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2022 Michigan Negative
Advantage Answers › Cables Answers › U.S. Naval Dom Inev

U.S. naval dominance is locked in and inevitable---any factor that affects us is worse for competitors

Robert Kaplan 17, senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security and a senior advisor at Eurasia Group, 1/24/17, “America Is a Maritime Nation,”

The United States, bordered by two oceans, is a maritime nation. Not only is its Navy the largest in the world by far, but its coast guard would qualify as the 12th largest fleet in the world. The U.S. Navy is America's foremost strategic instrument -- much more so than its nuclear arsenal, which in all probability can never be used. The U.S. Navy is on the high seas around the world in peacetime as well as in wartime, guarding the sea lines of communication and the main maritime choke points. This, in turn, allows for a free global trading regime and guarantees access to hydrocarbons for America's allies. This Navy, by the way, also allows for an inland strike capacity. To wit, America bombed Iraq, Afghanistan, and Kosovo from warships in the Indian Ocean and the Adriatic Sea.

Historically, America is not unique in this regard. Athens, Venice, and Great Britain were all great global maritime powers. So were Holland and Portugal. Maritime powers, with exceptions of course, were generally more benign than land powers such as Germany and Russia. For while armies invade, ships make port visits and facilitate commerce. Navies also do not occupy foreign territory to anywhere near the extent that land forces do. While armies are required for unpredictable contingencies, navies (and air forces) project power on a daily basis. America might have gotten into unnecessary wars in Vietnam and Iraq, but American power is undiminished, largely because of the size of its Navy and Air Force. Finally, the U.S. Navy helps keep America engaged but out of trouble.

2022 Michigan Negative
Advantage Answers › Cables Answers › SQ Solves --- 1NC

Satellites solve

Hitchens 22 – Theresa Hitchens is the Space and Air Force reporter at Breaking Defense. The former Defense News editor was a senior research associate at the University of Maryland’s Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM). Before that, she spent six years in Geneva, Switzerland as director of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR). (Theresa Hitchens, "US needs to temper reliance on at-risk undersea internet cables, satellites can help: Aerospace," Breaking Defense, 2-3-2022, https://breakingdefense.com/2022/02/us-needs-to-temper-reliance-on-at-risk-undersea-internet-cables-satellites-can-help-aerospace/, Accessed 7-5-2022, LASA-SC)

“Government and industry should continue to secure the communications enterprise—including undersea, terrestrial, air, and satellite segments,” the study states.

In particular, the study finds that new, high-capacity broadband satellites could provide backup for undersea cable infrastructure (UCI). These include the emerging mega-constellations in Low Earth Orbit (LEO) such as SpaceX’s Starlink and Amazon’s Project Kuiper.

2022 Michigan Negative
Advantage Answers › Cables Answers › Aff Fails --- 2NC

Redundancy solves BUT the impact is inevitable – they’re IMPOSSIBLE to monitor

Starosielski 15 – Nicole Starosielski is from the New York University. (Nicole Starosielski, "Are the Internet's Undersea Cables at Risk for Sabotage?," livescience, 11-4-2015, https://www.livescience.com/52685-are-the-internets-undersea-cables-at-risk-for-sabotage.html, Accessed 7-5-2022, LASA-SC)

The fact is it’s incredibly difficult to monitor these lines. Cable companies have been trying to do so for more than a century, since the first telegraph lines were laid in the 1800s. But the ocean is too vast and the lines simply too long. It would be impossible to stop every vessel that came anywhere near critical communications cables. We’d need to create extremely long, “no-go” zones across the ocean, which itself would profoundly disrupt the economy.

Fewer than 300 cable systems transport almost all transoceanic traffic around the world. And these often run through narrow pressure points where small disruptions can have massive impacts. Since each cable can carry an extraordinary amount of information, it’s not uncommon for an entire country to rely on only a handful of systems. In many places, it would take only a few cable cuts to take out large swathes of the internet. If the right cables were disrupted at the right time, it could disrupt global internet traffic for weeks or even months.

2022 Michigan Negative
Advantage Answers › Cables Answers › Aff Fails --- 1NC

Aff fails – they would just move farther into the ocean – military might can’t prevent attacks.

Barker 18 – Lieutenant Commander Peter Barker is a serving Royal Navy officer and barrister. He is currently the Associate Director for the Law of Coalition Warfare at the Stockton Center for the Study of International Law. (Peter, "Undersea Cables and the Challenges of Protecting Seabed Lines of Communication," CIMSEC, 3-15-2018, https://cimsec.org/undersea-cables-challenges-protecting-seabed-lines-communication/, Accessed 7-5-2022, LASA-SC)

Clearly, a protection strategy for undersea cables cannot depend solely on military action. It is impossible to protect the entire cable network given its global expanse. The geographic area requiring protection is simply too large, even for the most powerful of navies. The natural consequence of this conclusion is to focus on identifying and intercepting ships and submarines capable of interfering with the cable network. However, the practicalities of this option are not promising. The technology required to tamper with cables is not overly sophisticated. It can be hosted in a wide range of vessels and easily transferred between them. Submarines present additional challenges in monitoring, tracking and interception, requiring the use of satellites, intelligence, and underwater sensors. For a military commander, the task of protecting seabed submarine cables from attack can seem almost impossible.

Given this conclusion, national strategies may need to focus on alternative methods of safeguarding the exchange of information. One method would be to increase the level of redundancy within the system by laying additional cables. As cables are expensive and most cables are privately owned, additional routes have to be assured of sufficient funding to make them viable. Somewhat ominously, the International Cable Protection Committee (which represents cable owners) states that “most cable owners feel that there is enough diversity in the international submarine cable network.” This might be true if the only threat is from accidental damage. However, this analysis might change with the realistic prospect of deliberate targeting.

2022 Michigan Negative
Advantage Answers › Cables Answers › No Attack --- 1NC

Risk is hype – they break all the time and Egypt thumps

Starosielski 15 – Nicole Starosielski is from the New York University. (Nicole Starosielski, "Are the Internet's Undersea Cables at Risk for Sabotage?," livescience, 11-4-2015, https://www.livescience.com/52685-are-the-internets-undersea-cables-at-risk-for-sabotage.html, Accessed 7-5-2022, LASA-SC)

The biggest problem with cable systems is not technological – it’s human. Because they run underground, underwater and between telephone poles, cable systems populate the same spaces we do. As a result, we accidentally break them all the time. Local construction projects dig up terrestrial lines. Boaters drop anchors on cables. And submarines can pinpoint systems under the sea.

Most of the recent media coverage has been dominated by the question of vulnerability. Are global communications networks really at risk of disruption? What would happen if these cables were cut? Do we need to worry about the threat of sabotage from Russian subs or terrorist agents?

2022 Michigan Negative
Advantage Answers › Cables Answers › No Attack --- 1NC

No attack impact – incentive and backups

Boykin 19 – Nick Boykin is the News Marketing Producer at WUSA 9. ("How vulnerable are the undersea cables that power the global internet?" WTKR, 7-26-2019, https://www.wtkr.com/2019/07/26/how-vulnerable-are-the-undersea-cables-that-power-the-global-internet, Accessed 7-5-2022, LASA-SC)

However, with more than 50 cables connected to the UK alone, Clatterbuck was skeptical about how useful a deliberate outage could be in a time of war, pointing to the level of coordination and resources required to cut multiple cables at once.

“If you wanted to sabotage the global internet or cut off a particular place you’d have to do it simultaneously on multiple cables,” he said. “You’d be focusing on the hardest aspect of disrupting a network.”

2022 Michigan Negative
Advantage Answers › Cables Answers › A/C --- 1NC

Cyberattack alt cause – they can’t solve

David 22 – Rona has been a journalist for over 20 years, collaborating with various media trusts: Pro Tv, Prima Tv, RFI, Cotidianul (…). Notable is also her experience within the Environment Commission of the Romanian Senate, as an advisor to the Chairman of this commission. In the period 2008-2010 she was a correspondent for Prima TV at the European Parliament in Strasbourg, which allowed her a European approach to media issues. (Rona Rita David, "Submarine Cables: Risks and Security Threats," Energy Industry Review, 3-25-2022, https://energyindustryreview.com/analysis/submarine-cables-risks-and-security-threats/, Accessed 7-5-2022, LASA-SC)

The most vulnerable point of submarine cables, however, is where they reach land: the landing stations Thus, the town of Lège-Cap-Ferret, where the interface room between the Franco-American cable “Amitié” will be built, has recently become a veritable nest of spies, according to informed sources.

But the most worrying trend is that more and more cable operators are using remote management systems for their networks. Cable owners are excited about the staff cost savings. However, these systems have poor security, which exposes submarine cables to cyber security risks.

2022 Michigan Negative
Advantage Answers › Cables Answers › 1NC – AT: Cables

Squo solves cable attacks

David 22 – Rona has been a journalist for over 20 years, collaborating with various media trusts: Pro Tv, Prima Tv, RFI, Cotidianul (…). Notable is also her experience within the Environment Commission of the Romanian Senate, as an advisor to the Chairman of this commission. In the period 2008-2010 she was a correspondent for Prima TV at the European Parliament in Strasbourg, which allowed her a European approach to media issues. (Rona Rita David, "Submarine Cables: Risks and Security Threats," Energy Industry Review, 3-25-2022, https://energyindustryreview.com/analysis/submarine-cables-risks-and-security-threats/, Accessed 7-5-2022, LASA-SC)

The US executive has recently investigated possible risks in the event of multiple attacks. In addition to expanding the SSGP grant program, it has encouraged the Maritime Administration to involve various civil society associations, such as the International Propeller Club, in programs designed to minimize these threats. The idea is to create a kind of “submarine cable militia” capable of responding quickly in a crisis.

The Propeller Club has more than 6,000 members and has recently provided $ 3.5 billion in aid to the maritime industry in the fight against Covid-19. Similarly, the creation of a “submarine cable Airbus” capable of competing with GAFAMs, whose market share could increase from 5% to 90% in six years, can obviously become a reality only if Europe pays attention to this topic.

2022 Michigan Negative
Advantage Answers › Arctic War Answers › No Arctic War---2NC

Arctic war is unlikely – harsh conditions and new systems are less aggressive.

Schaller 16 — Benjamin, PhD, research fellow at the Centre for Peace Studies, Arctic University of Norway @ Tromsø, 3-9-2016, "Deconstructing the Narrative of Arctic War," World Policy, , accessed 7-3-2022 //THS—OLW

Natural Resources, Territorial Claims, and Militarization? First, what would be the source of a potential Arctic conflict? For many observers this seems to be very clear: economic interest. In 2008, a U.S. Geological Survey considered the Arctic to contain most of the world’s still undeveloped oil and gas. In addition, as the ice melts, lucrative shipping routes, like the Northwest Passage and the Northern Sea Route, are becoming more and more accessible. Since then, nearly every national submission to the extension of the Arctic state’s continental shelf (and thus the right to exploit the resources in the seabed) is considered a “provocative,” sometimes even “offensive” act. This entirely disregards the actual nature of this process, which is nothing more than a filing of scientific findings to a scientific body, the U.N. Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf. The commission will assess the findings and make recommendations, but lacks a mandate to resolve possible overlapping claims. However, the Arctic has a long history of resolving such disputes peacefully and in line with international law, such as in 2011 between Norway and Russia. There is also little reason why this should change in the near future. Hans Island, a “rock” in the Nares Strait between Canada and Greenland, became sort of a symbol for territorial disputes in the Arctic, as militaries from both states started to leave each other bottles of Danish schnapps or Canadian Club whiskey as well as welcome signs. Then, in August 2015, Russia indicated its willingness to negotiate its overlapping claims with Denmark in regards to the North Pole. Other remaining overlapping claims also carry little potential for military escalation. Second, what would war in the Arctic actually look like? It is probably not too surprising that the military presence in the Arctic is comparably low, considering that the Arctic is covered mainly by a large ocean and temperatures in winter can drop below -40 degrees Celsius. Historically, the High North continuously played an important geostrategic role, hosting, for example, Russia’s strategic nuclear missiles and air defense systems as well as serving as a “natural habitat” for strategic missile submarines. However, the harsh climate poses severe challenges to people and equipment, making a military presence in the Arctic very costly and often primarily symbolic. Denmark’s “Slædepatruljen SIRIUS,” an elite Danish navy unit, is a good illustration of this. The 14 soldiers of the unit split up in teams of two, patrolling 9942 miles of northeastern Greenland on dogsleds. Because very low temperatures make rifles operating with gas much less reliable, the soldiers are equipped with the M1917 Enfield, a rifle used during the first World War. Its main purpose is less military, but rather to protect them from straying polar bears. As former Canadian Chief of Defense Staff General Natynczyk put it: “If someone were to invade the Canadian Arctic, my first task would be to rescue them.” This leads directly to the last question: who would this “someone” be? Most recently, after Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea and the subsequent significant freeze in NATO-Russia relations, many seem to argue at least for one side of a military conflict in the Arctic. Russia’s military modernization program, the reopening of military infrastructure, changes in its maritime doctrine, and strong statements by high-level officials, such as by Deputy Prime Minister Rogozin or Defense Minister Shoigu, to feed suspicion about Russia’s ambitions in the Arctic. At the same time, it is advisable to take a sober second look at what is actually happening on the ground. As for most of the Arctic coastal states, the thawing ice and expected increase in shipping call for additional search and rescue capabilities and makes Russia’s northern border more vulnerable to security challenges such as piracy, terrorism, and trafficking. With this in mind, new air defense systems, radar sites, airfields, border infrastructure, icebreakers, and patrol vessels are less an issue of aggressive military power projection. At the same time, Russia recently carried out several large-scale and unannounced military exercises, some also involving its troops in the Arctic. It would nevertheless be wrong to directly link these exercises to Russia’s regional ambitions rather than to a general shift in its policy towards the West and, in particular, towards NATO. Even if one rejects the history of close cooperation in the Arctic, a similar shift in Russian policy towards confrontation in the High North seems very unlikely. The main reason for such a conclusion is that only through playing by the rules will Russia be entitled to the largest share of the unexploited resources in the Arctic—more than it will be able to exploit in the next 100 years. Even more so, Russia will need to cooperate since the harsh Arctic climate makes search and rescue, oil and gas production, and border security, particularly risky, technologically challenging, and consequently very expensive tasks. Any announcement of unilateral action must thus be met with an appropriate amount of skepticism.

2022 Michigan Negative
Advantage Answers › Arctic War Answers › No Arctic War---1NC

No Arctic war – their authors are hype.

Murray 16 — Robert, Vice-President of Research at the Frontier Centre for Public Policy and an Adjunct Professor at the University of Alberta ,5-16-2016, "Do Not Oversell the Russian Threat in the Arctic," War on the Rocks, https://warontherocks.com/2016/05/do-not-oversell-the-russian-threat-in-the-arctic/, accessed 7-3-2022 //THS—OLW

When doing a cursory search of articles and commentaries about the current state of Arctic international relations, you would be forgiven if you were to think the Russians are preparing to launch a massive offensive against other Arctic states, particularly Canada. The oft-repeated narrative surrounding the Arctic is that the Russians are building up their northern military capabilities as part of their neo-imperial ambitions and to turn the Arctic into a sphere of geopolitical competition, tension, and conflict. There is reason for this narrative to not only survive, but to grow in its sensationalism. Russia’s provocativeness, actions, and statements from Russian officials do little to allay fears. For scholars of foreign and defense policy, as well as casual observers, a potential conflict with the Russians in the Arctic would be of great interest. For media outlets, the idea of conflict in the Arctic continues to serve as click-bait, and so the sensationalism continues. The problem, however, is that very little of this narrative is grounded in reality. The Arctic has certainly emerged as an arena of vast interest in recent years, and rightfully so. Northern climates continue to change and there are greater opportunities for access, as well as the possibility of resource wealth. As such, more attention has been paid to affairs in the circumpolar region. Covering approximately 4 percent of the Earth’s surface at 20,000,000 square kilometers with an estimated 4 million people, the Arctic is far more complex than a simple calculation about Russia’s investments in military technology. Arctic international relations are based on interstate cooperation, indigenous engagement, scientific and environmental collaboration, and is seeing an emerging global governance architecture through bodies like the Arctic Council designed to provide a forum for future cooperation, resource sharing and to ensure diplomacy, rather than conflict. This continues to be the predominant norm. Despite the existing cooperative dynamics in the Arctic, there are reasons for concern and important historical lessons to bear in mind. The Arctic is not immune from geopolitics and other international political events, and it is still very much impacted by the international system’s anarchic structure and great power politics. Circumpolar relations involve multiple actors, including the eight Arctic states, Arctic-interested states, international institutions, indigenous groups, and NGOs. All are contributing to an increasingly complex Arctic political landscape. This complexity is leading to concerns over states’ intentions in the region, and how other states and institutions react. Russia has been generating the most attention for its recent Arctic behavior, primarily due to the ongoing militarization of its Arctic territory and fears about whether Russia’s actions in Crimea, eastern Ukraine, and Syria might somehow foreshadow aggression in the north. Given the fact that Russia’s Arctic policy has included an expansion of permanent military forces, new military bases, new air force divisions, new military technologies, and massive military exercises, it is understandable that other Arctic states would be paying close attention to Russia’s Arctic moves. However, the “Arctic conflict” narrative assumes that Russia wants to be an aggressor in the region. This line of thinking existed before Russia’s annexation of Crimea and its incursions into eastern Ukraine, but those events have sparked more debate about whether Russia’s international behavior is inherently aggressive and whether Russia might use the Arctic as another theater in a new Cold War. The Arctic is not immune to the rules of the international system and great power politics. It is thus highly unlikely that Russia would risk conflict with the United States and other NATO states in the Arctic. There is little to gain by doing so and conflict would disrupt the emerging balance of power in the Arctic. If Russia was to initiate conflict in the circumpolar region, it would unilaterally disrupt the existing cooperative framework

2022 Michigan Negative
Advantage Answers › Arctic War Answers › Turn---Adventurism Bad

Arctic adventurism is bad – collapses Russian trust and causes force-on-force friction

Ritter 20 — Scott, Former US Marine Corps intelligence officer. He served in the Soviet Union as an inspector implementing the INF Treaty, in General Schwarzkopf’s staff during the Gulf War, and from 1991-1998 as a UN weapons inspector, 05-14-2020, "US muscle-flexing threatens to open Arctic front in new Cold War with Russia," RT International, https://www.rt.com/op-ed/488679-arctic-military-russia-us/, accessed 7-1-2022 //THS—OLW

The US Navy is on the cusp of conducting confrontational freedom of navigation operations in the Arctic that threaten Russian economic and national security interests.

The recent resumption by the US Navy of a represents muscle-flexing on the part of Washington and its NATO allies unseen since the end of the Cold War. 

2022 Michigan Negative
Advantage Answers › Russia Deterrence › No Escalation---1NC

No escalation – their authors are cold war sensationalists.

Burke 18 — Danita Catherine, Marie Skłodowska-Curie Individual Fellow, Centre for War Studies, University of Southern Denmark, 12-13-2018, "Why the new Arctic 'Cold War' is a dangerous myth," Conversation, https://theconversation.com/why-the-new-arctic-cold-war-is-a-dangerous-myth-108274, accessed 7-5-2022 //THS—OLW

All too often the Arctic region is  as an area  of . This is an easy narrative to sell; it harks back to the Cold War.  of submarines trolling silently beneath the Arctic ice and nuclear ballistic missiles pointed across the North Pole.

During the height of the standoff between NATO and the USSR, the world feared a barrage of nuclear warheads streaming in from the frozen north – and this experience has imprinted on the collective imagination and created distinct ideas about the region. This fear, for example, motivated from the 1950s the construction of the , a system of radar stations across the northern US (Alaska), Canada, and Greenland. The DEW Lines were meant to give the US and its NATO allies an early warning of an incoming Soviet nuclear strike.

2022 Michigan Negative
Advantage Answers › Russia Deterrence › Not Revisionist --- 2NC

Russia doesn’t have the capabilities to be revisionist

Kamp 20 [Karl-Heinz Kamp was President of the Federal Academy for Security Policy (BAKS), Berlin, when he authored this text, “NATO’s coming existential challenge”, JSTOR]

At the same time, there is a broad perception among US political elites of Russia being a power in decline. The country missed decades of political, economic and societal modernization and seems already now unable to live up to its self-image as a major international player. Russia has a significantly smaller GDP than Italy, has only two competitive products on the world market (energy and weapons), while maintaining political and economic structures based on rent income and corruption instead of innovation and rule of law. The Russian armed forces might be able to attack or bully smaller neighbours, but they are hardly capable of taking decisive action on a global scale – and the situation is likely to further deteriorate as the reduction of the Russian defence budget for 2018 indicated. With its still relevant military capabilities, a huge nuclear arsenal and a permanent seat in the UN Security Council, Russia will certainly always have a “nuisance capability” for the United States. However, it will be less and less able to shape international politics on a decisive scale. This does not imply that a declining Russia will be easier to handle, as it might partly disintegrate and tempt the leadership to take irrational decisions. Nevertheless, its overall power to pursue what it considers Russian interests will profoundly decline.

2022 Michigan Negative
Advantage Answers › Russia Deterrence › No Russia War

No Russia war.

Galeotti, 18 – Mark Galeotti (Senior researcher at the Institute of International Relations Prague and head of its Centre for European Security; “Forget Britain’s nuclear deterrent – here’s what Russia is really afraid of”; ; accessed 7/18/18)

Tanks are great for fighting other tanks, but there is little serious likelihood of a full-scale land war between Russia and NATO. For everything else, from flag-flying and humanitarian intervention, to heading off Crimea-style landgrabs, where what matters is getting to the battlefield when it counts, rather than too late, the special forces, Royal Marines and paras are hard to beat. These forces also suit post-Brexit geopolitics. They allow the UK to achieve its usual aim of “punching above its weight” and, blasphemy though it may be, make the French happy. On a recent trip to the French defence ministry, I repeatedly heard concerns that Brexit leaves France as the last EU country with the will and the forces to mount serious out-of-area operations. If we are still potential partners, that gives us credibility – and leverage. In a way, the Russians have a similar perspective on the Royal Navy. What bothers them is not our massive new aircraft carrier, which one naval officer said would make a great “missile magnet” in time of war. Rather, the concern is about smaller, lighter forces. Submarines that can contest the northern waters. Frigates able to both protect our coastlines and project power abroad. Simply having the number of ships to keep enough deployed at any one time. As the officer continued: “If your navy is essentially one carrier battle group, you can do one thing well, but nothing else.” Thirdly, it is not just specific forces and units that the Russians believe gives the UK its edge, but training and morale. Russian successes in Crimea and Syria partly represent an unfamiliar new emphasis on the human side of their military. Britain’s problems of having to scrimp on training and overstretch its forces have not gone unnoticed. One Russian noted that “these days, the Europeans have armies but no soldiers, while the British have always had soldiers” – he actually used the word boets, which really means something closer to “warriors” – “so why would they want to lose that?” Why indeed? Of course there are many other facets essential to the UK’s defence capability. What doesn’t seem to worry the Russians? Not once have I heard any taking our “independent nuclear deterrent” seriously. For all kinds of reasons, this is currently not under serious debate – though taking its cost out of the defence budget would make a massive difference – but let us not pretend it is because Moscow thinks it matters.

2022 Michigan Negative
Advantage Answers › Russia Deterrence › No Russia War

Checks solve Russia escalation

Tsygankov 16—Professor at the Departments of Political Science and International Relations at San Francisco State University [Andrei, “5 reasons why the threat of a global war involving Russia is overstated,” Russia Direct, 19 Feb, http://www.russia-direct.org/opinion/5-reasons-why-threat-great-power-war-involving-russia-overstated]

First, whatever the rhetoric, major powers are not inclined towards risky behavior when their core interests are at stake. This concerns not only the nuclear superpowers, but also countries such as Turkey. The prospect of confronting Russia's overwhelmingly superior military should give pause even to someone as hot-tempered as Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan. Even if Erdogan wanted to pit Russia against NATO, it wouldn’t work. So far, NATO has been careful to not be drawn into highly provocative actions, whether it is by responding to Russia seizing the Pristina International Airport in June 1999, getting involved on Georgia’s side during the military conflict in August 2008 or by providing lethal military assistance and support for Ukraine. Unless Russia is the clear and proven aggressor, NATO is unlikely to support Turkey and begin World War III. Second, Russia remains a defensive power aware of its responsibility for maintaining international stability. Moscow wants to work with major powers, not against them. Its insistence on Western recognition of Russia’s interests must not be construed as a drive to destroy the foundations of the international order, such as sovereignty, multilateralism, and arms control. Third, the United States has important interests to prevent regional conflicts from escalating or becoming trans-regional. Although its relative military capabilities are not where they were ten years ago, the U.S. military and diplomatic resources are sufficient to restrain key regional players in any part of the world. Given the power rivalry across several regions, proxy wars are possible and indeed are happening, but they are unlikely to escalate. Fourth, unlike the Cold War era, the contemporary world has no rigid alliance structure. The so-called Russia-China-Iran axis is hardly more than a figment of the imagination by American neoconservatives and some Russia conspiracy-minded thinkers. The world remains a space in which international coalitions overlap and are mostly formed on an ad hoc basis. Fifth, with the exception of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Greater Syria (ISIS), there is no fundamental conflict of values and ideologies. Despite the efforts to present as incompatible the so-called “traditional” and “Western” values by Russia or “democracy” to “autocracy” by the United States and Europe, the world majority does not think that this cultural divide is worth fighting for. Despite the dangers of the world we live in, it contains a number of important, even underappreciated, checks on great powers’ militarism. The threat talk coming from politicians is often deceiving. Such talk may be a way to pressure the opponent into various political and military concessions rather than to signal real intentions. When such pressures do not bring expected results, the rhetoric of war and isolation subsides. Then a dialogue begins. Perhaps, the increasing frequency of exchanges between Obama and Putin since December 2015 - including their recent phone conversation following the Munich conference - suggest a growing recognition that the record of pressuring Russia has

2022 Michigan Negative
Advantage Answers › Russia Deterrence › No Russia War

No Russia war—Ukraine has recked them

Bergman 5/22- director of the Europe Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.,(Max Bergmann, “Russia’s Coming Great Power Struggle,” CSIS, May 12, 2022, https://www.csis.org/analysis/russias-coming-great-power-struggle)//mcu

On Monday, all eyes were on Red Square for the annual May 9 victory day celebration to see what Vladimir Putin would do. The answer was not much. Instead of mobilizing the country for total war against Ukraine or declaring some sort of Potemkin victory, Putin stayed the course. This is not because the current trajectory of Russia’s operation in Ukraine is working as planned. What has become apparent in the war in Ukraine, especially since Russia gave up its offensive against Kyiv, is that there is a gap between Russia’s grandiose geopolitical objectives and its capacity to deliver. In the case of Ukraine, escalating the conflict might turn the war in Putin’s favor, but mass mobilization would not guarantee success in the battlefield. It could also lead to intense public backlash, putting his regime at risk. Thus, the two defining obsessions of the Putin era—regime survival and Russia’s geopolitical might—are in tension. As sanctions take their toll and battlefield losses mount, the gap between Putin’s ambitions and Russia’s capacity is likely to grow. As a leader obsessed with geopolitics, Putin will inevitably engage in a desperate scramble to maintain Russia’s great power status, but he will find it incredibly difficult in the weeks, months, and years ahead to do so. The basic problem for Putin is that Western strategy to weaken Russia is working better than anyone could have expected. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin’s comment may have overstepped when he bluntly said, “We want to see Russia weakened.” But underlying Austin’s comments is a clear sense of confidence that the strategy is clearly working. The initial thrust of this strategy began on the economic front with sanctions. The original assumption behind sanctions was not that they would get Putin to end the war. Banks do not stop tanks, after all. But instead, by imposing significant medium- to long-term costs on Russia, such that in the next 1 year, 5 years, and 10 years, the Russian economy would be severely weakened, the Kremlin would be forced into a tough juggling act between guns (geopolitical ambition) or butter (domestic tranquility). What has surprised U.S. policymakers is the speed and intensity through which the U.S. and European public have demanded stronger actions. European outrage has led to a far stronger sanctions response than imagined possible before the war. Europe has demonstrated it is willing to bear substantial economic costs to weaken Russia and is now moving at an incredible pace to decouple from Russia, now targeting Russian oil. This is having a devastating impact on Russia’s economy. The Russian Central Bank survey reveals expectations of soaring inflation, economic contraction, and no growth. Furthermore, Russia is facing a massive brain drain as up to 200,000 Russians may have left the country by the second week of March alone. It has also suffered substantial damage to its burgeoning tech industry, as it lost access to some overseas markets and may lose up to 170,000 tech workers. The biggest surprise, however, is the performance of Ukraine on the battlefield, the ineptitude of Russia’s military, and the game-changing efficacy Western security assistance. Russia’s forces have suffered shocking losses. The Pentagon estimates that Russia has lost around 25 percent of the combat power it had used to invade Ukraine, with the UK defense minister claiming that Russia suffered losses of 15,000 in personnel and over 2,500 in large equipment. If the war ended tomorrow, Russia would have considerable costs to recapitalize its forces—build more tanks and Kalibr cruise missile systems, as well as train new personnel—not to mention seek to address the deficiencies exposed in the war. But the war is not going to end tomorrow, and the long-term costs to Russia will grow. Thus, Russia finds itself in a huge hole. But to make matters much worse for the Kremlin, the export controls—one of the most innovative aspects of the sanctions—is just starting to bite. The export controls are designed to restrict commercial exports to Russia of advanced technology. This raises major questions for the Kremlin. For instance, how will Russia be able to rebuild its military when it cannot buy semiconductors to build new Kalibr cruise missiles? When a Western component used to manufacture Russian tanks breaks, will Russia be able to get another? If not, can it build its own? According to the White House, two major plants that specialize in manufacturing and repair of tanks—Uralvagonzavod Corporation and the Chelyabinsk Tractor Plant—have suspended their work due to the lack of foreign components. There is no doubt that Russia will aggressively pursue work-arounds. Sanctions evasion will be a nonstop pursuit, aided by China, as well as other complicit countries. Russia will use “burner banks” that pop up to handle a transaction, get sanctioned, and go away. It will use shell companies, smugglers, and the criminal underworld to gain access to materials. It will, in short, act like North Korea. But while this type of smuggling can support a bespoke missile development operation, it is highly uncertain whether this will suffice to keep the Russian defense industrial sector humming. Nevertheless, even if Russia finds a way, acquiring items through the black market and through convoluted means will add substantial costs, further depleting Russia’s economic coffers. Russia will seek to turn to domestic production, pursuing classic import substitution, hoping domestic production will replace imported goods. This could work in some areas, but items like semiconductors cannot just be conjured out of thin air, especially when Russia’s knowledge workers have fled in droves. Even if Russia can replace imported parts domestically, this will still add costs and is unlikely to result in the same level of quality of imported goods. Whether export controls succeed in starving Russia of the technology and machinery necessary to rebuild its military is of immense geopolitical importance. Russia’s defense industrial prowess is key to its foreign policy and undergirds its relationships with countries across the globe. This is especially true for a country like India. India is dependent on the Russian arms industry and has $8 billion worth of outstanding military orders from Russia, and also needs a continuous supply of spare parts and components. Indian officials said they expect some short-term delays in the “S-400 Triumf missile systems, Grigorovich-class stealth frigates, and Kalashnikov AK 203-7.62x39mm assault rifles, as well as spares supplies for Kilo-class submarines, MiG-29 fighters, and Kamov Mi-17 military transport helicopters. . . . India today imports over 10,000 types of spares and line replacement units worth over $500 million annually from Russia.” Will Russia be able to meet its deliveries? If Russia can’t deliver, India will have to scramble, increasingly turning to U.S., European, and Asian partners for alternatives. But beyond India, Russia’s defense industrial troubles could severely impact its foreign policy with countries around the world. In Southeast Asia, Vietnam is reliant on Russia’s defense industry and could be further alienated by closer Sino-Russian relations. Furthermore, 50 percent of Africa’s defense industrial imports come from Russia. Thus, if sanctions and export restrictions work as expected, Putin will have to scramble to maintain Russia’s global standing. The most direct way for Putin to assert Russia’s strength and deter the West from taking advantage of a militarily weakened Russia, is nuclear saber rattling. This is already evident in loose talk from Russian officials, leading to understandable concerns about risks of nuclear escalation. Reviving such concerns in the West could be a boon to a Kremlin, as it might foster prestige-building Cold War-era nuclear talks or help constrain Western belligerence. Russia could also continue to look to asymmetric means to hit back and impose costs on the West. Cyberattacks, political influence and disinformation campaigns, money laundering and corruption efforts are few of the many tools in its toolbox. However, its effectiveness has eroded somewhat, as Russia has lost the element of surprise. The United States and Europe have obsessively studied Russia’s active measures campaigns since 2016. Russian disinformation campaigns on the war in Ukraine have had little impact on the West. Instead, it is the United States, with its aggressive disclosures of intelligence, and Ukraine, with Zelensky filming cell phone videos and posting Ukrainian battlefield successes on social media, that have been winning the information war. Russian political influencing efforts will also prove increasingly difficult. Putin-friendly politicians, from Marine Le Pen in France to Matteo Salvini in Italy, have sought to create their distance. Russia can still attempt at the margins to impact politics, corrupting politicians or secretly donating or funding political campaigns. But U.S. and European intelligence and law enforcement are focused on this threat. Additionally, the massive wealth and influence of Russian oligarchs, which has had a corrosive impact on their democratic hosts, has been aggressively uprooted. Russia has thus lost one of its most important soft power tools. The end result is that the West is both on guard and has built up a degree of resilience. Cyberattacks against the West are another potential option for Putin. There are significant concerns about the vulnerability of critical infrastructure in the United States to Russian cyberattacks. But attacks on critical infrastructure, such as the May 2021 Colonial Pipeline attack, allegedly by a nominally private Russian actors, also carry greater risks for the Kremlin now. While the Biden administration decided to prioritize summitry with Putin rather than responding in kind, a Russian cyberattack in this environment would likely be treated far differently, possibly resulting in a U.S. cyber response against Russian infrastructure or expanding direct involvement in Ukraine. A vulnerable Russia, with its hands full in eastern Ukraine, will likely be nervous about provoking an escalatory spiral.

2022 Michigan Negative
DA/Case Turns › China-Specific Work › Impacts --- LOW = Acc War

Chinese Launch on Warning causes accidental nuclear conflict

David Santoro 19, PhD, Director and Senior Fellow for Nuclear Policy, Pacific Forum International, 6/20/19, Testimony before the U.S.-China Economic Security Review Commission, https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Santoro_USCC%20Testimony_FINAL.pdf

Furthermore, Washington has been worried that China’s evolving nuclear capabilities will present Beijing with new, problematic strategic options and create significant command, control, and communication (C3) issues. For starters, the Chinese modernization program could lead Beijing to change its stance on nuclear counterattack: it could adopt a launch-on-warning (LOW) posture, abandoning its traditional stance to retaliate only after it has absorbed a nuclear strike. The improved mobility, readiness, and informatization of SAF assets and the PLA’s space-based early-warning system have increasingly made adoption of such a posture possible. The emerging nuclear roles of the PLAN and PLAAF will make it even easier because nuclear warheads have to be mated with delivery systems on sea and air platforms. Is an LOW posture compatible with an NFU policy, especially given that Beijing has often pointed to its de-mated posture as evidence that it abides by NFU principles? Another area of possible change concerns Chinese thinking about adopting a limited nuclear warfighting posture as a result of the increasing commingling and co-location of its nuclear and conventional assets, the diversification of its nuclear forces (notably its emerging nuclear triad), and its work to enhance “integrated strategic deterrence.” 21 Could these developments lead Beijing to endorse warfighting as an option for its nuclear forces? The consequences of Chinese modernization for C3 have also been worrisome to Washington. While the SAF was tasked to pursue “dual deterrence and dual operations,” i.e., wield both nuclear-and conventional-capable missiles, as early as in the mid-1980s, the modernization, diversification, and expansion of China’s conventional force has, as mentioned earlier, only begun to grow fast in recent years. Looking ahead, it is likely that the continued introduction of new dual-capable missiles, the increasing dispersal of land-mobile missiles, and the steady rise in the number of deployable nuclear weapons will, at the very least, complicate the C3 systems of China’s land-based nuclear delivery systems. What’s more, the emerging nuclear roles of the PLAN and PLAAF will add extra and probably major layers of complexity. The concern is that a human error or malfunction could increase instability or lead to inadvertent escalation. Many questions remain unanswered: Will C3 systems be modernized in a timely fashion, as nuclear modernization proceeds? Will the SAF be involved in PLAN and PLAAF nuclear missions? Will the PLAN and PLAAF develop nuclear-warhead management know-how and capability of their own? How do Beijing and the PLA intend to communicate with PLAN assets? Will they introduce pre-delegated authority to launch nuclear weapons?

2022 Michigan Negative
DA/Case Turns › China-Specific Work › Impacts --- Stab k NW

Stability and confidence in second strike ensures MAD and deterrence --- the aff’s perception change is the ONLY chance for a U.S.-China War

Colby and Denmark 13

(Elbridge A. Colby, Robert M. Gates Senior Fellow at the Center for a New American Security, and Abraham M. Denmark, United States Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for East Asia, March 2013, “Nuclear Weapons and U.S.-China Relations: A Way Forward”, https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/publication/130307_Colby_USChinaNuclear_Web.pdf)

To gain the benefits of strategic stability, the Working Group believes that nuclear relations between the United States and China should emphasize two complementary approaches: crisis stability and arms race stability. Crisis stability emphasizes the need to minimize pressure on either side to be the first to use nuclear weapons based on perceived advantage or vulnerability. It thus emphasizes the need for a strategic dynamic in which both sides see that launching their nuclear weapons first to avoid being disarmed or to try to disarm one’s opponent is unnecessary and unwise. Arms race stability focuses on the longer term and emphasizes controlling the dynamics of arms competition that can affect the strategic balance, and specifically calculations associated with first-strike stability. The Working Group believes these concepts can even be highly useful in relations between two countries that have asymmetric capabilities such as the United States and China. Such concepts do not demand that two nations have the same or similar numbers or types of forces. Rather, they are adaptable goals that can be fitted to the situation that exists between the United States and China. Based on this concept, stability can emerge between the United States and China if they each field forces that are capable of surviving a first strike and if they are able to credibly demonstrate to the other side that their current and future capabilities are unable to deny the other side a viable strategic deterrent. As a result, fear of preemption and the need to launch weapons early become irrelevant, either as irritants in crisis or as dangers in conflict. In this way, the benefits of deterrence can be retained while minimizing the chances of nuclear escalation. The premise of arms control and stability-oriented measures is that even potential adversaries can achieve the twin goals of both effective nuclear deterrence and mitigation of the possibility of conflict between them. This is because nuclear forces themselves can intensify, if not cause, competition and even conflict—but they need not. Nuclear deterrence is not simply a unilateral action that takes places in a vacuum; rather, it is a relationship shaped by perceptions. Indeed, the ways in which a country procures, postures, and operates its nuclear forces have a major interactive effect on how other countries procure, posture, and operate their forces. Potential adversaries can allay, and possibly even remove, these exacerbating factors through unilateral and cooperative measures that effectively demonstrate that each side’s strategic forces are not capable of conducting a disarming first strike. Such measures do not solve more fundamental political and strategic disputes, but they can help to lessen tensions and mistrust stemming from the essentially ancillary technical features of interstate relations. Both sides could derive value from cooperation on nuclear weapons grounded in the stability concept. The United States worries about the composition of China’s nuclear force, Chinese views on escalation and plans for nuclear use, and the future trajectory of China’s strategic posture. Meanwhile, China worries that the United States may be able or seek to be able to deny it a second-strike capability, and it worries about the scope and sophistication of future U.S. programs, as well as U.S. unwillingness to acknowledge a condition of mutual vulnerability between the two nations. A stability-grounded model could help address these anxieties—on the U.S. side by providing greater insight into China’s current and future force structure and deeper insight into China’s ways of thinking about nuclear strategy, and on the Chinese side by providing similar insight into U.S. developments and a greater degree of assurance about U.S. acknowledgment of the survivability of China’s force. Concurrently, such an approach would have the added benefit of building confidence on both sides. Finally, such a model could provide a satisfactory method through which China could see something approximating its current force size, posture, and doctrine as satisfactory and compatible with stability.

2022 Michigan Negative
DA/Case Turns › China-Specific Work › 2NC --- China not revisionist

China’s a purely defensive nuclear power---empirical record overwhelmingly goes affirmative.

Pan 18

(Major General Pan Zhenqiang (retired) is deputy chairman of the China Foundation for International Studies, senior adviser to the China Reform Forum and director of research at the Institute for Strategy and Management of the Central University of Finance and Economics in China. He is also a member of the Executive Committee of the Council of Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs., "A Study of China’s No-First-Use Policy on Nuclear Weapons," Journal For Peace And Nuclear Disarmament Volume 1, 2018 - Issue 1)

How should one understand China’s no-first-use nuclear policy? In its very first official statement on the no-first-use nuclear policy, the Chinese government purposefully chose powerful expressions, such as “at any time” and “under any circumstances,” to stress that this pledge is absolute, unconditional, and crystal clear. This fact has four implications. First, the unconditional no-first-use policy means that in China’s security calculation, nuclear weapons play only one role: to deter other states from attacking China with nuclear weapons. Simply put, if you do not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against China, then China’s nuclear arsenal is no threat to you. If you choose to launch nuclear attacks on China, you must anticipate nuclear retaliation, most likely in the form of counterattacks on several large cities that would demonstrate the “unbearable and disastrous consequences” that accompany the use of nuclear weapons. Following this logic, China hopes to achieve its objective of deterring any state from resorting to the nuclear option against China. In short, China’s nofirstuse commitment reflects the purely defensive nature of its nuclear policy. In this respect, China’s strategy that is aimed at deterring a nuclear attack differs fundamentally from the deterrence strategy pursued by the Western nuclear community. It aims strictly to prevent a nuclear war, whereas the deterrence strategy long maintained by other nuclear powers, particularly the United States and the USSR (now Russia), is based on preparing to win a nuclear war and is offensive in nature. This offensive strategy caused the US and the USSR to enter into a near-crazy nuclear arms race, escalating to a total of more than 70,000 warheads at the peak of the Cold War, far beyond any rational defensive needs. The US nuclear strategy has another striking feature: it is also applicable to non- nuclear-weapon states. Particularly with respect to those states considered unfriendly or disobedient, the US presents its nuclear weapons as a principal means of military threat and political blackmail, using its nuclear strategy as a powerful pillar to dominate the world. Intent on disassociating itself from Western deterrence theory, the Chinese government has little interest in going along with those Western defense analysts (as well as some nuclear theorists in China itself) who try to observe China’s nuclear strategy through the lens of the Western deterrence concept and who describe China’s nuclear doctrine with such labels as “limited deterrence” or “minimum deterrence” (Xu 1987, 366–369; Chen 1989, 214; Yang 1990, 407–411).3 China believes that these are specious interpretations that blur the clearly self-defensive nature of its nuclear strategy. Second, its unconditional nofirstuse policy implies that China has no need to engage in an arms race with other nuclear weapon states. No doubt, China must maintain a survivable nuclear force that can withstand the first wave of nuclear attacks with sufficient counterattack capability. However, China believes it is much more practical and sensible to keep its nuclear weapon development at that level than to pursue a strategy like that of the US and the USSR (Russia), which led inevitably to a nuclear arms race during the Cold War. Throughout those decades of rivalry, the two nuclear superpowers had to stand ready to strike first, thereby plunging themselves into a paranoid mindset. They never knew how much nuclear strike capability was sufficient, and they constantly worried about being overtaken by the other country. Each side, never sure when the other might launch the first bomb, remained constantly at the highest possible “launch on warning” alert; each exaggerating the other’s nuclear capabilities and proceeding with its own nuclear armament and readiness planning based on the worst-case scenario. From China’s perspective, a strategy containing these elements is the root cause of the escalating risk of a nuclear war. China has never been bothered by such over-anxiety or over-action in its nuclear thinking. China believes that to prevent a nuclear war from happening, it is sufficient to target just a few big cities for retaliation; thus it is not necessary to build a huge arsenal or develop massive offensive capabilities. Since acquiring its own nuclear capability in 1964, China has conducted the least number of nuclear tests among the five Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) nuclear weapon states, and it has maintained only a minimum number of warheads throughout that time. Also notably, China sees no need to develop non-strategic nuclear weapons, such as tactical nuclear weapons, which in China’s view are primarily for use on the battlefield; to develop so-called precision- strike nuclear war-fighting capabilities; or to deploy nuclear weapons on the soil of other countries. Furthermore, China considers it unnecessary to keep its nuclear forces at the launch-on-warning alert level, because it is prepared only to mount counter- attacks if attacked. Before any counterattack takes place, China must first determine whether the attack against China is of a nuclear nature and who the attacker is. Such investigation and verification will be time-consuming. In fact, China generally keeps its warheads away from intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launchers, installing them only when launching becomes necessary. This approach not only improves the survivability of its nuclear force but also, more importantly, tells the world that China’s nuclear posture is never offensive. All these are logical effects of the nofirstuse policy, which indeed determines China’s nuclear posture, including the mission, size, and structure of its nuclear weapons, as well as the doctrine governing them. For this reason, the common depiction of China’s nofirstuse policy as unverifiable rhetoric is demonstrably groundless. Currently, along with its technological and political development, China, like other nuclear weapon states, is also modernizing its array of nuclear armaments, particularly by enhancing the surety, reliability, and effectiveness of its ballistic missiles. This includes, among others, building a nuclear triangle focusing on land- launching ICBMs complemented by bombers and submarines. China is also strengthening its capacity for rapid reaction, effective penetration, conventional precision strikes, damage infliction, and its own protection and survivability. All these actions are geared toward effectively handling future war threats and emergencies. And all these steps, as pointed out by China’s Defense White Paper, have been taken in line with the country’s pledge never to be the first to resort to nuclear weapons (Information Office of the State Council (China) 2013, 12). In short, the no-first-use policy keeps China out of an arms race with other states, and this healthy mindset allows China to proceed with its nuclear modernization programs at a more measured and unruffled pace, in conformity with its national defense needs and within the limits of its overall national strength. Third, the unconditional no-first-use policy also means that nuclear development is not considered a way of compensating for any shortage of conventional capabilities in China’s overall military planning. This is another important factor distinguishing China’s nuclear strategy from that of other nuclear powers. In the eyes of other nuclear powers, nuclear weapons, other than being more powerfully destructive, are not qualitatively different from conventional weapons; both are ready and available for use in the battlefield. In the early years of the Cold War, when the US enjoyed first a nuclear monopoly and later nuclear superiority over the USSR but lagged behind in terms of conventional forces, it waved nuclear bombers as a trump card in its massive retaliation plan. In those years, Washington planned that if war should erupt with the USSR, it would immediately use nuclear weapons to crush the enemy. But soon, the Soviets caught up with the US nuclear capability while maintaining a superior conventional posture relative to NATO’s deployment in Europe. By this time, the latter alliance was forced to abandon the idea of winning the war through massive nuclear attacks. But the US and NATO were still prepared to use nuclear weapons first as an effective firewall to stop an offensive by Warsaw Pact conventional forces. With the end of the Cold War and the breakup of the Warsaw Pact, the confrontation persisted between the two factions, with the US and the NATO on one side, and Russia, which retained the legacy of the Soviet era, on the other side. But the two sides now seem to have swapped positions, with Russia on the weak side, particularly with regard to conventional weapons. It is, thus, now Russia’s turn to follow the same path that the Western bloc had adopted during the Cold War era, offsetting its conventional inferiority with its nuclear arsenal. Soon after the end of the Cold War, in November 1993, Russia announced that it was abandoning its pledge not to use nuclear weapons first, emphasizing that in a future major military conflict with the West, it would launch a first strike if deemed necessary – although many believe that the USSR was never serious about its no-first-use pledge during the Cold War. Britain and France, the two next-tier nuclear states, also cling to the position of willingness to use nuclear weapons first, even though as members of NATO they are already under the US nuclear umbrella at least theoretically. Their calculation seems to be that, if they were to give up this position, their status as global powers would be substantially undermined and their status within NATO greatly impaired. Another consideration behind these countries’ threat to use nuclear weapons first is the desire to maintain their traditional interests in specific regions of the world, such as the Middle East and Africa.4 China has taken an approach fundamentally different from the other NPT nuclear weapon states. Its no-first-use pledge demonstrates that China does not plan to offset its relatively weak conventional strength (vis-à-vis the US, for example) with its nuclear capabilities, nor would it consider resorting to nuclear weapons first in a conventional conflict. There are at least two reasons for this approach. One reason is that China deeply understands the huge, devastating consequences of the use of nuclear weapons, including the massive and inhumane damage that would be perpetrated on both sides, and especially on innocent people. Furthermore, China believes that a disconnection between nuclear and conventional forces may be in China’s best interests. The nofirst- use policy was formulated by the first-generation leaders of the newly founded republic in 1949; all these leaders had experienced long revolutionary wars and had little taste for engaging in another large-scale conventional war. In their vision of a next war involving China, there was no role for China as an invader; rather, China would be the invaded country, meaning that the war would be on China’s soil. Such a war was quite familiar to leaders like Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai. They were confident that under the Communist Party’s leadership, and with its disciplined military force supported by the people, China could fight a prolonged people’s war, using inferior weapons to vanquish its technically superior enemies, who would eventually drown in “the sea of people’s war” (Sun 2006). This strategic thinking, passed down from the forefathers, continues to be deeply imprinted in the minds of their successors and serves as important guidance shaping the no-first-use policy regarding nuclear weapons. Finally, the unconditional no-first-use policy indicates that China does not intend to employ nuclear weapons as a foreign-policy tool to advance its national interests. This view arises from China’s socialist system, which has consistently supported a non-allied, independent foreign policy of peaceful coexistence. In sharp contrast, the US acted in exactly the opposite way. By providing “extended nuclear deterrence” to its allies, the US sought from the onset to control these countries and prevent them from developing indigenous nuclear weapons, keeping them dependent on a global security system dominated by Washington. Such arrangements may have worked for some time, but whether they could work permanently is a big question. Many of these allies have never become fully reconciled to putting their fate in US hands and have desired to break away from the US control from time to time, giving rise to complicated frictions in the alliances. China has no such problems. It stands firm, not forming a military alliance with any other state nor using nuclear weapons as a means to control or influence another state’s policy. This position is consistent with its no-first-use pledge.

2022 Michigan Negative
DA/Case Turns › China-Specific Work › Nuclear Deterrence Link

AUVs and UUVs actively complicate and undermine deterrence

Sylvia Mishra 19, Sylvia Mishra is a New Tech Nuclear Officer at the European Leadership Network and a doctoral researcher at the Department of Defence Studies, King’s College London , 5/8/19, “Could unmanned underwater vehicles undermine nuclear deterrence?” The Strategist, , JH

Nuclear deterrence rests on the ability of strategic assets to survive an enemy’s first strike and to retaliate, ensuring mutually assured destruction.

Nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarines (SSBNs) are considered to be the most survivable of all nuclear platforms due to their stealth capabilities, mobility and discretion. Placing nuclear assets underwater puts them at a safer distance from a crippling first strike. But as technology improves and the ocean battlefield becomes more complex, these advances could undermine the survivability of strategic forces around the world and make them far more vulnerable.