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2022 SDI Negative
**Off-Case** › Disad --- Disclosure Bad › Disclosure Links

Secrecy is key to effective cyber deterrence and response

John Mowchan 11, Lt Col, October, “Don’t Draw the (Red) Line,” http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2011-10/dont-draw-red-line

Those arguing for establishing red lines fail to comprehend the complexity of the digital domain, in which adaptation and anonymity are the norm. The United States is better served in the long run by not establishing such thresholds, for four reasons. First, not doing so allows government leaders the latitude to tailor response options based on a hostile act, its physical and digital effects, and how it relates to the current state of affairs in the international system. As retired Air Force General Kevin Chilton remarked in 2009 as commander, U.S. Strategic Command, “I don’t think you take anything off the table when you provide [response] options to the president to decide. Why would we constrain ourselves on how we would respond [to hostile acts in cyberspace]?” 15 Such an approach does not differ from the way the United States addresses hostile acts in other domains. If red lines are established, we will be compelled to respond to each threat that crosses the line, which is unrealistic, given that our computer networks are subjected to millions of probes, scans, and attacks on a daily basis. Even if red lines are narrowly focused (e.g., employing military force if a cyber attack results in the deaths of U.S. citizens), the first time the United States fails to respond accordingly, it will undermine the credibility and deterrence effect of our other capabilities. A second reason in favor of ambiguity is that if our adversaries know our response to such acts, they will adjust accordingly. Because neither the national nor the defense strategy explicitly defines a hostile act in cyberspace or exactly how the United States will respond, this leaves it open to interpretation. As one military official remarked, “If you shut down our power grid, maybe we will put a missile down one of your smokestacks.” 16 In addition, hostile actors may perceive a green light for certain acts that do not cross a particular response threshold. While one such act below this threshold may not be harmful to U.S. interests, what if 100 million are? Again, maintaining ambiguity concerning when, how, and to what extent to respond gives the United States greater latitude. Third, because cyberspace is a global domain that emphasizes open access, the free flow of information, and anonymity, it is extremely difficult to determine where the threat or attack originated. For example, U.S. military networks are probed more than six million times a day by assailants operating in one corner of the world using computer networks or servers in another corner. Most perpetrators are never identified, except for a computer Internet protocol address or a one-time user alias. Army General Keith Alexander, commander of U.S. Cyber Command and Director, National Security Agency, emphasized this challenge, saying, “Too often, the military discovers through forensics that network probes have been successful [and] as a consequence, response becomes policing up after the fact versus mitigating it real time.” 17 If red lines demand a timely response and there is no one to pin responsibility on, then how can a response be implemented? Finally, even if the source of the attacks is determined in a timely manner, automatic triggers for a response, particularly those that employ military force, could create negative second- and third-order effects that make a bad situation even worse. Given that nation states pose the greatest threat to U.S. networks, red lines that automatically result in a response could escalate an already volatile situation. For example, in 2009 individuals in China and Russia penetrated computer networks operating parts of the U.S. electrical power grid. 18 They reportedly inserted malware that could destroy infrastructure components. Although their identities or associations with the Russian and Chinese governments were not disclosed, it validates the point that response options must be tailored. If Russia or China, two nuclear powers, were responsible, a U.S. response would be markedly different than if they had they been conducted by a non-nuclear state. Clearly the diplomatic, information, and economic instruments of national power versus military force would receive more emphasis with China or Russia for what could be considered a hostile act in cyberspace. Given the complex and indeterminate 21st century international system and the multitude of current threats, U.S. interests will be better served by not establishing clear thresholds. Ambiguity is a powerful tool to shape our adversaries’ actions in all domains and allows us the maneuverability to respond where, when, and how we choose. Red-line advocates must understand that thresholds only constrain our actions and could undermine credibility and the power to effectively deter our adversaries.

2022 SDI Negative
**Off-Case** › Disad --- Disclosure Bad › Disclosure Links

Disclosure allows vendors to patch up vulnerabilities --- this weakens innovation and the discovery of new vulnerabilities

Cushing 14 --- Seychelle Cushing, B.A., Simon Fraser University, 2011, Project Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts in the Department of Political Science, SIMON FRASER UNIVERSITY, “Leveraging Information as Power: America’s Pursuit of Cyber Security”, Fall 2014, (accessed via wayback machine)

Cyber defence is an initially disadvantaged position167 given that cyber barriers cannot stop all attacks from penetrating its systems. The ability to absorb a cyber attack, while inconvenient, helps America identify holes in its own security. Although America may be aware of a number of vulnerabilities, additional unaccounted for vulnerabilities will always exist in its systems. A cyber strike thus helps the United States identify where additional previously unknown vulnerabilities exist and, as a result, the US can direct its security apparatus to develop counter-capabilities.

The United States, through the Department of Homeland Security, has launched both passive and active cyber sensors to detect network intrusions. EINSTEIN 2, the passive sensor, was launched in 2008 to detect network intrusions.168 Building on the capabilities of EINSTEIN 2 was EINSTEIN 3, an active sensor designed to provide realtime threat detection capable of stopping known malware before it reaches the targeted government network.169 Passive defences “scan, firewall, and patch” in an attempt to protect a system. These defences, however, have little utility against sophisticated cyber attacks, such as Stuxnet, or against attacks employing zero-days. Active defences, in comparison, build on passive defences to try and stop the cyber attack170 but the success rates of such measures in the US security architecture remains unknown.171 In reality, the EINSTEIN systems only detect and (in the case of EINSTEIN 3) stop known malware entering through known vulnerabilities.172 Nevertheless, every vulnerability subsequently discovered through attack absorption allows EINSTEIN 3 to erect new cyber barriers in its systems.

2022 SDI Negative
**Off-Case** › Disad --- Disclosure Bad › Disclosure Links

Over-disclosure of vulnerabilities weakens offensive cyber capabilities

Cushing 14 --- Seychelle Cushing, B.A., Simon Fraser University, 2011, Project Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts in the Department of Political Science, SIMON FRASER UNIVERSITY, “Leveraging Information as Power: America’s Pursuit of Cyber Security”, Fall 2014, (accessed via wayback machine)

Nuclear or conventional weapons, once developed, can remain dormant yet functional until needed. In comparison, the zero-days used in cyber weapons require the US to constantly discover new vulnerabilities to maintain a deployable cyber arsenal. Holding a specific zero-day does not guarantee that the vulnerability will remain unpatched for a prolonged period of time by the targeted state.59 Complicating this is the fact that undetected vulnerabilities, once acquired, are rarely used immediately given the time and resources it takes to construct a cyber attack.60 In the time between acquisition and use, a patch for the vulnerability may be released, whether through routine patches or a specific identification of a security hole, rendering the vulnerability obsolete. To minimize this, America deploys several zero-days at once in a cyber attack to increase the odds that at least one (or more) of the vulnerabilities remains open to provide system access.6 2.4.

One Attack, Multiple Vulnerabilities

2022 SDI Negative
**Off-Case** › Disad --- Disclosure Bad › Link Overview

Disclosure wrecks our cyber-deterrent

Jardine 20 --- Eric Jardine Assistant Professor, Political Science, Virginia Tech, “Optimizing Cyber Deterrence”, In The Cyber Deterrence Problem, Aaron F. Brantly, ed. (New York: Rowman and Littlefield), page 87-104, 2020, https://osf.io/ns7b3

Given the clear offensive potential of zero-day vulnerabilities, governments actively collect these software flaws in order to build up their cyber-arsenals. In the US, for example, the National Security Agency (NSA) actively attempts to identify and collect zero-days for the purpose of tailored access operations (TAO). In 2013 alone, the NSA reportedly spent $25 million purchasing zero-day vulnerabilities (EPIC, 2018). While TAO have clear espionage and even outright offensive purposes in some situations, the threat of using zero-days as a retaliatory measure in the eventuality of a cyberattack readily contributes to the nation’s cyber deterrent. In this sense, the collection of zero-day vulnerabilities by government agencies such as the NSA can be viewed as increasing the potential for deterrence by threat of retaliation and punishment.

2022 SDI Negative
**Off-Case** › Disad --- Disclosure Bad › Overview

Draws in everyone

Blackwill 21 --- Robert and Philip Zelikow; February; Deputy National Security Advisor under George W. Bush, Lecturer in International Security at Harvard; History Professor at the University of Virginia, Former Executive Director of 9/11 Commission; Council on Foreign Relations, “The United States, China, and Taiwan: A Strategy to Prevent War,” Council Special Report No. 90]

The horrendous global consequences of a war between the United States and China, most likely over Taiwan, should preoccupy the Biden team, beginning with the president. It could be unlikely that a U.S.- China conflict would go nuclear and Beijing has repeated its no first use doctrine, but there is little doubt that China wants to grow its arsenal of a few hundred warheads and build a more sophisticated force that could employ hypersonic glide capabilities.189 Millions of Americans could die in the first war in human history between two nuclear weapons states. A 2015 RAND Corporation study of the effects of U.S.-China combat determined that estimating military losses would be “exceedingly difficult.” World War II, however, was the last time the United States lost a major warship, and one sunk vessel could turn into the deadliest U.S. military event since the Vietnam War.190

The outbreak of a great power war would likely produce a global recession, if not a depression. It would disrupt Asian and international trade, sever major supply chains, and could collapse international financial systems.191 This would produce deeply painful economic consequences for U.S. allies, who trade more with China than they do with the United States. One study estimates that a single year of U.S.-China conflict could cause American GDP to decline by 5 to 10 percent.192

2022 SDI Negative
**Off-Case** › Disad --- Disclosure Bad › Overview

Unwanted nuclear escalation is likely---comingled systems AND irrationality.

Sweeney 21 --- Mike; March; Fellow at Defense Priorities; Defense Priorities, “Why A Taiwan Conflict Could Go Nuclear,” https://www.defensepriorities.org/explainers/why-a-taiwan-conflict-could-go-nuclear]

The preferred U.S. style of warfare—to conduct attacks deep throughout an enemy’s territory rather than simply meeting them at a forward line of engagement—also presents problems and contains the prospect that non-nuclear strikes might unintentionally trip Chinese redlines regarding nuclear use. Within the U.S. academic community, this has produced a small, but important body of literature focused on the subject of “entanglement,” or the co-mingling of systems with both conventional and nuclear applications.48 This discussion has primarily focused on China’s ballistic missile force, as most of its systems are capable of firing both nuclear and non-nuclear warheads.49

China’s increasing reliance on road-mobile ICBMs (such as the DF-31 variants and the new DF-41) complicates this problem, creating the potential for their misidentification as shorter-range systems, such as the road-mobile DF-21 and DF-26, that might be used against U.S. ships or regional bases.50 Analysts have also expressed concern over the potential for U.S. forces to inadvertently sink a Chinese SSBN as part of its ASW campaign during a Taiwan conflict, a fear that echoes similar worries from the U.S.-Soviet struggle.51 Recall again the private comments of Chinese officials about conventional attacks on nuclear systems nullifying its NFU policy.

2022 SDI Negative
**Off-Case** › Disad --- Disclosure Bad › 1NC

Taiwan invasion causes nuclear war

Walker, 9-18-2020, Richard Walker reporter for Deutsche Welle Deutsche Welle (DW) is Germany’s international broadcaster and one of the most successful and relevant international media outlets. DW is an unbiased media organization, based in Germany. We provide our journalistic content to people worldwide, giving them the freedom to make up their own minds and the information required to form their own opinions, Taiwan: The threat that the world ignores," DW, https://www.dw.com/en/taiwan-the-threat-that-the-world-ignores/a-54944934, Accessed: 1-21-2021, MB

Taiwan's Foreign Minister Joseph Wu is ringing the alarm, hoping that the world will pay attention to the profound threat emanating from China.

"The threat is very real and therefore Taiwan's preparation is also very serious," he told DW. "We are trying to deal with the military threat, day in and day out."

2022 SDI Negative
**Off-Case** › Disad --- Disclosure Bad › 1NC

Loss of offensive capabilities, particularly zero-days, causes China to invade Taiwan

Ramos 21 --- Capt Allison R. Ramos Squadron Officer School Class 21-D, Flight B-19, “Cyber Deterrence: Controlling Escalation in Taiwan”, Website created Sept 17th 2021, https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/ISR/student-papers/AY21-22/CyberDeterrence_ControllingEscalation_Ramos.pdf

The Deterrence Operations Joint Operation Guide (DOJOC) defines deterrence as the ability to “Convince adversaries to not take action that threaten US vital interests by means of decisive influence over their decision making … [to] change the decision calculus of an adversary by denying benefits, imposing costs, or encouraging adversary restraint.”13 One method to deter is the cyber domain is through a forward-deployed presence. The US Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) has included the concept as a central focus through superiority through persistence.14 The goal is to deploy as close to the adversary activity as possible, allowing the research of weaknesses, intentions, capabilities, and ability to counter-attack.15 USINDPACOM reinforces a cyber alliance with the ROK, Japan, and Australia to include information sharing and cyber attack response commitments.16 It lists the Philippines as a nation that the US will support specifically in an armed attack in the South China Sea.17 However, it does not mention Taiwan or cyber attacks. Forward deploying in cyberspace assumes that the US can act in cyberspace while controlling escalation and the persistence will deter others from cyber attacks.

Forward deployed troops allow for the normalization of cyber operations, which decreases the risk of escalatory response in a conflict situation. The decision to forward deploy in cyberspace includes cyber protection teams, operations within allied networks, operations against adversary networks, intelligence sharing with allies and partners, and using malware to set up critical national infrastructure to be effected.

2022 SDI Negative
**Off-Case** › Disad --- Disclosure Bad › 1NC

Sharing vulnerabilities weakens the United States cyber-capabilities --- China will exploit

Aitel & Rampersaud 14 --- Dave Aitel is CEO of Immunity Inc., a leading offensive security firm that serves major financial institutions, industrials, Fortune/Global 500s and US government/military agencies. He is a former NSA computer scientist and DARPA contractor. Skylar Rampersaud is a former NSA computer scientist and director of vulnerability analysis at Immunity., “Some People Want A Time Limit On The NSA's 'Zero-Day' Exploits — Here's Why That's A Terrible Idea”, Jul 2, 2014, https://www.businessinsider.com/why-a-time-limit-on-zero-days-is-a-bad-idea-2014-7

In particular, people have suggested that the NSA be restrained from collecting a “zero-day” stockpile and that one of the logical ways to do this was to force them to report any discovered vulnerabilities to the vendor for patching after a certain time period has elapsed, presumably so they could use them in the meantime for intelligence collection.

First, some context from the White House’s NSA task force and their own blog:

2022 SDI Negative
**Off-Case** › Disad --- Disclosure Bad › 1NC

US Cyber capabilities are high but China is catching up

Marks 21 --- Joseph Marks, Anchor of The Cybersecurity 202 newsletter, Washington Post, “The Cybersecurity 202: The United States is still number one in cyber capabilities”, June 2021, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2021/06/28/cybersecurity-202-united-states-is-still-number-one-cyber-capabilities/

The United States remains by far the world’s most cyber-capable nation with no major competitors for the title.

That’s the conclusion from a mammoth 182-page report released today by British think tank the International Institute for Strategic Studies that reviews the cyber capabilities of 15 of the world’s biggest players in hacking and digital defense. The report assesses both government and private-sector capabilities.

2022 SDI Negative
**Off-Case** › Topicality --- Security Cooperation

Information sharing is distinct from cybersecurity

Zaccor 05 --- Colonel Albert Zaccor U.S. Army Atlantic Council Senior Fellow, “Security Cooperation and Non-State Threats: A Call for an Integrated Strategy”, The Atlantic Council, August 2005, https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/46290/2005_08_Security_Cooperation_and_Non-State_Threats.pdf

Relationships built on trust and mutual interests are also necessary to obtain cooperation from foreign governments in the area of Intelligence and Information. It is useful to separate the distinct, but related, issues of Intelligence Sharing and Intelligence Security Cooperation. Intelligence Sharing is a critical element in the fight against non-state threats, or strategic crime. By its nature, however, such sharing involves sensitive sources, methods and arrangements, normally in the context of a bilateral relationship. Its sensitivity requires delicate handling in highly restrictive channels. Intelligence sharing, in practice, falls outside the scope of Security Cooperation. Intelligence Security Cooperation, on the other hand, involves the development of interoperable and cooperative intelligence systems and processes designed to enhance the ability of one partner to work with one or several other partners. The core activities in Intelligence Security Cooperation are analytical and expertise exchanges, familiarization, training, and traditional Security Assistance. Both Intelligence Sharing and Intelligence Security Cooperation are mutually supporting. It is clear that the quality and reliability of intelligence we get from our partners depends on the competence, capability, professionalism, and trustworthiness of their national intelligence services and how compatible their operations are with ours. Intelligence Security Cooperation provides the tools to develop long-range relationships with foreign partners to improve both the quality of the intelligence we share and our ability to work together.

2022 SDI Negative
**On-case** › A2: Solvency › Ext --- Say No

NATO wont share

Herpig & Reinhold 18 --- Sven Herpig, PhD, project director for international cyber security policy, and Thomas Reinhold, research associate and PhD student at the Department of Science and Technology for Peace and Security (PEASEC) at TU Darmstadt“Spotting the bear: credible attribution and Russian operations in cyberspace”, European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) (2018), https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/resrep21140.7.pdf

Although crucial to solving the challenge, the intelligence component has been the most underrated aspect in the public debate. The reason for that is the classification of intelligence materials and thus their rare exposure to public scrutiny. After the US presidential elections in 2016, the American intelligence community issued a declassified intelligence report18 that was supposed to convince the public of Russia’s guilt. It however achieved almost the opposite effect because – due to declassification – the public report no longer contained any hard proof of Russian intervention. When asked whether they think Russia attempted to meddle in the 2016 presidential elections, 45% of respondents in the US answered either that they do not know or that it is not true.19 At the end of the day, it is the state’s strategic choice how much it discloses about what it knows and how it obtained its intelligence. Therefore, credible attribution is indeed within the realms of possibility. Whether that proof can be presented to international organisations (e.g. UN, NATO) and/or the public or not is a different story as this would likely mean exposure of the intelligence operation. Revealing such an intelligence operation would decrease the likelihood of it still being effective in the future. If attackers follow the counter-response to their actions closely, they might be able to identify what measures were used to track them down and circumvent/avoid them if possible.

2022 SDI Negative
**On-case** › A2: Solvency › Ext --- Say No

No sharing

Borghard & Lonergan 19 --- Erica D. Borghard Adjunct Research Scholar in the Arnold A. Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies, Saltzman Institute of War & Peace Studies, and Shawn W. Lonergan, Instructor in the Department of Social Sciences at the United States Military Academy at West Point and a PhD Candidate, “Cyber Operations as Imperfect Tools of Escalation “, STRATEGIC STUDIES QUARTERLY FALL 2019, https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/SSQ/documents/Volume-13_Issue-3/Borghard.pdf

Second, beyond operational requirements for secrecy, states make political decisions to eschew attribution for offensive cyber operations.64 States employ technical methods to avoid attribution (e.g., obfuscating points of departure of attacks by using spoofing, proxy servers, third-party infrastructure, compromised certificates, and other anonymizing capabilities) as well as make deliberate efforts to obscure command and control for cyberattacks (e.g., using cyber proxies with varying degrees of plausible deniability).65 The time requirements for a targeted state to achieve attribution at a reasonable confidence threshold, as well as its willingness to share potentially sensitive intelligence information with allies or domestic publics to justify any escalatory responses, create additional temporal breaks for the pressure of a crisis situation to diffuse and for decision-makers to evaluate alternative courses of action.

2022 SDI Negative
**On-case** › A2: Solvency › 1NC --- Say No

No modeling --- countries don’t want to share their cyber secrets

Jacobsen 20 --- Jeppe T Jacobsen, Ph.D. candidate at the Danish Institute for International Studies and the University of Southern Denmark, “Cyber offense in NATO: challenges and opportunities”, International Affairs, Volume 97, Issue 3, May 2021, Pages 703–720, https://academic.oup.com/ia/article-abstract/97/3/703/6205395

The third challenge to the integration of cyber effects in NATO operations relates to a well-known military concept, deconfliction. The coordination by allies and military units of their efforts to avoid confliction, between for example an air operation and a special forces operation in the same area, is a central element in every military campaign. Deconfliction is all about openness and communication between allied partners. But in cyberspace, deconfliction comes with several difficulties. At the core of these difficulties is the fact that the tools and techniques that produce cyber effects—which are often also used and heavily depended on for intelligence collection—are developed in secret and must stay secret until the effect is achieved. If the IT vulnerabilities and exploits are known, vendors or adversaries can fix or replace the software and thereby render the effect impossible to achieve.39 In an alliance not known for sufficient mutual trust among members to share intelligence,40 there is little indication that allies will become more open about the cyber tools and techniques they currently have at their disposal. The request-based model is the result of that lack of trust. And the unwillingness to share cyber intelligence seriously challenges NATO’s ambition to use CYOC to facilitate information-sharing to increase situational awareness and thereby achieve the ‘cyber readiness’ and ‘cyber resiliency’ that NATO Deputy Secretary-General Mircea Geoană hopes to attain.41

2022 SDI Negative
**On-case** › A2: Attribution › Ext --- Democracy Bad

US and Israel prove – citizen preferences for a capital-intensive military doctrine lock in aggressive foreign policy and protracted warfare – legal reforms fail.

Caverley 10 – Jonathan, Poli Sci Prof @ NU, The Myth of Military Myopia: Democracy, Small Wars, and Vietnam, International Security 34.3.

This article shows that, contrary to the consensus regarding U.S. military intransigence in the face of unconventional warfare, civilian officials in Lyndon Johnson's administration - and ultimately the American public - played an essential role in the selection of a capital-intensive strategy to fight insurgents in the Vietnam War. President Johnson was convinced that the American public would punish any administration that "lost" South Vietnam to communism, but he was equally certain that public preferences constrained the number of U.S. forces to be deployed and lives to be lost far more than the amount of money to be spent and ordnance to be consumed. In response, he and his sub- ordinates instructed the military to fight what they themselves acknowledged to be an ineffective, capital- and firepower-intensive strategy. The article ex- plains this seemingly nonstrategic behavior using a theory, generalizable be- yond this specific case, of the distribution of the costs of war within the electorate.138 Israel's experience in its 2006 war against Hezbollah suggests that this phenomenon is not limited to the Vietnam War or to U.S. strategic culture.139 Israel expended 170,000 artillery shells, twice the number fired in the conve tional 1973 Arab-Israeli War, in a month.140 The Israel Defense Force's (IDF's) initial campaign plan - a rapid air and small-unit ground assault that relied on firepower to control territory - was designed to minimize the number of ground forces and casualties. The Israeli cabinet rejected it; the transportation minister objected to "exposing 40,000 troops to the Lebanese reality."141 Four days into the conflict, the IDF deputy chief of staff recommended stopping the campaign: "We have exhausted the [aerial] effort; we have reached the peak; from now on we can only descend."142 Nonetheless, despite its intention to avoid a ground war, the Israeli government announced ambitious goals far beyond releasing hostages and deterring further rocket attacks.143 A report written by a subsequent government commission describing the strategic co- nundrum evokes the constraints faced by Johnson in Vietnam: "Declared goals were too ambitious, and it was publicly stated that fighting will continue till they are achieved. But the authorized military operations did not enable their achievement." The report acknowledges the government's bind: no "other ef- fective military response to such missile attacks than an extensive and pro- longed ground operation" existed, but this "would have a high 'cost' and did not enjoy broad support."144 Cost distribution theory makes such behavior explicable. From four ma- jor assumptions - security is a public good; voters weigh security benefits against taxes, conscription, and casualties; median wealth is less than mean wealth in every state; and the preferences of the median voter are heeded in a democracy - I derive a voter preference for a capitalized military. Like the democratic exceptionalist research program, this article finds evidence that the American public weighs the benefits of limited war against the costs. Although one recent study of American public opinion assigns expectations of success as the most important factor in the public's support for a conflict, it also points out that the public more generally carries out relatively competent cost-benefit analysis.145 This article extends this logic by arguing that when the ability to substitute matériel for personnel is low, as it is against unconventional opponents, democracies may still prosecute wars using an ill-suited military doctrine (and thus a lower chance of success), because the costs remain modest for this pivotal voter. Democratic exceptionalism's cost-internalization mechanism provides an overly optimistic assessment of democracies' discretion in how and even when they fight small wars. Neither an apolitical public, nor a dysfunctional military culture, nor a military doctrine divorced from grand strategy causes a flawed warfighting strategy. Rather, it results from political leaders' assessment of the average voter's preferences. Although claiming that democracies substitute capital for labor to reduce the costs of war for voters is not news, tying the pur- suit of such a strategy to a rational voter has two novel and important implications. First, many observers argue that most wars of the twenty-first century will be hybrid conflicts involving unconventional opponents; finding the root cause of poor counterinsurgency is an essential task. This article argues that fixating on reforming the armed services (or even the civilian tools of foreign policy) in an effort to improve democratic performance in small wars is its own form of myopia. My theory gives reason to be skeptical of how much the U.S. military will be allowed to shift by future administrations and the public to which they are held accountable. Dysfunctional organizations can eventu- ally learn and adapt. If the public suffers from foolish preconceptions, it may be dissuaded through public education and the marketplace of ideas. Even positing a powerful strategic culture underpinning U.S. doctrine suggests that "it is at least possible that by deconstructing the standard American 'way' . . . some pathways to improved performance may be identified."146 But if a rational, fully informed electorate views such a military doctrine as its best option, the prospects for change are less clear.

2022 SDI Negative
**On-case** › A2: Attribution › Ext --- Democracy Bad

It's an empirical question, answered by statistical methods---failing to code based on exogenous variables corrupts their evidence

Chiba 21 --- Dr. Daina Chiba, Associate Professor of Political Science in the Department of Government and Public Administration at the University of Macau, Ph.D. in Political Science from Rice University, LL.M in Jurisprudence and International Relations from Hitotsubashi University, and Dr. Erik Gartzke, Professor of Political Science at the University of California, San Diego, PhD in Political Science from the University of Iowa, “Make Two Democracies and Call Me in the Morning: Endogenous Regime Type and the Democratic Peace”, 2/19/2021, https://dainachiba.github.io/research/make2dem/Make2Dem.pdf

Before we review our approach in detail, it may be useful to explain why this type of analysis has not been pursued successfully in the past and what makes our effort different from other, broadly related projects. We are not the first to apply an IV framework (more specifically) or multi-equation models (more broadly) to the democratic peace. However, previous attempts suffer from two major problems. First, previous studies have typically used a dyad (country pair) as the unit of observation in analyzing conflict, which requires some summary measure(s) of democracy for a pair of countries rather than the state-level (monadic) democracy measure. 6 Use of a dyadic aggregate to represent regime type creates a discrepancy between the first stage regression (predicting democracy at the country level) and the outcome stage regression (predicting conflict at the dyad level). 7 We avoid this problem by using the directed dyad as the unit of observation in predicting conflict, distinguishing between the potential challenger and target in a dispute. This allows us to connect the first stage equations (predicting the challenger’s and target’s regime types) and the outcome stage equation seamlessly. Doing so has several benefits: the outcome stage model could directly include country-level covariates (such as challenger’s and target’s democracy) without having to convert them to a dyadic summary. This also allows us to estimate the system of equations jointly rather than relying on the “forbidden regression.” 8

Second, a more daunting challenge in applying an IV approach to democratic peace research is the difficulty of finding a plausible instrument for regime type — a variable that is strongly correlated with regime type but is unrelated to war. This is the challenge that has plagued empirical researchers in many fields. For example, a recent study of the effect of regime type on economic growth uses a diffusion-based measure of democracy (i.e., average value of democracies in a given region) as an instrument for democracy (Acemoglu et al. 2019). However, diffusion-based instruments such as this are unlikely to be a valid instrument, due to spatial spill-over, interdependence, and, most importantly, simultaneity (Betz, Cook, and Hollenbach 2018). Recognizing problems with spatial instruments, McDonald (2015) seeks to exploit the very discrepancy between country-level and dyad-level designs as the source of identification. His discussion, however, lacks a clear explanation as to why some determinants of regime type do not influence conflict. 9

2022 SDI Negative
**On-case** › A2: Attribution › Ext --- Democracy Bad

Democratic peace is statistically disproven---it’s conflict driving

Chiba 21 --- Dr. Daina Chiba, Associate Professor of Political Science in the Department of Government and Public Administration at the University of Macau, Ph.D. in Political Science from Rice University, LL.M in Jurisprudence and International Relations from Hitotsubashi University, and Dr. Erik Gartzke, Professor of Political Science at the University of California, San Diego, PhD in Political Science from the University of Iowa, “Make Two Democracies and Call Me in the Morning: Endogenous Regime Type and the Democratic Peace”, 2/19/2021, https://dainachiba.github.io/research/make2dem/Make2Dem.pdf

The democratic peace—the observation that democracies are less likely to fight each other than are other pairings of states—is one of the most widely acknowledged empirical regularities in international relations. Prominent scholars have even characterized the relationship as an empirical law (Levy 1988; Gleditsch 1992). The discovery of a special peace in liberal dyads stimulated enormous scholarly debate and led to, or reinforced, a number of policy initiatives by various governments and international organizations. Although a broad consensus has emerged among researchers regarding the empirical correlation between joint democracy and peace, disagreement remains as to its logical foundations. Numerous theories have been proposed to account for how democracy produces peace, if only dyadically (e.g., Russett 1993; Rummel 1996; Doyle 1997; Schultz 2001).

At the same time, peace appears likely to foster or maintain democracy (Thompson 1996; James, Solberg, andWolfson 1999). A vast swath of research in political science and economics proposes explanations for the origins of liberal government involving variables such as economic development (Lipset 1959; Burkhart and Lewis-Beck 1994; Przeworski et al. 2000; Acemoglu and Robinson 2006; Epstein et al. 2006) and inequality (Boix 2003), political interests (Downs 1957; Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003), power hierarchies (Moore 1966; Lake 2009), third party inducements (Pevehouse 2005) or impositions (Peceny 1995; Meernik 1996), geography (Gleditsch 2002b), and natural resource endowments (Ross 2001), to list just a few examples. Each of these putative causes of democracy is also associated with various explanations for international conflict. Indeed, some as yet poorly defined set of canonical factors may contribute both to democracy and to peace, making it look as if the two variables are directly related, even if possibly they are not.

2022 SDI Negative
**On-case** › A2: Attribution › 1NC --- Democracy Bad

2. Median voter theory – democracies fight capital intensive wars more frequently.

Caverley 10 – Jonathan, Poli Sci Prof @ NU, The Myth of Military Myopia: Democracy, Small Wars, and Vietnam, International Security 34.3.

This section offers a theory of how a rational actor, the average voter in a democracy, can favor what appears to be a nonstrategic policy. To do so, it uses the core logic of a research program claiming that this sort of behavior should rarely happen in democracies. The theory presented here shares three impor- tant assumptions with the cost-internalization logic of democratic exception- alism: the distribution of costs within the state affects its pursuit of security; a democratic government's provision of security is a public good; and voters "take a reasonably level-headed cost-benefit approach in forming attitudes to- wards military missions."28 I relax the claim that costs are always internalized within democracies, however, arguing that the average voter's share may be much lower than the state's per capita costs. Even in democracies, wealth is not distributed equally within any given state; the person with median income is less well off than someone possessing the mean. A political-economic approach, the Meltzer-Richard hypothesis, suggests that if the median voter can set a tax rate and spend the revenue on a service available to all citizens, she will take advantage of the potential for re- distribution.29 Even with a flat tax on income, the wealthy will pay a larger portion of the costs for a public good enjoyed by all. For example, in 2005 the fifth of the population with the highest incomes paid 69 percent of all U.S. fed- eral tax revenue, and the middle fifth paid only 9 percent.30 Similarly, the median voter will prefer to tax capital more heavily than labor, because labor income is distributed more equally than capital income.31 How these taxes are spent plays a most important role in establishing the redistributive nature of the public good of defense. Military doctrine, the means by which military power is developed and exercised, can be stylized as a production function consisting of two factors - capital (e.g., tanks, planes, ammunition, and even training) and labor (soldiers, sailors, etc.) - as well as the technology that allows one factor of production to serve as a substitute for another.32 Capital and labor are imperfect replacements and show diminishing returns; given a hundred tanks and ten soldiers, adding another tank will not produce as much capability as adding another soldier. The type of conflict af- fects substitutions as well; it is much harder to substitute capital for labor when fighting an unconventional opponent. Tax revenue can pay for both the capital and labor inputs. Personnel also can be supplied through conscription, a tax on a citizen's labor rather than income. Even if the odds of being conscripted are equally distributed, the median voter will demand that a larger amount of the military budget go toward the purchase of capital to reduce the risk of conscription. In cases where existing threats do not currently justify resorting to conscription, military capitalization will still to a large degree determine a draft's future likelihood. The median voter normally will be happy with an expensive, all-volunteer military; but once the level of threat creates a demand for labor that reaches into the middle class, the voter will support a conscripted military where draftees are protected by large amounts of capital.33 Casualties are also a public bad: no one wants to see their fellow citizens die. The less wealthy are more likely to be drafted and to join an all-volunteer force; they may gain jobs from domestic weapons manufacturing; and they of- ten regard military service as a means of acquiring human capital. Conscription is therefore an important, but not the only, reason why militaries with large amounts of labor can be a public bad. The median voter will accept a higher tax, what the British socialist Sidney Webb called the "conscription of riches," to build highly capitalized militaries both in peace and in war, because such militaries redistribute money and skills through jobs and training as well as reduce the risk of conscription and casualties. The median voter theory outlined above does not claim to perfectly capture how policy is made in a democracy, nor does it argue that one's relative in- come determines one's position on foreign policy. Rather, this simple theory suggests an equally simple insight: a military doctrine that privileges capital over labor will reduce the costs of conflict for an important swath of voters. A capitalized military not only results in many voters doing less of the fighting themselves, but also allows someone else's resources to fund the costs of war. Politicians should respond accordingly. This distribution of costs explains how a state's seemingly nonstrategic behavior may be in the interests of important rational actors within a democracy. Because of its redistributive nature, a capitalized military doctrine can lead to moral hazard, which arises when perverse incentives encourage actors to pursue risky behavior. For example, drivers with auto theft coverage are more likely to park on the street than pay for secure parking. Many domestic gov- ernment programs merge moral hazard with the Meltzer-Richard effect dis- cussed above. Deposit insurance uses government backing to insure bank deposits up to a certain limit, a redistributive public good. Because the insur- ance applies regardless of the bank (subject to government regulations), an individual has little motivation to consider the bank's solvency. Indeed, she is likely to choose the higher interest provided by a bank making risky investments. Regarding defense provision, a lack of cost internalization creates an incentive for the median voter to support risky behavior: that is, using a capital- intensive military in conflicts where substitutability is low because the decreased likelihood of winning is outweighed by the lower costs of fighting in such a manner. If the median voter's risky behavior is in effect being subsidized by the wealthy, democratic leaders sensitive to this voter's costs will pursue strategies that make success less likely. I argue that this is what happened in Vietnam.

2022 SDI Negative
**On-case** › A2: Attribution › 1NC --- Democracy Bad

1. Security dilemma.

Muller, director of the Peace Research Institute in Frankfurt, professor of International Relations at Goethe University, 15

(Harald, Democracy, Peace, and Security, Lexington Books pp. 44-49)

My own proposal for solving the problem. developed together with my colleague Jonas Wolff (Müllcr 2004. Muller/Wolff 2006). turns the issue upside down: We do not start with explaining mutual democratic peacefulness, but its opposite. the proven capability of democracies to act aggressively against non-democracies. We note that—apart from self-defense where there is no difference between democracies and non-democracies——democratic states go to war—in contrast to non-democracies—to uphold international law (or their own interpretation thereof), to prevent anarchy through state failure, to “save strangers” when dictatorships massacre their own people, and to promote democracy. None of these acts is likely to find its target in a democracy. Since the use of force by democracies is hardly possible without public justification, even the rhetorical use of the said reasons will not stand public scrutiny when uttered against a democracy—people will not believe it, War other than for self-defense thus can only be fought by democracies against non-democracies because against a fellow democracy justification would fail. Because whether this is the case or not to a degree that justifies war as the ‘ultimate means” must rely on practical judgments. and practical judgments can differ among even reasonable people. democracies might disagree whether or not the judgment applies in specific cases. Democracies also show variance in that regard due (o a systematic. political-culturally rooted different propensity to judge situations as justifing war or not, and to participate in such wars (Gels et al, 2013). It should also be noted that, given the continuum between autocracy, anocracy and democracy, whether a given state is a democracy or not can be subject to interpretation. and this interpretation may even change over time (Oren 1995, Hayes 2013). The fact is that there are a couple of fairly warlike democracies, and that the democracies participating most frequently in military disputes (apart from the special case of Israel) are, by and large. major powers such as the United States, the United Kingdom. France. or India. This pattern is important to keep in mind when the question of the utility of democratic peace for today ‘s world problems is to be answered. Transnational terrorism, failed states, civil wars and the like dominate the international agenda on war and peace. At the classical level of international relations, in the relationships among major powers. developments arc undcr way which potentially pose an even greater threat than this diverse collection of non-interstate problems presently does. We are living in an era of rather rapid and disturbing power change (Tammcn et al. 2000). The United States are still the leading power of the world with unprecedented militany and economic poer. But others are coming closer: China. India. Braiil and Indonesia, China is at the top of this cohort, All major power changes chal lenge existing structures and thus contain the potential for great disturbance. The leading power may start to fear for its dominant position and take measures to ensure its position at the lop. These actions may frustrate emerging powers and even lead to the perception that their security is endangered. which would motivate counter-measures that further propel a political escala tion spiral. An increasingly focused competition in which a true power change appears increasingly possible. that is. a change of position at the top of the international hierarchy, has an even greater risk potential. If the inherent dangers are not contained—which remains always a possibility major power war may ensue defying all propositions that major war has become obsolete or that nuclear deterrence will prevent this calamity once and for all. Of course, states can grow peacefully into roles of higher responsibility. status and influence on the world stage. There arc no natural laws saving that changes in the world’s power structure must end in war, despite all distur bances and ensuing risks (Rauch 2014). The less conflict an emerging power experiences with established ones, and with peer challengers that emerge simultaneously, the better the chances that the rise will travel a peaceful trajectory. Looking through this lens. thc relations of only one emerging power with the present hegemon appear to be partially conflict-pronc. and seriously so: it concerns the pair China/United States. The Iwo great powers are rivals for preponderance in East and South East Asia and eventually for being the number one at the global level. There is also Chinese resentment stemming from the US role in China’s past as a victim of Western imperialism. On the other hand. China’s authoritarian system of rule and ensuing violations of human and political rights trigger the liberal resentment discussed in the first part of this chapter. which is rooted particularly strongly in US political culture. The Chinese—US relationship is thus thc key to a peaceful. tense or even violent future at the world stage. A small group of major powers. Including the United States and China, is interconnected today by a complex conflict system. China has territorial claims against Japan, South Korea, Vietnam. the Philippines. Brunci. and India which it pursues by a variety of means, not shying away from the limited, small scale usc of militan force in some cases, notably against obviously weaker counterparts (Ellcman ci al. 2012). China’s relation (o wards Japan is the one most burdened by China’s past as a victim of Japanese oppression and related cruelties, and the propcnsit of the conservative part of Japan’s elite to display cavalier attitudes towards this past or even sort of celebrate it (as through visits to the notorious Yasukuni shrine hosting the remnants of war criminals) only adds to anti-Japanese feelings in China (Russia. another great power. also openly pursues a revisionist agenda. as vividly shown in the recent Crimean move, but these territorial ambitions are not part of the most virulent conflict complex in Asia). Territorial claims are always emotionalized and dangerous. Territorial claims by a major power bear particular risks, because threatened countries look for protective allies which are, by necessity, major powers with the capability to project power into the region of concern. The great power claimant and the great power protector then position themselves on the opposite sides of the conflict. A classical constellation of great power conflict results that looks far more traditional than all the talk about post-modern global relations in which state power struggles fade into oblivion would suggest. In the Asian conflict complex that structures the shape of the US—Chinese contest (Foot/Walter 201 1). Japan. South Korea and the Philippines arc for mall allied ith the United Slates. India and Vietnam today entertain rda (ions ith the United States that can be depicted as cordial entente, already include military cooperation, and might move further towards an alliance. depending on deelopmens in Asia. The United States is also a protector of Taiwan. officially a Chinese province, factualh an independent political entity. and the main object of Chinese interest because of the unfinished agenda of national re-unification. Given the enormous asymmetries between China and Taiwan. the latter’s independence depends fully and unambiguously on the US guarantee. Russia and China have a fairly ambivalent relation with each other that is officially called a strategic partnership. Ambiguous as this relationship is, it is predictable that the more the West and Russia are at loggerheads, the closer the Russian—Chinese relations might become. On the other hand. Chi na is the stronger partner and harbors not completely friendly feelings to wards Moscow. as Russia took part in China’s humiliation during the imperi alist period no less than the United States did. Russian fears concerning covert immigration into Eastern Siberia and demographic repercussions and political consequences that might result therefrom add to the uneasiness. China and India arc natural rivals for regional preponderance in Asia (Gilbov/Hcginbotham 2012). Both arc developing rapidly. with China still ahead. Territorial disputes. India’s liospitalit Lo TibeLan exiles including the Dalai Lama. China’s close relation to Pakistan and a growing naval rivalry spanning the Indian Ocean from the Strait of Malacca to Iranian shores (Garofano/Dew 2013) run parallel to rapidly growing economic relations and ostensible efforts lo present the relationship if not as amiable then at least as partner-like. The United States, China, Russia and India even today conduct a multi- pronged nuclear arms race (Fingar 2011: Gangul /Thompson 2011: O’Neill 2013. Müllcr 2014). In this race, conventional components like missile de fense. Intercontinental strike options, space-based assets and the specter of cbcr war play their role, as does the issue of extended dcterrcncc The general US militar’ superiority induces Russia and China to improve their nuclear arsenals, while India tries not to be left too far behind the Chinese in terms of nuclear capability. Pakistan and North Korea ork as potential spoilers at the fringe of this arms race. They are not powerful but thc arc capable of stirring up trouble, whenever they move. In tems of the military constellation, the most disquieting development is the drafting of pre-emptive strategies of a first (most likely conventional) strike by the United States and China, on either side motivated by the per ceived need to keep the upper hand early in a potential clash close to Chinese shores (such as in the context of a Taiwan conflict). China is building up middle-range ballistic capabilities to pre-empt US aircraft carrier groups from coming into striking distance and to desiroy US Air Force assets in Okinawa. while the United States is developing means to neutralize exactly these Chinese capabilities. They are steering towards a hair-trigger security dilemma in which the mutual postures cry out for being used first before the enemy might destroy them (Goldstein 2013: Le Miôre 2012). It cannot be excluded that this whole conflict system might collapse into two opposing blocks one da the spark for a major violent cataclysm could even be lighted by uncontrolled non-state actors inside some of the powers. or—in analogy to the role of Serbia in 1914— a ‘spoiler” state with a particularly idios ncralic agenda. Pakistan. North Korea or Tai an arc con ceivable in this role. Even Japan might be considered, if nationalism in Nippon grows further and seeks confrontation with the old rival China. If anything. this constellation does not look much better than the one which drove Europe into World War I a century ago. and it contains a nuclear component. To trust in the infallibility of nuclear deterrence in this mufti- pronged constellation needs quite a lot of optimism Can democratic peace be helpful in this constellation? Our conflict system includes democracies—the United States, India, Japan. Indonesia and non- democracies such as China. Russia, and Vietnam, but not necessarily on the same side. Should the European theater become connected to the Asian one through continuous US—Russian disputes and a Russian—Chinese entente. defective democracies like Ukraine and Georgia may feature rather importantly as potential triggers for a worsening of relationships. While democracy is useful in excluding certain conflict dyads in the whole complex, such as India and the United States. Japan and the United States. Japan and India. from the risk that they might escalate into a violent conflict, and as democratic peace is pacifying parts of the world. such as South America or Europe. it helps little in disputes between democracies and non-democracies. To the contrary: as discussed above, democracies have a more or less moral-emotional inclination to demonize non-democracies once they dis agree, and to feel a missionary drive to turn them democratic. This might exacerbate the existing, more interest-based conflicts between democracies and non-democracies, and it creates fears in the hearts of autocratic leaders that they might be up for democratization sooner or later. The close inter- democratic relations which democratic peace tends to produce, in turn, only exacerbate these fears as democracies tend to be rich, well organized, and powerful and dispose together of much more potent military capabilities than their potential non-dcnwcratic counterparts. Rather than helping with peace. the inter-democratic consequences of the democratic peace tend to exacerbate the security dilemma which exists between democracies and non-democracics an way. This non-peaceful dark side of democratic peace has escaped the attention of most academic writings on this subject and certainly all political utterances about democratic peace in our political systems. But democratic militancy is the Siamese twin of democratic peace as the Bush Administration unambiguously taught us (Gels et al. 2013: Müllcr 2014b).

2022 SDI Negative
**On-case** › A2: Attribution › Ext --- Democracy D

No democratic peace

Jeff Grabmeier 15. Senior Director, Research communications, Media & PR "'Democratic peace' may not prevent international conflict". No Publication. 9-3-2015. https://phys.org/news/2015-09-democratic-peace-international-conflict.html

Using a new technique to analyze 52 years of international conflict, researchers suggest that there may be no such thing as a "democratic peace."

In addition, a model developed with this new technique was found to predict international conflict five and even ten years in the future better than any existing model.