharp contrast to Ladwig’s other case study, Vietnam, where U.S. aid was used as an inducement in the hope that it would eventually change partner behavior. In this case, U.S. advisors tried in vain year after year to cajole prime minister Ngo Dinh Diem and successor regimes to implement reforms that would have broadened domestic political support and made the South Vietnamese forces more effective. All the while, massive U.S. assistance continued to flow in with the expectation that it would eventually bring about a change of heart in the host-nation government. Such change never came, and the United States and its South Vietnamese proxies lost the war. The more recent U.S. experience in Iraq from 2003 until the withdrawal in 2011 contains echoes of Vietnam. David Lake’s study of that conflict suggests that provision of unconditional security assistance may still be America’s default setting. Despite massive volumes of military aid provided to the Iraqi government during this period, U.S. urging to reform the security forces and national government repeatedly failed. Nouri al-Maliki, prime minister during much of this period, resisted efforts to make the armed forces more broadly inclusive and apolitical, instead continuing to employ them as his own sectarian instrument. Again, the United States used an approach focused on training and equipping, known in the current lexicon as building partner capacity. The Iraqi government received assistance regardless of its effort, or lack thereof, to implement much-needed reform while the United States failed to use the leverage which hundreds of millions of dollars of assistance could buy. Several years later, the Iraqi military in which the United States had invested so much fell apart virtually upon first contact with the Islamic State’s irregular militia. The “building partner capacity” approach has two main flaws. First, it ignores fundamental problems, such as corruption, coup-proofing, and otherwise weak defense institutions which additional military capacity cannot overcome and may even exacerbate. Paradoxically, a focus primarily on capacity-building often fails to build meaningful, long-term capacity because it neglects underlying institutional problems. Second, it ignores principal-agent problems by assuming that once in possession of highly capable security forces, the partner will wield them in a manner aligned with U.S. interests. U.S. advisors and diplomats may recognize the pressing need for security sector reform in the partner. Unfortunately, the ingrained culture of U.S. security assistance seemingly relies on the false premise that with enough U.S. training and relationship-building, other countries’ militaries will voluntarily reform even though it is often not in their personal interests to do so.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Unilat Carrots CPs › Aff › Inducements CP ---Fails---Pressure Key

Loss is more persuasive than gain for states and sub-state actors

Berejikian & Early 13, *PhD, Professor at the University of Georgia, Associate Professor in the Department of International Affairs **PhD, Associate Professor of Political Science, Associate Dean for Research at the University at Albany, SUNY's Rockefeller College (Jeffrey Berejikian; Bryan Early, 2013, “Loss Aversion and Foreign Policy Resolve,” Political Psychology, 34.5)

Loss aversion is perhaps the most enduring and intuitive finding in behavioral decision theory (Kahneman et al., 1991; Novemsky & Kahneman, 2005; Thaler, 1980). Experimental results suggest that the subjective pain of loss is greater than the benefit enjoyed from an equivalent gain, and scholars have extended this finding beyond the laboratory to explain a wide range of otherwise puzzling human behavior. Building upon these results, and adding new findings from the field of neuroscience, we seek to contribute to the theory-building enterprise in the study of foreign policy by constructing a gener- alizable theory of loss aversion and foreign policy behavior. The approach is consistent with the call to continue to develop theories of foreign policy built upon solid micro foundations (Hudson, 2005). Specifically, we hope to explain why policy makers stubbornly stand firm in their prosecution of some international disputes while in others they are willing to back down. The question is relevant for any number of foreign policy issues, such as territorial disputes, trade negotiations, conflicts over water rights, arms control, and international treaty compliance. Much of the research on loss aversion in the foreign policy literature has relied heavily upon case studies (Mercer, 2005). However, for some time scholars have suggested that loss aversion should produce broad patterns of behavior that could, in principle, be captured by statistical analysis (e.g., Jervis, 1992, Levy, 1996). Large-n analyses of broader behavior patterns thus remain fertile territory for research and contain the potential for advancing our understanding of how loss aversion affects foreign policy. As we demonstrate in this article, foreign policy behaviors, like trade disputes, can be analyzed using contemporary insights about loss aversion derived from neuroscience. Our analysis proceeds in the following manner. First, we build upon neuroscience research to argue that policy makers' aversion to accepting losses can affect their willingness to back down in international disputes. Cognitive science has convincingly demonstrated that individuals tend to strive harder and take more risks to avoid losses than they will to achieve similar gains. More recent neuroscientific findings show that unrealized expectations, like those observed in a broken agreement, are processed in the human mind in a way almost identical to actual losses. The result is that unmet expectations can also trigger loss aversion. Policy makers' resolve during disputes can thus vary if they perceive themselves to be defending previously established agreements from violations by their counterparts. Such violations diminish expected and hoped for gains, triggering loss aversion. Generalizing from this phenomenon, we then distinguish between preventive goals in which policy makers seek to protect against perceived losses versus promotive goals in which policy makers seek to make new gains. We theorize that policy makers should be less willing to back down in disputes initiated for preventive reasons than for promotive ones. We employ our theory to help explain cross-case variation in the level of resolve demonstrated by the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) in prosecuting Section 301 trade disputes designed to improve the terms of trade for U.S. businesses. Drawing on our preventive versus promotive framework, we hypothesize that the USTR should be less willing to back down in Section 301 disputes initiated because of breached trade agreements than those initiated to open up new markets. We test our theory via two different large-n analyses of a hundred Section 301 trade disputes. This approach is unique because - to the best of our knowledge - this study constitutes the first theoretically driven statistical analysis of loss aversion on foreign policy behavior grounded in a specific set of neuroscientific findings. In our first test, we conduct an analysis using binary logit, and, in the second, we employ a competing risks model. The two approaches allow us to model the effects of time on U.S. resolve in different ways. Our empirical results provide strong support for our theory, revealing that the U.S. Government was significantly less likely to back down in preventive disputes. Indeed, we find that the preventive/promotive distinction provides the single greatest determinant of U.S. resolve in prosecuting its Section 301 cases. We believe that this project offers a number of novel contributions. First, this study demonstrates that specific findings from cognitive neuroscience can make tangible contributions to explaining phenomena in international relations. Our study reveals that loss aversion and unrealized expecta- tions profoundly shape the behavior of even the most powerful states in the international system and that it does so in ways that traditional theoretical approaches are often blind to. This suggests that the loss-aversion-based framework we have developed may be able to yield novel insights into a host of other issue areas beyond the study of trade policy. Second, we test our arguments utilizing large-n statistical analysis - a method that has seen little use in evaluating cognitive and/or neuroscience theories of international relations (e.g., Drury, 2005). Moving forward with a program of quantitative analysis broadens the applicability of such theories and places them on equal analytical footing with rationalist models. Our project thus demonstrates that the empirical barriers that have to date "arrested" the development of the cognitive research agenda in international relations can be overcome (Walker, 2007). Lastly, our inquiry provides a number of case-specific insights explaining the comparative resolve demonstrated by the United States in prosecuting its Section 301 trade disputes and the policy implications that arise from them.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Unilat Carrots CPs › Aff › Inducements CP ---Fails---Pressure Key

Reassurances undermines pressure

Techau 15, senior fellow and director of the Europe Program at The German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF). As a foreign policy analyst, his research focuses on European integration and the EU's role in the world, German foreign policy, transatlantic relations, and security and defense issues. (Jan, September, 2015, “THE POLITICS OF 2 PERCENT: NATO and the Security Vacuum in Europe”, https://carnegieendowment.org/files/CP_252_Techau_NATO_Final.pdf)

And so the dilemma remains: Europeans are still dependent on U.S. services for their security, and they are not too bothered by that fact. At the same time, Americans eagerly want Europeans to do more but can’t really sanction them in any painful way because, in the end, Europe is too strategically important for the United States to abandon it and leave its defense to the Europeans alone. Meanwhile, the United States feels the need to demonstrate to both Europeans and external powers that it stands by its security commitments to Europe and that it is ready to show strength when needed. This could well undermine the strong American push for Europeans to adopt the 2 percent metric. It could make the target less realistic by creating a false sense of security among Europeans that serves as an incentive against, not for, more European defense spending. In the absence of any political will from the Europeans to significantly beef up their defense, this impasse can basically only be broken in one of two ways: Either the United States is completely honest about its role in Europe and says it will continue to subsidize the continent’s security. This will probably mean an expensive, permanent recommitment to Europe over the next decade or so. Or the United States reduces its commitment, thereby risking a security crisis in Europe and the erosion of the cornerstones of its global posture. Neither of these two radical solutions will be embraced, of course. Instead, a third option will likely continue for some time: balancing the two and hoping that a blend of demonstrated American solidarity, lecturing, and threats of leaving will move the Europeans in the desired direction. This will be a shaky compromise. It can only last as long as NATO and the territory protected by Article 5 of the NATO treaty are not really threatened by anyone, and as long as the political consensus in Washington survives that says Europe, America’s geostrategic countercoast, must be always defended by the United States. Should the strategic situation in Europe change dramatically, or should America’s support for Europe erode, as some say it inevitably will, the status quo will become unsustainable. No one knows how long it will take to reach that point.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Unilat Carrots CPs › Aff › Inducements CP ---Fails---Pressure Key

Pressure is critical to change their mind

Joyner 14, associate professor of strategic studies at the Marine Corps Command and Staff College and a nonresident senior fellow at the Brent Scowcroft Center of International Security at the Atlantic Council, (James, July 13th, 2014, (“Europe's Free Ride on the American-Defense Gravy Train”), https://nationalinterest.org/feature/europes-free-ride-the-american-defense-gravy-train-10864)

Demands to do something the receiver doesn't want to do—in this case, spend money that could go to social welfare programs or job creation on defense—are useless without an "or else." While senior American officials have been vaguely threatening for years that, if the Europeans didn't pony up for their own defense, the American taxpayer would stop doing it for them, it's long been obvious that the threat is hollow. To be sure, the United States has drawn down most of its huge pre-positioned force from the Cold War days. But there's simply no question that we'll respond rapidly in the event an ally is seriously threatened. So long as the Europeans know that's true, they're unlikely to change their behavior.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Unilat Carrots CPs › Top Shelf › Solvency---Inducements---Empirics

Incentives create the perception of future benefits---creating instant buy-in.

J. Andrés Gannon (<3 BFHR 2022) & Daniel Kent 21. PhD Eisenhower Defence Fellow at the NATO Defence College in Rome, Italy. Previously, he was an International Security Program Postdoctoral Research Fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and a Hans J. Morgenthau Research Fellow at the Notre Dame International Security Center; Data scientist at Kaiser Permanente in San Francisco. Prior to Kaiser Permanente I completed a Ph.D. in Political Science at Ohio State, where I specialized in computational social science. “Keeping Your Friends Close, but Acquaintances Closer: Why Weakly Allied States Make Committed Coalition Partners.” Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 65, no. 5, May 2021, pp. 889–918, doi:10.1177/0022002720978800. //EM

Closer alignments may be valued inherently, for unspecified reasons, or to help the state acquire side payments or policy concessions on unrelated issues. Henke (2019a) argues that states contribute to coalition conflicts when the “pivotal state”— what we call the coalition leader—provides side payments as incentives to contribute. This highlights our broader logic about variation in club goods and public goods in alliances and coalitions.

States contribute to coalition warfare when there are benefits to contributing troops that fall outside the traditionally understood alliance mandates or security concerns. In US-led conflicts since the Korean War, Henke (2019a) find that future benefits offered by pivotal states can induce coalition participation. We extend upon this finding by arguing that states with unrealized alliance potential are most likely to be moved by that logic. Furthermore, they will go above and beyond in their coalition participation to try to secure future benefits— whether side payments or unrelated payments—that extend from a closer relationship with the coalition leader.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Unilat Carrots CPs › Top Shelf › Solvency---Inducements---Theory

Inducements open up concessions that can achieve unprecedented cooperation.

Muhammad S. Kabir 17. Received a B.A. (with honors) from New York University. He holds a Ph.D. in political science from the CUNY Graduate Center. Dr. Kabir teaches courses in international relations, international security, comparative politics, and political economy. . “Asymmetric Alliances and Side Payments: Alliance Politics Between Unequal Powers.” City University of New York (CUNY), CUNY Academic Works. 02-2017. https://academicworks.cuny.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2912&amp;context=gc_etds //EM

There is a well-developed area of research on the use of side payments (of which issue linkage is a part) in the bargaining literature. According to bargaining theories, policymakers use side payments as either direct monetary payments (such as bribes) or material concessions on other issues (such as issue linages) to encourage concessions on a given issue.42 Side payments and issue linkages, if used to provide a positive inducement, help states to diminish conflict and to reach an otherwise unattainable level of cooperation during negotiations.43 Issue linkages, as a part of side payment mechanism, help states to solve distribution problems, arise when actors have different preferences over alternative possible agreements, in bargaining situations. As Morrow observed: “a linkage deal requires two issues that the sides believe are of different importance. Each side receives concessions on the issue it believes is of greater relative importance. . . [if] done properly, both sides prefer the linkage deal to going to war over the initial issue.” 44

A state may offer various types of incentives to encourage otherwise unwilling governments to cooperate with it. Side payments may come in the form of direct payments such as cash payments (or grants), loans, or military aid, etc. Positive incentives can also be in the form of indirect payments, such as unilateral trade concessions, investments, etc. In an alliance negotiation the nature and volume of side payments, however, will depend on the strategic value of the alliance to the more powerful side.45I contend that side payments serve as a compensation mechanism that closes the deficit in net gains sometimes felt by a member (usually, the weaker side) of the alliance. Side payments sometimes increase the scope of the alliance to include economic and/or military dimensions. For a great power considering an alliance with a small state, the strategic value of the alliance may justify the cost of side payments; for the small state gains involve both economic and strategic dimensions at the expense of concessions on issues deemed important to the great power.46 This study probes the conditions under which side payments are used as a bargaining tool in asymmetric alliances.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Unilat Carrots CPs › Top Shelf › Solvency---Inducements

Allies say yes---they have mutual incentives to partner with the US in the expectation of future security assistance.

Tommy Ross & Melissa Dalton 20. Non-resident senior associate at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. He served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Security Cooperation at the Pentagon and was the senior defense and intelligence adviser to Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid. He has also held other senior positions in the House and Senate. Melissa Dalton directs the Cooperative Defense Project and is a senior fellow and deputy director of the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Prior to CSIS, she served in the U.S. Department of Defense for 10 years. “A Roadmap for Better Choices from Security Partners.” War on the Rocks. 1-17-2020. https://warontherocks.com/2020/01/a-roadmap-for-better-choices-from-security-partners/ //EM

In the realm of security sector assistance, experience has been disproportionately focused on negative approaches, almost always negative and ex post. In addition to Egypt, Indonesia, and Pakistan, the United States has sought to limit or cut off security sector assistance in El Salvador in the 1980s, Rwanda in 2012, Bahrain in 2011, and Burundi in 2015. All these efforts followed the ex post/negative pattern in which the United States has taken essentially punitive measures to reframe an existing security sector assistance relationship. One might view the application of the Leahy Law, which restricts assistance in cases of human rights abuse, or post-coup legal restrictions as cases of ex ante/negative conditionality, given that partners are expected to be aware of these condition-triggering laws prior to the acceptance of assistance or the commission of violations.

By contrast, examples of positive conditionality in the security sector assistance arena have been few and far between, even though the idea is not particularly new. “Incentive-based conditions” might tie additional and/or more sophisticated levels of security sector assistance, including new military capabilities or specific weapons platforms, to reform milestones to incentivize behavioral changes. In addition, rather than authorizing aid and then withholding it, on the basis of shared interests, the United States might identify positive actions that a recipient is considering taking and then incentivize them. More recently, the U.S. Institute for Peace Task Force on Extremism in Fragile States argued for “graduated security sector assistance,” in which the United States calibrates its engagement with fragile states according to a jointly agreed plan that enables partners in those countries to achieve escalating levels and types of U.S. security sector assistance as partners achieve reform milestones leading to more inclusive governance. These recommendations build on recent experiments in new government approaches to security sector assistance, such as the Security Governance Initiative, which have sought to establish joint bilateral planning on the basis of overlapping interests as the foundation of assistance programs, though these initiatives have not ultimately meaningfully conditioned assistance. The challenge has been that, while positive conditionality has been posited as a potentially viable and beneficial approach to improving security sector assistance outcomes, it has neither been sufficiently attempted in practice nor sufficiently elaborated in literature.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Unilat Carrots CPs › Top Shelf › 2NC --- PDCP

Security cooperation only includes mil-to-mil cooperation.

Office of the Secretary of Defense 21. “Justification for Security Cooperation Program and Activity Funding.” 2021. https://open.defense.gov/Portals/23/Documents/Security_Cooperation/Budget_Justification_FY2021.pdf //EM

The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY 2017 defines security cooperation as “any program, activity (including an exercise), or interaction of the Department of Defense with the security establishment of a foreign country to achieve a purpose as follows:

• To build and develop allied and friendly security capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Unilat Carrots CPs › Top Shelf › 1NC --- CP Shell

Allies say yes---they have mutual incentives to partner with the US in the expectation of future security assistance.

Tommy Ross & Melissa Dalton 20. Non-resident senior associate at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. He served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Security Cooperation at the Pentagon and was the senior defense and intelligence adviser to Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid. He has also held other senior positions in the House and Senate. Melissa Dalton directs the Cooperative Defense Project and is a senior fellow and deputy director of the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Prior to CSIS, she served in the U.S. Department of Defense for 10 years. “A Roadmap for Better Choices from Security Partners.” War on the Rocks. 1-17-2020. https://warontherocks.com/2020/01/a-roadmap-for-better-choices-from-security-partners/ //EM

In the realm of security sector assistance, experience has been disproportionately focused on negative approaches, almost always negative and ex post. In addition to Egypt, Indonesia, and Pakistan, the United States has sought to limit or cut off security sector assistance in El Salvador in the 1980s, Rwanda in 2012, Bahrain in 2011, and Burundi in 2015. All these efforts followed the ex post/negative pattern in which the United States has taken essentially punitive measures to reframe an existing security sector assistance relationship. One might view the application of the Leahy Law, which restricts assistance in cases of human rights abuse, or post-coup legal restrictions as cases of ex ante/negative conditionality, given that partners are expected to be aware of these condition-triggering laws prior to the acceptance of assistance or the commission of violations.

By contrast, examples of positive conditionality in the security sector assistance arena have been few and far between, even though the idea is not particularly new. “Incentive-based conditions” might tie additional and/or more sophisticated levels of security sector assistance, including new military capabilities or specific weapons platforms, to reform milestones to incentivize behavioral changes. In addition, rather than authorizing aid and then withholding it, on the basis of shared interests, the United States might identify positive actions that a recipient is considering taking and then incentivize them. More recently, the U.S. Institute for Peace Task Force on Extremism in Fragile States argued for “graduated security sector assistance,” in which the United States calibrates its engagement with fragile states according to a jointly agreed plan that enables partners in those countries to achieve escalating levels and types of U.S. security sector assistance as partners achieve reform milestones leading to more inclusive governance. These recommendations build on recent experiments in new government approaches to security sector assistance, such as the Security Governance Initiative, which have sought to establish joint bilateral planning on the basis of overlapping interests as the foundation of assistance programs, though these initiatives have not ultimately meaningfully conditioned assistance. The challenge has been that, while positive conditionality has been posited as a potentially viable and beneficial approach to improving security sector assistance outcomes, it has neither been sufficiently attempted in practice nor sufficiently elaborated in literature.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
DEMOCRACY QPQ CP › net benefit › at: avoids politics

The counterplan threatens NATO allies. That links to politics.

Tamkin 18 [Emily Tamkin is a Reporter covering foreign affairs, "More than 8 in 10 Americans support NATO, study finds", Washington Post, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2019/04/03/more-than-americans-support-nato-study-finds/] GBS-HW

NATO is a popular punching bag for President Trump. Days before coming into office, he called it “obsolete.” As president, he’s railed against European spending on defense and noted time and again that many NATO allies don’t meet the target of 2 percent of gross domestic product on defense. Other U.S. politicians — in Congress, for example — have rushed to make sure NATO allies know that the United States remains committed to the alliance. But as NATO approaches its 70th birthday Thursday, it’s worth asking — are Americans still behind NATO or have they been swayed by Trump’s arguments?

According to a new study by the Program for Public Consultation of the School of Public Policy at the University of Maryland and released by the nonpartisan organization Voice of the People, the American people remain committed to NATO, too.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
DEMOCRACY QPQ CP › net benefit › us fails

Failure to shore up democracy at home makes global democracy promotion impossible

Elisa Massimino, contributor to Washington Post, 2021

“America’s hypocrisy on democracy and human rights has a cost,” Washington Post, , (accessed 6-2-2022)

American diplomats have long understood that hypocrisy has a cost, especially for a nation that seeks to champion the ideals of democracy and human rights as the cornerstone of global peace and security. As E.J. Dionne Jr. rightly pointed out in his June 10 Thursday Opinion column, “Our national security now depends on civil rights,” failing to shore up our democratic institutions and uphold human rights at home deepens the United States’ credibility deficit and weakens its effectiveness as a champion of these values abroad. And that has serious national security implications, because we know — from hard data and grim experience — that Americans are safer when democracies set the rules of a global order. But though it’s true that our adversaries will use this hypocrisy to discredit the United States in the global struggle of ideas, there’s a deeper and more direct security threat posed by our failure to live up to those ideals at home. Societal divisions that result from systemic racism and other human rights violations left to fester, combined with weak institutions seemingly incapable of addressing these challenges, make us not just a weaker champion but also a weaker nation, increasingly vulnerable to attacks of all kinds from those with a different vision of the world.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
DEMOCRACY QPQ CP › net benefit › us fails

Global atrocities committed by the US undermine its ability to promote human rights

Anna Rosario Malindog-Uy, Professor of Political Science, International Relations, Development Studies, European Studies, SEA and China Studies, April 17, 2022

“Human Rights: US’ Double Standards, Hypocrisy,” ASEAN Post, , (accessed 6-2-2022)

Externally, the war waged by America in countries like Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria alone have already caused more than 20 million people to become either refugees or migrants. During the US withdrawal of its troops from Afghanistan, a US drone killed 10 members of an Afghan family, including seven children, among which the youngest was only two years old. Also, to date, the US still holds 39 detainees at the Guantanamo high-security prison. Hence, given all these, it is imperative to ask if the US, a title-holder in pointing fingers at the human rights shortcomings of other countries, will take responsibility and address its dismal human rights record within its borders and beyond? Conclusion Indeed, “righteous indignation should be reserved for the truly righteous.” But America is far from being righteous given its blatant dismal human rights record within its borders and beyond. America lecturing the world on human rights is a farce, for it doesn’t have the moral ascendancy and integrity given its gloomy human rights record. Instead of schooling other countries on their human rights shortcomings, the US probably needs some self-introspection and should first address its human rights situation.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
DEMOCRACY QPQ CP › net benefit › us fails

Domestic human rights violations prevent effective US pressure

Tanya Elahi, JD, assessment analyst at the Independent Office for Police Conduct, 2020

“Hypocrisy And Human Rights Abuses In The Land Of The Free,” Human Rights Pulse, , (accessed 6-2-2022)

The US has faced accusations of voter suppression by introducing policies such as requiring citizens to show ID and prohibiting early votes, both of which disproportionately affect Black Americans and disabled people. The report highlights that people of colour and specifically Black Americans are “particularly vulnerable to abuses of every single right measured”. This highlights a worrying disregard for human rights which appears to affect vulnerable minority groups at a higher level. THE HYPOCRISY OF THE US America has taken a leading role in condemning human rights abuses worldwide. In December 2019, US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo condemned Iran for violating human rights, including “the violent crackdown on protestors in November 2019”. This US subsequently placed sanctions on Iran. The current protests taking place in the US demonstrate the country’s outright hypocrisy. The death of George Floyd at the hands of US police officers has triggered worldwide protests against police brutality. American protestors have largely been met with further violence from the police. What began as a series of peaceful protests quickly became widespread chaos, with police cars driving into protestors, elderly men being pushed to the ground and seriously injured, and assaults on innocent reporters. Pompeo has also criticised Tehran for using violence against anti-government protestors. He stated that “we pray for a day when … all peoples can speak and assemble freely without fear of their own governments.” Whilst this violation of human rights should certainly be condemned, it is difficult to see how any country could learn lessons from the US, where the state is encouraging the use of violence against its own citizens during protests. For instance, Trump tweeted a controversial warning to protestors, stating that “when the looting starts, the shooting starts”. This statement was flagged by Twitter as violating their guidelines by “glorifying violence”. These protests are a clear example of the US committing the same violations it condemns overseas. THE EFFECTS OF HYPOCRITICAL POLICY The hypocrisy demonstrated by the US has a huge impact on the enforcement of international human rights. The US has a reputation for boasting about its citizens’ freedoms and claims to set an example for the rest of the world. US violations, however, of its own citizens freedoms have allowed countries such as China and Russia to undermine American efforts to condemn human rights abuses. America’s recent violations are likely to prohibit any effective intervention when encouraging other countries to respect human rights.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
DEMOCRACY QPQ CP › net benefit › us fails

US human rights pressure fails because of hypocrisy

Anna Rosario Malindog-Uy, Professor of Political Science, International Relations, Development Studies, European Studies, SEA and China Studies, April 17, 2022

“Human Rights: US’ Double Standards, Hypocrisy,” ASEAN Post, , (accessed 6-2-2022)

Unimaginably, the US is like a loose cannon with its double standards and hypocrisy in lecturing and pillorying other countries’ human rights shortcomings as if it has the moral and ethical superiority on this matter. It is as if the US is the world’s human rights judge and role model. Truth be told, the US hardly befits a nation that is a role model of human rights to be emulated by other countries. Relative to its size and power, the US, at the moment, is one, if not the most brazen and impertinent guilty party or delinquent in the international human rights community. Nevertheless, it is unashamed to castigate other countries across the world for their human rights deficiencies as if it has the moral ascendancy and credibility to do so, given that the US does not practice what it preaches more often than not. To note, the US is the only major world power that has failed to fully ratify or adhere to any of the significant human rights instruments introduced by the United Nations (UN) or other human rights bodies.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
DEMOCRACY QPQ CP › net benefit › us fails

Jan 6 ruined US demo-cred

Soare 21, PhD in Political Science, Senior Associate Analyst at EUISS from 2019 to end May 2021. Her research focused on United States security policy, transatlantic security and EU-NATO relations. Prior to joining EUISS, Simona served as advisor to the Vice-President of the European Parliament (2015-2019) and as an analyst with the Romanian Ministry of Defence, working on transatlantic and European security. She has also been a research associate with the Institut d’Études Européennes (IEE) at Université Saint Louis-Bruxelles (Simona, Biden’s Security Policy: Democratic Security or Democratic Exceptionalism?,

More broadly, Biden's team will emphasise human rights and democratic principles and shift from a transactional to a more traditionally conditional US pressure on partners. This could take the form of leveraging US strategic relations with challenging allies like Poland, Hungary and Turkey to achieve concessions on respect for the rule of law and human rights (Harvard-DGAP, 2020, 4). However, following the 6 January 2021 storming of the US Capitol by pro-Trump rioters, experts argue: 'The power of America's example will be dimmer than it once was; American arguments will be harder to hear' (Applebaum, 2021). Some have called on President Biden to abandon the idea of an international Summit for Democracy and instead focus inwards on American democratic renewal e.g. (Goldgeier and Jentlesen, 2021).

2022 Michigan Counterplan
DEMOCRACY QPQ CP › net benefit › squo solves

Countries other than the US solve

Jonathan Katz, director of Democracy Initiatives and a senior fellow with The German Marshall Fund of the United States, and Torry Taussig, research director for the Project on Europe and the Transatlantic Relationship at Harvard Kennedy School's Belfer Center, 2018 “An inconvenient truth: Addressing democratic backsliding within NATO,” Brookings Institute, , (accessed 6-2-2022)

Regardless of U.S. leadership or support, other NATO states such as the Nordic countries, Canada, Germany, France, the United Kingdom and other members must play a role in prioritizing NATO’s core values at the Brussels Summit and strengthening democratic institutions. In speaking to diplomats from several member states, it is clear that they recognize the growing democracy deficit in the alliance, and that the United States will likely not lead the charge on championing democratic institutions. In response, officials from such member states can use bilateral meetings and sideline conversations with the Hungarians, Poles, and Turks to raise concerns. Already the European Union is pressing Poland on its violation of EU democratic principles with the threat of sanctions and suspension of voting privileges. The security implications of their transgressions give NATO a role in maintaining this pressure, too.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
DEMOCRACY QPQ CP › net benefit › squo solves

The United States already did the counterplan under Trump

Jonathan Katz, director of Democracy Initiatives and a senior fellow with The German Marshall Fund of the United States, and Torry Taussig, research director for the Project on Europe and the Transatlantic Relationship at Harvard Kennedy School's Belfer Center, 2018 “An inconvenient truth: Addressing democratic backsliding within NATO,” Brookings Institute, , (accessed 6-2-2022)

In developing the communiqué’s language, the United States and its NATO allies should use momentum from Assistant Secretary for Europe and Eurasia Wess Mitchell’s recent remarks at the Heritage Foundation, where he reaffirmed that when it comes to NATO, “[w]e have to be clear that we stand for strong democracy as the foundation of our security and prosperity.” Based on this positioning, Washington would likely support NATO allies if they insist that democracy, human rights, and rule of law be a focus of the NATO summit and its communiqué.