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2022 SDI Disadvantage
AFF › 1AR › 1AR: China Answers

China does not have the capabilities launch a full-scale war against Taiwan – not enough ships, geography prevents, and Taiwan’s infrastructure not sufficient for full-scale attack.

Ullman, 2/18 - Senior Advisor at the Atlantic Council

[Dr. Harlan Ullman, Senior Advisor at the Atlantic Council, February 18, 2022, “Reality Check #10: China will not invade Taiwan,” , accessed 4-2-2022]

Despite Beijing’s longstanding desire to invade and conquer Taiwan and achieve “one China,” China simply lacks the military capability and capacity to launch a full-scale amphibious invasion of Taiwan for the foreseeable future. With a potential defending force of 450,000 Taiwanese today, using the traditional three-to-one ratio of attackers to defenders taught at war colleges, to undertake an invasion, China would need over 1.2 million soldiers (out of a total active force of over 2 million) that would have to be transported in many thousands of ships. Although Beijing is unlikely to launch a full-scale invasion of Taiwan, given China’s strength, autocratic government, and ambitions, the United States cannot totally ignore the risk of such an attack. At the same time, however, Washington should develop an overall strategy designed to deter the most likely scenarios—such as imposing economic and financial embargoes on Taiwan, imposing a maritime blockade of the island, or attempting a regime change from within—or prevail militarily if deterrence fails. China does have many other options for pressuring Taiwan. What’s the issue? The Trump administration’s National Defense Strategy (NDS) was substantially predicated on preventing two faits accomplis: a Russian invasion of the Baltics and a Chinese amphibious assault on Taiwan. To what degree these scenarios will survive the Biden administration’s soon-to- be-released strategic review remains to be seen. The most likely outcome is that “integrated deterrence,” Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin’s term—for now more a slogan than a strategic concept that attempts a more “wholistic” all-of-government effort—will become prominent, as will a greater focus on the “deter” element rather than on “defeat” as was the last NDS. Defining what defeat means and how it would be achieved remains elusive. Some observers believe that how the United States handles the Ukraine crisis will be closely watched by China. That is true. But, as this paper argues, the Ukraine crisis will not influence Chinese decisions on whether or not to launch a full-scale amphibious invasion because, given the force demands, China simply lacks the capacity to do so for the foreseeable future. The current and former heads of Indo-Pacific Command have warned about China’s building the necessary forces to invade and conquer Taiwan, possibly by decade’s end. Given China’s long-standing determination to make Taiwan part of the mainland and achieve “one China,” a military takeover of Taiwan sounds plausible. However, this notion is based on a fundamental misperception regarding China’s capability to launch a major amphibious assault. If China were to launch such a military attack on Taiwan, what would that take in terms of forces and force levels? Does China possess the requisite numbers and capabilities? If not, when, if at all, might it build those forces that, if history counts, would number in the hundreds of thousands of troops and thousands of ships and maritime assault vehicles? Current and past studies do not successfully or specifically address these questions. These studies focus on the how, but not on the specific manpower requirements of what would be required to carry out an invasion. The definitive document on what size force would be required to seize Taiwan in a full-out landing was drafted by the US military in the late stages of World War II in the Pacific. In 1944, Operation Causeway was the US plan for retaking Formosa, as it was then called, from 30,000 starving Japanese soldiers. The planned invasion force was double the size of Operation Overlord, the Normandy landing: 400,000 soldiers and marines deployed on 4,000 ships. With a potential defending force of 450,000 Taiwanese today, using the traditional three-to-one ratio of attackers to defenders taught at war colleges, China would need to deploy over 1.2 million soldiers (out of a total active force of over 2 million). Many thousands of ships would be required to land all those forces, and doing so would take weeks. How many occupation forces would be required to pacify the Taiwanese? Surely the lessons of Afghanistan and Iraq are not lost on the PLA leadership. China possesses a small fraction of the necessary ships to execute a landing of that size and lacks the capacity to do so for the foreseeable future. Nor are there any current plans suggesting China is intent on procuring such a force, though that could change. Further, Taiwan is not conducive to any form of amphibious assault. A handful of landing sites on the west coast are blocked by proximate mountainous areas running the length of the 250-mile-long island, some approaching 10,000 feet in height. Defenders could fall back using this difficult terrain to wage a guerrilla war. Moreover, Taiwan lacks the infrastructure to support over a million invaders and their logistical needs, most of which would have to come from the mainland. Fixating on an unlikely scenario, no matter how compelling it sounds, skews US resources and force levels.

2022 SDI Disadvantage
AFF › 1AR › 1AR: Accession Thumper

Turkey won’t change their mind

Hacaoglu, 22 – Bloomberg News

[Selcan Hacaoglu, and Natalia Drozdiak, "Turkey Says Position on NATO Won’t Change in Blow to June Summit," Bloomberg, 6-15-2022, https://www.yahoo.com/video/turkey-says-position-nato-won-134859990.html, accessed 6-19-2022]

Turkey Says Position on NATO Won’t Change in Blow to June Summit

2022 SDI Disadvantage
AFF › 1AR › 1AR: Accession Thumper

Turkey collapsing NATO unity

Erlanger, 22 -- NY Times chief diplomatic correspondent in Europe

[Steven Erlanger and Matina Stevis-Gridneff, "Strongmen in Turkey and Hungary Stall Unity in NATO and the E.U.," NY Times, 5-18-2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/05/18/world/europe/sweden-finland-nato-turkey-oil.html, accessed 6-19-2022]

Strongmen in Turkey and Hungary Stall Unity in NATO and the E.U.

2022 SDI Disadvantage
AFF › 1AR › 1AR: Accession Thumper

Turkey is disrupting NATO unity

Crowley, 22 -- NY Times Washington Bureau diplomatic correspondent

[Michael Crowley and Steven Erlanger, "For NATO, Turkey Is a Disruptive Ally," NY Times, 5-30-2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/05/30/us/politics/turkey-nato-russia.html, accessed 6-19-2022]

For NATO, Turkey Is a Disruptive Ally

2022 SDI Disadvantage
AFF › 1AR › 1AR: No NATO Unity

NATO unity crumbling

Murray, 22 – The Telegraph

[Douglas Murray, "Nato’s united front is crumbling now that Putin has been humiliated in Ukraine," Telegraph, 5-23-2022, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/opinion/2022/05/23/natos-united-front-crumbling-now-putin-has-humiliated-ukraine/, accessed 6-19-2022]

Nato’s united front is crumbling now that Putin has been humiliated in Ukraine

2022 SDI Disadvantage
AFF › 1AR › 1AR: No NATO Unity

Domestic backlash ensures fraying unity the longer the war goes on

Ellyatt, 22 -- CNBC international correspondent in London

[Holly Ellyatt, “The West’s unity over Ukraine could be starting to crack, just as Russia’s invasion gains ground,” CNBC, 6-16-2022, https://www.cnbc.com/2022/06/16/us-europe-unity-over-ukraine-is-starting-to-crack-amid-russia-onslaught.html, accessed 6-19-2022]

The West’s unity over Ukraine could be starting to crack, just as Russia’s invasion gains ground

2022 SDI Disadvantage
AFF › 1AR › 1AR: No NATO Unity

Post-Ukraine unity is collapsing

Ramesh, 22 -- News9 Staff

[KV, "European unity starts fraying as Ukraine War stretches past 90 days," NewsNine, 5-27-2022, https://www.news9live.com/opinion-blogs/european-unity-starts-fraying-as-ukraine-war-stretches-past-90-days-172746, accessed 6-19-2022]

European unity starts fraying as Ukraine War stretches past 90 days

2022 SDI Disadvantage
AFF › 1AR › 1AR: ET Thumper

Emerging tech co-op high now

Harper, 22 -- Managing Editor of DefenseScoop

[Jon Harper, "Emerging tech to have prominent role in NATO's new strategic concept," FedScoop, 6-1-2022, https://www.fedscoop.com/emerging-tech-to-have-prominent-role-in-natos-new-strategic-concept%EF%BF%BC/, accessed 6-4-2022]

Emerging tech to have prominent role in NATO’s new strategic concept

2022 SDI Disadvantage
AFF › 2AC › 2AC: No Taiwan War

No China-Taiwan war

Scobell and Stevenson-Yang, 3-4

[BY: Andrew Scobell, Ph.D.; Lucy Stevenson-Yang, United States Institute of Peace, March 4, 2022, “China Is Not Russia. Taiwan Is Not Ukraine.” , accessed 4-2-2022]

China Is Not Russia Russia under Putin has repeatedly dispatched its armed forces for combat missions overseas to a range of countries, including Georgia, Syria and Ukraine, as well as conducted major military interventions against other states, most recently Kazakhstan (albeit at the invitation of that country’s president). Moscow has also actively supported armed groups and militias in some of these same countries and others. Although China has also been active and assertive in the use of its armed forces beyond its borders in recent years, Beijing has eschewed large-scale combat operations. Around its periphery, China has engaged in provocations, confrontations and even violent clashes. But China, unlike Russia, has refrained from massive interventions, invasions or occupations of other countries since it invaded Vietnam in 1979. China’s largest deployments of troops overseas in the post-Cold War era have been on U.N. Peacekeeping missions. Whereas Russia has more than 20 military installations beyond its borders, to date, China has only one official military base on foreign soil — in Djibouti (established in 2017) — and a handful of other facilities it does not formally acknowledge. Of course, Beijing has a history of using its potent armed forces and muscular coercive apparatus within China’s borders to repress vigorously peaceful protesters, political dissidents and disaffected ethnic minority peoples. The locations of these operations include Beijing, Tibet and Xinjiang, as well as Hong Kong. China has also not hesitated to employ armed force and a wide array of coercive instruments around its periphery. This includes building roads and bunkers in remote frontier areas of the high Himalayas along its contested border with India and constructing artificial islands and military installations in disputed waters of the South China Sea. In recent years, China’s armed forces have also engaged in deadly clashes and violent confrontations with Indian army units along the disputed Line of Actual Control and harassed and rammed the fishing boats and coast guard vessels of Vietnam, the Philippines and other countries. Putin appears to relish projecting the image of a strongman who is routinely willing to thumb his nose at the rest of the world. By contrast, Xi — at least to date — has mainly sought to cultivate a statesmanlike image on the global stage. At times he has given speeches attempting to cast China as a more responsible, less meddlesome and values-free version of the United States. And Xi has invested a lot of time and resources in promoting a set of high-profile international efforts intended to demonstrate that China is a constructive and proactive great power. Employing positive rhetoric touting “win-win” solutions and aspirations to build a “community with a shared future for mankind,” China under Xi’s leadership has launched ambitious efforts such as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. Putin, by contrast, has made no real effort to offer an alternative to U.S. global leadership beyond delivering vague grandiose declarations (often in tandem with Xi) and has offered the world little in the way of economic stimulus beyond the prospect of more energy exports and hype about the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). Despite consisting of only a handful of Soviet successor states, the EAEU is touted as Russia’s answer to China’s BRI. In terms of geostrategic activism, Russia’s major multilateralist initiatives have tended to involve China. These include the establishment of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in 2001 and the formation of the BRICS grouping in 2010. The former is a security community with a Central Asian focus consisting of Russia, China and four Central and two South Asian states. The latter is a loose association of some of the world’s largest “emerging economies”: Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. However, Moscow’s most significant geostrategic maneuver under Putin has been to strengthen Russia’s strategic partnership with China. Both Beijing and Moscow insist that their relationship is not an alliance and their 2001 treaty of friendship — which was renewed in 2021 — does not commit either signatory to come to the defense of the other in case of military conflict. Yet, the Sino-Russian relationship is a clearly consequential alignment that has grown closer in recent years, particularly as their respective relationships with the United States have deteriorated. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has put China in a very uncomfortable position: Beijing does not want to antagonize Moscow but neither does it want to damage its relations with Washington and European capitals. Consequently, China has equivocated in its statements and actions. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi has called for peace but has stopped short of condemning Russia or calling upon Moscow to withdraw its military. The lengthy joint statement of February 4, 2022, issued by Putin and Xi during the Russian leader’s visit to Beijing on the eve of the Winter Olympics, makes no mention at all of Ukraine — and China has pointedly abstained on all U.N. Security Council resolutions related to Russia’s invasion. Xi appears to have asked Putin to delay any military action against Ukraine until after the Olympics. Russia’s invasion poses other difficulties for China both in terms of running counter to Beijing’s long espoused principles in foreign affairs and its adverse impact on China’s national interests in Ukraine. Russia’s actions clearly contradict China’s cornerstone foreign policy principles of noninterference in other countries’ affairs and respecting territorial integrity. Moreover, China has sizable economic investments in Ukraine and is a good customer of Ukraine’s armaments industry. In 2020, Ukraine signed the BRI cooperation agreement, which further bolstered the economic relationship between the two countries and marked Ukraine as an important partner in Beijing’s signature foreign policy and economic initiative. Taiwan Is Not Ukraine The fact that Ukraine is not a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was almost certainly a decisive factor in Putin’s calculus to invade Ukraine. Russia’s commander in chief knew that his invading forces would likely not have to contend with the militaries of any other countries. And if there were any lingering doubts in the Kremlin about the disposition of the most powerful member of NATO, U.S. President Joe Biden stated publicly that the United States would not send military forces to help defend Ukraine. Nevertheless, the Biden administration has taken strong steps to reinforce NATO allies in Eastern Europe and provide robust military assistance to Ukraine. By contrast, Xi and his Politburo colleagues have long been convinced that Taiwan has the resolute support of the world’s most capable military. The People’s Liberation Army — as all branches of China’s armed forces are known — continues to assume that if it launches an invasion of Taiwan, the U.S. military will swiftly and decisively intervene. The U.S.-Taiwan relationship, while technically “unofficial” due to the One China policy, has strengthened in recent years. On February 28, the Biden administration sent an unofficial delegation of former U.S. defense and national security officials to Taiwan as a signal to China of that commitment. It remains true that the greatest deterrence to a massive Chinese military attack on the island is Beijing’s assumption that war with Taiwan also means a war with the United States. However, there is no formal military alliance between the United States and Taiwan. The defense pact binding Washington to Taipei was formally abrogated in 1979. So why is Beijing convinced that Washington has an ironclad alliance-like relationship with Taiwan? There are at least two reasons. First, successive U.S. administrations have publicly committed themselves to support Taiwan against Chinese aggression and have regularly sold arms to the island’s armed forces. Second, although there is no language in the1979 Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) that explicitly commits the United States to come to Taiwan’s defense in the event of an attack on the island by China, many in Washington believe that such a commitment exists. While there are different interpretations as to what the TRA means, the most significant fact is that the vast majority of U.S. political and military leaders are fully convinced that this legislation binds the United States to a de facto alliance with Taiwan. China’s increased military assertiveness and greater level of armed provocations in the Taiwan Strait and elsewhere around China’s periphery in recent years have only served to strengthen the conviction in Washington that the island is a staunch democratic partner worthy of U.S. support as it tries to defend tiny Taiwan against efforts by Beijing to coerce the island into unwanted unification with China. However, Taiwan, unlike Ukraine, is not a member of the United Nation. While Ukraine has ambassador-level diplomatic relations with more than 180 countries, including China and the United States, Taiwan only has full diplomatic ties with approximately a dozen countries and none of these are major powers. Yet, thanks to the TRA, Taipei enjoys robust quasi-diplomatic relations with Washington, and thanks to Taiwan’s pragmatic ingenuity, the island possesses a vibrant worldwide network of de facto diplomatic missions. Although Ukraine’s diplomatic standing is far superior to Taiwan’s, the European country’s military alliance status is less impressive — Ukraine is not a member of NATO, although it is a very active member of NATO’s Partnership for Peace initiative. While Taiwan also has no formal military allies, the island has several close and consequential security partners, most notably the United States. China Is China and Taiwan Is Taiwan Taiwan continues to be the most contentious issue in U.S.-China relations. Moreover, the Taiwan Strait is routinely identified as the most plausible location of a military confrontation between the United States and China. For Xi and his Politburo colleagues, Taiwan looms large and is prominently identified as a “core” national interest of China’s, with Xi reiterating in 2021 that “resolving the Taiwan question and realizing China’s complete reunification is a historic mission and an unshakable commitment of the Communist Party of China” and that “no one should underestimate the resolve, the will, and the ability of the Chinese people to defend their national sovereignty and territorial integrity.” Moreover, most Chinese citizens consider Taiwan to be Chinese territory and view the island as something worth fighting for. Indeed, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has staked its political legitimacy on the ultimate goal of unifying Taiwan with China and in the meantime is working resolutely to prevent the island from becoming de jureindependent. Beijing’s preferred means of realizing unification or preventing independence is peaceful but the CCP has never renounced the use of armed force. Furthermore, the PLA’s central warfighting scenario is Taiwan and China’s military has been focused on planning and preparing for an operation against the island for decades. A Cautionary Tale? The above differences notwithstanding, Russia’s combat experience in Ukraine will have a spillover impact on how China thinks about Taiwan. If the Russian armed forces remain bogged down in a stalemate in Ukraine for an extended period and/or face a prolonged and widespread insurgency, this may give Xi and his fellow Politburo members pause. If Russia’s military experiences major setbacks and perhaps even embarrassing defeats, this may make China’s political leaders think twice about the advisability of an invasion of Taiwan. After all, an invasion of Ukraine is relatively straightforward — the country is geographically contiguous to Russia, sharing an extended land border with mostly gentle terrain. By contrast, an invasion of the island of Taiwan is a far more complex operation — a successful campaign requires careful planning and coordinated execution between air, naval and ground forces. It would also involve amphibious landings in addition to considerable urban warfare — on an even larger scale than in Ukraine — including operations on rugged mountainous terrain. Certainly, the PLA will carefully study Russia’s Ukrainian campaign and draw lessons from it, much as they have studied campaigns of other major powers. Such analyses are conducted with great seriousness because China’s armed forces themselves have not fought a major war since 1979 (when Chinese forces invaded Vietnam) and have not conducted a major island landing campaign since 1950 (against Hainan Island). One way that China’s leadership might be taking notes from Russia’s Ukraine invasion is by rethinking the risks associated with escalation. In addition to noting the potential military embarrassment that Russia is facing, China might be wary of the sweeping economic sanctions levied by the international community. If China were to receive similar backlash for an invasion of Taiwan, it would raise the possibility of truly crippling sanctions at a time when the Chinese economy is experiencing anemic growth and structural challenges. In particular, the weaponization of the SWIFT payments system might give China pause. Russia has been trying to popularize a cross-border financial information transmission system, and China is committed to developing the CIPS payment network, but neither has had significant success outside Russian or Chinese borders. Despite its flaws, SWIFT remains the most efficient system for international financial transactions for banks and being removed from SWIFT could potentially be devastating to the Chinese economy. Furthermore, the lessons of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine to date are that the costs of armed aggression are high in blood and treasure, as well as strong international censure of Moscow and a resolute collective response by NATO member countries.

2022 SDI Disadvantage
AFF › 2AC › 2AC: Accession Thumper

Turkey blocking new members sabotages NATO unity

McFall, 22 -- Fox News

[Caitlin McFall, "Erdogan disrupts NATO unity amid Putin’s threat to European security," Fox News, 5-26-2022, https://www.foxnews.com/world/erdogan-disrupts-nato-unity-putins-threat-european-security, accessed 6-19-2022]

Erdogan disrupts NATO unity amid Putin’s threat to European security

2022 SDI Disadvantage
AFF › 2AC › 2AC: No NATO Unity

Post-Ukraine unity is collapsing

Lucas, 22 -- Center for European Policy Analysis nonresident fellow

[Edward Lucas, "NATO Is Out of Shape and Out of Date," Foreign Policy, 6-7-2022, https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/06/07/nato-ukraine-russia-war-alliance-reform-geopolitics-military/, accessed 6-19-2022]

NATO Is Out of Shape and Out of Date

2022 SDI Disadvantage
AFF › 2AC › 2AC: ET Thumper

NATO emerging tech co-op high now

Hudson, 22 -- former managing editor of the Wall Street Journal's European edition

[Richard L., and Florin Zubascu, "Science goes to war: western allies step up collaboration in military research," Science|Business, 4-7-2022, https://sciencebusiness.net/news/science-goes-war-western-allies-step-collaboration-military-research, accessed 6-5-2022]

Science goes to war: western allies step up collaboration in military research

2022 SDI Disadvantage
NATO COHESION DA › !: RUSSIA › !: Russia War

Extinction

David Rothkopf 3-3, CEO, The Rothkopf Group. Citing: Lt. Gen. Doug Lute, Former U.S. Ambassador, NATO. Former Deputy US National Security Adviser; Bill Taylor, US Ambassador, Ukraine; Jon Wolfsthal, Nonresident Scholar, Nuclear Policy Program; Joe Cirincione, Distinguished Fellow, Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, "How the West Can Help Ukraine," Daily Beast, 03/03/2022, .

There is a consensus among Western leaders and strategic thinkers about how to respond to Russia’s brutal and unjustifiable aggression against Ukraine. Unprecedented and sweeping economic sanctions, moving NATO forces toward its eastern frontiers, and providing substantial lethal aid to Ukraine are the pillars of this response.

While this approach may not be sufficient to stop Russian forces from seizing Kyiv, Kharkiv, and other cities, it has already aided Ukraine in slowing Russian offensives, and should be useful in supporting a protracted Ukrainian insurgency against the Russian occupiers. If the will to maintain economic pressure on Russia remains strong enough for long enough, it could also create real incentives for Russia to negotiate and, perhaps, to withdraw.

2022 SDI Disadvantage
NATO COHESION DA › !: RUSSIA › !: Russia War

NATO unity resurgence key to contain Russia to Ukraine

Livingston, 22 -- Texas Tribune Washington bureau chief

[Abby Livingston, "Texas Republicans who opposed resolution supporting NATO criticize and question its language," Texas Tribune, 4-6-22, https://www.texastribune.org/2022/04/06/congress-nato-support-texas-representatives/, accessed 6-4-2022]

That alliance is having a renaissance in Europe, as the United States and its allies are trying to prevent the Russian invasion from spilling into NATO countries. Most mainstream foreign policy experts credit NATO’s efficacy for containing the Russian aggression to Ukraine.

2022 SDI Disadvantage
NATO COHESION DA › !: CHINA › AT US Won’t Intervene

US would intervene- strategic interests and Biden’s comments prove

Feng, 22 -- Newsweek contributing editor, Asia

[John Feng, "Will U.S. defend Taiwan if China invades? Experts weigh in," Newsweek, 6-1-2022, https://www.newsweek.com/us-taiwan-china-invasion-1712083, accessed 6-4-2022]

Ely Ratner, the Pentagon's assistant secretary of defense for Indo-Pacific security affairs, told a House committee hearing in March that the U.S. response in such a scenario would differ from how it's supporting Ukraine. "I'm confident that some of our closest partners would be with us in a Taiwan contingency," he said.

2022 SDI Disadvantage
NATO COHESION DA › !: CHINA › AT No War

Diversionary theory and PLA hawks make Taiwan war likely, but not inevitable- credible deterrence is key

Feng, 22 -- Newsweek contributing editor, Asia

[John Feng, "Will China invade Taiwan?," Newsweek, 6-1-2022, https://www.newsweek.com/china-taiwan-invasion-joe-biden-1711647, accessed 6-4-2022]

Christina Chen, an assistant research fellow at the Institute for National Defense and Security Research, Taiwan's top military think tank, tells Newsweek the "likelihood of a military conflict in the Taiwan Strait in the near term is getting high."

2022 SDI Disadvantage
NATO COHESION DA › !: CHINA › !: Authoritarianism

Authoritarian expansion spurs global nuclear war

Orts 18, University of Pennsylvania Guardsmark Professor at The Wharton School

[Eric, “Foreign Affairs: Six Future Scenarios (and a Seventh),” 6-27-18, https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/foreign-affairs-six-future-scenarios-seventh-eric-orts, accessed 2020]

7. Fascist Nationalism. There is another possible future that the Foreign Affairs scenarios do not contemplate, and it’s a dark world in which Trump, Putin, Xi, Erdogan, and others construct regimes that are authoritarian and nationalist. Fascism is possible in the United States and elsewhere if big business can be seduced by promises of riches in return for the institutional keys to democracy. Perhaps Foreign Affairs editors are right to leave this dark world out, for it would be very dark: nationalist wars with risks of escalation into global nuclear conflict, further digital militarization (even Terminator-style scenarios of smart military robots), and unchecked climate disasters.

2022 SDI Disadvantage
NATO COHESION DA › !: CHINA › !: Authoritarianism

Taiwan is key to counter Chinese authoritarian expansion

Feng, 22 -- Newsweek contributing editor, Asia

[John Feng, "Why is Taiwan important to the United States?," Newsweek, 6-3-2022, https://www.newsweek.com/why-taiwan-important-united-states-china-1712363, accessed 6-4-2022]

"One thing is very important on top of these geopolitical or strategic calculations: Taiwan is a vibrant democracy," said Professor Yeh-chung Lu, chair of the Department of Diplomacy at National Chengchi University in Taipei. "Especially to the U.S. general public, Taiwan sounds more like an asset than a liability, because we all belong to this international democratic community."

2022 SDI Disadvantage
NATO COHESION DA › !: CHINA › IL: Unity Key

Unity deters China Taiwan invasion

Business Standard, 22 ["Int'l unity over Russia-Ukraine war makes China cautious towards Taiwan," 4-4-22, https://www.business-standard.com/article/international/int-l-unity-over-russia-ukraine-war-makes-china-cautious-towards-taiwan-122040400198_1.html, accessed 6-4-2022]

Int'l unity over Russia-Ukraine war makes China cautious towards Taiwan

While similarities between Taiwan and Ukraine cannot be drawn in a linear fashion, strong deductions can be made with regard to China's behavior toward Taiwan and the Russia-Ukraine crisis.

2022 SDI Disadvantage
NATO COHESION DA › !: CHINA › IL: Unity Key

China is watching to see if the unity lasts

Cheng, 22 -- CNBC China correspondent

[Evelyn Cheng, “China watches warily as Ukraine makes U.S., EU and Japan strengthen their alliance,” CNBC, 3-8-22, https://www.cnbc.com/2022/03/09/china-watches-as-ukraine-war-makes-us-eu-and-japan-show-unity.html, accessed 6-4-2022]

China watches warily as Ukraine makes U.S., EU and Japan strengthen their alliance