Free beta access. 50 free AI tokens each week. Optional top-ups available. See what is included
Open evidence library

Search the archive.

Current and older evidence is free during beta. Sign in for unlimited card access and full source downloads.

Matching cards
2022 SDI Affirmative
SDI Starter Packet --- Cyber Info Sharing Aff › 1AC › Contention 1: Resilience

Smart grids are particularly vulnerable to FDI attacks --- detection is key

Khazaei & Amini 21 --- Javad Khazaei, assistant professor in the electrical and computer engineering department at Lehigh University, and M. Hadi Amini, ssistant Professor at the Knight Foundation School of Computing and Information Sciences at Florida International University, “Protection of large-scale smart grids against false data injection cyberattacks leading to blackouts”, International Journal of Critical Infrastructure Protection Volume 35, December 2021, https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1874548221000482?casa_token=CJmndO91NGAAAAAA:hzNjEiWdnv10bAu7JnYgtcX86s_r21wmcKPMTE_mZNQK-8PEWxoJFMjNkexx3DXP-E5oTHW9

Power systems are the most important cyber–physical systems that guarantee reliability of other critical infrastructures including water networks, transportation, or health systems [1]. While the application of advanced monitoring system and supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems enhanced the monitoring, protection, and security of smart grids, they have made the energy system vulnerable to cyber threats, which can jeopardize the security of power systems [2], [3].

A cyberattacker can therefore inject computer viruses or anomalies to endanger the security and resilience of the smart grid system [4], [5], [6]. Examples of such attacks include software bugs on Israel’s utility grid in 2016 [7], or Russian’s cyberattack on obtaining detailed data on nuclear power plants and water facilities in the U.S. in 2018 [8]. Another real-world example is the successful cyberattack by Russian hackers in December 2015 on the Ukraine power grid. In this cyberattack, 30 substations were switched off by hackers which resulted in a power outage of 1–6 h for almost 230,000 people [9].

2022 SDI Affirmative
SDI Starter Packet --- Cyber Info Sharing Aff › 1AC › Contention 1: Resilience

Scenario 1 – Smart Grids --- they’re uniquely vulnerable to cyber-attacks in ways neg defense doesn’t assume --- resilience through information sharing is critical to counter threats

Ghiasi et al 20 --- Mohammad Ghiasi et al, a Research Assistant at the Shiraz University of Technology, M.S.in electrical power engineering, “Investigating Overall Structure of Cyber-Attacks on Smart-Grid Control Systems to Improve Cyber Resilience in Power System”, IEEE Smart Grid Newsletter, March 2020, https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Mohammad-Ghiasi-2/publication/339912094_Investigating_Overall_Structure_of_Cyber-Attacks_on_Smart-Grid_Control_Systems_to_Improve_Cyber_Resilience_in_Power_System/links/5e6b9024a6fdccf321d99889/Investigating-Overall-Structure-of-Cyber-Attacks-on-Smart-Grid-Control-Systems-to-Improve-Cyber-Resilience-in-Power-System.pdf

The use of information and communication technologies and computer-based software to enhance the quality, efficiency, and reliability of smart grids (SGs) have brought unwanted threats in these systems; one of the most important of such threats is cyber-attack. Understanding the ways to detect and deal with cyber threats in SGs will increase the resilience of power systems. In this paper, conceptual models of SG vulnerabilities are presented to address the issue of the vulnerability of SG control systems against cyber-attacks. Different scenarios of cyber-attacks are then dealt with in SG control systems to enhance their resilience.

1. INTRODUCTION

2022 SDI Affirmative
SDI Starter Packet --- Cyber Info Sharing Aff › 1AC › Contention 1: Resilience

Second --- Cyber attacks are inevitable --- lack of resilience ensures they are successful --- killing millions and collapsing society --- increased situational awareness is key to mitigate harms

Conklin et al 17 --- William Arthur Conklin, Associate Professor and Director of the Center for Information Security Research and Education in the College of Technology at the University of Houston, & Dan Shoemaker, Professor and Director of the Masters of Science in Cyber Security Program at the Center for Cyber Security and Intelligence Studies, a NSA Center of Academic Excellence, at the University of Detroit (313) Mercy, & Anne Kohnke, College of Management, Lawrence Technological University, “Cyber Resilience: Rethinking Cybersecurity Strategy to Build a Cyber Resilient Architecture”, International Conference on Cyber Warfare and Security, 2017, https://www.proquest.com/docview/1897660614/fulltextPDF/FE6EBF8A132A40C1PQ/1?accountid=12598

Von Clausewitz might have lived through the Napoleonic wars, but he could just as well have been writing about the present state of affairs in cyberspace. The fact is that the multitude of threats that populate the virtual eco-system is so all-embracing that it is impossible to defend against every form of attack (Symantec, 2015). The unfortunate reality is that every system can eventually be compromised and no computer is safe. Furthermore, America's electronic infrastructure is so riddled with vulnerabilities and there are so many adversaries out there, that "cybersecurity" is a relative term indeed (Brasso, 2016).

Adversaries in cyberspace range from state-sponsored hackers to the professional perpetrators of cybercrime, to any person with a grudge and an internet link. Moreover, because of the proliferation of adversaries and the inescapable vulnerability of the U.S. critical infrastructure, cyberattacks on its various elements are a daily fact of life. For instance, the Industrial Control Systems-Computer Emergency Response Team (ICS-CERT) reports that the U.S. industrial control systems were attacked at least 245 times over a 12-month period (OAS, 2015). In other parts of the world, a 2015 attack on Ukraine's power grid left 700,000 people without electricity for several hours [Brasso, 2016). And the perpetrators of the Ukrainian attack were observed conducting similar attacks against the U.S. energy sector (Brasso, 2016). Though there was never any actual disruption, many experts believe that those exploits were a reconnaissance for future moves on the U.S. infrastructure (Brasso, 2016). So they are still out there.

2022 SDI Disadvantage
Aff — Finland/Sweden Thumps

Turkey will prevent Finland and Sweden from joining NATO – Erdogan has a close eye on membership bids

Reuters 7/18 – (Reuters is an international news agency. It is one of the largest news agencies and focuses on terrorism and politics. “Erdogan says Turkey will freeze Finland, Sweden’s NATO bids if promises not kept,” Reuters, July 18, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/erdogan-says-turkey-will-freeze-finland-swedens-nato-bids-if-promises-not-kept-2022-07-18/) // TMBL

Turkey will freeze Finland and Sweden's NATO membership bids if the Nordic countries do not keep promises on counter-terrorism made last month, President Tayyip Erdogan said on Monday, adding he believed Sweden was "not showing a good image" for now. Finland and Sweden applied for membership of the defence alliance in response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine, but were met with opposition from Turkey, which accused the Nordic countries of supporting groups it deems terrorists. The three countries signed an accord at the NATO summit in Madrid last month to lift Ankara's veto in exchange for pledges on counter-terrorism and arms exports. Turkey has said it will closely monitor the implementation of the accord to ratify their membership bids.

2022 SDI Disadvantage
Aff — Finland/Sweden Thumps

Erdogan renewed his threat to prevent Finland and Sweden to join NATO – Turkey will only agree if their requests are met

MEE 7/18 – (The Middle East Eye is a London-based online news outlet covering events in the Middle East and North Africa. “Turkey: Erdogan renews threat to block Sweden and Finland from NATO Membership,” MME, July 18, 2022, https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/turkey-erdogan-freeze-sweden-finland-nato-bids-threat) // TMBL

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan on Monday renewed his threat to "freeze" the Nato membership bids of both Sweden and Finland unless the military alliance complies with Ankara's conditions. After weeks of wrangling, Turkey announced last month the signing of a memorandum with Finland and Sweden that opens the way for the two countries to become Nato members. The two nations have dropped their history of military non-alignment and announced plans to join Nato in response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine. But new countries' applications must be approved by all members and ratified by their respective parliaments. Their bids were headed for swift approval until Erdogan voiced concerns in May over the countries’ support for Kurdish militant groups which Ankara considers terrorist groups. In addition, the Turkish leader demanded the Nordic countries lift arms embargoes imposed in response to Turkey's 2019 military incursion into Syria. "I want to reiterate once again that we will freeze the process if these countries do not take the necessary steps to fulfil our conditions," Erdogan said Monday, on the eve of his trilateral summit with Russia and Iran. "We particularly note that Sweden does not have a good image on this issue," he added. A 10-point memorandum signed by the three sides on the sidelines of the Nato summit at the end of June appeared to address many of Erdogan's concerns. Turkish officials say they will seek the extradition of 33 "terror" suspects from Sweden and Finland as part of the agreement, although the deal did not include specific references to extradition. Turkish dissidents in Sweden have expressed their fears that the deal might lead to their extradition. The 33 individuals named by Turkey are all accused of being either outlawed Kurdish militants or members of a group led by the US-based preacher Fethullah Gulen, who Turkey blames for a failed 2016 coup. Yet Erdogan told reporters after the summit that the new memorandum did not mean Turkey would automatically approve the two countries' membership. The three-hour negotiations between Erdogan and his Finnish counterpart Sauli Niinisto and Prime Minister Magdalena Andersson of Sweden in Madrid were tense, according to a source with knowledge of the meeting. Erdogan made clear that his participation in the negotiations was only possible thanks to Nato secretary general Jens Stoltenberg’s invitation, the source told Middle East Eye. Turkish officials involved in the technical talks before the meeting were happy with the progress they had made. One senior Turkish official appreciated Sweden’s efforts to amend their laws to combat terrorism more forcefully, even though they predated Turkey’s demands. Yet Erdogan was not satisfied, with images of PKK flags flown freely in demonstrations on Stockholm's streets and interviews with YPG leaders on Swedish state TV. Both Kurdish factions are considered terrorist groups by Turkey. Before the memorandum, there had even been a debate in Ankara over giving Finland the green light while maintaining that further negotiations with Sweden were needed. In Madrid, negotiators saw little sign of a conciliatory approach, as Erdogan used his opening remarks to repeat his red lines: the PKK being allowed free rein in Swedish and Finnish cities; suspects linked to the group not being extradited; and aid given to the YPG. Both countries were still blocking arms exports to Turkey, he noted. The United States and some Nato states have worked closely with the YPG to combat the Islamic State group since 2014, a move that substantially undermined Ankara’s trust in its western allies. Erdogan responded by saying that Finland and Sweden’s Nato membership was not a birthright but a privilege, so they don’t set the rules. “I want you to abide by our red lines,” Erdogan repeated, bringing the negotiations to a stalemate. Sources said one fundamental disagreement was whether the YPG and the movement of Fethullah Gulen should be designated as terrorist groups. Sweden and Finland refused to recognise them as such and then the parties took a break to contemplate. The solution was put forward by Turkish intelligence chief Hakan Fidan, who said Erdogan wouldn’t sign a deal unless Sweden and Finland made clear commitments on the YPG and the Gulenists. “Instead of designating them as terror groups, both countries clearly said in the text of the memorandum that they would not provide support to these specific groups, which broke the deadlock,” said a source.

2022 SDI Disadvantage
Aff — Finland/Sweden Thumps

Turkey has renewed its threats against Sweden and Finland membership — Sweden won’t back down

Hacouglu and Rolander 22 — Selcan Hacaoglu, reporter in Ankara for Bloomberg news, Niclas Rolander, reporter in Stockholm for Bloomberg news, 2022 (“Turkey Renews Threat to Veto Sweden and Finland’s NATO Bids,” Bloomberg News, July 5th, Available Online at , Accessed on 07-18-22)

Turkey will not ratify membership of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization for the applicants if they don’t fufill their promises to combat terrorism and extradite suspects under a memorandum of understanding reached at an alliance summit in Madrid last week, Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu said Monday.

“They have to comply with this document, if they don’t then we won’t allow them to join NATO,” Cavusoglu told NTV television.

2022 SDI Counterplan
AFF AT: CP—DoS SA › Deficit – Delay

Massive delay

Bergmann 21 Max Bergmann, senior fellow at the Center for American Progress, focuses on European security and U.S.-Russia policy, formerly served in the U.S. Department of State as senior adviser to the assistant secretary of state for political-military affairs and special assistant to the undersecretary for arms control and international security, MA comparative politics, London School of Economics; and Alexandra Schmitt, senior policy analyst on the National Security and International Policy team at the Center for American Progress, MPP Harvard Kennedy School; “A Plan To Reform U.S. Security Assistance,” Center For American Progress, 3-9-2021, /GoGreen!

Specifically, this report calls for transferring the following programs and funding from the DOD to the State Department:

The relatively newly created Section 333 train and equip authority, which replicates the State Department’s Foreign Military Financing (FMF) authority

2022 SDI Counterplan
AFF AT: CP—DoS SA › Deficit – Conditionality

Our advantages are military in nature – subordinating them to State’s quixotic values crusades independently tanks solvency

Sadler 21 Brent Sadler, Senior Fellow for Naval Warfare and Advanced Technology, Center for National Defense, The Heritage Foundation, MA Jochi University, MS National War College; and Janae Diaz, member of the Young Leaders Program at The Heritage Foundation; “Don’t Shift Security Cooperation To State Dept.,” Breaking Defense, 6-28-2021, /GoGreen!

America spends billions each year on security cooperation and assistance programs, but the results do not match the investment. To help improve efficiencies, the Center for American Progress recently proposed consolidating all these programs within the State Department.

That would be a big mistake, because it would minimize the Pentagon’s role in shaping and directing security assistance and, ultimately, the program’s military objectives would be subordinated to State Department interests, such as judicial reform and humanitarian programs. Those are not the values by which such security assistance programs should be solely judged.

2022 SDI Counterplan
AFF AT: CP—DoS SA › Deficit – DoS Bureaucracy

DoS internal turf wars gut solvency and thump the net benefit – and reforms won’t solve

Ross 17 Tommy Ross, senior associate with the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, “Congressional Oversight on Security Assistance,” Commentary, 9-26-2017, /GoGreen!

Who’s in charge? As the Obama administration issued and then sought to implement Presidential Policy Directive 23 on security sector assistance, and as DoD’s security assistance profile has grown in recent years, debates both within and outside the government have recently been asking the “who’s in charge” question from an interagency perspective. Yet, the question is equally—and perhaps more—important inside the State Department itself.

Responsibility for security assistance is muddled and disjointed. The Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (PM) leads a planning process around FMF and International Military Education and Training (IMET) programs, but the Office of U.S. Foreign Assistance Resources makes final decisions about funding allocations, and regional bureaus exercise substantial influence on how resources are divvied up within their assigned regions. PM’s power can seem to range somewhere between facilitation and administration.

2022 SDI Counterplan
AFF AT: CP—DoS SA › Deficit – Capacity

No capacity – and their personnel reform plank just means incompetent contractors

Neptune 16 Neptune, veteran owned and operated strategy and advisory firm, “U.S. Security Cooperation Review,” February 2016, /GoGreen!

Title 10 vs. Title 22. State perceives authority to have shifted in two basic ways: 1) new DoD authorities (i.e. 2282) that undercut State’s lead responsibility for security assistance planning, and 2) new DoD authorities that extend beyond assistance to “armed forces,” whereby DoD now has authority to train non-security forces. Generally speaking, Defense sees this as a necessary evolution of the security assistance system given the shifting nature of global threats. Specifically, Defense sees Title 22 authorities as diplomatic in nature, focused on relationship building as they have always been. By contrast, DoD sees the new Title 10 authorities as critical to filling real capability gaps that have a direct connection to U.S. national security interests. Moreover, they cite, in a time of significant budget constraints, increasing pressure and need to rely on partners and coalitions in this way. Finally, a very real connection exists between Title 10 and Title 22 authority growth and the relative level of activity (or inactivity) between the Armed Services and Foreign Affairs committees. State has not seen an authorizations bill in a decade, and the evolution of their authorities has not kept pace with the evolution of Defense committees. Many of the State authorities are relatively outdated, but their committees have not been successful in moving State authorization legislation through the system. Finally, and above all, Defense continues to stress the pragmatic urgency of the current situation, and State’s inability (due to lack of resources, not incompetence) to do industrial scale security cooperation work. For instance, Defense personnel typically concede that it is undesirable for U.S. military forces to be training civilian security personnel, but that this is better than it not being done, or the training being done by incompetent contractors.

2022 SDI Counterplan
AFF AT: CP—DoS SA › AT: NB – AT: Readiness !

No impact to readiness

John Mueller 21, Adjunct Professor of Political Science and Senior Research Scientist at the Mershon Center for International Security Studies, "Proliferation, Terrorism, Humanitarian Intervention, and Other Problems," in The Stupidity of War: American Foreign Policy and the Case for Complacency, Chapter 7, 02/17/2021, pg. 183-184.

Over the course of the last several decades, alarmists have often focused on potential dangers presented by rogue states, as they came to be called in the 1990s. These were led by such devils du jour as Nasser, Sukarno, Castro, Gaddafi, Khomeini, Kim Il-sung, Saddam Hussein, Milosˇevic´, and Ahmadinijad, all of whom have since faded into history’s dustbin.66 Today the alarm has been directed at Iran as discussed in Chapter 6 and also at North Korea as discussed in this one. However, neither country really threatens to commit major direct military aggression. Iran, in fact, has eschewed the practice for several centuries.

Nonetheless, it might make some sense to maintain a capacity to institute containment and deterrence efforts carried out in formal or informal coalition with concerned neighboring countries – and there are quite a few of these in each case. However, the military requirements for effective containment by their neighbors, by the United States, and by the broader world community are far from monumental and do not necessarily require the United States to maintain large forces-in-being for the remote eventuality.

2022 SDI Counterplan
AFF AT: CP—DoS SA › AT: NB – AT: Readiness !

No impact to readiness

George 99 James L. George, former congressional professional staff member for national security affairs, “Is Military Readiness Overrated?” CATO, 5-27-1999, /GoGreen!

Military readiness promises to be a major issue when Congress marks up a defense bill later this year. Some members of Congress are already using readiness as a reason to increase funding in the emergency spending bill for the war in Yugoslavia. Most experts cite the initial stages of the Korean War and the Hollow Force of the late 1970s as cautionary examples of being ill-prepared. A closer look at both those examples, however, shows that they really had little to do with readiness. Moreover, the current crisis in Yugoslavia illustrates once again why readiness may be overrated and the funds better spent elsewhere. Although often used as a generic term for all military capabilities, readiness—defined as the ability to respond with appropriate force with little or no warning—is only one of four pillars of military preparedness. The other pillars are force structure, modernization and sustainability. Thus, an effective military force depends on much more than just readiness. Interestingly, the two favorite examples cited by readiness alarmists fail to prove their case. The performance of Task Force Smith, an ill-prepared battalion quickly sent to the front and fairly easily routed by the North Koreans during the initial days of the Korean War, is often cited as the worst case. “No More Task Force Smiths” has become a mantra for the Army. However, critics of Task Force Smith fail to point out that U.S. commanders made the most basic of military mistakes—including grossly underestimating the enemy and sending TFS to an exposed position. When such blunders occur, the end result will be the same whether it is an ill-trained Task Force Smith in Korea or well-trained Marines in Beirut or elite Rangers in Somalia. Moreover, critics also fail to mention that barely a month later the United States stabilized the situation in South Korea, and in another month the Marines conducted their famous Inchon Landing. In fact, without the Chinese intervention, the United States would have won the Korean War a few months after it began. Not bad for a U.S. force that was supposedly ill-prepared. Similarly, the Hollow Force of the late 1970s was not primarily a readiness problem but a combination of many factors—including a military characterized by low morale after Vietnam, serious drug and racial problems, the erroneous induction of too many mentally substandard recruits and low pay eroded further by high inflation. At the same time, major structural changes were transforming the U.S. military, including the introduction of women into the regular forces, the switch from a draft to an all-volunteer force and the initiation of the Total Force Concept that placed more reliance on the Reserves. Given all of that turbulence, no wonder we had a Hollow Force. Often overlooked, however, is how quickly those problems were solved. In some cases, solutions were found without spending a dime. For example, Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Thomas Hayward instituted his “Not in my Navy” program of zero tolerance for drugs. The drug problem was solved almost overnight. The induction of too many mentally substandard recruits by mistake which had lowered standards, was identified and corrected. That correction solved most other personnel problems (and should be a warning to people who want to lower standards today). Some members of Congress are now using the crisis in Yugoslavia to get more funds for readiness by arguing that the military is now stretched “too thin.” (Congress doubled President Clinton’s request for $6 billion in emergency spending for the war.) In fact, the situation is quite the opposite. Leaving aside the question of whether the United States should even be involved in Yugoslavia, the new Clinton Doctrine, which does not plan to use ground troops ( a position that is supported by many Republicans), limits the stress placed on the military. Those decisions are all deliberate political actions that have absolutely nothing to do with readiness. Under a well-conceived strategy, even a modestly capable force will probably perform well; but under a poorly conceived strategy, even a force with the highest degree of readiness will probably have serious problems. The experiences of Task Force Smith and the Hollow Force, as well as the invocation of a Clinton Doctrine that eschews the use of ground forces, have major implications. More forces, for example, could be placed in the reserves and scarce funds spent elsewhere. In addition, the military could switch to what Sen. John McCain (R- Ariz.) has called “Tiered Readiness:” a few forces would be kept on expensive ready status and be augmented by reserve forces that could be mobilized if a substantial threat to U.S. security arose. Military readiness is certainly important, and no one is suggesting a return to the truly shallow force of the late 1940s or the Hollow Force of the 1970s. But a close look at those forces shows that their difficulties involved much more than just poor readiness.

2022 SDI Counterplan
AFF AT: CP—DoS SA › AT: NB – AT: Readiness !

No readiness decline

Reveron 13 Derek S. Reveron, professor of national security affairs at the U.S. Naval War College, “When Foreign Policy Goals Exceed Military Capacity, Call The Pentagon,” Foreign Policy Research Institute E-Notes, February 2013, /GoGreen! *added [overlooked]

With dozens of treaty allies and a strategic priority of promoting the sovereignty of weak states, the U.S. military has been gradually shifting from a force designed for confrontation to one intended to promote international cooperation. To be sure, the U.S. military retains a technical and doctrinal advantage as a warfighting entity. However, over the past two decades, the military has been incorporating new organizations, doctrine, and training to prioritize efforts to prevent war through security force assistance. This has shifted focus to weak states where sub-national (e.g., gangs in Central America) and trans-national security challenges (e.g., al-Qa’ida) jeopardize sovereignty and regional stability.1 Consequently, countries such as the Philippines, Georgia, Colombia, Uganda, and Pakistan have requested security assistance from the United States. While level of support varies, U.S. forces are enabling partner countries to combat challenges that threaten their own stability.

This shift in focus has raised concerns about the “militarization of U.S. foreign policy,” which began in the 1990s with the recognition that combatant commanders are as much policy entrepreneurs as they are war fighters.2 Generals like Tony Zinni or Wesley Clark epitomized the new breed of warrior-diplomat who directly engaged with foreign heads of state.3 Far from rogue generals, these military leaders were directed by President Bill Clinton to engage with the world and promote security by assisting partners and assuring allies in a security environment freed from the Cold War dynamic. President George W. Bush and President Barack Obama continued the practice of using the military to assist almost every government of the world. As Administrations from both parties came to value the military’s capabilities in peace and war, some contended that defense overshadowed (if not displaced) traditional diplomacy and development efforts.4 Within defense circles, critics assumed that helping weak states jeopardized American military dominance and undercut preparations for major war.5 More recently, critics highlight that in an era of declining budgets, the United States military cannot afford nor overcome unintended consequences of attempting to be a “global force for good.”6 These are valid concerns, but the United States shows no signs of retreating from a global leadership role and instead seeks partnerships as a key component of U.S. strategy.

2022 SDI Counterplan
AFF AT: CP—DoS SA › AT: NB – AT: Miscalc !

No impact – wouldn’t escalate

Quinlan 9 Michael Quinlan, former British defence strategist and former Permanent Under-Secretary of State, Thinking About Nuclear Weapons, 2009, p.63-69 /GoGreen!

Even if initial nuclear use did not quickly end the fighting, the supposition of inexorable momentum in a developing exchange, with each side rushing to overreaction amid confusion and uncertainty, is implausible. It fails to consider what the situation of the decisionmakers would really be. Neither side could want escalation. Both would be appalled at what was going on. Both would be desperately looking for signs that the other was ready to call a halt. Both, given the capacity for evasion or concealment which modern delivery platforms and vehicles can possess, could have in reserve significant forces invulnerable enough not to entail use-or-lose pressures. (It may be more open to question, as noted earlier, whether newer nuclear-weapon possessors can be immediately in that position; but it is within reach of any substantial state with advanced technological capabilities, and attaining it is certain to be a high priority in the development of forces.) As a result, neither side can have any predisposition to suppose, in an ambiguous situation of fearful risk, that the right course when in doubt is to go on copiously launching weapons. And none of this analysis rests on any presumption of highly subtle or pre-concerted rationality. The rationality required is plain. The argument is reinforced if we consider the possible reasoning of an aggressor at a more dispassionate level. Any substantial nuclear armoury can inflict destruction outweighing any possible prize that aggression could hope to seize. A state attacking the possessor of such an armoury must therefore be doing so (once given that it cannot count upon destroying the armoury pre-emptively) on a judgement that the possessor would be found lacking in the will to use it. If the attacked possessor used nuclear weapons, whether first or in response to the aggressor's own first use, this judgement would begin to look dangerously precarious. There must be at least a substantial possibility of the aggressor leaders' concluding that their initial judgement had been mistaken—that the risks were after all greater than whatever prize they had been seeking, and that for their own country's survival they must call off the aggression. Deterrence planning such as that of NATO was directed in the first place to preventing the initial misjudgement and in the second, if it were nevertheless made, to compelling such a reappraisal. The former aim had to have primacy, because it could not be taken for granted that the latter was certain to work. But there was no ground for assuming in advance, for all possible scenarios, that the chance of its working must be negligible. An aggressor state would itself be at huge risk if nuclear war developed, as its leaders would know. It may be argued that a policy which abandons hope of physically defeating the enemy and simply hopes to get him to desist is pure gamble, a matter of who blinks first; and that the political and moral nature of most likely aggressors, almost ex hypothesis, makes them the less likely to blink. One response to this is to ask what is the alternative—it can only be surrender. But a more positive and hopeful answer lies in the fact that the criticism is posed in a political vacuum. Real-life conflict would have a political context. The context which concerned NATO during the cold war, for example, was one of defending vital interests against a postulated aggressor whose own vital interests would not be engaged, or would be less engaged. Certainty is not possible, but a clear asymmetry of vital interest is a legitimate basis for expecting an asymmetry, credible to both sides, of resolve in conflict. That places upon statesmen, as page 23 has noted, the key task in deterrence of building up in advance a clear and shared grasp of where limits lie. That was plainly achieved in cold-war Europe. 11 vital interests have been defined in a way that is clear, and also clearly not overlapping or incompatible with those of the adversary, a credible basis has been laid for the likelihood of greater resolve in resistance. It was also sometimes suggested by critics that whatever might be indicated by theoretical discussion of political will and interests, the military environment of nuclear warfare—particularly difficulties of communication and control—would drive escalation with overwhelming probability to the limit. But it is obscure why matters should be regarded as inevitably so for every possible level and setting of action. Even if the history of war suggested (as it scarcely does) that military decision-makers are mostly apt to work on the principle 'When in doubt, lash out', the nuclear revolution creates an utterly new situation. The pervasive reality, always plain to both sides during the cold war, is 'If this goes on to the end, we are all ruined'. Given that inexorable escalation would mean catastrophe for both, it would be perverse to suppose them permanently incapable of framing arrangements which avoid it. As page 16 has noted, NATO gave its military commanders no widespread delegated authority, in peace or war, to launch nuclear weapons without specific political direction. Many types of weapon moreover had physical safeguards such as PALs incorporated to reinforce organizational ones. There were multiple communication and control systems for passing information, orders, and prohibitions. Such systems could not be totally guaranteed against disruption if at a fairly intense level of strategic exchange—which was only one of many possible levels of conflict— an adversary judged it to be in his interest to weaken political control. It was far from clear why he necessarily should so judge. Even then, however, it remained possible to operate on a general fail-safe presumption: no authorization, no use. That was the basis on which NATO operated. If it is feared that the arrangements which a nuclear-weapon possessor has in place do not meet such standards in some respects, the logical course is to continue to improve them rather than to assume escalation to be certain and uncontrollable, with all the enormous inferences that would have to flow from such an assumption. The likelihood of escalation can never be 100 per cent, and never zero. Where between those two extremes it may lie can never be precisely calculable in advance; and even were it so calculable, it would not be uniquely fixed—it would stand to vary hugely with circumstances. That there should be any risk at all of escalation to widespread nuclear war must be deeply disturbing, and decision-makers would always have to weigh it most anxiously. But a pair of key truths about it need to be recognized. The first is that the risk of escalation to large-scale nuclear war is inescapably present in any significant armed conflict between nuclear-capable powers, whoever may have started the conflict and whoever may first have used any particular category of weapon. The initiator of the conflict will always have physically available to him options for applying more force if he meets effective resistance. If the risk of escalation, whatever its degree of probability, is to be regarded as absolutely unacceptable, the necessary inference is that a state attacked by a substantial nuclear power must forgo military resistance. It must surrender, even if it has a nuclear armoury of its own. But the companion truth is that, as page 47 has noted, the risk of escalation is an inescapable burden also upon the aggressor. The exploitation of that burden is the crucial route, if conflict does break out, for managing it to a tolerable outcome—the only route, indeed, intermediate between surrender and holocaust, and so the necessary basis for deterrence beforehand. The working out of plans to exploit escalation risk most effectively in deterring potential aggression entails further and complex issues. It is for example plainly desirable, wherever geography, politics, and available resources so permit without triggering arms races, to make provisions and dispositions that are likely to place the onus of making the bigger and more evidently dangerous steps in escalation upon the aggressor who wishes to maintain his attack, rather than upon the defender. (The customary shorthand for this desirable posture used to be 'escalation dominance'.) These issues are not further discussed here. But addressing them needs to start from acknowledgement that there are in any event no certainties or absolutes available, no options guaranteed to be risk-free and cost-free. Deterrence is not possible without escalation risk; and its presence can point to no automatic policy conclusion save for those who espouse outright pacifism and accept its consequences. Accident and Miscalculation Ensuring the safety and security of nuclear weapons plainly needs to be taken most seriously. Detailed information is understandably not published, but such direct evidence as there is suggests that it always has been so taken in every possessor state, with the inevitable occasional failures to follow strict procedures dealt with rigorously. Critics have nevertheless from time to time argued that the possibility of accident involving nuclear weapons is so substantial that it must weigh heavily in the entire evaluation of whether war-prevention structures entailing their existence should be tolerated at all. Two sorts of scenario are usually in question. The first is that of a single grave event involving an unintended nuclear explosion—a technical disaster at a storage site, for example, or the accidental or unauthorized launch of a delivery system with a live nuclear warhead. The second is that of some event—perhaps such an explosion or launch, or some other mishap such as malfunction or misinterpretation of radar signals or computer systems—initiating a sequence of response and counter-response that culminated in a nuclear exchange which no one had truly intended. No event that is physically possible can be said to be of absolutely zero probability (just as at an opposite extreme it is absurd to claim, as has been heard from distinguished figures, that nuclear-weapon use can be guaranteed to happen within some finite future span despite not having happened for over sixty years). But human affairs cannot be managed to the standard of either zero or total probability. We have to assess levels between those theoretical limits and weigh their reality and implications against other factors, in security planning as in everyday life. There have certainly been, across the decades since 1945, many known accidents involving nuclear weapons, from transporters skidding off roads to bomber aircraft crashing with or accidentally dropping the weapons they carried (in past days when such carriage was a frequent feature of readiness arrangements—it no longer is). A few of these accidents may have released into the nearby environment highly toxic material. None however has entailed a nuclear detonation. Some commentators suggest that this reflects bizarrely good fortune amid such massive activity and deployment over so many years. A more rational deduction from the facts of this long experience would however be that the probability of any accident triggering a nuclear explosion is extremely low. It might be further noted that the mechanisms needed to set off such an explosion are technically demanding, and that in a large number of ways the past sixty years have seen extensive improvements in safety arrangements for both the design and the handling of weapons. It is undoubtedly possible to see respects in which, after the cold war, some of the factors bearing upon risk may be new or more adverse; but some are now plainly less so. The years which the world has come through entirely without accidental or unauthorized detonation have included early decades in which knowledge was sketchier, precautions were less developed, and weapon designs were less ultra-safe than they later became, as well as substantial periods in which weapon numbers were larger, deployments more widespread and diverse, movements more frequent, and several aspects of doctrine and readiness arrangements more tense. Similar considerations apply to the hypothesis of nuclear war being mistakenly triggered by false alarm. Critics again point to the fact, as it is understood, of numerous occasions when initial steps in alert sequences for US nuclear forces were embarked upon, or at least called for, by indicators mistaken or misconstrued. In none of these instances, it is accepted, did matters get at all near to nuclear launch—extraordinary good fortune again, critics have suggested. But the rival and more logical inference from hundreds of events stretching over sixty years of experience presents itself once more: that the probability of initial misinterpretation leading far towards mistaken launch is remote. Precisely because any nuclear-weapon possessor recognizes the vast gravity of any launch, release sequences have many steps, and human decision is repeatedly interposed as well as capping the sequences. To convey that because a first step was prompted the world somehow came close to accidental nuclear war is wild hyperbole, rather like asserting, when a tennis champion has lost his opening service game, that he was nearly beaten in straight sets. History anyway scarcely offers any ready example of major war started by accident even before the nuclear revolution imposed an order-of-magnitude increase in caution. It was occasionally conjectured that nuclear war might be triggered by the real but accidental or unauthorized launch of a strategic nuclear-weapon delivery system in the direction of a potential adversary. No such launch is known to have occurred in over sixty years. The probability of it is therefore very low. But even if it did happen, the further hypothesis of its initiating a general nuclear exchange is far-fetched. It fails to consider the real situation of decision-makers, as pages 63-4 have brought out. The notion that cosmic holocaust might be mistakenly precipitated in this way belongs to science fiction.

2022 SDI Counterplan
AFF AT: CP—DoS SA › AT: NB – AT: Miscalc !

No risk of miscalc

Reveron 13 Derek S. Reveron, professor of national security affairs at the U.S. Naval War College, “When Foreign Policy Goals Exceed Military Capacity, Call The Pentagon,” Foreign Policy Research Institute E-Notes, February 2013, /GoGreen! *added [overlooked]

With dozens of treaty allies and a strategic priority of promoting the sovereignty of weak states, the U.S. military has been gradually shifting from a force designed for confrontation to one intended to promote international cooperation. To be sure, the U.S. military retains a technical and doctrinal advantage as a warfighting entity. However, over the past two decades, the military has been incorporating new organizations, doctrine, and training to prioritize efforts to prevent war through security force assistance. This has shifted focus to weak states where sub-national (e.g., gangs in Central America) and trans-national security challenges (e.g., al-Qa’ida) jeopardize sovereignty and regional stability.1 Consequently, countries such as the Philippines, Georgia, Colombia, Uganda, and Pakistan have requested security assistance from the United States. While level of support varies, U.S. forces are enabling partner countries to combat challenges that threaten their own stability.

This shift in focus has raised concerns about the “militarization of U.S. foreign policy,” which began in the 1990s with the recognition that combatant commanders are as much policy entrepreneurs as they are war fighters.2 Generals like Tony Zinni or Wesley Clark epitomized the new breed of warrior-diplomat who directly engaged with foreign heads of state.3 Far from rogue generals, these military leaders were directed by President Bill Clinton to engage with the world and promote security by assisting partners and assuring allies in a security environment freed from the Cold War dynamic. President George W. Bush and President Barack Obama continued the practice of using the military to assist almost every government of the world. As Administrations from both parties came to value the military’s capabilities in peace and war, some contended that defense overshadowed (if not displaced) traditional diplomacy and development efforts.4 Within defense circles, critics assumed that helping weak states jeopardized American military dominance and undercut preparations for major war.5 More recently, critics highlight that in an era of declining budgets, the United States military cannot afford nor overcome unintended consequences of attempting to be a “global force for good.”6 These are valid concerns, but the United States shows no signs of retreating from a global leadership role and instead seeks partnerships as a key component of U.S. strategy.

2022 SDI Counterplan
AFF AT: CP—DoS SA › AT: NB – AT: Terror !

No motive, no opportunity

--CBRN = chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear weapons

Koblentz 20 Dr. Gregory D. Koblentz, Associate Professor and Director of the Biodefense Graduate Program at George Mason University's Schar School of Policy and Government; “Emerging Technologies and the Future of CBRN Terrorism;” The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 43, 06-16-2020, Issue 2, Accessed through T&F, /GoGreen!

Cautions and Caveats

2022 SDI Counterplan
AFF AT: CP—DoS SA › AT: NB – AT: Terror !

No nuclear terror and no impact

John Mueller & Mark G. Stewart 21, Mueller is Woody Hayes Senior Research Scientist, Mershon Center for International Security Studies, and adjunct professor of Political Science, at Ohio State University, also a Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute in Washington; Stewart is Professor of Civil Engineering and Director of the Centre for Infrastructure Performance and Reliability at The University of Newcastle in Australia, “Terrorism and Bathtubs: Comparing and Assessing the Risks,” Terrorism and Political Violence, vol. 33, no. 1, 01/02/2021, pp. 138–163

The likelihood that anyone outside a war zone will be killed by an Islamist extremist terrorist is extremely small. In the United States, for example, some six people have perished each year since 9/11 at the hands of such terrorists—for an annual fatality rate of about one in 50 million for the period.

This might be taken to suggest, as one writer has characterized it, that “terrorism is such a minor threat to American life and limb that it’s simply bizarre—just stupefyingly irrational and intellectually unserious—to suppose that it could even begin to justify the abolition of privacy rights as they have been traditionally understood in favour of the installation of a panoptic surveillance state.” 1 And terrorism specialist Marc Sageman characterizes the threat terrorists present in the United States as “rather negligible.” 2 The vast majority of what is commonly tallied as terrorism has occurred in war zones, and this is especially true for fatalities.3 But even this has been exaggerated by conflating terrorism with war: civil war violence that would previously have been seen to be acts of insurgency are now often labeled terrorism.4

2022 SDI Counterplan
AFF AT: CP—DoS SA › AT: NB – AT: Demo ! – DPT

No impact to democracy – confounding variables control

Doorenspleet ’19 [Renske; 2019; Political Science and International Studies Professor at Warwick University; Rethinking the Value of Democracy: A Comparative Perspective, “Democracy and Interstate War,” Ch. 3]

This finding or ‘law’ has not only been recognized by scholars of international relations, but also found its way outside academia and has influenced foreign policies to promote peace and democracy, most prominently since the 1990s. However, my book will not draw conclusions based on ‘cherry-picking’ of specific studies showing how peaceful democracies are, but on a systematic overview of studies in this field. Therefore, this book relies on my own database with hundreds of different studies, which are relevant for each chapter; the articles had to engage directly with the chapter’s main research question. The next section will provide more detailed information around the selection criteria. This overview includes both highly cited and recent articles which were selected in a systematic way.

Based on analyses of statistical studies around this topic of democracy and war, it will become clear that the overall statistical support for the democratic peace hypothesis is not strong at all. In the rest of the chapter, I will spell out four reasons why democracy does not cause peace, and why the empirical support for the popular idea of democratic peace is quite weak: (1) most studies do not find a strong correlation between democracy and interstate war at the dyadic level, and they show that there are other—more powerful—explanations for war and peace, or even that the impact of democracy is a spurious one, (2) the theoretical foundation of the democratic peace hypothesis is weak, and the causal mechanisms are unclear, (3) democracies are not necessarily more peaceful in general, and the evidence for the democratic peace hypothesis at the monadic level is inconclusive, and (4) the process of democratization is dangerous and living in a democratizing country means living in a less peaceful country.

2022 SDI Counterplan
AFF AT: CP—DoS SA › AT: NB – AT: Global Demo I/L

No modelling

Miller 21 Aaron David Miller, Global Fellow at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, former Senior Advisor for Arab-Israeli Negotiations at the State Department, PhD American Diplomatic and Middle East History, University of Michigan; and Richard Sokolsky, nonresident senior fellow in Carnegie’s Russia and Eurasia Program, former director of the offices of Strategic Policy and Negotiations, Policy Analysis, and Defense Relations and Security Assistance in the State Department’s Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, MA Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies; “Biden is right that global democracy is at risk. But the threat isn’t China,” The Washington Post, 12-3-2021, /GoGreen!

It is simplistic to believe, however, that Chinese and Russian foreign policies are driven by the ideological impulse to spread autocracy. Both countries see the United States as their main geopolitical adversary and seek to undermine American influence and alliances wherever they can; the Chinese are also bent on outcompeting the United States in 21st-century technologies.

But the Russians don’t have an authoritarian model for export, and other autocratic-minded governments don’t need inspiration from Moscow to run kleptocratic, corrupt, repressive and misgoverned regimes. Putin’s overriding priority is self-preservation and the preservation of his regime. What evidence is there that he believes these objectives can be achieved only if the rest of the world looks like Russia?

2022 SDI Counterplan
AFF AT: CP—DoS SA › AT: NB – AT: NATO Demo I/L

The US is irrelevant – other members and the EU either thump OR solve

Katz 18 Jonathan Katz, director of Democracy Initiatives and senior fellow with The German Marshall Fund of the United States, former deputy assistant administrator in the Europe and Eurasia bureau at USAID, former senior advisor to the assistant secretary in the International Organization Affairs Bureau at the U.S. Department of State; and Torrey Taussig, research director for the Project on Europe and the Transatlantic Relationship at Harvard Kennedy School's Belfer Center, former foreign policy advisor in the German Bundestag and in the Transatlantic Division of the German Foreign Office; “An inconvenient truth: Addressing democratic backsliding within NATO,” 7-10-2018, /GoGreen!

Regardless of U.S. leadership or support, other NATO states such as the Nordic countries, Canada, Germany, France, the United Kingdom and other members must play a role in prioritizing NATO’s core values at the Brussels Summit and strengthening democratic institutions. In speaking to diplomats from several member states, it is clear that they recognize the growing democracy deficit in the alliance, and that the United States will likely not lead the charge on championing democratic institutions. In response, officials from such member states can use bilateral meetings and sideline conversations with the Hungarians, Poles, and Turks to raise concerns. Already the European Union is pressing Poland on its violation of EU democratic principles with the threat of sanctions and suspension of voting privileges. The security implications of their transgressions give NATO a role in maintaining this pressure, too.