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Shipley 21, senior editor @ Bloomberg responsible for the editorial page (David, “Biden Should Cut the Gordian Knot With Turkey,” Bloomberg,
Turkey has long since abandoned the West. Its president, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, has aligned his country with an axis of powers openly hostile to Western interests: China, Russia and Iran. This is his prerogative as a popular, elected leader. But Erdogan also craves the protection of the West’s military partnerships and membership in its economic associations. He wants Turkey to remain within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization even as he buys weapons systems that undermine the alliance’s security and hurls insults at heads of member states. And he seeks “mutual trust” with the European Union even as he threatens to flood it with millions of migrants. The West should respond by demonstrating that its tolerance for Turkish truculence is at an end. The best forum to do so is NATO, where patience for Erdogan is already wearing thin. The alliance’s first summit since President Joe Biden’s swearing-in takes place next week, and he is scheduled to meet Erdogan on June 14. Erdogan has deployed especially bellicose oratory against the U.S. Such hostility was met with amused tolerance by President Donald Trump, who showed little interest in American leadership. Now that Biden has said he will resume that responsibility, he should make it clear to Erdogan that Turkey can’t have it both ways. Biden has had plenty of opportunities to size Erdogan up over the years, and he has clearly concluded that the Turkish leader is an autocrat. Turkey, he has said, has “got to understand that we’re not going to continue to play with them the way we have.” Turkey is already testing this assertion by ratcheting up the rhetoric. Interior Minister Suleyman Soylu has openly accused the U.S. of ordering a failed 2016 coup attempt against Erdogan, and claimed Europe was enthusiastic in its support. This goes well beyond previous accusations, some aired by Erdogan himself, that the U.S. had sided with the coup plotters. In fact, Biden was vice president at the time of the coup attempt, and flew to Turkey to assure Erdogan of American support. Although Ankara has conducted exhaustive investigations into the events, and arrested thousands of people, it has not provided a shred of evidence that the U.S. or Europe were in any way involved. Yet Erdogan hasn’t thought to correct his minister’s charges, much less chastise him. As for NATO, Turkey has brushed aside its repeated warnings against acquiring Russian missile-defense systems, and is in fact proposing to buy even more. It has ratcheted up disputes with alliance members Greece (over hydrocarbon exploration) and France (over the Libyan civil war). More recently, it used its membership to further Moscow’s agenda by insisting that NATO water down its criticism of Belarus for the forced landing of an airliner and seizure of a dissident on board. NATO’s founding charter doesn’t allow for members to be expelled, but Turkey can be told in various ways that it’s no longer wanted as a member. A good start would be to reduce the alliance’s footprint on Turkish soil, starting with the withdrawal of nuclear weapons and other strategic assets. The group can also coordinate punitive measures against Turkey, including the suspension of arms sales and economic sanctions. The European Union should underline the message by confirming it has no intention of reviving the long-stalled talks over Turkey’s accession. Biden could back NATO with unilateral American measures. His administration has already indicated it may extend sanctions on Turkey’s defense industry and will uphold the country’s suspension from the F-35 fighter program. Secretary of State Antony Blinken has said even tougher penalties would be considered. This would be welcomed by Congress, where a bipartisan consensus on punishing Turkey had been frustrated by Trump’s tendency to cut Erdogan ever more slack. The site where Alexander ran his sword through the Gordian knot is an hour’s drive from modern Ankara. Cutting Turkey loose from the West should be a more straightforward undertaking.
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Sari 19, Aurel Sari, Associate Professor of Public International Law at the University of Exeter, director of the Exeter Centre for International Law, a Fellow of Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, a Fellow of the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps, “Can Turkey be Expelled from NATO? It’s Legally Possible, Whether or Not Politically Prudent”, 10/15/19, //AB
Turkey’s ongoing military action in Syria, Operation Peace Spring, has caused consternation and dismay among its allies. French President warned that the intervention could create an “unbearable humanitarian situation” and demanded that the offensive should cease. In a phone call with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, German Chancellor called for an immediate end to military operations. British Prime Minister and U.S. President Donald Trump expressed their serious concern over Turkey’s action and the risk of a humanitarian catastrophe in the region.
Others have gone further. Writing shortly before Operation Peace Spring commenced, U.S. Senator promised to “introduce bipartisan sanctions against Turkey if they invade Syria” and to “call for their suspension from NATO if they attack Kurdish forces who assisted the U.S. in the destruction of the ISIS Caliphate.” Echoing these sentiments, Representative , Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, suggested that the United States should consider kicking Turkey out of NATO. On Oct 13, U.S. Defense Secretary Mark Esper that he in advance of its incursion that if it were to proceed with the operation, this would “damage U.S. relations with Turkey, their staying in NATO.”
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Block › Competition – 2NC › AT Perm Do CP---“The”
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit 15 (“Gillie v. Law Office of Eric A. Jones, LLC”, No. 14-3836, May 8)
Special counsel do not perform "the duties" of any office. The use of the definite article preceding both "duties" and "office" in the definition in the Dictionary Act, 1 U.S.C.S. § 1, restricts the court's interpretation of that language. The word "the" frequently (but not always) indicates a particular thing. It can also be used to refer to something generically, as may be the case with "the office." By way of example, officers include any person authorized by law to perform the duties of the office in question--which could be the (Ohio) Office of Attorney General or some other public office. However, the word "the" that precedes "duties" has only one sensible construction--that it refers to a specific thing--all duties associated with the office in question. It would be unreasonable to construe "the," in that instance, to mean "a," "some" or "any." It is a fundamental canon of statutory construction that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning. And it is normal usage that, in the absence of contrary indication, governs interpretation of texts.
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Harvey et. al. 19 (Fiona Harvey, award-winning environmental journalist. Jennifer Rankin. Daniel Boffey. European Green Deal will change economy to solve climate crisis, says EU. The Guardian. 12/11/19, ) – ED
Nearly every major aspect of the European economy is to be re-evaluated in light of the imperatives of the climate and ecological emergency, according to sweeping new plans set out by the European commission on Wednesday. The comprehensive nature of the European Green Deal – which encompasses the air we breathe to how food is grown, from how we travel to the buildings we inhabit – was set out in a flurry of documents as Ursula von der Leyen, the new commission president, made her appeal to member states and parliamentarians in Brussels to back the proposals, which would represent the biggest overhaul of policy since the foundation of the modern EU. Von der Leyen said the package was aimed at economic growth and increasing prosperity. “[This] is our new growth strategy, for a growth that gives back more than it takes away,” she said. “It shows how to transform our way of living and working, of producing and consuming, so that we live healthier [lives] and make our businesses innovate. We will help our economy to be a global leader by moving first and moving fast.” Europe must lead on the climate crisis. The European Green Deal shows how Ursula von der Leyen Read more As well as bidding to lead the world on climate action with a proposed target of net-zero carbon by 2050 and halving emissions by 2030, the EU will delve far more deeply into the root problems that contribute to carbon emissions and pollution. For instance, in manufacturing: in previous decades, the EU was content to set targets for recycling rates; under the European Green Deal, regulators would set specific standards on the manufacturing of goods to create a circular economy and phase out unnecessary plastic and other waste before it is created. From 2021, at least 40% of the budget for the common agricultural policy and 30% of fisheries subsidies would be devoted to tackling climate change and reducing greenhouse gas emissions, instead of contributing to higher emissions and environmental degradation, as many of these subsidies do at present. Toxic air and its health impacts would be tackled through tougher air quality requirements, and energy targets would be raised to generate more energy from renewable sources, up to 100% by 2050. More freight would be transported by rail and water, and greenhouse gas emissions from air travel would be reduced. The emissions reduction target for 2030 was proposed at a level of 50-55%, with a new law enshrining the commitment to net zero carbon for 2050. As an inducement to the member states reluctant to sign up to the 2030 and 2050 targets – Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary – Von der Leyen promised€100bn (£84bn) to help finance the transition to a low-carbon economy, along with the potential for a carbon border tax to be levied on imports to the EU from countries without sufficiently stringent carbon targets of their own. Leaders will discuss the emissions goals when they meet in Brussels at a summit on Thursday, but agreement still appears some way off. Failure to agree a second time, following a previous attempt in June, would be a blow to the EU’s standing at the UN climate talks, now reaching their final days in Madrid. One senior EU official said: “One of the elements that the heads of state and government will have to take into account is the pressure outside the room on this. This is climate week, right. So there might be a deal, there might not be a deal.” The commission will also face a difficult task in gaining full backing for the rest of the package among all member states. As well as those concerned about the carbon targets, there are the powerful agricultural and fishing lobbies in several states with concerns over reforms to the subsidy regime, and industries such as car manufacturing and chemicals that will face new regulations In one indication of the troubles yet to come, the UK on Wednesday joined the Czech Republic and France in blocking a deal on a set of rules governing which financial products can be labelled “green” and “sustainable”. France was concerned that its nuclear industry would lose out from the “taxonomy for sustainable finance”. Negotiations among member states and the European parliament on the green financing proposals are expected to resume on Monday. EU's soaring climate rhetoric not always matched by action Green campaigners welcomed the aims of the European Green Deal but called for more detail and higher ambition, including a strengthening of the emissions target to a 65% cut by 2030. Franziska Achterberg, EU spokesperson for Greenpeace, said: “The climate targets [the commission is] proposing would be too little too late. On protecting nature, much is aspirational and needs to be fleshed out. The detailed measures that will follow must tackle the production and consumption patterns that have brought us to the brink.” Some campaigners at the UN climate talks in Madrid also called for the EU to bring forward its international proposals faster, to give more momentum to the push for tougher carbon targets under the Paris agreement. Under the commission’s proposals, the plans could not be formally adopted until next summer, giving only a few months before the crunch 2020 climate conference in Glasgow. Wendel Trio of the Climate Action Network said: “Timing is everything. Now EU member states have a big responsibility to agree on a much higher 2030 climate target at the European Council in June 2020.” “The proposed package is comprehensive, identifying the right areas for action – from biodiversity and nature restoration to climate change and stopping deforestation,” said Ester Asin, director of the European policy office at WWF. “However, by emphasising continued economic growth as a key objective, the commission has missed an opportunity to challenge the traditional growth paradigm in favour of an approach that would respect planetary boundaries.”
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Veebel and Ploom 18 (Vijar Veebel, Baltic Defense College. Illimar Ploom, Estonian National Defense College. The Deterrence Credibility of NATO and the Readiness of the Baltic States to Employ the Deterrence Instruments, Sciendo, December 2018, Pg. 199-200 ) – ED
Last but not least, the Alliance could also make some significant efforts to increase the credibility of its strategy of deterrence. For example, it is obvious that Russia is not underestimating the role of explicit strategic communication in determining the outcome of the conflict. The tactic of the Kremlin is to mobilize people using emotional arguments (more or less “we are under attack and everybody wants to destroy us”). The same approach would most likely not work in the case of the Alliance, because NATO is highly unlikely to be able and willing to emotionally mobilise and oppose itself to Russia. This is due to the differences among the NATO member states in the way they see Rus- sia’s ambitions and actions in the current security environment. An alternative option for NATO to increase the credibility of its political statements – which would also mean an increase to the credibility of the Alliance’s deterrence stra- tegy – would be to rely on rational arguments whereby it explains, in a simple manner, why it would be easier and cheaper for NATO to defend the Baltic countries in comparison to what it would take to liberate them.
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Kogan 18 (Eugene Kogan, held research fellowships at Deutsche Gesellschaft fuer Auswaertige Politik, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, the Swedish Defence Research Agency, the Swedish National Defence College, and the Institute of History of the Russian Academy of Sciences. Was a researcher for Harvard. Russian-Turkish Relations and their Impact on NATO and the EU, European Security and Defense. 6-26-18. http://gpf-europe.com/upload/esd_02-2018-2-30-32_kogan.pdf) – ED
The Black Sea region is one of the re- gions in which Turkey has lost its influ- ence to Russia. NATO and the EU have no influence on relations between Rus- sia and Turkey, as the Presidents of both countries either ignore the EU's efforts or, as in the case of Erdogan, despise their at- tempts to appease him. In addition, NATO has no mechanism for excluding Turkey as a member state. Although the EU has implicitly suspended negotiations on Tur- key's possible EU membership, it is not prepared to make a clear statement that Turkey will not join the Union in the fore- seeable future. The leaders of both organ- izations continue to hope that Erdogan will change the authoritarian course of the country and return to a European way and reconsider the comfortable relations with Putin. Erdogan has other plans, and as a result the leaders of NATO and the EU are likely to wait in vain. It must be emphasised that Erdogan was and is not an equal partner in the Turkish– Russian relationship, although both Presi- dent Vladimir Putin and Recep Tayyip Er- dogan have a similarly authoritarian style of government. Erdogan called Putin "my dear friend Vladimir" at a press confer- ence in St. Petersburg on 9 August 2016, shortly after the restoration of bilateral relations, which were damaged by a Turk- ish F-16 fighter plane on 24 November 2015 after the launch of a Russian Su-24 bomber. But Putin did not call Erdogan "my dear friend" Tayyip. There is a saying that Russia has no friends. As the Russian Tsar Alexander III previously said: has only two allies – the army and the navy." And in the 21st century, Russia also has nuclear deterrence and the right of veto in the UN Security Council. It can therefore be said that Putin does not regard Erdogan as a friend, but as an unequal counterpart. In addition, Murat Bilhan, former head of the Turkish Foreign Ministry's Strategic Re- search Centre, said: "Behind Putin's smile, Russia remains a great state and can show its talons whenever it suits him. Turkey could never compete with Russia. Russia is a superpower, while Turkey is a regional power." Turkey should not be under any illusions about its role in relations, namely that of the second fiddle. While Erdogan's authoritarian rule has alienated allies in Europe and the United States, it has strengthened Putin's control over Turkey and embarrassed Erdogan. Pu- tin's economic sanctions against Turkey in November 2015 caused serious damage to the Turkish economy when Russian tour- ists stayed away from Turkey. Putin can im- pose these economic sanctions and travel Russian President Vladimir Putin and Syrian President Bashar al-Assad met with representatives of the Russian Defence Ministry to discuss Russian “counter-terrorism operations” in Syria. On 13 November 2017, Vladimir Putin met with President of Turkey Re- cep Tayyip Erdogan in Sochi to discuss bilateral relations and current issues on the international agenda. 28 European Security & Defence · March 2018 Photo: Kremlin.ru Photo: Kremlin.ru have received unconditional support from Russia. The cost of unconditional support from Russia remains high and has a long- term impact. In addition, the renewed co- operation between Ankara and Moscow is to take place on Russian terms, and Turkey reluctantly accepts this reality." The never-ending story of Erdogan's deci- sion to buy the S-400 air defence system from Russia is an example of Putin's view of Moscow's support for Turkey. Turkey buys a system that is not compatible with NATO standards and cannot be integrated into NATO's air defence system. That is why Turkey must confine itself to its own archi- tecture. Even if Russia is ready to carry out maintenance work, maintenance is carried out by Russian and not by Turkish workers. At the same time, Russia is not prepared to supply software codes, IFF systems, joint production with Turkey and certainly no technology transfer to Turkey. And this de- spite the Turkish side's persistence to gain access to the software codes and the IFF system. In addition, the system cannot be delivered to Turkey before 2020. This is a high price paid by Turkey for unconditional support from Russia. The statement by Ca- SECURITY POLICY restrictions on Turkey if he feels that Er- dogan is not listening to him. In addition, Putin can impose sanctions at any time and without warning, which he can promise. Therefore, the relationship is one of senior and junior partners, even though Erdogan does not see this reality. But as Atilla Yesi- lada of Global Source Partners, a consul- tancy firm based in Istanbul, said in January 2017: "The Turkish government has com- pletely decoupled itself from reality. This is not the case with Putin, who is playing a tough, well-calculated and manipulative game against Erdogan and at the same time knows how to deal with the volatile Erdogan correctly, compared to the rather timid attitude of Turkey's Western allies." There is no doubt that Turkey did not only push itself into Russian orbit in 2015, but al- ready in 2008, because Turkey was already dependent on 60 percent of gas supplies from Russia at that time. Today, the figure is 55 percent. Turkey has no choice but to rely on Russia's good will, and Turkey pays in hard currency. The idea that Turkey must diversify its gas imports away from Russia and become a gas hub has remained an idea. In 2014, according to Turkey's foreign trade statistics, exports to Russia amount- ed to US$5.9Bn, while imports from Rus- sia amounted to US$25.2Bn. The first six months of 2016 were Turkey's worst export result since 2004, and the most striking as- pect of trade with Russia is that it has been in favour of Russia from the outset. Russia sells more to Turkey than Turkey sells to Russia. Turkey's dependence on Russian gas and oil (10 percent of oil comes from Russia) is a major factor in this imbalance. The current situation is unlikely to change, as Turkey's energy requirements will dou- ble in the next decade. Another factor in this imbalance is the increasing number of Russian tourists in Turkey. In addition to Turkey's dependence on Rus- sian gas and Russian tourists, the Russian- Georgian war in August 2008 sent a clear message to Ankara, namely that Ankara can only increase its influence in its imme- diate neighbourhood, namely in the Black Sea region, by coordinating with Moscow and not with its NATO allies. And that is exactly what has happened since then. Turkey's failed coup d'état on 15 July 2016 has further consolidated relations between Russia and Turkey. In a telephone call with Erdogan on 17 July 2016, Putin stressed the "categorical inadmissibility of anti-consti- tutional acts and violence in state life" and reaffirmed his intention to meet Erdogan in Russia. Putin's reaction was in stark con- trast to that of the Western allies. Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu said on 25 July 2016: "Unlike other countries, we A Russian S-400 Air Defence System on a BAZ trailer chassis On 24 November 2015, a Turkish F-16 fighter aircraft shot down a Rus- sian Su-24 aircraft near the Syrian-Turkish border. The Turkish Air Force claimed that the Russian aircraft violated Turkish airspace. The Russian pilot Capt. Konstantin Murakhtin said on Russian TV there was "no way" the jet could have violated Turkish airspace. Turkey says the pilots were warned 10 times before the plane was shot down. Capt. Murakhtin was rescued from rebel-held territory in Syria in a 12-hour operation involving Russian Special Forces. The incident strained Russian-Turkish relations. March 2018 · European Security & Defence 29 Graphics: Donor Furfur, Wikipedia CC Photo: Vitaly Kuzmin, Wikipedia CC vusoglu that "Ankara can refuse to buy the S-400 if Moscow refuses to stop joint production in Turkey on 9 October 2017" should be taken with a grain of salt. Cavusoglu is not the one who decided to buy the S-400. Cavusoglu's attempt to put the Russians under pressure is not taken seriously by Moscow and the Russians laugh behind Cavusoglu's back. After all, the Turkish cash deposit of around US$100M for the purchase of the S-400 will not be repaid. Finally, General Petr Pavel, Chairman of the Military Committee, said on 25 October 2017: "Although the principle of sovereignty obviously consists in the procurement of defence equipment, as the nations are sovereign in decision-making, they are also sovereign in coping with the consequences of this decision.” It remains to be seen whether Pavel's statement can be interpreted as an explicit warning to Erdogan, but it is obvious that NATO is not satisfied with Erdogan's decision to buy the S-400. The unequal bilateral relations are a major headache for NATO and the EU, as relations between Turkey and its Western allies have deteriorated since the failed coup d'état in Turkey. Let us recall the state of bilateral relations between Germany and Tur- key, and in particular the USA and Turkey, as well as the bitter relations between Austria and The Netherlands and Turkey. It is obvious that relations between Turkey and its Western allies will not change as long as Erdogan remains president. Although Turkey remains an ally of NATO, Turkey has become a difficult ally. Erdogan is fully aware of this fact and will not change his behaviour, making the NATO and EU response difficult. NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg's polite statement that Turk- ish officials told him that "Ankara remains a strong NATO ally" is without substance. Erdogan is acting in bad faith, knowing that Western allies cannot punish Turkey in the present circumstances. On the other hand, Putin behaves like a spectator and enjoys the confusion without moving a finger. As long as NATO does not succeed in including an article on the right of expulsion and penalties for misconduct of a member of NATO in the North Atlantic Treaty, Erdogan will continue to be- have boldly. As long as the EU heads of state and government dis- agree on the fate of Turkey's possible membership and therefore do not take a unanimous decision, Erdogan will treat these heads of state and government with contempt. It is an opportunity for Putin to bind the Turkish Gulliver to the land of the Lilliputians, to continue his policy of changing the military balance in the Black Sea region (with intensive militarisation of the Crimean peninsula) in his favour and to scorn the NATO alliance.NATO and the EU are in an unprofitable position because of consensus and compromise, while Putin and Erdogan continue to behave with impunity, knowing the internal weaknesses of the EU, which is unable to make a final decision on Turkey's EU membership. As long as NATO's language remains vague and ambiguous, Erdogan will not do anything to shake NATO's boat, but will enjoy the protection of NATO and Russia's embrace. Whether the Turkish formula of NATO protection and Russian embrace can also apply to other NATO member states goes beyond the scope of this article. Nevertheless, it can be said that other NATO members are carefully evaluating the Turkish experience. Putin will continue to draw Turkey into its sphere of influence by offering smaller trade, energy and tourism concessions and with the unresolved conflict in Syria, as Erdogan is also in an unprofitable position. The author can only repeat what Bilhan said above: "Behind Putin's smile Russia remains a great state and can show its claws whenever it suits it." And this is something that Erdogan and his government should remember well.
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Kardaş 19 (Şaban Kardaş, Professor of International Relations at TOBB University of Economics and Techology. Uncertainty, Power, and Rethinking Turkish-U.S. Relations after S-400 Debacle, German Marshall Fund of the United States, 2019, Pg. 1-5 ) – ED
Turkey’s determination to move ahead with the procurement of the Russian S-400 missile-defense system at the risk of sanctions by the United States has revived the debate on the future of its relations with its long-term ally. There has been a flourishing array of views on how things got to this point and where they might be heading. While much responsibility is put on Turkey’s unyielding strategic choices, the United States is also complicit for its inability to handle the relationship. Moving beyond the blame game, Nicholas Danforth identifies two broad narratives to explain Turkish conduct: “frustration” with an insensitive ally and “fear” from the threatening actions of an adversarial power. These two narratives correlate with the levels-of- analysis framework academics use to explain state behavior. In it, different factors at the individual, state, or systemic levels account for why states act the way they do, including forming alliances. Danforth’s “frustration” narrative is grounded in a state or systemic level of analysis, whereas the “fear” one relates mainly to the individual level of analysis. Until the recent delivery of components of the Russian weapons platform in Turkey, system- and state-level analyses prevailed in evaluations of the unfolding crisis. Many in Turkey and abroad had assumed that by opening new channels of communication the United States would convince, if not pressure, Turkish decision-makers to make a last-minute deal and change course. In addition to various mutual visits by official delegations, for instance, Senator Lindsay Graham and other lawmakers met President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan to discuss issues affecting the Turkish-U.S. relationship. But this did not suffice to affect the outcome. President Erdoğan, having emphasized on many occasions his promises to his Russian counterpart, showed his strong conviction to go ahead with a “done deal” despite pressure to change course. Moreover, he stressed his unease with Turkey’s Western partners especially after failed coup attempt of 2016. In that respect, taking delivery of the S-400s turned out to be a counterintuitive move by Turkey, reflecting how individual-level considerations can shape state behavior and override systemic imperatives. Perhaps what enabled the individual-level—or “fear”— factor to carry the day in Turkish decision-making is its coalescence with the system-level—or “frustration”— factor. Systemic transformations weakened the fundamentals of the Turkish-U.S. alliance and created an environment within which a new thinking came to dominate Turkey’s external conduct. Since the structural causes of divergence were already there, it is no surprise to see the “frustration” argument being widely embraced in Turkey to justify the S-400 decision. What is striking, however, is that it is not only adopted by the bureaucracy at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and by moderate commentators, as suggested by Danforth, but also by the major opposition parties. For instance, the leader of the main opposition Republican People’s Party, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, reacted to the pressure by the U.S. Congress on President Donald Trump to impose sanctions by arguing that the risks posed by Turkey’s geography justified the S-400 purchase. What Went Wrong? The root causes of the divergence between Turkey and the United States long predate the S-400 saga. They foreshadowed the fracturing of the relationship throughout the Syrian crisis, which many analysts mistakenly treated as the main trigger for the strategic decoupling by the two allies. At least for a decade now, the Turkish-U.S. relationship has required a proper redefinition, if not a new guiding framework. There was no scarcity of calls for this to happen either. For example, I argued in 2010 that “It might be time for the United States to abandon the search for redefining the relationship [with Turkey] on ‘partnership’ models.” The sea change in the relationship is the product of various factors. Harboring a regionally driven understanding of international relations in the post- Cold War era, Turkey has opted to base its external conduct on the quest for strategic autonomy. Likewise, a desire to adjust to global power transitions has lurked in the background. In its strategic thinking, especially with the AK Party at the helm, Turkey already lives in a world of multipolarity and seeks flexibility when it comes to alliance choices. Moreover, a deliberate attempt to challenge the power asymmetry inherent in the relationship with the United States shapes the worldview of Turkey’s current leadership. Consequently, every foreign policy issue has been framed as yet another battleground for correcting the “unequal” and “unfair” treatment by the United States and for breaking the dependence on Turkey’s senior partner. Furthermore, the cycle of insecurity following the Arab Spring of 2011 overwhelmed Turkey’s strategic thinking to such an extent that concerns for state and regime survival came to the forefront. The fragmentation of states and collapse of central authority in the region posed direct challenges to Turkey, and a concern to prevent spillover effects came to dominate its thinking. Last but not the least, the reconfiguration of Turkey’s domestic political scene—in terms of governance model and body politic—under the pressures of the post-Arab Spring regional turmoil brought about a new political culture, altering the normative fabric and personal dimensions of the relationship with the United States. In particular, the redesign of the domestic political system into a presidential one and the reconfiguration of the governing bloc with the alliance between the AK Party and the Nationalist Action Party to cater to the needs of the ruling elite precipitated a search for new external allies and weakened the traditional domestic pillars and constituencies of the alliance with the United States. Uncertainty, Leadership, and Alliances in a Post-U.S. World Largely ignored in the debate in the United States on “who lost Turkey” is the question of how the S-400 crisis relates to the wider debate on the role of “ What allies such as Turkey see is a deep structural uncertainty about the grand strategy of the United States and its inability to make credible commitments. alliances in today’s international system. What has been fundamentally altered in the post-Cold War era is not just the foundations of the Turkish-U.S. relationship, but the very meaning and mechanics of alliance behavior. Amid the endless arguments about retrenchment, rebalancing, offshore balancing, the decline of U.S. primacy, liberal internationalism, and patriotism, what U.S. allies such as Turkey see is a deep structural uncertainty about the grand strategy of the United States and its inability to make credible commitments. It is no secret that the United States had no easy ride in building or maintaining alliances in the unipolar era. Likewise, it has been far from perfect in exercising constructive and cooperative leadership that satisfies the needs of its allies. These two problems have been aggravated as the United States had to find ingenious ways to deal with allies that are less willing to abide a top-down partnership model. Perhaps equally problematic has been Washington’s handling of adversaries. It has failed to exercise its power to change the behavior of these through a mix of rewards or punishment. As has been demonstrated repeatedly, U.S. power has not automatically yielded the outcomes desired. For example, the inability of the United States to counter Russia’s assertiveness since the war in Georgia in 2008, despite threats and sanctions, and to build a coalition to contain it has been noted by its allies and adversaries alike. Reacting to U.S Power There have been at least two distinct reactions by second-tier powers like Turkey to the travails of U.S. preponderance. First, uncertainty has bred frustration as many still expect the United States to exercise leadership of some sort. Its failure to offer a shared vision to allies, let alone signaling its strategic priorities in a post-U.S. world, forces many of them to look for ways to guard their interests through unilateral action or strategies of hedging. Second, many countries still view the United States as too powerful despite the erosion of unipolarity. At least since the 2003 Iraq War, scholars like Stephen Walt have warned about the potential dangers involved in untamed exercise of U.S. power. Since then the United States’ allies and adversaries alike have engaged in acts of “soft balancing”—that is, actions “that use nonmilitary tools to delay, frustrate, and undermine aggressive unilateral U.S. military policies”. The accumulation of such practices arguably precipitates counterbalancing behavior on the part of second-tier powers, including building alliances with like-minded countries. Turkey’s S-400 decision has elements of both factors, which is nicely captured in the “fear and frustration” analogy. Its developing strategic relationship with Russia serves as a hedge against “the United States as an unreliable ally” and as a counterbalancing tool against “the United States as a threatening adversary.” It further illustrates how alignment behavior is driven by leaders’ attributes, including their worldviews and survival calculations as much as national strategic considerations. Turkey’s decision to forge closer ties with Russia cannot be fully explained without taking into account how perceptions of threat at the individual level can come to dominate decision- making. As for the United States, it has watched—if not allowed—the sea change in Turkey happen without undertaking preemptive steps to address the root causes of the flourishing Turkish-Russian relationship. Instead, in Washington’s lexicon, Turkey has gone from being an “intrinsically strategically important ally” to “too strategically important to be lost to the other side.” But even the latter view, which has kept many frictions from escalating, no longer holds as Turkey increasingly has become the subject of punitive language and sanctions. The country’s slide further toward the status of “dispensable ally” raises intriguing questions. Going beyond the political turmoil surrounding the Trump administration in Washington, there probably is a systemic logic behind the ease with which the United States has downgraded Turkey’s status. It may be part of a deliberate policy of rebalancing global U.S. commitments, rather than the mishandling of the relationship. The Way Forward There seems to be a deep belief in Turkey that the onus of mending ties lies with the United States. Just as the country’s leadership has insistently advocated in the S-400 crisis, it expects the United States to understand Turkey’s concerns and to act accordingly. In moving beyond the crisis, the thinking in Ankara will continue to challenge the inequality inherent in the very nature of the transatlantic alliance and remain bent on reconfiguring the relationship on a new notion of alliance. It is far from certain, however, the United States is ready to revise its cognitive map to accommodate Turkish concerns in a new structured partnership model. As I have argued before, this would “connote long-term commitments and cooperative behavior on the part of Turkey that might prove impossible to sustain. Instead, both parties might consider letting the relationship evolve on an ad hoc basis involving The United States has to find ways to address the structural uncertainty about its grand strategy, which, if unattended, may breed more distrust in Turkey. different degrees of cooperation and competition as interests overlap or diverge.” Moreover, at this stage, the problem may not lie so much in the lack of dialogue as much as in the incompatibility of strategic visions. Perhaps it would be better for both countries to brace themselves for a continued volatile period in their relations. Nonetheless, the United States still has to find ways to address the structural uncertainty about its grand strategy, which, if unattended, may breed more distrust in Turkey. It has to continue looking for ways to exercise its power more judiciously, as this remains a major prism for how others define their relations with it. Otherwise, the United States risks not only the decades-old alliance relationship with Turkey but also alliance solidarity in NATO.
2022
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Counterplan
1NC › Kickout NB – 1NC › Entrapment – ! – Kickout – 1NC
Saleh 20- Researcher, Political analyst , US foreign policy , Syria conflict, Kurds affairs and the Middle East issues.(John Saleh, “Turkey’s Authoritarian Policy on NATO Principles,” Modern Diplomacy, July 22 2020, https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2020/07/22/turkeys-authoritarian-policy-on-nato-principles/)//mcu
Protecting Europe from any further expansion of the Soviet Union’s sphere of influence and interference was the main argument for expanding NATO membership, to include Turkey in 1952. Turkey, in turn, sought to be part of the European club and approached the West. That is why the US military presence in Turkey with conventional and nuclear forces was against the Soviet threat as well as against the potential effects of instability and conflicts in the Middle East. Where the strategic interests of the allies always dominate relations between Turkey and NATO, during and after the Cold War. That is why Turkey was under the protection of NATO and its supply of advanced weapons. Turkey is an important member of NATO because of its strategic location between East and West, and its control of the Bosporus and Dardanelles to prevent Russia from reaching the Mediterranean Sea. Also hosting the Turkish Incirlik base for the American forces and the Patriot missiles, Turkey’s contribution to NATO with its soldiers in Kosovo and Afghanistan and supporting NATO’s military and financial tasks. That is why Erdogan takes advantage of all this to use him in his despotic policies and practices that are angering NATO countries and increasing their division. The preamble to the 1949 NATO Treaty states that NATO members are “determined to protect the freedom, shared heritage, and civilization of their people, based on the principles of democracy, individual freedom, and the rule of law.” That is why the member states of NATO are very concerned about the changes taking place in Turkey, but nonetheless NATO seeks to preserve the relationship with Turkey and not leave the alliance. This policy towards Turkey tarnishes the alliance’s image and mission, weakens democracy and the rule of law, and further weakens the alliance. It contributes to encouraging Erdogan to escalate his influence by supporting extremist Islamic movements, ISIS, Al-Qaeda and Al-Nusra Movement, and thus the terrorism industry in the Middle East, and its export to Europe. So, they should deal Turkey practices as a “frenemy” and adopt the term that has been applied to Pakistan. As a result, if NATO remains silent toward Erdogan’s authoritarian policies, which are hostile to liberal and democratic values, and his cooperation with Iran and Russia, we will find NATO implicated and responsible for Turkey’s crimes, where war crimes inside Syria and ethnic cleansing of the Kurds, as well as its interference in Libya. This will send NATO into wars to defend a member of the alliance. This will bring disaster, instability and the possibility of Iran and Russia affecting NATO’s security and military affairs through their relations and strategic cooperation with Turkey.
2022
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Counterplan
1NC › Kickout NB – 1NC › Kickout – L – 1NC
Sari 19 (Dr. Aurel Sari, an Associate Professor of Public International Law at the University of Exeter and the Director of the Exeter Centre for International Law, “Can Turkey be Expelled from NATO? It’s Legally Possible, Whether or Not Politically Prudent,” Just Security, October 15, 2019, , WC)
These passages confirm that maintaining and furthering the principles on which the Alliance is based — democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law — forms part of the object and purpose of the North Atlantic Treaty. This, in turn, suggests that a failure to comply with these principles may amount to a material breach of the treaty within the meaning of Article 60 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Pursuant to Article 60, a material breach consists of:
(a) a repudiation of the treaty not sanctioned by the present Convention; or
2022
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Counterplan
1NC › Top-level (Must-read)– 1NC › Turkey PIC – 1NC
Hamilton 22, Daniel S. Hamilton, Co-leads the Johns Hopkins University SAIS postdoctoral program on “The United States, Europe, and World Order,” President of the Transatlantic Leadership Network, Senior Fellow at the SAIS Foreign Policy Institute, Founding Director of the SAIS Center for Transatlantic Relations, served as Executive Director of the American Consortium for EU Studies, Director of the Atlantic Basin Initiative, served as Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs, served as U.S. Special Coordinator for Southeast European Stabilization, served as Director for Policy in the Bureau of European Affairs and Senior Policy Advisor to the U.S. Ambassador and U.S. Embassy in Germany, “Promoting U.S.-EU Coordination and Cooperation on Technology Standards: Recommendations for Action”, 2022, AB
International technical standards define the technological frontier. Those who determine the standards are those who shape the competition. Technical standard-setting in critical and emerging technologies also have direct bearing on key U.S. and EU foreign policy goals, such as the protection of human rights and democracy, and on their foreign economic and trade policies.2 In the past, the United States and Europe have largely been the world’s standard-makers. However, in a new world of disruptive innovation and diffuse power, they could quickly become standard-takers – unless they can leverage their mutual strengths to set the global regulatory framework for the standards of the future. In this context, the U.S.-EU Trade and Technology Council (TTC) takes on strategic importance.
Global technical standards are established in various ways. A de facto standard can be developed by a first- mover company and then accepted more broadly. Size also matters; users tend to flock to the biggest providers and use the standards they create.3 Formal standards are adopted through industrial consortia and global standard development organizations (SDOs), such as the International Organization for Standardization (ISO), the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC), and the International Telecommunications Union (ITU). Once standards are locked-in, they tend to remain rather durable, since changing them can be very costly.4
2022
UTNIF
Negative
Disease Neg – UTNIF › Solvency › Multilat Fails
Naim ‘9 (Moises; 6/21/09; Distinguished Fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; “MISSING LINKS Minilateralism The magic number to get real international action,” accessed 6/26/16, http://foreignpolicy.com/2009/06/21/minilateralism/)
Never say never. Because of the global economic crisis, habits that seemed unalterable are suddenly being altered. Americans are now saving more and consuming less. Financial institutions are no longer betting the house on risky investments they do not understand. Wealthy oil-exporting countries are tightening their belts. At least some emerging markets long prone to financial accidents are behaving with uncharacteristic prudence. Everywhere, change is in the air. Everywhere, that is, except in the way humanity responds to its most menacing threats. You know the list: climate change, nuclear proliferation, terrorism, pandemics, trade protectionism, and more. Not one can be solved, or even effectively contained, without more successful international collaboration. And that is not happening. When was the last time you heard that a large number of countries agreed to a major international accord on a pressing issue? Not in more than a decade. The last successful multilateral trade agreement dates back to 1994, when 123 countries gathered to negotiate the creation of the World Trade Organization and agreed on a new set of rules for international trade. Since then, all other attempts to reach a global trade deal have crashed. The same is true with multilateral efforts to curb nuclear proliferation; the last significant international nonproliferation agreement was in 1995, when 185 countries agreed to extend an existing nonproliferation treaty. In the decade and a half since, multilateral initiatives have not only failed, but India, Pakistan, and North Korea have demonstrated their certain status as nuclear powers. On the environment, the Kyoto Protocol, a global deal aimed at reducing greenhouse gas emissions, has been ratified by 184 countries since it was adopted in 1997, but the United States, the world’s second-largest air polluter after China, has not done so, and many of the signatories have missed their targets. The most recent multilateral initiative successfully endorsed by a large number of countries was in 2000, when 192 nations signed the United Nations Millennium Declaration, an ambitious set of eight goals ranging from halving the world’s extreme poverty to halting the spread of HIV/AIDS and providing universal primary education—all by 2015. Although some progress toward achieving these goals has been made—mostly thanks to Asia’s spectacular economic performance—the failure of rich countries to fully fund these efforts, execution problems in poor countries, and the global economic downturn make the achievement of the goals by 2015 unlikely. The pattern is clear: Since the early 1990s, the need for effective multicountry collaboration has soared, but at the same time multilateral talks have inevitably failed; deadlines have been missed; financial commitments and promises have not been honored; execution has stalled; and international collective action has fallen far short of what was offered and, more importantly, needed. These failures represent not only the perpetual lack of international consensus, but also a flawed obsession with multilateralism as the panacea for all the world’s ills. So what is to be done? To start, let’s forget about trying to get the planet’s nearly 200 countries to agree. We need to abandon that fool’s errand in favor of a new idea: minilateralism. By minilateralism, I mean a smarter, more targeted approach: We should bring to the table the smallest possible number of countries needed to have the largest possible impact on solving a particular problem. Think of this as minilateralism’s magic number. The magic number, of course, will vary greatly depending on the problem. Take trade, for example. The Group of Twenty (G-20), which includes both rich and poor countries from six continents, accounts for 85 percent of the world’s economy. The members of the G-20 could reach a major trade deal among themselves and make it of even greater significance by allowing any other country to join if it wishes to do so. Presumably, many would. Same with climate change. There, too, the magic number is about 20: The world’s 20 top polluters account for 75 percent of the planet’s greenhouse gas emissions. The number for nuclear proliferation is 21—enough to include both recognized and de facto nuclear countries, and several other powers who care about them. African poverty? About a dozen, including all the major donor countries and the sub-Saharan countries most in need. As for HIV/AIDS, 19 countries account for nearly two thirds of the world’s AIDS-related deaths. Of course, countries not invited to the table will denounce this approach as undemocratic and exclusionary. But the magic number will break the world’s untenable gridlock, and agreements reached by the small number of countries whose actions are needed to generate real solutions can provide the foundation on which more-inclusive deals can be subsequently built. Minilateral deals can and should be open to any other country willing to play by the rules agreed upon by the original group. The defects of minilateralism pale in comparison with the stalemate that characterizes 21st-century multilateralism. It has become far too dangerous to continue to rely on large-scale multilateral negotiations that stopped yielding results almost two decades ago. The minilateralism of magic numbers is not a magic solution. But it’s a far better bet at this point than the multilateralism of wishful thinking.
2022
UTNIF
Negative
Disease Neg – UTNIF › Solvency › Multilat Fails
Young et al 13 (Kevin Young, Assistant Professor in the University of Massachusetts Amherst’s Department of Political Science, Thomas Hale, Postdoctoral research fellow at the Blavatnik School of Government, Oxford University, David Held, Professor of politics and international relations at Durham University, “Global Cooperation Buckling Under Past Successes,” The Globalist, Global Cooperation Buckling Under Past Successes, *fc)
A Systemic Crisis While the need for global cooperation continues to grow, the ability of multilateral institutions to deliver the policy coordination we need has not kept pace. The provision of effective global governance isn’t just lacking in one area — like, say, climate change. It is systematically underperforming across a range of issues. These include the management of the global economy to human security and environmental problems. While many have pondered the many pressing global dilemmas facing the world today, there is a paradox accompanying the global situation as a whole. We are failing under the weight of our own success. Decades of multilateral agreements, new institutions and an increasingly robust system of international law have enabled a radical increase in economic globalization, with substantial benefits for a wide range of countries. But our ability to manage all this complexity of progress has not kept pace. Our more integrated global economy demands more, and more effective, collective management. The problems that confront us now are challenges we never would have encountered without the progress made by the existing network of institutions. The various committees based in Basel, the IMF, the G20, and beyond facilitated a sharp deepening of financial interdependence. When the crisis arrived, they proved adequate — albeit just adequate — to coordinate a minimally sufficient series of policy responses to avoid another Great Depression. Instead of an unmitigated disaster we got a mitigated one. They were of course unable to prevent the crisis from occurring in the first place and have not been able to take the measures needed to prevent the next one. Moreover, just as existing international institutions are useful vehicles for cooperation, they can also come to hinder it. International institutions like the IMF, for example, contain a vast array of resources and expertise for addressing global problems. Yet because of their past behavior and the lock-in of US dominance that was secured over six decades ago, many countries do not trust the IMF as a global governor. Newer institutions like the G20 are a testament to successful development of countries like Brazil, India and China, who have been able to strategically engage with economic globalization in recent years. Yet, with a greater plurality of voices at the negotiation table, cooperation becomes more difficult. Fragmentation From Cooperation When institutions proliferate, the overall system may slide toward dysfunctional fragmentation. Our current set of institutions arose from ad hoc crisis management over the postwar period. Each crisis saw the addition of a new committee, a new joint task force or some other institutional addition. But the sum is not greater than the parts. Indeed, the lack of coherence in global economic governance is directly responsible for a number of the challenges we now face. For example, the reform efforts surrounding complex financial instruments like derivatives are as complex as the instruments themselves. There is not one international institution handling the reform process. Rather, there are five different organizations all handling different pieces, separate initiatives at the EU level and a panoply of different countries all acting simultaneously. Some claim that global economic governance has utterly failed, pointing to the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression and a sluggish recovery. Others regard global economic governance as “good enough.” They point out that we averted an even worse disaster and — despite a global recession — didn’t collapse. In fact, both views are correct: global economic cooperation is failing under the weight of its own success. Across a range of issue areas, the remarkable success of global cooperation in the last several decades has made human interconnectedness weigh much more heavily on politics and the economy than it did in the past. But that process of growing cooperation has now stalled, unable to manage the deep interdependence it has created.
2022
UTNIF
Negative
Disease Neg – UTNIF › Advantage › AT Food Wars
Steven Pinker 11, Prof @ Harvard, Steven Pinker: Resource Scarcity Doesn’t Cause Wars,
Once again it seems to me that the appropriate response is “maybe, but maybe not.” Though climate change can cause plenty of misery… it will not necessarily lead to armed conflict. The political scientists who track war and peace, such as Halvard Buhaug, Idean Salehyan, Ole Theisen, and Nils Gleditsch, are skeptical of the popular idea that people fight wars over scarce resources. Hunger and resource shortages are tragically common in sub-Saharan countries such as Malawi, Zambia, and Tanzania, but wars involving them are not. Hurricanes, floods, droughts, and tsunamis (such as the disastrous one in the Indian Ocean in 2004) do not generally lead to conflict. The American dust bowl in the 1930s, to take another example, caused plenty of deprivation but no civil war. And while temperatures have been rising steadily in Africa during the past fifteen years, civil wars and war deaths have been falling. Pressures on access to land and water can certainly cause local skirmishes, but a genuine war requires that hostile forces be organized and armed, and that depends more on the influence of bad governments, closed economies, and militant ideologies than on the sheer availability of land and water. Certainly any connection to terrorism is in the imagination of the terror warriors: terrorists tend to be underemployed lower-middle-class men, not subsistence farmers. As for genocide, the Sudanese government finds it convenient to blame violence in Darfur on desertification, distracting the world from its own role in tolerating or encouraging the ethnic cleansing. In a regression analysis on armed conflicts from 1980 to 1992, Theisen found that conflict was more likely if a country was poor, populous, politically unstable, and abundant in oil, but not if it had suffered from droughts, water shortages, or mild land degradation. (Severe land degradation did have a small effect.) Reviewing analyses that examined a large number (N) of countries rather than cherry-picking one or toe, he concluded, “Those who foresee doom, because of the relationship between resource scarcity and violent internal conflict, have very little support from the large-N literature.”
2022
UTNIF
Negative
Disease Neg – UTNIF › Advantage › AT Data Collaboration
Shah and Steinhardt 20- associate professor of Medicine (Biomedical Informatics) at Stanford University and Associate CIO for Data Science at Stanford Healthcare AND** assistant professor of Statistics at University of California, Berkeley (Nigam and Jacob, “How data science can ease the COVID-19 pandemic,” Brookings, 4-27-20, Accessed Online at , Accessed Online on 7-4-22)
Social distancing and stay-at-home orders in the United States have slowed the infection rate of SARS-CoV-2, the pathogen that causes COVID-19. This has halted the immediate threat to the U.S. healthcare system, but consensus on a long-term plan or solution to the crisis remains unclear. As the reality settles in that there are no quick fixes and that therapies and vaccines will take several months if not years to invent, validate, and mass produce, this is a good time to consider another question: How can data science and technology help us endure the pandemic while we develop therapies and vaccines? Before policymakers reopen their economies, they must be sure that the resulting new COVID-19 cases will not force local healthcare systems to resort to crisis standards of care. Doing so requires not just prevention and suppression of the virus, but ongoing measurement of virus activity, assessment of the efficacy of suppression measures, and forecasting of near-term demand on local health systems. This demand is highly variable given community demographics, the prevalence of pre-existing conditions, and population density and socioeconomics. Data science can already provide ongoing, accurate estimates of health system demand, which is a requirement in almost all reopening plans. We need to go beyond that to a dynamic approach of data collection, analysis, and forecasting to inform policy decisions in real time and iteratively optimize public health recommendations for re-opening. While most reopening plans propose extensive testing, contact tracing, and monitoring of population mobility, almost none consider setting up such a dynamic feedback loop. Having such feedback could determine what level of virus activity can be tolerated in an area, given regional health system capacity, and adjust population distancing accordingly. We propose that by using existing technology and some nifty data science, it is possible to set up that feedback loop, which would maintain healthcare demand under the threshold of what is available in a region. Just as the maker community stepped up to cover for the failures of the government to provide adequate protective gear to health workers, this is an opportunity for the data and tech community to partner with healthcare experts and provide a measure of public health planning that governments are unable to do. Therefore, the question we invite the data science community to focus on is: How can data science help forecast regional health system resource needs given measurements of virus activity and suppression measures such as population distancing? For the data science effort to work, first and foremost, we need to fix delays in data collection and access introduced by existing reporting processes. Currently, most departments of public health are collecting and reporting metrics that are not helpful, and are reporting them with 48 hour delays, and often with errors. Although there are examples of regional excellence in such reporting, by and large, the recommendations from the health IT community around accurate and fast public health reporting remain ignored. For instance, consider the number of COVID-19 hospitalizations, which is the best indicator of the disease’s burden on the regional health system. At the present time, due to time lags in confirming and reporting cases and a failure to distinguish between current and cumulative hospitalizations, even regions that report hospitalization data often provide only a blurry picture of the burden on the regional health system. Regions should ideally report both suspected and confirmed hospital cases and indicate the date of admission, in addition to the date of report or confirmation. Even with perfect reporting, there are fundamental delays in what such data can tell us. For example, new admissions to a hospital today reflect virus activity as of 9 to 13 days ago (which depends, in turn, on social distancing interventions from up to 17 days prior). Not factoring in such considerations have led to significant over-estimation of hospitalization needs nationwide. We therefore need to measure virus activity via proxy measures that are indicative early in the lifecycle of the virus. We must benchmark these against the number of new and total COVID-19 hospitalizations as well as ideally the number of new infections, assuming it is accurately measured through large scale testing. Available proxy measures include test positivity rates in health systems, case counts, deaths and perhaps seropositivity rates. Ongoing symptom tracking via smartphone apps, daily web or phone surveys, or cough sounds can identify potential hotspots where virus transmission rates are high. Contact tracing, which currently requires significant human effort, can also help tracking of potential cases if it can be scaled using technology under development by major American tech companies. With reliable tracking and benchmarking in place, we can calculate infection prevalence as well as daily growth and transmission rates, which is essential for determining if policies are working. This is a problem not only of data collection but also data analysis. Issues of sensitivity, daily variability, time lags, and confounding need to be studied before such data can be used reliably. For instance, symptom tracking is nonspecific and may have difficulty tracking virus activity at low prevalence. Other emerging data sources such as wastewater and smart thermometer data hold similar promise but will have to grapple with these same issues. We then need to estimate the regional effects of policy interventions such as shelter-in-place orders (via mobility reduction) and contact tracing (via reductions in new cases), first as simple forecasts and eventually maturing to what-if analyses. Several efforts have quantified the impact of mobility on virus transmission and some have suggested “safe” forms of mobility. While there are many potential ways to quantify population mobility — such as via traffic patterns, internet bandwidth usage by address, and location of credit card swipes — the most scalable mechanism to measure mobility appears to be via tracking of smartphones. Groups such as the COVID-19 Mobility Data Network provide such data daily in anonymized, aggregated reports. Once the ability to project from mobility to transmission to health system burden is constructed, we can “close the loop” by predicting how much mobility we can afford given measured virus activity and anticipated health system resources in the next two weeks. Researchers have already attempted to calculate “tolerable transmission” in the form of maximum infection prevalence in a given geography that would not overload health systems. Coupling such tolerable transmission estimates with daily assessments of a valid sample of the population (via testing, via daily surveys, via electronic health record-based surveillance) would allow monitoring of changes in transmission which can alert us to the need to intervene, such as by reducing mobility. As new measures such as contact tracing cut transmission rates, these same monitoring systems can tell us that it is safe to increase mobility further. Continuously analyzing current mobility as well as virus activity and projected health system capacity can allow us to set up “keep the distance” alerts that trade off tolerable transmission against allowed mobility. Doing so will allow us to intelligently balance public health and economic needs in real time. Concretely, then, the crucial “data science” task is to learn the counterfactual function linking last week’s population mobility and today’s transmission rates to project hospital demand two weeks later. Imagine taking past measurements of mobility around April 10 in a region (such as the Santa Clara County’s report from COVID-19 Community Mobility Reports), the April 20 virus transmission rate estimate for the region (such as from http://rt.live), and the April 25 burden on the health system (such as from the Santa Clara County Hospitalization dashboard), to learn a function that uses today’s mobility and transmission rates to anticipate needed hospital resources two weeks later. It is unclear how many days of data of each proxy measurement we need to reliably learn such a function, what mathematical form this function might take, and how we do this correctly with the observational data on hand and avoid the trap of mere function-fitting. However, this is the data science problem that needs to be tackled as a priority. Adopting such technology and data science to keep anticipated healthcare needs under the threshold of availability in a region requires multiple privacy trade-offs, which will require thoughtful legislation so that the solutions invented for enduring the current pandemic do not lead to loss of privacy in perpetuity. However, given the immense economic as well as hidden medical toll of the shutdown, we urgently need to construct an early warning system that tells us to enhance suppression measures if the next COVID-19 outbreak peak might overwhelm our regional healthcare system. It is imperative that we focus our attention on using data science to anticipate, and manage, regional health system resource needs based on local measurements of virus activity and effects of population distancing.
2022
UTNIF
Negative
Disease Neg – UTNIF › Advantage › AT Science Diplomacy
Dickson, 10 (David, director of SciDev.net (science for the developing world) and 20+ years in science policy journalism, 6/28/10, “Science in diplomacy: “On tap but not on top,” https://scidevnet.wordpress.com/2010/06/28/the-place-of-science-in-diplomacy-%E2%80%9Con-tap-but-not-on-top%E2%80%9D/)
There’s a general consensus in both the scientific and political worlds that the principle of science diplomacy, at least in the somewhat restricted sense of the need to get more and better science into international negotiations, is a desirable objective. There is less agreement, however, on how far the concept can – or indeed should – be extended to embrace broader goals and objectives, in particular attempts to use science to achieve political or diplomatic goals at the international level. Science, despite its international characteristics, is no substitute for effective diplomacy. Any more than diplomatic initiatives necessarily lead to good science. These seem to have been the broad conclusions to emerge from a three-day meeting at Wilton Park in Sussex, UK, organised by the British Foreign Office and the Royal Society, and attended by scientists, government officials and politicians from 17 countries around the world. The definition of science diplomacy varied widely among participants. Some saw it as a subcategory of “public diplomacy”, or what US diplomats have recently been promoting as “soft power” (“the carrot rather than the stick approach”, as a participant described it). Others preferred to see it as a core element of the broader concept of “innovation diplomacy”, covering the politics of engagement in the familiar fields of international scientific exchange and technology transfer, but raising these to a higher level as a diplomatic objective. Whatever definition is used, three particular aspects of the debate became the focus of attention during the Wilton Park meeting: how science can inform the diplomatic process; how diplomacy can assist science in achieving its objectives; and, finally, how science can provide a channel for quasi-diplomatic exchanges by forming an apparently neutral bridge between countries. There was little disagreement on the first of these. Indeed for many, given the increasing number of international issues with a scientific dimension that politicians have to deal with, this is essentially what the core of science diplomacy should be about. Chris Whitty, for example, chief scientist at the UK’s Department for International Development, described how knowledge about the threat raised by the spread of the highly damaging plant disease stem rust had been an important input by researchers into discussions by politicians and diplomats over strategies for persuading Afghan farmers to shift from the production of opium to wheat. Others pointed out that the scientific community had played a major role in drawing attention to issues such as the links between chlorofluorocarbons in the atmosphere and the growth of the ozone hole, or between carbon dioxide emissions and climate change. Each has made essential contributions to policy decisions. Acknowledging this role for science has some important implications. No-one dissented when Rohinton Medhora, from Canada’s International Development Research Centre, complained of the lack of adequate scientific expertise in the embassies of many countries of the developed and developing world alike. Nor – perhaps predictably – was there any major disagreement that diplomatic initiatives can both help and occasionally hinder the process of science. On the positive side, such diplomacy can play a significant role in facilitating science exchange and the launch of international science projects, both essential for the development of modern science. Europe’s framework programme of research programmes was quoted as a successful advantage of the first of these. Examples of the second range from the establishment of the European Organisation of Nuclear Research (usually known as CERN) in Switzerland after the Second World War, to current efforts to build a large new nuclear fusion facility (ITER). Less positively, increasing restrictions on entry to certain countries, and in particular the United States after the 9/11 attacks in New York and elsewhere, have significantly impeded scientific exchange programmes. Here the challenge for diplomats was seen as helping to find ways to ease the burdens of such restrictions. The broadest gaps in understanding the potential of scientific diplomacy lay in the third category, namely the use of science as a channel of international diplomacy, either as a way of helping to forge consensus on contentious issues, or as a catalyst for peace in situations of conflict. On the first of these, some pointed to recent climate change negotiations, and in particular the work of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, as a good example, of the way that the scientific community can provide a strong rationale for joint international action. But others referred to the failure of the Copenhagen climate summit last December to come up with a meaningful agreement on action as a demonstration of the limitations of this way of thinking. It was argued that this failure had been partly due to a misplaced belief that scientific consensus would be sufficient to generate a commitment to collective action, without taking into account the political impact that scientific ideas would have. Another example that received considerable attention was the current construction of a synchrotron facility SESAME in Jordan, a project that is already is bringing together researchers in a range of scientific disciplines from various countries in the Middle East (including Israel, Egypt and Palestine, as well as both Greece and Turkey). The promoters of SESAME hope that – as with the building of CERN 60 years ago, and its operation as a research centre involving, for example, physicists from both Russia and the United States – SESAME will become a symbol of what regional collaboration can achieve. In that sense, it would become what one participant described as a “beacon of hope” for the region. But others cautioned that, however successful SESAME may turn out to be in purely scientific terms, its potential impact on the Middle East peace process should not be exaggerated. Political conflicts have deep roots that cannot easily be papered over, however open-minded scientists may be to professional colleagues coming from other political contexts. Indeed, there was even a warning that in the developing world, high profile scientific projects, particular those with explicit political backing, could end up doing damage by inadvertently favouring one social group over another. Scientists should be wary of having their prestige used in this way; those who did so could come over as patronising, appearing unaware of political realities. Similarly, those who hold science in esteem as a practice committed to promoting the causes of peace and development were reminded of the need to take into account how advances in science – whether nuclear physics or genetic technology – have also led to new types of weaponry. Nor did science automatically lead to the reduction of global inequalities. “Science for diplomacy” therefore ended up with a highly mixed review. The consensus seemed to be that science can prepare the ground for diplomatic initiatives – and benefit from diplomatic agreements – but cannot provide the solutions to either.
2022
UTNIF
Negative
Disease Neg – UTNIF › Advantage › AT Bioterror
Jefferson, et al, 14 [ Catherine, 21 August 2014 | doi: 10.3389/fpubh.2014.00115, Synthetic biology and biosecurity: challenging the “myths”, Catherine, Jefferson, imageFilippa Lentzos and imageClaire Marris* Department of Social Science, Health and Medicine, King’s College London, London, UK, Catherine joined SSHM in January 2013. Before joining the department, she worked as a senior policy advisor for international security at the Royal Society, where she led a project on Neuroscience, Conflict and Security. Prior to this she was a research fellow with the Harvard Sussex Program on Chemical and Biological Weapons at the University of Sussex, where she also obtained her DPhil. Catherine’s research interests are focused on the intersection of science and security policy, with a particular emphasis on chemical and biological security, dual use governance of emerging technologies and the growth of the amateur biology community. She is currently involved in research on the social dimensions of synthetic biology within theCentre for Synthetic Biology and Innovation, ]
Challenges to Myth 5 There are two dimensions to Myth 5. The first is about the intention of would-be terrorists, and the assumption is that terrorists would seek to produce mass casualty weapons and pursue capabilities on the scale of twentieth century state-level bioweapons programs. While most leading biological disarmament and non-proliferation experts believe that the risk of a small-scale bioterrorism attack is very real and very present, they consider the risk of sophisticated large-scale bioterrorism attacks to be very small (65). This is backed up by historical evidence. The three confirmed attempts to use biological agents against humans in terrorist attacks in the past were small-scale, low casualty events aimed at causing panic, and disruption rather than excessive death tolls: (i) the Rajneesh cult’s use of Salmonella on salad bars in local restaurants to sicken potential voters and make them stay away from the polls during Oregon elections in 1984; (ii) the 1990–95 attempted use of botulinum toxin and anthrax by the Japanese Aum Shinrikyo cult; (iii) and the “anthrax letters” sent to media outlets and members of US Congress in 2001 resulting in at least 22 cases of anthrax, five of which were fatal (66, 67). The second dimension to Myth 5 is the implicit assumption that producing a pathogenic organism equates producing a weapon of mass destruction. It does not. Considerable knowledge and resources are necessary for the processes of scaling up, storage, and developing a suitable dissemination method. These processes present significant technical and logistical barriers. Drawing from her in-depth study of the Iraqi, Soviet, and US bioweapons programs (3, 4), Ben Ouagrham-Gormley explains: Scaling up fragile microorganisms that are sensitive to environmental conditions and susceptible to change — and viruses are more sensitive than bacteria — has been one of the stiffest challenges for past bioweapons programs to overcome, even with appropriate expertise at hand. Scaling-up requires a gradual approach, moving from laboratory sample, to a larger laboratory quantity, to pilot-scale production, and then to even larger-scale production. During each stage, the production parameters need to be tested and often modified to maintain the lethal qualities of the agent; the entire scaling-up process can take several years (68). The dissemination of biological agents also poses difficult technical challenges. Whereas persistent chemical agents such as sulfur mustard and VX nerve gas are readily absorbed through the intact skin, no bacteria and viruses can enter the body via that route unless the skin has already been broken. Biological agents must either be ingested or inhaled to cause infection. To expose large numbers of people through the gastrointestinal tract, possible means of delivery are contamination of food and drinking water, yet neither of these scenarios would be easy to accomplish. Large urban reservoirs are usually unguarded, but unless terrorists added massive quantities of biological agent, the dilution effect would be so great that no healthy person drinking the water would receive an infectious dose (66). Moreover, modern sanitary techniques such as chlorination and filtration are designed to kill pathogens from natural sources and would probably be equally effective against a deliberately released agent. Bacterial contamination of the food supply is also unlikely to inflict mass casualties. Cooking, boiling, pasteurization, and other routine safety precautions are generally sufficient to kill pathogenic bacteria. The most likely way to inflict mass casualties with a biological agent is by disseminating it as a respirable aerosol: an invisible cloud of infectious droplets or particles so tiny that they remain suspended in the air for long periods and can be inhaled by large numbers of people. A high-concentration aerosol of B. anthracis or some other pathogen, released into the air in a densely populated urban area, could potentially infect thousands of victims simultaneously. After an incubation period of a few days, depending on the type of agent and the inhaled dose, the exposed population would experience an outbreak of an incapacitating or fatal illness. Although aerosol delivery is potentially the most lethal way of delivering a biological attack, it involves major technical hurdles that most terrorists would be unlikely to overcome. To infect through the lungs, infectious particles must be microscopic in size – between 1 and 5 μm in diameter. Terrorists would therefore have to develop or acquire a sophisticated delivery system capable of generating an aerosol cloud with the necessary particle size range and a high enough agent concentration to cover a broad area. Overall, an important trade-off exists between ease of production and effectiveness of dissemination. The easiest way to produce microbial agents is in a liquid form, yet when such a “slurry” is sprayed into the air, it forms heavy droplets that fall to the ground so that only a small percentage of the agent is aerosolized. In contrast, if the bacteria are first dried to a solid cake and then milled into a fine powder, they become far easier to aerosolize, yet the drying and milling process is technically difficult. The Aum Shinrikyo cult struggled with dissemination (67, 69, 70). In one of its anthrax dissemination attempts, it sprayed unknown, but probably very large, quantities of a liquid aerosol (most likely crude culture, unprocessed in any way) of B. anthracis from the roof of the Aum’s headquarters building in Tokyo. For the dissemination, the Aum set up two sprayers on the roof of the eight-story building, each within a large round cooling tower. Pipes were extended from the cooling towers to tanks below, which were filled with a liquid suspension of B. anthracis. The device worked poorly, producing large droplets rather than the very fine aerosol needed for effective transmission of anthrax. It also appears the spore concentration was very low (at least five orders of magnitude below that necessary for a highly infectious wet aerosol). In another dissemination attempt, targeting the area around the Kanagawa prefectural office and the Imperial Palace, the Aum equipped vehicles with spraying devices, but according to prosecutors’ statements, the nozzle of the sprayer clogged and the operation failed. Despite its 200 m2 laboratory containing, amongst other equipment, a glove box, incubator, centrifuge, drier, DNA/RNA synthesizer, electron microscope, two fermenters each having about a 2,000 litre capacity, and an extensive scientific library, and despite its repeated attempts at dissemination, the Aum was unsuccessful in causing any disease, and in retrospect it is clear that the cult did not even make the first substantive step toward an effective bioweapon. If, despite the odds, aerosolization was achieved, the effective delivery of biological agents in the open air is highly dependent on atmospheric and wind conditions, creating additional uncertainties. Only under highly stable atmospheric conditions would the aerosol cloud remain close to the ground where it can be inhaled, rather than being rapidly dispersed. Moreover, most microorganisms are sensitive to ultraviolet radiation and cannot survive more than 30 min in bright sunlight, limiting their use to night-time attacks. One major exception is anthrax, which can be induced to form spores with tough outer coats that enable them to survive for several hours in sunlight. Terrorists could, of course, stage a biological attack inside an enclosed space such as a building, a subway station, a shopping mall, or a sports arena. Such an attack, if it involved a respiratory aerosol, might infect thousands of people, but even here the technical hurdles would by no means be trivial. Finally, even if a biological weapon had been disseminated successfully, the outcome of an attack would be affected by factors like the health of the people who are exposed to the agent, and the speed and manner with which public health authorities and medical professionals detected and were able to respond to the resulting outbreak. A prompt response with effective medical countermeasures, such as antibodies and vaccination, can significantly blunt the impact of an attack. Simple, proven ways to curtail epidemics, such as wearing face masks, hand washing, and avoiding hospitals where transmission rates might soar, can also prove effective in stemming the spread of a disease. Indeed, this aspect of a bioterrorism attack is often underplayed in scenarios like Tara O’Toole’s “Dark Winter” and “Atlantic Storm,” where the rates of contagion used are often significantly higher than those in historical cases of natural outbreaks (71).
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Disease Neg – UTNIF › Advantage › AT Bioterror
Pinker 18 – Steven Arthur Pinker is a Canadian-American cognitive psychologist, Professor at Harvard University. [Enlightenment Now: The Case for Reason, Science, Humanism, and Progress, Viking, Penguin Group]//BPS
Biological agents are particularly ill-suited to terrorists, whose goal, recall, is not damage but theater (chapter 13).58 The biologist Paul Ewald notes that natural selection among pathogens works against the terrorist’s goal of sudden and spectacular devastation. 59 Germs that depend on rapid person-to-person contagion, like the common-cold virus, are selected to keep their hosts alive and ambulatory so they can shake hands with and sneeze on as many people as possible. Germs get greedy and kill their hosts only if they have some other way of getting from body to body, like mosquitoes (for malaria), a contaminable water supply (for cholera), or trenches packed with injured soldiers (for the 1918 Spanish flu). Sexually transmitted pathogens, like HIV and syphilis, are somewhere in between, needing a long and symptomless incubation period during which hosts can infect their partners, after which the germs do their damage. Virulence and contagion thus trade off, and the evolution of germs will frustrate the terrorist’s aspiration to launch a headline-worthy epidemic that is both swift and lethal. Theoretically, a bioterrorist could try to bend the curve with a pathogen that is virulent, contagious, and durable enough to survive outside bodies. But breeding such a fine-tuned germ would require Nazi-like experiments on living humans that even terrorists (to say nothing of teenagers) are unlikely to carry off. It may be more than just luck that the world so far has seen just one successful bioterror attack (the 1984 tainting of salad with salmonella in an Oregon town by the Rajneeshee religious cult, which killed no one) and one spree killing (the 2001 anthrax mailings, which killed five).60 To be sure, advances in synthetic biology, such as the gene-editing technique CRISPR-Cas9, make it easier to tinker with organisms, including pathogens. But it’s difficult to re-engineer a complex evolved trait by inserting a gene or two, since the effects of any gene are intertwined with the rest of the organism’s genome. Ewald notes, “I don’t think that we are close to understanding how to insert combinations of genetic variants in any given pathogen that act in concert to generate high transmissibility and stably high virulence for humans.”61 The biotech expert Robert Carlson adds that “one of the problems with building any flu virus is that you need to keep your production system (cells or eggs) alive long enough to make a useful quantity of something that is trying to kill that production system. . . . Booting up the resulting virus is still very, very difficult. . . . I would not dismiss this threat completely, but frankly I am much more worried about what Mother Nature is throwing at us all the time.”62 And crucially, advances in biology work the other way as well: they also make it easier for the good guys [public protectors] (and there are many more of them) to identify pathogens, invent antibiotics that overcome antibiotic resistance, and rapidly develop vaccines.63 An example is the Ebola vaccine, developed in the waning days of the 2014–15 emergency, after public health efforts had capped the toll at twelve thousand deaths rather than the millions that the media had foreseen. Ebola thus joined a list of other falsely predicted pandemics such as Lassa fever, hantavirus, SARS, mad cow disease, bird flu, and swine flu.64 Some of them never had the potential to go pandemic in the first place because they are contracted from animals or food rather than in an exponential tree of person-to-person infections. Others were nipped by medical and public health interventions. Of course no one knows for sure whether an evil genius will someday overcome the world’s defenses and loose a plague upon the world for fun, vengeance, or a sacred cause. But journalistic habits and the Availability and Negativity biases inflate the odds, which is why I have taken Sir Martin up on his bet. By the time you read this you may know who has won.65
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Dean 14 [Alex, "Fear Not, Ebola Won't Wipe Us Out", Spiked, 8/6/14, www.spiked-online.com/newsite/article/fear-not-ebola-wont-wipe-us-out/15549#.VaAbVvlViko] // SKY
Whenever a disease breaks out, we are bombarded with doomsday predictions. Coverage of ebola has conformed to this pattern. Major newspapers have bombarded us with page after page of pharmaceutical puffery; some journalists speak as though we are headed for an apocalypse. Commentary has been speculative, pessimistic and quick to apportion blame. The Guardian’s West Africa correspondent says that ‘new hotspots have flared up, fuelled by cross-border trade’, while US Republican politician Phil Gingrey has been making unsubstantiated rants about ‘illegal immigrants carrying deadly diseases’. The head of the World Health Organisation stoked panic with his statement that the virus ‘is moving faster than efforts to control it’. We must compare this reportage, all these ‘the end is nigh’ performances, with the reality. A quick look at hard science shows there is a dramatic mismatch and that commentators have wildly exaggerated the threat ebola poses. We are not headed for extinction. John Oxford, a virologist at the University of London, has explained that the hysteria surrounding ebola is disproportionate to the threat. He points out that ebola ‘doesn’t spread very easily’, and that the virus’s reproductive number - how many people are infected by each carrier - is very low. Where measles has a reproductive number of 12, ebola’s number is 1. Moreover, virologists have been quick to point out that ebola is very easily destroyed, for a virus. A quick wash of the hands and it’s gone. Ebola can devastate families and communities, yes, but when you consider that it has a low death toll compared with other viruses in Africa, we must conclude that reports have been hyperbolic and scaremongering. Yet this disproportionate panic over ebola was to be expected. We saw similar responses when swine flu broke out and the UK’s chief medical officer predicted 65,000 deaths and the media swallowed it up, and again when the House of Lords told us that 65,000 Britons would die from bird flu. Perhaps political and medical bodies have a duty to err on the side of caution – to over-prepare and over-predict – but the media and some of the public also gobbled up these doomsday predictions with relish. What’s the explanation for this? Why do some observers seem to be ravenously awaiting the next big pandemic? Why do we want these viruses to be worse than they are? I think some people long for doomsday predictions because they want their anti-progress attitudes to be validated. Ours is an era in which we are told to fear other people for their unpredictability and to see our fellow humans as a threat. Relationships are sometimes described as ‘toxic’ - such is our misanthropy that we now even describe our ultimate forms of intimacy in the language of disease. Today’s anti-human scaremongers are desperate for their attitudes to be affirmed, and so they exaggerate viruses which are spread through human contact and movement. People convince themselves that ebola is the result of immigration and human contact and modern forms of travel because then their regressive attitudes feel truer, more real. They don’t see the hectic globalised world as exciting; they see it as unnerving and are thrilled when a virus gives them reason to complain about it. These ridiculous attitudes have found no real affirmation, though. Humankind will deal with ebola, and a disease spread through contact should never serve as a reason to despise that contact: intimacy makes life worth living and immigration and trade are the seeds of social and economic progress. We must not allow the fearmongers to undermine our rational convictions. Pay no attention to the miserablists. Fear not, humankind – we are doing okay.
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Farquhar et al. 17 – Sebastian Farquhar, DPhil student at Oxford specializing in Cyber Security and AI. John Halstead, doctorate in political philosophy. Owen Cotton-Barratt, DPhil in pure mathematics. Stefan Schubert, Oxford's department of experimental psychology. Haydn Belfield, degree in Philosophy, Politics and Economics from Oriel College. Andrew Snyder-Beattie, Director of Research at the Future of Humanity Institute, University of Oxford, MS in biomathematics. [Existential Risk: Diplomacy and Governance, Global Priorities Project 2017]//BPS
For most of human history, natural pandemics have posed the greatest risk of mass global fatalities.37 However, there are some reasons to believe that natural pandemics are very unlikely to cause human extinction. Analysis of the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) red list database has shown that of the 833 recorded plant and animal species extinctions known to have occurred since 1500, less than 4% (31 species) were ascribed to infectious disease.38 None of the mammals and amphibians on this list were globally dispersed, and other factors aside from infectious disease also contributed to their extinction. It therefore seems that our own species, which is very numerous, globally dispersed, and capable of a rational response to problems, is very unlikely to be killed off by a natural pandemic. One underlying explanation for this is that highly lethal pathogens can kill their hosts before they have a chance to spread, so there is a selective pressure for pathogens not to be highly lethal. Therefore, pathogens are likely to co-evolve with their hosts rather than kill all possible hosts.39
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Halstead 19 – John Halstead, doctorate in political philosophy. [Cause Area Report: Existential Risk, Founders Pledge, https://founderspledge.com/research/Cause%20Area%20Report%20-%20Existential%20Risk.pdf]//BPS
However, there are some reasons to think that naturally occurring pathogens are unlikely to cause human extinction. Firstly, Homo sapiens have been around for 200,000 years and the Homo genus for around six million years without being exterminated by an infectious disease, which is evidence that the base rate of extinction-risk natural pathogens is low.82 Indeed, past disease outbreaks have not come close to rendering humans extinct. Although bodies were piled high in the streets across Europe during the Black Death,83 human extinction was never a serious possibility, and some economists even argue that it was a boon for the European economy.84 Secondly, infectious disease has only contributed to the extinction of a small minority of animal species.85 The only confirmed case of a mammalian species extinction being caused by an infectious disease is a type of rat native only to Christmas Island. Having said that, the context may be importantly different for modern day humans, so it is unclear whether the risk is increasing or decreasing. On the one hand, due to globalisation, the world is more interconnected making it easier for pathogens to spread. On the other hand, interconnectedness could also increase immunity by increasing exposure to lower virulence strains between subpopulations.87 Moreover, advancements in medicine and sanitation limit the potential damage an outbreak might do.