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2022 SDI Negative
Case Advantage Answers › AI Leadership Advantage Answers › Extensions #2: AI Tech Not Key to Military Power

AI is not key to military innovations.

Michael C. Horowitz, 2018 (Professor at the University of Pennsylvania, “Artificial Intelligence, International Competition, and the Balance of Power,” Retrieved 6/11/2022 from )

It is important to distinguish these potential technological innovations from military innovations. While military innovations are often linked to changes in technology,41 it is not always the case. Military innovations are significant changes in organizational behavior and ways that a military fights that are designed to increase its ability to effectively translate capabilities into power.42 The use of aircraft carriers as mobile airfields by the United States and Japan is a prototypical example. While AI could potentially enable a number of military innovations, it is not a military innovation itself, and no applications of AI have been used in ways that would count as a military innovation at this point.

2022 SDI Negative
Case Advantage Answers › AI Leadership Advantage Answers › Extensions #2: AI Tech Not Key to Military Power

Agile bureaucracies, not the best technology, will win the global tech competition race.

Rob Murray, 9/1/2020 (head of the Innovation Unit in NATO’s Emerging Security Challenges Division, “Building a resilient innovation pipeline for the Alliance,” Retrieved 6/12/2022 from )

Today, NATO’s competition is a global one and the race is one of technological adoption – that is, the acceptance, integration and use of new technology in society. From artificial intelligence to quantum and everything in between, governments are in a race to leverage these technologies at scale and speed – first adopter advantage for emerging disruptive tech could not be more prevalent in the world of geopolitics and deterrence. Indeed, the nations that win this race may be those with the most agile bureaucracy rather those with the best technology.

2022 SDI Negative
Case Advantage Answers › AI Leadership Advantage Answers › Extensions #1: Allies Will Win the Tech Race Extensions

The OECD solves the case—they have agreed to support the responsible and ethical approach to AI.

John R. Allen, 3/24/2021 (President of the Brookings Institution, “It is time to negotiate global treaties on artificial intelligence,” , Retrieved 6/15/2022)

The good news is there are some international entities that already are working on these issues. For example, the Global Partnership on Artificial Intelligence is a group of more than a dozen democratic nations that have agreed to “support the responsible and human-centric development and use of AI in a manner consistent with human rights, fundamental freedoms, and our shared democratic values.” This community of democracies is run by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and features high-level convenings, research, and technical assistance.

2022 SDI Negative
Case Advantage Answers › AI Leadership Advantage Answers › Extensions #1: Allies Will Win the Tech Race Extensions

The U.S. is currently winning the AI race against China.

JAMES COOPER AND KASHYAP KOMPELLA 02/03/22 (OPINION CONTRIBUTORS, https://www.whitehouse.gov/ostp/news-updates/2021/06/10/the-biden-administration-launches-the-national-artificial-intelligence-research-resource-task-force/, “No, China is not winning the AI race”, Retrieved 2/23/22)

The global competition between the United States and China continues apace. Technology is rightly seen as providing unique leverage to win this geopolitical race. The U.S. long has been the global technology powerhouse, but not surprisingly, we have heard much about the Chinese government’s  high-tech industries such as 5G telecommunications, autonomous vehicles, blockchain, and semiconductor chips.  In this light, as a horizontal technology that can be applied across all sectors, artificial intelligence (AI) has become a strategic priority and the  on superiority in this field is touted as something about which the U.S. should be concerned. Some have gone so far as to conclude that . Don’t believe the hype. To be sure, the availability of large amounts of data is at the heart of AI success. It is tempting to think that less-democratic regimes that amass huge amounts of data about their citizens and have scant regard for privacy can develop better AI systems using that data. However, all other things being equal, better and higher quality AI systems emerge from countries with strong data privacy and data protection regulations because AI systems must undergo greater scrutiny during their development and deployment.  of this can be seen in the United States regarding fair lending practices and consumer protection from credit bureaus. Further, the market for AI is global, and such high-quality AI systems find buyers in other countries as well. Around the globe, Big Tech’s rising power has resulted in calls for more oversight. In a drastic move that stunned the industry and analysts alike, the Chinese government  the rulebook for the country’s technology industry. In effect, China is vacating entire swaths of digital and creative industries, arenas that serve as training grounds and talent factories for other industries. This more restrictive approach may not bode well for China’s AI industry in the long term. China may find itself constrained on the extent of automation and AI in its manufacturing sector — labor-intensive manufacturing remains China’s main strength, and a high degree of automation can result in job losses, labor unrest, and instability. Meanwhile, there is bipartisan support for AI in the United States. Former  proposed  for AI development through the National Science Foundation. The  of 2020 signaled a sense of urgency and suggested that several federal agencies create a national strategy on artificial intelligence. The Biden administration has formed the Artificial Intelligence Research Resource Task Force to develop a roadmap to foment AI research and spark innovation nationwide. There is draft legislation, at both the state and federal level, to promote responsible use of AI and prevent its misuse. Strong objections to the use of facial recognition and other AI systems by law enforcement in the U.S., raised by civil liberties advocates, have led some local authorities, such as the City of San Francisco, to . To use a Silicon Valley phrase, these debates are “not a bug, but a feature.” They shine a light on the limitations of AI systems and help to set the “rules of the road” for proper use of AI. This will establish the U.S. as a global leader in AI regulation, once lawmakers and regulators do their work. China, meanwhile, has faced strong  for using facial recognition software to  in its Xinjiang region. China has outlined a set of , but the jury is still out on enforcement and how they function in practice. The increasing number of AI research papers and  by Chinese researchers is often cited as proof that China has caught up with the United States in this field. The increased focus is good for the Chinese AI ecosystem, and it will help them solve China-specific problems. But dominance in this emerging strategic industry is not guaranteed. The U.S. has several strategic advantages, including: the strengths of its higher education and research institutes, which attract the best STEM talent from across the world; the ; and the largest number of technology unicorns (start-ups with private valuations greater than $1 billion).  Beijing says Taiwan is 'not Ukraine,' has always been part of China Big Tech allies point to China, Russia threat in push to squash... China is not overtaking the U.S. in artificial intelligence. The current evidence and trajectory paint a clear picture: The conditions for AI to flourish, such as incentives to experiment, freedom to pursue opportunities without restrictions, and the coming guardrails to prevent misuse, favor U.S. leadership. This is still the United States’s game to lose — though maybe both countries could win through collaboration. To solve planet-scale problems such as climate change, we are going to need AI solutions from both competitors. 

2022 SDI Negative
Case Advantage Answers › AI Leadership Advantage Answers › Extensions #1: Allies Will Win the Tech Race Extensions

The US leads in the AI tech race now.

Neil Savage, 12/9/2020 (Neil Savage is a science writer based in Lowell, Massachusetts, “The race to the top among the world’s leaders in artificial intelligence,” , Retrieved 8/20/2021)

As nations vie for leadership, AI research output is increasing rapidly. According to our analysis of journal publications and conference papers tracked by the Dimensions database, the global output for AI research grew from just over 52,000 globally in 2000 to roughly 403,000 in 2019, representing an increase of more than 600%. Now the most popular specialization among computer-science PhD students in North America, AI is set to continue its steep, upward trajectory. Rising revenues The United States has historically been the leader in AI-related research output, having accumulated the highest number of publications over the past two decades. But China has ramped up its output in recent years. In each year from 2016 to 2019, China produced more AI-related papers than any other nation, according to Dimensions. Over this period, China’s output of AI-related research increased by just over 120%, whereas output in the US increased by almost 70%. In 2019, China published 102,161 AI-related papers, and the US published 74,386. India, which came in third, published 23,398. Publication numbers aren’t the whole story, says Jeffrey Ding, a PhD student at the Future of Humanity Institute at the University of Oxford, UK, who studies China’s AI strategy. In the AI Index Report, which uses citation numbers to measure the quality of AI papers, papers from China were cited about 20% less than the world average in 2019, whereas papers from the US were cited about 40% more than average. “Just pumping out raw numbers of papers that don’t have a lasting impact isn’t really useful,” says Ding. “It’s more important to keep up with the technology frontier.” A Nature Index analysis for this supplement looked at the number of AI-related articles published in the 82 high-quality natural-science journals tracked by the index, which primarily concern the application of AI to research in the broad fields of chemistry, the physical sciences, life sciences, and Earth and environmental sciences. Between 2015 and 2019, the US was the leader, with the UK, Germany and China in second, third and fourth place, respectively. But China has increased its output in journals tracked by the index. Although it was the fourth-most prolific country in the index in 2015, with roughly half as many AI-related papers as Germany, China crept up over the next three years, then leapt to second place in 2019, showing an increase of 340%. The US, UK and Germany slightly more than doubled their output over the same period. For the near future, Ding says, the US is likely to remain the world leader in AI. “Though China has some exceptional universities, such as Tsinghua University, the US dominates in terms of maybe the top 20 universities doing AI research, and that is reflected in the quality of the papers. It’s very unlikely that China will become the singular innovation centre by 2030.” Many countries see AI as providing a competitive edge, not only economically, but militarily, says Husain. He likens the competition in AI to the Space Race of the mid-twentieth century, in which the US and the Soviet Union vied to be the first to achieve milestones in space travel. “The Space Race yielded contributions that differentiated the American technological ecosystem from all others for decades to come,” says Husain. “If a country invests heavily in this area, it will yield technologies that will form the pillar of defence capability and economic differentiation for the rest of the century.” Technologies that can be developed based on AI will indeed have both economic and military benefit, says Daniel Araya, a policy analyst at the Center for International Governance Innovation, a think tank in Ontario, Canada. “We’re talking new weapons, data-driven innovation for industry and automation, and redesigning how our society works from the ground up.” Husain points to Germany, which maintains a strong economy that relies on exports of products such as machine parts and automobiles, even though lower-income countries can provide low-wage labour for manufacturing. Germany has been able to compete by using automation to keep manufacturing costs down, while keeping quality and productivity high. AI could reinforce this advantage by powering the next generation of automation technologies. “Anybody that has mastery over this technology and is investing in implementing it retains an economic lead,” says Husain. Institutions in Germany, such as the Fraunhofer Society, Europe’s largest application-oriented research organization, have been emphasizing Industry 4.0, a national strategic initiative from the German government to introduce more digital innovation and advanced robotics into manufacturing and supply-chain management. In China, the ability offered by AI systems to monitor public spaces and scan Internet traffic in an effort to glean user intentions may provide the state with improved tools for social control, enhancing its capability for monitoring the population or censoring information. Even in countries that don’t officially track their populaces, facial-recognition technology, such as that produced by New York-based company, Clearview AI, is being used by law enforcement to identify suspects. The technology has been met with deep concern by some researchers, who say that biases built into its algorithms could result in ethical and human rights abuses. Amid the controversy that surrounds certain applications of AI, some groups are highlighting the good it can do. In 2019, the Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence, a scientific society in Menlo Park, California, launched its Artificial Intelligence for the Benefit of Humanity award, a US$1-million prize funded by Squirrel AI, an education technology company based in Shanghai, China. The inaugural winner, Regina Barzilay from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) in Cambridge, Massachusetts, received the award in September 2020 for developing a machine-learning algorithm that can examine mammograms and predict which women are at a higher risk of breast cancer. Barzilay has also developed a pattern-recognition algorithm that predicts which molecules might make good candidates for new medications. Publishing in the journal Cell, Barzilay and her colleagues described how their system identified a molecule, dubbed halicin, as a potentially potent new antibiotic (J. M. Stokes et al. Cell 180, 688–702; 2020). When the molecule was synthesized and tested, it was found to kill antibiotic-resistant bacteria. Barzilay continues to work on halicin and hopes to progress it to clinical trials. Money to spend With an eye to the potential benefits of AI-based technologies, the US National Science Foundation (NSF) announced in August 2020 that it is establishing five new institutes focused on different topics, each led by a different university, and each to receive $20 million over five years. One, led by the University of Oklahoma in Norman, will use AI systems to improve climate forecasting accuracy. Another, at the University of Texas at Austin, will focus on the next generation of machine-learning algorithms. A third, led by the University of Colorado Boulder, will apply AI technologies to teaching and learning. The fourth, headed by the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, will explore the discovery and synthesis of new materials and drugs using AI systems. And a fifth, led by MIT, will investigate how AI can improve research in fundamental physics. The NSF has put out a call for proposals for eight more AI institutes, which it plans to announce next year. “We have a long history of supporting basic research in artificial intelligence,” says Erwin Gianchandani, the NSF’s deputy assistant director for computer and information science and engineering. In addition, the US Department of Agriculture’s National Institute of Food and Agriculture has committed to funding another two institutes each with $20 million over five years to apply AI to questions of crop yield, pest resistance and food distribution. Access to massive data sets on which to train machine-learning systems is one advantage that both the US and China have, says Araya. Europe, on the other hand, has stringent data laws, which protect people’s privacy, but limit its resources for training AI algorithms. “So, it seems unlikely that Europe will produce very sophisticated AI as a consequence,” he says. “China is at the opposite end of the spectrum, where it has few data protections, and huge access to varied and diverse pieces of data.” The NSF doesn’t make decisions based on global competition, says Rebecca Keiser, the organization’s first chief of research security strategy and policy. Her position is designed to safeguard the security of federally funded research, while promoting international collaborations. “We think of it more in terms of the impact that our funding is going to have, rather than from a nation perspective. The fact that it also contributes to US global science leadership is fabulous,” says Keiser. As for competing against China in AI, she says, “We don’t really know how much, and where, they’re investing, so it’s hard to compete against that.” With funding from other major US agencies, including the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency and National Institutes of Health, the US government expected to spend almost $5 billion on unclassified AI research in 2020. Other countries are investing, too. The UK’s Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council gave out nearly £160 million (US$212 million) in 2020. The European Commission, which has been supporting research through its Horizon 2020 programme, says public and private investment in AI should reach €20 billion (US$23 billion) across Europe by the end of 2020. Even with other countries placing emphasis on AI research, including Israel, Japan, Singapore and Australia, the race comes down to China versus the US, Araya says. The refinement of AI systems is driven not simply by academic questions, but by applying the systems’ intelligence to practical problems. Countries will probably make advances by using AI in areas where they already have expertise, says Ding, such as automation in Germany or robotics in Japan. Having so many researchers around the globe tackling all aspects of AI should advance the whole field, says Keiser. “It’s always good to have a bit of healthy competition.”

2022 SDI Negative
Case Advantage Answers › AI Leadership Advantage Answers › Extensions #1: Allies Will Win the Tech Race Extensions

NATO’s innovation fund solves the AFF.

Vivienne Machi, 11/3/2021 (reporter based in Stuttgart, Germany, “NATO ups the ante on disruptive tech, artificial intelligence,” , Retrieved 6/15/2022)

STUTTGART, Germany — NATO has officially kicked off two new efforts meant to help the alliance invest in critical next-generation technologies and avoid capability gaps between its member nations. For months, officials have set the ground stage to launch a new Defense Innovator Accelerator — nicknamed DIANA — and establish an innovation fund to support private companies developing dual-use technologies. Both of those measures were formally agreed upon during NATO’s meeting of defense ministers last month in Brussels, said Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg. Allies signed the agreement to establish the NATO Innovation Fund and launch DIANA on Oct. 22, the final day of the two-day conference, Stoltenberg said in a media briefing that day. He expects the fund to invest €1 billion (U.S. $1.16 billion) into companies and academic partners working on emerging and disruptive technologies. “New technologies are reshaping our world and our security,” Stoltenberg said. “NATO’s new innovation fund will ensure allies do not miss out on the latest technology and capabilities that will be critical to our security.” “We need to ensure that allies are able to operate the different technologies seamlessly, between their forces, and with each other,” he added. Seventeen allied countries agreed to help launch the innovation fund. They include: Belgium, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, and the United Kingdom.

2022 SDI Negative
Case Advantage Answers › AI Leadership Advantage Answers › Extensions #1: Allies Will Win the Tech Race Extensions

Allied open democracies are better for innovation than other forms of government.

Rob Murray, 9/1/2020 (head of the Innovation Unit in NATO’s Emerging Security Challenges Division, “Building a resilient innovation pipeline for the Alliance,” Retrieved 6/12/2022 from )

The reason is simple: the competition and creativity generated by start-ups is good for the Allied defence ecosystem. Allied open democracies and open educational models bring about levels of creativity which other forms of government are unable to do. This maximises disruptive innovation efforts and, as such, forces incumbents (large companies) to compete with new, fresh thinking – it builds resilience.

2022 SDI Negative
Case Advantage Answers › AI Leadership Advantage Answers › 1NC — AI Leadership Advantage

6. US & China won’t go to nuclear conflict.

James Andrew Lewis, 11/30/2018 (Senior Vice President and Director, Strategic Technologies Program, “Technological Competition and China,” , Retrieved 8/11/2021)

One touchstone for understanding this contest is the ruling party’s strong desire to avoid the fate of Gorbachev and the Soviet Union. The Chinese diagnosis of the Soviet collapse blames the problems created by corruption, exposure to damaging Western ideas, and by Soviet efforts to match U.S. military spending. However, this diagnosis begs the question of whether the Soviet system was fundamentally flawed and unsustainable and whether any system derived from the Soviet model, no matter how attenuated the connection, can be sustained. We can dismiss the idea of a “Thucydides trap.” It is not China’s rise that creates tensions, but the means China has used to achieve this rise. Putting asides its idiosyncratic interpretation of the Peloponnesian War, both China and the United States will seek to avoid damaging and risky military conflict. The advent of nuclear weapons imposes a degree of caution on even the most overconfident leaders when it comes to military adventures. Clashes at the margins similar to border fights with India and Russia might occur, but even low-level clashes hold considerable risk of escalation that will restrain both countries. Conflict and competition today will take new forms, and these new forms of conflict are redefining U.S.-China relations.

2022 SDI Negative
Case Advantage Answers › AI Leadership Advantage Answers › 1NC — AI Leadership Advantage

5. Nationalism prevents China from playing a leading role in the international world order.

James Andrew Lewis, 11/30/2018 (Senior Vice President and Director, Strategic Technologies Program, “Technological Competition and China,” , Retrieved 8/11/2021)

U.S. difficulties in governance and in developing a new model for innovation do not automatically cede leadership to China. Inherent tensions in Chinese policy make China’s desire for a leading role in the international order more complicated and problematic. China is in the Western world, but not of it, meaning its leaders reject the values and beliefs that underpin global institutions when these are contrary to the ruling party’s interests. There are, of course, tensions within Chinese politics over national versus international practice, but the ruling party’s political circumstances incline it toward a nationalism as a source of legitimacy. This emphasis on nationalism creates complications if China seeks to play a guiding role on the world stage.

2022 SDI Negative
Case Advantage Answers › AI Leadership Advantage Answers › 1NC — AI Leadership Advantage

4. LIO doesn’t cause peace, other factors explain peace, not LIO.

Charles L. Glaser, 4/1/2019 (professor of political science and international affairs and director of the Elliott School's Institute for Security and Conflict, “A Flawed Framework: Why the Liberal International Order Concept Is Misguided,” , Retrieved 9/19/2021)

However, while the causes of Cold War peace and the end of the Cold War have fueled much debate and generated many competing explanations, the LIO is rarely among them.80 Effective balancing by U.S. alliances, deterrence supported by nuclear weapons, and bipolarity are much more prominent explanations for the Cold War peace. The economic effectiveness of capitalism relative to Soviet communism, the overwhelming and increasing power advantage that the West enjoyed by the 1980s, and the spread of ideas about security requirements and cooperation are commonly identified as contributing to the end of the Cold War.81 If these factors are key, then there is little left for the LIO concept to explain.

2022 SDI Negative
Case Advantage Answers › AI Leadership Advantage Answers › 1NC — AI Leadership Advantage

3. Chinese leadership allows for world peace and the solution to a host of international problems.

Global Times, 2021 CHINA WINS INCREASING SUPPORT AT UN DURING 50 YRS, OPPOSING UNILATERALISM, PROTECTIONISM AND HEGEMONY. Oct. 22, 2021. Retrieved May 5, 2022 from

Over the past 50 years, China has firmly upheld world peace and security. China has been committed to an objective and just position, to resolving differences through dialogue and consultations, and to the principle of non-interference in each others' internal affairs. China firmly opposes the willful threat or use of force in international affairs, the paper said. China has also made vigorous efforts to promote global development, and has met the poverty eradication target of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development 10 years ahead of schedule. China has firmly upheld the international order underpinned by international law, and fully supported the UN in playing a central role in international affairs. On October 25, 1971, the 26th UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 2758 with an overwhelming majority of votes, restoring all the lawful rights of the People's Republic of China at the UN and recognizing the representatives of its government as the only legitimate representative of China at the UN. China will organize a conference marking the 50th anniversary of the restoration of its lawful seat in the UN in Beijing on Monday, and President Xi Jinping will attend the conference and deliver important remarks. UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres, foreign diplomats and representatives of international organizations will also attend the conference on site or via video, Zhao Lijian, spokesperson of the Chinese Foreign Ministry, said at Friday's media briefing. The past 50 years were the golden 50 years for close coordination and cooperation between China and the UN which has not only smoothened relations between China and other countries, but also enhanced the authority of the UN which has been undermined by the US' Cold War mentality and hegemony, analysts said. Chinese analysts said that China's international reputation as well as the UN's reputation in resolving international disputes were enhanced with deepened cooperation between China and UN, and China's concept of seeking cooperation, upholding multilateralism and acting as a responsible major country has enabled the UN to take more initiative and show more inclusiveness in dealing with global issues of security, climate change, and health.

2022 SDI Negative
Case Advantage Answers › AI Leadership Advantage Answers › 1NC — AI Leadership Advantage

2. AI technologies are not key to military power.

Michael C. Horowitz, 2018 (Professor at the University of Pennsylvania, “Artificial Intelligence, International Competition, and the Balance of Power,” Retrieved 6/11/2022 from )

Emerging technologies primarily shape the balance of power through military and economic means.37 Technologies can directly influence countries’ abilities to fight and win wars. They can also indirectly affect the balance of power by impacting a country’s economic power. After all, countries cannot maintain military superiority over the medium to long term without an underlying economic basis for that power.38 Recall the decline of the Ottoman Empire or Imperial China. However, it is not yet clear how the invention of specific AI applications will translate into military power. Despite continuing investment, efforts to integrate AI technologies into militaries have been limited.39 Project Maven is the first activity of an “Algorithmic Warfare” initiative in the U.S. military designed to harness the potential of AI and translate it into usable military capabilities. Still, many investments in the United States and elsewhere are in early stages. As Missy L. Cummings writes: Autonomous ground vehicles such as tanks and transport vehicles are in development worldwide, as are autonomous underwater vehicles. In almost all cases, however, the agencies developing these technologies are struggling to make the leap from development to operational implementation.40

2022 SDI Negative
Case Advantage Answers › AI Leadership Advantage Answers › 1NC — AI Leadership Advantage

1. Allied governments will win the tech race—they have the culture of innovation on their side.

Rob Murray, 9/1/2020 (head of the Innovation Unit in NATO’s Emerging Security Challenges Division, “Building a resilient innovation pipeline for the Alliance,” Retrieved 6/12/2022 from )

But before we get to commercialisation, we need to create the direction of what it is we wish to see commercialised. Technological disruptive innovation does not just happen. It starts with a mission-oriented vision, where measuring risk is impossible and only uncertainty reigns. It requires bold moves that will signpost the future; the confidence to place big bets on technology not yet invented; and an ability to pick winners – all of which must be underpinned by persistent engagement, encouragement and enlightenment. Since the end of the Second World War, only one entity has taken-on such uncertainty: Allied governments (see image below).

2022 SDI Kritik
AFF AT: K—Security › LINK › AT: L – Terrorism

Their evidence does NOT meet similar epistemological standards AND poststructuralism fails to affect either discourse or practice

Schmid 9 - Chair in International Relations; the Director of the Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence at St. Andrews University(Alex, Perspectives on Terrorism, v.3, issue 4, Book Review of “Critical Terrorism Studies. A new research agenda. by Richard Jackson”, *edited for ableist and gendered language

The editors accuse, in their introduction  “the orthodox field” of orthodox terrorism studies of functioning “ideologically in the service of existing power structures”, with their academic research. Furthermore, they claim that orthodox scholars are frequently being used “to legitimise coercive intervention in the global South….” (p.6). The present volume is edited by three authors associated with the Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Contemporary Political Violence (CSRV) in the Department of International Politics in Aberystwyth (Wales, UK). They also happen to be editors of a new Routledge journal “Critical Studies on Terrorism’ . The “critical” refers principally but not exclusively to the “Frankfurt-via-Welsh School Critical Theory Perspective”. The twelve contributors are not all equally “critical” in aHabermasian sense. The programmatic introduction of the editors is followed by two solid chapters from Magnus Ranstorp (former Director of CSTPV, St. Andrews, and currently Director of the Centre for Asymmetric Threat Studies at the Swedish National Defence College) and Andrew Silke (formerly with the UK Home Office and now Field Leader for Criminology at the University of East London). They both rightfully criticize some of the past sins and present shortcomings of the field of Terrorism Studies. One of them approvingly quotes Marc Sageman who observed that “disagreements among experts are the driving force of the scientific enterprise”. Such disagreements, however, exist among “orthodox” scholars like Sageman and  Hoffman or Pape and Abrams. In that sense, the claim by some critical theorists that the field of traditional Terrorism Studies is ossified without them, is simply is not true. One of the problems with many of the adherents of the “critical” school is that the focus is almost exclusively on the strawman [strawperson] they set up to shoot – “orthodox” terrorism discourse rather than on the practitioners of terrorism. Richard Jackson claims that “…most of what is accepted as well-founded ‘knowledge’ in terrorism studies is, in fact, highly debatable and unstable” (p.74), dismissing thereby almost four decades of scholarship as “based on a series of ‘virulent myths’, ‘half-truths’ and contested claims…biased towards Western state priorities” (p.80). For him “terrorism is…a social fact rather than a brute fact” and “…does not exist outside of the definitions and practices which seek to enclose it, including those of the terrorism studies field” (pp.75-76). He objects to prevailing “problem-solving theories of terrorism” in favour of an approach that questions “ the status quo and the dominant acts within it” (p.77). Another contributor, J.A. Sluka, argues, without offering any proof,  that “terrorism is fundamentally a product of social inequality and state politics” (p. 139). Behind many of the critical theorists who blame mainstream terrorism research for taking ‘the world as it finds it’ there is an agenda for changing the status quo and overthrowing existing power structures. There is, in itself, nothing wrong with wanting a new and better world order. However, it is not going to be achieved by using an alternative discourse on terrorism and counter-terrorism. Toros and Gunning, contributors of another chapter, state that “the sine qua non of Critical Theory is emancipation” (p. 99) and M. McDonald als puts “emancipation as central to the study of terrorism” (p.121). However, there is not a single word on the non-emancipated position of women under Islam in general or among the Taliban and their friends from al-Qaeda in particular. One of the strength (some argue weakness) of Western thinking is its ability for self-criticism – something largely absent in the Muslim world. In that sense, this volume falls within a Western tradition. However, self-criticism should not come at the cost of not criticising   adversaries by using the same yardstick. In this sense, this volume is strangely silent about the worldview of those terrorists who have no self-doubts and attack the Red Cross,  the United Nations, NGOs and their fellow Muslims with equal lack of scruples. A number of authors in the volume appear to equate terrorism uncritically with political violence in general while in fact it is more usefully thought of as one of some twenty sub-categories of  political violence - one characterized by deliberate attacks on civilians and non-combatants in order to intimidate, coerce or otherwise manipulate  various audiences and parties to a conflict. Part of the volume advocates reinventing the wheel. J. Gunning, for instance, recommends to employ Social Movement Theory for the study of terrorism. However, that theory has been employed already explicitly or implicitly by a number of more orthodox scholars, e.g. Donatella della Porta. Many “critical” statements in the volume are unsupported by convincing evidence, e.g. when C. Sylvester and S. Parashar state “The September 11 attacks and the ongoing war on terror reinforce gender hierarchy and power in international relations” (p.190). Jackson claims that the key question  for critical terrorism theory is “who is terrorism research for and how does terrorism knowledge support particular interests?” (p.224) It does not seem to occur to him that he could have studied this question by looking at the practitioners of terrorism and study al-Qaeda’s ideological writings and its training  and  recruiting manuals. If CTS is a call for “making a commitment to emancipatory praxis central to the research enterprise” (R. Jackson et al, p. 228), CTS academics should be the first on the barricades against jihadists who treat women not as equals and who would, if they get their way, eradicate freedom of thought and religion for all mankind. It is sad that some leading proponents of Critical Terrorism Studies appear to be in fact uncritical and blind on one eye.

2022 SDI Kritik
AFF AT: K—Security › LINK › AT: L – Russia

Even if it did, it’s too late now

Berls & Ratz 15 Dr. Robert E. Berls, Jr., Senior Advisor for Russia and Eurasia at the Nuclear Threat Initiative, former Colonel, U.S. Air Force, former air attaché at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, former special assistant to the Secretary of Energy for Russia/NIS programs, Ph.D. Russian Area Studies, Georgetown University; and Leon Ratz, Program Officer with NTI’s Materials Security and Minimization Program, former policy specialist on Russian nuclear security, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, Office for International Material Protection and Cooperation, U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration, M.A. John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, B.A. Boston College; “Rising Nuclear Dangers: Assessing the Risk of Nuclear Use in the Euro-Atlantic Region,” Nuclear Threat Initiative, NTI Paper, October 2015, /GoGreen!

The risk of nuclear weapons use in the Euro-Atlantic region is on the rise—and it is higher than it has ever been since the end of the Cold War. This is the conclusion of leading security experts from the United States, Russia, and Europe who responded to a questionnaire from the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) in early 2015.1 While the experts disagreed on the scale of the increase in risk and the reasons for the change, nearly all shared the view that the significant deterioration in relations between the United States and the Russian Federation has led to dangerous conditions under which nuclear weapons use has become more likely— although the probability of this outcome remains low. This study examined the risk of use of nuclear weapons, not just the risk of nuclear exchange or nuclear war. In other words, the study did not exclude the possibility of unilateral nuclear use. Indeed, respondents identified the possibility of unilateral nuclear use by Russia to quell a conflict on its borders as a risk of particular concern.2 Other possible nuclear-use scenarios identified by respondents include a rapid escalation due to miscalculation or accident (such as a mid-air collision between NATO and Russian warplanes), an escalatory response to a Russian incursion into the Baltic States, and a Russian reaction to NATO military intervention in Crimea or eastern Ukraine. The study did not assess the relative probabilities of these scenarios. Of all the risks examined, it is the risk of miscalculation that is of most concern. Absent a major incident, the likelihood of deliberate nuclear exchange under current circumstances is low. But it is the possibility of a major transformative event, such as a mid-air collision or a skirmish along NATO or Russian borders, that is on the rise. Such an incident involving the world’s two largest nuclear powers could plausibly shift alert postures and lead to a rapid series of escalatory measures precipitated by miscalculation and exacerbated by mistrust. The following section describes in detail the circumstances that have led to a heightened risk of escalation and possible nuclear use in the Euro-Atlantic region. Risk Factors The security experts who responded to NTI’s questionnaire identified one or more of the following ten reasons as contributing factors to the heightened risk: 1. Competing, Irreconcilable Narratives That Drive Heightened Threat Perceptions 2. A Deficit of Trust 3. Domestic Political Imperatives 4. Alliance Politics 5. Close Military Encounters 6. Broken Channels of Communication 7. Failing Safeguards to Prevent Nuclear Use 8. Conventional Force Disparity 9. Reckless Nuclear Saber Rattling 10. Lack of Nuclear Experience The authors of this paper provided supplementary research to expand on topics raised in the responses. 1. Competing, Irreconcilable Narratives That Drive Heightened Threat Perceptions Moscow and Washington diverge not only in their interpretations of recent events in Ukraine but also in the basic narratives that describe their relations during the entire post–Cold War era.3 The Russian narrative is characterized by a combination of grievance and resolve. Prominent Russians frequently claim that Western powers took advantage of Moscow’s weakness after the Cold War to shift NATO borders east and bomb Russia’s allies in the Balkans.4 Western support for Ukraine’s European Union association agreement, Western sanctions against Russia, and Western demonstrations of military support for allies on Russia’s borders (military exercises, supplies of arms) appear to reinforce this narrative of Russia as victim of Western bullying. Prominent Russian officials thus argue that they face no choice but to demonstrate resolve lest they invite further Western aggression against their most vital national interests.5 The Western narrative is starkly different. The United States and its NATO allies view Russia as a revanchist power aggressively attempting to reclaim influence and territory in neighboring countries that desire a break from their Soviet legacies.6 Western officials chastise Russia for employing tactics such as hybrid warfare, manipulation of gas exports, and other forms of economic and military intimidation to achieve its political aims.7 They argue that Russia’s annexation of Crimea and support for separatists in eastern Ukraine represent a major break with the post-war order in Europe, an order that has prioritized respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty.8 Russia’s behavior in Ukraine and the potential for Russian intervention in the Baltic States necessitate demonstrations of resolve lest the West invite further Russian aggression.9 These competing, irreconcilable narratives breed heightened threat perceptions, driving a vicious cycle of confrontation and escalation. By themselves, these threat perceptions would not necessarily lead to nuclear use, but—combined with the factors described below—they create dangerous conditions under which misunderstandings could escalate to unprecedented levels of confrontation between the world’s two largest nuclear powers. 2. A Deficit of Trust Russians and Americans have returned to Cold War-era levels of antagonism toward one another. According to a recent Gallup poll, Americans now view Russia as the greatest enemy to the United States, edging out both North Korea and Iran.10 The same poll showed that 49 percent of Americans view Russia as a critical military threat, and only 24 percent of Americans have a favorable view of Russia. By contrast, 62 percent of Americans held a favorable view of the Soviet Union in 1989 (see Figure 1).11 [ FIGURE 1 OMITTED – Figure 1. Americans’ Favorable/Unfavorable Ratings of Russia ] In Russia, the trust deficit is even worse. According to a recent poll conducted by the Levada Center, a Russian public opinion research organization, only 15 percent of Russians have a favorable view of the United States and 73 percent of Russians hold an unfavorable view, a figure that nearly doubled in the last year (see Figure 2).12 Another poll released in late June found that 62 percent of Russians believe that Russia’s relations with the West will always be characterized by mistrust.13 [ FIGURE 2 OMITTED – Figure 2. Russians’ Favorable/Unfavorable Ratings of the United States ] 3. Domestic Political Imperatives With such deep antagonism permeating public opinion, it becomes highly improbable for elected officials to support conciliatory measures. Instead, policy hawks who advocate resolve and confrontation tend to prevail in such environments. This is especially true in Russia where President Vladimir Putin brandishes a public image as Russia’s best guardian against Western bullying. Indeed, President Putin’s domestic approval ratings have never been higher. In June, a Levada Center poll revealed that 89 percent of Russians hold a favorable opinion of their President—Putin’s highest approval rating since he succeeded Boris Yeltsin 15 years ago.14 Considering that Russia’s economy continues to reel from the combination of low oil prices, Western sanctions, and structural economic problems, Putin’s high public approval rating indicates that the Russian people strongly support his handling of the Ukrainian crisis and his relations with the West. Any departure from the current course would almost certainly come with a heavy political price for Putin. In the United States, although anti-Russian rhetoric is much less prevalent, many public officials and political candidates also have voiced positions favoring resolve over restraint. For example, General Joseph Dunford, the Obama Administration’s nominee for Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in July 2015 told a Congressional committee that Russia poses the number one threat to the United States and that he favors sending heavy weaponry to Ukraine. The Islamic State, by contrast, was fourth on his list of security threats facing the United States.15 In August, the outgoing U.S. Army Chief of Staff General Raymond Odierno echoed General Dunford’s comments by labeling Russia “the most dangerous threat” facing the United States today.16 As the 2016 U.S. presidential election approaches, it is also unlikely that political candidates will depart significantly from this anti-Russia rhetoric given how closely it aligns with record-high public antagonism toward Russia. Such domestic political imperatives—from public opinion to political posturing—in Russia and the United States create strong incentives for demonstrations of resolve, diminishing the chances of a resolution to the current standoff and leading to a high risk of a continued cycle of confrontation and escalation. 4. Alliance Politics Alliance politics also contributes to the rhetoric of resolve and confrontation. NATO’s Eastern European and Baltic members increasingly view Russia as a major threat and voice concerns that NATO is ill-prepared to fulfill its Article 5 obligation for collective defense.17 Meanwhile, recent public opinion polls show that most Germans, Italians, and French believe that their countries should not use military force to defend a NATO ally (see Figure 3).18 In this context, NATO publics increasingly view the United States as the only credible military opposition to potential Russian aggression against the Alliance (see Figure 4).19 The Obama Administration is thus faced with both political and policy imperatives to demonstrate readiness to [ FIGURE 3 OMITTED – Figure 3. Many NATO Countries Reluctant to Use Force to Defend Allies ] [ FIGURE 4 OMITTED – Figure 4. NATO Countries Believe U.S. Will Come to Defense of Allies ] fulfill its Article 5 commitments, creating a situation that is not conducive to promoting a conciliatory tone in relations with Russia. This, in turn, exacerbates the risk of further demonstrations of resolve and increases the chance of miscalculation. 5. Close Military Encounters With increasing frequency and alarming regularity, Russian warplanes and warships are coming dangerously close to Western military and civilian assets, creating heightened risks for accidents that could lead to further escalation. As described in a recent report by the European Leadership Network, these close encounters include two near-collisions between Russian military jets and Swedish commercial airliners, repeated incidents of Russian fighter jets “buzzing” U.S. warships in the Black Sea, and incursions and near-incursions by Russian military aircraft into NATO airspace during the last 18 months.20 Russia has insisted that NATO also has engaged in such behavior, arguing that NATO military exercises close to Russian borders have “destabilizing” effects on the region.21 In the absence of routine military-to-military communications (a factor described in more detail later in this paper), these close encounters and military exercises create conditions under which dangerous misunderstandings and accidents could happen—accidents with the potential to prompt rapid escalation. 6. Broken Channels of Communication During the past 18 months, institutions designed to promote dialogue between Western powers and Russia have been suspended or rendered powerless. In March 2014, Russia’s membership in the Group of Eight (G8) was revoked and its participation in G8-linked processes, such as the Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, suspended.22 In April 2014, Russia’s representation at the NATO-Russia Council—the mechanism designed to foster security-related consultation and consensus building—was limited to the Ambassador-level, practically stripping it of any meaningful working-level interactions.23 Meanwhile, Russia withdrew from the Nuclear Security Summit process24 and suspended most of its nuclear security cooperation with the United States.25 Military-to-military engagement on EuroAtlantic issues between NATO and Russia, as well as the United States and Russia, has—for all practical purposes—been terminated. Security confidence-building engagement only continues in the context of arms control verification, an area that has also come under considerable strain as Western powers and Russia accuse each other of Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty violations.26 Such severe curtailment of communications creates little room for confidence-building and increases the likelihood of misunderstandings that could lead to escalation.

2022 SDI Kritik
AFF AT: K—Security › LINK › AT: L – Russia

Securitization theory does NOT explain Russia

van der Laan 16 Mark van der Laan, MA candidate, International Studies, Universiteit Leiden, BA History, University of Amsterdam, “Between a Rock and a Hard Place: A Security Dilemma in the Baltics?” MA thesis, 10-12-2016, /GoGreen!

The main theoretical underpinning of this thesis is, as mentioned before, that of securitisation. 13 The interesting point about this theory as explained by Wæver and others, is that takes a post-modern approach to security. Primarily that a discourse about security can enforce a reality. To specify this to Russian foreign policy, when NATO is seen as the primary adversary, every action by the alliance, such stationing military units Eastern Europe to reassure allies and deter possible military actions, can be viewed as a threat to Russian security concerns. Or as Sergey Karaganov, head of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, puts it in an interview with Der Spiegel, ‘Now, fears in countries like Poland, Lithuania and Latvia are to be allayed by NATO stationing weapons there. But that doesn't help them; we interpret that as a provocation. In a crisis, we will destroy exactly these weapons. Russia will never again fight on its own territory…’14 It must be stressed though that this securitisation debate in this case is not sole a Russian purview. In response to Russian actions taken in Ukraine, and the several large military exercises in the Russian Western Military District, a securitisation debate is taking place in the West. One outcome of this debate were the NATO Summits of 2014, and 2016 which were explicitly concerned with coming up with a response to Russian military aggression.15 Therein lies also a weakness for the securitisation theory. If two narratives are put beside each other, and are then argued to be a discourse, then we might arguably state a false equivalency about the two narratives. While the Russian narrative in regard to the West, is arguably a constructed view of the world, Western concerns about Russian behaviour are arguably justified and a response to Russian aggression. In other words, we must discern fact from bullshit, as Harry Frankfurt put in his article On Bullshit.16 While it can be argued that the current security situation is a construct, this construct has implications in the real world. How did this construct came into being? It can be argued that President Putin’s notion that the collapse of the Soviet as one of the greatest geopolitical disasters of the twentieth century is not without merit.17 If we view the collapse of the Soviet Union as a collapse of an imperial power, Putin’s argument is understandable. Decolonisation can be a traumatic experience, for both the coloniser, and the colonised. The example of how France fought two destructive wars in Algeria and Indochina reminds us, shows that this can be the case. However, how both parties interact with one another after the dust has settled can do much to normalise relations between the two. For much of the past twenty-six years, it seemed that new geopolitical situation in Central and Eastern Europe was a fait accompli. Which was reinforced by several treaties signed in the first decade after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Treaties like the Budapest Memorandum18 and the NATO-Russia Founding Act19 in 1994, and 1997 respectively. Even the advent of President Putin as prime minister, and later as president, gave no indication of major shifts in Russian foreign policy behaviour. While there were tensions in the way NATO resolved the several Balkan conflicts, one would have to be clairvoyant, or extremely pessimistic to predict the current security situation in Europe. Yet, in 2008 with the five-day war against Georgia, and the annexation of Crimea and starting a war in Donbas in 2014, Western governments were confronted by a Russia, willing to bare its teeth to gain a geopolitical advantage. The timing of these actions are arguably well planned. Russia, having invested heavily in upgrading its armed forces, giving it a comparative advantage militarily. This development caught European governments on a vulnerable moment, which issued condemnatory declarations, but lacked substantial tools, save economic sanctions, to give teeth to those condemnations. Due to systemic defence budget cuts in the past twentysix years. Undeterred, Russian sabre rattling has continued unabated.

2022 SDI Kritik
AFF AT: K—Security › LINK › AT: L – Nuke War

Securitizing nuclear deterrence failure spurs peace and disarm mobilization, NOT militarization

Harris & Bender 17 John Harris, Politico editor-in-chief; and Bryan Bender, Politico national security editor; interviewing William Perry, mathematician, engineer, businessman and former Secretary of Defense, currently the Michael and Barbara Berberian Professor (Emeritus) at Stanford University, with a joint appointment at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies and the School of Engineering, “Bill Perry Is Terrified. Why Aren’t You?” Politico, 1-6-2017, /GoGreen!

At this naked moment in the American experiment, when many people perceive civilization on the verge of blowing up in some metaphorical sense, there is an elderly man in California hoping to seize your attention about another possibility. It is that civilization is on the verge of blowing up in a non-metaphorical sense. William J. Perry is 89 now, at the tail end of one of his generation’s most illustrious careers in national security. By all rights, the former U.S. secretary of Defense, a trained mathematician who served or advised nearly every administration since Eisenhower, should be filling out the remainder of his years in quiet reflection on his achievements. Instead, he has set out on an urgent pilgrimage. Bill Perry has become, he says with a rueful smile, “a prophet of doom.” His life’s work, most of it highly classified, was nuclear weapons—how to maximize the fearsome deterrent power of the U.S. arsenal, how to minimize the possibility that the old Soviet arsenal would obliterate the United States and much of the planet along the way. Perry played a supporting role in the Cuban Missile Crisis, during which he went back to his Washington hotel room each night, fearing he had only hours left to live. He later founded his own successful defense firm, helped revolutionize the American way of high-tech war, and honed his diplomatic skills seeking common ground on security issues with the Soviets and Chinese—all culminating as head of the Pentagon in the early years after the end of the Cold War. Nuclear bombs are an area of expertise Perry had assumed would be largely obsolete by now, seven decades after Hiroshima, a quarter-century after the fall of the Soviet Union, and in the flickering light of his own life. Instead, nukes are suddenly—insanely, by Perry’s estimate—once again a contemporary nightmare, and an emphatically ascendant one. At the dawn of 2017, there is a Russian president making bellicose boasts about his modernized arsenal. There is an American president-elect who breezily free-associates on Twitter about starting a new nuclear arms race. Decades of cooperation between the two nations on arms control is nearly at a standstill. And, unlike the original Cold War, this time there is a world of busy fanatics excited by the prospect of a planet with more bombs—people who have already demonstrated the desire to slaughter many thousands of people in an instant, and are zealously pursuing ever more deadly means to do so. And there’s one other difference from the Cold War: Americans no longer think about the threat every day. Nuclear war isn’t the subtext of popular movies, or novels; disarmament has fallen far from the top of the policy priority list. The largest upcoming generation, the millennials, were raised in a time when the problem felt largely solved, and it’s easy for them to imagine it’s still quietly fading into history. The problem is, it’s no longer fading. “Today, the danger of some sort of a nuclear catastrophe is greater than it was during the Cold War,” Perry said in an interview in his Stanford office, “and most people are blissfully unaware of this danger.” It is a turn of events that has an old man newly obsessed with a question: Why isn’t everyone as terrified as he is? Perry’s hypothesis for the disconnect is that much of the population, especially that rising portion with no clear memories of the first Cold War, is suffering from a deficit of comprehension. Even a single nuclear explosion in a major city would represent an abrupt and possibly irreversible turn in modern life, upending the global economy, forcing every open society to suspend traditional liberties and remake itself into a security state. “The political, economic and social consequences are beyond what people understand,” Perry says. And yet many people place this scenario in roughly the same category as the meteor strike that supposedly wiped out the dinosaurs—frightening, to be sure, but something of an abstraction. So Perry regards his last great contribution of a 65-year career as a crusade to stimulate the public imagination—to share the vivid details of his own nightmares. He is doing so in a recent memoir, in a busy public speaking schedule, in half-empty hearing rooms on Capitol Hill, and increasingly with an online presence aimed especially at young people. He has enlisted the help of his 28-year-old granddaughter to figure out how to engage a new generation, including through a series of virtual lectures known as a MOOC, or massive open online course. He is eagerly signing up for “Ask Me Anything” chats on Reddit, in which some people still confuse him with William “The Refrigerator” Perry of NFL fame. He posts his ruminations on YouTube, where they give Katy Perry no run for her money, even as the most popular are closing in on 100,000 views. One of the nightmare scenarios Perry invokes most often is designed to roust policymakers who live and work in the nation’s capital. The terrorists would need enriched uranium. Due to the elaborate and highly industrial nature of production, hard to conceal from surveillance, fissile material is still hard to come by—but, alas, far from impossible. Once it is procured, with help from conspirators in a poorly secured overseas commercial power centrifuge facility, the rest of the plot as Perry imagines it is no great technological or logistical feat. The mechanics of building a crude nuclear device are easily within the reach of well-educated and well-funded militants. The crate would arrive at Dulles International Airport, disguised as agricultural freight. The truck bomb that detonates on Pennsylvania Avenue between the White House and Capitol instantly kills the president, vice president, House speaker, and 80,000 others. Where exactly is your office? Your house? And then, as Perry spins it forward, how credible would you find the warnings, soon delivered to news networks, that five more bombs are set to explode in unnamed U.S. cities, once a week for the next month, unless all U.S. military personnel overseas are withdrawn immediately? If this particular scenario does not resonate with you, Perry can easily rattle off a long roster of others—a regional war that escalates into a nuclear exchange, a miscalculation between Moscow and Washington, a computer glitch at the exact wrong moment. They are all ilks of the same theme—the dimly understood threat that the science of the 20th century is set to collide with the destructive passions of the 21st. “We’re going back to the kind of dangers we had during the Cold War,” Perry said. “I really thought in 1990, 1991, 1992, that we left those behind us. We’re starting to re-invent them. We and the Russians and others don’t understand that what we’re doing is re-creating those dangers—or maybe they don’t remember the dangers. For younger people, they didn’t live through those dangers. But when you live through a Cuban Missile Crisis up close and you live through a false alarm up close, you do understand how dangerous it is, and you believe you should do everything you could possibly do to [avoid] going back.” For people who follow the national security priesthood, the dire scenarios are all the more alarming for who is delivering them. Through his long years in government Perry invariably impressed colleagues as the calmest person in the room, relentlessly rational, such that people who did not know him well—his love of music and literature and travel—regarded his as a purely analytical mind, emotion subordinated to logic and duty. Starting in the 1950s as a technology executive and entrepreneur in some of the most secretive precincts of the defense industry, he gradually took on a series of high-level government assignments that gave him one of the most quietly influential careers of the Cold War and its aftermath. Fifteen years before serving as Bill Clinton’s secretary of defense, Perry was the Pentagon official in charge of weapons research during the Carter administration. It was from this perch that he may have had his most far-reaching impact, and left him in some circles as a legendary figure. He used his office to give an essential push to two ideas that transformed warfare over the next generation decisively to American advantage. One idea was stealth technology, which allowed U.S. warplanes to fly over enemy territory undetected. The other was precision-guided munitions, which allowed U.S. bombs to land with near-perfect accuracy. During the Clinton years, Perry so prized his privacy that he initially turned down the job of Defense secretary—changing his mind only after Clinton and Al Gore pleaded with him that the news media scrutiny wouldn’t be so bad. The reputation he built over a life in the public sphere is starkly at odds with this latest highly impassioned chapter of Perry’s career. Harold Brown, who also is 89, first recruited Perry into government, and was Perry’s boss while serving as Defense secretary in the Carter years. “No one would have thought of Bill Perry as a crusader,” he says. “But he is on a crusade.” Lee Perry, his wife of nearly 70 years, is living in an elder care facility, her once buoyant presence now lost to dementia. Perry himself, lucid as ever, has seen his physical frame become frail and stooped. Rather than slowing his schedule, he has accelerated his travels to plead with people to awaken to the danger. A trip to Washington includes a dinner with national security reporters and testimony on Capitol Hill. Back home in California, he’s at the Google campus to prod engineers to contemplate that their world may not last long enough for their dreams of technology riches to come true. He’s created an advocacy group, the William J. Perry project, devoted to public education about nuclear weapons. He’s enlisted both his granddaughter and his 64-year-old daughter, Robin Perry, in the cause. But if his profile is rising, his style is essentially unchanged. He is a man known for self-effacement, trying to shape an era known for relentless self-promotion, a voice of quiet precision in a time of devil-take-the-hindmost bombast. The rational approach to problem-solving that propelled his career and won him adherents and friends in both political parties and even among some of America’s erstwhile enemies remains his guide—in this case, by endeavoring to calculate the possibilities and probabilities of a terrorist attack, regional nuclear war, or horrible miscalculation with Russia. “I want to be very clear,” he said. “I do not think it is a probability this year or next year or anytime in the foreseeable future. But the consequence is so great, we have to take it seriously. And there are things to greatly lower those possibilities that we’re simply not doing.” *** Perry really did not expect he would have to write this chapter of his public life. His official career closed with what seemed then an unambiguous sense of mission accomplished. By the time he arrived in the Pentagon’s top job in 1994, the Cold War was over, and the main item on the nuclear agenda seemed to be cleaning up no-longer-needed arsenals. As defense secretary, Perry stood with his Russian counterpart, Pavel Grachev, as they jointly blew up missile silos in the former Soviet Union and tilled sunflower seeds in the dirt. “I finally thought by the end of the ‘80s we lived through this horrible experience and it’s behind us,” Perry said. “When I was secretary, I fully believed it was behind us.” After leaving the Pentagon, he accepted an assignment from Clinton to negotiate an end to North Korea’s nuclear development program—and seemed agonizingly close to a breakthrough as the last days of the president’s term expired. Now, he sees his grandchildren inheriting a planet possibly more dangerous than it was during his public career. No one could doubt that the Sept. 11 terrorists would have gladly used nuclear bombs instead of airplanes if they had had them, and it seems only a matter of time until they try. Instead of a retreating threat in North Korea, that fanatical regime now possesses as many as eight nuclear bombs, and is just one member of a growing nuclear club. Far from a new partnership with Russia, Vladimir Putin has given old antagonisms a malevolent new face. American policymakers talk of spending up to $1 trillion to modernize the nuclear arsenal. And now comes Donald Trump with a long trail of statements effectively shrugging his shoulders about a world newly bristling with bombs and people with reasons to use them. Perry knew Hillary Clinton well professionally, and says he admired both her and Bill Clinton for their professional judgment though he was never a personal intimate of either. He was prescient before the election in expressing skepticism about how voters would respond to the dynastic premise of the Clinton campaign—a healthy democracy should grow new voices—but was as surprised as everyone else on Election Day. Donald Trump was not the voice he was looking for, to put it mildly, but he has responded to the Trump cyclone with modulated restraint. Perry said he assumes his most truculent rhetoric isn’t serious, the utterances of a man who assumed his words were for political effect only and had no real consequences. Now that they do, Perry is hoping to serve as a kind of ambassador to rationality. He said he is hoping for audiences soon, with Trump if the incoming president will see him, and certainly Trump’s national security team, which includes several people Perry knows, including Defense Secretary nominee James Mattis. There is little doubt the message if the meeting comes. “We are starting a new Cold War,” he says. “We seem to be sleepwalking into this new nuclear arms race. … We and the Russians and others don’t understand what we are doing.” “I am not suggesting that this Cold War and this arms race is identical to the old one,” Perry added. “But in many ways, it is just as bad, just as dangerous. And totally unnecessary.” *** Perry had been brooding over the question for a year. It was in the early 1950s, he was still in his 20s, and the subject was partial differential equations—the topic of his Ph.D. thesis. A particular problem had been absorbing him, day in and day out, hours and hours on end. Then, out of nowhere, a light came on. “I woke up in the middle of the night, and it was all there,” Perry recalled. “It was all there, and I got out of bed and sat down. The next two or three hours, I wrote my thesis, and from the first word I wrote down, I never doubted what the last word was going to be: It was a magic moment.” The story is a reminder of something definitional about Bill Perry. Before he became in recent years an apostle of disarmament, before he sat atop the nation’s war-making apparatus in the 1990s, before he was the executive of a defense contractor specializing in the most complex arenas of Cold War surveillance in the 1960s, he was a young man in love with mathematics. In those days, Perry had planned on a career as a math professor. His attraction to math was not merely practical, in the way that engineers or architects rely on math. The appeal was just as much aesthetic, in ways that people who are not numbers people—political life tends to be dominated by word people—cannot easily comprehend. To Perry’s mind, there was a purity to math, a beauty to the patterns and relationships, that was not unlike music. Math for Perry represented analytical discipline, a way of achieving mastery not only over numerical problems but any hard problem, by breaking it down into essential parts, distilling complexity into simplicity. This trait was why Pentagon reporters in the 1990s liked spending time around Perry. When most public officials are asked a question, one studies the transcript later to decipher a succession of starts and stalls, sentence fragments and ellipses, that cumulatively convey an impressionistic sense of mind but no clear fixed meaning. Perry’s sentences, by contrast, always cut with surgical precision. It was one reason Clinton White House officials often held their breath when he gave interviews—Perry might make news by being clear on subjects, such as ethnic warfare in the Balkans or a nuclear showdown in North Korea, that the West Wing preferred to try to fog over. “I’ve never been able to attack a policy problem with a mathematical formula,” he recalled, “but I have always believed that the rigorous way of thinking about a problem was good. It separated the fact from the bullshit, and that’s very important sometimes, to separate what you can from what you would hope you can do.” Perry wishes more people were familiar with the concept of “expected value.” That is a statistical way of understanding events of very large magnitude that have a low probability. The large magnitude event could be something good, like winning a lottery ticket. Or it could be something bad, like a nuclear bomb exploding. Because the odds of winning the lottery are so low, the rational thing is to save your money and not buy the ticket. As for a nuclear explosion, by Perry’s lights, the consequences are so grave that the rational thing would be for people in the United States and everywhere to be in a state of peak alarm about their vulnerability, and for political debate to be dominated by discussion of how to reduce the risk. And just how high is the risk? The answer of course is ultimately unknowable. Perry’s point, though, is that it’s a hell of a lot higher than you think. Perry invites his listeners to consider all the various scenarios that might lead to a nuclear event. “Mathematically speaking, you add those all together in one year it is still just a possibility, not a probability,” he reckons. “But then you go out ten, twenty years and each time this possibility repeats itself, and then it starts to become a probability. How much time we have to get those possibility numbers lower, I don’t know. But sooner or later the odds are going to get us, I am afraid.” *** Almost uniquely among living Americans, Bill Perry has actually faced down the prospect of nuclear war before—twice. In the fall of 1962, Bill Perry was 35, father of five young children, living in the Bay Area and serving as director of Sylvania’s Electronic Defense Laboratories—driving his station wagon to recitals in between studying missile trajectories and the radius of nuclear detonations. Where he resided was not then called Silicon Valley, but the exuberance and spirit of creative possibility we now associate with the region was already evident. The giants then were Bill Hewlett and David Packard, men Perry deeply admired and wished to emulate in his own business career. The innovation engine at that time, however, was not consumer technology; it was the government’s appetite for advantage in a mortal struggle against a powerful Soviet foe. Perry was known as a star in the highly complex field of weapons surveillance and interpretation. So it was not a surprise, one bright October day, for Perry to get a call from Albert “Bud” Wheelon, a friend at the Central Intelligence Agency. Wheelon said he wanted Perry in Washington for a consultation. Perry said he’d juggle his schedule and be there the next week. “No,” Wheelon responded. “I need to see you right away.” Perry caught the red-eye from San Francisco, and went straight to the CIA, where he was handed photographs whose meaning was instantly clear to him. They were of Soviet missiles stationed in Cuba. For the next couple weeks, Perry would stay up past midnight each evening poring over the latest reconnaissance photos and help write the analysis that senior officials would present the next morning to President Kennedy. Perry experienced the crisis partly as ordinary citizen, hearing Kennedy on television draw an unambiguous line against Soviet missiles in this hemisphere and promising that any attack would be met with “a full retaliatory response.” But he possessed context, about the capabilities of weapons and the daily state of play in the crisis, that gave him a vantage point superior to that of all but perhaps a few dozen people. “I was part of a small team—six or eight people,” he recounted of those days 54 years earlier. “Half of them technical experts, half of them intelligence analysts, or photo interpreters. It was a minor role but I was seeing all the information coming in. I thought every day when I went back to the hotel it was the last day of my life because I knew exactly what nuclear weapons could do. I knew it was not just a lot of people getting killed. It was the end of civilization and I thought it was about to happen.” It was years later that Perry, like other more senior participants in the crisis, learned how right that appraisal was. Nuclear bombs weren’t only heading toward Cuba on Soviet ships, as Kennedy believed and announced to Americans at the time. Some of them were already there, and local commanders had been given authority to use them if Americans launched a preemptive raid on Cuba, as Kennedy was being urged, goaded even, by Air Force Gen. Curtis LeMay and other military commanders. At the same time, Soviet submarines were armed and one commander had been on the verge of launching them until other officers on the vessel talked him out of it. Either event would have in turn sent U.S. missiles flying. The Cuban Missile Crisis recounting is one of the dramatic peaks in “My Journey on the Nuclear Brink,” the memoir Perry published last fall. It is a book laced with other close calls—like November 9, 1979, when Perry was awakened in the middle of the night by a watch officer at the North American Aerospace and Defense Command (NORAD) reporting that his computers showed 200 Soviet missiles in flight toward the United States. For a frozen moment, Perry thought: This is it—This is how it ends. The watch officer soon set him at ease. It was a computer error, and he was calling to see whether Perry, the technology expert, had any explanation. It took a couple days to discover the low-tech answer: Someone had carelessly left a crisis-simulation training tape in the computer. All was well. But what if this blunder had happened in the middle of a real crisis, with leaders in Washington and Moscow already on high alert? The inescapable conclusion was the same as it was in 1962: The world skirting nuclear Armageddon as much by good luck as by skilled crisis management. Perry is part of a distinct cohort in American history, one that didn’t come home with the large-living ethos of the World War II generation, but took responsibility for cleaning up the world that the war bequeathed. He was a 14-year-old in Butler, Pennsylvania when he heard the news of the Pearl Harbor attack in a friend’s living room, and had the disappointed realization that the war might be over by the time he was old enough to fight in it. That turned out to be true—he was just shy of 18 at war’s end—a fact that places Perry in what demographers have called the “Silent Generation,” too young for one war but already middle-aged by the time college campuses erupted over Vietnam. Like many in his generation, Perry was not so much silent as deeply dutiful, with an understated style that served as a genial, dry-witted exterior to a life in which success was defined by how faithfully one met his responsibilities. Perry said he became aware, first gradually and over time profoundly, of the surreal contradictions of his professional life. His work—first at Sylvania and then at ESL, a highly successful defense contracting firm he co-founded in 1963—was relentlessly logical, analyzing Soviet threats and intentions and coming up with rational responses to deter them. But each rational move was part of a supremely irrational dynamic—“mutually assured destruction”—that placed the threat of massive casualties at the heart of America’s basic strategic thinking. It was the kind of framework in which policymakers could accept that a mere 25 million people dead was good news. Also the kind that in one year alone led the United States to produce 8,000 nuclear bombs. By the end, the Cold War left the planet with about 70,000 bombs (a total that is now down to about 15,500). “I think probably everybody who was involved in nuclear weapons in those days would see the two sides of it,” Perry recalls, “the logic of deterrence and the madness of deterrence, and there was no mistake, I think, that the acronym was MAD.” *** Perry has been at the forefront of a movement that he considers the sane and only alternative, and he has joined forces with other leading Cold Warriors who in another era would likely have derided their vision as naïve. In January 2007, he was a co-author of a remarkable commentary that ran on the op-ed page of the Wall Street Journal. It was signed also by two former secretaries of state, George Schulz and Henry Kissinger and by Sam Nunn, a former chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee—all leading military hawks and foreign policy realists who came together to argue for something radical: that the goal of U.S. policy should be not merely the reduction and control of atomic arms, it should be the ultimate elimination of all nuclear weapons. This sounded like gauzy utopianism, especially bizarre coming from supremely pragmatic men. But Perry and the others always made clear they were describing a long-term ideal, one that would only be achieved through a series of more incremental steps. The vision was stirring enough that it was endorsed by President Obama in his opening weeks in office, in a March 2009 address in Prague. In retrospect, Obama’s speech may have been the high point for the vision of abolition. “A huge amount of progress was made,” recalled Shultz, now 93. “Now it is going in the other direction.” “We have less danger of an all-out war with Russia,” in Nunn’s view. “But we have more danger of some type of accident, miscalculation, cyber interference, a terrorist group getting a nuclear weapon. It requires a lot more attention than world leaders are giving it.” Perry’s goal now is much more defensive than it was just a few years ago—halting what has become inexorable momentum toward reviving Cold War assumptions about the central role of nukes in national security. More recently he’s added yet another recruit to his cause: California Governor Jerry Brown. Brown, now 78, met Perry a year ago, after deciding that he wanted to devote his remaining time in public service mainly to what he sees as civilization’s two existential issues, climate change and nuclear weapons. Brown said he became fixated on spreading Perry’s message after reading his memoir: He recently gave a copy to President Obama and is trying to bend the ear of others with influence in Washington. If Bill Perry has a gift for understatement, Brown has a gift for the theatrical. In an interview at the governor’s mansion in Sacramento, he wonders why everyone is not paying attention to his new friend and his warnings for mankind. “He is at the brink! At the brink! Not WAS at the brink—IS at the brink,” Brown exclaimed. “But no one else is.” A California governor can have more influence, at least indirectly, than one might think, due to the state’s outsized role in policy debates and the fact that the University of California’s Board of Regents helps manage some of the nation’s top weapons laboratories, which study and design nuclear weapons. Brown, who was a vocal critic in the 1980s of what he called America's "nuclear addiction," reviewed Perry's recent memoir in the New York Review of Books, and said he is determined to help his new friend spread his message. “Everybody is, 'we are not at the brink,' and we have this guy Perry who says we are. It is the thesis that is being ignored." Even if more influential people wake up to Perry’s message—a nuclear event is more likely and will be more terrible than you realize—a hard questions remains: Now what? This is where Perry’s pragmatism comes back into play. The smartest move, he thinks, is to eliminate the riskiest part of the system. If we can’t eliminate all nukes, Perry argues, we could at least eliminate one leg of the so-called nuclear triad, intercontinental ballistic missiles. These are especially prone to an accidental nuclear war, if they are launched by accident or due to miscalculation by a leader operating with only minutes to spare. Nuclear weapons carried by submarines beneath the sea or aboard bomber planes, he argues, are logically more than enough to deter Russia. The problem, he knows, is that logic is not necessarily the prevailing force in political debates. Psychology is, and this seems to be dictating not merely that we deter a Russian military force that is modernizing its weapons but that we have a force that is self-evidently superior to them. It is an argument that strikes Perry as drearily familiar to the old days. Which leads him the conclusion that the only long-term way out is to persuade a younger generation to make a different choice. His granddaughter, Lisa Perry, is precisely in the cohort he needs to reach. At first she had some uncomfortable news for her grandfather: Not many in her generation thought much about the issue. “The more I learned from him about nuclear weapons the more concerned I was that my generation had this massive and dangerous blind spot in our understanding of the world,” she said in an interview. “Nuclear weapons are the biggest public health issue I can think of.” But she has not lost hope that their efforts can make a difference, and today she has put her graduate studies in public health on hold to work full time for the Perry Project as its social media and web manager. “It can be easy to get discouraged about being able to do anything to change our course,” she said. “But the good news is that nuclear weapons are actually something that we as humans can control...but first we need to start the conversation.” It was with her help that Perry went on Reddit to field questions ranging from how his PhD in mathematics prepared him to what young people need to understand. “As a 90s baby I never lived in the Cold War era,” wrote one participant, with the Reddit username BobinForApples. “What is one thing today's generations will never understand about life during the Cold War?” Perry’s answered, as SecDef19: “Because you were born in the 1990s, you did not experience the daily terror of ‘duck and cover’ drills as my children did. Therefore the appropriate fear of nuclear weapons is not part of your heritage, but the danger is just as real now as it was then. It will be up to your generation to develop the policies to deal with the deadly nuclear legacy that is still very much with us.” For the former defense secretary, the task now is to finally—belatedly—prove Einstein wrong. The physicist said in 1946: “The unleashed power of the atom has changed everything save our modes of thinking and we thus drift toward unparalleled catastrophe.” In Perry’s view the only way to avoid it is by directly contemplating catastrophe—and doing so face to face with the world’s largest nuclear power, Russia, as he recently did in a forum in Luxembourg with several like-minded Russians he says are brave enough to speak out about nuclear dangers in the era of Putin. “We could solve it,” he said. “When you’re a prophet of doom, what keeps you going is not just prophesizing doom but saying there are things we do to avoid that doom. That’s where the optimism is.”

2022 SDI Kritik
AFF AT: K—Security › LINK › AT: L – Extinction

Extinction scenarios do NOT create docile subjects tolerant of violent overreactions – that ignores the other half of the 1AC explaining why plan makes those responses unnecessary – rather, provokes reflection and criticism of the underlying conditions that make it possible – refusing to consider existential risks is itself existential

Stevens, 18—Lecturer in Global Security, King’s College London (Tim, “Exeunt Omnes? Survival, Pessimism and Time in the Work of John H. Herz,” Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 46, No. 3, pp. 283-302, dml) [ableist language modifications denoted by brackets]

Herz explicitly combined, therefore, a political realism with an ethical idealism, resulting in what he termed a ‘survival ethic’.65 This was applicable to all humankind and its propagation relied on the generation of what he termed ‘world-consciousness’.66 Herz’s implicit recognition of an open yet linear temporality allowed him to imagine possible futures aligned with the survival ethic, whilst at the same time imagining futures in which humans become extinct. His pessimism about the latter did not preclude working towards the former. As Herz recognised, it was one thing to develop an ethics of survival but quite another to translate theory into practice. What was required was a collective, transnational and inherently interdisciplinary effort to address nuclear and environmental issues and to problematize notions of security, sustainability and survival in the context of nuclear geopolitics and the technological transformation of society. Herz proposed various practical ways in which young people in particular could become involved in this project. One idea floated in the 1980s, which would alarm many in today’s more cosmopolitan and culturally-sensitive IR, was for a Peace Corps-style ‘peace and development service’, which would ‘crusade’ to provide ‘something beneficial for people living under unspeakably sordid conditions’ in the ‘Third World’.67 He expended most of his energy, however, from the 1980s onwards, in thinking about and formulating ‘a new subdiscipline of the social sciences’, which he called ‘Survival Research’.68 Informed by the survival ethic outlined above, and within the overarching framework of his realist liberal internationalism, Survival Research emerged as Herz’s solution to the shortcomings of academic research, public education and policy development in the face of global catastrophe.69 It was also Herz’s plea to scholars to venture beyond the ivory tower and become – excusing the gendered language of the time – ‘homme engagé, if not homme révolté’.70 His proposals for Survival Research were far from systematic but they reiterated his life-long concerns with nuclear and environmental issues, and with the necessity to act in the face of threats to human survival. The principal responsibilities of survival researchers were two-fold. One, to raise awareness of survival issues in the minds of policy-makers and the public, and to demonstrate the link between political inaction now and its effect on subsequent human survival. Two, to suggest and shape new attitudes more ‘appropriate to the solution of new and unfamiliar survival problems’, rather than relying on ingrained modes of thought and practice.71 The primary initial purpose, therefore, of Survival Research would be to identify scientific, sociocultural and political problems bearing on the possibilities of survival, and to begin to develop ways of overcoming these. This was, admittedly, non-specific and somewhat vague, but the central thrust of his proposal was clear: ‘In our age of global survival concerns, it should be the primary responsibility of scholars to engage in survival issues’.72 Herz considered IR an essential disciplinary contributor to this endeavour, one that should be promiscuous across the social and natural sciences. It should not be afraid to think the worst, if the worst is at all possible, and to establish the various requirements – social, economic, political – of ‘a livable world’.73 How this long-term project would translate into global policy is not specified but, consistent with his previous work, Herz identified the need for shifts in attitudes to and awareness of global problems and solutions. Only then would it be possible for ‘a turn round that demands leadership to persuade millions to change lifestyles and make the sacrifices needed for survival’.74 Productive pessimism and temporality In 1976, shortly before he began compiling the ideas that would become Survival Research, Herz wrote: For the first time, we are compelled to take the futuristic view if we want to make sure that there will be future generations at all. Acceleration of developments in the decisive areas (demographic, ecological, strategic) has become so strong that even the egotism of après nous le déluge might not work because the déluge may well overtake ourselves, the living.75 Of significance here is not the appeal to futurism per se, although this is important, but the suggestion this is ‘the first time’ futurism is necessary to ensuring human survival. This is Herz the realist declaring a break with conventional realism: Herz is not bound to a cyclical vision of political or historical time in which events and processes reoccur over and again. His identification of nuclear weapons as an ‘absolute novum’ in international politics demonstrates this belief in the non-cyclical nature of humankind’s unfolding temporality.76 As Sylvest observes of Herz’s attitude to the nuclear revolution, ‘the horizons of meaning it produced installed a temporal break with the past, and simultaneously carried a promise for the future’.77 This ‘promise for the future’ was not, however, a simple liberal view of a better future consonant with human progress. His autobiography is clear that his experiences of Nazism and the Holocaust destroyed all remnants of any original belief in ‘inevitable progress’.78 His frustration at scientism, technocratic deception, and the brutal rationality of twentieth-century killing, all but demanded a rejection of the liberal dream and the inevitability of its consummation. If the ‘new age’ ushered in by nuclear weapons, he wrote, is characterised by anything, it is by its ‘indefiniteness of the age and the uncertainties of the future’; it was impossible under these conditions to draw firm conclusions about the future course of international politics.79 Instead, he recognised the contingency, precarity and fragility of international politics, and the ghastly tensions inherent to the structural core of international politics, the security dilemma.80 Herz was uneasy with both cyclical and linear-progressive ways of perceiving historical time. The former ‘closed’ temporalities are endemic to versions of realist IR, the latter to post-Enlightenment narratives feeding liberal-utopian visions of international relations and those of Marxism.81 In their own ways, each marginalises and diminishes the contingency of the social world in and through time, and the agency of political actors in effecting change. Simultaneously, each shapes the futures that may be imagined and brought into being. Herz recognised this danger. Whilst drawing attention to his own gloomy disposition, he warns that without care and attention, ‘the assumption may determine the event’.82 As a pessimist, Herz was alert to the hazard of succumbing to negativity, cynicism or resignation. E.H. Carr recognised this also, in the difference between the ‘deterministic pessimism’ of ‘pure’ realism and those realists ‘who have made their mark on history’; the latter may be pessimists but they still believe ‘human affairs can be directed and modified by human action and human thought’.83 Herz would share this anti-deterministic perspective with Carr. Moreover, the possibility of agency is a product of a temporality ‘neither temporally closed nor deterministic, neither cyclical nor linear-progressive; it is rooted in contingency’.84 Again quoting from his autobiographical account of the impact of Nazism, Herz described the relationship between his early pessimism and his developing intellectual stance: The world became a theatre of the absurd. Suicide would probably have been the logical next move, and I considered it from time to time. But I was still too young for such a radical step. One thing, however, emerged: a growing interest in domestic and, above all, international politics. My complete resignation was no longer appropriate. If not from within, fascism might perhaps still be destroyed from without. To my continuing interest in theory, therefore, was added a practical interest in action.85 Channelling the spirit of E.H. Carr, he wrote of this ‘brutal awakening’ to the nature of power politics in the 1930s that, ‘Study could no longer be “pure” research; it had to become research committed to warn of the deadly peril and show the way to the necessary action.’86 His commitment to active engagement was an early one, gestated during his personal experiences of Nazism in the 1930s.87 This desire to combat Nazism from the outside was manifest in his activities for the Allies during and after World War II but it coloured his scholarly life also. Herz recognised pessimism was a powerful force in his life but, rather than overcome or mask it, he used it to propel his intellectual project further, and to engage with, not withdraw from, the world. He was, as van Munster and Sylvest relate, ‘[d]eeply pessimistic yet a committed social thinker’.88 Herz was explicit about this: a realistic and consistent pessimism can clarify where we are and prepare us to do what is necessary.89 Pessimism is a necessary component of a realistic view of the world, upon which proper and reasoned action can be founded. In this sense, pessimism can be productive. It produces positive outcomes through action, rather than negative ones through inaction or resignation. These are subjective value-judgements, to be sure, but are obtained through a process of realist engagement with the world, rather than blind [mere] fumbling or ideological railroading. Survival Research was a response to Herz’s pessimism about the future, not a rejection of it. This leads us to two observations about the relevance of pessimism to the study of international relations. The first is that pessimism does not imply disengagement from the world. If anything, the example of John Herz suggests the opposite. He was a pessimist, but his brand of pessimism was no ‘passive fatalism’.90 As he recalled a few years before he died, ‘I consider myself a realist who comes sometimes to pessimistic conclusions, but never gives up looking for solutions if ever so difficult ones’.91 Pessimism can be a spur to thought and to action and need not be a watchword for conservatism in theory or practice.92 This is not to say being a pessimist is easy. Morgenthau, for his part, ‘never flagged in efforts to use his conceptual skills to help improve the human condition’, despite his pessimism about the ability and will of people to take the long view on significant political issues.93 This required that scholars chart different paths through troublesome times and articulate alternative visions of international order, not to preclude political action but to facilitate it; not quite the conservative position realism is often assumed to occupy.94 In the face of worldly frustrations and horrors, it is this attention to the production of alternative futures that prevents ‘pessimism from turning into fatalism’.95 The second observation is that it is unhelpful and misleading to treat pessimism and optimism as oppositional.96 Pessimism and optimism are commonly regarded as antonyms but often enjoy a symbiotic relationship. In Herz, they mingle and cross-pollinate in ways that defy easy explication. Stirk claims, for instance, that Herz’s optimism about how the world could be refashioned ‘was never more than guarded’, restrained by his fierce attachment to the importance of the security dilemma.97 Puglierin notes that his ‘blatant pessimism’ (eklatanter Pessimismus) was always accompanied by some form of optimism.98 We are reminded of Gramsci’s famous statement regarding ‘pessimism of intellect, optimism of the will’ as the cognitive binary at work in the political mind.99 Even as his pessimism deepened over the course of his career, he was always wont to end his analyses with a ‘yet’ or ‘in spite of it all’.100 Importantly, as he became more pessimistic, ‘the solutions he proposed became ever more ambitious’.101 His growing pessimism was accompanied by increasing resolve to tackle the problems of the world head-on, although, as he admitted in a footnote in the 1980s, ‘Not for a moment do I have the illusion that what I have proposed is likely to happen’.102 A suitably pessimistic aside, perhaps, but it did not deter him from continuing his project for another twenty years. This drive seems not to be rooted in optimistic conviction, nor even a subtle version of hope, but in a properly pessimistic reading of the world and its possibilities, engendered as they were by the ontological temporality of perpetual change.

2022 SDI Kritik
AFF AT: K—Security › LINK › AT: L – Environment

Empirics prove they’re NOT coopted toward militarism and are key to our internal links

Leeson-Schatz 12 Joe Leeson-Schatz, Director of Speech & Debate, and teaches Media & Politics, Binghamton University, PhD English, Binghamton University, “The Importance of Apocalypse: The Value of End-Of- The-World Politics While Advancing Ecocriticism,” Journal of Ecocriticism, 4(2), 2012 /GoGreen!

It is no longer a question that human interaction with the world is destroying the very ecosystems that sustain life1. Nevertheless, within academic communities people are divided over which discursive tactic, ontological position, or strategy for activism should be adopted. I contend that regardless of an ecocritic’s particular orientation that ecocriticism most effectively produces change when it doesn’t neglect the tangible reality that surrounds any discussion of the environment. This demands including human-induced ecocidal violence within all our accounts. Retreating from images of ecological collapse to speak purely within inner-­‐academic or policymaking circles isolates our conversations away from the rest of the world—as it dies before our eyes.This is not to argue that interrogating people’s discourse, tactics, ontological orientation, or anything else lacks merit. Timothy Luke, Chair and Distinguished Professor of Political Science at the Virginia Polytechnic Institute, explains thatBecause nothing in Nature simply is given within society, such terms must be assigned significance by every social group that mobilizes them[.] ... Many styles of ecologically grounded criticism circulate in present-­‐day American mass culture, partisan debate, consumer society, academic discourse, and electoral politics as episodes of ecocritique, contesting our politics of nature, economy, and culture in the contemporary global system of capitalist production and consumption. (1997: xi)Luke reminds us that regardless of how ecocritics advance their agenda they always impact our environmental awareness and therefore alter our surrounding ecology. In doing so he shows that both literal governmental policies and the symbolic universe they take place within reconstruct the discourses utilized to justify policy and criticism in the first place. This is why films like The Day After Tomorrow and 2012 can put forth realistic depictions of government response to environmental apocalypse. And despite being fictional, these films in turn can influence the reality of governmental policy. Even the science-­‐fiction of weather-­‐controlling weapons are now only steps away from becoming reality2.Oftentimes it takes images of planetary annihilation to motivate people into action after years of sitting idly by watching things slowly decay. In reality it takes awareness of impending disaster to compel policymakers to enact even piecemeal reform. On the screen it takes the actual appearance of ecological apocalypse to set the plot in motion. What is constant is that “as these debates unfold, visions of what is the good or bad life ... find many of their most compelling articulations as ecocritiques ... [that are] mobilized for and against various projects of power and economy in the organization of our everyday existence” (Luke 1997: xi). We cannot motivate people to change the ecological conditions that give rise to thoughts of theorization without reference to the concrete environmental destruction ongoing in reality. This means that, even when our images of apocalypse aren’t fully accurate, our use of elements of scientifically-established reality reconstructs the surrounding power structures in beneficial ways. When we ignore either ecological metaphors or environmental reality we only get part of the picture.`In recent years, many ecocritics have shied away from the very metaphors that compel a sense of urgency. They have largely done so out of the fear that its deployment will get co-opted by hegemonic institutions. Such critics ignore how what we advocate alters our understanding of ourselves to the surrounding ecology. In doing so, our advocacies render such co-optation meaningless because of the possibility to redeploy our metaphors in the future. In the upcoming sections, I will provide an overview of how poststructuralist thinkers like Michel Foucault and Martin Heidegger influence some ecocritics to retreat from omnicidal rhetoric. This retreat minimizes the main objectives of their ecocriticism. I argue that rather than withdrawing from images of apocalypse that we should utilize them in subversive ways to disrupt the current relationship people have to their ecology. Professor of Sociology at York University, Fuyuki Kurasawa argues that “instead of bemoaning the contemporary preeminence of a dystopian imaginary ... it can enable a novel form of transnational socio-political action ... that can be termed preventive foresight. ... [I]t is a mode of ethico-political practice enacted by participants in the emerging realm of global civil society ... [by] putting into practice a sense of responsibility for the future by attempting to prevent global catastrophes” (454-­‐455).

2022 SDI Kritik
AFF AT: K—Security › LINK › AT: L – Environment

Securitizing environmental destruction spurs pro-social responses – NOT militarization

Veldman 12 Robin Veldman, Ph.D. candidate, Religion and Nature, University of Florida, National Foundation Fellow at the Integrative Graduate Education and Research Traineeship, “Narrating the Environmental Apocalypse: How Imagining the End Facilitates Moral Reasoning Among Environmental Activists,” Ethics and the Environment, 17(1), Spring 2012, ProjectMUSE /GoGreen!

Environmental Apocalypticism and Activism As we saw in the introduction, critics often argue that apocalyptic rhetoric induces feelings of hopelessness or fatalism. While it certainly does for some people, in this section I will present evidence that apocalypticism also often goes hand in hand with activism. Some of the strongest evidence of a connection between environmental apocalypticism and activism comes from a national survey that examined whether Americans perceived climate change to be dangerous. As part of his analysis, Anthony Leiserowitz identified several “interpretive communities,” which had consistent demographic characteristics but varied in their levels of risk perception. The group who perceived the risk to be the greatest, which he labeled “alarmists,” described climate change [End Page 5] using apocalyptic language, such as “Bad…bad…bad…like after nuclear war…no vegetation,” “Heat waves, it’s gonna kill the world,” and “Death of the planet” (2005, 1440). Given such language, this would seem to be a reasonable way to operationalize environmental apocalypticism. If such apocalypticism encouraged fatalism, we would expect alarmists to be less likely to have engaged in environmental behavior compared to groups with moderate or low levels of concern. To the contrary, however, Leiserowitz found that alarmists “were significantly more likely to have taken personal action to reduce greenhouse gas emissions” (ibid.) than respondents who perceived climate change to pose less of a threat. Interestingly, while one might expect such radical views to appeal only to a tiny minority, Leiserowitz found that a respectable eleven percent of Americans fell into this group (ibid). Further supporting Leiserowitz’s findings, in a separate national survey conducted in 2008, Maibach, Roser-Renouf, and Leiserowitz found that a group they labeled “the Alarmed” (again, due to their high levels of concern about climate change) “are the segment most engaged in the issue of global warming. They are very convinced it is happening, human-caused, and a serious and urgent threat. The Alarmed are already making changes in their own lives and support an aggressive national response” (2009, 3, emphasis added). This group was far more likely than people with lower levels of concern over climate change to have engaged in consumer activism (by rewarding companies that support action to reduce global warming with their business, for example) or to have contacted elected officials to express their concern. Additionally, the authors found that “[w]hen asked which reason for action was most important to them personally, the Alarmed were most likely to select preventing the destruction of most life on the planet (31%)” (2009, 31)—a finding suggesting that for many in this group it is specifically the desire to avert catastrophe, rather than some other motivation, that encourages pro-environmental behavior. Taken together, these and other studies (cf. Semenza et al. 2008 and DerKarabetia, Stephenson, and Poggi 1996) provide important evidence that many of those who think environmental problems pose a severe threat practice some form of activism, rather than giving way to fatalistic resignation. National surveys give a good overview of the association between apocalypticism and activism among the general public, but they do not [End Page 6] provide sufficient ethnographic detail. To complement this broader picture I now turn to case studies, which provide greater insight into how adherents themselves understand what motivates their environmental behavior. When seeking a subset of environmentalists with apocalyptic beliefs, the radical wing is an obvious place to look. For example, many Earth First!ers believe that the collapse of industrial society is inevitable (Taylor 1994). At the same time, the majority are actively committed to preventing ecological disaster. As Earth First! co-founder Howie Wolke acknowledged, the two are directly connected: “As ecological calamity unravels the living fabric of the Earth, environmental radicalism has become both common and necessary” (1989, 29).3 This logic underlies efforts to preserve wilderness areas, which many radical environmentalists believe will serve as reservoirs of genetic diversity, helping to restore the planet after industrial society collapses (Taylor 1994). In addition to encouraging activism to preserve wilderness, apocalyptic beliefs also motivate practices such as “monkeywrenching,” or ecological sabotage, civil disobedience, and the more conventional “paper monkeywrenching” (lobbying, engaging in public information campaigns to shift legislative priorities, or using lawsuits when these tactics fail). Ultimately, while there are disagreements over what strategies will best achieve their desired goals, for most radical environmentalists, apocalypticism and activism are bound closely together. The connection between belief in impending disaster and environmental activism holds true for Wiccans as well. During fieldwork in the southeastern United States, for example, Shawn Arthur reported meeting “dozens of Wiccans who professed their apocalyptic millenarian beliefs to anyone who expressed interest, yet many others only quietly agreed with them without any further elaboration” (2008, 201). For this group, the coming disaster was understood as divine retribution, the result of an angry Earth Goddess preparing to punish humans for squandering her ecological gifts (Arthur 2008, 203). In light of Gaia’s impending revenge, Arthur found that Wiccans advocated both spiritual and material forms of activism. For example, practices such as Goddess worship, the use of herbal remedies for healing, and awareness of the body and its energies were considered important for initiating a more harmonious relationship with the earth (Arthur 2008, 207). As for material activism, Arthur notes [End Page 7] that the notion of environmental apocalypse played a key role in encouraging pro-environmental behavior: images of immanent [sic] ecological crisis and apocalyptic change often were utilized as motivating factors for developing an environmentally and ecologically conscious worldview; for stressing the importance of working for the Earth through a variety of practices, including environmental activism, garbage collecting, recycling, composting, and religious rituals; for learning sustainable living skills; and for developing a special relationship with the world as a divine entity. (2008, 212) What these studies and my own experiences in the environmentalist milieu4 suggest is that people who make a serious commitment to engaging in environmentally friendly behavior, people who move beyond making superficial changes to making substantial and permanent ones, are quite likely to subscribe to some form of the apocalyptic narrative. All this is not to say that apocalypticism directly or inevitably causes activism, or that believing catastrophe is imminent is the only reason people become activists. However, it is to say that activism and apocalypticism are associated for some people, and that this association is not arbitrary, for there is something uniquely powerful and compelling about the apocalyptic narrative. Plenty of people will hear it and ignore it, or find it implausible, or simply decide that if the situation really is so dire there is nothing they can do to prevent it from continuing to deteriorate. Yet to focus only on the ability of apocalyptic rhetoric to induce apathy, indifference or reactance is to ignore the evidence that it also fuels quite the opposite—grave concern, activism, and sometimes even outrage. It is also to ignore the movement’s history. From Silent Spring (Carson [1962] 2002) to The Limits to Growth (Meadows et al 1972) to The End of Nature (McKibben 1989), apocalyptic arguments have held a prominent place within environmental literature, topping best-seller lists and spreading the message far and wide that protecting the environment should be a societal priority. Thus, while it is not a style of argument that will be effective in convincing everyone to commit to the environmental cause (see Feinberg and Willer 2011), there does appear to be a close relationship between apocalyptic belief and activism among a certain minority. The next section explores the implications of that relationship further. [End Page 8] The Apocalyptic Narrative as a Framework for Moral Deliberation In discussing how apocalypticism functions within the environmental community, it will be helpful to analyze it as a type of narrative. I do so because the domain of narrative includes both the stories that people read and write, as well as those they tell and live by. By using narratives as data, scholars can analyze experiential and textual sources simultaneously (Polkinghorne 1988; Riessman 2000). To analyze environmental apocalypticism as a type of narrative is not to suggest that apocalyptics’ claims about the future are fictional. Rather, it is to highlight that the facts to which environmentalists appeal have been organized with particular goals in mind, goals which have necessarily shaped the selection and presentation of those facts. Compelling environmental writers do not simply list every known fact pertaining to the natural world, but instead select certain findings and place them within a larger interpretive framework. Alone, each fact has little meaning, but when woven into a larger narrative, a message emerges. This process of narrativization is essential if a message is to be persuasive (Killingsworth and Palmer 2000, 197), and has occurred not only in the rapidly expanding genre of environmental nonfiction, but in much scientific writing about the environment as well (Harré, Brockmeier, and Mühlhäusler 1999, 69). What defines narratives as such is their beginning-middle-end structure, their ability to “describe an action that begins, continues over a well-defined period of time, and finally draws to a definite close” (Cronon 1992, 1367). Here I will focus on the last of these elements, the ending, because anything we can learn about how endings function within narratives in general will be applicable to the apocalypse, the most final ending of all. An ending is essential in order for a story to be complete, but there is more to it than this. Endings are also key because they establish a story’s moral, the lesson it is supposed to impart upon the reader. In other words, to know the moral of the story, auditors must know the consequences of the actions depicted therein, so there can be no moral without an ending. To take a simple example, when we hear the story of the shepherd boy who falsely claims that a wolf is attacking his flock of sheep in order to entertain himself at his community’s expense, what makes the lesson clear is that when a wolf does attack his flock, the disenchanted town members refuse to come to his aid. By clearly illustrating how telling lies can have [End Page 9] unpleasant consequences for the perpetrator, the ending reveals the moral that lying is wrong. As Cronon explains, it is “[t]he difference between beginning and end [that] gives us our chance to extract a moral from the rhetorical landscape” (1992, 1370). Endings play a similar role in environmental stories. In Al Gore’s book Earth in the Balance (1992), for example, he devotes over a third of the book’s pages to presenting scientific evidence that disaster is imminent.5 As he sums it up, “Modern industrial civilization…is colliding violently with our planet’s ecological system. The ferocity of its assault on the earth is breathtaking, and the horrific consequences are occurring so quickly as to defy our capacity to recognize them” (1992, 269). He builds this argument so carefully precisely because if the ending does not seem credible, the moral he wants readers to draw from the story will not be compelling. If his readers are not convinced that the ending to this story of ecological misbehavior will be a debacle of colossal proportions, they will not become convinced that they need to dramatically alter their ecological behavior. Thus the vision of future catastrophe that Gore presents provides a crucial vantage point from which the present environmental situation can be understood as the result of a grand moral failure, and Gore’s readers are made aware of their obligations in light of it. Gore himself appreciates the importance of this recognition, arguing that “whether we realize it or not, we are now engaged in an epic battle to right the balance of our earth, and the tide of this battle will turn only when the majority of people in the world become sufficiently aroused by a shared sense of urgent danger to join an all-out effort” (1992, 269, emphasis added). Here, as in so many other stories, the ending must be in place for the moral to become clear. To say that endings are essential in order for stories to have morals is already to hint that stories alter behavior, that they can encourage action in the real world even as they invoke an imaginary one. This much is clear from Earth in the Balance (1992): Gore does not just want people to grasp a moral, to perceive some ethic in the abstract—he wants them change their behavior in the here and now. In constructing a narrative with this goal in mind, he is banking on the ability of powerful stories to motivate social change, to be, as Cronon puts it, “our chief moral compass in the world” (1992, 1375). Mark Johnson’s insightful synthesis of cognitive science and philosophy helps explain further how this process of moral guidance occurs. For [End Page 10] Johnson, narrative is fundamental to our experience of reality, “the most comprehensive means we have for constructing temporal syntheses that bind together and unify our past, present, and future into more or less meaningful patterns” (1993, 174). Narratives are also critical to our ability to reason morally, an activity which Johnson asserts is fundamentally imaginative. In this view, we use stories to imagine ourselves in different scenarios, exploring and evaluating the consequences of different possible actions in order to determine the right one. Moral deliberation is thus …an imaginative exploration of the possibilities for constructive action within a present situation. We have a problem to solve here and now (e.g., ‘What am I to do?’…. ‘How should I treat others?’), and we must try out various possible continuations of our narrative in search of the one that seems best to resolve the indeterminacy of our present situation. (1993, 180) Put another way, what cognitive science has revealed is that from an empirical perspective the process of moral deliberation entails constructing narratives rooted in our unique history and circumstances, rather than applying universal principles (such as Kant’s categorical imperative) to particular cases. That we use narratives to reason morally is not a result of conscious choice but of how human cognition works. That is, insofar as we experience ourselves as temporal beings, a narrative framework is necessary to organize, explain, and ultimately justify the many individual decisions that over time become a life. Formal principles may be useful in unambiguous textbook cases, but in real life “we can almost never decide (reflectively) how to act without considering the ways in which we can continue our narrative construction of our situation” (Johnson 1993, 160). Empirically speaking, “our moral reasoning is situated within our narrative understanding” (Johnson 1993, 180, italics in original). The observation that people use narratives to reason morally may help explain the association between environmental apocalypticism and activism. The function of the apocalyptic narrative may be that it helps adherents determine how to act by providing a storyline from which they can imaginatively sample, enabling them to assess the consequences of their actions. In order to answer the question, “Should I drive or walk to the store?” for example, they can reason, “If I walk, that will reduce my carbon footprint, which will help keep the ice caps from melting, saving humans and other species.” It is their access to this narrative of impending [End Page 11] disaster that makes such reasoning possible, for it provides a simple framework within which people can consider and eventually arrive at some conclusion about their moral obligations.6 More broadly, it can guide entire lives by providing a narrative frame of reference that imbues the individual’s experiences with meaning. For example, it is the context of looming anthropogenic apocalypse which suggests that dedicating one’s life to achieving a healthier relationship with the natural world is a worthwhile endeavor. Absent the apocalypse, choices such as limiting one’s travel to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, becoming vegetarian, working in the environmental sector (often for less compensation), or growing one’s own food could seem to be meaningless sacrifices. Within this context, on the other hand, such choices become essential features of the quest to live a moral life. The apocalyptic narrative is but one of many ways to tell the environmental story, yet it is one that seems particularly well-suited to encouraging pro-environmental behavior. First, the apocalyptic ending discloses certain everyday decisions as moral decisions. Without the narrative context of impending disaster, decisions such as whether to drive or walk to the store would be merely matters of convenience or preference. In the context of potentially disastrous consequences for valued places, people, and organisms, by contrast, such decisions become matters of right and wrong. Second, putting information about the environment into narrative form enables apocalyptics to link complex global environmental processes to their own lives, a perceptual technique Thomashow describes as “bringing the biosphere home” (2002). Developing this skill is essential because without that felt sense of connection to their own lived experience, people are much less likely to become convinced that it is incumbent upon them to act (2002, 2). Finally, the sheer magnitude of the impending disaster increases the feeling of responsibility to make good on one’s moral intuitions. By locating individuals within a drama of ultimate concern, the narrative frames their choices as cosmically important, and this feeling of urgency then helps to convert moral deliberation into action. With this conceptual overview in place, we can now examine more closely what the relationship between apocalypticism and moral reasoning looks like in practice. [End Page 12]