Free beta access. 50 free AI tokens each week. Optional top-ups available. See what is included
Open evidence library

Search the archive.

Current and older evidence is free during beta. Sign in for unlimited card access and full source downloads.

Matching cards
2022 UTNIF Kritik
2NC – ATs › AT – IR Reflexive

No methodological pluralism – “Self-reflexivity” is a myth – IR’s priors are foundationally racist which makes it unfixable absent radical re-thinking of the alt

Henderson 13 – Associate Professor of International Relations at Penn State University, PhD in Political Science at the University of Michigan, MA [Errol, “Hidden in plain sight: racism in international relations Theory,” Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 2013, Vol. 26, No. 1, 71–92, DKP]

The centrality of race and racism in the foundations of IR and their enduring impact on world affairs towards the end of the millennium contrasts with the relative dearth of mainstream scholarship on the subject in IR. For example, Doty’s (1998, 136) survey of mainstream journals in IR for the period of 1945 –1993 (World Politics, International Studies Quarterly, International Organization, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Review of International Studies) ‘revealed only one article with the word race in the title, four with the term minorities and 13 with the term ethnicity’. Given that at its inception IR focused heavily on issues of race and racism, the marginalization of race and racism in mainstream IR journals (and textbooks) begs the question of what accounts for the apparent disparity? Doty (1998, 145) argues that ‘the dominant understandings of theory and explanation in International Relations’ preclude conceptualizations of ‘complex issues/concepts such as race’ and result in their marginalization or force them ‘into constraining modes of conceptualization and explanation’. For Krishna (2001, 401), the complexity is related less to the issue of racism than to the methodological orientations that often privilege abstract theorizing over historical analyses, which allows IR theorists to whitewash the historical content of global affairs, especially ‘the violence, genocide, and theft that marked the encounter between the rest and the West in the post-Columbian era’. Ignoring the role of racism facilitates this whitewash. He adds that ‘abstraction, usually presented as the desire of the discipline to engage in theory-building rather than in descriptive or historical analysis, is a screen that simultaneously rationalizes and elides the details of these encounters. By encouraging students to display their virtuosity in abstraction the discipline brackets questions of theft of land, violence, and slavery—the three processes that have historically underlain the unequal global order we now find ourselves in’ (Krishna 2001, 401– 402). Further, ‘overattention’ on the part of scholars to issues related to racism in IR ‘is disciplined by professional practices that work as taboo’ and may label such orientations as ‘too historical or descriptive’ and label such students as ‘not adequately theoretical’ and ‘lacking in intellectual rigor’ (Krishna 2001, 402). Moreover, where the impact of race and racism is analysed, insufficient attention is paid to the relevance of struggles related to race and racism to basic conceptions of fundamental issues in world politics such as power, war, freedom or democracy. For example, Persaud (2001, 116) maintains that ‘what needs to be underlined is that the struggle for racial equality has been fundamental to the emergence of democracy as a whole, not just for the colored world’ (2001, 116).

Persaud and Walker (2001, 374) claim that race has not been ignored in IR as much as it ‘has been given the epistemological status of silence’. This silence is linked by Maclean (1981, 110) to ‘invisibility’, which ‘refers to the removal (not necessarily through conscious action) from a field of enquiry, either concrete aspects of social relations, or of certain forms of thought about them’. Vitalis (2000) also acknowledges a ‘norm against noticing’ white racism throughout mainstream IR discourse (also see Depelchin 2005). Each of these processes perpetuates the racist assumptions embedded in the foundations of IR theory where they serve as the ‘priors’ of the main propositions. These assumptions may be exposed by tracing the racist claims that inform IR theory. This approach is different from that undertaken in most studies of racism in IR, which usually focus on one of four approaches: (1) examinations of the impact of non-racial factors on racial outcomes, such as the geographical studies of Linneaus and the physical anthropological works of Blumenbach and Kant, which attempted to determine the extent to which environmental and climatic factors led to the creation of different races;3 (2) examinations of the impact of racial outcomes on non-racial factors, such as studies of the effects of racial stratification on domestic outcomes (for example, development or democracy), or the impact of racial differences on the likelihood of violence within or between states (for example, Deutsch 1970; Shepherd and LeMelle 1970); (3) examinations of the impact of racist practices on the IR of states and non-state actors, such as studies of diplomatic historians on racist practices such as international slavery, imperial conquest, colonialism, genocide, apartheid, occupation, or racial discrimination, among single states, several states, or international organizations (for example, Elkins 2004; Hochschild 1998; Tinker 1977; Vincent 1982; Winant 2001); and (4) examinations of the impact of racist ideology on the IR of states and nonstate actors, such as studies on the impact of racism on foreign policy (for example, Hunt 1987; Lauren 1988; Anderson 2003), imperialism (for example, Rodney 1974), state-making (for example, Cell 1982; Fredrickson 1982; Mamdani 1996; Marx 1998), diasporization (Harris 1982; Walters 1993) or international war (Dower 1986).

2022 UTNIF Kritik
2NC – ATs › 2NC – AT – Perm

Footnoting DA – it’s about starting points – you can’t add black scholarship and stir

Hawthorne and Heitz 18 – *Chair of the  of the American Association of Geographers, Assistant Professor of Sociology at UC-Santa Cruz, PhD in Geography at UC Berkeley, MPA at Brown, BA in International Relations and Africana Studies at Brown, ** PhD Student in Human Geography, UC Berkeley [Camilla, Kaily, “A seat at the table? Reflections on Black geographies and the limits of dialogue,” 2018, DKP]

It is impossible to engage with the politics of dialogue without first situating ourselves—after all, these are fundamentally questions of power and access. I (Camilla) am a first-generation university student and the first in my immediate family to pursue a graduate degree. As a Black woman geographer, I must continuously reckon with the fact that the university—and the discipline of geography itself—was not made for me. Historically, the university has been a site wherein the subjugation of women and people of color has been articulated and legitimated. Still, I was drawn to human geography because it appeared to be a capacious, interdisciplinary field with productively porous boundaries. In other words, geography seemed to welcome, rather than strictly regulate, theoretical and methodological dialogue between disciplines. But when I began my PhD program, I experienced a distinct sense of alienation as I attempted to do research that seemed marginal to geography (specifically, understanding how Black youth in Italy craft a sense of place that challenges the symbolic and material boundaries of Europeanness and Italianness). I was alarmed that the vocabulary and rich canon shaped by my background in Africana studies (for instance, theories of diaspora, or the works of scholars such as Paul Gilroy and Sylvia Wynter) were not always recognized as ‘formally’ geographical, even though the issues they addressed were fundamentally about space, place, and power. I was similarly alarmed by the fact that, in a discipline whose history is so closely tied to the violent histories of colonialism and racism, race remained a relatively insignificant category in contemporary geography, a ‘superstructural’ embellishment atop the ‘material’, clanking gears of capitalism. The questions that animated my research and the intellectual genealogies I wanted to draw upon, were deeply spatial but seemedillegible to geography. They were, in other words, beyond dialogue.

As a Black woman, I (Kaily) can recall being taught from a very early age not to fight back. When I mouthed off, I was told to sit down and quite literally to shut up. ‘Black’ and ‘girl’ were thrown in my face as insults, justifications for my silence. Insecure in my body, I was also insecure in place, as I constantly moved around the country. Feeling powerless to do much to tangibly or markedly interface with the city streets or Midwestern fields in which I grew up, I found myself drawn to art and photography as some of the few ways I could dialogically assert the power of my body and represent it assuredly in place. Having utilized this embodied knowledge in my thesis research, my advisor proposed that I look into geography programs for my PhD. I found it to be a thrilling and expansive field that had the capacity to engage the language of visual representation and its materialization in structures of race, class, and environment. Like Camilla, my enthusiasm quickly hardened into exasperation when I found that theories of race and gender in geography were limited to one week each in most first-year curricula. I was, and still am, seeking to find the middle ground between the extensive attention Black studies scholars have paid to representations of race, and geographical scholarship on how place is epistemologically formed. It is time that geographers utilized the interdisciplinary nature of their field to widen dialogue formerly limited by structural inequalities.

2022 UTNIF Kritik
2NC – ATs › 2NC – AT – Perm

Gatekeeping DA – the perm is white respectability politics – they tokenize anti-racist critique while maintaining the form of disciplinary white IR while evading accountability but centering blackness thru refusing white epistemology solves

Abu-Bakare 22 – lecturer in the politics of race and decolonial studies at the University of Liverpool and a Visiting Fellow at the University of the University of South Wales’ International Centre for Policing and Security, PhD in International Politics at Aberystwyth University [Amal, “Your Work is Not International Relations,” Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, First Published 3/3/2022, , DKP]

The aim of this essay is to use my individual experience as an entry point for speaking to a structural pattern in IR scholarship. Here, I explore how observing the scholastic process of connecting disciplinary boundaries to real political lines demarcates an ongoing concern with how some academics pursue a monopoly on understandings of ‘the international’, treating its porous semi-arbitrary boundaries as though they define the political issues that traverse them (Conway, 2021). Some have described this monopoly as a form of methodological disciplinarity, a practice where research becomes restricted within disciplinary borders because of scholastic endeavours to keep the discipline pure. In this process, IR gatekeepers come to reject IR’s existence as a discipline that exists between fields, being focused on metaphorically manning the academic watchtower. By being busy policing what is and what is not a global issue, these same intellectuals miss key opportunities for innovative knowledge production concerning the international. As Annika Olsson (2015: 47) observes, ‘scholars of all kinds need to cross the borders of their disciplines more often’ if they are to bring new knowledge home. Vitalis concurs in his own exploration of the birth of American IR, where he writes that ‘the boundaries of international relations theory and in particular work in security […] remain open and ripe for infiltration’(2015:180). We indeed need to challenge ‘the bodies and borders of literature’ if we are ever to truly understand the structural nature of inequities in knowledge sharing in international studies (Olsson, 2015: 47).

On the question of whose bodies? Importantly, in the opening quote, it appears that the editors responding to my article felt that their contributing authors had to tick several boxes on their checklist. Not just to earn the right to exist within the purview of the journal but also to be considered international studies. My concern lies with how these editors seem disconcerted by how broadly their mandate may have been conceived instead of welcoming such breadth in conceptualisation. In the arena of IR, post-structural scholars have long since argued that the boundary between the international and domestic is insecure. Using the writings of Foucault, Derrida, Lacan and Žižek, Edkins (1999), for example, famously contested the technical arrangements that erroneously restricted the notion of the international subject when politics was presented as being a subsystem of social order instead of being seen as a mirror of a society’s own forgotten foundation – cutting off human beings from their sense of self. Others such as Charbonneau and Cox (2010: 14), in the context of foreign policy analysis, write how it is in locally situated security practices that scholars often find spaces where vital ‘elements of state power and global order are produced and reproduced’. So, why were the editors I quoted uncomfortable in the case of another break with the international–domestic divide prompted on the basis of a race-orientated tradition? A problem is that their anxiety and discomfort with a lack of perimeters being erected in this specific instance may possibly have been grounded in a particular epistemic genealogy where having a monopoly on how the international is conceived also constituted a form of racial domination. Allowing an analytical radicalism to be applied to IR problems only so far as they do not cross Eurocentric-white boundaries for what still constitutes intellectual respectability.

2022 UTNIF Kritik
2NC – ATs › 2NC – AT – Util

Everyday violence is a massive impact – you should prioritize it or risk terrible policymaking

Olson 15 – prof of geography @ UNC Chapel Hill

(Elizabeth, ‘Geography and Ethics I: Waiting and Urgency,’ Progress in Human Geography, vol. 39 no. 4, pp. 517-526)

Though toileting might be thought of as a special case of bodily urgency, geographic research suggests that the body is increasingly set at odds with larger scale ethical concerns, especially large-scale future events of forecasted suffering. Emergency planning is a particularly good example in which the large-scale threats of future suffering can distort moral reasoning. Žižek (2006) lightly develops this point in the context of the war on terror, where in the presence of fictitious and real ticking clocks and warning systems, the urgent body must be bypassed because there are bigger scales to worry about: What does this all-pervasive sense of urgency mean ethically? The pressure of events is so overbearing, the stakes are so high, that they nec essitate a suspension of ordinary ethical concerns. After all, displaying moral qualms when the lives of millions are at stake plays into the hands of the enemy. (Žižek, 2006) In the presence of large-scale future emergency, the urgency to secure the state, the citizenry, the economy, or the climate creates new scales and new temporal orders of response (see Anderson, 2010; Baldwin, 2012; Dalby, 2013; Morrissey, 2012), many of which treat the urgent body as impulsive and thus requiring management. McDonald’s (2013) analysis of three interconnected discourses of ‘climate security’ illustrates how bodily urgency in climate change is also recast as a menacing impulse that might require exclusion from moral reckoning. The logics of climate security, especially those related to national security, ‘can encourage perverse political responses that not only fail to respond effectively to climate change but may present victims of it as a threat’ (McDonald, 2013: 49). Bodies that are currently suffering cannot be urgent, because they are excluded from the potential collectivity that could be suffering everywhere in some future time. Similar bypassing of existing bodily urgency is echoed in writing about violent securitization, such as drone warfare (Shaw and Akhter, 2012), and also in intimate scales like the street and the school, especially in relation to race (Mitchell, 2009; Young et al., 2014). As large-scale urgent concerns are institutionalized, the urgent body is increasingly obscured through technical planning and coordination (Anderson and Adey, 2012). The predominant characteristic of this institutionalization of large-scale emergency is a ‘built-in bias for action’ (Wuthnow, 2010: 212) that circumvents contingencies. The urgent body is at best an assumed eventuality, one that will likely require another state of waiting, such as triage (e.g. Greatbach et al., 2005). Amin (2013) cautions that in much of the West, governmental need to provide evidence of laissez-faire governing on the one hand, and assurance of strength in facing a threatening future on the other, produces ‘just-in-case preparedness’ (Amin, 2013: 151) of neoliberal risk management policies. In the US, ‘personal ingenuity’ is built into emergency response at the expense of the poor and vulnerable for whom ‘[t]he difference between abjection and bearable survival’ (Amin, 2013: 153) will not be determined by emergency planning, but in the material infrastructure of the city. In short, the urgencies of the body provide justifications for social exclusion of the most marginalized based on impulse and perceived threat, while large-scale future emergencies effectively absorb the deliberative power of urgency into the institutions of preparedness and risk avoidance. Žižek references Arendt’s (2006) analysis of the banality of evil to explain the current state of ethical reasoning under the war on terror, noting that people who perform morally reprehensible actions under the conditions of urgency assume a ‘tragic-ethic grandeur’ (Žižek, 2006) by sacrificing their own morality for the good of the state. But his analysis fails to note that bodies are today so rarely legitimate sites for claiming urgency. In the context of the assumed priority of the large-scale future emergency, the urgent body becomes literally nonsense, a non sequitur within societies, states and worlds that will always be more urgent. If the important ethical work of urgency has been to identify that which must not wait, then the capture of the power and persuasiveness of urgency by large-scale future emergencies has consequences for the kinds of normative arguments we can raise on behalf of urgent bodies. How, then, might waiting compare as a normative description and critique in our own urgent time? Waiting can be categorized according to its purpose or outcome (see Corbridge, 2004; Gray, 2011), but it also modifies the place of the individual in society and her importance. As Ramdas (2012: 834) writes, ‘waiting … produces hierarchies which segregate people and places into those which matter and those which do not’. The segregation of waiting might produce effects that counteract suffering, however, and Jeffery (2008: 957) explains that though the ‘politics of waiting’ can be repressive, it can also engender creative political engagement. In his research with educated unemployed Jat youth who spend days and years waiting for desired employment, Jeffery finds that ‘the temporal suffering and sense of ambivalence experienced by young men can generate cultural and political experiments that, in turn, have marked social and spatial effects’ (Jeffery, 2010: 186). Though this is not the same as claiming normative neutrality for waiting, it does suggest that waiting is more ethically ambivalent and open than urgency. In other contexts, however, our descriptions of waiting indicate a strong condemnation of its effects upon the subjects of study. Waiting can demobilize radical reform, depoliticizing ‘the insurrectionary possibilities of the present by delaying the revolutionary imperative to a future moment that is forever drifting towards infinity’ (Springer, 2014: 407). Yonucu’s (2011) analysis of the self-destructive activities of disrespected working-class youth in Istanbul suggests that this sense of infinite waiting can lead not only to depoliticization, but also to a disbelief in the possibility of a future self of any value. Waiting, like urgency, can undermine the possibility of self-care two-fold, first by making people wait for essential needs, and again by reinforcing that waiting is ‘[s]omething to be ashamed of because it may be noted or taken as evidence of indolence or low status, seen as a symptom of rejection or a signal to exclude’ (Bauman, 2004: 109). This is why Auyero (2012) suggests that waiting creates an ideal state subject, providing ‘temporal processes in and through which political subordination is produced’ (Auyero, 2012: loc. 90; see also Secor, 2007). Furthermore, Auyero notes, it is not only political subordination, but the subjective effect of waiting that secures domination, as citizens and non-citizens find themselves ‘waiting hopefully and then frustratedly for others to make decisions, and in effect surrendering to the authority of others’ (Auyero, 2012: loc. 123). Waiting can therefore function as a potentially important spatial technology of the elite and powerful, mobilized not only for the purpose of governing individuals, but also to retain claims over moral urgency. But there is growing resistance to the capture of claims of urgency by the elite, and it is important to note that even in cases where the material conditions of containment are currently impenetrable, arguments based on human value are at the forefront of reclaiming urgency for the body. In detention centers, clandestine prisons, state borders and refugee camps, geographers point to ongoing struggles against the ethical impossibility of bodily urgency and a rejection of states of waiting (see Conlon, 2011; Darling, 2009, 2011; Garmany, 2012; Mountz et al., 2013; Schuster, 2011). Ramakrishnan’s (2014) analysis of a Delhi resettlement colony and Shewly’s (2013) discussion of the enclave between India and Bangladesh describe people who refuse to give up their own status as legitimately urgent, even in the context of larger scale politics. Similarly, Tyler’s (2013) account of desperate female detainees stripping off their clothes to expose their humanness and suffering in the Yarl’s Wood Immigration Removal Centre in the UK suggests that demands for recognition are not just about politics, but also about the acknowledgement of humanness and the irrevocable possibility of being that which cannot wait. The continued existence of places like Yarl’s Wood and similar institutions in the USA nonetheless points to the challenge of exposing the urgent body as a moral priority when it is so easily hidden from view, and also reminds us that our research can help to explain the relationships between normative dimensions and the political and social conditions of struggle. In closing, geographic depictions of waiting do seem to evocatively describe otherwise obscured suffering (e.g. Bennett, 2011), but it is striking how rarely these descriptions also use the language of urgency. Given the discussion above, what might be accomplished – and risked – by incorporating urgency more overtly and deliberately into our discussions of waiting, surplus and abandoned bodies? Urgency can clarify the implicit but understated ethical consequences and normativity associated with waiting, and encourage explicit discussion about harmful suffering. Waiting can be productive or unproductive for radical praxis, but urgency compels and requires response. Geographers could be instrumental in reclaiming the ethical work of urgency in ways that leave it open for critique, clarifying common spatial misunderstandings and representations. There is good reason to be thoughtful in this process, since moral outrage towards inhumanity can itself obscure differentiated experiences of being human, dividing up ‘those for whom we feel urgent unreasoned concern and those whose lives and deaths simply do not touch us, or do not appear as lives at all’ (Butler, 2009: 50). But when the urgent body is rendered as only waiting, both materially and discursively, it is just as easily cast as impulsive, disgusting, animalistic (see also McKittrick, 2006). Feminist theory insists that the urgent body, whose encounters of violence are ‘usually framed as private, apolitical and mundane’ (Pain, 2014: 8), are as deeply political, public, and exceptional as other forms of violence (Phillips, 2008; Pratt, 2005). Insisting that a suffering body, now, is that which cannot wait, has the ethical effect of drawing it into consideration alongside the political, public and exceptional scope of large-scale futures. It may help us insist on the body, both as a single unit and a plurality, as a legitimate scale of normative priority and social care. In this report, I have explored old and new reflections on the ethical work of urgency and waiting. Geographic research suggests a contemporary popular bias towards the urgency of large-scale futures, institutionalized in ways that further obscure and discredit the urgencies of the body. This bias also justifies the production of new waiting places in our material landscape, places like the detention center and the waiting room. In some cases, waiting is normatively neutral, even providing opportunities for alternative politics. In others, the technologies of waiting serve to manage potentially problematic bodies, leading to suspended suffering and even to extermination (e.g. Wright, 2013). One of my aims has been to suggest that moral reasoning is important both because it exposes normative biases against subjugated people, and because it potentially provides routes toward struggle where claims to urgency seem to foreclose the possibilities of alleviation of suffering. Saving the world still should require a debate about whose world is being saved, when, and at what cost – and this requires a debate about what really cannot wait. My next report will extend some of these concerns by reviewing how feelings of urgency, as well as hope, fear, and other emotions, have played a role in geography and ethical reasoning. I conclude, however, by pulling together past and present. In 1972, Gilbert White asked why geographers were not engaging ‘the truly urgent questions’ (1972: 101) such as racial repression, decaying cities, economic inequality, and global environmental destruction. His question highlights just how much the discipline has changed, but it is also unnerving in its echoes of our contemporary problems. Since White’s writing, our moral reasoning has been stretched to consider the future body and the more-than-human, alongside the presently urgent body – topics and concerns that I have not taken up in this review but which will provide their own new possibilities for urgent concerns. My own hope presently is drawn from an acknowledgement that the temporal characteristics of contemporary capitalism can be interrupted in creative ways (Sharma, 2014), with the possibility of squaring the urgent body with our large-scale future concerns. Temporal alternatives already exist in ongoing and emerging revolutions and the disruption of claims of cycles and circular political processes (e.g. Lombard, 2013; Reyes, 2012). Though calls for urgency will certainly be used to obscure evasion of responsibility (e.g. Gilmore, 2008: 56, fn 6), they may also serve as fertile ground for radical critique, a truly fierce urgency for now.

2022 UTNIF Kritik
2NC – ATs › 2NC – AT – Extinction First

The end of the world has already occurred – its try-or-die for an alternative form of being-in-the-world

Death 22 – Senior Lecturer in International Political Economy at the University of Manchester [Carl, “Africanfuturist Socio-Climatic Imaginaries and Nnedi Okorafor’s Wild Necropolitics,” Antipode, Volume 54, Issue1 January 2022 Pages 240-258, DKP]

Achille Mbembe’s (2019:7) diagnosis of the present is that “[n]early everywhere the political order is reconstituting itself as a form of organisation for death”. Even liberal democracies, he argues, are increasingly characterised by “separation, hate movements, hostility, and, above all, struggle against an enemy” (Mbembe 2019:42). War, racial hatred, the strengthening of borders and expulsion of enemies, the extreme inequality of contemporary capitalism, and the accelerating violence of runaway climate change produce what he terms an era of necropolitics, which the Covid-19 crisis has merely exacerbated and heightened. He uses the term necropolitics to account for the various ways in which diverse weapons are deployed in the interest of destroying life, and suggests that, “for a large share of humanity, the end of the world has already occurred” (Mbembe 2019:29). This trenchant picture resonates strongly, as we will see below, with the world Okorafor presents in the novel Who Fears Death. Like Okorafor, however, Mbembe does not flinch from this portrayal of a world characterised by violence and death, nor does he abandon all hope of a more convivial politics. Rather, he asks: What do human freedom and vulnerability mean in a necropolitical context? What alternative forms of being-in-the-world are possible? Refusing the binary choice between either violence or freedom, Mbembe (2019:92) suggests that “today’s form of necropower blurs the lines between resistance and suicide, sacrifice and redemption, martyrdom and freedom”.

Frantz Fanon (2001, 2008) wrote in the 1950s of the need for a “new humanism” that would set mankind free and restore human dignity, love, and understanding. This concern with the politics and possibilities of a new humanism is central to black feminist traditions of thought, which have done most to explore these questions precisely because the dominant genre of the human—Man—has always been irreducibly raced and gendered. As Sylvia Wynter (2003:313) puts it:

2022 UTNIF Kritik
1NC

Their theory of IR is wrong and racist – it relies on Western conceptions of sovereignty, and assumes a White, rational neoliberal subject at the core of decision making – this propagates both instability and imperialism through the cloak of liberal restraint.

Hobson 22 – Professor of Politics and International Relations at the University of Sheffield, PhD from the LSE [John, “Unmasking the racism of orthodox international relations/international political economy theory,” Security Dialogue 2022, Vol. 53(1) 3 –20, Security Dialogue 2022, Vol. 53(1) 3 –20, DKP]

Plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose1: Racism as shapeshifter – The polymorphous cycles of racism in everyday life and world politics

While liberal conceptions construct a progressive-evolutionary vision of world politics wherein racism gradually evaporates as the bright sunlight of modernity intensifies, nevertheless, numerous critical race scholars point to a recurring dark cycle of racial control that marks the long history of modernity (e.g. Alexander, 2012: 20–58; Bonilla-Silva, 2018: 17–52; Omi and Winant, 2014: 84–91; Perry, 2007). Focusing on the United States, Michelle Alexander (2012: 21) asserts that

2022 UTNIF Kritik
1NC

Cooperation with NATO is an extension of Western IRs colonial project of maintain European supremacy – it creates the conditions for violence and war against the periphery

CAMPBELL 19 – Professor of African American Studies and Political Science, Syracuse University [Horace, “,” 4/9/2019, , DKP]

In the celebratory events to memorialize the founding of NATO in 1949, it is usually forgotten that when the North American Treaty was signed in April 1949 most of the founding members were colonial overlords. Colonialism and imperialism took a new form under the leadership of US capitalists defending the dollar and Wall Street. At that historical moment in 1949, the justification for starting this organization was that it constituted a system of collective defense whereby its member states agreed to mutual defense in response to an attack by any external party. The external party in question at that time was the USSR; insofar as NATO had been formed as an alliance ostensibly to defend Western Europe against ‘communist expansion’. In the Treaty’s renowned Article 5, the new Allies agreed “an armed attack against one or more of them… shall be considered an attack against them all.” The US military and industrial leaders studied the terror and propaganda tactics of the Nazis in order to learn the lessons of how to develop an efficient military machine. James Whitman in the book, Hitler’s American Model: The United States and the Making of Nazi Race Law, outlined what the fascists had learnt from the eugenics movement in the United States.[10] Although many anti-fascist scientists from Germany had found a place in the US academy, the top planners of the Cold War linked the US primacy to the global history of racism to the efficient, bureaucratic and professionalism of conservative Germany. One of the unspoken aspects of the first years of NATO was the question of containing the possible revolutionary impulses of the German working peoples. To forestall such a possibility, the thinkers and planners of NATO collaborated with the former fascists to learn their skills. The details of this alliance have been spelt out in the book on the CIA by David Talbot in the book, The Devil’s Chessboard: Allen Dulles, the CIA, and the Rise of America’s Secret Government. The merging of fascist ideas with the ideas of Jim Crow in the United States were refined in the secret operation called, Operation Paperclip. Anne Jacobsen, Operation Paperclip: The Secret Intelligence Program to Bring Nazi Scientists to America, [11] elaborated in great detail the secret program of the Joint Intelligence Objectives Agency (JIOA) largely carried out by Special Agents of Army Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC), in which more than 1,600 German scientists, engineers, and technicians, such as Wernher von Braun and his V-2 rocket team, were taken from Germany to America for U.S. government employment, primarily between 1945 and 1959. Many were former members, and some were former leaders, of the Nazi Party. These elements were the foundation of a military program that has brought us the weaponization of space. The creators of NATO simultaneously mobilized the colonial and fascist elements in Belgium, Spain, Italy and France. Of the twelve founding members, six were outright colonial powers and at that moment, countries such as France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Britain and Portugal looked to the USA to support their plunder of colonial societies. In the specific case of France, in order to assist French colonialism, Algeria was named as a territory of NATO. Sixty years later when the President of France, Macron, apologized for the crimes of killing more than one million Algerians, there is no reflection inside western academic institutions on this role of NATO in Africa. Currently, the French have been the most aggressive in promoting the fiction that the defense radius of Europe stretches 4000 kilometers out from Brussels, up to the arctic, well across the Russian frontier and down into central Africa. It is not widely known that, initially, the Portuguese fascists were some of the principal beneficiaries of the membership of NATO, with major deployment of nuclear weapons in the Azores as reward for the NATO support for colonialism in Angola, Mozambique, Guinea and other Portuguese outposts of colonial domination. Prior to the formation of NATO in 1949, the 1947 document of the State Department on Cooperative Development of Africa had stipulated that colonialism would assist the recovery of European capitalism. [12]The State Department had been explicit in outlining how cheap foodstuffs and raw materials from Africa would assist Europe’s recovery and create the basis for unity and economic regeneration. The USA set about creating a number of international institutions to guarantee the survival of Europe and of capitalism, the IMF, IBRD (World Bank), the NATO, GATT, to guarantee the strength of the USA in international trade and finance. By the time NATO was formed in 1949, the US planners had already made their plans with Britain and France to extend their military control over Africa. France was bequeathed the task of maintaining order in western Africa while the British sought to maintain naval power incorporating the British facilities from the Suez Canal down through Aden (Yemen), to Mombasa (Kenya), Simons town South Africa across to Malaysia. [13] The racist apartheid regime had persuaded NATO that it was necessary to integrate the South African military into the western defense planning in order to protect the ‘Cape route.’ After the Suez crises of 1956 and the 1967 war this alliance with the racist regime deepened. Throughout its existence NATO assisted in the refinement of the racial status hierarchy in which whites are dominant and people of color are subordinate. [14] This incorporation of racist ideas into western defense continued a long tradition that shaped the outlook of NATO and reinforced the outlook of Frantz Fanon: “Colonialism is violence in its natural state.” France and Britain excelled in this violence with the Belgians cementing their communications and logistics coordination to kill Patrice Lumumba and later support the killing of the Secretary General of the United Nation, Dag Hammarskjold. [15]

2022 UTNIF Counterplan
AFF › Deficits/Turns › EU-NATO Coop

EU-NATO coop requires a strong Turkish partnership.

https://d1wqtxts1xzle7.cloudfront.net/45246769/NATO_-_Europeum-with-cover-page-v2.pdf?Expires=1656640561&Signature=NFfpJ926sWQwM5VX5~i-15bKcCKcEYNPWA93MEEDG5kfUMnEQXFXyCG0Ne~No4UkwI05XyBb3asU9vITvj3Qw3T5JShoyGJEqOfssm7FQC2k9RHHQMUvFySOx2xTtKv1C5YOUp9yEYcmBEVQQMWw9AqSXGLuZAuEDMbcVrIUIlqOKV6~88ZaQWN05eXldfp0GHfpUZpzRxgMQQEDCIA1UyGBNQQnDUeuABQFS9HFwE3okX92SFbQ2yjNkln3pxBf9zgYEeyDz0jWT-Ib3-vB-Liv5bGI2p4sFDo3EyTZzq4UgwXuWDT0rXXOaVcHb-9qyzCRfO1D9bB6jtuAoCpj4Q__&Key-Pair-Id=APKAJLOHF5GGSLRBV4ZA

Cyprus has been priority number one in Turkish foreign affairs for many years. The island has been a highly contentious issue for both Greece and Turkey, as well as for the international community. The tensions between the two countries have slowed down the strategic partnership between the EU and NATO in its fullest sense. According to the North Atlantic Council decision of 2002 Cyprus and Malta are excluded from participating in EUNATO meetings concerning ‘strategic cooperation’ between the two sides of the Atlantic. However, the EU, based on the community solidarity principle, does not want to leave Cyprus out of this security dialogue. Turkey insists on the validity of the North Atlantic Council decision of 2002 and blocks the participation of Cyprus in the NATO-EU strategic cooperation, Cyprus blocks Turkish membership and participation in the EU decision making mechanisms concerning security in return. Given all these tensions, there is still no guarantee that once the Cyprus problem is resolved, the EU and NATO will automatically cooperate. All the attention is now on this mutual blockade and the Cyprus problem is often blamed for non-cooperation (Buharalı, 2008). The Cyprus problem has transcended regional bickering to become an international problem. It is a long lived debate and an agreement does not seem to be reached soon. One has to acknowledge that even if the Cyprus problem were solved today, many complications remain. The EU and the United States have different approaches to security that might make it difficult to work together. Furthermore Turkey is still only a candidate member, and would not be allowed in the EU decision making processes. The EU-NATO cooperation needs an active Turkish presence to be effective in the region. The different approaches of the EU and the US may be the biggest problem impeding the transatlantic security alliance in the future. The EU as a soft power does not use the same means as the hard power United States and vice-versa. The division of tasks between the EU and NATO has created yet another problem. 6 It would be much less costly and easier to overcome the problems in the conflict zones if the two could decide on who is doing what. For now, instead of waiting for the Cyprus problem to be solved, new grounds for cooperation have to be found.

2022 UTNIF Counterplan
AFF › Deficits/Turns › US-Turkey Partnership

Alliance and cooperation with Turkey is key for NATO and U.S. deterrence strategies that is neccessary to fighting Advantage 1’s impacts

Eldridge 11 (William Eldridge, U.S. air force colonel and commander, former public policy scholar, “The Credibility of America’s Extended Nuclear Deterrence The Case of the Republic of Turkey,” Air University Press, September 2011, https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/AUPress/Papers/wp_0018_eldridge_extended_nuclear_deterrent.pdf)//nehahahah

This research suggests that it is the strength of the US-Turkish political-security relationship that is the most important factor for ensuring the credibility of the United States’ extended nuclear deterrent. In fact, the credibility of the US nuclear umbrella has little to do with the type of its nuclear weapons, the number of warheads, or the negative image of US nuclear competency generated from the Air Force’s nuclear handling missteps. Instead, US credibility depends on Turkey’s perception of its political, economic, and military ties with the United States. It is the quality of that broader relationship that will also have the greatest influence on whether or not Turkish leaders pursue an independent nuclear weapons capability. Turkey generally measures the strength of its security relationship with the United States through the lens of the reliability of bilateral and multilateral security and partnership agreements such as NATO and the European Union (EU). Although there are many ways to measure the strength of these types of relationships—domestic polls, media tone, treaties, and agreements— the perception of national leadership is the most important. It is the highest level of Turkish decision makers that will decide the merits of continued reliance on the US extended nuclear deterrent. Undoubtedly, domestic influence and external security threats influence those decision makers, but for Turkey, it is the perception of alliance strength that will have the most influence on its nuclear proliferation decisions.

2022 UTNIF Counterplan
AFF › Deficits/Turns › International Co-op

Turkey is key in international cooperation with NATO for emerging technologies, AI, and biotechnology – several benefits to keeping Turkey

THO No date (Turkey Heritage Organization, organization that promotes discussion and dialogue around Turkey’s role in the international community and issues of importance in the U.S.-Turkey bilateral relationship, as well as an analysis of the NATO alliance and geopolitics of the region, “Technology”, No date, https://www.turkheritage.org/en/issues/technology)//nehahahah

As technology continues to evolve, with the rise of autonomous vehicles, the blockchain industry, and artificial intelligence, Turkey, NATO and others continue to invest heavily in global technological advancements. The global technological developments allow for various responses to geo-political issues, but also have the potential to add more nuance to international issues. The response to the rise in new and emerging technologies relies on international coordination and cooperation. Domestic advancement in Turkey, for instance, involves international issues and stakeholders. Turkey, the United States and NATO have continued to develop and manufacture technological devices for space, communications and vehicles. In fact, NATO’s Deputy Secretary General Mircea Geoaña has emphasized the increasing significance of international cooperation on Artificial Intelligence (AI) “as the most pervasive emerging and disruptive technology, especially when combined with other technologies such as big data, autonomy or biotechnologies” (NATO, 2021). NATO uses the Science and Technology Organization (STO) to maintain modern technology advances for further development. The transatlantic collaboration amongst NATO Member-states allows for these advancements to reach their full potential in a world facing developing challenges.

Start-up businesses also reap the benefits of Turkey’s technological advancements. Internet companies such as Trendyol and Hepsiburada are becoming major players in the Turkish internet market, and have attracted attention from Silicon Valley in the U.S. Along with this, Turkey is the 20th largest market for eCommerce in 2020, and has attracted the attention of several American companies. In 2020, the centre joined the Centre for the Fourth Industrial Revolution (C41R) Network. In taking a more global approach, the goal of the center is to research the internet of things (IoT), artificial intelligence (AI), autonomous vehicles, and blockchain technology. Each of these are issues of focus for the U.S. as well.

2022 UTNIF Counterplan
AFF › Deficits/Turns › Russian Deterrence

NATO requires Turkish support to deter Russian efforts in the Black Sea

Tol and Isik 21 (Gönül Tol, professor at George Washington University’s Institute for Middle East Studies; Yörük Isik, geopolitical analyst based in Instanbul; “Turkey-NATO ties are problematic, but there is one bright spot”, Middle East Institute, https://www.mei.edu/publications/turkey-nato-ties-are-problematic-there-one-bright-spot)

When it comes to Turkey-NATO ties, Ankara is regarded as more of a problem than an ally these days. Not only did it purchase a Russian S-400 air defense system, but its gunboat diplomacy in the eastern Mediterranean also raised the specter of military conflict between NATO allies when Greek and Turkish naval flotillas steamed directly toward each other this past summer. There is one region, however, where Turkey can help NATO efforts: the Black Sea.

Since its annexation in 2014, the Crimean Peninsula has become a Russian military fortress. Moscow has significantly increased its military presence in a region that Russian President Vladimir Putin considers the centerpiece of Russia’s power projection into the Mediterranean. It has now enough assets, reinforced with new  and  with powerful Kalibr missile systems, to overwhelm any coalition in these waters. But Moscow wants more. In 2021, the Russian army will receive almost 3,500 pieces of new equipment, and two-thirds of the military budget will go toward purchases of armaments and upgrades. This includes the Ministry of Defense’s latest Strategiya automatic surface surveillance system in the Black Sea.

2022 UTNIF Counterplan
AFF › Deficits/Turns › Russian Deterrence

NATO requires Turkish support to deter Russian efforts in the Black Sea

Tol and Isik 21 (Gönül Tol, professor at George Washington University’s Institute for Middle East Studies; Yörük Isik, geopolitical analyst based in Instanbul; “Turkey-NATO ties are problematic, but there is one bright spot”, Middle East Institute, https://www.mei.edu/publications/turkey-nato-ties-are-problematic-there-one-bright-spot)

When it comes to Turkey-NATO ties, Ankara is regarded as more of a problem than an ally these days. Not only did it purchase a Russian S-400 air defense system, but its gunboat diplomacy in the eastern Mediterranean also raised the specter of military conflict between NATO allies when Greek and Turkish naval flotillas steamed directly toward each other this past summer. There is one region, however, where Turkey can help NATO efforts: the Black Sea.

Since its annexation in 2014, the Crimean Peninsula has become a Russian military fortress. Moscow has significantly increased its military presence in a region that Russian President Vladimir Putin considers the centerpiece of Russia’s power projection into the Mediterranean. It has now enough assets, reinforced with new  and  with powerful Kalibr missile systems, to overwhelm any coalition in these waters. But Moscow wants more. In 2021, the Russian army will receive almost 3,500 pieces of new equipment, and two-thirds of the military budget will go toward purchases of armaments and upgrades. This includes the Ministry of Defense’s latest Strategiya automatic surface surveillance system in the Black Sea.

2022 UTNIF Counterplan
AFF › Deficits/Turns › Russian Deterrence

Turkey can be cooperative and is key to deterring Russia

Jeffrey 22 (James Jeffrey, Former ambassador to Iraq and Turkey, and Special Envoy to the Global Coalition To Defeat ISIS, “The NATO Accession Crisis Risks Final Collapse of the Alliance-Turkey Relationship,” Wilson Center, 6/15/22, )

Turkey’s rejection of NATO accession for Sweden and Finland, beyond undercutting NATO’s response to Russia’s aggression, reflects a deeper rift between the West and Turkey. This is further manifest by Ankara’s recent threat to expand into northern Syria and its overflights of Greek territory. For the sake of the Alliance, immediate responses are vital, but the rift will worsen unless Washington and European capitals work with Ankara to fundamentally shift their relationship. While such a shift has long been advisable given Turkey’s importance, the existential threat of Russian aggression for both Turkey and the Alliance make it urgent. Almost overnight Ankara lashed out against Finland and Sweden, threatening to block their NATO accession if they did not cut real and alleged ties to the PKK. A month ago, Washington hosted Turkish Foreign Minister Melvut Cavusoglu and signaled a new bilateral strategic dialogue. This included possible sales of F-16’s to Ankara, symbolically ending the bitter dispute over a Turkish Russian missile purchase, and Washington’s subsequent cutting Turkey from the F-35 program. Turkey was also following analogous rapprochement with Arab states, Israel, Greece, and Armenia, and now plays a central role in the Ukrainian conflict providing weapons, closing the Straits to Russian naval reinforcements and pressing on various diplomatic exchanges. Then almost overnight Ankara lashed out against Finland and Sweden, threatening to block their NATO accession if they did not cut real and alleged ties to the PKK, and followed up with the aforementioned threats in Syria and escalation in the Aegean. Predictably, American commentators reacted vigorously, even suggesting once again for Turkey to be thrown out of NATO. Shifting attitudes toward Turkey Such dramatic flips in Turkish policy, gelding any predictable diplomacy, have become a hallmark of both Turkish president Erdogan and the convoluted internal political system with his party, dependent on an extremist nationalist partner. Such flips also make efforts to resolve issues such as those above (let alone the underlying rift between Ankara and NATO allies), a high-risk endeavor which most Western leaders avoid, writing Turkey off as a lost cause. But as Ukraine has demonstrated, Turkey is vital to containing Russia, as it has been to NATO’s nuclear deterrence, missile defense against Iran, operations in the Balkans, and Afghanistan. It is just too big, too important, and at times too problematic to ignore. While the Ukraine conflict is now generating strife between Turkey and NATO over Scandinavian accession, it also offers a chance to improve relations between them. That conflict resembles nothing seen since the late 1930s and immediate post-war period, with the very survival of the world order at stake. Winning this conflict, by maintaining Ukraine’s survival as an independent state and deterring new Russian aggression, while avoiding escalation into the unknown, is a categorical imperative not experienced since the Cold War. While this is true of the Alliance as a whole, it is especially relevant for Turkey, a front line state with a long history under Russian pressure. Furthermore, experience shows Turkey can be cooperative. The Bush administration worked well with Turkey on counter-PKK operations, and the Obama administration negotiated a NATO anti- Iranian ballistic missile radar deployment. The 2019 Pence-Erdogan ceasefire in Northeast Syria still holds despite Turkish threats, and the two capitals handled well President Biden’s acknowledgment of Armenian genocide. And, ironically, despite deep geostrategic hostility and recent military clashes, Russia and Turkey maintain productive presidential-level relations, with Putin and especially Erdogan usually following a ‘no-surprises’ principle. The Turks understand that accession of Sweden and Finland to NATO is critically important for a positive Ukraine outcome. The Turks understand that accession of Sweden and Finland to NATO is critically important for a positive Ukraine outcome. They know it would strengthen the West’s long-term against Russian aggression and underline the solidarity of the international front against Moscow, without, as Putin admitted, directly threatening Russia. But what Ankara may not get is that its penchant for dangerous haggling, not only over accession but with its Aegean and northern Syria threats, undercuts that solidarity and the whole Russia containment categorical imperative. Turkey would then be blamed and likely ostracized permanently within NATO. So, the question is, why does it keep running such risks?

2022 UTNIF Counterplan
Block › Solvency – 2NC › AT: Turkey K2 Security Co-op – Solvency – 2NC

5 key crises and a diverging relationship between U.S. and Turkey prove true security cooperation can never be achieved- Turkey is actively breaking relationships with the West

Dalay 21 (Galip Dalay, Research Director, has written multiple pieces on Turkey, NATO, and US relations, specializes on Turkey relations and Middle Eastern affairs,”US-Turkey relations will remain crisis-ridden for a long time to come,” Brookings, 1-29-22, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2021/01/29/us-turkey-relations-will-remain-crisis-ridden-for-a-long-time-to-come/)//nehahahahha

The U.S.-Turkey relationship has a long history of complexities, with no golden era to point to. However, even by these standards, recent years have been exceptionally bad. An accumulated series of crises, a dysfunctional framework for the relationship, and diverging threat perceptions have plagued ties. In particular, five crises that have tested U.S.-Turkey relations in recent years are likely to be on the Biden administration’s agenda: Turkey’s purchase of the Russian-made S-400 missile defense systems and the ensuing U.S. sanctions on Turkey, the Syrian Kurds, the Eastern Mediterranean crisis, the court case against Turkey’s state-owned Halkbank related to U.S. sanctions on Iran, and Biden’s views on Turkey’s democratic regression. Despite this long list of disputes, former President Trump shielded Turkey from many possible punitive actions. In this regard, his departure bodes ill for Ankara. In his confirmation hearing on January 19, Secretary of State Antony Blinken referred to Turkey as our “so-called strategic partner” in response to a question on Turkey’s purchase of the S-400 systems; this is indicative of the new administration’s mood toward Turkey. In the same vein, in almost all public opinion polls in Turkey, the United States tops the list of countries that people perceive to threaten Turkey’s national security. Zooming out, in spite of recent positive messaging from Ankara, the crisis in Turkey’s relations with the broader West are set to worsen. This will be evident in divergent readings of international affairs, Turkey’s quest to reduce dependency on the West, and different ideas of what a “reset” would look like.

2022 UTNIF Counterplan
Block › Solvency – 2NC › AT: Turkey K2 NATO Co-op – Solvency – 2NC

Turkey currently lowers NATO and EU credibility with relations to Russia

Kogan 18 (Eugene Kogan, held research fellowships at Deutsche Gesellschaft fuer Auswaertige Politik, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, the Swedish Defence Research Agency, the Swedish National Defence College, and the Institute of History of the Russian Academy of Sciences. Was a researcher for Harvard. Russian-Turkish Relations and their Impact on NATO and the EU, European Security and Defense. 6-26-18. ) – ED 

The Black Sea region is one of the re- gions in which Turkey has lost its influ- ence to Russia. NATO and the EU have no influence on relations between Rus- sia and Turkey, as the Presidents of both countries either ignore the EU's efforts or, as in the case of Erdogan, despise their at- tempts to appease him. In addition, NATO has no mechanism for excluding Turkey as a member state. Although the EU has implicitly suspended negotiations on Tur- key's possible EU membership, it is not prepared to make a clear statement that Turkey will not join the Union in the fore- seeable future. The leaders of both organ- izations continue to hope that Erdogan will change the authoritarian course of the country and return to a European way and reconsider the comfortable relations with Putin. Erdogan has other plans, and as a result the leaders of NATO and the EU are likely to wait in vain. It must be emphasised that Erdogan was and is not an equal partner in the Turkish– Russian relationship, although both Presi- dent Vladimir Putin and Recep Tayyip Er- dogan have a similarly authoritarian style of government. Erdogan called Putin "my dear friend Vladimir" at a press confer- ence in St. Petersburg on 9 August 2016, shortly after the restoration of bilateral relations, which were damaged by a Turk- ish F-16 fighter plane on 24 November 2015 after the launch of a Russian Su-24 bomber. But Putin did not call Erdogan "my dear friend" Tayyip. There is a saying that Russia has no friends. As the Russian Tsar Alexander III previously said: has only two allies – the army and the navy." And in the 21st century, Russia also has nuclear deterrence and the right of veto in the UN Security Council. It can therefore be said that Putin does not regard Erdogan as a friend, but as an unequal counterpart. In addition, Murat Bilhan, former head of the Turkish Foreign Ministry's Strategic Re- search Centre, said: "Behind Putin's smile, Russia remains a great state and can show its talons whenever it suits him. Turkey could never compete with Russia. Russia is a superpower, while Turkey is a regional power." Turkey should not be under any illusions about its role in relations, namely that of the second fiddle. While Erdogan's authoritarian rule has alienated allies in Europe and the United States, it has strengthened Putin's control over Turkey and embarrassed Erdogan. Pu- tin's economic sanctions against Turkey in November 2015 caused serious damage to the Turkish economy when Russian tour- ists stayed away from Turkey. Putin can im- pose these economic sanctions and travel Russian President Vladimir Putin and Syrian President Bashar al-Assad met with representatives of the Russian Defence Ministry to discuss Russian “counter-terrorism operations” in Syria. On 13 November 2017, Vladimir Putin met with President of Turkey Re- cep Tayyip Erdogan in Sochi to discuss bilateral relations and current issues on the international agenda. 28 European Security & Defence · March 2018 Photo: Kremlin.ru Photo: Kremlin.ru have received unconditional support from Russia. The cost of unconditional support from Russia remains high and has a long- term impact. In addition, the renewed co- operation between Ankara and Moscow is to take place on Russian terms, and Turkey reluctantly accepts this reality." The never-ending story of Erdogan's deci- sion to buy the S-400 air defence system from Russia is an example of Putin's view of Moscow's support for Turkey. Turkey buys a system that is not compatible with NATO standards and cannot be integrated into NATO's air defence system. That is why Turkey must confine itself to its own archi- tecture. Even if Russia is ready to carry out maintenance work, maintenance is carried out by Russian and not by Turkish workers. At the same time, Russia is not prepared to supply software codes, IFF systems, joint production with Turkey and certainly no technology transfer to Turkey. And this de- spite the Turkish side's persistence to gain access to the software codes and the IFF system. In addition, the system cannot be delivered to Turkey before 2020. This is a high price paid by Turkey for unconditional support from Russia. The statement by Ca- SECURITY POLICY  restrictions on Turkey if he feels that Er- dogan is not listening to him. In addition, Putin can impose sanctions at any time and without warning, which he can promise. Therefore, the relationship is one of senior and junior partners, even though Erdogan does not see this reality. But as Atilla Yesi- lada of Global Source Partners, a consul- tancy firm based in Istanbul, said in January 2017: "The Turkish government has com- pletely decoupled itself from reality. This is not the case with Putin, who is playing a tough, well-calculated and manipulative game against Erdogan and at the same time knows how to deal with the volatile Erdogan correctly, compared to the rather timid attitude of Turkey's Western allies." There is no doubt that Turkey did not only push itself into Russian orbit in 2015, but al- ready in 2008, because Turkey was already dependent on 60 percent of gas supplies from Russia at that time. Today, the figure is 55 percent. Turkey has no choice but to rely on Russia's good will, and Turkey pays in hard currency. The idea that Turkey must diversify its gas imports away from Russia and become a gas hub has remained an idea. In 2014, according to Turkey's foreign trade statistics, exports to Russia amount- ed to US$5.9Bn, while imports from Rus- sia amounted to US$25.2Bn. The first six months of 2016 were Turkey's worst export result since 2004, and the most striking as- pect of trade with Russia is that it has been in favour of Russia from the outset. Russia sells more to Turkey than Turkey sells to Russia. Turkey's dependence on Russian gas and oil (10 percent of oil comes from Russia) is a major factor in this imbalance. The current situation is unlikely to change, as Turkey's energy requirements will dou- ble in the next decade. Another factor in this imbalance is the increasing number of Russian tourists in Turkey. In addition to Turkey's dependence on Rus- sian gas and Russian tourists, the Russian- Georgian war in August 2008 sent a clear message to Ankara, namely that Ankara can only increase its influence in its imme- diate neighbourhood, namely in the Black Sea region, by coordinating with Moscow and not with its NATO allies. And that is exactly what has happened since then. Turkey's failed coup d'état on 15 July 2016 has further consolidated relations between Russia and Turkey. In a telephone call with Erdogan on 17 July 2016, Putin stressed the "categorical inadmissibility of anti-consti- tutional acts and violence in state life" and reaffirmed his intention to meet Erdogan in Russia. Putin's reaction was in stark con- trast to that of the Western allies. Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu said on 25 July 2016: "Unlike other countries, we A Russian S-400 Air Defence System on a BAZ trailer chassis On 24 November 2015, a Turkish F-16 fighter aircraft shot down a Rus- sian Su-24 aircraft near the Syrian-Turkish border. The Turkish Air Force claimed that the Russian aircraft violated Turkish airspace. The Russian pilot Capt. Konstantin Murakhtin said on Russian TV there was "no way" the jet could have violated Turkish airspace. Turkey says the pilots were warned 10 times before the plane was shot down. Capt. Murakhtin was rescued from rebel-held territory in Syria in a 12-hour operation involving Russian Special Forces. The incident strained Russian-Turkish relations. March 2018 · European Security & Defence 29 Graphics: Donor Furfur, Wikipedia CC Photo: Vitaly Kuzmin, Wikipedia CC vusoglu that "Ankara can refuse to buy the S-400 if Moscow refuses to stop joint production in Turkey on 9 October 2017" should be taken with a grain of salt. Cavusoglu is not the one who decided to buy the S-400. Cavusoglu's attempt to put the Russians under pressure is not taken seriously by Moscow and the Russians laugh behind Cavusoglu's back. After all, the Turkish cash deposit of around US$100M for the purchase of the S-400 will not be repaid. Finally, General Petr Pavel, Chairman of the Military Committee, said on 25 October 2017: "Although the principle of sovereignty obviously consists in the procurement of defence equipment, as the nations are sovereign in decision-making, they are also sovereign in coping with the consequences of this decision.” It remains to be seen whether Pavel's statement can be interpreted as an explicit warning to Erdogan, but it is obvious that NATO is not satisfied with Erdogan's decision to buy the S-400. The unequal bilateral relations are a major headache for NATO and the EU, as relations between Turkey and its Western allies have deteriorated since the failed coup d'état in Turkey. Let us recall the state of bilateral relations between Germany and Tur- key, and in particular the USA and Turkey, as well as the bitter relations between Austria and The Netherlands and Turkey. It is obvious that relations between Turkey and its Western allies will not change as long as Erdogan remains president. Although Turkey remains an ally of NATO, Turkey has become a difficult ally. Erdogan is fully aware of this fact and will not change his behaviour, making the NATO and EU response difficult. NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg's polite statement that Turk- ish officials told him that "Ankara remains a strong NATO ally" is without substance. Erdogan is acting in bad faith, knowing that Western allies cannot punish Turkey in the present circumstances. On the other hand, Putin behaves like a spectator and enjoys the confusion without moving a finger. As long as NATO does not succeed in including an article on the right of expulsion and penalties for misconduct of a member of NATO in the North Atlantic Treaty, Erdogan will continue to be- have boldly. As long as the EU heads of state and government dis- agree on the fate of Turkey's possible membership and therefore do not take a unanimous decision, Erdogan will treat these heads of state and government with contempt. It is an opportunity for Putin to bind the Turkish Gulliver to the land of the Lilliputians, to continue his policy of changing the military balance in the Black Sea region (with intensive militarisation of the Crimean peninsula) in his favour and to scorn the NATO alliance.NATO and the EU are in an unprofitable position because of consensus and compromise, while Putin and Erdogan continue to behave with impunity, knowing the internal weaknesses of the EU, which is unable to make a final decision on Turkey's EU membership. As long as NATO's language remains vague and ambiguous, Erdogan will not do anything to shake NATO's boat, but will enjoy the protection of NATO and Russia's embrace. Whether the Turkish formula of NATO protection and Russian embrace can also apply to other NATO member states goes beyond the scope of this article. Nevertheless, it can be said that other NATO members are carefully evaluating the Turkish experience. Putin will continue to draw Turkey into its sphere of influence by offering smaller trade, energy and tourism concessions and with the unresolved conflict in Syria, as Erdogan is also in an unprofitable position. The author can only repeat what Bilhan said above: "Behind Putin's smile Russia remains a great state and can show its claws whenever it suits it." And this is something that Erdogan and his government should remember well.

2022 UTNIF Counterplan
Block › Solvency – 2NC › AT: Turkey K2 NATO Co-op – Solvency – 2NC

Turkey is far from aligned with NATO and its allies

Mahmoud 22 (Nervana Mahmoud, British Egyptian regional observer and independent commentator on Middle East affairs, “Turkey and Nato are no longer aligned, even if they won't admit it,” TheNationalNews, 6/30/22, https://www.thenationalnews.com/opinion/comment/turkey-and-nato-are-no-longer-aligned-even-if-they-won-t-admit-it-1.1242583//eo

Following the accession of Turkey to Nato in 1952, the newly elected Turkish leader at the time, Adnan Menderes, expressed his desire for his government to be the western military alliance’s “backbone”. Nearly 70 years later, Turkey has changed fundamentally. Out of the 30 members of Nato, Turkey is one of the oldest, but now the most isolated. The long-awaited meeting between Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and US President Joe Biden at the latest Nato summit this week was, in a nutshell, an anti-climax. Turkey once had unconditional loyalty to Nato, and used its strategic location to prove its importance to the organisation. In 1955, it joined the Baghdad Pact, a Nato-backed regional alliance with Britain, Iraq, Iran and Pakistan, aimed at preventing a Soviet Union infiltration of the Middle East. The next year, Turkey stood by Britain against Egypt during the Suez crisis. Simon Smith, in his book Reassessing Suez 1956, wrote that Menderes's government did not regard the Suez Canal dispute as a bilateral problem between the UK and Egypt, but one that concerned Nato's entire strategy. Menderes argued: "Turkey is convinced that the UK is acting as a guardian of one of the key positions of the free world." Under the leadership of Mr Erdogan, however, Turkey has turned 180 degrees away from its unified accord with its Nato allies. Turkey, like other non-western members of the bygone Baghdad Pact, Iran and Pakistan, has adopted its own version of Islamist nationalism, while demonstrating degrees of suspicion and hostility towards the western world. It is no secret that this year’s Nato summit in Brussels was held against a backdrop of a long list of flashpoints between Turkey and other Nato members, and ambiguous relations with the alliance’s chief competitors, Russia and China. In 2017, Turkey brokered a deal worth billions with Russian President Putin for the S-400 mobile surface-to-air missile system. It forced the administration of then US president Donald Trump, one of the friendliest US administrations towards Erdogan’s Turkey, to impose sanctions on Ankara last year. The thorny dispute continued as Mr Trump’s presidency wound down, and has since forced Mr Biden’s administration to exclude Turkey from the new F35 consortium agreement. Turkey has turned 180 degrees away from its unified accord with its Nato allies In addition to the S-400 and F35 disputes, the US and Turkey disagree on a long list of issues, including US support for Kurdish militias in Syria and the Biden administration’s formal acknowledgment of the Armenian genocide. On the human rights front, the White House issued a strongly worded statement following Turkey’s withdrawal from the Istanbul Convention on preventing domestic violence against women. Moreover, Turkey has had tense relations with Greece, France and Cyprus. Last year, Turkey came close to a naval confrontation with Greece in disputed Eastern Mediterranean waters over Turkey’s gas exploration activities near the Greek island of Kastellorizo. Relations with France are not any better. Last year, the French frigate, the Courbet, tried to stop Turkish arms smuggling to Libya, forcing Nato to investigate the incident. Furthermore, the two countries have been engaged in wars of words – Mr Erdogan called for a boycott of French products after French President Emmanuel Macron firmly upheld the right of cartoonists to depict religious figures. As for Cyprus, Turkey insists on the continued division of the country, contradicting the stances taken by Europe and the US on the issue. As if all the above is not bad enough for its relations with its supposed allies, Turkey raised eyebrows when it pushed Nato members into watering down its official reaction to Belarus’s recent forced landing of a passenger plane in order to detain a dissident journalist. In face of all of those challenging disagreements, Turkey approached this year’s Nato summit with a multifaceted strategy to engage in a charm offensive, defiance, and spin. Ahead of the Brussels meeting, Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu made conciliatory statements to Paris, Athens and Washington. Mr Cavusoglu subsequently visited both Greece and France, and insisted that Turkey and France should maintain stable ties as "allies". In Athens, a cheerful Mr Cavusoglu and his Greek counterpart, Nikos Dendias, agreed to “continue co-operation on a positive agenda to resolve pending bilateral issues”. Furthermore, to prove its importance to Nato, Turkey has offered to run the main airport in Kabul, Afghanistan, despite the Taliban militant group condemning the proposal. Turkey has long-standing naval ties with European powers, but relations have become strained. Reuters At the summit, there were, as expected, no breakthroughs, with none of the big issues poisoning ties between the Nato allies getting resolved. The meeting was not even followed by a published read-out, but Mr Erdogan described it as "fruitful and sincere". That description that may convince his fans at home, but the Turkish lira was not impressed – it fell against the dollar after the talks. Mr Erdogan’s uncompromising stance on the S-400 front will undoubtedly serve as a major obstacle to any joint military co-operation between the US and Turkey in the future. There is a saying that one who rides two horses at once will split asunder. That sums up the current affairs of Mr Erdogan’s Turkey, which rides the horse of Ottoman Islamist revisionism, but still clings to the Nato club and its prestigious advantages. That dualism has dispossessed Turkey of the trust of many fellow Nato members as well as anti-extremist regimes in the Arab world. It is rather ironic that the Mr Erdogan, who claims to consider former Prime Minister Adnan Menderes a hero, has deviated so much from Menderes’s policies. Menderes went out of his way, even supporting a colonial Britain, to cement Turkey firmly within Nato. Mr Erdogan appears to have gone out of his way to set Turkey adrift in the opposite direction. Mr Erdogan’s supporters in Turkey, however, should consider themselves lucky. Analysts and observers who hoped for a firm handling of Turkey’s troubled policies have been disappointed by the outcome of this year’s Nato summit. Calls for cutting the Gordian knot with Turkey are widely vocalised, but Mr Biden, who is trying his best to disengage from the Middle East and focus on his country’s pressing domestic issues, appears to think that doing so would be a drastic move – particularly amid a challenging pandemic and strong appetite in his administration to maintain transatlantic unity. In Brussels, Mr Biden and Mr Erdogan have maintained the veneer of unity, but the door for healing the rifts between Turkey and Nato also seems to be firmly closed. Sooner or later, all of the thorny issues will resurface again. Nonetheless, solving the Turkish conundrum may be postponed until another Nato summit.

Turkey may be kicked out of NATO or not get assistance from NATO

2022 UTNIF Counterplan
Block › Solvency – 2NC › AT: Turkey K2 NATO Co-op – Solvency – 2NC

Turkey is the biggest roadblock to NATO cooperation and advancement

Crowler & Erlanger (Crowley, diplomatic correspondent in the Washington bureau, writer for the NYTimes; Erlanger, chief diplomatic correspondent in Europe for the NYTimes, “For NATO, Turkey Is a Disruptive Ally”, New York Times, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/05/30/us/politics/turkey-nato-russia.html)

Within an alliance that operates by consensus, the Turkish strongman has come to be seen as something of a stickup artist. In 2009, he blocked the appointment of a new NATO chief from Denmark, complaining that the country was too tolerant of cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad and too sympathetic to “Kurdish terrorists” based in Turkey. It took hours of cajoling by Western leaders, and a face-to-face promise from President Barack Obama that NATO would appoint a Turk to a leadership position, to satisfy Mr. Erdogan.

After a rupture in relations between Turkey and Israel the next year, Mr. Erdogan prevented the alliance from working with the Jewish state for six years. A few years later, Mr. Erdogan delayed for months a NATO plan to fortify Eastern European countries against Russia, again citing Kurdish militants and demanding that the alliance declare ones operating in Syria to be terrorists. In 2020, Mr. Erdogan sent a gas-exploration ship backed by fighter jets close to Greek waters, causing France to send ships in support of Greece, also a NATO member. Now the Turkish leader is back in the role of obstructionist, and is once again invoking the Kurds, as he charges that Sweden and Finland sympathize with the Kurdish militants he has made his main enemy. “These countries have almost become guesthouses for terrorist organizations,” he said this month. “It is not possible for us to be in favor.”

2022 UTNIF Counterplan
Block › Solvency – 2NC › Admonishment – NB Solvency – 2NC

NATO needs to create policies that exclude Turkey to ensure that Turkey does not continue gathering support from the West

Ghosh 22 (Bobby Ghosh, Bloomberg columnist covering foreign affairs and previous international editor at Time, “US Should Brace for More Pushback From Erdogan,” The Washington Post, 6/20/22, https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/us-should-brace-for-more-pushback-from-erdogan/2022/06/17/88e89f1e-ee03-11ec-9f90-79df1fb28296_story.html//eo)

President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has kicked off Turkey’s campaign season by confirming that elections will be held next June — and that he will seek to extend his rule into a third decade. “Now, I am saying that I am the candidate of the People’s Alliance,” he told supporters in the Aegean port city of Izmir last week. He was referring to the ruling coalition of his AK Party and the nationalist MHP. Turkey’s allies and rivals, along with Turks themselves, might want to buckle up for 12 months of turbulence. The US and Europe should brace themselves for even more mudslinging and contrariness from Erdogan at a time when they need his cooperation in containing Russian adventurism. Ornery in the best of times, Erdogan has grown even more quarrelsome with the West as he has become politically vulnerable at home. His fortunes are now at their lowest ebb since he first took the reins in Ankara in 2003. He and his party have slipped in opinion polls over the past couple of years, as Turkey’s economy has been hammered by a combination of the pandemic and the president’s economic policies. Although the lira has tanked and inflation has soared, Erdogan has stubbornly resisted calls to raise interest rates. “Turkey is again stuck in a vicious cycle. High inflation causes the lira to weaken, which results in even higher inflation” said Ziad Daoud, chief emerging markets economist at Bloomberg Economics. “Lifting interest rates would break this cycle, but that’s unlikely to happen.” With little prospect of an economic turnaround in time for the vote, the president must find other ways to make his case for re-election. All the early signs are that he will dip into the old populist’s playbook, appealing to ethno-nationalism at home and raising alarms about foreign enemies — real and imagined. Some of his favorite bogeymen are now out of bounds: Turkey’s economic troubles have forced Erdogan to make nice with the Gulf Arab states he used to pillory, to popular acclaim. He can’t very well portray the ruling families of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates as perfidious reactionaries while pleading with them for investment and trade deals. Erdogan has also softened his rhetoric against Israel, thanks in no small part to a friendship he has struck with President Isaac Herzog. This leaves him with one familiar fall guy: the West. He has already begun to ratchet up his rhetoric against the US and Europe. In a carefully choreographed meeting with young Turks last week, he denounced the West as mendacious and untrustworthy. He has lashed out at another old bugbear, demanding that Greece demilitarize islands in the Aegean Sea, adding that he was “not joking.” In the months ahead, expect Erdogan to build on the general themes of Western duplicitousness and to double down on his conspiracy theory that Turkey’s woes are the result of a deliberate campaign by “global barons of politics and money.” Turks groaning under the twin burdens of inflation and currency depreciation will be encouraged to blame the US and the Europe rather than their president. In addition to using progressively more astringent rhetoric, the president will be less cooperative in his dealings with the West. We’re already seeing this in his refusal to budge on NATO expansion: By framing his objection to Sweden and Finland as a matter of national security (he accuses them of harboring Kurdish terrorists) Erdogan is exaggerating the threat as well as portraying his recalcitrance as patriotic resistance in the face of foreign bullying. There is no point in expecting reasonableness from any politician who has their back to the wall, and certainly not from one who has decided intransigence is in his best interest. As frustrating as it will be for President Biden and European leaders, they should recognize where Erdogan is coming from, and act accordingly. Threats won’t work since they will only play into his narrative of heroic defiance. Their best bet might be to signal to him that if Turkey won’t join the consensus, they will devise workarounds. This may require the NATO powers to build a separate security architecture for Sweden and Finland outside the alliance — at least until next summer, when they will either be dealing with a new Turkish president or with a victorious Erdogan who no longer needs them as bogeymen.

2022 UTNIF Counterplan
Block › Solvency – 2NC › Admonishment – NB Solvency – 2NC

US response must take a hardline stance against Turkey taking advantage of their NATO allies

Armbruster 21 (Natalie Armbruster, foreign policy research associate at Defense Priorities focusing on the Middle East and North Africa, “Turkey is Becoming a Problem for NATO—the U.S. Should Pay Attention,” Newsweek, 10/8/21, https://www.newsweek.com/turkey-becoming-problem-nato-us-should-pay-attention-opinion-1636810//eo

Russian President Vladimir Putin and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan recently met in Sochi to discuss military operations in northwestern Syria. While on opposing sides in Syria, before the talks, Erdogan nevertheless described Turkish military cooperation with Russia as "of utmost importance," alluding to what the U.S. already knows: Turkey does not feel constrained by its NATO responsibilities. It will not hesitate to pursue the path most closely aligned with its own interests, no matter where it lies: in the West or Russia. The U.S. can learn something from this shrewd and unashamed realpolitik. In 2019, after years of toeing the line between cozy relations with Russia and the West, Turkey appeared to put the death knell in its NATO credibility, purchasing Russian-made S-400 defense systems, booting Turkey from the F-35 joint strike fighter program. The White House released a statement on the decision claiming that Turkey's purchase rendered "continued involvement with the F-35 impossible" as "the F-35 cannot coexist with a Russian intelligence collection platform." However, officials such as Senator Jim Risch (R-Idaho) were far more candid about the purchase's implications. "This is not some minor dustup with this country," he said. "They've thumbed their nose at us, and they've thumbed their nose at their other NATO allies." The U.S. has sanctioned Turkey and urged Erdogan to reverse the decision. Erdogan doubled down before the Sochi meetings: "It is not possible for us to turn back from the steps we took. ... It is of great importance for us to continue by strengthening Turkey-Russia relations every day." Turkey has chosen its trajectory. The U.S. should adjust its behavior accordingly and stop treating its NATO alliances as sacrosanct when Turkey clearly does not view the relationship similarly. Turkey, despite having the second-largest standing military force in NATO, is inching toward a point where it becomes a possible liability, instead of an asset. While not discounting the points of tension in Syria and Libya, the most glaring flashpoint for possible conflict is Turkey's enduring commitment to the defense of Azerbaijan against Armenia, through training Azerbaijani officers and supplying military equipment. Should a conflict erupt once more, it would be between Turkish-backed Azerbaijan and Russian-backed Armenia, presenting the potential for Turkey to, once again, be at odds with the Russian military and call for NATO aid or assistance. Even among NATO allies themselves, Turkey has fanned the flames of conflict, with Erdogan becoming more and more aggressive in the Mediterranean. In 2020, Turkey disregarded a U.N.-enforced arms embargo around Libya and responded with hostility when confronted by French patrols. Greco-Turkish tensions in the Aegean almost erupted into war in the same year after Greek and Turkish frigates nearly collided over drilling disputes, forcing the U.S. to step in and push for de-escalation and negotiations. Nevertheless, among these hostilities, Turkey has been left relatively unscathed by its NATO allies. As Turkey continues to stoke the fires of ongoing tensions, the U.S. must make clear that it will not fight Erdogan's wars under the obligation of NATO defense if these disputes erupt beyond Erdogan's control. Continued concessions and aid to U.S. partners, for simply being allies, are why American allies like Turkey have abused and taken advantage of these leniencies and strayed away from American interests. Alliances are not meant to be treated as sacred bonds of a covenant. They are formed to recognize parallel interests and commit to jointly serving those interests. NATO was formed to support European nations who wanted to counter the influence and might of Moscow and provide a unified defense against the now dissolved Soviet Union. If these same NATO allies are now flirting with Putin unapologetically, the U.S. should adjust the extent of its obligation to those whose interests lie opposite of American interests. The U.S. should rethink its responsibility of perpetual European defense and stop serving allies like Turkey their cake on a platter so that they can both have it and eat it too.

2022 UTNIF Counterplan
Block › Solvency – 2NC › EU Security Coop – Solvency – 2NC

European Security Cooperation has decreased with Turkey since the Cold War – Turkey is seen as part of the Middle Eastern security architecture rather than NATO’s

Oğuzlu 12 (Tarık Oğuzlu, He is currently a Prof. Dr. in the Department of Political Science and International Relations at Antalya International University. He holds a Ph.D. degree in IR, a Master of Science degree in IR, and another Master of Arts degree in IR taken taken from Bilkent University. He teaches courses on International Relations Theories, International Politics, European Union Foreign, Security and Defense Policies, Turkey’s relations with the European Union, Foreign Policy Analysis and Turkish Foreign Policy. He works on the following subjects: international relations theories, Europeanization of foreign policy, European Union foreign and security policy, transatlantic relations, Turkish foreign policy, Turkey’s relations with EU and NATO/US, Turkey-Greece relations, Cyprus dispute, Turkey and the Middle East. He has academic articles published in such journals as Political Science Quarterly, Washington Quarterly, Middle East Policy, International Journal, Security Dialogue, Middle Eastern Studies, Turkish Studies, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, European Security, International Spectator, Contemporary Security Policy, Mediterranean Politics, Australian Journal of International Affairs, Journal of Balkans and Near Eastern Studies, Insight Turkey and Uluslararası İlişkiler, etc. He is also the head of Center for Social, Economic and Politics Research, “Turkey's Eroding Commitment to NATO: From Identity to Interests,” Turkish Studies, The Washington Quarterly, 7-25-12, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2012.706578)//nehahahahha

NATO currently suffers from a legitimacy crisis in the eyes of the Turks, and in recent years Turkey has ceased to define its membership in NATO through nonnegotiable identity-related lenses. As Alliance members have been at odds with each other about how to define NATO’s purpose moving forward, and as NATO has become a more global and less European organization, Turkish decision-makers are finding it difficult to believe that membership in NATO supports Turkey’s Western European identity anymore. In a radical turnabout, Turkey has embarked on a process to build its relations with NATO on the basis of more pragmatic, and less enduring, common interests and concerns. How long those binding common interests endure, however, remains to be seen. The need for European allies to rely on Turkey’s security cooperation has decreased since the Cold War, while Turkey’s security has simultaneously become increasingly exposed to challenges from the Middle East. Ankara had perceived its security in the context of conventional threats and valued NATO mainly for its Article V commitments (Article V states that an armed attack against one or more NATO members is considered an attack on them all), but European members of the Alliance have tried their best not to get involved in non-European contingencies. The majority of the European allies have continued to focus their attention on intra-European affairs, and prioritized the European Union as the most appropriate organizational platform for dealing with them. Europeans have increasingly considered Turkey as part of the Middle Eastern security architecture.4 Two occasions in the recent past have led Turkish decision-makers to doubt whether European members of the Alliance would continue to see Turkey’s territorial defense as part of their responsibilities. Both took place because of Turkey’s proximity to Iraq. In both 1991 and 2003, Turkey asked NATO to deploy early warning systems and Patriot missiles to its territory to guard against the possibility of any Iraqi attack. Both times, some European members of the Alliance hesitated to respond positively to Turkey’s appeals. Although it is true that those European allies were generally against the possibility of NATO-ization of the 2003 U.S.-led war in Iraq, their resistance to calls to strengthen Turkey’s defense capabilities vis-a`-vis Iraq’s ballistic missiles suggest that they did not recognize Turkey’s security perceptions.