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2022 UTNIF Negative
Disease Neg – UTNIF › Advantage › AT Disease

Disease can’t cause extinction

Dr. Toby Ord 20, Senior Research Fellow in Philosophy at Oxford University, DPhil in Philosophy from the University of Oxford, The Precipice: Existential Risk and the Future of Humanity, Hachette Books, Kindle Edition, p. 124-126

Are we safe now from events like this? Or are we more vulnerable? Could a pandemic threaten humanity’s future?10

The Black Death was not the only biological disaster to scar human history. It was not even the only great bubonic plague. In 541 CE the Plague of Justinian struck the Byzantine Empire. Over three years it took the lives of roughly 3 percent of the world’s people.11

2022 UTNIF Negative
Disease Neg – UTNIF › Advantage › Not Inherent

Disease telemedicine framework is being developed now

Bricknell 21- Editor-in-Chief at Military-medicine.com interviewing Brigadier Stefan Kowitz, Director of the NATO Multi-National Coordination Centre/European Union Medical Command (Martin, “The NATO response to the COVID-19 pandemic – Interview with Brigadier Stefan Kowitz,” Military-Medicine.com, 9-22-21, Accessed Online at , Accessed Online on 7-5-22)

During the COVID pandemic, the current role of MMCC/EMC has been to use lessons identified for its future work to support military medical collaboration and coordination across our participating nations, NATO and the EU. Our Telehealth Workshop in May 2021 is an excellent example. Telehealth has been a game-changer during the COVID pandemic, and the use of telehealth has increased in different areas of medical support. Telehealth provides significant means to measure the health of our soldiers and to improve the outcome of their medical treatment. COVID has been a trigger for transformation in telemedicine and telehealth. A follow-on Biosensor and Telehealth Workshop is planned in June 2022 We have just finalised an overview of COVID vaccination policies. The most notable finding is that most nations have not made COVID vaccination compulsory for members of the armed forces (as of Sep 2021). This may be hampering the success of vaccination programmes and reducing benefits for this population of risk. However, the vaccines’ success in preventing COVID infection and their limited side effects may change the situation, until a new variant of the virus appears. MMCC/EMC is increasing its work in civil-military cooperation for the evacuation of patients in large-scale emergencies and in crises, including a higher number of infectious patients. We are working in close cooperation with the NATO Joint Healthcare Working Group and other participating nations on this issue. A workshop on this topic with participants of the responsible civilian and military stakeholders is planned in June 2022. The MMCC/EMC was able to gain initial experience in stockpiling concepts in April 2020, when it was asked by the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC) of NATO to develop a medical stockpiling concept for the NATO COVID Trust Fund. An important part of the concept is a calculator that can be used to compute costs, storage space, and required personnel for each module. The NATO COVID Trust Fund has provided many donations based on this concept. Based on these experiences, the MMCC/EMC has extended this medical stockpiling concept to the Military Modular Multipurpose Epidemic/Pandemic Stockpiling (M3-EPS) Concept, which can be used by EU and NATO nations and medical stakeholders. As a surge capacity, rapidly deployable and modular standard packages of medical materiel have been identified and defined for stockpiling. The seven modular standard packages, such as support for intensive care units, can be used to support both military and civilian medical facilities. For example, the bilateral support that the Bundeswehr Medical Service provided to Portugal was based on the principles of M3-EPS and included an ICU capability to enhance a civilian hospital. The French medical services use a similar approach. We hope to bring these results into NATO standardisation work and into national developments. We also aim to increase our preparedness with regard to the stockpiling of CBRN chemical and radiation antidotes. If the MMCC/EMC has the time and resources, it will develop technical guidelines - based on existing NATO STANAGS - for deployed outbreak investigation team, which can be used for both infectious diseases and CBRN agents. We would like to combine deployable medical CBRN capabilities and public health capabilities. Civil-military collaboration regarding reachback laboratories with their sophisticated diagnostic capabilities has to be included in this concept.

2022 UTNIF Negative
Disease Neg – UTNIF › Advantage › Not Inherent

NATO response is coordinated now

Garamone 20- Reporter for DoD News (Jim, “NATO Looks to Ensure Health Crisis Doesn't Become Security Crisis,” DoD News, 5-14-20, Accessed Online at , Accessed Online on 7-5-22)

Royal Air Force Air Chief Marshall Sir Stuart Peach opened today's virtual meeting of the alliance's 30 chiefs of defense to discuss the response to COVID-19 and all the other aspects of security in which the military alliance is involved. Army Gen. Mark A. Milley, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, is attending the virtual meeting from the Pentagon. Peach said the unprecedented virtual meeting demonstrates "that despite the challenging times that we are all currently facing, the core mission of NATO continues unchanged: to deliver credible and effective deterrence and defense." Afghanistan, Iraq, Kosovo, Baltic air policing and NATO's forward battlegroups are all on the table for the alliance military leaders. ... Our forces are ready, vigilant and prepared to respond to any threat." Royal Air Force Air Chief Marshall Sir Stuart Peach NATO is not a primary first responder to the pandemic, but it is doing its part, Peach said. "Allies are standing together and acting together in solidarity," he noted in his opening remarks. "Allied national armed forces are supporting national civilian efforts and are playing a key role in slowing the pandemic." Military forces from across the alliance have flown more than 100 missions to transport medical personnel, supplies and treatment capabilities, he said. Military forces have also facilitated the construction of field hospitals adding tens of thousands of treatment beds. "So our alliance is helping to get the right support to the right place, at the right time," he said. "Helping our nations, our allies, save lives. This is also a time when our resilience is being tested."

2022 UTNIF Negative
Disease Neg – UTNIF › Cap K › Links

Securitizing biological risks ties health to the protection of global capitalism.

Mohan J. DUTTA, 15. Professor and Head of the Department of Communications and New Media at the National University of Singapore, Adjunct Professor of Communication at the Brian Lamb School of Communication at Purdue University. Neoliberal Health Organizing, 2015, p. 167-169.

The globalization of economies has produced accelerated patterns of movements of capital, goods, services, materials, and labor, simultaneously resulting in the accelerated production and circulation of anxieties constituted around these movements. Neoliberal organizing of health manifests itself in the development and deployment of surveillance, management, and coordination networks that see health primarily in the realm of threats posed by diseases dispersed through global networks, networks of bioterror, emerging infectious diseases, and biowarfare (Salinsky, 2002). The response of health systems therefore is formulated in the form of network structures of biodefense and homeland security, performing functions of surveillance, information gathering, and information dissemination, constituted around the economic logics of growth and efficiency. The protection of the economic opportunities of globalization becomes the function of public health systems formulated in the narrative of geosecurity and implemented in the form of programs controlled by the police-military complex within structures of biodefense, biosecurity and geosecurity. With this emphasis on security, the mandate for health depicts continuity with colonial implementations of public health administration to manage erstwhile colonies, increasingly being set within the military metaphor of health, turning health into a geosecurity threat for the new configurations of empire, and therefore, deploying military interventions to address health issues. Consider the following depiction in a report issued by the U.S. National Intelligence Council (NIC) that offers a picture of the global health threats posed by infectious diseases: New and reemerging infectious diseases will pose a rising global health threat and will complicate U.S. and global security over the next twenty years. These diseases will endanger U.S. citizens at home and abroad, threaten U.S. armed forces deployed overseas, and exacerbate social and political instability in key countries and regions in which the United States has significant interests. (Gordon, 2000) [END PAGE 167] The protection of human health is seen as a function of the military, tied to the goals of defending global capitalism against the threats to health and reflecting the colonial undertones of health containment measures deployed by the instruments of empire. In this instance of the report published by the NIC, knowledge about health is constituted in the realm of intelligence gathering to protect the interests of national security of the United States. Framed as threats to the health of citizens at home and abroad and to the health of the armed forces deployed overseas, infectious diseases are seen as contributors to social and political instability in key strategic regions of significant value to the United States. International relations are understood in the language of security, casting interpenetrating networks as targets of surveillance and management. The portrayal of infectious diseases as threats to geosecurity deploys valuable health resources into the hands of the military, placing the power of disease management under military structures and framing the responses to disease in military interpretations. Moreover, the juxtaposition of epidemic narratives amid narratives of war and bioterror heighten the concerns for geosecurity, foregrounding and necessitating a variety of military response strategies (Aaltola, 2012). The interpenetrating relationship between health and the military constitute one element of the consolidation of power in the hands of the global elite achieved through neoliberal transformations. The military emerges as a global organizational structure for the management of health, simultaneously justifying the deployment of resources to the military and the deployment of military strategies to address health issues. This emphasis on the military framed within the realm of protecting geostrategic interests constructs health in the realm of threats, simultaneously erasing questions of fundamental human rights to health. Similarly, in the president's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, a significant proportion of resources are housed in the military in order to deploy military-to-military interventions within the broader umbrella of protecting the geostrategic interests of the United States. Consider, for instance, the workings of the U.S. Africa Command to address HIV/ AIDS prevention as a security threat in Africa. The U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) is the result of an internal reorganization of the U.S. military command structure, creating one administrative headquarters that answers to the Secretary of Defense and is responsible for U.S. military relations with 53 African countries. AFRICOM recognizes that HIV/AIDS has an enormous impact on economic and political stability across the continent, and, by degrading military medical readiness, weakens the national security of individual countries. HIV/ AIDS programming will be a key component of AFRICOM's security cooperation and humanitarian assistance activities. (www.pepfar.gov/about/agencies/ cl 9397.htm) [END PAGE 168] Critical to the deployment of a militarized form of governance in addressing health is the consolidation of power within elite structures, working through militarized systems of governance to control disease to protect the economic interests of the status quo. The military, as an instrument of power and control, functions within the narratives of security cooperation and humanitarian assistance activities to assert its power and control in global governance. Intelligence gathering emerges as an instrument for the generation of data to secure and protect zones of economic function. This gathering of targeted intelligence and the deployment of targeted interventions becomes particularly critical within the context of maintaining open zones of communication and economic exchange within the neoliberal structuring of economic relationships. Knowledge and technical interventions in this sense are constituted amid the paradoxical agenda of needing to protect boundaries and at the same time ensuring transnational spaces of movement of capital, labor, services, materials, and markets. In this chapter, we closely interrogate the meanings that circulate around the militarization of health, and attend to the communicative processes through which the militarization of health is achieved. The surveillance of spaces and the militarization of responses, I argue, are continuous with colonial logics of controlling spaces in distant locales of imperial governance, and are discontinuous from the colonial forms of governance because of the paradoxes of networked flows in neoliberal governance.

2022 UTNIF Negative
Disease Neg – UTNIF › Cap K › Links

Approaching disease through military planning leads to militarized disease response and turns the case

Ticktin 2017 – Miriam Ticktin is Associate Professor of Anthropology at The New School for Social Research (“Invasive Pathogens?: Rethinking Notions of Otherness,” Social Research: An International Quarterly, Volume 84, Number 1, Spring 2017, pp. 55-58)

Over the past 10 years, the global north has been increasingly bombarded by news of impending epidemics: SARS in 2003, avian flu in 2005, Ebola in 2013, and Zika in 2015. One thing that has helped to stoke the fear is that these are not simply viruses, but zoonoses—infectious diseases that are transmitted between species, or more specifically, from nonhuman animals or birds to humans. Although zoonoses are clearly not unknown phenomena—an earlier example is HIV/ AIDS—transformations associated with the scope and speed of human mobility and with climate change have led these infections to spread more quickly and widely, leading to a fear not simply of epidemics, but of global pandemics.

Stated differently, a threat of invasion is perceived on multiple fronts: the rapid movement of infections across political borders, but also, the movement of viruses across species borders. In this sense, it seems like threat is everywhere, and no bodies or borders could ever be safe. The field of biosecurity developed in response to this fear. Joseph Masco writes that as early as 2001, after the September 11 attacks, which were quickly followed by anthrax attacks (via letters that contained anthrax spores), public health started to be spoken of in the language of war, blurring the two realms: all vectors, from people to microbes, represented future danger. Biosecurity—initially a term used in New Zealand in the 1990s for animal and agricultural safety, to protect livestock and crops from disease—was incorporated into the counterterror state after 2001, and the logic of disease merged with those of weapons of mass destruction, becoming one unified problem (Masco 2014). That is, invasion by people and pathogens became spoken of in the same language and framed as the same problem.

2022 UTNIF Negative
Disease Neg – UTNIF › DOD DA › Link – Disease Collaboration

The aff is resource intensive

Cullison and Morrison 22- Senior Associate (Non-resident) of the Global Health Policy Center at the CSIS AND** Senior Vice President and Director at the Global Health Policy Center at the CSIS (Thomas and J. Stephen, “Bring DOD Fully into the Mix of Pandemic Preparedness and Response,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 6-30-22, Accessed Online at , Accessed Online on 7-5-22)

Throughout the Covid-19 pandemic, the Department of Defense (DOD) has made major contributions, both domestically and internationally, to civilian-led preparedness and response, particularly in logistics and planning, and numerous biomedical arenas including research, direct clinical care, and all aspects of public health including a worldwide network of infectious disease research laboratories. Certainly, DOD will be called upon to augment civil authorities for future similar crises both at home and abroad as it has been so often in the past with Ebola, SARS, MERS, and numerous other outbreaks. Often, however, these contributions arise amid sudden emergency demands, in an ad hoc fashion, without adequate forward mission planning and budgeting, and without clear backing in U.S. national security doctrine. And often DOD actions have deliberately low visibility—they are soon out of sight, out of mind—and are neither appropriately acknowledged nor well understood. At the recent , organized by the White House in collaboration with heads of state representing the G7, G20, African Union, and Caribbean Community (CARICOM), there was no mention of DOD’s special assets and recent performance, no DOD presence among participants, and no consideration of DOD’s current and future contributions to the global response. At some level, that omission is no surprise: the summit is first and foremost about the civilian response. At another, it is a sign of an enduring problem. Multiple factors account for why the DOD role is so often obscured: DOD is typically called upon, at short notice, to play a temporary role addressing critical, often embarrassing gaps, indeed failures, in the civilian sphere. DOD is itself hesitant and ambivalent: many within DOD do not regard its support of pandemic response as part of its core mission, even though its special expertise in intentional or accidental biological events is well recognized. Medical and public health capabilities overwhelmed by a pandemic are fundamentally no different from other disasters for which militaries routinely prepare and respond, both domestically and internationally, when civilian capabilities are insufficient. Yet significant preparation and planning are regularly exercised for many likely scenarios, such as wildfires, tropical storms, and earthquakes, while the same is not true for biological events. Certain live sensitivities are always at play. DOD commitments cannot be open-ended, otherwise they will compromise DOD’s core readiness and operational missions. The commitments cannot be seen, either at home or abroad, as militarizing and dominating the pandemic response. To answer these concerns, it is critically important to clarify early what the likely required capabilities are and how they will be resourced. When that step has not been taken ahead of a sudden emergency, hesitation can follow. These many important considerations notwithstanding, DOD remaining in relative obscurity also carries a price. Often DOD’s capacities are allowed to wither after the emergency has faded, particularly if DOD is not at the interagency table—before, during, and after the crisis—to contribute in a sustained way to strategic planning for future pandemics, with adequate forward budgeting. If DOD’s special assets are not operationally integrated with other agencies, well in advance, into overall U.S. health security strategies, both at home and abroad, hesitation, ambivalence, and ad hoc decisionmaking will follow. This all contributes to high inefficiency and confusion, impeding an effective DOD role.

2022 UTNIF Negative
Disease Neg – UTNIF › DOS CP › Solvency – Science Diplomacy

The DoS is comparatively better for international diplomacy

Lord 8- president and CEO of IREX, an independent nonprofit organization dedicated to building a more just, prosperous, and inclusive world by empowering youth, cultivating leaders, strengthening institutions, and extending access to quality education and information (Kristin, “The State Department, Not the Pentagon, Should Lead America’s Public Diplomacy Efforts,” Brookings, 10-29-08, Accessed Online at , Accessed Online on 7-4-22)

In most circumstances, the Department of Defense (DoD) should not serve as the most visible face of the United States overseas. This is particularly true in areas where the public feels threatened by American power.

The Middle East is one area where polls show distrust of American motives and concern that America seeks to dominate the region militarily. Indeed, according to a Pew Global Attitudes Project survey taken last year, 64 percent of Turks – citizens of a NATO ally – see the United States as the greatest threat to their country in the future. Civilians, including those who do not work for government agencies, are the best conduits for building trust with wary publics.

2022 UTNIF Negative
Disease Neg – UTNIF › DOS CP › Solvency – Science Diplomacy

DoS solves science diplomacy

Copeland 16- Senior Fellow at the Canadian Global Affairs Institute, and Policy Fellow, Centre for International Studies and Research (CERIUM), University of Montreal (Daryl, “CRUNCH THE NUMBERS: THE CASE FOR SCIENCE DIPLOMACY,” USC Center on Public Diplomacy Blog, 10-20-16, Accessed Online at , Accessed Online on 7-4-22)

Science diplomacy (SD), a transformative tool of soft power that combines knowledge-based, technologically enabled problem-solving with international political agency, is underutilized but indispensable.  In the face of the negative attributes of globalization – including polarization and the tendency to socialize the costs while privatizing benefits – SD alone offers the prospect of engaging shared interests to overcome political constraints and enlarge international cooperation.  Notwithstanding conventional convictions and the present spike in the incidence of armed conflict, there are no military solutions to the world’s most pressing problems – security is much more than a martial art.  Accordingly, sustaining broadly based development, bridging digital divides and responding to the needs of the poor must become priorities for both diplomacy and international policy. Unfortunately, they are not.

The situation is not entirely bleak. Some specialized agencies (UN, EU) and governments (US, UK, , Spain, Japan and NZ) have demonstrated a number of best practices in SD. New Zealand’s Chief Science Advisor, Peter Gluckman, has worked tirelessly to establish an International Network of Government Science Advice (). Vaughan Turekian, the Science and Technology Advisor at the US State Department, has launched a raft of innovative . The SESAME Synchrotron  in Jordan is co-managed by a group of countries not known for their habits of cooperation – Palestine, Israel, Turkey and Cyprus, among others. Iran is no longer pursuing nuclear weapons development, and Syria’s chemical weapons program has been wound down. Still, these examples represent the exceptions rather than the rule.

2022 UTNIF Negative
Disease Neg – UTNIF › DOS CP › Solvency – NATO Collaboration

DOS security assistance deters adversaries and creates cooperation

Tankel and Ross 20- associate professor at American University, and an adjunct senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security AND** non-resident senior associate at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, served as deputy assistant secretary of defense for security cooperation, and was the senior defense and intelligence adviser to Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid (Stephen and Tommy, “RETOOLING U.S. SECURITY SECTOR ASSISTANCE,” 10-28-20, Accessed Online at , Accessed Online on 7-1-22)

One of America’s most important foreign policy tools is not fit for purpose. U.S. security sector assistance — the means by which the United States strengthens alliances and partners — is stuck in the past. Crucially, it is out of sync with U.S. priorities when it comes to where resources are needed most and the types of capabilities required by America’s allied and partners. Despite widespread agreement on the need to prioritize strategic competition with Russia and China, the United States still directs a disproportionate amount of assistance toward the Middle East. An emphasis on counter-terrorism since 9/11 has also contributed to an emphasis on building the wrong capabilities. The United States is not equipping allies and partners with the capabilities they need to deal with competitors who are adopting increasingly sophisticated strategies in the areas of cyber security, strategic communications, and illicit commercial activity. Moreover, the mechanisms needed to integrate security sector competition with other instruments of national power, including diplomacy, military operations, strategic communications, and other foreign assistance, are underdeveloped at best. These shortcomings hinder U.S. allies and partners, in turn leaving them vulnerable to Chinese and Russian influence. Assistance could and should be a critical tool for deterring competitors and enabling, influencing, and reassuring frontline allies and partners. Making it so will require the United States to change how it envisions, prioritizes, plans, and executes security sector assistance, and that it become more adept at using assistance for signaling purposes. This in turn will necessitate that the executive and legislative branches work together to expand the resources for security assistance or to slay the sacred cows that account for the misuse of the resources currently available. In taking these steps, the U.S. government should ensure that assistance is delivered in a way that reinforces, rather than neglects, its fundamental commitment to democracy and human rights, for ignoring these values cedes valuable ground to America’s competitors. Signs of a Gradual Shift The United States provides security sector assistance to foreign civilian and military forces, agencies, and institutions ranging from local law enforcement and judicial systems to standing militaries. This assistance is intended to strengthen U.S. access to key territories and facilities, shape partners’ national security decision-making and governance, and build their capacity and capabilities for use against shared threats and adversaries. It also promotes the U.S. defense industry via arms transfers, supports the infrastructure and operations of multilateral organizations such as NATO, and increases military interoperability. The State Department implements assistance across the entire security sector, including organizations responsible for defense, law enforcement, and security of key assets like ports and borders. The Department of Defense has a narrower mandate, and provides assistance to partner militaries under the umbrella of security cooperation. The Pentagon also engages in a range of other activities — combined exercises, staff talks, port visits, and officer exchanges — that fall under security cooperation as well. We use the term security sector assistance for simplicity, and distinguish where these additional security cooperation activities are relevant. The U.S. government does not typically define as assistance, but we believe it should, and that it ought to factor Direct Commercial Sales into its assistance planning as well. Both types of sales can lead to sustained U.S. engagement with a partner in the form of training, maintenance, and sustainment for the purchased items. Over the last several years, the national security enterprise has, with a great many fits and starts, endeavored to shift its broader focus — from weapons systems to diplomacy — away from counter-terrorism and toward strategic competition with state actors. As part of this shift, policymakers have attempted to realign security assistance to contribute more directly to strategic competition, primarily by creating new resources for security assistance in Europe and the Asia-Pacific region. The , launched in 2014, has allocated around $6 billion annually to enhance America’s deterrent posture vis-à-vis Russia. It has been supplemented by the , authorized by Congress in Fiscal Year 2016 to provide $250 million in security assistance to bolster Ukraine’s security. Congress also created the in 2014, later re-designated as the Indo-Pacific Maritime Security Initiative, and funded it as a five-year, $425 million security assistance effort, which it has since extended through FY2025. This program is intended to improve the ability of Southeast and East Asian nations to address growing Chinese assertiveness in the South China Sea. In the FY2021 defense bill currently being finalized, Congress is set to authorize a , modeled on the European Deterrence Initiative, with as much as to improve U.S. posture in the Asia-Pacific region, reportedly with a significant security assistance component. These efforts have been laudable, but far from sufficient. The European Deterrence Initiative has largely been used to for U.S. military presence in Europe into the Overseas Contingency Operations portion of the defense budget. It has also dedicated the vast majority of funds to posture and equipment pre-positioning, with little attention to security assistance beyond combined exercises — a significant missed opportunity. The Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative has been managed insularly by the U.S. Europe Command, which has bypassed synchronization with other Defense Department and U.S. government stakeholders, leading to a on the provision of “training and equipment at the expense of developing a long-term strategic vision and implementation of meaningful defense reform.” In the Asia-Pacific, the Maritime Security Initiative has shown promise, but its relatively limited funding has failed to significantly contribute to a rebalance of assistance toward the region, and it has largely funded projects with little deterrent value. Incoming U.S. Indo-Pacific Commander Adm. Philip Davidson , “China is now capable of controlling the South China Sea in all scenarios short of war with the United States.” Moreover, none of these initiatives have prioritized partner security sector governance — a vital element of any strategy that seeks to shape the behavior of U.S. allies and partners. As Congress considers the Pacific Deterrence Initiative, it is essential that these mistakes — failure to integrate security assistance with other instruments of national power, overemphasis on posture at the expense of cooperation, and too little ambition for assistance initiatives — are not repeated. Even avoiding them, however, will go only so far in terms of optimizing security sector assistance for the challenges ahead. The U.S. government should also address broader challenges with the way security sector assistance is prioritized and executed.

2022 UTNIF Negative
Disease Neg – UTNIF › DOS CP › Solvency – NATO Collaboration

Security assistance facilitates continued cooperation

Bergmann and Schmitt 21- senior fellow at the Center for American Progress, where he focuses on European security and U.S.-Russia policy AND** senior policy analyst on the National Security and International Policy team at the Center (Max and Alexandra, “A Plan To Reform U.S. Security Assistance,” Center for American Progress, 3-9-21, Accessed Online at , Accessed Online on 7-1-22)

Moreover, countries that receive U.S. military systems are not just buying equipment off the shelf; they are entering into a longer-term relationship with that country for training, maintenance, and sustainment. This is similar to when a consumer buys a smart phone, as they are not simply buying a piece of hardware; they are reliant on the company to access its broader ecosystem of apps and software and trusting the company to safeguard important data. Over time, a consumer becomes locked in and dependent on a particular provider. Similarly, when a state commits to expanding military-to-military ties—often the most sensitive area for a country—they are making a diplomatic bet on that country. As they base their military on U.S. equipment and U.S. training and engagement, they similarly become locked in to the United States. This sets the ground for more productive American partnerships to tackle a range of geopolitical challenges. For example, U.S. security assistance has been key to building ties with Vietnam after the war between the two countries. American assistance provided to clear unexploded ordnance has helped repair diplomatic relations between Hanoi and Washington, while the recent provision of a retired Coast Guard ship to the Vietnam military can help strengthen military ties and potentially open the door to more U.S. assistance and security cooperation, which will further strengthen bilateral relations.

2022 UTNIF Negative
Disease Neg – UTNIF › Unilat CP › AT LTNB – DOD DA

Funding comes from other agencies besides the DoD

CRS 21- Congressional Research Service (“Domestic Funding for COVID-19 Vaccines: An Overview,” CRS, 3-29-21, Accessed Online at , Accessed Online on 7-4-22)

COVID-19 vaccine research and development (R&D), regulation, manufacture, and purchase have been largely supported by a collaboration among several federal agencies, including the National Institutes of Health (NIH), the Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority (BARDA), FDA, DOD, and others (formerly OWS). Six vaccines were chosen for coordinated federal support under OWS. Some vaccine R&D has been supported by NIH, BARDA, and DOD separately from the OWS efforts. For R&D, funding has been provided to accounts at NIH, DOD, and the Public Health and Social Services Emergency Fund (PHSSEF; parent account for BARDA) for COVID-19 related R&D, including vaccine R&D. In addition, over $50 billion in PHSSEF funding has been made available until September 24, 2024 for a broad set of medical countermeasures and surge capacity purposes, including for the development, manufacture, and purchase of vaccines and related supplies. Separately, FDA has received broad supplemental appropriations for its regulatory and other activities. ARPA (P.L. 117-2) further provides appropriations that can be used for activities under this heading (all ARPA funds are mandatory appropriations): Section 2303 provides $6.05 billion to HHS, available until expended, for research, development, manufacturing, production, and the purchase of vaccines, therapeutics, and ancillary medical products and supplies—available for COVID-19 (or SARS-CoV-2), its variants, and any disease with potential for creating a pandemic. Section 2304 provides $500 million to FDA, available until expended, for a broad set of activities, including for its review of the performance, safety, and effectiveness of vaccines; inspection of vaccine manufacturing facilities; and oversight of the vaccine supply chain. Section 3101 provides $10 billion, available until September 30, 2025, for activities under the Defense Production Act with respect to medical supplies and equipment for the pandemic, including for vaccines and related supplies. Funds can support the purchase, production, and distribution of such supplies. After September 30, 2022, funds can be used to meet critical public health needs with respect to any pathogen that the President has determined has the potential for creating a public health emergency.

2022 UTNIF Negative
Disease Neg – UTNIF › Unilat CP › Solvency – Data Collaboration

Managing risks is key

Borja et. al. 20- postdoctoral research fellow at the Center for Global Security Research (CGSR) at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory AND** Fellow at the Center for Global Security Research (CGSR) AND** research associate at the Center for Global Security Research (CGSR) at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory AND** postdoctoral research fellow at the Center for Global Search Research AND** postdoctoral research fellow at the Center for Global Security Research (CGSR) (Lauren, Alexander Campbell, Marigny Kirschke-Schwartz, Brian Radzinsky, Brandon Williams, “Rethinking U.S. Biosecurity Strategy for the Decade Ahead (Workshop Summary),” Center for Global Security Research, 10-29-20, Accessed Online at , Accessed Online on 6-21-22)

The prevailing approach to managing pandemic risks is to quickly detect and respond to infectious diseases as they arise. The tools for doing so have steadily improved since the 1980s. Panelists cited two in particular: first, in the mid-1990s, U.S. and Israeli support developed the Global Infectious Disease and Epidemiology Network, a unified online software platform for diagnosing diseases and identifying potential treatments. With the twin advent of genomic science and improved computing power, U.S. universities and federally funded research centers developed significant bioinformatics capabilities to aid in the processing of emergent pandemic data and the identification of responses. The widespread use of relatively inexpensive, high throughput genomic sequencing has aided bioinformatics efforts and may aid in characterizing the risks of future pandemics. The genomes of over 2000 viruses have been sequenced thus far, although approximately 300,000 mammalian viruses remain unsequenced. In contrast, success in predicting the emergence of harmful pathogens has proved more elusive. A stronger worldwide surveillance system that monitors people with novel and unusual diseases would provide additional early warning before pandemics emerge. However, there are domestic and geopolitical barriers to the development of such a surveillance system. Governments are hesitant to provide external researchers with the kind of access necessary to conduct good disease surveillance, while sustained access might require a degree of international cooperation that is unrealistic in an era of renewed interstate competition. In addition, all pathogens are somewhat unique, and the emergence of a particularly virulent infectious diseases can overwhelm the ability of public and private sector actors to prevent spread of a contagion and rapidly produce vaccines and treatments. These challenges affect both man-made and natural pathogens. Man-made threats are further complicated by the dual-uses of many emerging biotechnologies which lack effective means for establishing norms to enforce their misuse. Early warning and response could also be significantly improved with a better understanding of which pathogens might infect humans and cause adverse effects. This could contribute to efforts to anticipate natural pathogens as well as potential man-made threats. A framework for understanding the movement of pathogens from animal to human hosts would involve several aspects, including identifying whether animals and humans share particular cell receptors that would allow for infection, the intracellular components that would allow viruses to replicate, and the mechanism of cross-species transmission. Panelists also identified the importance of studying single- and double-stranded RNA and DNA viruses to better understand their replication. The U.S. government through DARPA and other funding has sponsored several efforts to develop tools for anticipating future pandemics. Nevertheless, such efforts must contend with the unique attributes of otherwise related pathogens. For instance, SARS-CoV-2, the novel coronavirus that causes COVID-19, proved to be more infectious and more harmful than other coronaviruses. 5 Nevertheless, panelists emphasized that it was too costly an effort to study all identified viruses to understand potential risks. A more fruitful approach was to invest in better global biosurveillance to filter out “signals” from “noise”—that is, to leverage the capabilities of the global health community to provide credible early warning when potential pathogens first begin to spread. While there is national interest in anticipating emerging threats, participants did not identify a clear path forward for U.S. government efforts. One recommendation was that the U.S. Intelligence Community reassess its standards for confidence when making judgments about potential pandemic risks. Excessively high confidence requirements for community acceptance of judgments could, the argument goes, limit further study of a potential threat. Another recommendation was to leverage artificial intelligence and computing capabilities to better mine large data sources for insight into emergent threats.

2022 UTNIF Negative
Disease Neg – UTNIF › Unilat CP › Solvency – Data Collaboration

Detection and early warning solves spread

Borja et. al. 20- postdoctoral research fellow at the Center for Global Security Research (CGSR) at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory AND** Fellow at the Center for Global Security Research (CGSR) AND** research associate at the Center for Global Security Research (CGSR) at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory AND** postdoctoral research fellow at the Center for Global Search Research AND** postdoctoral research fellow at the Center for Global Security Research (CGSR) (Lauren, Alexander Campbell, Marigny Kirschke-Schwartz, Brian Radzinsky, Brandon Williams, “Rethinking U.S. Biosecurity Strategy for the Decade Ahead (Workshop Summary),” Center for Global Security Research, 10-29-20, Accessed Online at , Accessed Online on 6-21-22)

Biological threats are inherently difficult to calibrate. In the natural environment, emerging and re-emerging pathogens are constantly evolving and spread opportunistically. The intentions and capabilities of human actors to exploit biological agents for purposes of terrorism and war are also in flux as advancing biotechnologies enable both state and nonstate actors to develop new threats. Thus, bio surprise is inevitable, even when the risk is generally acknowledged. Following the initial surprise, rapid detection and assessment are critical to staying ahead of the threat. a. Looking ahead a decade, emerging infectious diseases will likely intensify. A combination of factors, including increased human encroachment into remote habitats and the effects of global warming, can be expected to increase the frequency of epidemics and pandemics. Participants agreed that the United States does not have the luxury of preparing for one or the other (naturally-occurring or man-made); it must be prepared for both. b. Early warning can make a huge difference in mitigating human and other consequences. This requires broad surveillance, reliable information, and broad information sharing. The United States and the international community have multiple capabilities in place to look for early warning signs of an emerging public health crisis, but these depend on a high degree of scientific competence and credibility. Both have diminished in recent years or have failed to adapt in the face of growing political and societal challenges to authority and expertise. Divestment, disinformation, and outright attacks have all been contributing factors. c. With early indicators in hand, the role of the scientific community is to out-race the unfolding public health crisis by rapidly characterizing the biological source, openly sharing epidemiological data, implementing public health measures (such as maskwearing, contact tracing, and isolating the sick), and developing medical therapeutics. The ability to do these has greatly advanced in recent years, with improved international cooperation within the scientific community a contributing factor. The potential pathways to medical solutions have also increased significantly (e.g., there are currently 44 vaccines for COVID-19 in clinical evaluation and another 154 in preclinical stages). 3. Looking to the future, specific actions should be in place to enable an effective crisis response. This includes steps to enable the rapid production and deployment of diagnostic tests, monoclonal antibodies, antivirals, and anti-inflammatory drugs. It also includes steps to maintain a capacity for large-scale development and production of vaccines and new therapeutic drugs. In addition, better predictive models would improve the analysis of alternative interventions; however, these models require access to well curated and prepositioned data sets. A key challenge in accelerating responses by the medical research community is the improved use of research that has not yet been peer reviewed; some innovative mechanisms to rapidly review, assess, and make available worthy research are now up and running. 4. In addition, many of the global and regional partnerships needed to respond effectively have not worked as desired during COVID-19 and are in need of repair. These partnerships include the following: public-private, public health-national security, medical-law enforcement, U.S.- allies, international organizations-member states, government-news media, elements of the supply chain, etc. 3 5. To a significant extent, further revisions to national strategy will be driven by lessons learned from the COVID-19 epidemic. As the pandemic tapers off, governmental attention and funding are likely to remain high—for a while. If the past is any guide, however, other demands will emerge, and both attention and funding will decline. Given the expectation of an increased frequency of public health crises in the future, specific actions should be taken now while there is increased funding and public attention on the problem. a. Successful management of a health crisis requires a whole of government response. Essential capabilities include the ability to rapidly get all stakeholders to the table, generate reliable data, quickly define required decisions and make them, rapidly identify and cope with unexpected facets of the problem, coordinate the distribution of limited resources, and coordinate implementation activities across state, federal, and local lines. They also include the ability to manage the domestic and international political dimensions of a situation, rather than try to pretend that a public health crisis is not a political event. The opportunity to learn and practice these skills will improve their efficacy during a crisis. b. Communicating effectively in crisis is an especially important skill. Past crises have repeatedly taught a lesson about the importance of communicating with empathy. This means telling the truth, providing hope, setting expectations, and being explicit about “the ask” of the audience. c. Much more can be done both nationally and internationally to strengthen existing capacities and add new capabilities. Significant gaps remain in the global architecture of institutions and processes for managing biological risks, whether naturally occurring or man-made. d. The United States should also learn from the successes of its COVID-19 response, particularly those from Operation Warp speed. Many panelists commented that the speed by which vaccine candidates have advanced to clinical trials was amazing. This success story demonstrates how the U.S. government can help underwrite cost and risk of new vaccine development for pharmaceutical companies.

2022 UTNIF Negative
Disease Neg – UTNIF › Unilat CP › Solvency – Data Collaboration

Using data science solves

Bollyky and Patrick 20- director of the global health program and senior fellow for global health, economics, and development at the Council on Foreign Relations AND** James H. Binger senior fellow in global governance and director of the International Institutions and Global Governance (IIGG) Program at the Council on Foreign Relations (Thomas J. and Stewart M., “Improving Pandemic Preparedness: Lessons From COVID-19,” Council on Foreign Relations, October 2020, Accessed Online at , Accessed Online on 7-5-22)

In a global crisis involving a highly transmissible novel pathogen, some heterogeneity in national responses is to be expected. Yet the current pandemic demonstrates that an international framework for pandemic detection and response that relies so heavily on the transparency, judgment, and discretion of individual national governments leaves too many opportunities for failure. The Task Force recommends the following measures to improve the availability and reliability of early epidemic threat surveillance and to enable rapid identification, characterization, and tracking of emerging infectious diseases. First, the United States should work with other governments and civil society partners to build and integrate national and global epidemic surveillance systems, which would detect, share, and publicize early signs of an outbreak in near real time. This framework should establish a voluntary, international sentinel surveillance network, founded on health-care facilities around the world that regularly share hospitalization data, using anonymized patient information, to identify unusual trends. National voluntary sentinel surveillance systems could target vulnerable communities—such as nursing homes or low-income neighborhoods—which could allow for the detection of new, dangerous outbreaks within these groups before they became unstoppable. Participation in these international and national sentinel networks should be incentivized with grants and technology transfers. Other surveillance methods being used in this and previous outbreaks are worth expanding. Wastewater surveillance to detect the presence of certain viruses was pioneered in polio eradication and is now being harnessed in some settings to track coronavirus trends. Kinsa, which uses internet-connected thermometers to predict the spread of the flu, has been used to identify anomalous fever spikes that could be COVID-19 related. These and similar methods, known as syndromic surveillance, could be used more broadly to identify presence of pathogens with outbreak potential, even before people start becoming sick. Just as national security agencies have expanded their activities to include and rely on data surveillance expertise, so should public health communities. Since 2013, the CDC has fostered an open collaboration, called FluSight, to improve the science and usability of epidemic forecasts of influenza for public health decision-making. Proposals to create similar systems for sharing data on epidemic threats are worthy of support.125 This data should feed into an integrated global disease surveillance data platform, created under the auspices of the Health Security Coordination Committee. This platform should enlist participating government agencies and relevant nongovernmental agencies to standardize assessment of data and characterization of threats. It should share the results of those assessments and raise the alarm over any unusual trends with the UN coordinator, WHO Emergency Program, and the general public. This global surveillance architecture should be linked to public health agencies in participating nations, including the CDC, so that the data can be used to directly inform preparedness and response activities to both global and domestic threats.

2022 UTNIF Negative
Disease Neg – UTNIF › Unilat CP › Solvency – Pandemics

US biotech investment alone solves

Borja et. al. 20- postdoctoral research fellow at the Center for Global Security Research (CGSR) at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory AND** Fellow at the Center for Global Security Research (CGSR) AND** research associate at the Center for Global Security Research (CGSR) at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory AND** postdoctoral research fellow at the Center for Global Search Research AND** postdoctoral research fellow at the Center for Global Security Research (CGSR) (Lauren, Alexander Campbell, Marigny Kirschke-Schwartz, Brian Radzinsky, Brandon Williams, “Rethinking U.S. Biosecurity Strategy for the Decade Ahead (Workshop Summary),” Center for Global Security Research, 10-29-20, Accessed Online at , Accessed Online on 6-21-22)

Leading in biotechnology is crucial for many U.S. economic and strategic goals; however, the U.S. must balance these with necessary regulation and oversight. Geopolitical events, such as global pandemics or great power competition, can also influence this balancing act. How can leaders strike the right balance to attain maximal benefit and prosperity for the United States? It was also clear that professionals in the biological sciences should play a role in determining this balance, potentially through organizations such as the National Academies that bridge the scientific and policy communities. 12 Responsible leadership is a central factor in establishing the necessary oversight starting at labs and extending to the intergovernmental sphere. Biotechnology and biosecurity regimes call for principled leadership that is responsive to scientists, policymakers, and stakeholders across institutions. Engaged leaders devise whole of enterprise solutions, an issue noticeably lacking with COVID-19 and a theme which will certainly appear in the future. Accordingly, oversight from knowledgeable leaders is a vital force in crafting policy that will spur innovation to build trust across sectors. Leaders and bureaucrats setting the regulatory tone should be mindful of striking the right balance: scientists who labor under burdensome regulatory regimes may be stymied in their pursuit of technological advancement. Leaders should avoid counterproductive measures such as layers of oversight, redundant paperwork, or a distrustful culture that hinder scientists’ spirit of risk taking or engagement beyond a stovepiped world. One troubling reality exists: much of global oversight falls between seams of multinational organizations, and cooperation from scientists and policymakers is essential to remedy a dilemma brought further into relief by COVID-19. There is no ambiguity on the necessary role of scientific expertise in biosecurity and biotechnology: to leverage cooperation to play an outsized role in working beyond the sphere of geopolitical competition. Panelists were unanimous in scientists’ power to work effectively across borders, to make friends via science. Forging relationships based on like-minded scientific expertise creates the possibility for the scientific community to harmonize interests that may sit uneasily between sparring nations’ heads of state. A basis for a Track 2 or 1.5 dialogue between different governments may run through the long-standing friendships that were cultivated by scientists before the return of great power competition. Scientist-to-scientist bonds offer policymakers with a foundation to utilize not only for diplomatic ends, but also in the possibility of a future global pandemic that necessitates collaboration. Scientific relationships will be the cornerstone for future cooperation, even when the fires of geopolitical competition flare up. Biotechnological competition with China represents a rupture from the past and threatens American primacy in this domain. Chinese policymakers identified biotechnology as a key space for China to dominate. China’s prioritization of biotechnology meets multiple ends for a state poised to shape geopolitics: Chinese biosecurity, the nation’s economy, and the health of the Chinese people. China’s strategic whole of nation investment in biotechnology aims to unseat the United States from its place of historic control over the material and intellectual production of biotechnology. In a break from historic competitors, a rival nation-state is pouring resources into technology development at levels that are comparable with the United States’ publicprivate funding streams. With the arrival of a near peer competitor in biotechnology, how should U.S. policymakers strike the right policy balance? On the one hand, stakeholders in government, philanthropy, and the private sector cannot underestimate the magnitude of the challenge. The implications for the United States extend beyond facing a competitor. China’s military-civil fusion, alongside torrents of state funding, aspires to fuse agents across China into the mission of overtaking America’s global position. The stakes are clear, and the consequences of losing preeminence for American biosecurity and economy should not be underestimated. 13 On the other hand, engagement with Chinese scientists and policymakers should not be dismissed out of hand. The experts agreed that China should be encouraged to take up a partnership role in the global biosecurity and biotechnology architecture. Evidence of Chinese willingness to participate exist at the institutional and personal level, and the voices on both sides of the Pacific urging cooperation should not be squelched. An American whole of enterprise solution to compete with China can exist in parallel with outreach efforts to prevent future pandemics. Striking the right balance between engaging and competing with China will not be easily executed, yet it is a policy solution that leaders in Beijing and Washington must embrace. A whole of sector push to facilitate developing nations’ biotechnology and biosecurity development can garner influence for the United States. Developed countries no longer hold a monopoly over biotechnologies. Developing countries are increasing investments in biotechnology, and this represents an opportunity for the United States to assert global leadership. Leveraging the United States’ scientific expertise to compete against China, shape norms, and usher in a global regulatory regime is not only a positive series of outcomes. It gestures to a policy agenda for the America’s role in the world’s biotechnology and biosecurity frontier. Nation-state competition is not the only challenge facing the United States. A pattern of panic and neglect historically led policymakers and the public to abandon investments in biosecurity of the order required to overcome COVID-19 and future pandemics. Institutions that preserve focus on biosecurity and biotechnology must be built that strike the right balance between encouraging oversight, elevating scientific expertise, competing with China, and cooperating internationally. The United States’ security, health, and economy are tethered to a biotechnological future that demands attention, not neglect.

2022 UTNIF Negative
Disease Neg – UTNIF › Unilat CP › Solvency – Pandemics

R&D solves pandemic preparedness

Riley 21- Homeland Preparedness News reporter based in the Washington, D.C., metro area where she has access to Capitol Hill lawmakers, lobbyists and other national change-makers (Kim, “Bolster R&D for improved pandemic preparedness and response, say experts,” Homeland Preparedness News, 11-29-21, Accessed Online at , Accessed Online on 7-4-22)

Federal agencies, Congress and the White House must jointly foster improved research and development for pandemic preparedness and response, experts said during a recent webinar hosted by the Capitol Hill Steering Committee on Pandemic Preparedness & Health Security.

“Over the last two years, the United States and the rest of the world have really seen the immense value of research and development in terms of new tools technologies, drugs and vaccines to combat infectious disease threats,” said panel moderator Anita Cicero, deputy director at the Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security, which manages the steering committee. 

2022 UTNIF Disadvantage
Affirmative Answers › Internal Link/Impact › Defense – Multipolarity

Multipolarity coming now despite Covid – intraregional trade, investments, and globalization prove.

Short version of the above card!

Siddiqui 21 - Dr. Kalim Siddiqui is an economist, specializing in International Political Economy, Development Economics, International Trade, and International Economics. His work, which combines elements of international political economy and development economics, economic policy, economic history and international trade, often challenges prevailing orthodoxy about which policies promote overall development in less developed countries. Kalim teaches international economics at the Department of Accounting, Finance and Economics, University of Huddersfield, U.K.. He has taught economics since 1989 at various universities in Norway and U.K., [1, 1-25-2021, "Prospects of a Multipolar World and the Role of Emerging Economies," World Financial Review, https://worldfinancialreview.com/prospects-of-a-multipolar-world-and-the-role-of-emerging-economies/]RA

IV. Growth of Regional Economy Although a significant share of East Asia’s trade is in intermediate manufactured goods for final destination export to the USA, Europe and Japan, it has allowed for technology transfers and has stimulated endogenous growth factors in East Asia region. The other dimension is regionalisation and the intensification of transnational trade and investment flows among the developing countries. Regionalisation has been an important feature of East Asian re-emergence. Initiated by the relocation of Japanese manufacturing capacities in the 1980s, which generated a concatenated division of labour in East Asia, regional economic integration has deepened over the past decade and a half. Intra-regional trade as a share of total trade has thus risen constantly over past decades by 20% in 1970, 32% in the early 1980s, 47% in the early 1995, 54.8% in 2000 and nearly 60% in 2012. The Chinese government appears to be only focusing on building its economy and the living conditions of its people. China has become the world’s largest economy, but it has a population of 1.4 billion, which is more than four times larger than the US. Having an economy the size of the US means that average living standards are far lower than in the US and at present, per capita income is one-fourth than of the US. It means that China still has a long way to go to become a rich country. Chinese annual GDP growth averaged over 9% between 1997 and 2019 and, in the aftermath of the East Asian crisis, trade and investment flows between China and the rest of Asia grew significantly. Since the late 1990s, regional trade with China has been growing faster than with the US. For instance, Japan’s imports from China already exceed those from the US, and Japanese exports to China have been steadily rising. This same trend is apparent in South Korean, Thai, Malaysian and Singaporean trade flows (Amsden, 2001; Siddiqui, 2020a). Chinese leaders thus interpret the 1997 East Asian financial crisis as a turning point: ‘The process of the East Asian cooperation has been consolidated day by day since then [and is now] based on a multi-layered, multi-faceted structure’. Recent moves to gradually internationalise the Renminbi and use it in regional transactions, such as the June 2012 Japanese–Chinese accord to trade in their currencies rather than the dollar, represent a further step in this direction. (Siddiqui, 2020d) Trade between China and all other developing countries grew significantly over the past two decades. While the share of South America, Africa and South Asia in China’s total trade remains relatively small, it is steadily growing, but China’s share in their total trade has become strategically important. The space is not available for a comprehensive review of the new transcontinental flows, but the pattern is clear even when we look at the data. Over the past two decades Asia has become Brazil’s main trading partner, accounting for 30% of its exports and 31% of its imports. Exports to China, as a share of total exports, have risen from 0.9% in 1992 to over 17%. China has thus become Brazil’s second trading partner, just behind the European Union (21%) but well ahead of the US (10%). Argentina’s exports to China, as a share of total exports, have likewise risen from 1.1% to 9.7%. Similar patterns are apparent for Africa, where South Africa’s export share to China has risen from 1.8% in 1998 to over 12% in 2018, while imports rose from 3% to 15%, and Nigeria’s exports from 0.5% to 6.9%. In South Asia the share of Indian exports to China has risen from 2.9% to over 10%, and imports from 2% to 12% during the same period. V. Restructuring Global Capitalism It seems that the historic pendulum, which had swung to the ‘West’ in the late 18th century, is swinging back to Asia, which is reclaiming the leading economic role it held for a very long period before the Age of the Western Empire. The movement towards a polycentric and plural world system has indeed quickened over the past quarter century, as major Asian regions have consolidated their position as a dynamic growth region of the world capitalist economy, developing regional and transcontinental linkages that are reconfiguring global trade, investment and financial flows. First in the 1960s, economic changes began in the East Asian region and later on in the 1990s, growth spread to other developing countries like Brazil, China, India, South Africa and Turkey. The systemic restructuring has primarily been driven by East Asia, which has experienced a process of economic expansion, the duration of which have been remarkable by historic standards. Beginning with Japan’s rapid economic transformation in the 1950s and 1960s, a regional development dynamic was set into motion that spread successively, in wave-like formations, to the Newly Industrialised Countries and moreover, over the last four decades, to spectacular growth in China. Varying initial conditions, historic pathways and a combination of both state and markets have produced positive results in East Asia. There are uneven country-to-country developmental outcomes, distinguishing first and second wave industrialising from third and fourth wave countries that are climbing the ladder but are not far from catching-up with the most developed economies. (Siddiqui, 2020c) Growing financial power derived from cumulative surpluses is another important feature of the rebalancing of the world economy, which has been accentuated by the deepening economic crisis in the European Union, Brexit and in the USA. Nonetheless, a coherent process has been at work, unfolding over time and space to most of the region, with global effects. East Asia’s aggregate share of constantly increasing world GDP (in PPP), which was negligible in the 1950s, has thus risen from around 10% in 1980 to 30% in 2015. China’s share has grown from 2% to over 18%. Over the same time period PPP per capita GDP in current international dollars was multiplied by 14 in South Korea, by over seven in Singapore and Thailand, by six in Malaysia and Indonesia, and by 39 in China (from US$250 to US$9380 in 2019)–a spectacular increase that reflects the intensity of growth and its cumulative impact. By the end of 2020 East Asia’s share of world GDP (in PPP) is expected to reach 32%, with China accounting for nearly two-thirds of the total. In South Asia, India’s world share has risen from 2.5% to 5.5%, and per-capita GDP has increased by a factor of 14, from $419 dollars to $3800 dollars today (in current US dollars). Asia’s aggregate share of world GDP (in PPP) is thus projected to approach 46% in a few years. When other major re-emerging countries and world regions – Brazil, India, Turkey, Mexico, and South Africa are taken into account, despite the Covid-19 setback, their world output share in 2020 is expected to exceed 55%. Over the past two decades, East Asia region has thus been the main source of world growth and has emerged as increasingly trade and investment linkages. Growing financial power derived from cumulative surpluses is another important feature of the rebalancing of the world economy, which has been accentuated by the deepening economic crisis in the European Union, Brexit and in the USA. We are witnessing the end of the long historical cycle during which wealth and power were concentrated in the hands of a small number of countries in Europe, North America and Japan. (Siddiqui, 2019a; also Siddiqui, 2012b) The hierarchical international system constructed in the last three hundred years, that was centred in Europe, and which instituted a global division of labour dividing the world into dominant cores and dependent peripheries, is giving way to a multi-polar world. In fact, the USA’s Cold War strategy required a few regions of secure and prosperous states in Northeast Asia to contain the Soviet Union and China, until the late 1960s Sino-Soviet border tension, and to minimise any possibility of radical movement in the region. (Siddiqui, 2017b) This is also true of China, which, because of its scale, nonetheless constitutes a special case. Gradual integration into the world capitalist economy and export-led industrialisation modelled on the neo-mercantilist strategies of earlier East Asian developmental states has generated intense growth and real GDP gains over long periods. The capitalist transformation has simultaneously led to spatial polarisation, large-scale continental mass migrations, sharp new social stratifications and major problems of environmental sustainability linked to energy use and urbanisation. Sustained growth, fuelled by transnational investment flows, has been made possible by the mobilisation and exploitation of a vast subordinate labour force, notably women concentrated in low value-added activities, raising crucial issues of gender and class. While they highlight the need for vigorous corrective measures, without which a country’s development is likely to be compromised, these problems do not call into question the fact that the strategy followed since 1978 has been broadly successful. China’s pathway bears some analogies to US economic expansion in the 19th century, which was fostered by transnational flows and relied on the exploitation of slave labour until the mid-19th century, and of low wage immigrant labour in the latter part of the century. This comparison is not meant to justify disciplinary Chinese labour policies, although there are currently some signs of relaxation, much less the authoritarian regime that is engineering capitalist transformation. It merely points to the fact that China, through the exploitation of its rural and most backward regions, is following the path of earlier successful European Capitalism. Soon after the communist revolution in China in 1949, the country faced enormous challenges, seeking to overcome severe underdevelopment, widespread malnutrition and illiteracy, and the Western monopoly over technology. It promoted reforms to encourage growth and economic development such as the government’s introduction of radical land reforms, compulsory primary education, and the availability of primary health care for all its citizens. Deng Xiaoping, the chief architect of the ‘open policy towards the West’ expressed this as: “Our country must develop. If we do not develop then we must be bullied. Development is the only hard truth.” China’s political orientation has been shaped by its history of subjugation by foreign powers since the mid-19th century, also known as the “century of humiliation”, and anti-imperialist struggles for national liberation. In the 1950s and 1960s, China extended support to developing countries due to the collective struggle of formerly colonised and oppressed nations against global inequality brought by the West. Four decades later, the success of the Chinese economic reform is undeniable, and it is even noted that such a rapid economic transformation has never happened in human history in such a short period. According to the World Bank, China has lifted nearly 800 million people out of poverty, more than ever happened in human history, and generated “the fastest sustained expansion by a major economy in history”. China’s GDP growth has averaged 10% annually for over forty years, without crises, with the country becoming a world leader in manufacturing, technology and innovation. In mater of just two life spans, from being extremely poor to an international power, China is now predicted to overtake the US in GDP terms in the next fifteen years. Measured in terms of PPP, China’s economy already surpassed the US in 2018. Since the last decade, the US-China trade imbalance has been rising against the US as shown in Figure 1. The US has blamed China and claimed it is due to the Chinese policy of currency manipulation. (Siddiqui, 2020b) After Donald Trump became President of the US in 2017, he initiated a rise in tariffs against certain Chinese products and also threatened more trade sanctions against China and Russia. However, a number of studies have pointed out that the US trade deficit rose not only with China but with Europe and Japan as well (see Figure 2). Therefore, the persistence of trade imbalances trends must be seen as a US domestic policy, rather than putting the blame on others. I argue that a disparity in real costs is the root cause of the US-China trade imbalance. Figure 1, which shows the trade in goods between the US and China, indicates that the US has had trade deficits in goods with China since the early 1990s, which has grown substantially. For example, the deficit was only US$10 billion in 1990, but by 2000 had reached US$100 billion; by 2005 it had risen further to US$200 billion, by 2012 it was US$ 315 billion, and by 2017 it had reached US$376 billion. The sharpest rise was since 2001, which also coincided with China joining the WTO. For example, China’s exports to the US increased from US$125 billion to US$505 billion, while US exports to China increased only US$19 billion to about US$130 billion for the same period. [figure omitted] Figure 2 indicates that China is an important trading partner for the US, but that China still has less than half of the US’s overall trade deficits. For example, in 2017 the US’s trade deficit with China was US$ 375 billion; however, its overall trade deficit was US$ 775 billion. This means that even if the US were to eliminate its trade deficit with China, its trade imbalance problems would still exist. [figure omitted] The US trade deficit and also external payments kept on rising as shown in Figure 3, and has grown remarkably over the last two decades. This was coincident with the period when China joined WTO, which appears to have given the US an excuse to blame China for raising its trade deficits. The US trade deficit with China and other countries are shown in Figure 2. Since 1990, the labour and total factor productivity in the advanced economies has witnessed negative growth, while in the emerging economies including China it has grown steadily, as indicated in Figure 5. [figure omitted] The US-China trade war has facilitated the establishment of Russia as China’s top strategic partner. This also led Russian oil to be redirected from European countries to China. Chinese President Xi Jinping announced in Russia in 2019 the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), both countries signed to develop bilateral trade and cross-border payments using the Rouble and Renminbi, bypassing the US dollar. (Siddiqui, 2020d) [Figure Omitted] As China overtook the US as the worlds’ largest economy, a multi-polar world could be a welcome development for all, especially the developing countries. According to Fortune 2018, among global 500 top businesses, the China has moved into second position only behind the US (see Figure 4). The IMF has said that in 2019 China displaced the US as the world’s largest economy. The IMF’s estimation is made on a purchasing power parity (PPP) basis, meaning that it takes into account the differing prices in both countries. Therefore, if at present 1 US$ is worth Chinese 6.1 Renminbi on the foreign exchange market, it means that 6.1 Renminbi can buy much more in China than one dollar can buy in the US market. Hence, the PPP comparison makes adjustments for this, and this is why the Chinese economy is much larger than the measure most commonly used by international organisations and media, which simply converts China’s GDP to US dollars at the official exchange rate. [figure Omitted] China is playing a very assertive and leading role in global affairs. It has launched the trillions of dollars on ‘Belt and Road Initiative’ – called “the largest single infrastructure programme in human history.” The BRI involves over 70 countries and 1700 developmental projects, connecting Asia, Europe, Africa and Latin America (Siddiqui, 2019c), while the US is facing economic stagnation and decline, and is losing international control. The US President Donald Trump in 2019 increased military spending rapidly to US$ 716 billion and has brought into his cabinet extreme hawks and anti-China hardliners such as Mike Pompeo and Peter Navarro. For US policy makers and elites, rather than accepting this new challenge, they see it as a threat to their world domination, and have formulated a recent policy known as the “containing China” policy. Similarly, three-quarters of a century earlier, the US took over as the leader of the capitalist world, declared the Soviet Union as its main enemy, and began an arms race with the Soviet Union. However, at that time the Soviet economy was one-quarter of the size of the US. But now the situation is very different, the Chinese economy is currently bigger than the US and also has huge amounts of trade and a current account surplus. Even after the Covid-19 set back, the Chinese economy has not only recovered, but began growing into the fastest economy in the world. Moreover, China has emerged as the top investor country in the world in recent years. China is a rising power, but they do not seem to be interested in building an empire. For example, China’s billon US dollar investment commitment to ‘one belt one road’, and it becoming the largest investor in Africa, while the West has still not recovered from the 2008 financial crisis and the more recent Covid-19 epidemic. It seems that due to the long-term consequences of the COVID crisis, public debt in most developed economies will rise sharply. In fact, the 2008 financial crisis increased government debt in the US and EU. (Siddiqui, 2020c; also Siddiqui, 2019b) We think of the financial crisis as a temporary shock that the developed economies barely recovered from, but as we look at the current crisis, it will increase government debt greatly compared to the GDP. This is a legacy that will remain for a long time and will pose very pressing policy questions. As we think about the future of developed economies, in the US and EU, we have to ask ourselves how we will be dealing with a level of government debt that will exceed, as a share of GDP, the amount we had at the end of World War II. The management of this new massive debt through the policy response in the aftermath of the crisis will shape Western society, determining the economic balance between generations, the actual opportunities for future generations, and the technological disruption and transformation that was already in place before this outbreak. VI. Conclusion As we have discussed, the new globalisation cycle that began in the late 20th century has led to an unexpectedly rapid, albeit still incomplete, rebalancing between emerging and advanced economies. East Asia has been the main driver of a systemic change that is leading to new transnational linkages between Asia, Africa and Latin America. These new patterns of interaction are part of a broad process of gradual decentring and restructuring of the world economy that, at the political level, is leading to a diffusion of power. Domestic or international events, for instance a hypothetical but not unthinkable Chinese overreach in the South China Sea leading to sustained inter-state tensions, might slow but are unlikely to halt a transformation that is embedded in globalisation and has become one of its driving forces. The rapid economic development in the emerging economies has been dynamically restructuring world capitalism from within. It conforms to one of the historic aims of generations of anti-colonial leaders and thinkers, gaining upward mobility and achieving sovereign equality, the way in which it is occurring represents a rather sharp break with the past. But unlike the first generation of postcolonial leaders, who aimed for revolution or sought to invent a ‘Third Way’ between capitalism and communism, and the framers of the NIEO who challenged the intellectual and material foundations of the post-1945 world order, the actors of the current shift in global power relations are claiming a central competitive place in the world capitalist system that their predecessors had attempted to either reform or supplant. (Dos Santos, 1970) The success of that claim, and their consequent implications for current and future global system management, has dampened and in some cases entirely submerged the broader emancipatory or universalistic dimensions of the long struggle for independence, equality and justice. The rapid economic development in the emerging economies has been dynamically restructuring world capitalism from within. It conforms to one of the historic aims of generations of anti-colonial leaders and thinkers, gaining upward mobility and achieving sovereign equality, the way in which it is occurring represents a rather sharp break with the past. It has now been sixty-five years since the historic Bandung Conference of 1955, rightly regarded as a milestone in the formation of SSC as a global political movement. The SSC as a movement intended to challenge the Northern-dominated political and economic system and, from the 1950s to the present, has been through a series of starts and stops, surges and retreats. As expressed at the Asian-African Conference held in Bandung in 1955, the newly decolonised countries of the global South emphasised economic and political cooperation, human rights, and the promotion of world peace. This emergent movement of solidarity among the developing countries thereby sought to challenge global power relations. The ‘Bandung Spirit’ henceforth came to encapsulate policies of non-interference and developing economic cooperation among the former colonies to end global inequality while lessening their economic and political dependence on the West. While Bandung and the NAM embodied the political dimensions, the Group of 77, named after the number of countries present at the founding of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), called for the establishment of a NIEO. The NIEO was to be achieved through tackling structural unequal exchanges through ‘a just and equitable relationship’ between the goods exported by developing countries and the goods imported, with an emphasis on sovereignty over natural resources and the right to nationalise key industries and to formulate their own domestic economic policies as sovereign nations. By the 1980s, however, the developing countries’ debt crisis and the rise of neoliberalism had served to eclipse the NIEO project. The retreat of developing countries’ solidarity was given no clearer indication than at the 1992 UNCTAD summit, when UNCTAD dropped its demands for the adjustment of the international patent system to the developmental needs of the global South, and adopted a statement expressing the belief that the adoption of adequate and effective International Patent Protections and related efforts in the World Intellectual Property Organization and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) would facilitate technological transfers to developing countries. Henceforth, UNCTAD had been sidelined by GATT, and its successor the WTO. The study finds that people have nothing to fear from a multi-polar world. And today it seems that the time is ripe for emerging economies to stand up and demand a greater role in the international arena related to the formulation of politics and economics, and in support of its historic promise to transform the world order. There has been a historically significant global shift in production and manufacturing from the advanced economies to the emerging economies, altering the economic geography of the world. The tendency over the past several decades to greatly intensify the globalisation of production, trade and financial flows was advocated primarily as a systemic solution to underlying structural problems in the international political economy, including growth, terms of trade, and productivity. But these same globalising tendencies have also enhanced the historical potential of economic growth and industrialisation in the emerging economies, although currently limited to only a few regions, but expected to spread in the coming decades.

2022 UTNIF Disadvantage
Affirmative Answers › Internal Link/Impact › Defense – Multipolarity

Their impact is non-unique: Multipolarity is inevitable --- but it’s currently a peaceful transition

Siddiqui 21 - Dr. Kalim Siddiqui is an economist, specializing in International Political Economy, Development Economics, International Trade, and International Economics. His work, which combines elements of international political economy and development economics, economic policy, economic history and international trade, often challenges prevailing orthodoxy about which policies promote overall development in less developed countries. Kalim teaches international economics at the Department of Accounting, Finance and Economics, University of Huddersfield, U.K.. He has taught economics since 1989 at various universities in Norway and U.K., [1, 1-25-2021, "Prospects of a Multipolar World and the Role of Emerging Economies," World Financial Review, , charts included!

IV. Growth of Regional Economy Although a significant share of East Asia’s trade is in intermediate manufactured goods for final destination export to the USA, Europe and Japan, it has allowed for technology transfers and has stimulated endogenous growth factors in East Asia region. The other dimension is regionalisation and the intensification of transnational trade and investment flows among the developing countries. Regionalisation has been an important feature of East Asian re-emergence. Initiated by the relocation of Japanese manufacturing capacities in the 1980s, which generated a concatenated division of labour in East Asia, regional economic integration has deepened over the past decade and a half. Intra-regional trade as a share of total trade has thus risen constantly over past decades by 20% in 1970, 32% in the early 1980s, 47% in the early 1995, 54.8% in 2000 and nearly 60% in 2012. The Chinese government appears to be only focusing on building its economy and the living conditions of its people. China has become the world’s largest economy, but it has a population of 1.4 billion, which is more than four times larger than the US. Having an economy the size of the US means that average living standards are far lower than in the US and at present, per capita income is one-fourth than of the US. It means that China still has a long way to go to become a rich country. Chinese annual GDP growth averaged over 9% between 1997 and 2019 and, in the aftermath of the East Asian crisis, trade and investment flows between China and the rest of Asia grew significantly. Since the late 1990s, regional trade with China has been growing faster than with the US. For instance, Japan’s imports from China already exceed those from the US, and Japanese exports to China have been steadily rising. This same trend is apparent in South Korean, Thai, Malaysian and Singaporean trade flows (Amsden, 2001; Siddiqui, 2020a). Chinese leaders thus interpret the 1997 East Asian financial crisis as a turning point: ‘The process of the East Asian cooperation has been consolidated day by day since then [and is now] based on a multi-layered, multi-faceted structure’. Recent moves to gradually internationalise the Renminbi and use it in regional transactions, such as the June 2012 Japanese–Chinese accord to trade in their currencies rather than the dollar, represent a further step in this direction. (Siddiqui, 2020d) Trade between China and all other developing countries grew significantly over the past two decades. While the share of South America, Africa and South Asia in China’s total trade remains relatively small, it is steadily growing, but China’s share in their total trade has become strategically important. The space is not available for a comprehensive review of the new transcontinental flows, but the pattern is clear even when we look at the data. Over the past two decades Asia has become Brazil’s main trading partner, accounting for 30% of its exports and 31% of its imports. Exports to China, as a share of total exports, have risen from 0.9% in 1992 to over 17%. China has thus become Brazil’s second trading partner, just behind the European Union (21%) but well ahead of the US (10%). Argentina’s exports to China, as a share of total exports, have likewise risen from 1.1% to 9.7%. Similar patterns are apparent for Africa, where South Africa’s export share to China has risen from 1.8% in 1998 to over 12% in 2018, while imports rose from 3% to 15%, and Nigeria’s exports from 0.5% to 6.9%. In South Asia the share of Indian exports to China has risen from 2.9% to over 10%, and imports from 2% to 12% during the same period. V. Restructuring Global Capitalism It seems that the historic pendulum, which had swung to the ‘West’ in the late 18th century, is swinging back to Asia, which is reclaiming the leading economic role it held for a very long period before the Age of the Western Empire. The movement towards a polycentric and plural world system has indeed quickened over the past quarter century, as major Asian regions have consolidated their position as a dynamic growth region of the world capitalist economy, developing regional and transcontinental linkages that are reconfiguring global trade, investment and financial flows. First in the 1960s, economic changes began in the East Asian region and later on in the 1990s, growth spread to other developing countries like Brazil, China, India, South Africa and Turkey. The systemic restructuring has primarily been driven by East Asia, which has experienced a process of economic expansion, the duration of which have been remarkable by historic standards. Beginning with Japan’s rapid economic transformation in the 1950s and 1960s, a regional development dynamic was set into motion that spread successively, in wave-like formations, to the Newly Industrialised Countries and moreover, over the last four decades, to spectacular growth in China. Varying initial conditions, historic pathways and a combination of both state and markets have produced positive results in East Asia. There are uneven country-to-country developmental outcomes, distinguishing first and second wave industrialising from third and fourth wave countries that are climbing the ladder but are not far from catching-up with the most developed economies. (Siddiqui, 2020c) Growing financial power derived from cumulative surpluses is another important feature of the rebalancing of the world economy, which has been accentuated by the deepening economic crisis in the European Union, Brexit and in the USA. Nonetheless, a coherent process has been at work, unfolding over time and space to most of the region, with global effects. East Asia’s aggregate share of constantly increasing world GDP (in PPP), which was negligible in the 1950s, has thus risen from around 10% in 1980 to 30% in 2015. China’s share has grown from 2% to over 18%. Over the same time period PPP per capita GDP in current international dollars was multiplied by 14 in South Korea, by over seven in Singapore and Thailand, by six in Malaysia and Indonesia, and by 39 in China (from US$250 to US$9380 in 2019)–a spectacular increase that reflects the intensity of growth and its cumulative impact. By the end of 2020 East Asia’s share of world GDP (in PPP) is expected to reach 32%, with China accounting for nearly two-thirds of the total. In South Asia, India’s world share has risen from 2.5% to 5.5%, and per-capita GDP has increased by a factor of 14, from $419 dollars to $3800 dollars today (in current US dollars). Asia’s aggregate share of world GDP (in PPP) is thus projected to approach 46% in a few years. When other major re-emerging countries and world regions – Brazil, India, Turkey, Mexico, and South Africa are taken into account, despite the Covid-19 setback, their world output share in 2020 is expected to exceed 55%. Over the past two decades, East Asia region has thus been the main source of world growth and has emerged as increasingly trade and investment linkages. Growing financial power derived from cumulative surpluses is another important feature of the rebalancing of the world economy, which has been accentuated by the deepening economic crisis in the European Union, Brexit and in the USA. We are witnessing the end of the long historical cycle during which wealth and power were concentrated in the hands of a small number of countries in Europe, North America and Japan. (Siddiqui, 2019a; also Siddiqui, 2012b) The hierarchical international system constructed in the last three hundred years, that was centred in Europe, and which instituted a global division of labour dividing the world into dominant cores and dependent peripheries, is giving way to a multi-polar world. In fact, the USA’s Cold War strategy required a few regions of secure and prosperous states in Northeast Asia to contain the Soviet Union and China, until the late 1960s Sino-Soviet border tension, and to minimise any possibility of radical movement in the region. (Siddiqui, 2017b) This is also true of China, which, because of its scale, nonetheless constitutes a special case. Gradual integration into the world capitalist economy and export-led industrialisation modelled on the neo-mercantilist strategies of earlier East Asian developmental states has generated intense growth and real GDP gains over long periods. The capitalist transformation has simultaneously led to spatial polarisation, large-scale continental mass migrations, sharp new social stratifications and major problems of environmental sustainability linked to energy use and urbanisation. Sustained growth, fuelled by transnational investment flows, has been made possible by the mobilisation and exploitation of a vast subordinate labour force, notably women concentrated in low value-added activities, raising crucial issues of gender and class. While they highlight the need for vigorous corrective measures, without which a country’s development is likely to be compromised, these problems do not call into question the fact that the strategy followed since 1978 has been broadly successful. China’s pathway bears some analogies to US economic expansion in the 19th century, which was fostered by transnational flows and relied on the exploitation of slave labour until the mid-19th century, and of low wage immigrant labour in the latter part of the century. This comparison is not meant to justify disciplinary Chinese labour policies, although there are currently some signs of relaxation, much less the authoritarian regime that is engineering capitalist transformation. It merely points to the fact that China, through the exploitation of its rural and most backward regions, is following the path of earlier successful European Capitalism. Soon after the communist revolution in China in 1949, the country faced enormous challenges, seeking to overcome severe underdevelopment, widespread malnutrition and illiteracy, and the Western monopoly over technology. It promoted reforms to encourage growth and economic development such as the government’s introduction of radical land reforms, compulsory primary education, and the availability of primary health care for all its citizens. Deng Xiaoping, the chief architect of the ‘open policy towards the West’ expressed this as: “Our country must develop. If we do not develop then we must be bullied. Development is the only hard truth.” China’s political orientation has been shaped by its history of subjugation by foreign powers since the mid-19th century, also known as the “century of humiliation”, and anti-imperialist struggles for national liberation. In the 1950s and 1960s, China extended support to developing countries due to the collective struggle of formerly colonised and oppressed nations against global inequality brought by the West. Four decades later, the success of the Chinese economic reform is undeniable, and it is even noted that such a rapid economic transformation has never happened in human history in such a short period. According to the World Bank, China has lifted nearly 800 million people out of poverty, more than ever happened in human history, and generated “the fastest sustained expansion by a major economy in history”. China’s GDP growth has averaged 10% annually for over forty years, without crises, with the country becoming a world leader in manufacturing, technology and innovation. In mater of just two life spans, from being extremely poor to an international power, China is now predicted to overtake the US in GDP terms in the next fifteen years. Measured in terms of PPP, China’s economy already surpassed the US in 2018. Since the last decade, the US-China trade imbalance has been rising against the US as shown in Figure 1. The US has blamed China and claimed it is due to the Chinese policy of currency manipulation. (Siddiqui, 2020b) After Donald Trump became President of the US in 2017, he initiated a rise in tariffs against certain Chinese products and also threatened more trade sanctions against China and Russia. However, a number of studies have pointed out that the US trade deficit rose not only with China but with Europe and Japan as well (see Figure 2). Therefore, the persistence of trade imbalances trends must be seen as a US domestic policy, rather than putting the blame on others. I argue that a disparity in real costs is the root cause of the US-China trade imbalance. Figure 1, which shows the trade in goods between the US and China, indicates that the US has had trade deficits in goods with China since the early 1990s, which has grown substantially. For example, the deficit was only US$10 billion in 1990, but by 2000 had reached US$100 billion; by 2005 it had risen further to US$200 billion, by 2012 it was US$ 315 billion, and by 2017 it had reached US$376 billion. The sharpest rise was since 2001, which also coincided with China joining the WTO. For example, China’s exports to the US increased from US$125 billion to US$505 billion, while US exports to China increased only US$19 billion to about US$130 billion for the same period. Figure 2 indicates that China is an important trading partner for the US, but that China still has less than half of the US’s overall trade deficits. For example, in 2017 the US’s trade deficit with China was US$ 375 billion; however, its overall trade deficit was US$ 775 billion. This means that even if the US were to eliminate its trade deficit with China, its trade imbalance problems would still exist. The US trade deficit and also external payments kept on rising as shown in Figure 3, and has grown remarkably over the last two decades. This was coincident with the period when China joined WTO, which appears to have given the US an excuse to blame China for raising its trade deficits. The US trade deficit with China and other countries are shown in Figure 2. Since 1990, the labour and total factor productivity in the advanced economies has witnessed negative growth, while in the emerging economies including China it has grown steadily, as indicated in Figure 5. The US-China trade war has facilitated the establishment of Russia as China’s top strategic partner. This also led Russian oil to be redirected from European countries to China. Chinese President Xi Jinping announced in Russia in 2019 the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), both countries signed to develop bilateral trade and cross-border payments using the Rouble and Renminbi, bypassing the US dollar. (Siddiqui, 2020d) As China overtook the US as the worlds’ largest economy, a multi-polar world could be a welcome development for all, especially the developing countries. According to Fortune 2018, among global 500 top businesses, the China has moved into second position only behind the US (see Figure 4). The IMF has said that in 2019 China displaced the US as the world’s largest economy. The IMF’s estimation is made on a purchasing power parity (PPP) basis, meaning that it takes into account the differing prices in both countries. Therefore, if at present 1 US$ is worth Chinese 6.1 Renminbi on the foreign exchange market, it means that 6.1 Renminbi can buy much more in China than one dollar can buy in the US market. Hence, the PPP comparison makes adjustments for this, and this is why the Chinese economy is much larger than the measure most commonly used by international organisations and media, which simply converts China’s GDP to US dollars at the official exchange rate. China is playing a very assertive and leading role in global affairs. It has launched the trillions of dollars on ‘Belt and Road Initiative’ – called “the largest single infrastructure programme in human history.” The BRI involves over 70 countries and 1700 developmental projects, connecting Asia, Europe, Africa and Latin America (Siddiqui, 2019c), while the US is facing economic stagnation and decline, and is losing international control. The US President Donald Trump in 2019 increased military spending rapidly to US$ 716 billion and has brought into his cabinet extreme hawks and anti-China hardliners such as Mike Pompeo and Peter Navarro. For US policy makers and elites, rather than accepting this new challenge, they see it as a threat to their world domination, and have formulated a recent policy known as the “containing China” policy. Similarly, three-quarters of a century earlier, the US took over as the leader of the capitalist world, declared the Soviet Union as its main enemy, and began an arms race with the Soviet Union. However, at that time the Soviet economy was one-quarter of the size of the US. But now the situation is very different, the Chinese economy is currently bigger than the US and also has huge amounts of trade and a current account surplus. Even after the Covid-19 set back, the Chinese economy has not only recovered, but began growing into the fastest economy in the world. Moreover, China has emerged as the top investor country in the world in recent years. China is a rising power, but they do not seem to be interested in building an empire. For example, China’s billon US dollar investment commitment to ‘one belt one road’, and it becoming the largest investor in Africa, while the West has still not recovered from the 2008 financial crisis and the more recent Covid-19 epidemic. It seems that due to the long-term consequences of the COVID crisis, public debt in most developed economies will rise sharply. In fact, the 2008 financial crisis increased government debt in the US and EU. (Siddiqui, 2020c; also Siddiqui, 2019b) We think of the financial crisis as a temporary shock that the developed economies barely recovered from, but as we look at the current crisis, it will increase government debt greatly compared to the GDP. This is a legacy that will remain for a long time and will pose very pressing policy questions. As we think about the future of developed economies, in the US and EU, we have to ask ourselves how we will be dealing with a level of government debt that will exceed, as a share of GDP, the amount we had at the end of World War II. The management of this new massive debt through the policy response in the aftermath of the crisis will shape Western society, determining the economic balance between generations, the actual opportunities for future generations, and the technological disruption and transformation that was already in place before this outbreak. VI. Conclusion As we have discussed, the new globalisation cycle that began in the late 20th century has led to an unexpectedly rapid, albeit still incomplete, rebalancing between emerging and advanced economies. East Asia has been the main driver of a systemic change that is leading to new transnational linkages between Asia, Africa and Latin America. These new patterns of interaction are part of a broad process of gradual decentring and restructuring of the world economy that, at the political level, is leading to a diffusion of power. Domestic or international events, for instance a hypothetical but not unthinkable Chinese overreach in the South China Sea leading to sustained inter-state tensions, might slow but are unlikely to halt a transformation that is embedded in globalisation and has become one of its driving forces. The rapid economic development in the emerging economies has been dynamically restructuring world capitalism from within. It conforms to one of the historic aims of generations of anti-colonial leaders and thinkers, gaining upward mobility and achieving sovereign equality, the way in which it is occurring represents a rather sharp break with the past. But unlike the first generation of postcolonial leaders, who aimed for revolution or sought to invent a ‘Third Way’ between capitalism and communism, and the framers of the NIEO who challenged the intellectual and material foundations of the post-1945 world order, the actors of the current shift in global power relations are claiming a central competitive place in the world capitalist system that their predecessors had attempted to either reform or supplant. (Dos Santos, 1970) The success of that claim, and their consequent implications for current and future global system management, has dampened and in some cases entirely submerged the broader emancipatory or universalistic dimensions of the long struggle for independence, equality and justice. The rapid economic development in the emerging economies has been dynamically restructuring world capitalism from within. It conforms to one of the historic aims of generations of anti-colonial leaders and thinkers, gaining upward mobility and achieving sovereign equality, the way in which it is occurring represents a rather sharp break with the past. It has now been sixty-five years since the historic Bandung Conference of 1955, rightly regarded as a milestone in the formation of SSC as a global political movement. The SSC as a movement intended to challenge the Northern-dominated political and economic system and, from the 1950s to the present, has been through a series of starts and stops, surges and retreats. As expressed at the Asian-African Conference held in Bandung in 1955, the newly decolonised countries of the global South emphasised economic and political cooperation, human rights, and the promotion of world peace. This emergent movement of solidarity among the developing countries thereby sought to challenge global power relations. The ‘Bandung Spirit’ henceforth came to encapsulate policies of non-interference and developing economic cooperation among the former colonies to end global inequality while lessening their economic and political dependence on the West. While Bandung and the NAM embodied the political dimensions, the Group of 77, named after the number of countries present at the founding of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), called for the establishment of a NIEO. The NIEO was to be achieved through tackling structural unequal exchanges through ‘a just and equitable relationship’ between the goods exported by developing countries and the goods imported, with an emphasis on sovereignty over natural resources and the right to nationalise key industries and to formulate their own domestic economic policies as sovereign nations. By the 1980s, however, the developing countries’ debt crisis and the rise of neoliberalism had served to eclipse the NIEO project. The retreat of developing countries’ solidarity was given no clearer indication than at the 1992 UNCTAD summit, when UNCTAD dropped its demands for the adjustment of the international patent system to the developmental needs of the global South, and adopted a statement expressing the belief that the adoption of adequate and effective International Patent Protections and related efforts in the World Intellectual Property Organization and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) would facilitate technological transfers to developing countries. Henceforth, UNCTAD had been sidelined by GATT, and its successor the WTO. The study finds that people have nothing to fear from a multi-polar world. And today it seems that the time is ripe for emerging economies to stand up and demand a greater role in the international arena related to the formulation of politics and economics, and in support of its historic promise to transform the world order. There has been a historically significant global shift in production and manufacturing from the advanced economies to the emerging economies, altering the economic geography of the world. The tendency over the past several decades to greatly intensify the globalisation of production, trade and financial flows was advocated primarily as a systemic solution to underlying structural problems in the international political economy, including growth, terms of trade, and productivity. But these same globalising tendencies have also enhanced the historical potential of economic growth and industrialisation in the emerging economies, although currently limited to only a few regions, but expected to spread in the coming decades.

2022 UTNIF Disadvantage
Affirmative Answers › Internal Link/Impact › Offense – Heg Causes Conflict

Liberal leadership incites global conflict, failed states, and terrorism – downsizing is comparatively safer and resolves their offense

Mearsheimer and Walt 16 (John J, R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago, and Stephen M, Robert and Renée Belfer Professor of International Affairs at the Harvard Kennedy School, “The Case for Offshore Balancing: A Superior U.S. Grand Strategy,” Foreign Affairs, July/August, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2016-06-13/case-offshore-balancing)

HEGEMONY'S HOLLOW HOPES Defenders of liberal hegemony marshal a number of unpersuasive arguments to make their case. One familiar claim is that only vigorous U.S. leadership can keep order around the globe. But global leadership is not an end in itself; it is desirable only insofar as it benefits the United States directly. One might further argue that U.S. leadership is necessary to overcome the collective-action problem of local actors failing to balance against a potential hegemon. Offshore balancing recognizes this danger, however, and calls for Washington to step in if needed. Nor does it prohibit Washington from giving friendly states in the key regions advice or material aid. Other defenders of liberal hegemony argue that U.S. leadership is necessary to deal with new, transnational threats that arise from failed states, terrorism, criminal networks, refugee flows, and the like. Not only do the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans offer inadequate protection against these dangers, they claim, but modern military technology also makes it easier for the United States to project power around the world and address them. Today's "global village," in short, is more dangerous yet easier to manage. This view exaggerates these threats and overstates Washington's ability to eliminate them. Crime, terrorism, and similar problems can be a nuisance, but they are hardly existential threats and rarely lend themselves to military solutions. Indeed, constant interference in the affairs of other states-and especially repeated military interventions- generates local resentment and fosters corruption, thereby making these transnational dangers worse. The long-term solution to the problems can only be competent local governance, not heavy-handed U.S. efforts to police the world.

2022 UTNIF Disadvantage
Affirmative Answers › Internal Link/Impact › Offense – Heg Causes Conflict

Liberal hegemony is obsolete – only de-centering US leadership can resolve next-gen prolif and planetary destruction

Sachs 16 (Jeffrey D. Sachs, Professor of Sustainable Development and Professor of Health Policy and Management at Columbia University, is Director of Columbia’s Center for Sustainable Development and of the UN Sustainable Development Solutions Network, “Learning to Love a Multipolar World,” 12/29, https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/multipolar-world-faces-american-resistance-by-jeffrey-d-sachs-2016-12)

NEW YORK – American foreign policy is at a crossroads. The United States has been an expanding power since its start in 1789. It battled its way across North America in the nineteenth century and gained global dominance in the second half of the twentieth. But now, facing China’s rise, India’s dynamism, Africa’s soaring populations and economic stirrings, Russia’s refusal to bend to its will, its own inability to control events in the Middle East, and Latin America’s determination to be free of its de facto hegemony, US power has reached its limits. One path for the US is global cooperation. The other is a burst of militarism in response to frustrated ambitions. The future of the US, and of the world, hangs on this choice. Global cooperation is doubly vital. Only cooperation can deliver peace and the escape from a useless, dangerous, and ultimately bankrupting new arms race, this time including cyber-weapons, space weapons, and next-generation nuclear weapons. And only cooperation can enable humanity to face up to urgent planetary challenges, including the destruction of biodiversity, the poisoning of the oceans, and the threat posed by global warming to the world’s food supply, vast drylands, and heavily populated coastal regions. Yet global cooperation means the willingness to reach agreements with other countries, not simply to make unilateral demands of them. And the US is in the habit of making demands, not making compromises. When a state feels destined to rule – as with ancient Rome, the Chinese “Middle Kingdom” centuries ago, the British Empire from 1750 to 1950, and the US since World War II – compromise is hardly a part of its political vocabulary. As former US President George W. Bush succinctly put it, “You’re either with us or against us.”