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2022 Michigan Counterplan
DEMOCRACY QPQ CP › net benefit › 2nc – turns case

Rising authoritarianism turns the case. Expands Russian influence, causes European instability and shreds interoperability

Katz and Taussig 18, * director of Democracy Initiatives and a senior fellow with The German Marshall Fund of the United States, **was the research director for the Project on Europe and the Transatlantic Relationship at Harvard Kennedy School's Belfer Center. She was also a nonresident fellow at the Brookings Institution’s Center on the United States and Europe (Jonathan and Torrey, “An inconvenient truth: Addressing democratic backsliding within NATO,” Brookings,

There is also significant democratic backsliding among NATO member states. The cast of illiberal characters—who are leading the charge in the wrong direction—includes the recently reelected and empowered Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his Justice and Development Party (AKP), Jaroslaw Kaczynski’s Law and Justice (PiS) Party in Poland, and Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán and the ruling Fidesz Party. Each has proven more than willing to repress free media, dismantle checks and balances, demonize political opposition, clamp down on civil society, and diminish the rule of law. America’s democratic system and norms under President Trump are also under duress; as a result, Freedom House downgraded the country’s score on the basis of weakening political rights and civil liberties. Despite these alarming developments, NATO leaders have relegated democratic backsliding to the backburner. Opponents of making the case for democracy within NATO might argue that pushing Ankara, Warsaw, and Budapest too hard on their commitments to good governance will exacerbate already tense divisions in the alliance. Others might say that Russia would be the prime beneficiary of a contentious democracy discussion at NATO. Yet this is a counterproductive approach with current and potential costs to NATO’s future. Here are three security-based reasons why the United States and NATO should care about democratic backsliding, and actions the alliance can take to address them. 1 Russia is already benefiting from and effectively leveraging its relationships with Hungary and Turkey to exacerbate discord within Europe and NATO. Viktor Orbán and Vladimir Putin see one another as allies in their disdain for the European Union and Orbán has courted Russian financial and political support as he builds an illiberal democracy in Hungary. Russian propaganda also finds fertile ground in Hungarian media. A 2018 Senate Foreign Relations Committee report noted that Russian state-owned media content “by Sputnik and RT is widely referenced by pro-government news sources in Hungary.” The report cited Orbán as the EU and NATO’s most supportive leader of Putin’s worldview and leadership. Acting as the Russian “camel’s nose under the tent,” Orbán is thwarting Ukraine and NATO’s partnership efforts by blocking the Ukraine-NATO Commission from meeting at the upcoming summit. In Turkey, Erdoğan has rattled the NATO alliance by pursuing a deal to purchase the S-400 missile system from Russia. In addition to hurting NATO’s ability to cooperate on security, the system is also not compatible with NATO’s defenses. Through arms and energy deals, Putin uses Turkey as a wedge to divide NATO. Similarly, Erdoğan might see his deals with Putin as a way to free Turkey from Western leverage, particularly as European states push back on his brand of authoritarian politics by cutting EU pre-accession funds. After winning the recent twin parliamentary and presidential elections, an emboldened Erdoğan will likely become an even more problematic partner for NATO. President Putin is building ties with illiberal leaders across Europe while attacking fundamental elements of Western democracies. Other illiberal and populist governments, including Italy’s new anti-establishment government, could follow suit in enhancing their partnerships with Russia, creating future intelligence-sharing and cohesion problems for the alliance. President Putin is building ties with illiberal leaders across Europe while attacking fundamental elements of Western democracies, including electoral process and open information spaces. 2 There is a strong link between democratic governance and security gains. Liberal democracies have historically been less likely to experience intra- and interstate conflict, generate refugees, and harbor violent extremists. They are also better at maintaining transparent institutions, civilian control of the military and intelligence services, and working together on confidence-building measures, all of which are core features of NATO’s ability to collectively defend its members. On the other hand, corruption and insecurity grow under politicized institutions and poor rule of law. This hurts NATO’s renewed efforts to combat terrorism, as military and security communities have long acknowledged the connection between corruption and the existence of criminal networks, traffickers, and terrorists within state borders. Corruption also opens space for Russian kleptocratic networks close to Putin to operate and gain influence. For example, in 2014 Orbán awarded Rosatom, a Russian state-owned nuclear company, the sole contract to build two nuclear plants in Hungary in exchange for a 10 billion euro loan from Moscow. The Hungarian parliament, dominated by Orbán’s Fidesz Party, then passed a rushed vote to keep data from the nuclear deal confidential for 30 years in the name of “national security.” The deal diminished transparent economic competition within the European Union and solidified Hungary and Russia’s energy ties. 3 Distrust among allies hurts alliance interoperability. The PiS Party’s assault on independent media and the Constitutional Court, including efforts last week to summarily force out 27 Polish Supreme Court justices, have isolated Poland from France and Germany, diminishing trust among the European nations. This could make it increasingly difficult for Washington to gain consensus on joint decisions, communications, and operations. If NATO is dedicated to building resiliency along Russia’s periphery by placing multi-national battalions in Poland, then it should not ignore the accountable institutions that would strengthen this joint effort.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
DEMOCRACY QPQ CP › net benefit › 2nc – turns case

Creeping authoritarianism zeroes solvency---it shreds cohesion and causes European instability

Ellehuus and Morcos 21, * deputy director and senior fellow with the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C. and previously served as principal director for European and NATO policy in the Pentagon, **visiting fellow with the Center for Strategic and International Studies’ Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program and was formerly deputy head of the Strategic Affairs and Cybersecurity Division in the French foreign service (Rachel and Pierre, “NATO SHOULD FINALLY TAKE ITS VALUES SERIOUSLY,” War on the Rocks, https://warontherocks.com/2021/06/nato-should-take-its-values-seriously/)

From Russia and China to terrorism and climate change, NATO faces no shortage of external threats. Yet an equally serious challenge now comes from democratic decline within the alliance itself. Left unaddressed, the erosion of democratic values will further accentuate divisions between allies and create vulnerabilities that can be exploited by NATO’s rivals. The upcoming NATO summit is a unique opportunity for allies to tackle this underlying challenge. The trans-Atlantic alliance will only remain strong if members genuinely abide by its founding principles. The adoption of a “political pledge” in which allies recommit to upholding trans-Atlantic values would be a start. But NATO countries will need to move beyond words if they want to have a meaningful impact. This means regularly reviewing allies’ compliance with NATO values and principles and using incentives and disincentives to raise the political cost for countries breaking the rules. This is a challenging path with potential risks for NATO unity. But turning a blind eye [ignoring] to the ongoing erosion of NATO’s founding principles will be even more damaging to its political cohesion and credibility. Democratic values are not only important to the alliance in the abstract. They also help create the societal resilience that gives it strength. As such, NATO should link democratic progress with its existing resilience metrics and draw on joint NATO-European Union resilience response teams to assist struggling allies. This would enable NATO to take a graduated, collective, and dispassionate approach to addressing democratic decline and shoring up trans-Atlantic values while also preserving its political cohesion. The Threat from Within Over the past decade, several NATO allies have taken a turn away from democracy. Hungary and Poland are sliding into illiberalism, while the rule of law has long since unraveled in Turkey. In Greece and Slovenia, press freedom is rapidly deteriorating. NATO’s newest members made substantial progress since the end of the Cold War, but democracy remains fragile in Montenegro, Albania, and North Macedonia. As a result, internal corruption or malign influence could readily unleash new instability. From the beginning, NATO has faced tensions over how much emphasis to put on democratic values. On one hand, NATO has always been more than just a military alliance. Its strength and resilience have long derived from the shared commitment of allies to the principles of the North Atlantic Treaty. The preamble to this document stresses democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law while its second article explicitly commits to “peaceful and friendly international relations.” But the alliance has not always lived up to these ideals. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, NATO debated how to deal with authoritarianism in Portugal and Greece as well as multiple coups in Turkey. Ultimately, members decided not to address the problem, instead prioritizing cohesion and geopolitical interests during a tense Cold War period. As explained by then-National Security Adviser Walt Rostow, “[T]he time has come to separate our NATO relationship from our disapproval of domestic Greek politics.” This was the wrong choice then and an even worse one today. The risks of ignoring NATO’s internal strains far outweigh the benefits of addressing them. Some of the reasons are longstanding: A country’s treatment of its own citizens reflects, positively or negatively, on NATO’s brand, and an unstable domestic environment inhibits that country’s ability to meet its international obligations. Today, though, ignoring democratic decline carries new risks. NATO’s adversaries have become increasingly skilled at taking advantage of and, in some cases, actively exacerbating countries’ societal vulnerabilities. A compromised media environment allows disinformation campaigns to flourish, while corruption opens space for Russian networks to operate and gain influence. Moscow is also preying on the grievances of racial and ethnic minorities in NATO member countries in order to weaken national-level governance and cohesion.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
DEMOCRACY QPQ CP › net benefit › 2nc – solves democracy/LIO

US key

HRW 20 (Human Rights Watch, “US: President Should Set a Human Rights Foreign Policy,” https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/11/10/us-president-should-set-human-rights-foreign-policy#R9)//BB

The United States should strive to be a world leader on human rights. Human Rights Watch offers 12 priorities for the next US administration to create a rights-focused foreign policy.

The United States has the power, influence, and resources to create positive change for human rights beyond its borders. The global defense of human rights is stronger when the United States joins with others to promote and protect them. Although US policymakers often espouse human rights and humanitarian values, the United States has been inconsistent in defending human rights abroad and has been complicit in or has committed serious abuses in its foreign policies and engagement. The US government has often invoked human rights selectively or to achieve a short-term diplomatic goal. Instead, the president should commit in word and deed to a foreign policy that consistently prioritizes promoting and protecting human rights, not solely as a means to an end.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
DEMOCRACY QPQ CP › net benefit › 2nc – solves democracy/LIO

Ensuring that alliances on emerging tech forefront democratic norms is vital for global democracy

Rasser 21, Senior Fellow and Director of the Technology and National Security Program at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS). Prior to joining CNAS, Mr. Rasser served as a senior intelligence officer and analyst at the Central Intelligence Agency (Martijin, “The case for an alliance of Techno-Democracies,” https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/the-case-for-an-alliance-of-techno-democracies/)

An effective tech alliance will need to balance the national interests and shared interests of its members, a difficult but feasible proposition when one considers common values and goals for economic competitiveness. A change in mindset in what ‘sovereignty’ in this context means is also necessary. Ultimately, interdependencies with allies and like-minded countries should be viewed foremost as a shared techno-democratic sovereignty, while those with autocratic countries such as China are fraught with economic and national security vulnerabilities that pose a direct challenge to liberal-democratic norms and values.

The other critique would be that a tech alliance would exacerbate a ‘Tech Cold War’, referring primarily to the strained US–China relationship. In less dramatic terms, this concerns a bifurcation of the tech ecosystem of China and that of the United States, as well as other tech-leading democracies. A partial divergence has already happened because leaders in both countries want it that way. American leaders are rightfully concerned about the risks associated with products from Chinese tech companies, and the Chinese Communist Party has been clear in word and deed that it seeks to be self-sufficient in a range of technology disciplines. China, like the US and its allies, also seeks greater resiliency and security in its supply chains.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
DEMOCRACY QPQ CP › net benefit › 2nc – solves democracy/LIO

The counterplan alone is key to the LIO

Lewis 22, Assistant Secretary of State (Jessica, “Future of Security Sector Assistance,” Testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,

As shown in our response to Ukraine, our global network of allies and partners are a unique American advantage and strategic asset in competition with the PRC and Russia. As a fundamentally political, relationship-building tool, security sector assistance can play a vital role in strengthening those partnerships. Both Beijing and Moscow have invested heavily in efforts meant to drive a wedge between us and our allies and partners. For the foreseeable future, it will be a priority for the United States to continue leveraging security cooperation to help our partners deter and defeat Russian and PRC aggression. It is especially critical that our fellow democracies on the frontlines have the means to defend themselves against their larger, autocratic neighbors. I should be clear, however, that just because a strategic competitor is willing to transfer arms to a country, it does not mean we should, or will. We will approve arms transfers only when they are actually in our foreign policy interest. Indeed, we must keep in mind that strategic competition is not simply a struggle of might between great powers. It is at base a contest of values and norms – of two fundamentally different models of global governance. As President Biden has said, “We're living at an inflection point in history, both at home and abroad. We're engaged anew in a struggle between democracy and autocracy.” And as Secretary Blinken said last year in a message to all our diplomatic posts worldwide, “in a more contested, competitive world, America’s values and our commitment to supporting the rights and freedoms of people around the world are a competitive structural advantage that our undemocratic adversaries and competitors cannot match, and that we should not cede.” Therefore, the President has stressed the need to defend free societies and promote democracy around the world, including by elevating our promotion of human rights. We must keep the importance of security sector governance and respect for universal human rights front and center as we consider where to provide security assistance, and as we engage partner nations’ security institutions and empower them toward modernization, accountability, and reform.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
DEMOCRACY QPQ CP › net benefit › 2nc – solves democracy/LIO

Democratic principles must be explicitly tied to security cooperation. That solves.

Loening 21, served as the German government’s commissioner for human rights and was European policy spokesman of the FDP parliamentary group in the German Bundestag (Markus, “The US must get tough with NATO members brazenly backsliding on core values,”

But for the alliance to regain its bite, the US must first get tough with fellow NATO members – in particular Poland and Hungary – that brazenly backslide on core NATO values. Democratic principles and fundamental human rights such as press freedom must be welded to strategic geopolitical interests. For its part, Europe must earn Biden’s trust. The only way it can do this is by getting its own house in order. Starting with the prickly populists of Central and Eastern Europe. Shared democratic values have anchored NATO as the most successful alliance in history. These values are now being chiselled away in Hungary and Poland as well as Slovenia, which takes over Presidency of the EU Council on July 1. A spate of recent reports by international watchdogs has painted a grim picture of independent journalism being stifled. It came as no surprise when a few months ago Reporters Without Borders relegated Hungary to 92nd position in its World Press Freedom Index. Poland, meanwhile, has fallen over 40 spots on the Index since the ruling Law and Justice party came to power in 2015. It is now behind Niger and war-pocked Armenia. The Hungarian Prime Minister Victor Orbán has used legislative and regulatory tools to muzzle critical outlets. This has included a law that puts journalists behind bars for up to five years if they are found guilty of spreading disinformation. The Hungarian government has used the fog of the Covid-19 pandemic to tighten the screws: starving independent media of advertising revenues while swallowing small independent outlets, either directly or through its large web of business cheerleaders. Earlier this year, Hungary’s government-controlled media regulator forced Klubrádió, a leading independent radio station, off the air. With only flickers of free press left in Hungary, Orbán’s state capture of the media is now almost complete. Poland follows Hungary’s lead No wonder that Orbán’s playbook is so appealing to other illiberal governments looking to put the press under its thumb. Following Hungary’s lead, Polish public broadcasters are being transformed into propaganda mouthpieces. Plans to ‘repolonise’ the media are already underway. In December, Poland’s state-controlled energy giant PKN Orlen bought German-owned Polska Press, giving it control over 20 regional dailies, 120 magazines and hundreds of online portals across the country. Independent minded editors and reporters have already started to be swapped for pro-government foot soldiers. In a few months time, there will be pockets of Poland without access to newspapers that do not toe the government line. Polska Press has a total reach of over 17 million readers. PKN Orlen’s shopping spree will be a valuable tool for the ruling Law and Justice party ahead of the 2023 parliamentary elections. Lawsuits and targeted taxes aimed at private media have become the norm. Government cronies with deep pockets have launched over 50 lawsuits against independent media outlets. The idea is to wear down the opposition into submission – or bankruptcy. There are echoes here of Poland’s dark past. During communism, editors were summoned to the party’s Central Office for the Control of the Press in Warsaw where their articles were often heavily massaged, redacted or withdrawn. Editors of unruly publications would be replaced or have their paper quota reduced. The irony is that the current government led by erstwhile anti-communist crusaders is now reaching for similar tactics. Independent television and radio stations are also facing the heat. Poland’s most watched news channel, TVN 24, owned by US-based TV content provider Discovery, has been waiting for over 18 months for its licence to be renewed by the National Broadcasting Council, an agency packed with government apparatchiks. TVN’s US-links have so far shielded it from more aggressive state meddling. But without assertive action from the EU and US, TVN 24 could still succumb to a similar fate as German-owned Polska Press. Another television channel, ATM Rozrywka, did not have its licence renewed on the grounds that it did not submit proper documentation. Earlier this year, the anti-monopoly watchdog stopped Agora, the publisher of Poland’s top-selling liberal newspaper Gazeta Wyborcza, from taking over radio broadcaster Eurozet due to “competition concerns”. Time to deploy the right tools To protect what remains of the free media in Central and Eastern Europe, leading democratic lights within the NATO alliance must deploy the right tools to stop Europe’s worst offenders in their tracks. German Chancellor Angela Merkel should use her last months in office to flex political muscle. The EU can make sure that Budapest and Warsaw do not weaponise national regulation to intimidate independent outlets. Introducing EU legislation to weed out lawsuits against journalists will also go a long way. In turn, the Biden Administration can needle the populists where it hurts. Poland is an important ally, but US security assistance should not be unconditional. NATO is not solely about battle tanks and gleaming fighter jets; it is a community of values that have to be defended not only against external foes but also those trying to subvert basic rights at home.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
DEMOCRACY QPQ CP › net benefit › 2nc – solves democracy/LIO

Unconditional SC fails to uphold US democratic norms – conditioning cooperation on democracy fill the gaps

Cole & Trenkov-Wermuth 21 – Emily Cole, program officer for governance, justice, and security in the Applied Conflict Transformation Center, served in the Peace Corps in Senegal, MALD from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, B.A. from Amherst College; Dr. Calin Trenkov-Wermuth, security governance advisor at the US Institute of Peace, lead author of the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Coordination Compact, visiting fellow at the Norwegian Nobel Institute and the EU Institute for Security Studies, TAPIR fellow at the RAND Corporation and the Finnish Institute of International Affairs, Ph.D. and M.A. in international relations from the University of Cambridge, B.A. in world politics from Hamilton College (“To Consolidate Democracy, Change US Security Assistance”, 12/6/2021, ) FGY

As the United States pursues its initiative to bolster democratic rule and human rights after last week’s Summit for Democracy, a priority should be to diagnose and repair the flaws in U.S. and allied approaches to helping vulnerable nations strengthen their security. Our existing pattern of security sector assistance focuses largely on training and equipping such nations’ forces, and it emphasizes the security of governments and institutions, rather than of the people they are meant to serve. This type of assistance prioritizes short-term tactical gains to the detriment of long-term U.S. strategic goals—and it should be reformed.

Ample evidence—including the global surge in coups d’états and crises of police violence from Brazil and Nigeria to the Philippines—shows that dozens of countries must improve not only the “kinetic” capacities, but also their governance, of police, military and other security institutions. Yet a first outline last week of the new U.S. “initiative for democratic renewal” omits any mention of this vital task. The United States and its allies must re-shape their assistance to support democracy and human rights. In some countries—for example Egypt and Uganda—U.S. security sector assistance has helped to consolidate authoritarianism. Current trends risk exacerbating the problem in a “race to the bottom” among the United States, Russia and China.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
DEMOCRACY QPQ CP › net benefit › 2nc – avoids politics

Solves agenda link

Rand and Tankel 2015 Dr. Dafna H. Rand is the former Deputy Director of Studies and the inaugural Leon E. Panetta Fellow at CNAS. She formerly served on the National Security Council staff and as a Middle East expert on the Department of State’s Policy Planning Staff. Stephen Tankel is an Assistant Professor in the School of International Service at American University, and an adjunct fellow in the Asia-Pacific Security program at CNAS. He previously served as a Senior Adviser for Asian & Pacific Security Affairs at the Department of Defense. “Security Cooperation and Assistance: Rethinking the Return on Investment,” August 2015.

Over the past few years, as the number of security assistance and cooperation programs has grown, Congress has expressed concern about what it believes is the executive branch’s failure to implement these programs in a strategic, rather than ad hoc, manner. Members of Congress have repeatedly asked the Government Accountability Office to study individual programs and country outcomes.23 Clearly identifying the goals of a particular security assistance and cooperation initiative, the time frame for achieving them, and agreed-upon metrics and methods for evaluating outcomes is essential for improving the efficacy of these programs in support of broader national security policy. To assist this effort, we identify eight challenges that policymakers must confront in order to employ security assistance and cooperation in the most strategic and effective manner to support overarching U.S. foreign policy goals.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
DEMOCRACY QPQ CP › net benefit › 2nc – avoids politics

Avoids politics—the CP is directly in line with Congressional intent

Young 20 [Thomas-Durell Young, Senior Lecturer at the Naval Postgraduate School; "The "Politics" of Security Cooperation and Security Assistance"; Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Defense Exports and Cooperation; Published: 9-10-2020; Accessed: 6-18-2022; https://www.dasadec.army.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/2344014/the-politics-of-security-cooperation-and-security-assistance/; KL]

That there has been an apparent disconnect between congressional expectations that SC and SA encourage the adoption of democratic norms abroad is hardly subtle and suggests a political causation for these inconsistencies. After all, if there is no government requirement to produce concrete results, no one can ever be held accountable for failure to meet congressional intent. This inherent weakness to the U.S. Government’s approach to assisting its partners is no more glaringly obvious than in its experience in Afghanistan. For instance, who bears ultimate responsibility for the failure of DOD to re-create the Afghan air force: the originating policymaker, Headquarters Air Force, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Training Mission–Afghanistan, or U.S. Air Force Central Command?22 A recent (and quite damning) Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction’s lessons-learned report on that lack of progress in the country was unsubtly titled Divided Responsibility.23

2022 Michigan Counterplan
DEMOCRACY QPQ CP › net benefit › 2nc – key to democracy / link

Concessions to authoritarian states enable backsliding

Hegedüs 22, visiting fellow for Central Europe at the German Marshall Fund of the United States. He researches populism and democratic backsliding in Central and Eastern Europe and the European and foreign affairs of the Visegrad countries (Daniel, “US, EU Face Higher Hurdles Now for Action Against Orbán’s Tightening Grip in Hungary,” Just Security,

Clearly, democracy is not the only game in town anymore in Central Europe. While many Western stakeholders might be tempted to make concessions to the region’s illiberal strongmen in order to preserve EU and NATO unity, this approach was a key enabling factor and will only continue to weaken European and transatlantic organizations further. In the face of the clear authoritarian threat posed by Russia and China, challenging these trends in Central Europe to strengthen the democratic integrity of the Western alliance is more crucial than ever.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
DEMOCRACY QPQ CP › net benefit › 2nc – key to democracy / link

Failure to condition aid wrecks US democratic credibility

Carothers 21, senior vice president for studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and Benjamin Press, research assistant in the Democracy, Conflict, and Governance Program (Thomas, “Navigating the Democracy-Security Dilemma in U.S. Foreign Policy: Lessons from Egypt, India, and Turkey,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, )//BB

As President Joe Biden and his team seek to put the defense of democracy and protection of human rights at the center of U.S. foreign policy, they confront the stubborn fact that the United States maintains cooperative security relations with a wide range of undemocratic or democratically backsliding governments. Such situations frequently give rise to a policy dilemma: confronting these governments over their political shortcomings risks triggering hostility that would jeopardize the security benefits that such governments provide to Washington. Yet giving them a free pass on democracy and rights issues undercuts the credibility of U.S. appeals to values, bolstering the damaging perception that America only pushes for democracy against its adversaries or in strategically irrelevant countries. And if, as the Biden administration claims, democracy is the best system at delivering for people, soft-pedaling democracy may undermine the effort to help countries build effective political systems that will make them better partners in the long run.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
DEMOCRACY QPQ CP › competition › 2nc – at: ask perm

The “ask perm” relies on persuasion, not explicit bargaining. That fails.

Tecott 21, PhD in Political Science @ MIT (Rachel, “The Cult of the Persuasive: The U.S. Military’s Aversion to Coercion in Security Assistance,” Proquest Dissertations)

This study offers a novel conceptualization of U.S. influence strategies in security assistance based on inductive analysis of U.S. security assistance projects since World War II. In conducting security assistance, the U.S. military has historically employed an influence strategy “ladder” comprised of four rungs: teaching, persuasion, bargaining, and direct command. Teaching refers to the transmission of information and expertise to recipient decision-makers. This didactic approach hinges on the assumption that recipients are actually interested in building stronger militaries, and only insufficient knowledge stands in their way. Persuasion, bargaining, and direct command each begin with recognition of interest misalignment between provider and recipient. Persuasion aims to reshape recipient preferences through a variety of mechanisms including inducements (no strings attached) designed to spur reciprocal concessions, conversation and argumentation to change minds, demonstration of “what right looks like” to inspire emulation, and the development of interpersonal relationships and rapport to motivate compliance on the basis of personal friendship. Bargaining, in contrast, refers to the use of conditionality—carrots and sticks tied to compliance or defiance—to overcome interest divergence. Finally, the U.S. may take direct command of partner militaries or military units, exercising influence directly by replacing partner decision-makers with Americans. In early examples of U.S. security assistance—to China during World War II, to Greece in the 1950s, and to South Korea in the 1940s and 1950s—the United States taught and persuaded, but it also escalated to bargaining and direct command to push partners to purge incompetent officers, root out corruption, follow the chain of command, and implement other professional military practices necessary for military effectiveness. In contemporary security assistance, however, persuasion has emerged the overwhelming rule. A review of U.S. security assistance doctrine reveals a strong emphasis on relationship building and argumentation as the preferred tools of influence in security assistance. Advisory efforts have been redefined as the absence of direct command, and bargaining is explicitly discouraged.14 Practice matches doctrine: in the post-9/11 period, U.S. military personnel frustrated with Afghan and Iraqi leaders for the politicization and corruption rotting the militaries they were trying to build nonetheless remained generally committed to persuasive tactics and eschewed conditionality or command. Building from the premise that the fundamental challenge of security assistance is influence, and observing the prevalence of persuasion in the contemporary period, this study asks and answers the following two questions: 1) How do different U.S. influence strategies in security assistance affect recipient military effectiveness? 2) What explains U.S. strategy selection? 1.2 Arguments This study proposes and tests two theories. The first theory examines the consequences of U.S. security assistance influence strategies for recipient military effectiveness. The second theory moves a link back in the causal chain and examines the causes of United States strategy selection. Causes of Influence Strategies Influence Strategies Consequences of Influence Strategies Influence Strategy Theory (Consequences) I argue that teaching and persuasion on their own will not suffice—the United States is more likely to influence partners to build better militaries when it employs the full escalation ladder. Teaching is unlikely to succeed because motivation, not lack of expertise, is almost always the reason recipient leaders make decisions that undermine the development of their militaries. Persuasion, bargaining, and direct command are all logical improvements over teaching because they begin from the more realistic premise that recipient decision-makers may not be interested in—and may actively oppose—the development of a more effective military. The persuasion strategy on its own, however, is ill-suited to the security assistance context, because the United States tends to provide the most assistance to states whose leaders are least likely to be receptive to normative or personal entreaties by U.S. personnel. Conversely, the ingredients necessary for successful bargaining—recipient dependence, iterated interactions, and the availability of calibrated carrots and sticks—are met in the context of security assistance. Direct command works because it removes the influence challenge altogether as American decision-makers replace partner decision-makers. United States influence strategies are by no means the only factor that affect security assistance outcomes. The United States might employ bargaining and direct command and still fail to build more effective partner militaries for a whole host of reasons. Though bargaining or direct command are not sufficient for effective security assistance in cases where interests between provider and recipient diverge (i.e. almost all cases of security assistance), I argue that they are necessary. I call this theory of influence strategy consequences “Influence Strategy Theory,” or, IST.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
DEMOCRACY QPQ CP › competition › 2nc – at: lie perm

Genuine and effective conditionality is key to the credibility of US conditions across-the-board

Boutton 18, assistant professor of political science at the University of Central Florida (“POLICY ROUNDTABLE: THE PROS AND CONS OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE,” Texas National Security Review,

It would be wishful thinking, however, to argue that Washington could avoid working with such regimes altogether. In fact, many of the regimes in which Washington claims to have vital security interests are fragile and plagued by the same governance problems discussed herein. Working with these regimes is often unavoidable. Where this is the case, the United States should consider the following. First, due to misaligned security priorities, productive cooperation and capacity-building in these cases can only be achieved by shaping and altering host-state incentives through the establishment and credible enforcement of conditionality. This notion is widely recognized among development aid scholars, but has recently gained traction among those who study security assistance.32 Recent work on security assistance advocates allocating security assistance ex post as a reward for effort and reform, rather than ex ante as an inducement, in a manner similar to the Millenium Challenge Account.33 In a recent book,34 Walter Ladwig shows that the United States has been able to exercise greater influence over host government policy when it enforces conditions, as it did in the Philippines and El Salvador. Positive conditionality requires the United States to verify the efforts undertaken by the partner government, which in turn necessitates more intrusive monitoring. Many countries will balk at this as a violation of sovereignty, but the United States should insist upon it as a condition of military assistance. A larger presence will not only enable better monitoring of the host government’s coup-proofing actions, but may also mitigate the internal security dilemma that drives such behavior. The worst paranoid excesses of the Maliki regime did not occur until after 2011, when the United States was no longer present on the ground as a safety net protecting his regime. The United States should also signal that it is prepared to cut ties with regimes that work against its security interests. Washington’s reliance on security assistance to fight terrorism abroad, without putting large numbers of U.S. forces in combat, often undermines the credibility of any threats to withdraw this assistance. Even in the rare cases when punishment has been enacted, as it has been several times with Egypt and Pakistan,35 it has historically come in the form of temporary freezes that are later lifted even after little change in behavior. In the case of both Diem and Maliki, the United States ultimately withdrew its support when backing them became untenable. But the fact that this only happened after years of military assistance instilled in both leaders the perception that they could do no wrong, and that steadfast support would continue even as they further consolidated power. By the time America decided to advocate for their removal, it was far too late and the damage was already done. Unwillingness to enforce conditions and withdraw support can seriously undermine the objectives of U.S. assistance and makes it more likely that other leaders will test the limits of what the United States will tolerate from its clients.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
DEMOCRACY QPQ CP › competition › 2nc – at: perm do counterplan

Substantial is immediate

Words and Phrases 64 (40 W&P 759) (this edition of W&P is out of print; the page number no longer matches up to the current edition and I was unable to find the card in the new edition. However, this card is also available on google books, Judicial and statutory definitions of words and phrases, Volume 8, p. 7329)

The words “outward, open, actual, visible, substantial, and exclusive,” in connection with a change of possession, mean substantially the same thing. They mean not concealed; not hidden; exposed to view; free from concealment, dissimulation, reserve, or disguise; in full existence; denoting that which not merely can be, but is opposed to potential, apparent, constructive, and imaginary; veritable; genuine; certain; absolute; real at present time, as a matter of fact, not merely nominal; opposed to form; actually existing; true; not including admitting, or pertaining to any others; undivided; sole; opposed to inclusive. Bass v. Pease, 79 Ill. App. 308, 318.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
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Should is immediate

Summers 94 (Justice – Oklahoma Supreme Court, “Kelsey v. Dollarsaver Food Warehouse of Durant”, 1994 OK 123, 11-8, http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287#marker3fn13)

The legal question to be resolved by the court is whether the word "should" in the May 18 order connotes futurity or may be deemed a ruling in praesenti. The answer to this query is not to be divined from rules of grammar; it must be governed by the age-old practice culture of legal professionals and its immemorial language usage. To determine if the omission (from the critical May 18 entry) of the turgid phrase, "and the same hereby is", (1) makes it an in futuro ruling - i.e., an expression of what the judge will or would do at a later stage - or (2) constitutes an in in praesenti resolution of a disputed law issue, the trial judge's intent must be garnered from the four corners of the entire record. "Should" not only is used as a "present indicative" synonymous with ought but also is the past tense of "shall" with various shades of meaning not always easy to analyze. See 57 C.J. Shall § 9, Judgments § 121 (1932). O. JESPERSEN, GROWTH AND STRUCTURE OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1984); St. Louis & S.F.R. Co. v. Brown, 45 Okl. 143, 144 P. 1075, 1080-81 (1914). For a more detailed explanation, see the Partridge quotation infra note 15. Certain contexts mandate a construction of the term "should" as more than merely indicating preference or desirability. Brown, supra at 1080-81 (jury instructions stating that jurors "should" reduce the amount of damages in proportion to the amount of contributory negligence of the plaintiff was held to imply an obligation and to be more than advisory); Carrigan v. California Horse Racing Board, 60 Wash. App. 79, (1990) (one of the Rules of Appellate Procedure requiring that a party "should devote a section of the brief to the request for the fee or expenses" was interpreted to mean that a party is under an obligation to include the requested segment); State v. Rack, 318 S.W.2d 211, 215 (Mo. 1958) ("should" would mean the same as "shall" or "must" when used in an instruction to the jury which tells the triers they "should disregard false testimony"). In praesenti means literally "at the present time." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 792 (6th Ed. 1990). In legal parlance the phrase denotes that which in law is presently or immediately effective, as opposed to something that will or would become effective in the future [in futurol]. See Van Wyck v. Knevals, , 365, 1 S.Ct. 336, 337, 27 L.Ed. 201 (1882).

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Should is mandatory

Zhang 15, Professor of Law, Temple University Beasley School of Law. (Mo, Spring 2015, “ARTICLE: RETHINKING CONTRACTUAL CHOICE OF LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF RELATION SYNDROME”, 44 Stetson L. Rev. 831, 853-854. Lexis accessed online via KU libraries, date accessed 4/17/22)

The primary purposes jus cogens and jus dispositivum serve are also different. Jus cogens are rules of law centered on public interest and intended to protect interests such as national economy and social justice in general, or weaker parties like consumers and employees in particular. 171 Jus dispositivum rules are aimed at more effectively protecting private interests. 172 By granting certain power to the parties, these rules attempt to help achieve justice and commercial expedience for the parties, especially in the area of contract law. 173 In many countries, jus cogens and jus dispositivum appear in their statutes as either mandatory or non-mandatory rules, differentiating from the "commanding" words in the specific rule. 174 If the word "should," "shall," or "must" is used, the rule is usually mandatory. 175 But when the word "may" or "could" is employed, the rule is generally non-mandatory. 176

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Resolved

OED 89 (Oxford English Dictionary, “Resolved,” Volume 13, p. 725)

Of the mind, etc.: Freed from doubt or uncertainty, fixed, settled. Obs.

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As do military planners

Harold Jarche, 5-20-13, (Harold, graduate of the Royal Military College, Harold served over 20 years with the Canadian Armed Forces in leadership and training roles. Harold began his career as an officer with Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry. He completed his service as a Training Development Officer with the Royal Canadian Air Force where he conducted the analysis and design of training for aircrew and technicians on the newly purchased CH146 helicopter “Social tools or tools that are social?”, JARCHE, )

Sharepoint supports people who are collaborating, focused on specific objectives, and sharing the same documents. As I mentioned in my last post on this subject, Yammer has the capability to not just support collaboration, but also workplace cooperation (freely sharing without any quid pro quo). Platforms like Yammer enable serendipitous connections by making work more transparent. But is a separate collaboration platform necessary, or just an added extra? It will be interesting to see if the triad of Yammer + Sharepoint + Office will dominate in large organizations, over more pure-play enterprise social platforms

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This definition of ‘cooperation’ is widely recognized. International relations distinguishes between QPQs and cooperation

Tang 9 – PhD, Professor of IR and Public Affairs @ Fudan U (Shiping, “Living with China: Regional States and China through Crises and Turning Points,” p. 4)

In contrast, issue linkage means many instances of quid pro quo, thus limiting the chances of obtaining cooperation in some issue areas via piecemeal cooperation building. Issue linkage is essentially a coercive measure to extract concessions from the other side, and "cooperation" obtained from such a process can be only tactical concessions, not genuine cooperation based on goodwill to forge a more cooperative relationship. As a result, even if one side succeeds in coercing the other side into concession through issue linkage, the chance for achieving a more cooperative relationship is reduced because such an outcome generates resentment rather than trust from the other side. More likely than not, the other side will want some payback next time, rather than a more cooperative relationship. Certainly, while issue linkage was one of Henry Kissinger's favorite tools for getting the Soviet Union to agree to some concessions during the Cold War years, he had no intention to build cooperation with the Soviet Union.9

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2 – cooperation – it requires voluntary adjustment, not coercion

Berenskotter 8 – PhD @ LSE (Felix Sebastian, From Friends to Strangers: A Theory of Interstate Security Cooperation Applied to German-American Relations, 1945 – 1995,

In this thesis cooperation is not understood as an instantaneous decision but as a process, that is, something occurring over time. It builds on Keohane’s definition of cooperation as the phenomenon when “the politics actually followed by one government are regarded by its partners as facilitating realization of their own objectives, as the result of a process of policy coordination”. Importantly, this process implies change where “actions of separate individuals...be brought into conformity with one another” (Keohane, 1984: 5 If, emphasis added). This is echoed by Grieco (1990: 22) who adds the qualification of cooperation as “voluntary adjustment” of policies, thereby limiting cooperation to those relationships where policy coordination was not a consequence of coercion but of choice, thus implying agency. Taken together, cooperation thus requires the convergence of policies through a process of mutual coordination and voluntary adjustment. The qualification that these policies are ‘actually followed’ is important and points out that cooperation goes beyond rhetoric and distinguishes, in Morgenthau’s (1960: 186) words, an operative from an inoperative alliance. In this sense, following Grieco (1990) and Stein (1990), cooperation is defined as costly investment in a shared institutions (or regime) on the international level over a period of time.