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2022 SDI Affirmative
SDI Starter Packet --- Cyber Info Sharing Aff › Aff Extensions / A2s --- Attribution › A2: Attribution Doesn’t Deter

Attribution is key to early warning --- deters escalation

Clark & Landau 10 --- David D. Clark Massachusetts Institute of Technology Susan Landau PrivacyInk.com, “Untangling Attribution” Proceedings of a Workshop on Deterring Cyberattacks: Informing Strategies and Developing Options for U.S. Policy (2010) National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2010. Proceedings of a Workshop on Deterring Cyberattacks: Informing Strategies and Developing Options for U.S. Policy. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. https://doi.org/10.17226/12997.

In February 2010, former NSA Director Mike McConnell wrote that, “We need to develop an earlywarning system to monitor cyberspace, identify intrusions and locate the source of attacks with a trail of evidence that can support diplomatic, military and legal options—and we must be able to do this in milliseconds. More specifically, we need to reengineer the Internet to make attribution, geolocation, intelligence analysis and impact assessment—who did it, from where, why and what was the result—more manageable.”2

This statement is part of a recurring theme that a secure Internet must provide better attribution for actions occurring on the network. Although attribution generally means assigning a cause to an action, this meaning refers to identifying the agent responsible for the action (specifically, “determining the identity or location of an attacker or an attacker’s intermediary”3). This links the word to the more general idea of identity, in its various meanings. Attribution is central to deterrence, the idea that one can dissuade attackers from acting through fear of some sort of retaliation. Retaliation requires knowing with full certainty who the attackers are.

2022 SDI Affirmative
SDI Starter Packet --- Cyber Info Sharing Aff › Aff Extensions / A2s --- Attribution › Ext --- Info Sharing K2 Attribution

Increased intelligence sharing allows attribution

Shea 17 --- Jamie Shea Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Emerging Security Challenges at NATO, How is NATO Meeting the Challenge of Cyberspace?, PRISM , Vol. 7, No. 2, THE FIFTH DOMAIN (2017), pp. 18-29, https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/26470515.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3A13066a3aa3cce031d0aff811a7cc9f2c&ab_segments=&origin=

Beyond these two flagship initiatives of the 2016 Warsaw Summit, a good portion of NATO’s effort to step up its game in cyber defense, is to enhance its ability as a platform to assist the Allies across a whole spectrum of cyber defense needs. For instance, a new memorandum of understanding (MOU) between NATO Headquarters (HQ) and individual Allies has been offered to improve intelligence sharing, crisis management, and lessons learned from cyberattacks. Already 22 of the 29 Allies have signed this new MOU. NATO has established a new intelligence division with a strong cyber threat intelligence function, which should incentivize Allies to provide more early warning and advance notice of cyberattacks or malware and not only lessons learned and post–incident information. Enhanced intelligence sharing among Allies will not only help to parry cyberattacks or to limit their damage but also to build over time a much more detailed and comprehensive picture of hacker groups, proxies, methodologies, and attribution techniques.6

2022 SDI Affirmative
SDI Starter Packet --- Cyber Info Sharing Aff › Aff Extensions / A2s --- Attribution › Ext --- Info Sharing K2 Attribution

Info sharing is key to proper attribution --- solves false flags

Skopik and Pahi 20 --- Florian Skopik, Senior Scientist of the research program “IT Security, & Timea Pahi “Under false flag: using technical artifacts for cyber attack attribution”., Cybersecurity volume 3, Article number: 8 (2020), https://link.springer.com/article/10.1186/s42400-020-00048-4

The challenges related to false flags have been investigated before (Pihelgas 2015). Especially (Bartholomew and Guerrero-Saade 2016) takes a closer look into the problem and also surveys noteworthy actors in the field. Cyber Information sharing (Skopik et al. 2016; Wagner et al. 2016) is a common means to gather important data to aid the attribution process, for instance, information on attackers, their capabilities, used TTPs and so on.

It is important to note that attack detection is very much different from attribution, in that sense that not all sources (Zimmermann 2014; MITRE 2019) relevant to detect attacks (Caltagirone et al. 2013) are also appropriate for attribution. In contrast to pure detection of attacks, attribution sets its focus to relating actions to actors. A particularly important piece are therefore actor profiles (Chiesa et al. 2008) used to correlate identified actions to known capabilities and applied tactics and techniques of actor groups. The main problem of the attribution is a potential misattribution. Since the perpetrator attempt to cover up their tracks through a mixture of evasiveness, deception, and destruction of records or though false flags. This issue is well known among agencies and secret services. The NSA and NCSC released for instance a joint advisory APT group to avoid possible misattribution Footnote1. The information sharing, especially threat intelligence, is one essential aspect to detect false falgs. There are some initiatives worldwide, such as the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act in the USA Footnote2, Cyber Security Information Sharing of ENISA Footnote3, or Cyber Information Exchange in the NATO Footnote4. The NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence is also aware of the issue and developed own definitions for false-flag, no-flag cyber operations (Pihelgas 2015) and influence cyber operations (Brangetto and Veenendaal 2016). Influence cyber operations are designed to influence the behaviour of a target audience. These false flag operations are part of the hybrid threats today, such as Russian aggression against Ukraine in 2014 and its intervention in Syria in 2015. One of the latest false flag operation is the TV5Hack (see “Illustrative application of CAM to identify false flags” section).

2022 SDI Affirmative
SDI Starter Packet --- Cyber Info Sharing Aff › Aff Extensions / A2s --- Attribution › Ext --- Attribution Insufficient Now

Failure to share information makes Russia hybrid attacks successful

Beaulieu & Salvo 18 --- Brittany Beaulieu, fellow and program officer for GMF's Alliance for Securing Democracy, and David Salvo, deputy director of the Alliance for Securing Democracy (ASD) and a senior fellow at the German Marshall Fund, German Marshall Fund of the United States (2018), “NATO and Asymmetric Threats:: A Blueprint for Defense and Deterrence”, https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/resrep18856.pdf

While NATO and the EU have pledged to improve their information sharing and coordination of responses across the asymmetric toolkit, these efforts are under-funded and lack high-level coordination. Moreover, the absence of a mechanism to share NATO classified information with the EU, an old problem, prevents both organizations from more systematic cooperation in responding jointly to the hybrid challenge. The lack of information sharing among allies at NATO is another challenge. For example, the United States did not share much information about the Russian operation against the 2016 presidential election as it unfolded and only a meager amount afterward. In the lead up to the French and German elections, information was shared on a bilateral basis, rather than through the NAC. The reservations of some allies to discuss their own vulnerabilities to interference operations only exacerbate NATO’s organizational impediments to addressing hybrid threats in a timely and coordinated manner. A formalized information sharing or early warning mechanism could help to rectify this problem, as would decisions in allied capitals to elevate discussion on hybrid threats at the NAC and share more threat information and intelligence.

2022 SDI Affirmative
SDI Starter Packet --- Cyber Info Sharing Aff › Resilience Add-Ons › Add-On --- Trade

Trade disruption triggers multiple extinction scenarios

Langan-Riekhof ‘21

et al; Maria Langan-Riekhof is the Lead Author and is the new Director of the Strategic Futures Group at the National Intelligence Council, leading the Intelligence Community’s assessment of global dynamics and charged with producing the quadrennial Global Trends product for the incoming or returning administration. She has spent more than 27 years in the intelligence community as both a senior analyst and manager, serving at the CIA and on the NIC. She brings a background in Middle East studies and has spent more than half her career analyzing regional dynamics. Her leadership roles include: Chief of the CIA’s Red Cell, founder and director of the CIA’s Strategic Insight Department, and research director for the Middle East. She was one of the DNI’s Exceptional Analysts in 2008-09 and the Agency’s fellow at the Brookings Institution in 2016-17. She is a member of the Senior Analytic Service and the Senior Intelligence Service and hold degrees from the University of Chicago and the University of Denver - National Intelligence Council - Global Trends 2040 – Form the section: “Scenario Four – Separate Silos” - MARCH 2021 - #E&F - https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/GlobalTrends_2040.pdf

With the trade and financial connections that defined the prior era of globalization disrupted, economic and security blocs formed around the United States, China, the EU, Russia, and India. Smaller powers and other states joined these blocs for protection, to pool resources, and to maintain at least some economic efficiencies. Advances in AI, energy technologies, and additive manufacturing helped some states adapt and make the blocs economically viable, but prices for consumer goods rose dramatically. States unable to join a bloc were left behind and cut off.

2022 SDI Affirmative
SDI Starter Packet --- Cyber Info Sharing Aff › Resilience Add-Ons › Add-On --- Trade

Cyber attacks on infrastructure collapses trade

Merk 18 [Olaf Merk, leads the ports and shipping work at the International Transport Forum (ITF) of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Lucie Kirstein and Filip Salamitov, "The Impact of Alliances in Container Shipping", 11/2/18, https://www.itf-oecd.org/sites/default/files/docs/impact-alliances-container-shipping.pdf]

In addition to alliances, vertical integration risks also reduce system resilience. Integration of shipping, terminal handling and hinterland transport could mean that whole transport chains are in the hand of just a few players, creating huge leverage for cyber-attacks, especially if parts of the chain are digitally connected. This became painfully evident during the NotPetya attack that hit Maersk ships and terminals (Box 7). Vertical integration could be considered to be related to the emergence of alliances. As service differentiation for the sea-leg is difficult in alliances – as the product is basically the same – one of the few remaining possibilities for individual carriers to differentiate is via vertical integration.

Box 7. Cyber security and risks associated to vertical integration

2022 SDI Affirmative
SDI Starter Packet --- Cyber Info Sharing Aff › Aff Extensions / A2s --- Resilience › Ext --- Shipping Impact Dump

Supply chain cyber disruptions trigger grid disruption and environmental destruction

Edwards et al. 21

Frances L. Edwards, MUP, PhD, CEM, Joseph Szyliowicz, PhD, Dan Goodrich, MPA, CEM, William Medigovich, MS, Liz Lange, MPA, Autumn Anderton, MA, March 2021, “Surface Transportation Supply Chain Security: Creating a Blueprint for Future Research”, Mineta Transportation Institute, jt

Cybersecurity has a prominent role in the management of business and government activities. While it has achieved increased academic recognition, with degrees in cybersecurity being offered at major national universities, 79 not all agencies have developed complete cybersecurity systems. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has created the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), a national risk management center for US critical infrastructure. The cybersecurity branch notes that “[c]yberspace and its underlying infrastructure are vulnerable to a wide range of risks stemming from both physical and cyber threats and hazards.”80 Palo Alto Networks has noted that the supply chain is the weakest link in cybersecurity. The cybersecurity of each partner in the chain is controlled within its own organization so that one partner with weak protections exposes the rest of the partners to hackers. New vulnerabilities are developing through the “Internet of Things, digital buyer-seller relationships, and robotic process automation,” raising the need to know how you’re your “suppliers, and their suppliers’ suppliers, and so on down the value chain, have the same kind of protection.”81

2022 SDI Affirmative
SDI Starter Packet --- Cyber Info Sharing Aff › Aff Extensions / A2s --- Resilience › Ext --- Resilience Solves Shipping

Resilience through info sharing key to shipping

Estay & Guerra 20 --- Daniel Sepulveda Estay and Pablo Guerra, Department of Technology Management and Economics, Technical University of Denmark, “The Wave Analogy of Cyber-Resilience as Applied to Shipping Operations” in “Cybersecurity and Resilience in the Arctic” 2020, page 266

It is therefore becoming increasingly clear that the abilities to avoid and detect cyber-attacks (cyber-security) and to react efficiently once cyber-attacks have been detected (cyber-resilience) have become critical for the success of smart shipping operations. loT enabled cyber-physical systems are regularly threatened by a broad range of potential cyber-attacks coming from criminals, terrorists, or hacktivists (He et al., 2016). Cyber-attackers use any available channel to exploit poorly secured systems for different purposes, giving way to threats like harassment, corporate espionage, extortion, stock market manipulation, or the planning and carrying out of terrorist activities. In parallel, there is the risk that failing to ensure continuous IT systems may also cause disruptions in operations (Jarvelainen, 2013), and consequent challenges for mission assurance of the enterprise (D. J. Bodeau, Graubart & Fabius-Greene, 2010). Rand has estimated that the global cost of cyber-crime can range from USS799 billion to over USS2 trillion (Dreyer et al., 2018) and, as recent examples like the Wannacry and Petya a viruses have shown, effects include not only disruption of industrial operations, but also lives put at risk.

The modem shipping industry thus faces cyber-risks associated with its own data and control systems, and also to its supply chains (He et al., 2016), as processes connected both with suppliers and customers through the internet form part of a shared network. As a result, cyber-attackers' access and impact actors sharing a common network, gaining access to IT systems through the weakest link in the supply network (He et al., 2016), (Khan & Sepulveda Estay, 2015). Considering their effects and the urgency of a problem that is continuing to unfold, it is sensible to ask how risks derived from the use of IT systems should be managed in shipping operations to increase detection and reaction to cyber-attacks.

2022 SDI Affirmative
SDI Starter Packet --- Cyber Info Sharing Aff › Aff Extensions / A2s --- Resilience › A2: No Grid Attacks

Actors have the means and motivations to strike critical infrastructure.

Wintch 21 --- Timothy M. Wintch, an active-duty Major in the United States Air Force. He is currently a graduate student at the Oettinger School of Science & Technology Intelligence, National Intelligence University, in Bethesda, Maryland. Mr. Wintch has over 11 years of experience in command-and-control operations as an Air Battle Manager. He holds a Bachelor of Arts in Politics from the University of California, Santa Cruz, and a Master of Arts in Military Studies from American Military University. (April 20th, 2021, “PERSPECTIVE: Cyber and Physical Threats to the U.S. Power Grid and Keeping the Lights on”, https://www.hstoday.us/subject-matter-areas/infrastructure-security/perspective-cyber-and-physical-threats-to-the-u-s-power-grid-and-keeping-the-lights-on/)

Among critical infrastructure sectors in the U.S., energy is perhaps the most crucial of the 16 sectors defined by the Department of Homeland Security. This sector is so vital because it provides the energy necessary to run every other critical infrastructure sector. However, the U.S. power grid, the backbone of the energy sector, is built upon an aging skeleton that is becoming increasingly vulnerable every day. Whether from terrorists or nation-states like Russia and China, the power grid is susceptible to not just physical attacks, but also to cyber intrusion as well. However, much of this threat can be mitigated if the U.S. takes the appropriate steps to safeguard the power grid and avoid a potential catastrophe in the future.

Since Sept. 11, 2001, terrorism on U.S. soil has been at the forefront of American consciousness. Critical infrastructure provides an appealing target because of the disproportionally large impact even a small attack can have on the sectors. In particular, the power grid represents a particularly lucrative target, both in terms of the ease of access and the large impact it can make. The National Research Council stated that the U.S. power grid is “vulnerable to intelligent multi-site attacks by knowledgeable attackers intent on causing maximum physical damage to key components on a wide geographical scale.”[1] Additionally, the physical security of transmission and distribution systems is difficult due to the dispersed nature of these key components, which in turn is advantageous to attackers as it reduces the likelihood of their capture.[2] From 2002-2012, approximately 2,500 physical attacks occurred against transmission lines and towers worldwide and approximately 500 attacks against transformer substations.[3] Terrorists have the motivation to attack the U.S. power grid but the very nature of the grid makes it highly vulnerable. The power grid is not only at risk from physical attacks, but also nation-state cyberattacks.

2022 SDI Affirmative
SDI Starter Packet --- Cyber Info Sharing Aff › Aff Extensions / A2s --- Resilience › A2: Grid Resilient

Grid attacks likely

Stringer 21 --- David Stringer, Asia Energy Team Leader, and Heesu Lee. Bloomberg News, “Why Global Power Grids Are Still Vulnerable to Cyber Attacks” https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-03-03/why-global-power-grids-are-still-so-vulnerable-to-cyber-attacks#xj4y7vzkg

More than five years after massive cyber attacks left a quarter of a million Ukrainians without electricity, the world’s power grids have become even more vulnerable to hackers.

As utilities turn to sources of renewable energy and add millions of other components like smart meters, they’re rapidly multiplying the number of connections and sensors along their networks, widening the potential for intrusions.

2022 SDI Affirmative
SDI Starter Packet --- Cyber Info Sharing Aff › Aff Extensions / A2s --- Resilience › Ext --- Grid Collapse Turns Economy

Cyberattack on electric grid hurts the economy, national security, and public health

Kenderine and Jermain 18 (Melanie A. Kenderdine, nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Global Energy Center, served at the US Department of Energy (DOE) as the energy counselor to the secretary and director of the Office of Energy Policy and Systems Analysis, David Jermain, adjunct professor at Boston University, contributed to the DOE’s electricity system review, “US power grid needs defense against looming cyber attacks”, The Hill, published 3/23/18, accessed 7/3/18, )//EQ

A recent poll showed that more than 90 percent of Americans believe the government is not doing enough to protect the electric grid from cybersecurity attacks. Their fears appear to be justified. This month, the U.S. government revealed its concerns about Russian incursions into the operating systems of domestic electric power plants and noted that the efforts to disrupt date back to 2013. These attacks have the capability to bring down all or part of our electricity service. Such large-scale grid cyberattacks were foreseen. The Departments of Energy and Homeland Security identified the grid’s vulnerability to cyberattacks some time ago and called for new protective measures in the DOE-led January 2017 Quadrennial Energy Review. The study, which analyzed the entire U.S. electricity system, noted that that the key critical infrastructures underpinning the nation’s economy and national security — transportation, water, finance, natural gas, oil, communications/IT — depend upon a reliable electricity “uber-network.” A 2012 report by the National Research Council concluded that a cyberattack could black out a large region of the nation for weeks or even months. Public health and safety would be in jeopardy from an extended, widespread power outage, resulting in loss of life support systems in hospitals, nursing homes, and households, disruption of clean water supplies and sanitation, and a massive breakdown of the transportation system. The economic disruptions from an extended blackout would also be enormous. A 2015 Lloyds of London study found that a cyberattack on 50 generators in the Northeast could leave 93 million people without power and cost the economy over $234 billion. We’ve already seen previews of a successful cyberattack on the grid stemming from operational failures and extreme weather. The 2003 Northeast blackout left 50 million people without power for four days, causing economic losses between $4 billion and $10 billion. In Puerto Rico, 400,000 people are still without power six months after Hurricane Maria, with staggering impacts on the commonwealth’s economy and well-being. Russia, Iran, North Korea and others have large-scale, offensive cyberattack programs. The CIA has concluded with “high confidence” that Russian military attackers crippled computers in Ukraine’s financial system last year. This followed 2015 and 2016 cyberattacks that disabled part of Ukraine’s electric grid. Global security analysts say Russia is using Ukraine as a cyberwar testing ground. The U.S. also appears to be in their crosshairs as the overall U.S.-Russia relationship hits new lows, evidenced most dramatically by their interference in our 2016 elections. According to DHS and the FBI, Russia appears to be laying a foundation for a large scale cyberattack on U.S. infrastructure. The Dragonfly 2.0 hackers, identified by DHS as Russian government cyber actors, pursued a prolonged cyberattack (since 2015) on a U.S. power plant and computer networks controlling the grid. Industry and government have been trying to address cyber vulnerabilities. In 2015, Congress expanded DOE’s authority to take immediate measures in response to cyberattacks on the grid in the FAST Act. Congress has also proposed additional legislation to address grid-related cyber-defense deficiencies with resilience measures for electricity infrastructure. These bills — introduced but not passed — focus on state assistance, authority to address cybersecurity gaps for other energy infrastructures, and identification of cybersecure products for the grid. Energy Secretary Rick Perry should also be commended for setting up a new cybersecurity office at DOE. These actions are important but not enough. It is time for a comprehensive examination of how we anticipate, recover, and deter cyberattacks. We need to fund development and deployment of advanced designs and technologies to protect our grid and to provide states the tools they need to contribute to the defense of the nation’s electricity system. We need to incorporate mandatory reliability and resilience measures into every aspect of our electricity system and the internet. We must also address state-sponsored cyberattacks at the legal, regulatory, operational and diplomatic levels, including the development of international protocols. But the hardest part may be modernizing our jurisdictional system to ensure seamless federal authority to prepare for and respond to cyberattacks. The DOE study concluded that the electricity system is a national security asset. National security is inherently a federal responsibility and cybersecurity attacks do not respect jurisdictional boundaries. It is time to adopt a regulatory system that meets 21st century realities. Our economy and national security depend on it

2022 SDI Affirmative
SDI Starter Packet --- Cyber Info Sharing Aff › Aff Extensions / A2s --- Resilience › Ext --- Grid Collapse Turns Economy

A cyberattack on the grid collapses the economy and invites lethal terror attacks

Barletta 16 (Lou Barletta, Congressman of Pennsylvania’s 11th Congressional District, 6/2/16, “Attack on electrical grid could collapse economy,” https://barletta.house.gov/media-center/opinion-editorials/attack-on-electrical-grid-could-collapse-economy)

It was like something from a Hollywood movie, but it was real. At about 3:30 p.m. on Dec. 23, a computer in an electricity distribution center in western Ukraine seemed to take on a life of its own. While a helpless worker watched, the cursor on the screen moved by itself and clicked on a box that opened a series of circuit breakers — a move that would take the entire power station offline. When a dialogue box appeared asking for confirmation of the command, the ghostly cursor moved again and completed the action. Reaching frantically for the mouse, the worker tried to abort what was happening, but the computer was being controlled from elsewhere. In all, about 30 substations were taken out of commission and 225,000 customers were suddenly cut off from the power supply. It marked what is believed to be the world’s first successful cyber-attack on a nation’s power grid. What happened is ominous because it reminded us that we should not believe ourselves immune to such an attack, even in the United States. A cyberattack on the power grid could leave millions of residents and key physical locations without power for an extended period of time. It is a discouraging fact that unlike every other hazard we are likely to face, from hurricanes to earthquakes and chemical attacks to space weather, there is no specific planning scenario to help state and local governments prepare for an extensive blackout. This prompts a blizzard of questions: How long will the power be out? How many people will be impacted? What backups need to be in place to protect our citizens? With this in mind, I hosted an April hearing on the consequences of a massive, coordinated attack on the electrical grid, in my role as chairman of the House Transportation and Infrastructure’s Subcommittee on Economic Development, Public Buildings and Emergency Management. We asked our witnesses from the Department of Energy, the Federal Emergency Management Agency and the Department of Homeland Security to provide the realistic timeframe for which we should be prepared for the power to be out. FEMA Administrator Craig Fugate was clear, saying, “Planning needs to be measured in weeks.” The other witnesses agreed. As a former mayor of my hometown of Hazleton, Pennsylvania, I know that localities will be on the front lines during a widespread, lengthy outage and will be tasked with handling much of the response. While our subcommittee witnesses tried to assure us that there were numerous efforts underway to help prepare state and local governments for the unthinkable, the mayors and local elected officials I frequently talk to feel they do not have all the information they need to prepare for such a catastrophe. We must be ready to deal with disruptions in telecommunications, water and waste treatment, healthcare delivery, financial services and transportation. There is no question that good communication is vital during the reaction to a disaster, but it is also critical when crafting a response strategy in advance. Since I believe that all disasters are local events, it is important that we tie in localities with states and the federal government so that the greatest coordination can be achieved. All levels of government must cooperate and anticipate all types of disasters. The FBI and the Homeland Security Department are hosting briefings for local governments, law enforcement, and energy companies to discuss and develop strategies for mitigating risk and providing better defense. In addition, I have been meeting with the North American Electric Reliability Corporation, the Edison Electric Institute, the American Public Power Association and the National Rural Electric Cooperative Association. These national organizations have committed to identify initiatives that cut across all levels of government and create plans we can put in the hands of officials at the state and local levels. Some pre-planning has already been undertaken, such as exercises conducted by NERC and PPL — one of the largest electric utilities in the nation. At our hearing, PPL President and CEO Bill Spence told of regular internal exercises and external drills with other utilities to practice their responses to various disaster scenarios. By extending this training by linking up state and local officials to the utilities, relationships will be formed, information will be shared, and efforts will be maximized. If the goal of terrorists is to collapse our economy, then shutting down our electrical grid is where they would start. Most troubling is the possibility that a cyberattack would be accompanied by a physical terrorist attack, a scenario that promises true havoc, panic and loss of life. The great challenge is that the threat continues to evolve, which only means that we are forced to evolve with it and be prepared for it.

2022 SDI Affirmative
SDI Starter Packet --- Cyber Info Sharing Aff › Aff Extensions / A2s --- Resilience › Ext --- Grid Collapse Causes Food Shocks

Blackouts cause extinction and mass crop failures

Hecht 11 – Editor in Chief @ 21st Century Magazine

Laurence, Solar Storm Threatening Power Grids – Yet no Action Taken to Implement Defences, *Language Modified

A prolonged lack of electricity in any of these areas would reduce the population to Dark Age-like conditions. Drinking water supply would break down for lack of pumping, and sewage service would cease shortly thereafter. For lack of refrigeration, the food chain would collapse, and medical supplies would be lost. Fuel could not be pumped, and thus transportation would break down. Heating and air conditioning systems would cease functioning. Communication would be [undermined] crippled by the lack of electricity as well as from the direct damage to satellites and sensitive electronics which a solar storm produces—perhaps no Internet and no cell phones. Modern life would come to an end, and a population and economic infrastructure unprepared for a return to pre-electricity conditions could descend into chaos.

2022 SDI Affirmative
SDI Starter Packet --- Cyber Info Sharing Aff › Aff Extensions / A2s --- Resilience › Ext --- Grid Collapse Causes Nuclear Meltdowns

Extinction

Goldes 11 – MA @ Brandeis and San Francisco State

Mark Goldes Former Research Fellow at Brandeis University is Founder of the Aesop Institute. Formerly Senior Director of the Berlin Corridor control radar in Germanyfor US Air Force SOLAR MEGASTORMS can GENERATE a GLOBAL NUCLEAR NIGHTMARE

We face a severe potential emergency. External threats serve to unite. The world faces an unrecognized nuclear peril! Uniting to confront it can generate the missing popular and government support to generate millions of jobs and revitalize the global economy.

2022 SDI Affirmative
SDI Starter Packet --- Cyber Info Sharing Aff › Aff Extensions / A2s --- Resilience › Ext --- Grid Collapse Causes Nuclear Meltdowns

Grid collapse makes all conflict inevitable and causes nuclear meltdowns

Ahmed 19 --- Nafeez Ahmed, Vice, “U.S. Military Could Collapse Within 20 Years Due to Climate Change, Report Commissioned By Pentagon Says”, Oct 24th 2019, https://www.vice.com/en/article/mbmkz8/us-military-could-collapse-within-20-years-due-to-climate-change-report-commissioned-by-pentagon-says

The US Army report shows that California’s power outage could be a taste of things to come, laying out a truly dystopian scenario of what would happen if the national power grid was brought down by climate change. One particularly harrowing paragraph lists off the consequences bluntly:

“If the power grid infrastructure were to collapse, the United States would experience significant:

2022 SDI Affirmative
SDI Starter Packet --- Cyber Info Sharing Aff › Aff Extensions / A2s --- Resilience › Ext --- Grid Attack Impacts --- Blackouts

Blackouts go nuclear.

Richard Andres and Hanna Breetz, 2011. Professor of National Security Strategy at the National War College and a Senior Fellow and Energy and Environmental Security and Policy Chair in the Center for Strategic Research, Institute for National Strategic Studies, at the National Defense University, doctoral candidate in the Department of Political Science at The Massachusetts Institute of Technology. “Small Nuclear Reactors for Military Installations: Capabilities, Costs, and Technological Implications”,

The DOD interest in small reactors derives largely from problems with base and logistics vulnerability. Over the last few years, the Services have begun to reexamine virtually every aspect of how they generate and use energy with an eye toward cutting costs, decreasing carbon emissions, and reducing energy-related vulnerabilities. These actions have resulted in programs that have significantly reduced DOD energy consumption and greenhouse gas emissions at domestic bases. Despite strong efforts, however, two critical security issues have thus far proven resistant to existing solutions: bases’ vulnerability to civilian power outages, and the need to transport large quantities of fuel via convoys through hostile territory to forward locations. Each of these is explored below. Grid Vulnerability. DOD is unable to provide its bases with electricity when the civilian electrical grid is offline for an extended period of time. Currently, domestic military installations receive 99 percent of their electricity from the civilian power grid. As explained in a recent study from the Defense Science Board: DOD’s key problem with electricity is that critical missions, such as national strategic awareness and national command authorities, are almost entirely dependent on the national transmission grid . . . [which] is fragile, vulnerable, near its capacity limit, and outside of DOD control. In most cases, neither the grid nor on-base backup power provides sufficient reliability to ensure continuity of critical national priority functions and oversight of strategic missions in the face of a long term (several months) outage.7 The grid’s fragility was demonstrated during the 2003 Northeast blackout in which 50 million people in the United States and Canada lost power, some for up to a week, when one Ohio utility failed to properly trim trees. The blackout created cascading disruptions in sewage systems, gas station pumping, cellular communications, border check systems, and so forth, and demonstrated the interdependence of modern infrastructural systems.8 More recently, awareness has been growing that the grid is also vulnerable to purposive attacks. A report sponsored by the Department of Homeland Security suggests that a coordinated cyberattack on the grid could result in a third of the country losing power for a period of weeks or months.9 Cyberattacks on critical infrastructure are not well understood. It is not clear, for instance, whether existing terrorist groups might be able to develop the capability to conduct this type of attack. It is likely, however, that some nation-states either have or are working on developing the ability to take down the U.S. grid. In the event of a war with one of these states, it is possible, if not likely, that parts of the civilian grid would cease to function, taking with them military bases located in affected regions. Government and private organizations are currently working to secure the grid against attacks; however, it is not clear that they will be successful. Most military bases currently have backup power that allows them to function for a period of hours or, at most, a few days on their own. If power were not restored after this amount of time, the results could be disastrous. First, military assets taken offline by the crisis would not be available to help with disaster relief. Second, during an extended blackout, global military operations could be seriously compromised; this disruption would be particularly serious if the blackout was induced during major combat operations. During the Cold War, this type of event was far less likely because the United States and Soviet Union shared the common understanding that blinding an opponent with a grid blackout could escalate to nuclear war. America’s current opponents, however, may not share this fear or be deterred by this possibility. In 2008, the Defense Science Board stressed that DOD should mitigate the electrical grid’s vulnerabilities by turning military installations into “islands” of energy self-sufficiency. The department has made efforts to do so by promoting efficiency programs that lower power consumption on bases and by constructing renewable power generation facilities on selected bases. Unfortunately, these programs will not come close to reaching the goal of islanding the vast majority of bases. Even with massive investment in efficiency and renewables, most bases would not be able to function for more than a few days after the civilian grid went offline Unlike other alternative sources of energy, small reactors have the potential to solve DOD’s vulnerability to grid outages. Most bases have relatively light power demands when compared to civilian towns or cities. Small reactors could easily support bases’ power demands separate from the civilian grid during crises. In some cases, the reactors could be designed to produce enough power not only to supply the base, but also to provide critical services in surrounding towns during long-term outages. Strategically, islanding bases with small reactors has another benefit. One of the main reasons an enemy might be willing to risk reprisals by taking down the U.S. grid during a period of military hostilities would be to affect ongoing military operations. Without the lifeline of intelligence, communication, and logistics provided by U.S. domestic bases, American military operations would be compromised in almost any conceivable contingency. Making bases more resilient to civilian power outages would reduce the incentive for an opponent to attack the grid. An opponent might still attempt to take down the grid for the sake of disrupting civilian systems, but the powerful incentive to do so in order to win an ongoing battle or war would be greatly reduced.

2022 SDI Affirmative
SDI Starter Packet --- Cyber Info Sharing Aff › Aff Extensions / A2s --- Resilience › Ext --- Grid Attack Impacts --- Blackouts

Loss of critical infrastructure causes extinction

Friedemann 16 (Alice Friedemann, transportation expert, founder of EnergySkeptic.com and author of “When Trucks Stop Running, Energy and the Future of Transportation,” worked at American Presidential Lines for 22 years, where she developed computer systems to coordinate the transit of cargo between ships, rail, trucks, and consumers, citing Dr. Peter Vincent Pry. Pry is executive director of the Task Force on National and Homeland Security, a Congressional advisory board dedicated to achieving protection of the United States from electromagnetic pulse and other threats. Dr. Pry is also the director of the United States Nuclear Strategy Forum, an advisory body to Congress on policies to counter weapons of mass destruction. Dr. Pry has served on the staffs of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States, the Commission to Assess the Threat to the U.S. from an EMP Attack, the House Armed Services Committee, as an intelligence officer with the CIA, and as a verification analyst at the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. 1-24-16, accessed 1/1/19 “Electromagnetic pulse threat to infrastructure (U.S. House hearings)” )

Modern civilization cannot exist for a protracted period without electricity. Within days of a blackout across the U.S., a blackout that could encompass the entire planet, emergency generators would run out of fuel, telecommunications would cease as would transportation due to gridlock, and eventually no fuel. Cities would have no running water and soon, within a few days, exhaust their food supplies. Police, Fire, Emergency Services and hospitals cannot long operate in a blackout. Government and Industry also need electricity in order to operate. The EMP Commission warns that a natural or nuclear EMP event, given current unpreparedness, would likely result in societal collapse. Terrorists, criminals, and even lone individuals can build a non-nuclear EMP weapon without great trouble or expense, working from Unclassified designs publicly available on the internet, and using parts available at any electronics store. In 2000, the Terrorism Panel of the House Armed Services Committee sponsored an experiment, recruiting a small team of amateur electronics enthusiasts to attempt constructing a radiofrequency weapon, relying only on unclassified design information and parts purchased from Radio Shack. The team, in 1 year, built two radiofrequency weapons of radically different designs. One was designed to fit inside the shipping crate for a Xerox machine, so it could be delivered to the Pentagon mail room where (in those more unguarded days before 9/11) it could slowly fry the Pentagon’s computers. The other radiofrequency weapon was designed to fit inside a small Volkswagon bus, so it could be driven down Wall Street and disrupt computers— and perhaps the National economy. Both designs were demonstrated and tested successfully during a special Congressional hearing for this purpose at the U.S. Army’s Aberdeen Proving Ground. Radiofrequency weapons are not merely a hypothetical threat. Terrorists, criminals, and disgruntled individuals have used home-made radiofrequency weapons. The U.S. military and foreign militaries have a wide variety of such weaponry. Moreover, non-nuclear EMP devices that could be used as radiofrequency weapons are publicly marketed for sale to anyone, usually advertised as ‘‘EMP simulators.’’ For example, one such simulator is advertised for public sale as an ‘‘EMP Suitcase.’’ This EMP simulator is designed to look like a suitcase, can be carried and operated by one person, and is purpose-built with a high energy radiofrequency output to destroy electronics. However, it has only a short radius of effect. Nonetheless, a terrorist or deranged individual who knows what he is doing, who has studied the electric grid for a major metropolitan area, could—armed with the ‘‘EMP Suitcase’’— black out a major city. A CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER. An EMP weapon can be used by state actors who wish to level the battlefield by neutralizing the great technological advantage enjoyed by U.S. military forces. EMP is also the ideal means, the only means, whereby rogue states or terrorists could use a single nuclear weapon to destroy the United States and prevail in the War on Terrorism or some other conflict with a single blow. The EMP Commission also warned that states or terrorists could exploit U.S. vulnerability to EMP attack for coercion or blackmail: ‘‘Therefore, terrorists or state actors that possess relatively unsophisticated missiles armed with nuclear weapons may well calculate that, instead of destroying a city or military base, they may obtain the greatest political-military utility from one or a few such weapons by using them—or threatening their use—in an EMP attack.’’ The EMP Commission found that states such as Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran have incorporated EMP attack into their military doctrines, and openly describe making EMP attacks against the United States. Indeed, the EMP Commission was established by Congress partly in response to a Russian nuclear EMP threat made to an official Congressional Delegation on May 2, 1999, in the midst of the Balkans crisis. Vladimir Lukin, head of the Russian delegation and a former Ambassador to the United States, warned: ‘‘Hypothetically, if Russia really wanted to hurt the United States in retaliation for NATO’s bombing of Yugoslavia, Russia could fire an SLBM and detonate a single nuclear warhead at high altitude over the United States. The resulting EMP would massively disrupt U.S. communications and computer systems, shutting down everything.’’ China’s military doctrine also openly describes EMP attack as the ultimate asymmetric weapon, as it strikes at the very technology that is the basis of U.S. power. Where EMP is concerned, ‘‘The United States is more vulnerable to attacks than any other country in the world’’: ‘‘Some people might think that things similar to the ‘Pearl Harbor Incident’ are unlikely to take place during the information age. Yet it could be regarded as the ‘Pearl Harbor Incident’ of the 21st Century if a surprise attack is conducted against the enemy’s crucial information systems of command, control, and communications by such means as… electromagnetic pulse weapons… Even a superpower like the United States, which possesses nuclear missiles and powerful armed forces, cannot guarantee its immunity…In their own words, a highly computerized open society like the United States is extremely vulnerable to electronic attacks from all sides. This is because the U.S. economy, from banks to telephone systems and from power plants to iron and steel works, relies entirely on computer networks… When a country grows increasingly powerful economically and technologically…it will become increasingly dependent on modern information systems… The United States is more vulnerable to attacks than any other country in the world.’’ Iran—the world’s leading sponsor of international terrorism—in military writings openly describes EMP as a terrorist weapon, and as the ultimate weapon for prevailing over the West: ‘‘If the world’s industrial countries fail to devise effective ways to defend themselves against dangerous electronic assaults, then they will disintegrate within a few years… American soldiers would not be able to find food to eat nor would they be able to fire a single shot.’’ The threats are not merely words. The EMP Commission assesses that Russia has, as it openly declares in military writings, probably developed what Russia describes as a ‘‘Super-EMP’’ nuclear weapon—specifically designed to generate extraordinarily high EMP fields in order to paralyze even the best protected U.S. strategic and military forces. China probably also has Super-EMP weapons. North Korea too may possess or be developing a Super-EMP nuclear weapon, as alleged by credible Russian sources to the EMP Commission, and by open-source reporting from South Korean military intelligence. But any nuclear weapon, even a low-yield first generation device, could suffice to make a catastrophic EMP attack on the United States. Iran, although it is assessed as not yet having the bomb, is actively testing missile delivery systems and has practiced launches of its best missile, the Shahab–III, fuzing for high- altitude detonations, in exercises that look suspiciously like training for making EMP attacks. As noted earlier, Iran has also practiced launching from a ship a Scud, the world’s most common missile—possessed by over 60 nations, terrorist groups, and private collectors. A Scud might be the ideal choice for a ship-launched EMP attack against the United States intended to be executed anonymously, to escape any last-gasp U.S. retaliation. Unlike a nuclear weapon detonated in a city, a high-altitude EMP attack leaves no bomb debris for forensic analysis, no perpetrator ‘‘fingerprints.’’ Under present levels of preparedness, communications would be severely limited, restricted mainly to those few military communications networks that are hardened against EMP. Today’s microelectronics are the foundation of our modern civilization, but are over 1 million times more vulnerable to EMP than the far more primitive and robust electronics of the 1960s, that proved vulnerable during nuclear EMP tests of that era. Tests conducted by the EMP Commission confirmed empirically the theory that, as modern microelectronics become ever smaller and more efficient, and operate ever faster on lower voltages, they also become ever more vulnerable, and can be destroyed or disrupted by much lower EMP field strengths. Microelectronics and electronic systems are everywhere, and run virtually everything in the modern world. All of the civilian critical infrastructures that sustain the economy of the United States, and the lives of 310 million Americans, depend, directly or indirectly, upon electricity and electronic systems. Of special concern is the vulnerability to EMP of the Extra-High-Voltage (EHV) transformers, that are indispensable to the operation of the electric grid. EHV transformers drive electric current over long distances, from the point of generation to consumers (from the Niagara Falls hydroelectric facility to New York City, for example). The electric grid cannot operate without EHV transformers—which could be destroyed by an EMP event. The United States no longer manufactures EHV transformers. They must be manufactured and imported from overseas, from Germany or South Korea, the only two nations in the world that manufacture such transformers for export. Each EHV transformer must be custom-made for its unique role in the grid. A single EHV transformer typically requires 18 months to manufacture. The loss of large numbers of EHV transformers to an EMP event would plunge the United States into a protracted blackout lasting years, with perhaps no hope of eventual recovery, as the society and population probably could not survive for even 1 year without electricity. Another key vulnerability to EMP are Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition systems (SCADAs). SCADAs essentially are small computers, numbering in the millions and ubiquitous everywhere in the critical infrastructures, that perform jobs previously performed by hundreds of thousands of human technicians during the 1960s and before, in the era prior to the microelectronics revolution. SCADAs do things like regulating the flow of electricity into a transformer, controlling the flow of gas through a pipeline, or running traffic control lights. SCADAs enable a few dozen people to run the critical infrastructures for an entire city, whereas previously hundreds or even thousands of technicians were necessary. Unfortunately, SCADAs are especially vulnerable to EMP. EHV transformers and SCADAs are the most important vulnerabilities to EMP, but are by no means the only vulnerabilities. Each of the critical infrastructures has their own unique vulnerabilities to EMP: The National electric grid, with its transformers and generators and electronic controls and thousands of miles of power lines, is a vast electronic machine—more vulnerable to EMP than any other critical infrastructure. Yet the electric grid is the most important of all critical infrastructures, and is in fact the keystone supporting modern civilization, as it powers all the other critical infrastructures. As of now it is our technological Achilles Heel. The EMP Commission found that, if the electric grid collapses, so too will collapse all the other critical infrastructures. But, if the electric grid can be protected and recovered, so too all the other critical infrastructures can also be restored. Transportation is a critical infrastructure because modern civilization cannot exist without the goods and services moved by road, rail, ship, and air. Cars, trucks, locomotives, ships, and aircraft all have electronic components, motors, and controls that are potentially vulnerable to EMP. Gas stations, fuel pipelines, and refineries that make petroleum products depend upon electronic components and cannot operate without electricity. Given our current state of unpreparedness, in the aftermath of a natural or nuclear EMP event, transportation systems would be paralyzed. Traffic control systems that avert traffic jams and collisions for road, rail, and air depend upon electronic systems, that the EMP Commission discovered are especially vulnerable to EMP. Communications is a critical infrastructure because modern economies and the cohesion and operation of modern societies depend to a degree unprecedented in history on the rapid movement of information—accomplished today mostly by electronic means. Telephones, cell phones, personal computers, television, and radio are all directly vulnerable to EMP, and cannot operate without electricity. Satellites that operate at Low-Earth-Orbit (LEO) for communications, weather, scientific, and military purposes are vulnerable to EMP and to collateral effects from an EMP attack. Within weeks of an EMP event, the LEO satellites, which comprise most satellites, would probably be inoperable. Banking and finance are the critical infrastructure that sustain modern economies. Whether it is the stock market, the financial records of a multinational corporation, or the ATM card of an individual—financial transactions and record keeping all depend now at the macro- and micro-level upon computers and electronic automated systems. Many of these are directly vulnerable to EMP, and none can operate without electricity. The EMP Commission found that an EMP event could transform the modern electronic economy into a feudal economy based on barter. Food has always been vital to every person and every civilization. The critical infrastructure for producing, delivering, and storing food depends upon a complex web of technology, including machines for planting and harvesting and packaging, refrigerated vehicles for long-haul transportation, and temperature-controlled warehouses. Modern technology enables over 98 percent of the U.S. National population to be fed by less than 2 percent of the population. Huge regional warehouses that resupply supermarkets constitute the National food reserves, enough food to feed the Nation for 30–60 days at normal consumption rates, the warehoused food preserved by refrigeration and temperature control systems that typically have enough emergency electrical power (diesel or gas generators) to last only about an average of 3 days. Experience with storm-induced blackouts proves that when these big regional food warehouses lose electrical power, most of the food supply will rapidly spoil. Farmers, less than 2 percent of the population as noted above, cannot feed 310 million Americans if deprived of the means that currently makes possible this technological miracle. Water too has always been a basic necessity to every person and civilization, even more crucial than food. The critical infrastructure for purifying and delivering potable water, and for disposing of and treating waste water, is a vast networked machine powered by electricity that uses electrical pumps, screens, filters, paddles, and sprayers to purify and deliver drinkable water, and to remove and treat waste water. Much of the machinery in the water infrastructure is directly vulnerable to EMP. The system cannot operate without vast amounts of electricity supplied by the power grid. A natural or nuclear EMP event would immediately deprive most of the U.S. National population of running water. Many natural sources of water—lakes, streams, and rivers—would be dangerously polluted by toxic wastes from sewage, industry, and hospitals that would backflow from or bypass wastewater treatment plants, that could no longer intake and treat pollutants without electric power. Many natural water sources that would normally be safe to drink, after an EMP event, would be polluted with human wastes including feces, industrial wastes including arsenic and heavy metals, and hospital wastes including pathogens. Emergency services such as police, fire, and hospitals are the critical infrastructure that upholds the most basic functions of government and society—preserving law and order, protecting property and life. Experience from protracted storm-induced blackouts has shown, for example in the aftermath of Hurricanes Andrew and Katrina, that when the lights go out and communications systems fail and there is no gas for squad cars, fire trucks, and ambulances, the worst elements of society and the worst human instincts rapidly takeover. The EMP Commission found that, given our current state of unpreparedness, a natural or nuclear EMP event could create anarchic conditions that would profoundly challenge the existence of social order.

2022 SDI Affirmative
SDI Starter Packet --- Cyber Info Sharing Aff › Aff Extensions / A2s --- Resilience › Ext --- Grid Attack Impacts --- Blackouts

Blackouts cause extinction

Morris 17 --- Craig Morris, co-author of Energy Democracy, the first history of Germany’s Energiewende, “After two weeks without power, civilization collapses”, Energy Transition, Oct 2nd 2017, https://energytransition.org/2017/10/after-two-weeks-without-power-civilization-collapses/

Elsberg started work on the book in 2008. Just before he finished, Germany’s Office of Technology Assessment (TAB) published its own scientific study on what an extended blackout would look like (PDF in German). Entitled “The vulnerability of modern societies: a case study of a large-scale blackout,” the study revealed lots of scary things.

For instance, people would not only be without drinking water, but the piping itself would become “irreparably” contaminated within weeks. Chaos would quickly break out because all forms of communication – cell phones, radio, television, internet, etc. – would stop working, and people would lack power for batteries in their devices anyway (how many of you have a hand-crank flashlight or radio?). Those with backup generators would run out of fuel because the authorities would confiscate the available supply (fuel pumps require power) for emergency services.

2022 SDI Affirmative
SDI Starter Packet --- Cyber Info Sharing Aff › Aff Extensions / A2s --- Resilience › Ext --- Grid Attack Impacts --- Blackouts

Blackouts threaten critical supply chains --- triggers multiple existential scenarios

Pry 21 --- Dr. Peter Vincent Pry is executive director of the Task Force on National and Homeland Security, “When will America protect itself against EMP, cyber and ransomware attacks?”, The Hill, 05/21/21, https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/554503-when-will-america-protect-itself-against-emp-cyber-and-ransomware

“A long-term outage owing to EMP could disable most critical supply chains, leaving the U.S. population living in conditions similar to centuries past, prior to the advent of electric power. In the 1800s, the U.S. population was less than 60 million, and those people had many skills and assets necessary for survival without today’s infrastructure. An extended blackout today could result in the death of a large fraction of the American people through the effects of societal collapse, disease and starvation. While national planning and preparation for such events could help mitigate the damage, few such actions are currently under way or even being contemplated.” — Congressional EMP Commission (2017)

The people of Rangely, Colo., are not waiting for Washington to protect them from a Great American Blackout caused by a solar superstorm or cyber warfare or electromagnetic pulse (EMP) attack. Like several other Western municipalities, Rangely, a town of 2,300 in northwest Colorado, home to a community college, has rolled up its sleeves and, in the best traditions of Western pioneering spirit, independence and self-sufficiency, is building redundant microgrids so they can survive anything.

2022 SDI Affirmative
SDI Starter Packet --- Cyber Info Sharing Aff › Aff Extensions / A2s --- Resilience › Ext- Sharing Solves Resilience

Resilience solves impacts

Abraham & Daultrey 20 --- Chon Abraham Associate Professor of Management Information Systems William & Mary Sally Daultrey Chief Intelligence Analyst Adenium Group, “Considerations for NATO in Reconciling Challenges to Shared Cyber Threat Intelligence: A study of Japan, the US and the UK”, in “Cyber Threats and NATO 2030: Horizon Scanning and Analysis”, Dec 2020, NATO COOPERATIVE CYBER DEFENCE CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE (CCDOE), https://ccdcoe.org/uploads/2020/12/Cyber-Threats-and-NATO-2030_Horizon-Scanning-and-Analysis.pdf

Cyber threats are fundamentally changing the nature of warfare and the digital economy with implications for international collaboration and security cooperation (NATO, 2019). Governments and the leadership of multinational companies must understand threat vectors and threat actors to activate their collective response, both in peacetime and during targeted cyber operations. Efforts for developing approaches to exchange information on security incidents, known as Cyber Threat Intelligence (CTI) sharing, is an international imperative (Menges et al., 2019) and governments can no longer rely on voluntary compliance across business ecosystems and supply chains to operationalise international cyber defence. Cyber operations are increasingly understood as linked to strategic campaigns, particularly when initiated by adversarial countries seeking to shift the relative balance of power amongst targeted countries with rippling global effects (Harknett and Smeets, 2020; NATO CCDCOE, 2017). CTI sharing is therefore essential for all directly and indirectly targeted societies and countries to build a collective understanding of these cyber operations and strategic campaigns in terms of: (1) their true nature; (2) the global reach of effects; (3) the duration; and (4) the extent of data exfiltration and aggregation compromising national security. The sophistication and proliferation of cyber threats are outpacing the capacities of countries to respond using conventional decision structures, to be replaced by dynamic bilateral and regional collaboration architectures. CTI sharing is vital to protecting the global business ecosystem and shared security interests, yet not all nations have comparable capabilities to effectively share and act on threat information.