2022
SDI
Negative
**On-case** › A2: Resilience › Ext --- Shipping Not K2 Trade
Fechner 22 --- Inga Fechner, economist at ING in Germany, covering international economic developments with a specific focus on Austria, and Rico Luman is a senior sector economist with a focus on transport, logistics and the automotive industry, “Trade Outlook 2022: Clogged supply chains won’t hold trade back”, ING, 26 January 2022, https://think.ing.com/articles/trade-outlook-2022-clogged-supply-chains-wont-hold-back-trade
Despite the profound disruptive impact of the pandemic on supply chains, demand for consumer goods rose strongly last year. We expect merchandise world trade volumes to have increased by 10.6% in 2021 compared to the previous year, surpassing its pre-pandemic level by 4.3%. The growth rates of global merchandise trade should return to pre-pandemic levels this year, supported by industrial growth, global demand for goods remaining elevated, and only a limited shift of consumption back to services.
And that double-digit expected increase comes in spite of massive supply chain disruptions and soaring transport costs. It reflects strong demand for goods during the pandemic with China being one of the main drivers of the trade surge.
2022
SDI
Negative
**On-case** › A2: Resilience › Ext --- Cyber Shipping D
Lewis ’20 [James Andrew; 8/17/20; senior vice president and director of the Strategic Technologies Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies; "Dismissing Cyber Catastrophe," https://www.csis.org/analysis/dismissing-cyber-catastrophe]
This is a short overview of why catastrophe is unlikely. Several longer CSIS reports go into the reasons in some detail. Past performance may not necessarily predict the future, but after 25 years without a single catastrophic cyberattack, we should invoke the concept cautiously, if at all. Why then, it is raised so often?
Some of the explanation for the emphasis on cyber catastrophe is hortatory. When the author of one of the first reports (in the 1990s) to sound the alarm over cyber catastrophe was asked later why he had warned of a cyber Pearl Harbor when it was clear this was not going to happen, his reply was that he hoped to scare people into action. "Catastrophe is nigh; we must act" was possibly a reasonable strategy 22 years ago, but no longer.
2022
SDI
Negative
**On-case** › A2: Resilience › Ext --- Cyber Shipping D
Valeriano & Maness 18 – Brandon Valeriano, PhD, Chair of Armed Politics at the Marine Corps University, Cyber Security Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council. Ryan Maness, an American cybersecurity expert, Defense Analysis Professor at Naval Postgraduate School. [How We Stopped Worrying about Cyber Doom and Started Collecting Data, Politics and Governance, 6(2), Cogitatio Press]
6. Expanding Cyber Security Data Our team has been coding cyber incident data since 2010 and serves as a unique example of how the process of collecting cyber security data and evidence can be done. Our first peer reviewed published work appeared in 2014 in Journal of Peace Research (Valeriano & Maness, 2014). In this article we note that cyber conflict is much more restrained than generally understood by popular discourse. Threat inflation is ripe in cyber security, and the real use of cyber tools seems to be to enhance the power of strong states.
The data that Valeriano and Maness (2014, 2015) have built challenges the cyber revolution perspective and does so with the tools of social science, and is a necessary turn given the general tone of the debate. We first determine that a viable data collection method in light of limited resources was to focus on states that are committed interstate rivals (Diehl & Goertz, 2001). This allows us to focus on those actors with an intense history of recent hostilities that should be the most likely users of cyber technology on the battlefield (Maness & Valeriano, 2018).
2022
SDI
Negative
**On-case** › A2: Resilience › 1NC --- Cyber Shipping D
Chalk 10—Adjunct Political Scientists at RAND, Adjunct Professor at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, and a PhD in political science from the University of British Columbia [Peter, “Assessing the Recent Terrorist Threat to the Malacca Strait,” CTC Sentinel, Vol. 3, Iss. 4, April, p. 9-11, Emory Libraries]
While there is little doubt concerning the economic salience of the Malacca Strait, carrying out decisive attacks against ships transiting through this corridor is somewhat more challenging than commonly portrayed. One of the most frequently postulated scenarios is that terrorists could attempt to disrupt the commercial viability of the Strait, either by detonating a hijacked oil or LNG tanker to shut down a prominent commercial terminal (such as the Port of Singapore) or by scuttling a large ship to block the through-passage of maritime traffic.8 Although theoretically possible, realization of both attack contingencies would be difficult to achieve.
Igniting pressurized LNG or oil is technically problematic. Unless these substances vent in their liquid form and mix with air in the correct ratio, the probability of either substance fully catching fire is extremely low. Even if this did occur, the lateral force of any subsequent explosion would likely be contained by the tanker’s hull, which would force the destructive energy upwards rather than outwards (thus minimizing its destructive potential).9 Sinking a major oceangoing freighter is equally as challenging and would, at a minimum, require the perpetrating group to have ready access to a large quantity of explosives, the time and means to transport this material and the expertise to know where to place the bombs to cause a critical breach. These logistical and knowledge barriers would pose formidable barriers for a single attack—much less an assault that targeted two or three ships (which would be required to truly block the Strait).10
2022
SDI
Negative
**On-case** › A2: Resilience › Ext --- Cyber Grid D
Jim Avila 12, Senior National Correspondent at ABC News, “A U.S. Blackout as Large as India’s? ‘Very Unlikely’”, http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/headlines/2012/07/a-u-s-blackout-as-large-as-indias-very-unlikely/
As India recovers from a blackout that left the world’s second-largest country — and more than 600 million residents — in the dark, a ripple of uncertainty moved through the Federal Regulatory Commission’s command center today in the U.S. The Indian crisis had some people asking about the vulnerability of America’s grid.
“What people really want to know today is, can something like India happen here? So if there is an outage or some problem in the Northeast, can it actually spread all the way to California,” John Wellinghoff, the commission’s chairman, told ABC News. “It’s very, very unlikely that ultimately would happen.”
2022
SDI
Negative
**On-case** › A2: Resilience › Ext --- Cyber Grid D
Victoria Craig 16, Analyst at Fox Business, Citing the Senior Manager of Industrial Control Systems at Mandiant, “The U.S. Power Grid is 'Vulnerable,' But Don't Panic Just Yet”, http://www.foxbusiness.com/features/2016/02/02/u-s-power-grid-is-vulnerable-but-dont-panic-just-yet.html
The idea of the nation's power grids becoming the next battleground for cyber warriors could make hacking into consumers’ credit card accounts and personal information seem like child’s play. While U.S. power companies are likely targeted by foreign governments and others in increasingly sophisticated breaches, actually shutting off the lights and causing chaos is far more complicated than many pundits make it seem. Dan Scali, senior manager of industrial control systems at Mandiant, a cybersecurity consulting arm of FireEye (), explained that while cyber criminals may gain access to power and utility data systems, it doesn’t necessarily mean the result will be a power outage and a total takedown of power grid control systems. In other words, the power grid is controlled by more than just a panel of digital buttons. “Losing the control system is bad from the perspective that it takes you out of your normal mode of operations of being able to control everything from one command center, but it doesn’t mean you’ve lost control or all the lights go out [in the city],” Scali explained. While many of the systems have been modernized to include digitized control panels, if a hacker were to infiltrate the system, a utility worker could still have the ability to manually control the machines by flipping a switch, pushing a button, or tripping a breaker. As the world saw with the recent attack in Ukraine, which caused a blackout for 80,000 customers of the nation’s western utility, the biggest problem may be ensuring the power grid’s control systems are not vulnerable to cyber break ins. The January attack in Ukraine was likely caused by a corrupted Microsoft Word attachment that allowed remote control over the computer, according to the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Scali said there was no evidence from the incident in Ukraine that the hacker’s malware was able to physically shut down the power. “It wiped out machines, deleted all the files. Kill disk malware made it impossible to remotely control things. It caused chaos on the business network, and the area where control system operations sat. But the attacker, we believe, would have had to actually used the control system to cause load shedding, which caused the power to go out, or trip breakers to cause the actual problem. Malware itself didn’t turn the power out,” Scali said. He said what most likely happened in that incident was the hacker stole user credentials and logged into the system remotely. The bottom line: Yes, a similar event could happen in the U.S. And corporate America is concerned. A recent survey released in January on the state of information security, conducted by consulting firm Pricewaterhouse Coopers, showed cybersecurity as one of the biggest concerns among the top brass at U.S. power and utilities firms. Part of the problem, Brad Bauch, security and cyber sector leader at PwC said, is the interconnectedness of the industry’s tools. “Utilities want to be able to get information out of [their] systems to more efficiently operate them, and also share that information with customers so they have more real-time information into their usage,” he explained. While allowing access to their own consumption data allows the companies to give their customers more of what they want, it also opens up a host of access points for hackers, making the systems more vulnerable than they otherwise would be. But to say that the power grid is susceptible to cyber hackers is a bit of an oversimplification.
2022
SDI
Negative
**On-case** › A2: Resilience › Ext --- Cyber Grid D
Pfeiffer et al. 17, Kyle B. Pfeiffer, Director of the National Preparedness Analytics Center within the Decision and Infrastructure Sciences Division at Argonne National Laboratory, M.S. in Science and Technology Leadership from Brown University; Carmella Burdi, Senior Geographic Information Systems Analyst in the Decision and Infrastructure Sciences Division at Argonne National Laboratory, M.S. in Geographic Information Systems from Northwest Missouri State University; Scott Schlueter, Senior Geographic Information Systems Analyst at Argonne National Laboratory, M.S. in Geographic Information Science and Cartography from the University of Washington, “Local Supply Chains: the Disaster Management Perspective,” International Journal of Safety and Security Engineering, Vol. 7, No. 3, 2017, https://www.witpress.com/elibrary/sse-volumes/7/3/1886
Managing risk, even for a simplistic supply chain, has become a professional responsibility. In the United States, both small and large private sector organizations employ logisticians, continuity experts, and risk analysts to help identify and mitigate risks to their enterprise. Their focus can be everything from coordination of supply and demand to minimizing disruption of normal activities. For the purpose of this research, disruption risks are examined, as they are more likely to intersect with the roles and responsibilities of public safety officials. [2] Furthermore, those in the public sector may be able to effect the most change around them. Disruption risks can be described in four broad categories: operational contingencies, natural hazards, terrorism, and political instability. Operational contingencies are systematic failures, such as the August 2003 Northeastern United States grid blackout, which caused curtailment of operations for many supply and demand nodes. [2, 3]. Natural hazards are events such as hurricanes, wildfires, earthquakes, or flooding which can disrupt critical components of a supply chain – such as the fuel shortages in the New York–New Jersey area following Superstorm Sandy in 2012. [4] Terrorism, the next category of disruption risks, may include indiscriminate destruction of critical supply chain components or targeted sabotage of known critical assets and systems. [3] Lastly, political instability may disrupt supply chains, such as oil production curtailment in Iraq and Syria, given the regional strife since 2012.
In the United States, operational contingencies and natural hazards are among the most likely disruption risks to significantly affect supply chains that are critical to communities following a disaster. The effects of these disruptions may directly impact the ability of a community to obtain food, fuel, prescription medication, or other critical goods and services in the minutes, days, or weeks following a disaster. Understanding the behavior of these supply chains, particularly in near real-time after a disaster, may help officials to make more informed decisions regarding response and recovery activities.
2022
SDI
Negative
**On-case** › A2: Resilience › Ext --- Cyber Grid D
TULLY 21 --- SHAWN TULLY , “A new technology being used in Chicago could protect cities from blackouts and cyberattacks”, Fortune, Aug 31st 2021, https://fortune.com/2021/08/31/chicago-reg-resilient-electric-grid-system-preventing-blackouts-cyberattacks/
A new partnership between a pioneer in superconductor technology and the Chicago utility has hatched a new solution for keeping the heat pumping and factories chugging if anything were to knock out parts of the city’s grid. American Superconductor (AMSC), a Nasdaq-listed innovator in energy technology, is deploying its Resilient Electric Grid (REG) system at two substations operated by ComEd, the utility serving over 4 million homes and businesses in Chicago and northern Illinois. If this first installation performs as the city expects, Chicago could expand the technology to link many more of the nodes that distribute electricity directly to homes and businesses. “We’re planning this stage with the next stage of connecting multiple substations in mind,” says Terence Donnelly, president and COO of ComEd. Put simply, REG is a backup system that for the first time connects substations so that if a downtown facility is damaged by severe weather or a massive hack, a nearby station it’s linked to sends power to the offices and apartment buildings that would otherwise suffer a blackout.
The REG technology offers a second big advantage. It could create a fully integrated network where when one substation needs extra power, others that harbor additional capacity can fill the gap. Hence, utilities would no longer need to build each individual station so that it holds tons of excess capacity for times when AC units or heaters are running at full tilt, or when part of its equipment fails. “REG changes the whole geography of the grid,” says Daniel McGahn, AMSC’s chief executive. “The more you network the grid, the less excess capacity you need. The utilities no longer have to keep building new substations to meet higher usage, they can tap the ‘trapped’ capacity from the substations already there.”
2022
SDI
Negative
**On-case** › A2: Resilience › 1NC --- Cyber Grid D
Larson 19, Intel Analyst @ Dragos. (Selena, 4-3-2019, "Debunking the Hacker Hype: The Reality of Widespread Blackouts", Dragos, )
Unfortunately, the Hollywood-esque idea of a country-wide blackout that grinds society to a halt is what many people consider to be the reality of the threat to the electric grid system. But the truth is less of a blockbuster.
Consider this:
2022
SDI
Negative
**On-case** › A2: Resilience › Ext --- Top Level Cyber D
Valeriano & Maness 18 Brandon Valeriano, PhD, Chair of Armed Politics at the Marine Corps University, Cyber Security Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council, & Ryan Maness, an American cybersecurity expert, Defense Analysis Professor at Naval Postgraduate School. [How We Stopped Worrying about Cyber Doom and Started Collecting Data, Politics and Governance, 6(2), Cogitatio Press]
Moderate and measured takes on cyber security threats are swamped by the recent flood of research and policy positions in the cyber research field offering hyperbolic perspectives based on limited observations. This skewed perspective suggests constant cyber disasters that are confronting humanity constantly. The general tone of the debate argues that cyber war is already upon us and our future will only witness more cyber doom. However, these hyperbolic perspectives are being countered by empirical investigations that produce the opposite of what is to be expected. It is generally observed that limited cyber engagements throughout the geopolitical system are the dominant form of interaction. Our task here is to offer a different path forward. We first posit what can be known about cyber security interactions with data as well as what cannot. Where is the water's edge in cyber security research? We then examine the known works in the field that utilize data and evidence to examine cyber security processes. Finally, we conclude with an offering of what types of studies need to be done in the future to move the field forward, away from the prognostication and generalizations so typical in the discourse in this constantly changing and growing field. Keywords cyber conflict; cyber security; cyber strategy; data collection; quantitative methods Full Text: 1. The Challenge of Cyber Security Threat Data Beginning in 2014, various news organizations began reporting on a particular cyber security firm, Norse Corporation, and their active cyber threat map (Walker, 2015). Mashable noted in 2016 that "the global cyber war is raging on, and this mesmerizing map shows just how serious it has become" (Gallucci, 2016). The map is dynamic, colorful, and gets the point across quickly, a criterion for any decent visualization of data. As late of August 2017, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) tweeted out a link and photo of the threat maps suggesting it represented ongoing cyber-attacks (DIA, 2017). Yet this map is not a very clear representation of any real threats that nationstates face on a daily basis. Unfortunately, the Norse cyber threat map does not represent active threat data, but attacks, likely by bots, on preset honeypots. Honeypots are a method of providing data on fake targets to either distract the opposition from the real targets or to deter an aggressor from attacking in the first place (Gartzke & Lindsay, 2015). While sometimes a useful method to gather threat intelligence if presented a sleight of hand for an attractive target, honeypots as reported in popular discourse are not exactly an accurate representation of the cyber threat landscape. In this case, the goal was to demonstrate the ability to track global attacks to gain interest in the company and promote its capabilities. Nearly all active threat maps either present data tracking honeypots and various bot networks that are devoid of human agency, simply presenting what is in fact fake data. Active representation of the threat landscape is the goal, but the reality is that the picture of the cyber security threat landscape we currently have is incomplete, misleading, or outright fake. High profile data breaches have been consuming media narratives for at least a decade. With each act of cyber disruption or espionage, pundits as well as government officials and several academics declare that cyberwar-fare is upon us, is the future of warfare, and it is only a matter of time before a "Cyber Pearl Harbor" wreaks havoc on the American homeland (Gurdus, 2016). With this new revolution in military affairs, the battlefield, according to some, is forever changed and the next big war could very well be a cyberwar (Clarke & Knake, 2010; Kello, 2013). Politicians, pundits, and practitioners have jumped on this doomsday narrative and have promoted cyber arms races, offensive advantage, and deterrence strategies to stay one step ahead of would be adversaries in order to prevent them from infiltrating networks out of fear of massive retaliation. These revolutionists point to acts such as Stuxnet, Shamoon, Sony, and the Office of Personal Management (OPM) hack as the new norm of conflict between states, and that the US is losing ground with every tolerated cyber-attack on American networks.
2022
SDI
Negative
**On-case** › A2: Resilience › Ext --- Top Level Cyber D
Lewis ’20 [James Andrew; 8/17/20; senior vice president and director of the Strategic Technologies Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies; "Dismissing Cyber Catastrophe," https://www.csis.org/analysis/dismissing-cyber-catastrophe]
A catastrophic cyberattack was first predicted in the mid-1990s. Since then, predictions of a catastrophe have appeared regularly and have entered the popular consciousness. As a trope, a cyber catastrophe captures our imagination, but as analysis, it remains entirely imaginary and is of dubious value as a basis for policymaking. There has never been a catastrophic cyberattack.
To qualify as a catastrophe, an event must produce damaging mass effect, including casualties and destruction. The fires that swept across California last summer were a catastrophe. Covid-19 has been a catastrophe, especially in countries with inadequate responses. With man-made actions, however, a catastrophe is harder to produce than it may seem, and for cyberattacks a catastrophe requires organizational and technical skills most actors still do not possess. It requires planning, reconnaissance to find vulnerabilities, and then acquiring or building attack tools—things that require resources and experience. To achieve mass effect, either a few central targets (like an electrical grid) need to be hit or multiple targets would have to be hit simultaneously (as is the case with urban water systems), something that is itself an operational challenge.
2022
SDI
Negative
**On-case** › A2: Resilience › 1NC --- Top Level Cyber D
Jasmine Rodet 18, Master’s Degree in Cyber Security, Strategy, and Diplomacy from the University of New South Wales, Cyber Security Program Manager at Fortescue Metals Group, “The Threat of Cyber War is Exaggerated”, 11/11/2018, linkedin.com/pulse/threat-cyber-war-exaggerated-jasmine-rodet/
For the regular person on the street, the term ‘cyber war’ is more likely to bring to mind the 1983 movie “WarGames” and the doomsday articles that appear regularly in the media about the ‘cyber battlefield’ and an impending World War III. This essay argues that the threat of cyber war is exaggerated and although it can, by definition, be stated that we are already in a state of cyber war, the impact on states is negligible compared to conventional war domains. The argument is presented in 3 steps. The first step is to define cyber war and cyber weapons, referencing scholars and experts in the area of conventional war and the cyber domain. The second step is to explore who has been exaggerating the threat of cyber war and what their motivations might be. The third is to explore the evidence and quantify the probability and impact that cyberwar has had on states to date. ‘Cyber war’ is a term often used interchangeably in media with cyber-crime, cyber-attacks, cyber-conflict and cyber-incidents, creating confusion amongst the public and scholars alike. Clausewitz (1989, 75), in his book, On War, defines war as ‘an act of force to compel the enemy to do our will’. Rid (2012, 7) on the other interprets Clausewitz use of ‘force’ as meaning ‘violent’ force. According to Rid, if an act is not potentially violent, it is not an act of war. However, Stone (2013, 107) describes ‘cyber war’ as a politically motivated act of force, not necessarily lethal and not necessarily attributable. The definition by Powers and Jablonski states more simply that cyber war is the utilisation of digital networks for geopolitical purposes (Nocetti 2016, 464). Neither of the latter two definitions requires violence to qualify as cyber war. Under these definitions, the Stuxnet cyber-incident in 2010 and the Estonia incident in 2007 would constitute an act of cyber war, and as such we could say that nations have been at cyber war in the past and are likely to continue to engage in cyber war in years to come. For this essay, I will use Stones definition to argue that even though states may engage in cyber war, the concept of cyber war is exaggerated. It seems that cyber war is deliberately exaggerated in the media and by politicians for financial and political gains. There are countless examples in the media and in politics of the exaggeration of the threat of cyber war and the language used plays a big factor in creating a sense of fear in the community. The Four Corners report, Hacked, is a classic example where the reporter, Andrew Fowler describes the current situation in Australia as ‘… a secret war where the body count is climbing every day’ (Fowler 2013). The documentary reveals nothing violent or lethal about cyber incidents. The documentary is actually about hackers working from locations overseas, having targeted key Federal Government departments and major corporations in Australia. In another example, NATO may be interpreted as exaggerating the threat of Cyber War when they invited Charlie Millar to present at their Conference for Cyber Conflict at the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence in 2017. Millar is an independent security evaluator, and his presentation was titled ‘Kim Jong-il and me: How to build a cyber army to attack the US’. He later presented similar content at Def Con 2018. His presentation described the steps he would take to mount a cyber war, including the types of people he would engage, how much he would pay them, what his strategy would be and how much it would cost in total. Who stands to gain from the exaggeration and hype? Logically, one group would be those that gain financially from the sale of cyber protective services and software. According to Valerino, 57% of technical experts surveyed said that we are currently in a cyber arms race and 43% said that the worst-case scenarios are inevitable (Valeriano and Ryan 2015). Translate this into sales and Gartner projects worldwide security spending will reach $96 Billion in 2018, up 8 Percent from 2017 and to top $113 billion by 2020 (Gartner 2017). Additionally, there may be political motivations to exaggerate the threat of cyber war. Cyberspace is not well understood by the general public and fear is natural. In the US’s cyber security debate, observers have noted there is a tendency for policymakers, military leaders, and media, among others, to use frightening ‘cyber-doom scenarios’ when making a case for action on cyber security (Dunn 2008, 2). There is some evidence to suggest that more recently in the political arena; we may be maturing in our understanding of the real threat of cyber war. The Tallinn Manual, an academic, non-binding study on how international law applies to cyber conflicts and cyber warfare, was written at the invitation of the Tallinn-based NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence. It was first published in 2013 with the title ‘The Tallinn Manual on the International Law of Cyber War’. In 2017, it was re-released with the revised title ‘Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law of Cyber Operations’. The change in title from ‘war’ to ‘operations’ signifies a more moderate use of language from NATO and is an acknowledgement that cyber incidents generally fall below the threshold at which International Law would declare them to be a formal act of war. Experience over the 4 short years from 2013 to 2017 has demonstrated that cyber incidents tend to have a low-level impact on the target state. As the book’s authors put it ‘the focus of the original Manual was on the most severe cyber operations, those that violate the prohibition of the use of force in international relations, entitle states to exercise the right of self-defence, and/or occur during armed conflict’ while the new version ‘adds a legal analysis of the more common cyber incidents that states encounter on a day-to-day basis and that fall below the thresholds of the use of force or armed conflict’ (Leetaru 2017). To get a better sense if cyber war is exaggerated, we must also consider the probability of cyber war in the future. The probability of cyber war should be weighed up against the probability of conventional war. Where tensions are already high, for example, between North Korea and the US or Russia and Estonia, I would argue that cyber war is more likely than conventional war. This is due to factors including; cyber warfare is less costly than conventional warfare, states are less rational in their decision space in the cyber realm, states find cyber attribution very difficult to achieve so attacks can be undertaken covertly and cyber war is considered ‘a challenge’ and central to the hackers’ ethos (Junio 2013, 128). Further, Sanger describes in his book, The Perfect Weapon, cyber weapons (such as cyber vandalism, Distributed Denial of Service (DDOS), intrusions and advanced persistent threat (APT)) as the ‘perfect weapons’ for the following reasons; They are cheap: When compared to Nuclear weapons, there are only a handful of nations globally that can afford the technology to create a nuclear weapon. They are easily accessible: Unlike a Nuclear bomb that requires uranium, a highly protected metal, in the production process, a cyber weapon can be created with minimal investment and highly available IT infrastructure. They can be dialled-up or dialled-down relatively easily. A ballistic missile, the force of the explosion cannot be adjusted as easily as a DDOS attack. A DDOS attack can be adjusted to last an hour, a few days or a few weeks. They have a huge range in how they are used: Sabotage as with Stuxnet, Espionage as with the Chinese industrial spying on the US, North Korea’s infiltration of Sony, the Iranians attack on Las Vegas Sands Corp. casino operators. The significant factor is that cyber weapons can and are being used every day for discrete, low-level cyber conflicts to undermine and disrupt rivals, but historically it has not progressed to open conflict, nor has it warranted a military response (Sanger 2018). Additionally, massive cyber operations would necessarily impact the civilian population and violate the immunity of non-combatants. The conditions of war dictate that this is “taboo” and to date, rival states have shown restraint in their use of cyber weapons for this reason (Valeriano and Ryan 2015). It appears that the threat that cyber weapons represent to national security is overstated and the threat of cyber war is overstated. The US and likely other highly networked nations appear reticent about using cyber weapons for significant cyber conflict given their vulnerabilities. Ironically, NSA programs such as PRISM have made the US more of a target given the sheer volume of sensitive information stored in one place. Regardless of US defences, there is no way to make this information completely secure from intrusion, and as such, the very act of storing the information makes them more vulnerable. Rid (2012) is among some academics who argue that cyber war has never and will likely never eventuate. The benefits of being on this side of the debate mean that public funding can be allocated away from offensive cyber security initiatives to other, potentially more important initiatives, such as public health and housing. The government is constantly under pressure to prioritise public spending and it is imperative that they have realistic, accurate projections regarding the risk of cyber war, the probability and the impact, to allow them to focus spending on the most important areas.
2022
SDI
Negative
**On-case** › A2: Resilience › 1NC --- Top Level Cyber D
--- Defenders advantage nullifies any ROI --- assumes NC3 and Infrastructure
Borghard & Saltzman 19 --- Erica D. Borghard, Adjunct Research Scholar in the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies and an Adjunct Associate Professor in the School of International and Public Affairs, and Shawn W. Lonergan, Senior Advisor to the U.S. Cyberspace Solarium Commission, Strategic Studies Quarterly , Vol. 13, No. 3 (FALL 2019), pp. 122-145, https://www.jstor.org/stable/26760131?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents
Therefore, the time and resource requirements to gain access and develop specific offensive capabilities may render important escalatory response options infeasible or impractical at the desired time. Operational planning and execution must consider that a given capability may not be usable or even exist at a chosen time of employment.29 As the above discussion illustrates, many of the target sets that would represent strategic (and therefore escalatory) targets, such as a state’s critical infrastructure or nuclear command and control, demand extensive planning, pre-positioning, and capability development in advance of employing offensive capabilities. Therefore, the timing of a crisis plays a crucial role in decisions about cyber escalation responses. Specifically, the time required to develop access to hold strategic targets at risk means that, even if a state seeks to escalate against an adversary using cyber means, it may find itself limited by the accesses and capabilities it possesses at the moment a crisis occurs. Cyber response options may be limited to less decisive or more vulnerable target sets, rather than those that are more strategically significant.
2022
SDI
Negative
**On-case** › A2: Resilience › Ext --- Sharing Sufficient
CERULUS 22 --- LAURENS CERULUS, Politico, “NATO steps up intelligence-sharing ‘in preparation’ for Russian cyberattacks”, March 24, 2022,
Leaders of the NATO defense alliance Thursday said they were stepping up intelligence-sharing on feared Russian cyberattacks, following U.S. warnings that Moscow was preparing large-scale attacks on NATO countries linked to its military invasion in Ukraine.
"In preparation for any Russian malicious cyber response to the actions we have taken, we are taking steps to increase the resilience of the infrastructure in our respective nations by strengthening our coordinated cyber defences and improving our shared awareness of cyber threats," said a statement released after NATO leaders met in Brussels Thursday.
2022
SDI
Negative
**On-case** › A2: Resilience › 1NC --- Sharing Sufficient
Maigre 22 --- Merle Maigre, Senior Expert on Cyber Security at the e-Governance Academy (eGA), a non-profit think tank that specializes in empowering central and local governments to lead digital transformation programmes and create smart, sustainable and effective e-government, e-democracy and cyber security solutions, “NATO’s Role in Global Cyber Security”, German Marshall Fund, APRIL 06, 2022, https://www.gmfus.org/news/natos-role-global-cyber-security
Attribution is only as good as the information that allies are willing to share. NATO’s value can be in becoming the preferred platform for sharing cyber information. General Paul Nakasone, who heads US Cyber Command, told the House Armed Services subcommittee on intelligence that “in 35 years” he has never seen a better sharing of accurate, timely, and actionable intelligence than what has transpired with Ukraine.30 Sharing information and intelligence with allies “builds coalitions” and can “shine a light on disinformation” campaigns, like the one Russia used to lay the groundwork for their invasion of Ukraine.
2022
SDI
Disadvantage
AFF › 1AR › AT Russia Impact
Gardner 2/23 (Frank, “Russia-Ukraine crisis: How likely is it to escalate into broader war?” Feb. 23, 2022)
Let's cut right to the chase here: are we witnessing the prelude to World War 3?
Because let's face it, that is what a lot of people are understandably asking and thinking in the light of the Kremlin's recent actions over Ukraine - actions and statements that have triggered a deluge of denouncements and sanctions from the West.
2022
SDI
Disadvantage
AFF › 1AR › AT Russia Impact
Dhanesha 2/25 (Neel, reporter for Vox. “How to think about the risk of nuclear war, according to 3 experts” Feb 25, 2022)
The main reason, Bunn said, is that the United States and its NATO allies have made it clear that they will not send troops to Ukraine. Without the threat of military intervention, Putin has little reason to use his nuclear weapons, especially since Russia has a staggering numbers advantage over the Ukrainian military.
“His objective is not to bring the world to nuclear war,” said , senior lecturer in global studies at Boston University. “His objective is to simply swallow Ukraine — and restore not just the [power of the] Soviet Union, but the Tsarist empire.”
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Ganesh ’20 [Janan Ganesh was a Researcher at the Policy Exchange and is the principal political columnist with the Financial Times, “Bonhomie but no brotherhood: The authoritarian bloc that never was,” 4-22-20, https://www.irishtimes.com/news/world/us/bonhomie-but-no-brotherhood-the-authoritarian-bloc-that-never-was-1.4235287]
Bill Hicks, the late comic and grouch, dreamt of a political party for “people who hate people”. He just couldn’t get them to come together in the same room. The great egoist movement was undone by its central principle. I think of the skit whenever the world brotherhood of jingoist authoritarians is talked up. US president Donald Trump is in this group, with, among others, the leaders of China (Xi Jinping), Russia (Vladimir Putin), India (Narendra Modi) and Brazil (Jair Bolsonaro). Trump and Xi are superpower rivals, America cancelled India’s preferential trading status, and still the idea of a Nationalist International survives. It should not survive the coronavirus pandemic. Recent months have further teased out the differences between these conflated governments. Their domestic autocracy is real enough, but their coherence as a bloc is overstated. Liberalism is not confronted by anything like a unified opponent. The most vivid case in point is the US-China blame-game. It is also the least surprising. Relations were dire before the virus, and it should not be news that nativists feud more easily than they collude across national lines. World war allusions have flowed too cheaply of late, but it is hard not to think of the autocrats who mercifully failed to act in concert for long in the previous century. Leaders who believe in the separateness of nations above all else will always have trouble co-ordinating. As long as this is true, the position of liberal democracy is less exposed than it sometimes looks. What its enemies have in numbers and geographic spread they lack in togetherness. At present, they cannot agree on the efficacy of the World Health Organisation. The prospect of a new world order built around their shared preferences seems far off. As telling as the diplomatic schisms between nationalists is their range of antivirus policies. Mainstream governments have converged on much the same strategy, couched in much the same language. It is true enough that some were quicker than others and some were better prepared to begin with. As lives are at issue, the stragglers should be held to eventual account. Free-for-all But as time passes, what distinguishes the approaches of, say, France, Canada and Ireland, lies in the details. Given how many countries fall into the non-populist category, true outliers such as Sweden, with its minimal lockdown, are amazingly few. Compare this with the free-for-all inside the populist world. Modi has kept the second-largest population on Earth at home for a month. Binyamin Netanyahu, Israel’s prime minister, took measures against the virus relatively early. At the opposite end, there is the laxity of Trump and Bolsonaro. The crisis has exposed how little connects these leaders beyond a surface bonhomie. Some pretend to be serious about the business of government, some do not. A club that encompasses them all is likely to be meaningless. Notice, too, how gaping are its exit doors. By embracing a shutdown, however tardily, and not talking up a relaxation, Boris Johnson is viewed ever more as a “normal” leader. At least before his illness, the UK premier was counted unambiguously among the nativists. Scott Morrison, the Australian prime minister, after tackling the virus seriously, has undergone a similar reassignment. The nationalist team roster has thinned in a few weeks, which tells you how much rigour the idea ever had. And this is not just about personalities. There are theoretical contradictions within populism. This is a creed that cannot decide what it thinks about personal freedom. It resents technocratic bossiness while brooking no checks and balances in the protection of the homeland. Trump claims “total authority”, yes, but to loosen restrictions on people, not to tighten them (except for would-be immigrants). If this tension is evident in one leader, imagine its permutations for policy across several governments across several continents across several issues. Even according an “-ism” to such a disparate bunch is to flatter them. It is understandable that we do. We are a pattern-recognising species, and sometimes a pattern-inventing one. It is consoling to detect some kind of shape to the world. But the point is to not make the pattern itself more frightening than anarchic reality. No doubt, the momentum has been with authoritarians in recent times. The question is whether they add up to a cohesive front against democracy. An empire of illiberalism, on which the sun never sets, assumes more unity than could feasibly exist among national egoists. It just took a crisis to show it.
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Leong ’19 [Ho Wai Clarence Leong holds an MSc from the Columbia University Graduate School of Journalism and an MA in English and Modern History from the University of St. Andrews, is the Asia newswire editor for Dow Jones, “In an age of authoritarianism, the world sees glimmers of hope,” 3-19-19, ]
In the past year, citizens of Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, and Ethiopia have taken to the streets to demand accountability from their governments, while voters in Malaysia and the Maldives ousted corrupt governments at the ballot box. Countries with a strong civil society or decent-sized middle class continue to push back against autocrats, even though the headlines are more often about the threats to democracy. That’s not to say democracy has nothing to worry about. A new paper published this month found that the world has been in “a wave of autocratization” since 1994, and as many as 75 democracies have seen a reversal to autocracy. Modern-day autocrats know better than to blatantly shore up power, but do so gradually and under a legal facade, making it harder to detect, researchers say. Autocrats pit authoritarianism against democracy, promoting it as a more efficient form of governance and spreading the technology that strengthens control. Social media amplifies the spread of misinformation, clouding voters’ judgment. Global freedom, which is composed of political rights and civil liberties, has been in decline for the 13th year in a row, according to a new report from Freedom House. But the same report also notes significant improvement in accountability for corruption in Angola, Armenia, and other nations. Political participation in most parts of the world has seen a continuous upward trend, reports The Economist. And while autocrats threaten democracies, they are also “fueling a powerful counterattack,” Human Rights Watch notes in its latest annual report. “Those who are bemoaning this authoritarian turn in the world were overstating the case,” says Steven Levitsky, a political scientist at Harvard and co-author of “How Democracies Die.” The euphoric expansion of democracy in the 1990s led to the over-optimistic belief that authoritarianism was a thing of the past, and now that expectation has been dashed, he says. But “there’s yet to emerge a real, viable, truly legitimate alternative to democracy in the world.” That doesn’t discount the fact that people are disillusioned with traditional political parties and losing confidence in democracy. But rather than disengaging from it, that dissatisfaction is driving citizens to participate in political processes, according to The Economist. Voter turnout and membership of political parties rose, reversing a downward trend. A larger proportion of the world’s population is now willing to engage in lawful demonstrations. The Economist also notes a particularly striking area of progress coming from female participation in politics. “Women have become much more active, not just in [the] U.S. but around the world,” says Steven Leslie, lead analyst at The Economist Intelligence Unit. “There is an ongoing surge of female participation in politics and in activities that are essential to democracy.” Barriers like discriminatory laws and socioeconomic obstacles are gradually being removed. In Rwanda and Ethiopia, half of the cabinet ministers are women. New legislation in Japan encourages gender parity in parliament. In the United States, the voters in the November midterms elected the highest number of women to Congress in history – though they still make up only 23.7 percent. Still, the international atmosphere has become less favorable to the expansion of democracy. Not only is the totalitarian state of China spreading its influence, but cracks are appearing in decades-old alliances such as the European Union and NATO. In the EU, both Italy and Turkey saw their rankings in The Economist’s democracy index fall by at least 10 places. Meanwhile, on the other side of the Atlantic, the U.S. is becoming more isolationist, analysts say. “America’s commitment to the global progress of democracy in its foreign policy has been seriously compromised,” says Sarah Repucci, senior director for research and analysis at Freedom House. In one example, when the U.S. withdrew from the council on human rights at the United Nations, it left “a huge vacuum of power,” says Rosa Freedman, a professor of law, conflict, and global development at the University of Reading in England and author of several books on the U.N. Despite the downward trends, however, countries are forming new alliances to put pressure on repressive regimes, reports Human Rights Watch. It points to the example of the EU and a group of Muslim-majority countries working together to create a mechanism at the U.N. to collect evidence on the ethnic cleansing of Rohingyas, which could be used in future trials of the Myanmar government. A group of Latin American countries led a resolution in the Human Rights Council to condemn the severe persecution of Venezuelans under President Nicolás Maduro. Other human rights mechanisms have sprung up in unexpected places, adds Joseph Saunders, deputy program director at Human Rights Watch. For example, the organizing bodies of big sports tournaments, such as the World Cup and the Olympics, will scrutinize the bidders and hosts’ human rights records. “These are obviously dark times,” says Mr. Saunders. “But [you] miss a large part of the picture if you don’t see the pushback that is also happening.”
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AFF › 1AR › 1AR: China Answers
Ullman, 2/18 - Senior Advisor at the Atlantic Council
[Dr. Harlan Ullman, Senior Advisor at the Atlantic Council, February 18, 2022, “Reality Check #10: China will not invade Taiwan,” , accessed 4-2-2022]
Despite Beijing’s longstanding desire to invade and conquer Taiwan and achieve “one China,” China simply lacks the military capability and capacity to launch a full-scale amphibious invasion of Taiwan for the foreseeable future. With a potential defending force of 450,000 Taiwanese today, using the traditional three-to-one ratio of attackers to defenders taught at war colleges, to undertake an invasion, China would need over 1.2 million soldiers (out of a total active force of over 2 million) that would have to be transported in many thousands of ships. Although Beijing is unlikely to launch a full-scale invasion of Taiwan, given China’s strength, autocratic government, and ambitions, the United States cannot totally ignore the risk of such an attack. At the same time, however, Washington should develop an overall strategy designed to deter the most likely scenarios—such as imposing economic and financial embargoes on Taiwan, imposing a maritime blockade of the island, or attempting a regime change from within—or prevail militarily if deterrence fails. China does have many other options for pressuring Taiwan. What’s the issue? The Trump administration’s National Defense Strategy (NDS) was substantially predicated on preventing two faits accomplis: a Russian invasion of the Baltics and a Chinese amphibious assault on Taiwan. To what degree these scenarios will survive the Biden administration’s soon-to- be-released strategic review remains to be seen. The most likely outcome is that “integrated deterrence,” Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin’s term—for now more a slogan than a strategic concept that attempts a more “wholistic” all-of-government effort—will become prominent, as will a greater focus on the “deter” element rather than on “defeat” as was the last NDS. Defining what defeat means and how it would be achieved remains elusive. Some observers believe that how the United States handles the Ukraine crisis will be closely watched by China. That is true. But, as this paper argues, the Ukraine crisis will not influence Chinese decisions on whether or not to launch a full-scale amphibious invasion because, given the force demands, China simply lacks the capacity to do so for the foreseeable future. The current and former heads of Indo-Pacific Command have warned about China’s building the necessary forces to invade and conquer Taiwan, possibly by decade’s end. Given China’s long-standing determination to make Taiwan part of the mainland and achieve “one China,” a military takeover of Taiwan sounds plausible. However, this notion is based on a fundamental misperception regarding China’s capability to launch a major amphibious assault. If China were to launch such a military attack on Taiwan, what would that take in terms of forces and force levels? Does China possess the requisite numbers and capabilities? If not, when, if at all, might it build those forces that, if history counts, would number in the hundreds of thousands of troops and thousands of ships and maritime assault vehicles? Current and past studies do not successfully or specifically address these questions. These studies focus on the how, but not on the specific manpower requirements of what would be required to carry out an invasion. The definitive document on what size force would be required to seize Taiwan in a full-out landing was drafted by the US military in the late stages of World War II in the Pacific. In 1944, Operation Causeway was the US plan for retaking Formosa, as it was then called, from 30,000 starving Japanese soldiers. The planned invasion force was double the size of Operation Overlord, the Normandy landing: 400,000 soldiers and marines deployed on 4,000 ships. With a potential defending force of 450,000 Taiwanese today, using the traditional three-to-one ratio of attackers to defenders taught at war colleges, China would need to deploy over 1.2 million soldiers (out of a total active force of over 2 million). Many thousands of ships would be required to land all those forces, and doing so would take weeks. How many occupation forces would be required to pacify the Taiwanese? Surely the lessons of Afghanistan and Iraq are not lost on the PLA leadership. China possesses a small fraction of the necessary ships to execute a landing of that size and lacks the capacity to do so for the foreseeable future. Nor are there any current plans suggesting China is intent on procuring such a force, though that could change. Further, Taiwan is not conducive to any form of amphibious assault. A handful of landing sites on the west coast are blocked by proximate mountainous areas running the length of the 250-mile-long island, some approaching 10,000 feet in height. Defenders could fall back using this difficult terrain to wage a guerrilla war. Moreover, Taiwan lacks the infrastructure to support over a million invaders and their logistical needs, most of which would have to come from the mainland. Fixating on an unlikely scenario, no matter how compelling it sounds, skews US resources and force levels.