Free beta access. 50 free AI tokens each week. Optional top-ups available. See what is included
Open evidence library

Search the archive.

Current and older evidence is free during beta. Sign in for unlimited card access and full source downloads.

Matching cards
2022 Georgetown Counterplan
OSCE CP › OFF

That’s the only path to a sustainable European détente---failure causes escalating conflict in numerous hotspots

Olesya Vartanyan & David Lanz 22, Vartanyan is Crisis Group's Senior Analyst for the South Caucasus region; Lanz is Crisis Group’s Representative for Dialogue Promotion, trained mediator with fifteen years’ experience supporting international mediation processes and leading dialogue efforts, “Preserving the OSCE at a time of war,” ReliefWeb, 3/21/2022, https://reliefweb.int/report/world/preserving-osce-time-war

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine risks incapacitating one of the only remaining multilateral spaces for cooperation between Russia and the West, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). Participating states must work to prevent this outcome and preserve the OSCE’s critical role in containing conflicts.

Russia’s 24 February invasion of Ukraine has sent shock waves through the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), a body that has been instrumental in containing conflicts that erupted after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Russia’s actions in Ukraine are a glaring violation of the OSCE’s commitment to respecting sovereignty, territorial integrity and human rights, memorialised in its founding principles. They have poisoned the atmosphere at the organisation’s seat in Vienna – which hosts the 57 participating states, including Ukraine and Russia as well as all European Union (EU) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) members – and compromised its ability to take decisions on matters big and small.

2022 SDI Disadvantage
AFF AT: DA—DoD O/S › U O/W – Requirements

There is no part of the government not on board, it just takes a while

O’Mahony 18 Angela O’Mahony, associate dean for academic affairs at Pardee RAND Graduate School and a senior political scientist at RAND, former assistant professor of international political economy and economic statecraft at the University of British Columbia, PhD political science, UCSD; Ilana Blum, researcher at RAND; Gabriela Armenta, researcher at RAND; Nicholas Burger, senior economist at RAND and director of RAND’s Washington office; Joshua Mendelsohn, researcher at RAND; Michael J. McNerney, Acting Director, International Security and Defense Policy Center, and Senior International/Defense Researcher, at RAND, Affiliate Faculty at Pardee RAND Graduate School, MA international relations, University of Maryland; Steven W. Popper, researcher at RAND; Jefferson P. Marquis, Adjunct Political Scientist at RAND, PhD U.S. diplomatic and military history, Ohio State University, MA international security affairs, Columbia University; and Thomas S. Szayna, senior political scientist and former director of RAND's Defense and Political Sciences Department at RAND, MA international relations, Claremont Graduate School; “Assessing, Monitoring, and Evaluating Army Security Cooperation: A Framework for Implementation,” RR2165, RAND Corporation, 2018, /GoGreen!

As Part I of this study discussed, Army security cooperation activities have aligned fairly well with what previous analyses have found contribute to effectiveness in both security cooperation and international development assistance. However, across the U.S. government, requirements for more rigorous and systematic AM&E are growing. The Army, with the rest of DoD, must improve its ability to analyze and report the extent to which its security cooperation activities are meeting their objectives. As Part I makes clear, there is still much to be learned. As the United States increases the scope of security cooperation, in terms of both activity and partner types, planners will need to understand not only what has been effective in the past but also how to identify lessons from the broader range of partners the United States is engaging. Part II of this study focuses on helping the Army develop an AM&E implementation framework that will better link security cooperation activities to their outcomes.

AM&E Developments—and Requirements—Are Accelerating

2022 SDI Disadvantage
AFF AT: DA—DoD O/S › U O/W – Requirements

AM&E is structurally inevitable – legally required! – and stuff’s been optimized

Maginnis 21 Robert Maginnis, contractor with Sigmatech Inc. supporting DASA (DE&C) as a global strategist, retired U.S. Army officer who recently completed 18 years with HQDA G-3/5/7 working security cooperation policy and training, MS management science, Naval Postgraduate School, BS engineering, United States Military Academy at West Point, graduate of numerous Army schools including the Command and General Staff College and the Army War College’s Strategy Course; and Michael Prater, principal adviser to the DASA (DE&C) for global security assistance and armaments cooperation, BBA acquisition and contracts management, Strayer University; “Security Cooperation Refresh,” Army AL&T Magazine, 9-2-2021, /GoGreen!

Fortunately, those too often disjointed outcomes are now collapsing into a far more synergistic endeavor thanks to the National Defense Authorization Act of 2017, and in particular the codification of Title 10, Chapter 16, Security Cooperation.

Congress redefined nearly everything DOD does with a foreign partner as “security cooperation.” That definition includes not just exercises and information sharing—which is the traditional forte of operational forces—but the Army’s support of State Department-approved foreign military sales cases, direct commercial sales, the training provided to foreign partners at our schoolhouses and other programs as defined by Title 22 Security Assistance, a State Department authority executed by DOD.

2022 SDI Disadvantage
AFF AT: DA—DoD O/S › N/U – Deprioritized

AM&E is already deprioritized

Cole 21 Emily Cole, program officer for governance, justice and security in the Applied Conflict Transformation Center at the U.S. Institute of Peace, MALD Fletcher School at Tufts University, BA Amherst College; and Dr. Calin Trenkov-Wermuth, security governance advisor at USIP, formerly worked at the U.N. Office of Counter-Terrorism, served in the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, PhD, MA international relations, University of Cambridge, BA world politics Hamilton College; “To Consolidate Democracy, Change U.S. Security Assistance,” U.S. Institute of Peace, 12-16-2021, /GoGreen!

2. Enforce assessment, monitoring and evaluation requirements. The 2017 National Defense Authorization Act required better assessment, monitoring and evaluation of security sector assistance. U.S. government officials admit that this is not happening yet, and big strides need to be taken to implement and learn from security assistance monitoring and evaluation. This is one way to ensure programming is effective and that it helps broader strategic objectives, including the consolidation of democracy.

2022 SDI Disadvantage
AFF AT: DA—DoD O/S › N/L – Compartmentalized

AM&E is compartmentalized

Walther-Puri 21 Andrea Walther-Puri, PhD candidate, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, research focuses on the effects of U.S. military counterterrorism programs on longer-term security governance transformation in the Sahel, “Afghanistan: A Tragic Lesson of the US Military’s Flawed Approach to Capacity Building,” Just Security, 9-6-2021, /GoGreen!

The FY2017 NDAA also included a crucial development: the creation of an in-house AM&E workforce at DOD. The Defense Security Cooperation University was founded in September 2019, to uphold a common knowledge base across the workforce, mandate common professional standards through a required multi-tier certificate program, and prioritize continued intellectual development. To further bolster this in-house AM&E workforce and minimize dependence on third-party contractors, the NDAA mandated the establishment of teams dedicated to AM&E within the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Security Cooperation, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, and within each Geographic Combatant Command.

2022 SDI Disadvantage
AFF AT: DA—DoD O/S › N/L – Plan Cheap

Plan is cheap

Kelly 10 Terrence K. Kelly, principal mathematician at the RAND Corporation, former director of the RAND Homeland Security Research Division, formerly served for 20 years as a commissioned officer in the U.S. Army, positions included senior national security officer in the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy, PhD mathematics, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute; Jefferson P. Marquis, Adjunct Political Scientist at RAND, PhD U.S. diplomatic and military history, Ohio State University, MA international security affairs, Columbia University; Cathryn Quantic Thurston, Political Scientist at RAND, PhD Conflict Analysis and Resolution, George Mason University; Jennifer D. P. Moroney, senior political scientist at RAND, PhD international relations, University of Kent at Canterbury; and Charlotte Lynch, researcher at RAND; “Security Cooperation Organizations in the Country Team Options for Success,” RAND Corporation, 2010, /GoGreen!

The U.S. military must plan for a wide range of security cooperation1 missions, ranging from “normal” peacetime security cooperation activities—such as building the long-term institutional and operational capabilities and capacity of key partners and allies, establishing and deepening relationships between the U.S. and partner militaries, and securing access to critical areas overseas—to managing quasi-operational efforts, such as managing foreign internal defense within the overall foreign policy objectives of the United States. Security cooperation, in the form of noncombat military-to-military activities, is a useful part of the military’s toolkit in conflict prevention.2 Although security cooperation requires a relatively small investment with respect to the overall efforts of the U.S. military, it can be a key enabler of the success of future U.S. military missions by shaping the environment and laying the groundwork for future coalition and stability operations with allies and partners.3

2022 SDI Disadvantage
AFF AT: DA—DoD O/S › N/L – Budget Space

DoD’s programming is flexible – has the budgetary space to accommodate the plan

Bergmann 21 Max Bergmann, senior fellow at the Center for American Progress, focuses on European security and U.S.-Russia policy, formerly served in the U.S. Department of State as senior adviser to the assistant secretary of state for political-military affairs and special assistant to the undersecretary for arms control and international security, MA comparative politics, London School of Economics; and Alexandra Schmitt, senior policy analyst on the National Security and International Policy team at the Center for American Progress, MPP Harvard Kennedy School; “A Plan To Reform U.S. Security Assistance,” Center For American Progress, 3-9-2021, /GoGreen!

DOD officials can work around the State Department’s diplomats. In part due to restrictions from the Budget Control Act and with new programs at the DOD, Pentagon officials had more flexibility on security assistance programs than their State Department counterparts. The DOD had budgetary space to reallocate significant funds from the substantial Pentagon budget to respond to sudden emergencies or new crises, something that is virtually impossible for the State Department, making the DOD often the lead actor in a crisis.44 Regional combatant commands aggressively sought more resources from Congress to conduct their own security assistance programs, giving them added flexibility to work with partners in the field that their State Department counterparts lacked.45 A Government Accountability Office report found that 56 DOD security assistance programs do not require any involvement from the State Department.46

2022 SDI Disadvantage
AFF AT: DA—DoD O/S › N/L – No Tradeoff XT

There’s no trade-off between AM&E and SC programs

Shea 5 Colonel Timothy C. Shea, US Army, associate director of the Senior Executive Seminar for the College of International and Security Studies at the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, “Transforming Military Diplomacy,” Joint Forces Quarterly, iss.38, 2005, /GoGreen! *added [eclipse]

The defense attaché system structure, mission, and manning have not evolved with the changes of the last decade that require increased levels of involvement in operational activity. The primary attaché function of observing and reporting is often considered to be in direct conflict with time and energy spent on other nonintelligence activities. Intelligence and military-diplomatic activity are not zero-sum competing requirements. Narrow specialization by other DOD elements has undermined the overall effectiveness of the military attaché by reducing access to the host nation military. DOD representation abroad should be the military attaché. Security assistance and arms control would be better managed by trained attachés with the requisite language skills, cultural knowledge, and regional expertise. This approach would eliminate parochialism, reduce overhead, streamline operations, and simplify bilateral coordination for the host nation military.

Transformation of the military attaché corps begins at the higher headquarters. The nature and function of a headquarters influence the priorities of its subordinate elements. By eliminating stovepipe organizations inside the U.S. Embassy in a consolidated DAO, the combatant command headquarters will need to establish a Politico-Military Directorate to manage, deconflict, and synchronize the activities of military attachés. This transformed organization will integrate national requirements for observing and reporting, supporting operational and exercise taskings, security assistance, and strategy and policy. More coherent policy and guidance will enable the military attachés to apply the informational instrument of national power more effectively. Making the director of this new organization within each combatant command a general/flag officer with attaché experience will brighten the promotion prospects for attaché duty and attract higher quality officers.

2022 SDI Disadvantage
AFF AT: DA—DoD O/S › N/L – No Tradeoff + Thumpers

NO link uniqueness NOR internal link – there will always be a higher-priority SC crisis – Ukraine and Taiwan thump – AND black swans are inevitable – BUT DoD planners can walk and chew gum

Sprenger 22 Sebastian Sprenger, Europe editor and former managing editor for Defense News; Joe Gould, senior Pentagon reporter for Defense News; “US military readies to ‘walk and chew gum’ as multiple crises loom,” Defense News, 1-28-2022, /GoGreen!

As roughly 100,000 Russian troops amass around Ukraine, a series of emerging crises around the world — the Middle East, China, North Korea — are demanding the full attention of NATO, and particularly its most powerful member, the United States.

Now, there’s a growing sense among national security experts that the crisis in Ukraine is just one of many conflicts on the precipice, putting pressure on the alliance and its member countries to address this threat and at the same time brace for the next one.

2022 SDI Disadvantage
AFF AT: DA—DoD O/S › Thumper – Taiwan

Taiwan thumps – it’s being prioritized

Nakamura 6-13-22 Ryo Nakamura, Nikkei staff writer, “U.S., Taiwan set to hold strategic dialogue this month: sources,” Nikkei Asia, 6-13-2022, /GoGreen!

The U.S. and Taiwan are in the final stages of preparation for a strategic bilateral dialogue between security officials, three people with knowledge of the matter told Nikkei.

The dialogue, scheduled to take place by the end of this month in the U.S., is expected to focus on specific measures for weapons provision and military drills.

2022 SDI Disadvantage
AFF AT: DA—DoD O/S › Thumper – Ukraine

Ukraine will remain a more urgent priority

DoS 6-1-22 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, “U.S. Security Cooperation with Ukraine,” Fact Sheet, 6-1-2022, /GoGreen!

The United States, our allies, and our partners worldwide are united in support of Ukraine in response to Russia’s premeditated, unprovoked, and unjustified war against Ukraine. We have not forgotten Russia’s earlier aggression in eastern Ukraine and occupation following its unlawful seizure of Crimea in 2014. The United States reaffirms its unwavering support for Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity within its internationally recognized borders, extending to its territorial waters.

Ukraine is a key regional strategic partner that has undertaken significant efforts to modernize its military and increase its interoperability with NATO. It remains an urgent security assistance priority to provide Ukraine the equipment it needs to defend itself against Russia’s war against Ukraine.

2022 SDI Disadvantage
AFF AT: DA—DoD O/S › Thumper – Ukraine

Ukraine thumps – and more unexpected arms increases are coming

Ryan 6-14-22 Missy Ryan, reports on diplomacy, national security and the State Department for The Washington Post; and Emily Rauhala, Brussels bureau chief for The Washington Post, covering the European Union and NATO; “Ukraine battle intensifies as Western backers mull new military aid,” The Washington Post, 6-14-2022, /GoGreen!

Russia intensified its assault on a strategic Ukrainian city on Tuesday as NATO officials prepared to debate increased military support for Kyiv’s attempt to reverse Russian momentum in the country’s east.

Officials in the eastern city of Severodonetsk said that Ukrainian forces were mounting a pitched defense of an area that is now a central focus of Russian firepower. Mayor Oleksandr Stryuk described “constant fighting” for Severodonetsk, which has become increasingly isolated following the destruction of bridges leading out of the city. He said Russian troops so far have been unable to complete their control of the area.

2022 SDI Disadvantage
AFF AT: DA—DoD O/S › AT: AM&E I/L

Even if it works, results won’t be used effectively

Lahaye 20 Estelle Lahaye, Senior Financial Sector Specialist at CGAP, former account manager in Luxembourg at Banco Itaú Europa, MS Business, San Francisco State University, BS banking, finance, and insurance, University of Nancy 2 in France; and Alice Nègre, Senior Financial Sector Specialist at CGAP, graduated from ESCP, Paris; “How Can Funders Avoid Chasing Data as the Latest Shiny Object?” CGAP Blog, 12-8-2020, /GoGreen!

We don’t need to preach to the choir: given the plethora of data-related projects that donors and development finance institutions (DFIs) have supported in the past, they clearly know that data is a powerful tool for advancing financial inclusion. And there is a lot to be excited about, given how digital technologies are accelerating the speed, depth and breadth of available data.

We share this excitement. In fact, data is at the heart of CGAP’s work. In recent years, we have talked about data-based segmentation to better serve customers, data sharing to enable innovation, data protection and how data capabilities need to be revamped to implement risk-based supervision.

2022 SDI Disadvantage
AFF AT: DA—DoD O/S › AT: AM&E I/L

Empirics disprove – AM&E itself is waste

Görgens 5 Marelize Görgens, World Bank, HIV/AIDS Monitoring and Evaluation consultant, “Monitoring and Evaluation Systems for HIV/AIDS: chasing data or challenging paradigms?” November 2005, /GoGreen!

Within the international development arena, the past few years has witnessed a move towards measured, progress-focused development, as illustrated by the birth of terms such as “effective aid ” and “managing for development results ” at various international forums. For example, at a global meeting of development partners in 2004, , the discussions centred on how to strengthen an international partnership around the concept of ’managing for development results’. This upped the stakes for monitoring and evaluation (M&E), in the sense that the Joint Memorandum, which was issued by all these global partners at the end of their meeting, focused not only on M&E processes itself, but also on using results for improvement and decision-making.

“[We will] rely on – and strengthen – countries’ monitoring and evaluation systems to track progress and assess outcomes. As agencies with regional or global reach, we pledge to better distill the lessons of countries’ experiences and disseminate knowledge about what gets results in different country contexts.”

2022 SDI Disadvantage
AFF AT: DA—DoD O/S › AT: AM&E I/L

The impact’s absurd – no part of SC relationships are truly wasted and trying to mini-max them is as likely to harm as help – BUT the difference is so marginal it can’t affect the balance of power anyway

Reynolds 21 Dr. Phil W. Reynolds, visiting scholar at the Center for Futures Studies at the University of Hawaii, “Building Partner Capacity Is Great Power Competition: The Future of 333 Funds,” Small Wars Journal, 2-6-2021, /GoGreen!

Can the U.S. Department of Defense do two things at once: Operate in the gray zone and excel in great power competition? Not according to Tommy Ross and Stephen Tankel who argue that security assistance “is focused on the wrong countries and being used to build the wrong capabilities.” Their idea is that competition with China and Russia - great power competition (GPC) - is the priority and all instruments of national power must be bent to that end, at the expense of all other needs. Ross and Tankel conclude that the “United States is no longer well-positioned to use security sector assistance to “compete with China and Russia — especially in ‘gray zone’ activities short of war.” Ross is a former assistant Secretary of Defense for Security Cooperation and should know better.

Changes in administrations are an opportunity to reflect on what works and what doesn’t, but in this case, changes in the name of so-called reform could cause real harm. They suggest, in part, converting what are known as building partner capacity (BPC) funds into general-purpose security assistance funds so they may explicitly be used for Great Power Competition — that is, to block China and Russia. That is a fine goal, but there are greater and more effective tools already in use. Security assistance writ large, about $19 billion dollars in 2019, and the deterrent effect of the U.S. armed forces being forward stationed and deployed around the world. Besides, Congress created specific categories of activities in for BPC which lie in the gray zone like counter terrorism operations, countering illicit drug trafficking, countering organized crime, supporting intelligence operations and supporting multi-national operations- like AMISOM in Somalia and the G5 Sahel. These funds are critical in providing equipment and training support against various insurgent, transnational terrorists and smuggling threats in twenty-one countries. Moving those funds from these conflicts to support great-power competition would result in the abandonment of those partners who are now decisively engaged on the United States’ behalf. There is real danger to a U.S. withdrawal of support to these fragile partners.

2022 SDI Disadvantage
AFF AT: DA—DoD O/S › AT: Terror !

No motive, no opportunity

--CBRN = chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear weapons

Koblentz 20 Dr. Gregory D. Koblentz, Associate Professor and Director of the Biodefense Graduate Program at George Mason University's Schar School of Policy and Government; “Emerging Technologies and the Future of CBRN Terrorism;” The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 43, 06-16-2020, Issue 2, Accessed through T&F, /GoGreen!

Cautions and Caveats

2022 SDI Disadvantage
AFF AT: DA—DoD O/S › AT: Terror !

No nuclear terror and no impact

John Mueller & Mark G. Stewart 21, Mueller is Woody Hayes Senior Research Scientist, Mershon Center for International Security Studies, and adjunct professor of Political Science, at Ohio State University, also a Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute in Washington; Stewart is Professor of Civil Engineering and Director of the Centre for Infrastructure Performance and Reliability at The University of Newcastle in Australia, “Terrorism and Bathtubs: Comparing and Assessing the Risks,” Terrorism and Political Violence, vol. 33, no. 1, 01/02/2021, pp. 138–163

The likelihood that anyone outside a war zone will be killed by an Islamist extremist terrorist is extremely small. In the United States, for example, some six people have perished each year since 9/11 at the hands of such terrorists—for an annual fatality rate of about one in 50 million for the period.

This might be taken to suggest, as one writer has characterized it, that “terrorism is such a minor threat to American life and limb that it’s simply bizarre—just stupefyingly irrational and intellectually unserious—to suppose that it could even begin to justify the abolition of privacy rights as they have been traditionally understood in favour of the installation of a panoptic surveillance state.” 1 And terrorism specialist Marc Sageman characterizes the threat terrorists present in the United States as “rather negligible.” 2 The vast majority of what is commonly tallied as terrorism has occurred in war zones, and this is especially true for fatalities.3 But even this has been exaggerated by conflating terrorism with war: civil war violence that would previously have been seen to be acts of insurgency are now often labeled terrorism.4

2022 SDI Disadvantage
AFF AT: DA—DoD O/S › AT: Demo ! – DPT

No impact to democracy – confounding variables control

Doorenspleet ’19 [Renske; 2019; Political Science and International Studies Professor at Warwick University; Rethinking the Value of Democracy: A Comparative Perspective, “Democracy and Interstate War,” Ch. 3]

This finding or ‘law’ has not only been recognized by scholars of international relations, but also found its way outside academia and has influenced foreign policies to promote peace and democracy, most prominently since the 1990s. However, my book will not draw conclusions based on ‘cherry-picking’ of specific studies showing how peaceful democracies are, but on a systematic overview of studies in this field. Therefore, this book relies on my own database with hundreds of different studies, which are relevant for each chapter; the articles had to engage directly with the chapter’s main research question. The next section will provide more detailed information around the selection criteria. This overview includes both highly cited and recent articles which were selected in a systematic way.

Based on analyses of statistical studies around this topic of democracy and war, it will become clear that the overall statistical support for the democratic peace hypothesis is not strong at all. In the rest of the chapter, I will spell out four reasons why democracy does not cause peace, and why the empirical support for the popular idea of democratic peace is quite weak: (1) most studies do not find a strong correlation between democracy and interstate war at the dyadic level, and they show that there are other—more powerful—explanations for war and peace, or even that the impact of democracy is a spurious one, (2) the theoretical foundation of the democratic peace hypothesis is weak, and the causal mechanisms are unclear, (3) democracies are not necessarily more peaceful in general, and the evidence for the democratic peace hypothesis at the monadic level is inconclusive, and (4) the process of democratization is dangerous and living in a democratizing country means living in a less peaceful country.

2022 SDI Disadvantage
AFF AT: DA—DoD O/S › AT: Demo I/L

US backsliding thumps

Miller 21 Aaron David Miller, Global Fellow at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, former Senior Advisor for Arab-Israeli Negotiations at the State Department, PhD American Diplomatic and Middle East History, University of Michigan; and Richard Sokolsky, nonresident senior fellow in Carnegie’s Russia and Eurasia Program, former director of the offices of Strategic Policy and Negotiations, Policy Analysis, and Defense Relations and Security Assistance in the State Department’s Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, MA Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies; “Biden is right that global democracy is at risk. But the threat isn’t China,” The Washington Post, 12-3-2021, /GoGreen!

There’s also the politically inconvenient question of whether the United States is best positioned to lead this effort. Rarely has America’s democracy crusade abroad contrasted more with its commitment to democratic practices at home — where the threats include Trump’s false claims that the presidential election was “stolen,” an insurrection to stop a democratic transition and efforts to restrict voting rights. America has a glass-house problem, and it needs to promote its democratic virtues with considerable humility. According to Freedom House’s annual country-by-country assessment of political and civil rights, the United States continued to experience erosion in democratic practices in 2020;over the past decade, America’s score dropped from 94 to 83 out of 100, among the steepest falls of any country during this period.

It is hard to take seriously the notion that the United States can restore its “soft power” by virtue of the example it is setting at home. A recent Pew Research Center study found that a median of only 17 percent of people in surveyed countries thought U.S. democracy worth emulating, while 23 percent said it had never offered a good example. It is also hard to quibble with the proposition that America’s influence abroad is waning primarily because of its domestic problems, rather than authoritarian muscle-flexing in Moscow or Beijing.

2022 SDI Disadvantage
AFF AT: DA—DoD O/S › AT: Demo I/L

SC can’t solve democracy

Miller 21 Aaron David Miller, Global Fellow at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, former Senior Advisor for Arab-Israeli Negotiations at the State Department, PhD American Diplomatic and Middle East History, University of Michigan; and Richard Sokolsky, nonresident senior fellow in Carnegie’s Russia and Eurasia Program, former director of the offices of Strategic Policy and Negotiations, Policy Analysis, and Defense Relations and Security Assistance in the State Department’s Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, MA Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies; “Biden is right that global democracy is at risk. But the threat isn’t China,” The Washington Post, 12-3-2021, /GoGreen!

There are many good reasons to host such a gathering. It’s smart politics, fulfills a campaign commitment and counters the perception, fostered by President Donald Trump, that America is no longer interested in promoting democracy and human rights. But as a geopolitical instrument, drawing lines between democracies and autocracies is not only certain to disappoint — it’s also a deeply flawed organizing principle for America’s approach to the world.

China and Russia, which Biden has also singled out for criticism, are not the main causes of the weakening of democracies around the world. Most of the backsliding, according to a recent study, has been caused by erosion within the world’s democracies, including the United States and many of its allies. Indeed, the upcoming summit includes a number of countries — India, Brazil, the Philippines and Poland among them — marked by growing autocratic movements and infringements on freedom of expression and a free press. And pushing these and other countries to reform their political, electoral or judicial institutions from the outside is hard if not impossible.