Free beta access. 50 free AI tokens each week. Optional top-ups available. See what is included
Open evidence library

Search the archive.

Current and older evidence is free during beta. Sign in for unlimited card access and full source downloads.

Matching cards
2022 Georgetown Affirmative
AFF › Case › 2AC---Interoperability Key

Intra NATO AI gap decks interoperability---cooperation through NATO is key

Matej Tonin 19, current Slovenian Minister of Defense, was an active member of the NATO PA from 2012 to 2020. He served as rapporteur and Chairperson of the Assembly's Sub-Committee on Technology Trends and Security and as Deputy Head of the Slovenian delegation to the NATO PA. "ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: IMPLICATIONS FOR NATO’S ARMED FORCES" Report from the Sub-Committee on Technology Trends and Security. October 13. //pipk

63. Second, the defence technology gap between Allies must remain small enough to be bridged by interoperability. The large diversity of Allies is ultimately a primary source of NATO’s strength, but it also means that large differences exist in defence capabilities. There is a danger that the significant investment in AI in leading Allied nations could lead to substantial interoperability problems and a loss of NATO’s overall military effectiveness in the future. However, the good news is that AI efforts do not need to be capital intensive, as the Committee witnessed during its fact-finding visit to Singapore in May 2019. Small- and medium-sized Allies with smart scientists and engineers can play an outsized role in AI development and adoption if they so choose. This could indeed be a very effective contribution to Allied burden sharing from the smaller Allied nations. To increase interoperability, cooperation through NATO’ structures has a large role to play. Interoperability should be at the heart of AI efforts carried out by the STO, ACT, the NCI Agency, NIAG, and others. Allies leading in the S&T sector should encourage open architecture standards and regulations for technology sharing and transfer among Allies in order to narrow the technology gap, in line with all national obligations and the sensitive nature of technologies

64. Allied armed forces alone will not be able to solve the AI-specific challenges laid out in this report, including the ethical and legal questions. This will need a much broader push across the entire AI ecosystem. However, governments, NATO, and the EU can and must play a critical role in overcoming the investment, innovation, and workforce challenges of adopting AI. Just as national governments across the Alliance are rising to the challenge of AI, so should their armed forces. They should move beyond scanning the horizon and, instead, invest in real research, experimentation, development, and adoption efforts. It should be underlined that all dual-use and military AI efforts should, however, tackle all ethical, legal, and social questions right from the beginning, including privacy considerations and the definition of appropriate human involvement in decisions about the use of force. Allies should consider examining whether an ethics code of conduct could put the adoption of AI in the armed forces on a more stable foundation. At a strategic level, Allies must also address the geopolitical challenges, including the ones arising from Chinese and Russian investments in military AI systems. As this report has shown, Russia and China see AI as critical to future military power and invest heavily into AI-enabled military systems. For its part, the NATO PA Science and Technology Committee will continue to monitor AI developments in the defence sector through fact-finding visits and expert testimony.

2022 Georgetown Affirmative
AFF › Case › 2AC---Say Yes

Allies want AI defense cooperation---they’ll sign on to a US lead initiative.

Kahn & Horowitz 21 --- Research and Senior Fellows at the Council on Foreign Relations.

Lauren and Michael, 2021, The Washington Quarterly 44:4 “Leading in Artificial Intelligence through Confidence Building Measures”

An informal multilateral agreement could be proposed and opened for signature to all nations. If the United States leads, American allies and partners would be likely to sign on, both due to the impact of American leadership in shaping attitudes and the likely perception that following US-led principles would facilitate defense cooperation in this area. One might argue that US leadership in multilateral AI standards could create risks for the United States if it involves commitments that prevent the US deployment and use of militarily important AI-enabled systems. These risks, however, are minimal. The standards the United States would promote involve commitments to international humanitarian law and responsible behavior that the United States already follows when it comes to the development and use of military systems. Thus, it would not require changes in US behavior that might slow down responsible military AI adoption.

2022 Georgetown Affirmative
AFF › Case › Advantage 2---Norm Setting

Failure of emerging tech governance guarantees extinction

Ash Jain 19, Senior fellow with the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, “Present at the Re-Creation: A Global Strategy for Revitalizing, Adapting, and Defending a Rules-Based International System,” Strategic Studies Quarterly, October 2019,

The system must also be adapted to deal with new issues that were not envisioned when the existing order was designed. Foremost among these issues is emerging and disruptive technology, including AI, additive manufacturing (or 3D printing), quantum computing, genetic engineering, robotics, directed energy, the Internet of things (IOT), 5G, space, cyber, and many others. Like other disruptive technologies before them, these innovations promise great benefits, but also carry serious downside risks. For example, AI is already resulting in massive efficiencies and cost savings in the private sector. Routine tasks and other more complicated jobs, such as radiology, are already being automated. In the future, autonomous weapons systems may go to war against each other as human soldiers remain out of harm’s way.

Yet, AI is also transforming economies and societies, and generating new security challenges. Automation will lead to widespread unemployment. The final realization of driverless cars, for example, will put out of work millions of taxi, Uber, and long-haul truck drivers. Populist movements in the West have been driven by those disaffected by globalization and technology, and mass unemployment caused by automation will further grow those ranks and provide new fuel to grievance politics. Moreover, some fear that autonomous weapons systems will become “killer robots” that select and engage targets without human input, and could eventually turn on their creators, resulting in human extinction. The other technologies on this lisgt similarly balance great potential upside with great downside risk. 3D printing, for example, can be used to “make anything anywhere,” reducing costs for a wide range of manufactured goods and encouraging a return of local manufacturing industries.61 At the same time, advanced 3D printers can also be used by revisionist and rogue states to print component parts for advanced weapons systems or even WMD programs, spurring arms races and weapons proliferation.62 Genetic engineering can wipe out entire classes of disease through improved medicine, or wipe out entire classes of people through genetically engineered superbugs. Directed-energy missile defenses may defend against incoming missile attacks, while also undermining global strategic stability.

2022 Georgetown Affirmative
AFF › Case › Advantage 2---Norm Setting

Authoritarian AI is an existential threat

Di Minardi 20, Communications Officer at the Georgia Tech School of Economics and School of History & Sociology, “The grim fate that could be ‘worse than extinction’,” Georgia Tech, 10/15/2020, https://www.bbc.com/future/article/20201014-totalitarian-world-in-chains-artificial-intelligence

What would totalitarian governments of the past have looked like if they were never defeated? The Nazis operated with 20th Century technology and it still took a world war to stop them. How much more powerful – and permanent – could the Nazis have been if they had beat the US to the atomic bomb? Controlling the most advanced technology of the time could have solidified Nazi power and changed the course of history.

When we think of existential risks, events like nuclear war or asteroid impacts often come to mind. Yet there’s one future threat that is less well known – and while it doesn’t involve the extinction of our species, it could be just as bad.

2022 Georgetown Affirmative
AFF › Case › Advantage 2---Norm Setting

Democracy solves war.

Tomz & Weeks 13 --- Michael Tomz, professor of political science at Stanford University, Ph.D. in Political Science, Jessica L. Weeks, assistant professor of government, Ph.D., Political Science.

Michael & Jessica, 2013, “Public Opinion and the Democratic Peace," American Political Science Review, February, Available Online at http://web.stanford.edu/~tomz/pubs/TomzWeeks-2013-02.pdf

Our research supports the hypothesis that peace among democracies could be due, at least in part, to public opinion. Countless studies have shown that democratic leaders are responsive to public opinion on matters of foreign policy; we demonstrate that the public discriminates between democratic and autocratic targets. Public opinion may, therefore, foster a special zone of peace among democracies.

2022 Georgetown Affirmative
AFF › Case › Advantage 2---Norm Setting

The plan is key to prevent rising authoritarian AI from undermining democracy.

Imbrie et al. 20 --- Senior Fellow at Georgetown's Center for Security and Emerging Technology (CSET).

Andrew Imbrie, Ryan Fedasiuk, Catherine Aiken, Tarun Chhabra & Husanjot Chahal. February 2020, "Agile Alliances: How the United States and its Allies Can Deliver a Democratic Way of AI,” CSET, https://cset.georgetown.edu/publication/agile-alliances/#:~:text=How%20the%20United%20States%20and,a%20Democratic%20Way%20of%20AI&text=The%20United%20States%20must%20collaborate,wield%20AI%20for%20authoritarian%20ends.

How can the United States collaborate with allies and partners to shape the trajectory of artificial intelligence in ways that will promote liberal democratic values and protect against efforts to wield AI for authoritarian ends?

2022 Georgetown Affirmative
AFF › Case › Advantage 2---Norm Setting

Global development is inevitable---try or die for norm setting.

Horowitz 18 --- Michael C. Horowitz is a professor of political science and the associate director of Perry World House at the University of Pennsylvania.

Michael Horowitz, May 2018, “Artificial Intelligence, International Competition, and the Balance of Power,” Texas National Security Review, https://tnsr.org/2018/05/artificial-intelligence-international-competition-and-the-balance-of-power/

Whether AI capabilities diffuse relatively slowly or quickly, major military powers will likely face security dilemmas having to do with AI development and deployment. In a slow diffusion scenario, if countries fear that adversaries could get ahead in ways that are hard to rapidly mimic — and small differences in capabilities will matter on the battlefield — that will foster incentives for quick development and deployment. In a rapid diffusion scenario, competitive incentives will also exist, as countries feel like they have to race just to keep up.114 Moreover, it will be inherently difficult to measure competitors’ progress with AI (unlike, say, observing the construction of an aircraft carrier), causing countries to assume the worst of their potential rivals.

2022 Georgetown Affirmative
AFF › Case › Advantage 2---Norm Setting

NATO is key. It occupies a unique role to credibly spearhead norm setting in emerging tech.

Ehlert 21 --- PhD. Head of Strategy and Policy in the Office of the Chief Scientist at NATO headquarters.

Ulf, 12-16-2021, "NATO Review," NATO Review, https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2021/12/16/why-our-values-should-drive-our-technology-choices/index.html

It would be short-sighted to assume that Western countries could globally enforce emerging technologies’ compliance with Western values. Instead, differences in values may well result in divergent technological competences that can, in turn, affect the global distribution of power.

2022 Georgetown Affirmative
AFF › Case › Advantage 1---Joint Operations

Every member says yes---US initiating the cooperation ensures allies toe the line.

Sperling 19 – Professor of Political Science at the University of Akron, PhD from the University of California, Santa Barbara, and Dr. Mark Webber, Professor of International Politics at the University of Birmingham, PhD from the University of Birmingham, Master of Social Science from the University of Birmingham, BA from the University of Warwick.

James Sperling, January 20 2019, “Trump’s foreign policy and NATO: Exit and voice,” Review of International Studies, https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/CECD6A4DA95D3C177531E8C10A6E562B/S0260210519000123a.pdf/trumps_foreign_policy_and_nato_exit_and_voice.pdf

If exit is a credible option for the US, why has it not taken place? The answer lies in the institutional character of the Alliance. Institutional analysis of NATO is often seen as a counter to realism. The latter views alliances as mechanisms of balancing or bandwagoning in the international system with alliance formation, stability, and durability being a reflection of power configurations among states. Realism can account for the formation of NATO, its cohesion when confronted with a commonly recognised existential threat such as the Soviet Union, and its adaptation after the Cold War as the US harnessed the Alliance to new security tasks. Here, what matters is national and especially American preferences not NATO’s institutional qualities.33 Discounting institutions in this case is, however, misplaced. NATO’s permanent mechanisms of intra-alliance political consultation alongside a standing command structure (embracing defence planning, standardisation, interoperability, and a recurrent rather than one-off ability to deploy) are unique among both historical alliances and contemporary international organisations.34 Two consequences follow from the presence of these arrangements. First, NATO has assumed an elevated status in American strategic calculations. Here, the burden of defending allies is offset by NATO’s political role in aligning allied preferences with those of the US. NATO’s institutional mechanisms (the North Atlantic Council above all) make that alignment possible, ensure it is embedded, and deliver efficiencies and gains to all allies in the process. NATO thus takes on alliance-centric tasks (the security of Europe and the stabilisation of its periphery) that are of clear benefit to Europeans but which provide, simultaneously, an important security externality to the US. Second, institutionalisation has assumed a social character – the sophistication and permanency of intra-alliance mechanisms provide ample opportunities for voice and renders that articulation legitimate. One need not characterise NATO as a community organisation of democratic values35 in order to allow for this outcome. It can be seen also as the consequence of more formal properties that pertain to a sophisticated multilateral security arrangement: acceptance of the principle of consultation, agreement on common security threats and, in NATO’s case, a sense of shared endeavour built up over a decades’ long history.36 These properties are certainly open to exploitation. However, even the most powerful ally will be wont to play within the multilateral rules of the game. These, after all, are stacked in its favour and so offer a reliable means of exercising leadership and getting fellow allies to toe the line.37

2022 Georgetown Affirmative
AFF › Case › Advantage 1---Joint Operations

The AFF solves---it standardizes AI rules for NATO members that builds upon existing principles.

Sharma 5/30 --- Dr Sanur Sharma is Associate Fellow at Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses.

Sanur, NATO’s AI Push And Military Implications – Analysis, May 30, 2022, Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA) 

NATO’s AI Adoption: Challenges and Limitations

2022 Georgetown Affirmative
AFF › Case › Advantage 1---Joint Operations

Independently, fragmented allied AI systems risk accidents and miscalculated escalation.

Stanley-Lockman & Trabucco 22 --- *Defense and Strategic Studies, Nanyang Technological University. **Political Science, University of Copenhagen.

Zoe & Lena, “NATO’s Role in Responsible AI Governance in Military Affairs,” Oxford Handbook, https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780197579329.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780197579329-e-69

Even without being attacked, governability of AI in a NATO context also means understanding how AI-enabled and autonomous systems developed by the 30 Allies – and other partners – will interact with one another. NATO has expressed interest in governability as a principle of AI “to disengage or deactivate in case of unintended behaviour,”86 which echoes the U.S. Department of Defense definition of governable AI.87 Disengaging adversaries is important to maintain de-escalation measures in conflict. For NATO, interoperability between systems also relates to governable AI because allies must also consider how the interactions between the 30 Allies’ own AI-enabled and autonomous systems may result in unintended or emergent behaviour.88 This means that NATO has a responsibility to coordinate activities – be they technical exchanges, standardisation efforts, or training and exercises – to build confidence that the systems perform as humans intend.89 Without this coordination, the lack of interoperability of allied systems could lead to accidents, and separately, the potential loss of operational effectiveness also presents vulnerabilities for adversaries to exploit.

2022 Georgetown Affirmative
AFF › Case › Advantage 1---Joint Operations

Failure to successfully check Russia causes cascading conflicts throughout Europe --- great power war.

Graham 22 — Thomas Graham, Distinguished Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, Cofounder of the Russian, East European, and Eurasian Studies Program at Yale University, 2022 (“Preventing a Wider European Conflict,” Council on Foreign Relations, March 8th, Available Online at https://www.cfr.org/report/preventing-wider-european-conflict#chapter-title-0-1)

The large-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine now underway could quite plausibly precipitate a wider conflict in Europe. The United States is focused primarily on raising the costs to Russia with punishing sanctions and reassuring North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies neighboring Russia of its commitment to collective defense. Less attention has been given to containing the war to Ukraine and preventing its escalation into a broader European conflict.

The stakes are enormous. The ripple effects of a wider conflict in Europe would spread across the globe, stressing the geopolitical, economic, and institutional foundations of the international order the United States has fashioned and underwritten since the end of the Second World War. It would test the resilience of the U.S. global system of alliances, the international financial system, global energy markets, arms control regimes, and global institutions in the face of ever more violent great power competition. No region of the world would be spared, although developments on the Eurasian supercontinent, the other locus of world power and economic might outside North America, would bear the gravest consequences for U.S. interests.

2022 Georgetown Affirmative
AFF › Case › Advantage 1---Joint Operations

Russia’s integrating autonomous systems into their military. Failure to adapt will drastically change the global balance of power.

Garamone 20 – Reporter - United States Department of Defense.

Jim Garamone, September 9 2020, “Esper Says Artificial Intelligence Will Change the Battlefield,” U.S. Department of Defense, https://www.defense.gov/Explore/News/Article/Article/2340972/esper-says-artificial-intelligence-will-change-the-battlefield/

Artificial intelligence has the potential to change the battlefield, and the country that's first to field it will have enormous advantages over competitors, he told participants today. 

2022 Georgetown Affirmative
AFF › Case › Advantage 1---Joint Operations

That’s key to a litany of impacts---terrorism, authoritarianism, and disinformation.

Kolga 21 – founder of DisinfoWatch.org and is a senior fellow at the Macdonald-Laurier Institute’s Centre for Advancing Canada’s Interests Abroad

Marcus Kolga, "Improving NATO’s cohesion is critical to combat Russia and China’s threat: Marcus Kolga for Inside Policy," Macdonald-Laurier Institute, 10-5-2021, https://macdonaldlaurier.ca/improving-natos-cohesion-critical-combat-russia-chinas-threat/

A united NATO is critically important to projecting credible deterrence. The erosion of domestic trust and confidence in the Alliance among its member states, including Canada, represents a threat to this cohesion. A proposal to withdraw Canada from NATO was tabled at a recent policy conference for one of Canada’s three major political parties. The proposal was defeated, but it represents a fringe anti-NATO narrative within Canada’s illiberal left; if left unaddressed, such a narrative could grow.

2022 Georgetown Affirmative
AFF › Case › Advantage 1---Joint Operations

Streamlining the process through NATO itself is key. No other institution has the capacity.

Stanley-Lockman & Trabucco 22 --- *Defense and Strategic Studies, Nanyang Technological University. **Political Science, University of Copenhagen.

Zoe & Lena, “NATO’s Role in Responsible AI Governance in Military Affairs,” Oxford Handbook, https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780197579329.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780197579329-e-69

At the core, this chapter argues that NATO is well positioned to steward the development of military AI and institute governance mechanisms towards coalition inclusion of responsible AI while simultaneously maintaining incentives for comparative advantage. Using the three pillars—ethics and values, legal norms, and safety and security—as issue areas which present AI governance challenges, we show that NATO has space to emerge as a leader in AI governance and contribute to responsible adoption of EDTs in the international security environment. This builds on foundations that derive NATO’s responsibilities to govern AI according to its values, legal obligations, and institutional interests. These foundations from both STS and military innovation studies offer ways that the Alliance can activate its existing governance mechanisms to exert influence in new ways. Not only is this influence important for the Alliance to bolster its institutional relevance in an evolving international security architecture, but it also dovetails with its capacity to shore up military effectiveness and interoperability as Allies modernize their arsenals and associated concepts into the frontier of AI.

2022 Georgetown Affirmative
AFF › Case › Advantage 1---Joint Operations

That’s because every facet of modern warfare is being revolutionized by AI.

Carnegie 19, 11-28-2019, "Artificial Intelligence and the Future of Conflict," Carnegie Europe, https://carnegieeurope.eu/2019/11/28/artificial-intelligence-and-future-of-conflict-pub-80421

Modern warfare is based on unprecedented connectivity between and within three categories of the battlefield, which together build complex battle spaces. The first category is the physical domain, in which ballistic missiles, main battle tanks, aircraft, the weaponry of ground infantries, and other military hardware are used to degrade or destroy an adversary’s physical resources.

The second battlefield is the information technology space. Here, each side tries to gain superiority by improving the way information is shared, connecting space-based intelligence to weapons systems, or calculating the trajectory of an incoming ballistic missile. For example, a combatant may use electronic warfare to try to blind an adversary’s acquisition radars before an airstrike.

2022 Georgetown Affirmative
AFF › Case › Advantage 1---Joint Operations

Interoperable allied AI systems are critical to future military effectiveness.

Reeves 21 --- Lead Partner, Digital Defense.

Thomas, 2021, “Military interoperability in the intelligent age of warfare,” Deloitte, https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/global/Documents/Public-Sector/gx-gps-fowf-military-interoperability-in-the-intelligent-age.pdf

Interoperability has become the cornerstone of successful military operations and the critical element for future military effectiveness against threats ranging from grey zone disinformation campaigns, to defending the rules-based international order, and peer warfare. Future conflict success will require rapid pace, precise understanding, quick decisions, and coordinated effects to disrupt enemy activity. Interoperability between departments, agencies, allies, and domains will deliver critical outcomes to achieve campaign goals faster at strategic and operational levels.

2022 Georgetown Affirmative
AFF › Case › Advantage 1---Joint Operations

Lack of joint standards on AI undermines interoperability. That will collapse the ability of NATO to respond AND contain emerging threats.

Merwe 21 --- MA in International Relations and Global Conflict in the Modern Era, from Leiden University. She conducted her research in collaboration with the Land Warfare Centre of the Netherlands Ministry of Defense, focusing on Artificial Intelligence and the future of combat.

Joanna van der, 2-17-2021, "NATO Leadership on Ethical AI is Key to Future Interoperability," CEPA, https://cepa.org/nato-leadership-on-ethical-ai-is-key-to-future-interoperability/

In October 2020, Deputy Secretary General of NATO Mircea Geoană highlighted the benefits of establishing a “).” The Deputy Head of NATO’s Innovation Unit followed with a . The US Department of Defense (DoD) adopted  in 2020 and has  to operationalize these principles. Despite these statements and developments, more work is required to tackle the very real  will pose to future interoperability within NATO.

2022 Georgetown Disadvantage

2NC – Allied Mistrust

Either allies won’t integrate OCOs due to political, cultural, and legal constraints OR they’ll feel pressured to which causes premature, faulty system development.

Black & Lynch, 20 – Research Leader Defence, Security and Infrastructure RAND Europe J=(James Black & Alice Lynch; "Cyber Threats to NATO from a Multi-Domain Perspective"; RAND; https://ccdcoe.org/uploads/2020/12/7-Cyber_Threats_NATO_Multidomain_Perspective_ebook.pdf; 07-2020, Accessed 6-28-2022)//ILake-NoC

B. Policy Tensions