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2022 UTNIF Disadvantage
2NC Cards › Link › Turns Case – Russia Relations

NATO fails to solve international crisis while making relations with Russia worse

Cohen 17 – Stephen Cohen is Professor Emeritus of Russian Studies and Politics at NYU and Princeton, [“Have 20 Years of NATO Expansion Made Anyone Safer?”, 10/18/2017, The Nation, https://www.thenation.com/article/have-20-years-of-nato-expansion-made-anyone-safer]

The expansion of the US-led military alliance, which began in Germany with 13 member states and now stretches to Russia’s borders with 29, is the largest and fastest growth of a “sphere of influence” (American) in modern peacetime history. Throughout the process, Russia has been repeatedly denounced for seeking any sphere of security, even on its own borders. NATO expansion included two broken promises to Russia that the Kremlin has never forgotten. In 1990, the Bush administration (and the West Germany government) assured Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev that, in return for Russia’s agreeing to a united Germany in NATO, the alliance would “not expand one inch to the east.” (Though denied by a number of participants and commentators, the assurance has been confirmed by other participants as well as by archive researchers.) The other broken promise is unfolding today as NATO builds up permanent land, sea, and air forces near Russian territory, along with missile-defense installations. NATO “enlargement,” as it is sometimes benignly termed by its promoters, continues. Montenegro became a member in 2017 and the “door remains open,” officials say repeatedly, to the former Soviet republics of Georgia and Ukraine. 2. NATO is more than the world’s most powerful military alliance. With lavishly funded offices, representatives, think tanks, and other advocates not only in Brussels but in many Western capitals, it is also a powerful political-ideological-lobbying institution—perhaps the world’s most powerful corporation, also taking into account its multitude of bureaucratic employees in Brussels and elsewhere. In the United States alone, scarcely a week passes without media “news” and commentary produced by NATO-affiliated authors or based on NATO sources. (See, among other examples, the Atlantic Council and Newsweek.) 3. Asking whether “enlarged” NATO has resulted in more insecurity than security requires considering the consequences of several wars it led or in which several of its member states participated since 1997: § The Serbian war in 1999 resulted in the NATO occupation and annexation of Kosovo, a precedent cited by subsequent secessionists and occupiers. § The 2003 Iraq War was a catastrophe for all involved and a powerful factor behind expanding organized terrorism, including the Islamic State, and not only in the Middle East. The same was true of the war against Libya in 2011, no lessons having been learned. § NATO promises that Georgia might one day become a member state was an underlying cause of the Georgian-Russian war of 2008, in effect a US-Russian proxy war. The result was the near ruination of Georgia. NATO remains active in Georgia today. § Similar NATO overtures to Ukraine also underlay the crisis in that country in 2014, which resulted in Russia’s annexation of Crimea, the still ongoing Ukrainian civil war in Donbass, and in effect another US-Russian proxy war. Meanwhile, US-backed Kiev remains in profound economic and political crisis, and Ukraine fraught with the possibility of a direct American-Russian military conflict. § Meanwhile, of course, there is Afghanistan, initially a NATO war effort but now the longest (and perhaps most un-winnable) war in American history. Any rational calculation of the outcomes of these wars, Cohen points out, reveals far more military and political insecurity than security, which is mainly pseudo-security or simmering crises. 4. NATO expansion has also bred political-ideological insecurities. NATO’s incessant, ubiquitous media saturation and lobbying in Western capitals, particularly in the United States, has been a major driving force behind the new Cold War and its rampant Russophobia. One perilous result has been the near-end of American diplomacy toward Russia and the almost total militarization of US-Russian relations. This alone is a profound source of insecurity—indeed of possible war with Russia. 5. Meanwhile, the vast resources devoted to NATO expansion have scarcely contributed anything to resolving real international crises, among them economic policies in Europe that have helped inspire secessionist movements; international terrorism in the Middle East and the refugee crisis; the danger of nuclear proliferation, which NATO has abetted by spurring a new nuclear arms race with Russia; and others. Nor does NATO’s vast expansion resolve its own internal crises, as, for example, the growing alliance between NATO member Turkey and Russia; and undemocratic developments in other member states such as Hungary and Poland. And this leaves aside the far-reaching implications of an emerging anti-NATO alliance centering around Russia, China, and Iran—itself a result of NATO’s 20-year expansion. 6. Cohen ends by considering the counter-arguments made by NATO expansion promoters over the years: § They say the small Baltic and other Eastern European countries previously victimized by Soviet Russia still felt threatened by post-Soviet Russia and therefore had to be brought into the alliance. This makes no empirical sense. In the 1990s, Russia was in shambles and weak, a threat only to itself. And if any perceived or future threat existed, there were alternatives: acting on Gorbachev’s proposed “Common European Home”—that is, a security agreement including all of Europe and Russia; bilateral security guarantees to those once-victimized nations, along with diplomacy on their part to resolve any lingering conflicts with Russia, including the endangered status of their own ethnic Russian citizens. This argument makes no historical sense either: The tiny Baltic states near Russia were among the last to be granted NATO membership. § It is also said that every qualified nation has a “right” to NATO membership if it wishes to join. This too is illogical. NATO is not a non-selective fraternity or the AARP. It is a security organization whose sole criterion for membership should be whether or not membership enhances the security of its members. From the outset, it was clear, as many Western critics pointed out, it would not. § Later, it is belatedly argued, Russia did become a threat under its leader Vladimir Putin. But as the British academic specialist Richard Sakwa has compellingly argued, any threat Russia now poses was created by NATO itself, by Moscow’s reactions to NATO expansion. Cohen puts this somewhat differently: Much of what is today denounced as “Putin’s aggression” abroad has been his responses to US and NATO policies. There is also another negative consequence. Moscow’s perception that it is being increasingly encircled by an “aggressive” US-led NATO has had lamentable, and predictable, influence on Russia’s domestic politics. For the sake of international security, NATO expansion must end now. But is there a way back from the 20-year folly, Cohen asks. Member states taken in since the late 1990s cannot, of course, be expelled. But NATO expansion could be demilitarized, its forces withdrawn back to Germany, from which they crept to Russia. This may have been possible in the late 1990s or early 2000s, as promised in 1997. Now it is mostly a utopian idea, but one without which the world is in ever graver danger—a world with less and less real security.

2022 UTNIF Disadvantage
2NC Cards › Link › Link – Countering China

Increasing NATO cooperation in Asia ensures China draw-in over regional disputes

Murphy et. al 22 - Colum Murphy, Lucille Liu, Jing Li, and Philip Glamann are contributors to Bloomberg News over international diplomacy and security matters, ["China Warns U.S. Over Forming Pacific NATO, Backing Taiwan," Bloomberg, 3-7-2022, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-03-07/china-urges-world-not-to-add-fuel-to-fire-in-war-in-ukraine]RA

China warned the U.S. against trying to build what it called a Pacific version of NATO, while declaring that security disputes over Taiwan and Ukraine were “not comparable at all.” Foreign Minister Wang Yi told his annual news briefing Monday that the “real goal” of the U.S.’s Indo-Pacific strategy was to form Asia’s answer to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. China has often accused the U.S. of trying to form blocs to suppress its growth, a complaint that’s likely to attract greater attention after President Vladimir Putin cited similar grievances before his invasion of Ukraine. “The perverse actions run counter to the common aspiration of the region for peace, development, cooperation and win-win outcomes,” Wang added. “They are doomed to fail.” Complaints about U.S. efforts to strengthen its alliance network in Asia were among several points of contention raised by Wang in the almost two-hour briefing on the sidelines of the National People’s Congress in Beijing. The senior diplomat repeatedly alluded to the U.S. as the source of problems with countries around the globe and issued some of China’s most pointed warnings yet against calls to expand U.S. ties with Taiwan. “This would not only push Taiwan into a precarious situation, but will also bring unbearable consequences for the U.S. side,” Wang said on the sidelines of the National People’s Congress in Beijing, later adding: “Taiwan will eventually return to the embrace of the motherland.” Several Asian nations -- like their counterparts on Russia’s European frontier -- have sought closer security ties with the U.S. to keep from being dominated by the region’s biggest player. China has active border disputes with neighbors including Japan, India and Vietnam and has stepped up military, diplomatic and economic pressure on Taiwan, sending warplanes on some 960 forays through the island’s air defense identification zone last year. The Biden administration outlined efforts to push back against growing Chinese clout in its Indo-Pacific strategy released last month. The U.S. has sought to build a coalition of democracies around the world, including both traditional treaty partners such as Japan and new grouping such as the Quad, including also Australia and India. U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken criticized China in a news conference Monday hosted by Lithuanian Foreign Minister Gabrielius Landsbergis, whose Baltic nation has been embroiled in a dispute with Beijing over Taiwan opening a representative office in its capital. “Beijing talks a lot about the importance of upholding international order, stability, respecting sovereignty,” Blinken said. “But from its coercion of Vilnius to its failure thus far to condemn Moscow’s flagrant violation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine, today and in 2014, Beijing’s actions are speaking much louder than its words,” he added, referring to Moscow’s earlier seizure of Crimea. Russia’s attack on Ukraine has undermined confidence that world powers would be able to prevent a crisis from similarly erupting over Taiwan, a democratically governed island of more than 23 million people and key global source of semiconductors. Wang dismissed the comparisons, arguing that Taiwan is part of Chinese territory -- a claim President Tsai Ing-wen in Taipei has rejected. “Some, while being vocal about the principle of sovereignty on the Ukrainian issue, have kept undermining China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity on the Taiwan question -- this is a blatant double standard,” Wang said. Russia launched its action in Ukraine weeks after President Xi Jinping hosted Putin in Beijing and publicly declared their friendship had “no limits.” China has sought to avoid taking a position in the conflict, as it attempts to balance support for Russian efforts to challenge U.S. dominance with its interest of being regarded as a responsible major power.

2022 UTNIF Disadvantage
2NC Cards › Link › Link – Countering Russia

Increasing NATO cooperation to counter Russia only provokes the country, has the opposite affect and causes war

Galen 3/7/22 - Ted Galen Carpenter is senior fellow for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute. Carpenter served as Cato’s director of foreign policy studies from 1986 to 1995 and as vice president for defense and foreign policy studies from 1995 to 2011, ["The U.S. and NATO Helped Trigger the Ukraine War. It's Not 'Siding With Putin' to Admit It," Cato Institute, 3/7/2022, https://www.cato.org/commentary/us-nato-helped-trigger-ukraine-war-its-not-siding-putin-admit-it]RA

Russian leaders and several Western policy experts were warning more than two decades ago that NATO expansion would turn out badly—ending in a new cold war with Russia at best, and a hot one at worst. Obviously, they were not “echoing” Putin or anyone else. George Kennan, the intellectual architect of America’s containment policy during the Cold War, perceptively warned in a May 2, 1998 New York Times interview what NATO’s move eastward would set in motion. “I think it is the beginning of a new cold war,” he stated. “I think the Russians will gradually react quite adversely and it will affect their policies. I think it is a tragic mistake.” U.S. and European officials blew through one red light after another. Kennan was speaking of the first round of enlargement that brought into the Alliance Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary. Later rounds, which added the Baltic Republics and other East European countries, were considerably more abrasive, and Washington’s subsequent attempt to make Ukraine and Georgia members was contemptuous of Russia’s core security interests. Moscow’s complaints and warnings were becoming increasingly sharp as well. Yet U.S. and European officials blew through one red light after another. George W. Bush began to treat Georgia and Ukraine as valued U.S. political and military allies, and in 2008, he pressed NATO to admit Ukraine and Georgia as members. French and German wariness delayed that endeavor, but the NATO summit communique affirmed that both countries would eventually achieve that status. In his 2014 memoir, Duty, Robert M. Gates, who served as secretary of defense in both Bush’s administration and Barack Obama’s, conceded that “trying to bring Georgia and Ukraine into NATO was truly overreaching.” That initiative, he concluded, was a case of “recklessly ignoring what the Russians considered their own vital national interests.” Indeed it was, and Moscow began to push back. Putin exploited a foolish provocation by Georgia’s pro‐​Western government to launch a military offensive that penetrated deeply into the country. Upon its victory, Russia permanently detached two secessionist‐​minded Georgian regions and put them under permanent Russian control. The Kremlin’s decisive action should have alerted even slow‐​learning U.S. leaders that the days of Russian officials merely issuing verbal protests about the West’s steady encroachment into Russia’s security sphere were over. Amazingly, though, the Obama administration still sought to turn Ukraine into a NATO political and military asset. In late 2013 and early 2014, the United States and several European governments meddled shamelessly to support the efforts of demonstrators to unseat Ukraine’s generally pro‐​Russia president, Victor Yanukovych, some two years before the expiration of his term. That campaign was especially inappropriate since Yanukovych became president in 2010 as the result of an election that even the European Union and other international observers acknowledged was reasonably free and fair. In a democratic system, the legal way to remove a president from office is, depending on a specific country’s constitutional rules, through a parliamentary vote of no‐​confidence, impeachment, or defeat in the next election. Angry street demonstrations do not fit into any of those categories, yet the United States and its allies backed that illegal process. A recording of the infamous leaked telephone call between Assistant Secretary of State Victoria Nuland and U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine Geoffrey Pyatt confirmed the extent of Washington’s meddling in the affairs of a sovereign country. The Ukraine episode proved to be an intolerable provocation to neighboring Russia. Putin responded by annexing the strategic Crimea peninsula and the United States and its NATO partners then imposed economic sanctions on Russia. The new cold war was on in earnest. Yet Washington still refused to back off. Instead, the Trump and Biden administrations poured weapons into Ukraine, approved joint military exercises between U.S. and Ukrainian forces, and even prodded the allies to include Ukraine in NATO war games. In late 2021, it became clear that the Kremlin’s restraint had run dry. Moscow issued demands for security guarantees, including a draw‐​down of military forces already deployed in NATO’s eastern members. With respect to Ukraine, the demand was very clear and uncompromising: Not only would Kyiv never receive a membership invitation, but NATO weapons and troops would never be deployed on Ukrainian soil. When the West failed to provide those guarantees, Putin launched his devastating, full‐​scale war. Moscow’s cruel overreaction deserves emphatic condemnation. However, the culpability of the United States and its NATO allies also is sizable. Moving an alliance that one great power dominates to the border of another major power is inherently destabilizing and provocative.

2022 UTNIF Disadvantage
2NC Cards › Link › Link – Sweden/Finland

Increasing cooperation with Sweden/Finland harms risks security dilemmas, draw in, and wrecks our economy

Bandow 5-19-22 – Doug Bandow is a senior fellow at the Cato Institute, specializing in foreign policy and civil liberties. He worked as special assistant to President Ronald Reagan and editor of the political magazine Inquiry. He writes regularly for leading publications such as Fortune magazine, National Interest, the Wall Street Journal, and the Washington Times, [“Sweden and Finland in NATO: What’s in it for Us?”, Cato Institute, https://www.cato.org/commentary/sweden-finland-nato-whats-it-us]RA

Yet when the Ukraine crisis began last fall, the U.S. and European NATO members refused to state the obvious, that Kyiv would not be joining the alliance. Doing so might have forestalled Putin’s invasion. Of course, allied irresponsibility did not justify Moscow’s invasion, but Washington and Brussels share blame for the tragic war. With conflict raging in Ukraine, Finland and Sweden decided that they want formal U.S. protection as well. That comes as no surprise: Countries and even movements around the world eagerly seek the great superpower’s assistance. Years ago, I was asked by ethnic Karen insurgents in Burma/​Myanmar why Washington did not sent troops there to do what it had recently done in Kosovo. If I faced such a regime, I also would want the U.S. to eliminate the brutal, oppressive Tatmadaw, as the Burmese military is known. However, the U.S. government is not the world’s 911 number and should stop treating its defense guarantees as a matter of charity. Sweden, in its (long ago) day a great power, perceived no threat and reduced its military. Finland retained tough armed forces, which proved their worth—and the Finns’ determination to protect their nation—during the infamous “Winter War” from November 1939 to March 1940. The Soviet Union triumphed, but only at great cost; rather than occupy Finland, like the Baltic states, Moscow accepted territorial concessions and a pledge of neutrality. Although Russia’s attack on Ukraine understandably unsettled Europe, Moscow never demonstrated any interest in reviving hostilities with Helsinki or threatening Sweden. And Russia’s poor military performance demonstrates that, contra its pre‐​conflict reputation, Moscow could not conquer its many neighbors, let alone the entire continent, even if it desired to do so. The two countries’ desire to join appears to be an attempt to get an insurance policy at America’s expense, expanding still further Washington’s already lengthy list of defense dependents. If the Duchy of Grand Fenwick was available, it would join NATO as well. Instead, the U.S. should be shifting responsibility for Europe’s defense to Europe, which far outranges Russia in economic strength, population, and military outlays. While America patrols the entire globe, the Europeans (and America’s Asian allies as well) scrimp on their armed forces—for instance, 19 NATO members spend less than two percent of their GDP on defense. Today, Washington is hurtling toward insolvency. The national debt is 100 percent of GDP, nearing the record set after World War II. Even as the Covid‐​19 pandemic recedes, the U.S. is running trillion‐​dollar annual deficits, with the red ink set to increase as the Baby Boomers continue to retire, inflating medical and retirement outlays. The Congressional Budget Office warns that the debt to GDP ratio could hit 200 percent by mid‐​century. And now Washington is going to subsidize Finland’s and Sweden’s security? The U.S. also loses by further contributing to Russian paranoia. The invasion of Ukraine should make obvious that Putin’s oft‐​repeated concerns about NATO expansion were real. Overturning the peaceful Scandinavian status quo and creating another allied front just a few score miles from St. Petersburg will encourage a response likely to further unsettle regional security. Of course, there is little that Russia can do directly against Helsinki and Stockholm. However, Moscow is likely to further rely on nuclear weapons to bolster deterrence. Putin ally (and former stand‐​in president) Dmitry Medvedev warned: “If Sweden and Finland join NATO, the length of the land borders of the alliance with the Russian Federation will more than double. Naturally, these boundaries will have to be strengthened.” It would be one thing to accept enhanced nuclear risks as a response to necessary defense measures. But should we do so because two more wealthy European countries desire a share of America’s defense subsidy? Simply joining the alliance might be only the start. Who will help Finland cover its 810 mile border with Russia? Already, U.S. forces in Europe have jumped 20 percent since January to their highest level since 2005. Among Europe’s NATO members, only the U.K. has made a measurable, though still modest, troop contribution over the same period. Yet Poland and the Baltic states are not satisfied with NATO’s Article 5 guarantee. They also want American (not European) garrisons to create tripwires guaranteeing U.S. involvement in any war. Playing to President Donald Trump’s perceived vanity, Warsaw lobbied the last administration to establish a permanent base, proposing the name “Camp Trump.” Helsinki might not want to be left out the great garrison game. Instead of waving more applicants through NATO’s door, Washington should end expansion. Nothing in the alliance or its founding documents requires the organization to accept applications, let alone grant them. To the contrary, Article 10 provides: “The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European State in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty.” The transatlantic alliance is supposed to take the initiative and act for the benefit of existing members. That is, NATO was created to promote security, not extend charity. Instead of expanding the antiquated U.S. defense dole, the European security system should be reconstructed and placed in European hands. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine should remind Washington policymakers that alliances are serious commitments, which in the past have expanded as much as diminished conflict. Equally important, the U.S. should go to war only when forced to do so, to defend itself. That was not the case with Kiev, which is why America neither forced Ukraine’s inclusion in NATO nor joined in Ukraine’s defense against Russia. If the U.S. wants to remain a superpower and able to care for its own citizens, it must learn to say no.

2022 UTNIF Disadvantage
2NC Cards › Link › Link – Ukraine

Increasing engagement with Ukraine causes draw-in and escalates conflict – Russia is the example, not the exception.

Bilefsky and Peña 4/21/22 - Dan Bilefsky is an international correspondent, based in Montreal. He was previously based in London, Paris, Prague and New York. He was part of the team that won the 2022 George Polk Award for an investigation of the assassination of Haiti’s president, Richard Pérez-Peña, an international news editor in New York, has been with The Times as a reporter and editor since 1992, ["The Roots of the Ukraine War: How the Crisis Developed," The New York Times, 4-21-2022, https://www.nytimes.com/article/russia-ukraine-nato-europe.html]RA

After the Soviet Union collapsed in the early 1990s, NATO expanded eastward, eventually taking in most of the European nations that had been in the Communist sphere. The Baltic republics of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, once parts of the Soviet Union, joined NATO, as did Poland, Romania and others. As a result, NATO moved hundreds of miles closer to Moscow, directly bordering Russia. And in 2008, it stated that it planned — some day — to enroll Ukraine, though that is still seen as a far-off prospect. Mr. Putin has described the Soviet disintegration as one of the greatest catastrophes of the 20th century that robbed Russia of its rightful place among the world’s great powers. He has spent his 22 years in power rebuilding Russia’s military and reasserting its geopolitical clout. The Russian president calls NATO’s expansion menacing, and the prospect of Ukraine joining it a major threat. As Russia has grown more assertive and stronger militarily, his complaints about NATO have grown more strident. He has repeatedly invoked the specter of American ballistic missiles and combat forces in Ukraine, though U.S., Ukrainian and NATO officials insist there are none. Mr. Putin has also insisted that Ukraine is fundamentally parts of Russia, culturally and historically. East-West relations worsened drastically in early 2014, when mass protests in Ukraine forced out a president closely allied with Mr. Putin. Russia swiftly invaded and annexed Crimea, part of Ukraine. Moscow also fomented a separatist rebellion that took control of part of the Donbas region of Ukraine, in a war that still grinds on, having killed more than 13,000 people. What does Putin want? Mr. Putin appears intent on winding back the clock more than 30 years, establishing a broad, Russian-dominated security zone resembling the power Moscow wielded in Soviet days. Now 69 years old and possibly edging toward the twilight of his political career, he clearly wants to draw Ukraine, a nation of 44 million people, back into Russia’s sphere of influence. Russia presented NATO and the United States in December with a set of written demands that it said were needed to ensure its security. Foremost among them are a guarantee that Ukraine would never join NATO, that NATO draw down its forces in the Eastern European countries that have already joined, and that the 2015 cease-fire in Ukraine be implemented — though Moscow and Kyiv disagree sharply on what that would mean. The West dismissed the main demands out of hand. Moscow’s aggressive posture has also inflamed Ukrainian nationalism, with citizen militias preparing for a drawn-out guerrilla campaign in the event of a Russian occupation. The Russian leader may also want to energize nationalists at home by focusing on an external threat, as he has in the past. Nevertheless, since the invasion began, thousands of Russians, some at great personal risk, have taken to the streets to protest the war.

2022 UTNIF Disadvantage
2NC Cards › Link › Link – Cybersecurity

The US must take the helm in cyber security – anything else collapses US military power

Barno and Bensahel 21 – Lt. Gen. David W. Barno, USA (Ret.) is a Visiting Professor of Strategic Studies and Senior Fellow at the Merrill Center in the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) in D.C. He was senior American commander of U.S. and coalition forces in Afghanistan from 2003–2005, Nora Bensahel, Ph.D. is a Visiting Professor of Strategic Studies and Senior Fellow at the Merrill Center in the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) in Washington, D.C, ["Why the United States Needs an Independent Cyber Force," War on the Rocks, 5-4-2021, ]RA

Cyber is now the oxygen upon which the U.S. military depends for almost literally every element of its vast warfighting capabilities. No military service today can function without reliable, resilient cyber capabilities for everything from command and control, to intelligence analysis, to the routine functioning of every weapon system from tanks and ships to aircraft and satellites. Take away that oxygen, disrupt its availability, or sow mistrust in its integrity, and the whole global system of U.S. military power may catastrophically malfunction, if not collapse. What is more, almost every element of government, business, and civil society today also depends on cyberspace to enable every imaginable function. Disrupt cyberspace, and our entire society risks a plunge into chaos. Yet despite this existential reliance by both American society and the U.S. military, the nation’s cyber defense, deterrence, and offense capabilities today are fragmented and disjointed. While the Department of Defense cannot and should not take ownership of every aspect of this ubiquitous challenge that spans the public and private sector alike, it must bring new focus, capacity, and transformative change to effectively address the military dimensions of this challenge. To do so, it needs to establish the U.S. Cyber Force as a new military service. Two recent reports highlight the alarming perils facing the nation from the cyber domain. In March 2020, the Congressionally mandated Cyber Solarium Commission framed its final report by arguing “the status quo is not getting the job done. The status quo is inviting attacks on Americans every second of the day. The status quo is a slow surrender of American power and responsibility.” And this past March, the National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence concluded that “America is not prepared to defend or compete” in the era of artificial intelligence, and that the country “will not be able to defend against AI-enabled threats without ubiquitous AI capabilities and new warfighting paradigms.” Taken together, these two bipartisan efforts sound urgent alarm bells about the ability of the United States to defend itself against the burgeoning dangers in the virtual world, which threaten to undermine traditional U.S. deterrence and military dominance. The chilling findings and wide-ranging recommendations of these two commissions — over 150 in total — provide many arguments that buttress the case for an independent U.S. Cyber Force within the Department of Defense. They both highlight the need to fundamentally rethink how wars will be fought in this century, and flag the U.S. military’s continued reliance on legacy platforms and systems that are not AI-capable and were not designed for warfare in a digital world. The National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence, for example, observes that “a new warfighting paradigm is emerging,” and pointedly states that the Department of Defense “should not be a witness to the AI revolution in military affairs, but should deliver it with leadership from the top, new operating concepts, relentless experimentation, and a system that rewards agility and risk.” As currently structured, the Pentagon simply cannot meet this transformative challenge. Like the other unified combatant commands, U.S. Cyber Command and its Cyber Mission Force draw their personnel solely from the existing military services, each of which has its own cyber missions and responsibilities. The services should retain many of those personnel, since they will need to continue protecting their own cyber networks and providing tactical cyber support to their units on the battlefield. But the cyber warfare domain is entirely different from the physical domains of air, land, sea, and space that shape the focus and warfighting priorities of the services. Too often, the services treat cyber as an enabler of more conventional military operations in their respective domains, rather than an entirely new and unique domain of warfare. The nation needs more capacity and more finely honed skills in the cyber domain than the traditional services can contribute. In many ways, this dynamic parallels the struggle for an independent U.S. Air Force in the first half of the 20th century. In that era, the Army and Navy used newly invented airplanes to support their units and ships, rather than exploring how airpower might be used as a separate, even decisive, instrument of war. They successfully blocked attempts to create a separate Air Force until 1947, after the monumental contributions of American airpower to winning World War II were finally recognized. This pattern is largely repeating itself today, as the services continue to treat cyber principally as a means of advancing their legacy warfighting capabilities rather than think imaginatively about the necessity for a new paradigm that focuses on the revolutionary impacts of the cyber domain on warfare. Yet at a broader level, when no service is specifically charged with the responsibility for thinking solely about fighting in the cyber domain, the nation’s ability to leverage its full cyber warfare potential will forever remain fragmented and inevitably incomplete. A separate U.S. Cyber Force would deeply transform the Department of Defense and prepare it more effectively for the challenges of future warfare. The nascent state of strategic thinking about cyber conflict today shares many similarities with the early days of the nuclear age, when concepts of nuclear deterrence and warfighting were just forming. Establishing a new Cyber Force would speed that process by catalyzing new and truly innovative thinking, without the constraints of other service cultures, doctrine, legacy programs, and bureaucratic preferences. Consolidating and focusing the Pentagon’s expertise, energy, and budgetary power in a separate cyber service would promote new thinking on cyber warfare, cyber deterrence, and cyber defense. It would accelerate the development of AI and a range of other cyber-specific tools and doctrines for deterrence and warfighting in ways that the traditional armed services simply cannot replicate. And it would create a distinct cyberspace culture inside the U.S. military that can be both a lodestar and incubator of cyber talent in the force, distinct from the strong service cultures associated with war on land, in the air, and at sea.

2022 UTNIF Disadvantage
2NC Cards › Link › Link – Cybersecurity

Only US leadership in cybersecurity can counter a rising China – key to hardline approach.

Dominguez 21 - Gabriella M. Dominguez (BA, Texas Tech University; MA, Texas Tech University; MMOAS, Air Command and Staff College) is an intelligence specialist with analytic expertise in adversarial doctrine, plans, and tactics regarding the employment of space, counterspace, and denial and deception systems against EUCOM, [“‘Smart Power’ Is Hard Power: A Liberal Position on the US Approach to China," 12-21-2021, Air University (AU), https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/JIPA/Display/Article/2880386/smart-power-is-hard-power-a-liberal-position-on-the-us-approach-to-china/]RA

Put simply, the United States is in danger of losing the information and soft power war against the PRC and with it, its superpower status. China has successfully conducted numerous cyberespionage operations, stealing information to build advanced technology and military equipment to counter US information and military advantage. Moreover, the US is failing to rapidly transition emerging technologies into the armed forces and has fallen short in discovering novel ways in which these technologies can be used for enhanced military advantage over an adversary. In 2020, Secretary of Defense Mark Esper stressed the inability of the Department of Defense (DOD) to appropriately and rapidly acquire and scale innovative technology for military employment.21 Beijing has initiated a number of efforts to continue to move China closer toward attaining a global leadership position in the IC. China’s “intelligent” approach to warfare—the militarization of enabling technologies such as cloud computing, artificial intelligence (AI), quantum information, big data analytics, and unmanned systems—demonstrate its efforts to prepare for the demands of future combat operations requiring “rapid processing and the fusing of information to support quick and efficient command decision-making.”22 In 2016, China launched the first space-based quantum satellite, Micius, demonstrating considerable progress in in its goal to develop unhackable global communications through entanglement-based quantum key distribution.23 Additionally, its “Three Warfare” strategy—nonkinetic measures to manipulate the behavior of states in favor of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) preferred outcomes—serves to maintain CCP legitimacy, extend Beijing’s reach, and insert China’s brand of socialism across the IC.24 China’s use of information at the political level buoy these advances in information’s operational employment. Most recently, the PRC has taken advantage of the US State Department’s delayed response to the coronavirus pandemic, its emphasis in placing the blame on China and the Chinese people for the creation and spread of COVID-19, and its failure to rapidly allocate COVID-19 resources, including providing vaccines beyond US borders. Notably, Beijing was able to quickly portray itself as a “well-organized state capable of controlling the full situation,” rapidly distribute conspiracy theories that accused the US of spreading COVID-19, pose as the defender against an American bully, and provide vaccines to countries in need before the US—all soft power tools shaping global perceptions in favor of Chinese leadership and direction concerning the pandemic.25 Every action China takes to pursue its interests weakens the legitimacy and attractiveness of US hegemonic leadership, which results in a loss in relative power. A 2020 Pew Research Center survey of 14 advanced economies, three located in the Indo-Pacific region, most people believed China handled the coronavirus better than the US and overall had unfavorable views of both the US and China.26 While limited in scope, this poll provides a glimpse of reduced attractiveness to US liberal hegemony largely influenced by its soft power deficiencies. For weak Indo-Pacific states that regularly employ hedging strategies to prevent either the US or China from dominating the region, the decreased attractiveness of a US partner may spell disaster.27 The US can reverse this potential disaster through a strategy that combines power with ideas—strength with liberal values. The United States must maximize its power relative to that of China to preserve American dominance in the international community, while reinvesting in the propagation of its liberal values28 These smart power objectives emphasize the militarization of emerging technologies to deny CCP advantages in the information domain and require the US to take the lead in strengthening the legitimacy and attraction to US liberal hegemony. To gain a clear military advantage over China, the United States needs to continue to heavily invest in the research and development of emerging information-age technologies—AI, autonomy, robotics, quantum, big data, and machine learning—and its rapid integration into all aspects of US military infrastructure to increase the effectiveness of the information collected and how it is used. Specifically, the United States needs to allocate a larger portion of defense spending to the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, increase defense partnerships with Silicon Valley industries and research universities, and improve acquisition practices to facilitate and accelerate military applications of intelligent technologies. The US must invest in and further develop technologies that will enable persistent awareness of adversary actions, speed up effective decision-making, and increase lethality at a low cost and low risk to the US. Specifically, investing in quantum, AI, autonomy, and cyber technologies for offensive and defensive purposes requires further integration and cooperation between the Department of Defense and the scientific community. Increased integration and cooperation between scientific and technical entities and the DOD will assist and maintain US technical and military advantages. Information is power. These high-tech systems are a cost-effective avenue to overcome the limits of human intelligence and allow the United States to rapidly understand the environment and make decisions faster than the adversary. Moreover, a high-tech–enabled force supports rapid collection and analysis of large amounts of data, enables swift decision-making, and enhances the lethality of US military forces.29 Whereas now the US can neither effectively stop nor respond to China stealing US intellectual property via cyber channels, technology such as AI-enabled cybersecurity can be used to rapidly detect China encroachment into US systems and automatically deny its ability to steal US scientific and military data. In an environment characterized by information power, operational agility against an adversary must be met with agility at the political level. The US Department of State (DOS)—responsible for advancing American interests through diplomacy, advocacy, and assistance efforts—has fallen short in the narrative battle against its adversaries leading to an overall decline in US appeal and influence worldwide. To increase the attractiveness of US liberal hegemony, the United States needs to influence states to champion American interests and combat adversaries’ anti-US information campaign. To achieve this, the United States must craft a strategic narrative in which ‘a strong America means freedom, prosperity, and security for all,’ consistently reinforcing the story that only through US liberal hegemony can the international community achieve a peaceful end state. Knowing this, the United States must increase its emphasis on alternative instruments to comprehensively maximize power and maintain its superpower status, or risk being outpaced by its competitors.

2022 UTNIF Disadvantage
2NC Cards › Link › Link - Biotech

US biotech primacy is the only way to counter revisionist powers – offshoring precludes hardline strategy

Carlson et. al 21 – Rob Carlson is a managing director at Bioeconomy Capital, an early-stage venture capital firm. Chad Sbragia is a research staff member at the Institute for Defense Analyses, where he concentrates on U.S. national security and defense policy. Kate Sixt is an assistant director of the Strategy, Forces and Resources Division at the Institute for Defense Analyses, where she leads the Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Analysis group, ["Beyond Biological Defense: Maintaining the U.S. Biotechnology Advantage," War on the Rocks, 9-14-2021, https://warontherocks.com/2021/09/beyond-biological-defense-maintaining-the-u-s-biotechnology-advantage/]RA

Maintaining America’s Biotechnology Advantage Biotechnology in the United States is a significant contributor to the economy. By one estimate, in 2017, U.S. biotechnology revenues exceeded $400 billion, or 2 percent of gross domestic product, substantially surpassing better-measured sectors such as mining. Bioeconomy revenues have grown at an average rate of 10 percent annually for two decades. Notably, U.S. biotechnology revenues alone were approximately equal to worldwide semiconductor revenues for 2017. Biotechnology now supplies critical medicines, and, as more than 90 percent of the corn and soy grown in the United States is genetically modified, biotechnology feeds the armed forces. Industrial biotechnology is responsible for upward of 20 percent of chemicals produced in the United States, suggesting a similar proportion of chemicals used in the military are also biologically derived. And these impressive figures may still be significant underestimates: Using a different methodology, the U.S. National Academy of Sciences recently concluded that the biotechnology industry contributes 5 to 7 percent of U.S. gross domestic product. Biotechnology, therefore, may already constitute an even larger share of the military supply chain. As biotechnology continues to mature, its contribution to physical and economic security will become even more significant. Tools are now being deployed that enable the engineering and biomanufacturing of materials that will eventually not only displace petrochemicals but also surpass them in production scale and performance. Over the next ten to twenty years, biological production could soon supply up to 60 percent of physical inputs across the global economy, and biotechnology could have a “direct economic impact of up to $4 trillion a year.” While the United States is arguably still leading in biotechnology, it risks losing this lead to China. In China, biotechnology is a national development and a security matter. China’s Innovation Driven Development Strategy emphasizes biotechnology’s essential role in the country’s economic development, while the Military-Civil Fusion Development Strategy seeks to ensure that biotechnology research is also oriented toward the country’s military and broader security goals. Chinese biotechnology revenues are reported to be of a similar size to those in the United States, although they are subject to even lesser clarity in reporting. While China continues its licit and illicit acquisition efforts targeting the U.S. biotechnology sector, it is also shifting its attention to domestic innovation. In time, this will provide the People’s Liberation Army with new capabilities and increase both America’s and the Pentagon’s reliance on Chinese biotechnology products. Recommendations As early as 1958, the Department of Commerce was tracking the economic contribution of semiconductors, even though they made up less than 0.1 percent of the gross domestic product. Yet, today, the U.S. government has made no equivalent effort to track the much more significant role of biotechnology. This illiteracy is a national security issue. American and Chinese bioeconomies are in competition, and Beijing asserts that it is investing with the intent to take, and to then maintain, the lead. To sustain America’s advantage, the U.S. Department of Defense should better understand its reliance on biotechnology and increase investment in it accordingly. The Pentagon’s recent investment in the BioIndustrial Manufacturing and Design Ecosystem is a notable step in the right direction. However, the seven-year budget for this project is approximately the cost of a single F-35A. For an investment that could impact the entire defense supply chain, this is inadequate. We recommend the following plan of action for the Department of Defense to take its place alongside the Departments of Commerce and State in the broader interagency effort to secure America’s biotechnology advantage. First, in close coordination with the Department of Commerce, the Department of Defense should make a systematic effort to better understand the role of biotechnology in the economy, supply chains, and manufacturing. This, in turn, should inform additional oversight and regulatory controls. The responsibility to understand, prepare for, and respond to biotechnology threats is balkanized, spread across at least nine departments and agencies. Vulnerabilities in the bioeconomy will affect the Department of Defense in terms of readiness, soldier health, and the ability to fulfill missions. Addressing those vulnerabilities begins with a sustained, comprehensive effort to understand the role of biotechnology in industry today, as well as how that industry contributes to defense supply chains, and how military acquisition policy shapes biotechnology. To that end, the Pentagon should work with the Department of Commerce to create domestic reporting codes for biotechnology revenues and employment for the quarterly and annual economic census, and further incorporate those codes into the North American Industrial Classification System. Institutionalizing the gathering of these data is the first step toward sustainable policymaking and rational spending. The Department of Commerce should then consider adding import/export controls on biotechnology, while avoiding overly broad restrictions that suffocate innovation. Protecting foundational technologies using the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act and Export Control Reform Act will be critical for securing biotechnology. However, biotechnology competition is not exclusive to commercial activities. The Pentagon should assess critical vulnerabilities and dependencies to assist the other agencies in bringing China’s foreign biotechnology access in line with standards in other major markets. The Department of Defense has been asked to document and secure supply chains critical to defense applications and to the overall U.S. economy. This should also apply to biotechnology. Current Pentagon efforts to expand domestic biological manufacturing capabilities are an important start, but a broader effort is needed. An empowered deputy national security adviser could help oversee the relationship between the Pentagon and the National Economic Council to promote and secure the military’s broader technology needs. Second, the Department of Defense should better study the accomplishments and intent of China, especially the Chinese military, in developing biotechnology as a strategic technology. Once the Department of Defense better understands critical U.S. biotechnology dependencies on China, it can begin the work of reducing them. This requires an interagency examination to identify cross-cutting resources, develop mitigation strategies, formulate best practices to bolster innovation, and expand outreach to allies and partners to reduce systemic gaps China could exploit. Partnership with industry and allies will allow the U.S. government to understand and counter Beijing’s efforts to distort commercial activity in its favor. To this end, the Department of Defense should mirror the National Security Council’s effort by creating an emerging technology portfolio within Office of the Under Secretary of Defense-Policy. While other technology offices in the Department of Defense are internally focused, an entity in this office that concentrates externally on foundational technology competition is required. Such an office may be able to address uncertainties in assessments of Chinese biotechnology revenues and capabilities. Finally, in coordination with the Department of State, the Department of Defense should identify opportunities for dialogue with the People’s Liberation Army about biotechnology-related security issues.

2022 UTNIF Disadvantage
2NC Cards › Link › Link – AI/DIANA

Only US leadership in AI can counter a rising China – key to hardline approach.

Dominguez 21 - Gabriella M. Dominguez (BA, Texas Tech University; MA, Texas Tech University; MMOAS, Air Command and Staff College) is an intelligence specialist with analytic expertise in adversarial doctrine, plans, and tactics regarding the employment of space, counterspace, and denial and deception systems against EUCOM, [“‘Smart Power’ Is Hard Power: A Liberal Position on the US Approach to China," 12-21-2021, Air University (AU), https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/JIPA/Display/Article/2880386/smart-power-is-hard-power-a-liberal-position-on-the-us-approach-to-china/]RA

Put simply, the United States is in danger of losing the information and soft power war against the PRC and with it, its superpower status. China has successfully conducted numerous cyberespionage operations, stealing information to build advanced technology and military equipment to counter US information and military advantage. Moreover, the US is failing to rapidly transition emerging technologies into the armed forces and has fallen short in discovering novel ways in which these technologies can be used for enhanced military advantage over an adversary. In 2020, Secretary of Defense Mark Esper stressed the inability of the Department of Defense (DOD) to appropriately and rapidly acquire and scale innovative technology for military employment.21 Beijing has initiated a number of efforts to continue to move China closer toward attaining a global leadership position in the IC. China’s “intelligent” approach to warfare—the militarization of enabling technologies such as cloud computing, artificial intelligence (AI), quantum information, big data analytics, and unmanned systems—demonstrate its efforts to prepare for the demands of future combat operations requiring “rapid processing and the fusing of information to support quick and efficient command decision-making.”22 In 2016, China launched the first space-based quantum satellite, Micius, demonstrating considerable progress in in its goal to develop unhackable global communications through entanglement-based quantum key distribution.23 Additionally, its “Three Warfare” strategy—nonkinetic measures to manipulate the behavior of states in favor of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) preferred outcomes—serves to maintain CCP legitimacy, extend Beijing’s reach, and insert China’s brand of socialism across the IC.24 China’s use of information at the political level buoy these advances in information’s operational employment. Most recently, the PRC has taken advantage of the US State Department’s delayed response to the coronavirus pandemic, its emphasis in placing the blame on China and the Chinese people for the creation and spread of COVID-19, and its failure to rapidly allocate COVID-19 resources, including providing vaccines beyond US borders. Notably, Beijing was able to quickly portray itself as a “well-organized state capable of controlling the full situation,” rapidly distribute conspiracy theories that accused the US of spreading COVID-19, pose as the defender against an American bully, and provide vaccines to countries in need before the US—all soft power tools shaping global perceptions in favor of Chinese leadership and direction concerning the pandemic.25 Every action China takes to pursue its interests weakens the legitimacy and attractiveness of US hegemonic leadership, which results in a loss in relative power. A 2020 Pew Research Center survey of 14 advanced economies, three located in the Indo-Pacific region, most people believed China handled the coronavirus better than the US and overall had unfavorable views of both the US and China.26 While limited in scope, this poll provides a glimpse of reduced attractiveness to US liberal hegemony largely influenced by its soft power deficiencies. For weak Indo-Pacific states that regularly employ hedging strategies to prevent either the US or China from dominating the region, the decreased attractiveness of a US partner may spell disaster.27 The US can reverse this potential disaster through a strategy that combines power with ideas—strength with liberal values. The United States must maximize its power relative to that of China to preserve American dominance in the international community, while reinvesting in the propagation of its liberal values28 These smart power objectives emphasize the militarization of emerging technologies to deny CCP advantages in the information domain and require the US to take the lead in strengthening the legitimacy and attraction to US liberal hegemony. To gain a clear military advantage over China, the United States needs to continue to heavily invest in the research and development of emerging information-age technologies—AI, autonomy, robotics, quantum, big data, and machine learning—and its rapid integration into all aspects of US military infrastructure to increase the effectiveness of the information collected and how it is used. Specifically, the United States needs to allocate a larger portion of defense spending to the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, increase defense partnerships with Silicon Valley industries and research universities, and improve acquisition practices to facilitate and accelerate military applications of intelligent technologies. The US must invest in and further develop technologies that will enable persistent awareness of adversary actions, speed up effective decision-making, and increase lethality at a low cost and low risk to the US. Specifically, investing in quantum, AI, autonomy, and cyber technologies for offensive and defensive purposes requires further integration and cooperation between the Department of Defense and the scientific community. Increased integration and cooperation between scientific and technical entities and the DOD will assist and maintain US technical and military advantages. Information is power. These high-tech systems are a cost-effective avenue to overcome the limits of human intelligence and allow the United States to rapidly understand the environment and make decisions faster than the adversary. Moreover, a high-tech–enabled force supports rapid collection and analysis of large amounts of data, enables swift decision-making, and enhances the lethality of US military forces.29 Whereas now the US can neither effectively stop nor respond to China stealing US intellectual property via cyber channels, technology such as AI-enabled cybersecurity can be used to rapidly detect China encroachment into US systems and automatically deny its ability to steal US scientific and military data. In an environment characterized by information power, operational agility against an adversary must be met with agility at the political level. The US Department of State (DOS)—responsible for advancing American interests through diplomacy, advocacy, and assistance efforts—has fallen short in the narrative battle against its adversaries leading to an overall decline in US appeal and influence worldwide. To increase the attractiveness of US liberal hegemony, the United States needs to influence states to champion American interests and combat adversaries’ anti-US information campaign. To achieve this, the United States must craft a strategic narrative in which ‘a strong America means freedom, prosperity, and security for all,’ consistently reinforcing the story that only through US liberal hegemony can the international community achieve a peaceful end state. Knowing this, the United States must increase its emphasis on alternative instruments to comprehensively maximize power and maintain its superpower status, or risk being outpaced by its competitors.

2022 UTNIF Disadvantage
2NC Cards › Link › Link – AI/DIANA

NATO cooperation on AI ensures decentralization of American AI primacy – DIANA Plan proves.

Machi 4/6/22 – Vivienne Machi is a reporter in Stuttgart, Germany, contributing to Defense News' European coverage. She previously reported for National Defense Magazine, Defense Daily, Via Satellite, Foreign Policy and the Dayton Daily News. She was named the Defence Media Awards' best young defense journalist in 2020, ["NATO unveils tech accelerator footprint, with plans for over 60 sites," 4/6/2022, "NATO unveils tech accelerator footprint, with plans for over 60 sites," Defense News, ]RA

The initiative comes with more than 60 innovation sites. That includes a headquarters in Europe and another in North America, about 10 “accelerator sites” that provide financing, mentorship and exposure to business opportunities to participating startups, and more than 50 dedicated test centers hosting labs and equipment. “Altogether, the initial footprint will cover 20 NATO nations, representing a true trans-Atlantic endeavor, and we expect it will continue to expand in the future,” Stoltenberg said. The technology accelerator will be a new NATO body, tasked to bring innovative civilian and military organizations closer together to develop cutting-edge solutions in the realms of emerging and disruptive technologies, said David van Weel, NATO assistant secretary general for emerging security challenges. The plan is for allies to agree upon a new strategic direction every two years, which will then dictate critical defense and security problems as well as the desired solutions. “This provides strong signals of market demand and opportunity for innovators,” van Weel said at a Tuesday press briefing. From there, startups, academic institutions and nontraditional industry members can participate in so-called challenge programs that work to solve real-world problems — such as operating in a GPS-denied environment — and submit proposals to participate in DIANA’s accelerator effort. Member nations submitted proposals for more than 90 institutions to be part of the DIANA footprint; after evaluations, NATO pared it down to more than 10 accelerator sites and over 50 test centers, with many already in existence, van Weel said. Among those selected sites are the Niels Bohr Institute at the University of Copenhagen in Denmark, which will focus on quantum technologies, and a new site in Turin, Italy, which will be dedicated to the space domain. Imperial College London will host the European headquarters along with a DIANA accelerator, in a space currently housing the U.K.’s Defence and Security Accelerator, according to the British government. The U.K.’s program will be “twinned” with a new accelerator based in Tallinn, Estonia, to help share expertise, test cyber innovations and explore the viability of “virtual sites” to trial new tech such as autonomous vehicles. “The UK and Estonia are two of the most innovative countries in NATO, and our hosting of DIANA will harness that innovation for the benefit of all allies tackling future military threats,” British Defence Secretary Ben Wallace said in a news release. While the centers on the European side have all been selected, the North American footprint will be announced at the NATO Summit in June in Madrid, Spain. The goal is to have DIANA reach its full operational capability by 2025, said van Weel. Alongside the tech accelerator is a nascent venture capital fund, dubbed the NATO Innovation Fund. “Ultimately, reimagining NATO’s engagement with civilian innovators is only credible if we also provide the right funding mechanisms,” van Weel noted. Twenty-one members worked together to establish the underlying framework of the fund — outlining the investment strategy, the pool of capital, and determining the fund’s structure and governance. They also provided initial financial support. The Innovation Fund will invest €1 billion into “deep-tech startups” over 15 years. These are public funds that participating nations can allocate, either from their existing defense budgets or established innovation funds, a senior NATO official said Tuesday. The participating nations in DIANA’s innovation fund currently include Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Montenegro, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Turkey and the United Kingdom.

2022 UTNIF Disadvantage
2NC Cards › Link › Link – Generic/Security Concerns

Increasing NATO cooperation historically ensures security dilemmas through permanent “defense dependents” and intervention.

Bandow 5-19-22 – Doug Bandow is a senior fellow at the Cato Institute, specializing in foreign policy and civil liberties. He worked as special assistant to President Ronald Reagan and editor of the political magazine Inquiry. He writes regularly for leading publications such as Fortune magazine, National Interest, the Wall Street Journal, and the Washington Times, [“Sweden and Finland in NATO: What’s in it for Us?”, Cato Institute, https://www.cato.org/commentary/sweden-finland-nato-whats-it-us]RA

Both Finland and Sweden are applying to join NATO. The Blob, as the foreign policy establishment has come to be known, is ecstatic. It cannot conceive of saying no to any alliance applicant, no matter how insignificant or irrelevant. Once upon a time, serious nations defended themselves, rather than begging faraway great powers to do the job for them. And no serious great power would do so unless it believed the other state to be essential for its own security. As Great Britain’s Lord Palmerston remarked, countries had no permanent friends, only permanent interests. Even serious defensive alliances could drag members into war, often against their interests, when deterrence failed. World War I provides the most dramatic modern example. Serbia committed an act of state terrorism against the Austro‐​Hungarian Empire. When the latter threatened Belgrade, Imperial Russia stood by its Slavic brethren, lest Vienna establish dominance in the Balkans. Imperial Germany backed Austria‐​Hungary with the infamous “blank check.” France supported its ally Russia. Great Britain feared a rising Berlin and joined its historic enemies Paris and St. Petersburg. Other states, either feeling threatened (Ottoman Empire) or perceiving a chance for territorial gain (Italy) later joined in. The result was continent‐​wide catastrophe, and another much worse war just a generation later. The latter turned America into a global power and left Washington to play leader of “the free world,” defending Western Europe and Asian dependencies amid fears of Soviet aggression and threats posed by the newly created People’s Republic of China. The policy made sense as a temporary expedient, protecting vulnerable states as they recovered and became able to defend themselves. If the U.S. wants to remain a superpower and defend its own citizens’ interests, it must learn to say no. It wasn’t just the Old Right which feared “allies” becoming permanent defense dependents. So did Dwight Eisenhower, World War II allied commander, first NATO military head, and U.S. president. He warned against acting like “a modern Rome guarding the far frontiers with our legions.” Instead, he advocated helping “these people [to] regain their confidence and get on their own military feet.” Foreign policy scholar Mark Sheetz explained that “The purpose of America’s ‘temporary’ intervention in Western Europe was to eliminate the need for ‘permanent’ intervention.” However, Ike’s admonitions were forgotten as U.S. policymakers came to enjoy America acting as the “essential power.” Moreover, foreign governments—whether of allies, partners, friends, or otherwise connected states—learned the useful arts of deception and flattery. Defense dependents promised to do more while planning to do less, sure that Washington would forgive them, no matter how loud U.S. officials whined and wailed. Allies also insisted that freedom would disappear, a new Dark Ages would descend, and the world would end if the U.S. ever did anything less, an argument enthusiastically repeated by the Blob. Yet the transatlantic alliance’s spell over U.S. foreign policy appeared broken when the Warsaw Pact dissolved, followed by the Soviet Union. Even NATO’s most loyal retainers feared that the alliance’s time was coming to an end, proposing that the organization shift over to handling student exchanges and fighting the drug war. But creative policy entrepreneurs came up with “out‐​of‐​area” activities, which essentially meant bombing, invading, and occupying more distant nations which weren’t threatening NATO members. Of course, the U.S. would do the real war‐​making, while the allies would pretend that their assistance was essential. It was difficult to discern America’s interest in Serbia and Libya and Europe’s interest in Afghanistan, but all went forward as alliance campaigns. Although European NATO members suffered casualties in the latter, none of these wars could have been prosecuted except by Washington. Indeed, the Europeans ran out of missiles when fighting Libya. All the while the transatlantic alliance abandoned its role as continental guardian and became a militarized Welcome Wagon for the detritus of the Soviet empire. The European Union was better suited to that task, but the U.S. did not control the E.U. Hence, Washington’s preference was to use NATO to extend America’s reach. Unfortunately, this process violated a multitude of assurances given Moscow that the alliance would not advance ever eastward. The alliance also shifted from defense to offense, most importantly against Yugoslavia (an enhanced Serbia, for which Russia went to war in WWI). Although Vladimir Putin started out inclined to do business with the West, by 2008 his patience was gone and he turned toward confrontation, starting with Georgia. Although NATO expansion continued, even alliance members recognized that adding Georgia and Ukraine were steps too far: For 14 years the allies prevaricated, simultaneously reiterating and then ignoring promises to Tbilisi and Kyiv. Yet when the Ukraine crisis began last fall, the U.S. and European NATO members refused to state the obvious, that Kyiv would not be joining the alliance. Doing so might have forestalled Putin’s invasion. Of course, allied irresponsibility did not justify Moscow’s invasion, but Washington and Brussels share blame for the tragic war. With conflict raging in Ukraine, Finland and Sweden decided that they want formal U.S. protection as well. That comes as no surprise: Countries and even movements around the world eagerly seek the great superpower’s assistance. Years ago, I was asked by ethnic Karen insurgents in Burma/​Myanmar why Washington did not sent troops there to do what it had recently done in Kosovo. If I faced such a regime, I also would want the U.S. to eliminate the brutal, oppressive Tatmadaw, as the Burmese military is known. However, the U.S. government is not the world’s 911 number and should stop treating its defense guarantees as a matter of charity. Sweden, in its (long ago) day a great power, perceived no threat and reduced its military. Finland retained tough armed forces, which proved their worth—and the Finns’ determination to protect their nation—during the infamous “Winter War” from November 1939 to March 1940. The Soviet Union triumphed, but only at great cost; rather than occupy Finland, like the Baltic states, Moscow accepted territorial concessions and a pledge of neutrality.

2022 UTNIF Disadvantage
2NC Cards › Link › Link – Generic/Security Concerns

Increasing cooperation with NATO has grave repercussions on American foreign policy and ensures security dilemmas. It’s the sole security concern – historically proven.

Sachs 22 – Jeffrey Sachs, contributor to the Financial Times and director of the Center for Sustainable Development at Columbia University, [“The US should compromise on Nato to save Ukraine," The Financial Times, 2/21/22, https://www.ft.com/content/b5886606-4d7d-41af-87c1-8d9993722e51]RA

If US President Joe Biden and his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin do manage to hold a summit on Ukraine, what should Biden’s approach be? Biden has said repeatedly that the US is open to diplomacy with Russia, but on the issue that Moscow has most emphasised — Nato enlargement — there has been no American diplomacy at all. Putin has repeatedly demanded that the US forswear Nato’s enlargement into Ukraine, while Biden has repeatedly asserted that membership of the alliance is Ukraine’s choice. If a summit does materialise in the days ahead, and in the planned meeting this week between US secretary of state Antony Blinken and Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov, the US should propose a guarantee that Nato will not enlarge to include Ukraine in return for a full withdrawal of Russian forces from the Donbas region and an end to Russian support for the independence of the two Moscow-backed separatist regions in eastern Ukraine, a demobilisation along the Russia-Ukraine border and an assurance of Ukrainian sovereignty. If the US won’t do this, then France and Germany should step forward instead. This would inevitably lead to cries of appeasement. Many insist that Nato enlargement is not the real issue for Putin and that he wants to recreate the Russian empire, pure and simple. Everything else, including Nato enlargement, they claim, is a mere distraction. This is utterly mistaken. Russia has adamantly opposed Nato expansion towards the east for 30 years, first under Boris Yeltsin and now Putin. Before that, the Soviet Union largely opposed Nato expansion, too. It is easy to understand why. The US would not be very happy were Mexico to join a China-led military alliance, nor was it content when Fidel Castro’s Cuba aligned with the USSR 60 years ago. Neither the US nor Russia wants the other’s military on their doorstep. Pledging no Nato enlargement is not appeasement. It does not cede Ukrainian territory. It does not undermine Ukraine’s sovereignty. It would in fact help to secure it. Ukraine should aspire to resemble the non-Nato members of the EU: Austria, Cyprus, Finland, Ireland, Malta and Sweden. Americans can learn much from the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. As the historian Martin Sherwin showed in his book Gambling with Armageddon, the crisis was resolved by a deft compromise. The Soviet Union agreed to remove its missiles from Cuba while the US agreed to remove its missiles from Turkey. The American public never appreciated this, alas, because President John F Kennedy insisted on keeping the US removal of missiles from Turkey secret. Kennedy did not want to appear to speak for all of Nato, and sought to protect himself from charges of appeasement from the US right. The public therefore believed that the crisis ended with Soviet capitulation, not compromise. Despite claims to the contrary, the western nations offered informal assurances to the Soviet Union that Nato would not enlarge to the east after German unification. The US and allies acted deceitfully, using sophistical arguments to claim that previous pledges were not binding. It was especially reckless in 2008 for President George W Bush to open the door to Ukraine’s (and Georgia’s) Nato membership. Biden and the US foreign policy establishment has so far refused to reconsider Nato enlargement for three reasons. First, they fear the charge of appeasement. Second, the US wants the prerogative to puts its military in any country that will have it, even if that disregards the legitimate security concerns of neighbouring states. Third, the US foreign policy establishment has long failed to acknowledge valid Russian security concerns that go back to the second world war and even earlier. Russia has long feared invasions from the west, whether by Napoleon, Hitler or latterly Nato. For this reason, cooler and wiser US foreign policy strategists, including Bill Clinton’s defence secretary William Perry, the great statesman and diplomat George Kennan and former ambassador to the Soviet Union, Jack Matlock, argued that Nato enlargement to the east after the demise of the USSR was unnecessary, reckless and provocative. If war comes, Putin would of course deserve the blame and global opprobrium. Russia’s threats are thuggish and dangerous. Yet as misguided as the Russian actions are, American intransigence regarding Nato enlargement is also utterly misguided and risky. True friends of Ukraine, and of global peace, should be calling for a US and Nato compromise with Russia — one that respects Russia’s legitimate security interests while fully backing Ukraine’s sovereignty.

2022 UTNIF Disadvantage
2NC Cards › Uniqueness › Uniqueness – Generic/AT Expansion High

NATO structural inefficiencies deck effective co-op efforts now – guarantees regional challenges and US leadership collapse.

Deni 19 – John Deni is a Professor of Joint, Interagency, Intragovernmental, and Multinational Security Studies at the USAWC SSI, [“Staying Alive by Overeating? The Enduring NATO Alliance at 70,” Journal of Transatlantic Studies, 2019]RA

Over the last 30 years, NATO’s evolving mission growth has exhibited two of the most commonly cited typologies of organizational change—adaptive learning and incremental growth.35 The former is rational, empirically driven, and usually efficient—organizations change by carefully studying and modifying ends, ways, and means. The latter may be rational but it is typically not efficient—new tasks are simply added on to old ones, without any critical appraisal of purpose or goals. With specific regard to the post-Cold War period, or roughly 1990 until 2014, both of these typologies were evident. In some cases during the 1990–2014 time period, the alliance engaged in a well-informed, almost methodical shift away from collective defense and toward crisis management and cooperative security. For example, NATO developed the Membership Action Plan (MAP) to build norms, establish guidelines, and manage the admission of new member states from Eastern Europe.36 In a similar way, the alliance developed a robust force generation system to manage the challenge of providing continuous force rotations for operations in Afghanistan during an era of shrinking resources.37 In other instances during the 1990–2014 time period, it seems clear that NATO’s post-Cold War shift toward crisis management and cooperative security was characterized by incremental growth, with member states pushing tasks onto the alliance’s plate without a knowledge-mediated approach. For example, the addition of energy security to the alliance’s agenda made little sense at a time when there was (and still is) significant divergence among the member states over what role NATO should play in this issue area, or when there was little understanding of what capabilities or capacity NATO could actually bring to the table.38 In contrast to the post-Cold War 1990–2014 time period, since Russia’s invasion of Crimea in 2014 NATO appears to have whole-heartedly resorted to incremental growth. It has done so by recommitting itself to collective defense while also maintaining or even augmenting its work in crisis management and cooperative security. Notably, there has been no significant strategic-level reassessment of NATO’s mission set and no new Strategic Concept published since the last was released in 2010. The alliance’s embrace of an all-of-the-above approach is largely a function of the unique principal–agent dynamic at work within NATO and among its member states, and the complex array of member state interests. As noted briefly earlier in this article, in contrast to an international organization like the United Nations, NATO’s potential for action independent of the interests of its largest member states is extraordinarily limited. Certainly, there are instances when NATO’s international secretariat or its Secretary General show signs of autonomy. However, the alliance organization’s ability to exploit its limited autonomy and truly counteract the desires of its member states is limited by several factors. First, the Secretary General’s position is not a permanent one but rather a rotating one—most NATO Secretary Generals serve a single 4-year term—and the nominees are subject to the unanimous approval of all member states. This prevents the development of an entrenched leader capable of making decisions against the wishes of most member states. In contrast, UN Secretary Generals are nominated by a minimum of 9 members of the UN Security Council, including no vetoes by the five permanent members, and then subject to a majority vote of the General Assembly. UN Secretary Generals normally hold two consecutive 5-year terms. Second, while it is true that the NATO International Staff consists of many permanent civil servants, it also is comprised of staff members temporarily assigned there by individual allied governments. This limits the autonomy that the International Staff might otherwise develop since temporarily assigned employees usually fail to develop strong biases toward the institution they work for, or biases that would displace their loyalties to their permanent employer back home.39 Moreover, the International Military Staff (IMS) is comprised almost entirely of military officials on temporary assignments. The same holds true with regard to the Allied Command Operations based in Mons, Belgium and the Allied Command Transformation based in Norfolk, Virginia. At the same time, the array of sometimes disparate interests among the various alliance member states drives much of NATO’s all-of-the-above approach. NATO exists for several reasons, such as the fact that the alliance is a community of (mostly) liberal democracies that share similar values. What is arguably more critical though is the fact that the alliance continues to exist because it provides more benefits than costs to its members—in short, it meets their security needs, at least in part, in an efficient and effective way relative to other options.40 Among other ways of meeting these needs, the alliance satisfies the demands of its member states by engaging in issue areas of interest to those member states. For instance, Spain wants security in the Mediterranean Sea and stability in northwest Africa. Italy desires the same as well as capacity-building in Africa. Meanwhile, Germany wants a framework for the further development of its political and economic power that reassures its neighbors as well as itself. France wants increased intelligence sharing to mitigate the challenge of returning foreign fighters. Poland wants reassurance against domination from the East (Russia) and possibly from the West (Germany). Farther east, the Baltic States want protection against an existential enemy. The United States wants political legitimacy and military burden sharing for operations near and far. The point is, NATO’s member states often have different security interests, threat perceptions, and strategic objectives, and yet they all look to NATO as a primary means of fulfilling their interests and meeting their objectives. Accordingly, the alliance responds by pursuing a broadening agenda. Arguably, this tendency on the part of the alliance to pursue a broadening agenda to satisfy the sometimes disparate interests of its member states has only gotten worse with enlargement. Since 1997, the alliance has steadily grown, and it seems that trend will continue albeit at a slower rate. In July 2018, the alliance decided to begin accession talks with Macedonia, and it is possible Kosovo may follow. Less likely but still possible is membership for Sweden or Finland, as addressed by Anna Wieslander elsewhere in this special issue. As membership grows, definitions of ‘why NATO matters’ may grow as well, and with it NATO’s agenda. 39 The primary challenge confronting the alliance today is that it lacks the capability and the capacity to fulfill all of the various missions and activities that member states wish to saddle it with. European defense budgets, on average, steadily declined through most of the post-Cold War period, and trends have only reversed since 2014. Despite the turnaround, that acquisition accounts are struggling to keep pace with demand, many military units remain whole on paper only, and readiness continues to be underfunded. Additionally, even though spending increases have been broad based, they have also been uneven. The most significant increases have come from those countries with relatively small military forces, while the ‘big four’ European NATO members—France, Germany, Italy, and the UK, which together account for roughly two-thirds of European NATO military spending—have been increasing at a slower pace. Until these countries pick up their defense spending pace, and until all of the European allies are able to acquire the equipment, manpower, and training necessary to fulfill their agreed upon defense plans, the alliance will continue to struggle in its effort to achieve ‘all of the above.’

2022 UTNIF Disadvantage
International Cooperation Disadvantage Starter Pack File › 1NC – heg good › 1nc shell – hegemony

Retrenchment causes extinction – US hegemony is an impact filter.

Brooks, Ikenberry, and Wohlforth 13 – Stephen Brooks is a Professor of Government in the Department of Government at Dartmouth College, G. John Ikenberry is a theorist of international relations and United States foreign policy, and the Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, William Wohlforth is the Daniel Webster Professor of Government in the Dartmouth College Department of Government, together they often form a mecha-crocodile and team up for Avengers-like save-the-day special operations, [“Don’t Come Home America: The Case Against Retrenchment”, International Security, Vol. 37, No. 3, Winter 12-13]RA

A core premise of deep engagement is that it prevents the emergence of a far more dangerous global security environment. For one thing, as noted above, the United States’ overseas presence gives it the leverage to restrain partners from taking provocative action. Perhaps more important, its core alliance commitments also deter states with aspirations to regional hegemony from contemplating expansion and make its partners more secure, reducing their incentive to adopt solutions to their security problems that threaten others and thus stoke security dilemmas. The contention that engaged U.S. power dampens the baleful effects of anarchy is consistent with influential variants of realist theory. Indeed, arguably the scariest portrayal of the war-prone world that would emerge absent the “American Pacifier” is provided in the works of John Mearsheimer, who forecasts dangerous multipolar regions replete with security competition, arms races, nuclear proliferation and associated preventive war temptations, regional rivalries, and even runs at regional hegemony and full-scale great power war. 72 How do retrenchment advocates, the bulk of whom are realists, discount this benefit? Their arguments are complicated, but two capture most of the variation: (1) U.S. security guarantees are not necessary to prevent dangerous rivalries and conflict in Eurasia; or (2) prevention of rivalry and conflict in Eurasia is not a U.S. interest. Each response is connected to a different theory or set of theories, which makes sense given that the whole debate hinges on a complex future counterfactual (what would happen to Eurasia’s security setting if the United States truly disengaged?). Although a certain answer is impossible, each of these responses is nonetheless a weaker argument for retrenchment than advocates acknowledge. The first response flows from defensive realism as well as other international relations theories that discount the conflict-generating potential of anarchy under contemporary conditions. 73 Defensive realists maintain that the high expected costs of territorial conquest, defense dominance, and an array of policies and practices that can be used credibly to signal benign intent, mean that Eurasia’s major states could manage regional multipolarity peacefully without the American pacifier. Retrenchment would be a bet on this scholarship, particularly in regions where the kinds of stabilizers that nonrealist theories point to—such as democratic governance or dense institutional linkages—are either absent or weakly present. There are three other major bodies of scholarship, however, that might give decisionmakers pause before making this bet. First is regional expertise. Needless to say, there is no consensus on the net security effects of U.S. withdrawal. Regarding each region, there are optimists and pessimists. Few experts expect a return of intense great power competition in a post-American Europe, but many doubt European governments will pay the political costs of increased EU defense cooperation and the budgetary costs of increasing military outlays. 74 The result might be a Europe that is incapable of securing itself from various threats that could be destabilizing within the region and beyond (e.g., a regional conflict akin to the 1990s Balkan wars), lacks capacity for global security missions in which U.S. leaders might want European participation, and is vulnerable to the influence of outside rising powers. What about the other parts of Eurasia where the United States has a substantial military presence? Regarding the Middle East, the balance begins to swing toward pessimists concerned that states currently backed by Washington— notably Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia—might take actions upon U.S. retrenchment that would intensify security dilemmas. And concerning East Asia, pessimism regarding the region’s prospects without the American pacifier is pronounced. Arguably the principal concern expressed by area experts is that Japan and South Korea are likely to obtain a nuclear capacity and increase their military commitments, which could stoke a destabilizing reaction from China. It is notable that during the Cold War, both South Korea and Taiwan moved to obtain a nuclear weapons capacity and were only constrained from doing so by a still-engaged United States. 75 The second body of scholarship casting doubt on the bet on defensive realism’s sanguine portrayal is all of the research that undermines its conception of state preferences. Defensive realism’s optimism about what would happen if the United States retrenched is very much dependent on its particular—and highly restrictive—assumption about state preferences; once we relax this assumption, then much of its basis for optimism vanishes. Specifically, the prediction of post-American tranquility throughout Eurasia rests on the assumption that security is the only relevant state preference, with security defined narrowly in terms of protection from violent external attacks on the homeland. Under that assumption, the security problem is largely solved as soon as offense and defense are clearly distinguishable, and offense is extremely expensive relative to defense. Burgeoning research across the social and other sciences, however, undermines that core assumption: states have preferences not only for security but also for prestige, status, and other aims, and they engage in trade-offs among the various objectives. 76 In addition, they define security not just in terms of territorial protection but in view of many and varied milieu goals. It follows that even states that are relatively secure may nevertheless engage in highly competitive behavior. Empirical studies show that this is indeed sometimes the case. 77 In sum, a bet on a benign post-retrenchment Eurasia is a bet that leaders of major countries will never allow these nonsecurity preferences to influence their strategic choices. To the degree that these bodies of scholarly knowledge have predictive leverage, U.S. retrenchment would result in a significant deterioration in the security environment in at least some of the world’s key regions. We have already mentioned the third, even more alarming body of scholarship. Offensive realism predicts that the withdrawal of the American pacifier will yield either a competitive regional multipolarity complete with associated insecurity, arms racing, crisis instability, nuclear proliferation, and the like, or bids for regional hegemony, which may be beyond the capacity of local great powers to contain (and which in any case would generate intensely competitive behavior, possibly including regional great power war). Hence it is unsurprising that retrenchment advocates are prone to focus on the second argument noted above: that avoiding wars and security dilemmas in the world’s core regions is not a U.S. national interest. Few doubt that the United States could survive the return of insecurity and conflict among Eurasian powers, but at what cost? Much of the work in this area has focused on the economic externalities of a renewed threat of insecurity and war, which we discuss below. Focusing on the pure security ramifications, there are two main reasons why decisionmakers may be rationally reluctant to run the retrenchment experiment. First, overall higher levels of conflict make the world a more dangerous place. Were Eurasia to return to higher levels of interstate military competition, one would see overall higher levels of military spending and innovation and a higher likelihood of competitive regional proxy wars and arming of client states—all of which would be concerning, in part because it would promote a faster diffusion of military power away from the United States. Greater regional insecurity could well feed proliferation cascades, as states such as Egypt, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Saudi Arabia all might choose to create nuclear forces. 78 It is unlikely that proliferation decisions by any of these actors would be the end of the game: they would likely generate pressure locally for more proliferation. Following Kenneth Waltz, many retrenchment advocates are proliferation optimists, assuming that nuclear deterrence solves the security problem. 79 Usually carried out in dyadic terms, the debate over the stability of proliferation changes as the numbers go up. Proliferation optimism rests on assumptions of rationality and narrow security preferences. In social science, however, such assumptions are inevitably probabilistic. Optimists assume that most states are led by rational leaders, most will overcome organizational problems and resist the temptation to preempt before feared neighbors nuclearize, and most pursue only security and are risk averse. Confidence in such probabilistic assumptions declines if the world were to move from nine to twenty, thirty, or forty nuclear states. In addition, many of the other dangers noted by analysts who are concerned about the destabilizing effects of nuclear proliferation—including the risk of accidents and the prospects that some new nuclear powers will not have truly survivable forces—seem prone to go up as the number of nuclear powers grows. 80 Moreover, the risk of “unforeseen crisis dynamics” that could spin out of control is also higher as the number of nuclear powers increases. Finally, add to these concerns the enhanced danger of nuclear leakage, and a world with overall higher levels of security competition becomes yet more worrisome. The argument that maintaining Eurasian peace is not a U.S. interest faces a second problem. On widely accepted realist assumptions, acknowledging that U.S. engagement preserves peace dramatically narrows the difference between retrenchment and deep engagement. For many supporters of retrenchment, the optimal strategy for a power such as the United States, which has attained regional hegemony and is separated from other great powers by oceans, is offshore balancing: stay over the horizon and “pass the buck” to local powers to do the dangerous work of counterbalancing any local rising power. The United States should commit to onshore balancing only when local balancing is likely to fail and a great power appears to be a credible contender for regional hegemony, as in the cases of Germany, Japan, and the Soviet Union in the midtwentieth century. The problem is that China’s rise puts the possibility of its attaining regional hegemony on the table, at least in the medium to long term. As Mearsheimer notes, “The United States will have to play a key role in countering China, because its Asian neighbors are not strong enough to do it by themselves.” 81 Therefore, unless China’s rise stalls, “the United States is likely to act toward China similar to the way it behaved toward the Soviet Union during the Cold War.” 82 It follows that the United States should take no action that would compromise its capacity to move to onshore balancing in the future. It will need to maintain key alliance relationships in Asia as well as the formidably expensive military capacity to intervene there. The implication is to get out of Iraq and Afghanistan, reduce the presence in Europe, and pivot to Asia— just what the United States is doing. 83 In sum, the argument that U.S. security commitments are unnecessary for peace is countered by a lot of scholarship, including highly influential realist scholarship. In addition, the argument that Eurasian peace is unnecessary for U.S. security is weakened by the potential for a large number of nasty security consequences as well as the need to retain a latent onshore balancing capacity that dramatically reduces the savings retrenchment might bring. Moreover, switching between offshore and onshore balancing could well be difficult. Bringing together the thrust of many of the arguments discussed so far underlines the degree to which the case for retrenchment misses the underlying logic of the deep engagement strategy. By supplying reassurance, deterrence, and active management, the United States lowers security competition in the world’s key regions, thereby preventing the emergence of a hothouse atmosphere for growing new military capabilities. Alliance ties dissuade partners from ramping up and also provide leverage to prevent military transfers to potential rivals. On top of all this, the United States’ formidable military machine may deter entry by potential rivals. Current great power military expenditures as a percentage of GDP are at historical lows, and thus far other major powers have shied away from seeking to match top-end U.S. military capabilities. In addition, they have so far been careful to avoid attracting the “focused enmity” of the United States. 84 All of the world’s most modern militaries are U.S. allies (America’s alliance system of more than sixty countries now accounts for some 80 percent of global military spending), and the gap between the U.S. military capability and that of potential rivals is by many measures growing rather than shrinking. 85

2022 UTNIF Disadvantage
International Cooperation Disadvantage Starter Pack File › 1NC – heg good › 1nc shell – hegemony

That decks American primacy and causes retrenchment – US hardline key to reliable and legitimate security commitments.

Defense spending, strengthening American hardpower projection is a necessity, not relying on NATO – primacy key warrants

Brands and Edelman 16 - Hal Brands is an American scholar of U.S. foreign policy. He is the Henry A. Kissinger Distinguished Professor of Global Affairs at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies and a Resident Scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, Eric Steven Edelman is an American diplomat who served as Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, U.S. Ambassador to Turkey, U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Finland, and Principal Deputy Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs, [“The Crisis of American Military Primacy and the Search for Strategic Solvency,” The US Army War College Quarterly: Parameters, Volume 46, Number 4, Parameters, Winter 2016, Article 5, 36-42]RA

There are historical precedents for this approach. The Nixon Doctrine and US withdrawal from Vietnam helped Washington retreat to a more defensible strategic perimeter in the 1970s following strategic overstretch in the decade prior. More significantly, beginning in the late-nineteenth century, the United Kingdom gradually conducted an elegant global retreat by first relying upon rising regional powers such as the United States and Japan to maintain acceptable regional orders, and later encouraging Washington to shoulder many of London’s global burdens after World War II. Graceful retrenchment, then, is not an impossibility.30 It is, however, extremely problematic today. This approach— particularly the more aggressive variants—would be enormously difficult to implement. The US commitment to the Baltic states is part of a larger commitment to NATO; shredding the former guarantee risks undermining the broader alliance. Even in Asia, where the United States has bilateral alliances, withdrawing the US commitment to Taipei could cause leaders in Manila, Seoul, or Tokyo to wonder if they might be abandoned next—and to hedge their strategic bets accordingly. Alliances hinge on the credibility of the patron’s promises; revoking some guarantees without discrediting others is difficult.31 This dynamic underscores another liability—the likelihood of profound geopolitical instability. Retrenchment works best when the overstretched hegemon can hand off excessive responsibilities to some friendly power. But today, there is no liberal superpower waiting in the wings. Rather, the countries most sympathetic to America’s view of the international order—Japan, the United Kingdom, and key European allies—confront graver long-term economic and demographic challenges than the United States. The countries most likely to gain influence following US retrenchment—Russia and China—have very different global visions. In these circumstances, US retrenchment seems unlikely to succeed. Rather than simply forcing friendly local actors to do more to defend themselves and check revisionist powers, the outcome might easily be underbalancing—in which collective action problems, internal political divisions, or resource limitations prevent timely action against a potential aggressor—or bandwagoning, in which exposed countries buy a measure of safety by aligning with, rather than against, an aggressive power.32 Meanwhile, although writing off Taiwan or Estonia might produce a near-term improvement of relations with Beijing or Moscow, the longer-term effect would be to remove a chief constraint on the aggressive behavior these powers have been increasingly manifesting. If Moscow and Beijing seem eager to bring their “near abroads” to heel now, just wait until the United States retracts its security perimeter.33 If more aggressive variants of retrenchment are thus deeply flawed, even more limited versions, such as a Middle Eastern Nixon Doctrine, have weaknesses. As Iran’s military power continues to grow, and the recent removal of nuclear-related sanctions makes this seem likely, even the wealthy Persian Gulf kingdoms will have great difficulty dealing with Tehran’s advanced and asymmetric capabilities without US assistance. In fact, without US leadership, the long-standing collection action problems between the Gulf countries are likely to worsen. Moreover, the United States essentially tried a version of this approach by withdrawing from Iraq in late 2011. But as soon became clear, Iraq, a vital state in a key region, could not withstand challenges from nontraditional foes such as the Islamic State on its own. In fact, US retrenchment actually encouraged developments that left Iraq more vulnerable to collapse, such as the increasingly sectarian nature of Nūrī al-Mālikī’s governance and the hollowing out of the Iraqi Security Forces.34 Retrenchment, then, may narrow the gap between capabilities and commitments in the short run, but only by inviting greater global dangers and instability. VI If the United States is unwilling to spend significantly more on defense, but does not wish to invite the geopolitical instability associated with retrenchment, a second option is to live with greater risk. Living with greater risk could take two different, but not mutually exclusive, forms. First, the United States could accept higher risk with respect to its global commitments by wagering that even exposed commitments are unlikely to be tested because US adversaries are risk averse and are unwilling to start a war, even a potentially successful one, that might cause American intervention. In other words, the United States might not be able to defend Taiwan effectively, but the mere prospect of an invasion provoking a Sino-American war would stay Beijing’s hand. Second, the United States could bridge the capabilitiescommitments gap through riskier strategies substituting escalation for additional resources. Most likely, this would entail relying more heavily on nuclear warfighting and the threat of nuclear retaliation to defend vulnerable allies in East Asia or Eastern Europe. Because US allies are already covered by the US extended nuclear deterrent, this approach would involve making more explicit nuclear threats and guarantees and integrating greater reliance on nuclear weapons into US plans. Similarly, this approach could entail the use, or the threat of use, of powerful nonnuclear capabilities such as strategic cyberattacks against critical enemy infrastructure for the same purpose—bolstering deterrence on the cheap by raising the costs an aggressor would expect to pay.35 Lest these approaches sound ridiculous, both have a distinguished pedigree. In the late 1940s, the United States could not credibly defend Western Europe from a Soviet invasion. But the Truman administration still undertook the security guarantees associated with NATO on the calculated gamble that Moscow was unlikely to risk global war by attacking US allies, particularly during the period of the US nuclear monopoly.36 And in the 1950s, to control costs and address the continuing deficiency of US and allied conventional forces, the Eisenhower administration relied heavily on nuclear threats to deter aggression.37 Throughout much of the Cold War, in fact, the United States compensated for conventional inferiority—particularly in Central Europe—by integrating early recourse to nuclear weapons into its war plans. Accepting greater risk would mean updating Cold War-era approaches for today’s purposes. Yet substituting risk for cost entails serious liabilities. Simply hoping exposed commitments will not be challenged might work—for a while. But this strategy carries enormous risk of those guarantees eventually being tested and found wanting, with devastating effects on America’s reputation and credibility. Meanwhile, a strategy of bluff could weaken deterrence and reassurance on the installment plan as allies and adversaries perceive a shifting balance of power and understand US guarantees are increasingly chimerical. The second variant of this approach, embracing more escalatory approaches, lacks credibility. Consider threatening to employ strategic cyberattacks against an aggressor in a conflict over Taiwan or the Baltic states. Such threats are problematic, because as President Obama acknowledged in 2016, “open societies” such as the United States are “more vulnerable” to massive cyberattacks than authoritarian rivals such as Russia or China.38 America may simply lack the escalation dominance needed to make a strategy of cyber-retaliation believable. So too in the nuclear realm. Threats to punish Communist aggression with nuclear retaliation might have been credible in the 1950s, when China lacked nuclear weapons: Washington had a massive nuclear advantage over Moscow, and neither adversary could reliably target the US homeland. But today, both rivals possess secure second-strike capabilities and could inflict horrific damage on America should nuclear escalation occur. This approach thus risks leading the United States into a trap where, if its interests are challenged, it faces a choice between pursuing escalatory options carrying potentially unacceptable costs and acquiescing to aggression. Awareness of this dynamic may, in turn, make adversaries more likely to probe and push. Trading cost for risk may seem attractive in theory, but in practice the risks may prove far more dangerous than they initially seem. VII This leaves a final option—significantly increasing resources devoted to defense, thereby bringing capabilities back into alignment with commitments and strengthening the hard-power backbone of US strategy. Given current trends, this strategy would likely entail a sustained, multiyear buildup of magnitude roughly similar to the Carter-Reagan buildup, when real defense spending increased by around 50 percent. This buildup would require permanently lifting the Budget Control Act caps to provide increased resources and budgetary stability. It would require not just procuring larger quantities of existing capabilities but also investing aggressively in future capabilities geared toward defeating great-power challengers as well as middle-tier problem countries such as Iran and North Korea. And crucially, greater resources would have to be coupled with developing innovative operational concepts, streamlining Defense procedures and acquisition processes, and maximizing the Pentagon’s other efforts toward effectiveness and efficiency. Recent proposals demonstrate the likely parameters of this approach. If the goal was to restore an authentic two major regional contingency capability, the United States might follow the recommenda- tions issued in 2014 by the National Defense Panel, which call for a force consisting, at minimum, of 490,000 active duty Army personnel and 182,000 marines, a Navy of between 323 and 346 ships (versus 274 today), and an Air Force of unspecified size but substantially larger than the end-strength envisioned in late Obama-era budgets.39 If, more ambitiously, the United States sought a two-plus or even a three-war standard, a more significant buildup would be required. One recent estimate issued by Senator John McCain calls for a threetheater force—a Navy of over 330 ships and nearly 900 frontline naval strike fighters, an Air Force of 60 combat squadrons and 1,500 combat aircraft, an Army of at least 490,000–500,000 active duty soldiers, and a Marine Corps of at least 200,000 active duty marines. Because McCain’s budget reaches out only 5 years, these numbers would presumably grow further over time.40 Another three-theater proposal by the American Enterprise Institute advocates a 10-year expansion to 600,000 active duty Army soldiers, over 200,000 active duty marines, a Navy of 346 ships, and an Air Force of unspecified but significantly increased end-strength. The number of F-22s, for instance, would rise from 185 to 450.41 These proposals would require significant new investments. The McCain budget calls for $430 billion in new money over 5 years, culminating in a Fiscal Year 2022 budget of roughly $800 billion.42 The American Enterprise Institute proposal, issued in late 2015, calls for $1.3 trillion in new money over 10 years.43 All of these force constructs reflect a high-low mix designed to enable effective operations ranging from counterterrorism, to major conventional war against Iran or North Korea, to high-end combat against a great-power adversary. All the proposals include robust recapitalization of the US nuclear triad. And although these proposals differ on specifics, all are meant to enable a range of investments necessary to maintaining US primacy in a more competitive environment. If the United States were to undertake a buildup of this magnitude, it could, for instance, invest in a more survivable, multibrigade presence in Eastern Europe. America could significantly increase investments in capabilities—from additional Zumwalt-class destroyers and nuclear attack submarines, to stealthy fighters and penetrating long-range bombers, to vastly enhanced stocks of precision-guided and standoff munitions, to improved air and missile defenses necessary to retain air and sea control in high-end conflicts as well as to maintain the upper hand in fights with Iran and North Korea.44 This approach would ease the tradeoffs between critical capabilities for today’s fight, such as the A-10, and those critical for tomorrow’s fight, such as the F-35. Crucially, this approach would also allow aggressive development and production of future technologies in areas from hypersonics to directed energy, which currently receive seed funding but cannot be adequately fielded without additional resources.45 Finally, this approach, particularly the more aggressive, three-theater option, would permit the increased force structure necessary to cover a larger number of contingencies and reduce stress on the current force. So how viable is this option? Critics offer four primary objections. The first critique deems this approach unnecessary, because the Pentagon can maintain US primacy at existing budget levels either by pursuing technological innovation and strategic offsets or by undertaking busi- ness and acquisition reforms. The second critique asserts a sustained, multiyear buildup will overtax the US economy, given persistent budget deficits and a debt-to-GDP ratio of 76 percent.46 The third critique views this approach as self-defeating because it will spur arms races with American adversaries. The fourth critique holds this approach will incentivize continued free-riding by US allies and partners by forcing Washington to continue subsidizing their defense. All of these argu- ments have some logic, but none is persuasive. The first argument—about innovation, offsets, and defense reform—is alluring but unsatisfying. To be sure, repurposing existing capabilities, developing high-end future capabilities to create significant dilemmas for competitors from Iran to China, and designing innovative operational concepts—essentially, what former Secretaries of Defense Hagel and Ashton Carter termed the Third Offset Strategy—are absolutely vital to restoring strategic solvency. Yet offsets and innovation cannot by themselves compensate for the lack of resources Washington faces in covering the range of plausible contingencies. Moreover, any meaningful offset strategy is dependent on significantly greater resources. As senior Pentagon officials have acknowledged, right now the United States simply cannot field even promising technolo- gies in numbers sufficient to have strategic impact. “We’ll do the demo, we’ll be very happy with the results, [but] we won’t have the money to go on,” Undersecretary of Defense Frank Kendall warned in 2016.47 Offsets and innovation are necessary for sustaining American primacy, but they are hardly sufficient. Similarly, although virtually all experts consider defense reform essential, no one has identified a feasible reform program sufficient to close the capabilities-commitments gap. The economic argument is also deceptive. Although a multiyear buildup would be very expensive, it would hardly be unmanageable. Even the most aggressive proposed buildups would push defense spending only to 4 percent of GDP. The United States has previously supported far higher relative defense burdens without compromising economic performance.48 One cannot draw a perfect parallel with earlier eras, of course, because during the 1950s America enjoyed higher growth and lower levels of deficits and debt. But these factors do not make a major buildup economically impossible. For one thing, defense spending increases can actually stimulate growth. As Martin Feldstein, a former chair of the Council of Economic Advisers, has noted, “Military procurement has the . . . advantage that almost all of the equipment and supplies that the military buys is made in the United States, creating demand and jobs here at home.”49 Moreover, defense spending simply does not drive federal spending or deficits to the extent often imagined. In fiscal year 2016, defense consumed 16 percent of federal spending; domestic entitlements consumed 49 percent.50 As a result, the growth of federal debt is influenced far more by unconstrained entitlement spending and insufficient tax revenues than by defense outlays. Put differently, if Washington can make politi- cally difficult decisions regarding tax increases and curbing entitlement growth, it can spend significantly more on defense while also getting its fiscal house in order. If, conversely, the United States is unwilling to confront such politically difficult decisions, then the deficit will explode, the debt-to-GDP ratio will skyrocket, and Social Security and Medicare/ Medicaid will go bankrupt regardless of how much or how little the country spends on defense. The third objection, regarding intensified competition with US rivals, is also problematic. It is hard to see how increased US defense spending could trigger an arms race with Russia or China, or Iran or North Korea, because these countries are already developing significant military capabilities aimed at the United States. China, for instance, has averaged double-digit annual defense spending increases for two decades. Strenuous military competition is already underway; US adversaries are just the ones competing most seriously. Moreover, although increased US defense efforts, particularly if paired with additional forward presence in Eastern Europe or East Asia, might cause increased near-term tensions with Moscow or Beijing, over the longer-term, failure to counter Russian and Chinese buildups and limit their opportunities for successful coercion might well prove more destabilizing. To be sure, Russia and China, or even Iran and North Korea, are not powerless to respond to US capability enhancement, and there may come a time when Washington simply cannot preserve the desired level of overmatch at an acceptable cost. Yet in light of the significant internal challenges—political, economic, demographic, or all of the above— facing each of America’s adversaries, the passing of US primacy is hardly inevitable.51 Given how advantageous US primacy has proven over the decades, America’s goal should be to push that point of unsustainability as far into the future as possible. The fourth and final objection, regarding allied free riding and the need for a collective approach, can also be answered. US strategy has always been a concert strategy, and so this approach certainly requires enhanced allied efforts. Countries from Japan and Taiwan to Poland and the Baltic states will have to spend more on defense if their situation is not to become untenable. They will, in many cases, also have to adopt more cost-effective and realistic defense strategies.52 But because the United States cannot simply make this decision for its allies, the question is which US approach will best encourage constructive changes. And although advocates of retrenchment often argue allies will only do more if the United States does less, the United States has been most successful at securing increased allied contributions when it, too, has been willing to do more. In previous instances when NATO allies collectively increased military spending—during the early 1950s or under the long-term defense program of the Carter-Reagan years—they did so as part of a broader program in which Washington also significantly increased its contributions to European security.53 Likewise, the United States elicited the best performance from the Iraqi military and government when the American commitment to Baghdad was greatest, during the surge of 2007–8. The performance declined rather than improved as the US commitment was subsequently reduced.54 In sum, the United States may actually get the most out of its allies and partners when those countries are reassured of the American commitment and thus prepared to take risks of their own. As the principal objections to increasing defense resources fall away, the advantages and logic become clearer. This approach recognizes, for instance, how beneficial US military primacy has been in shaping a relatively stable, prosperous, and congenial international order, and it makes the investments necessary to sustain as much of this order as possible. This approach provides the United States with greater ability to meet aggression from a range of enemies and rivals without resorting to dangerously escalatory strategies in the most operationally demanding scenarios. As a result, this approach is arguably best suited to avoid the use of force over the long term, by averting situations in which American adversaries from Iran and North Korea to Russia and China think aggression might pay. “Peace through strength” is not a meaningless catchphrase; it is good strategy. Closing the capabilities-commitments gap by dramatically increasing the former therefore represents the best available approach.

2022 UTNIF Disadvantage
International Cooperation Disadvantage Starter Pack File › 1NC – heg good › 1nc shell – hegemony

Increasing cooperation with NATO has grave repercussions on American foreign policy and ensures security dilemmas.

Sachs 22 – Jeffrey Sachs, contributor to the Financial Times and director of the Center for Sustainable Development at Columbia University, [“The US should compromise on Nato to save Ukraine," The Financial Times, 2/21/22, https://www.ft.com/content/b5886606-4d7d-41af-87c1-8d9993722e51]RA

If US President Joe Biden and his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin do manage to hold a summit on Ukraine, what should Biden’s approach be? Biden has said repeatedly that the US is open to diplomacy with Russia, but on the issue that Moscow has most emphasised — Nato enlargement — there has been no American diplomacy at all. Putin has repeatedly demanded that the US forswear Nato’s enlargement into Ukraine, while Biden has repeatedly asserted that membership of the alliance is Ukraine’s choice. If a summit does materialise in the days ahead, and in the planned meeting this week between US secretary of state Antony Blinken and Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov, the US should propose a guarantee that Nato will not enlarge to include Ukraine in return for a full withdrawal of Russian forces from the Donbas region and an end to Russian support for the independence of the two Moscow-backed separatist regions in eastern Ukraine, a demobilisation along the Russia-Ukraine border and an assurance of Ukrainian sovereignty. If the US won’t do this, then France and Germany should step forward instead. This would inevitably lead to cries of appeasement. Many insist that Nato enlargement is not the real issue for Putin and that he wants to recreate the Russian empire, pure and simple. Everything else, including Nato enlargement, they claim, is a mere distraction. This is utterly mistaken. Russia has adamantly opposed Nato expansion towards the east for 30 years, first under Boris Yeltsin and now Putin. Before that, the Soviet Union largely opposed Nato expansion, too. It is easy to understand why. The US would not be very happy were Mexico to join a China-led military alliance, nor was it content when Fidel Castro’s Cuba aligned with the USSR 60 years ago. Neither the US nor Russia wants the other’s military on their doorstep. Pledging no Nato enlargement is not appeasement. It does not cede Ukrainian territory. It does not undermine Ukraine’s sovereignty. It would in fact help to secure it. Ukraine should aspire to resemble the non-Nato members of the EU: Austria, Cyprus, Finland, Ireland, Malta and Sweden. Americans can learn much from the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. As the historian Martin Sherwin showed in his book Gambling with Armageddon, the crisis was resolved by a deft compromise. The Soviet Union agreed to remove its missiles from Cuba while the US agreed to remove its missiles from Turkey. The American public never appreciated this, alas, because President John F Kennedy insisted on keeping the US removal of missiles from Turkey secret. Kennedy did not want to appear to speak for all of Nato, and sought to protect himself from charges of appeasement from the US right. The public therefore believed that the crisis ended with Soviet capitulation, not compromise. Despite claims to the contrary, the western nations offered informal assurances to the Soviet Union that Nato would not enlarge to the east after German unification. The US and allies acted deceitfully, using sophistical arguments to claim that previous pledges were not binding. It was especially reckless in 2008 for President George W Bush to open the door to Ukraine’s (and Georgia’s) Nato membership. Biden and the US foreign policy establishment has so far refused to reconsider Nato enlargement for three reasons. First, they fear the charge of appeasement. Second, the US wants the prerogative to puts its military in any country that will have it, even if that disregards the legitimate security concerns of neighbouring states. Third, the US foreign policy establishment has long failed to acknowledge valid Russian security concerns that go back to the second world war and even earlier. Russia has long feared invasions from the west, whether by Napoleon, Hitler or latterly Nato. For this reason, cooler and wiser US foreign policy strategists, including Bill Clinton’s defence secretary William Perry, the great statesman and diplomat George Kennan and former ambassador to the Soviet Union, Jack Matlock, argued that Nato enlargement to the east after the demise of the USSR was unnecessary, reckless and provocative. If war comes, Putin would of course deserve the blame and global opprobrium. Russia’s threats are thuggish and dangerous. Yet as misguided as the Russian actions are, American intransigence regarding Nato enlargement is also utterly misguided and risky. True friends of Ukraine, and of global peace, should be calling for a US and Nato compromise with Russia — one that respects Russia’s legitimate security interests while fully backing Ukraine’s sovereignty.

2022 UTNIF Negative
NEG – AI – Neg vs. AI Aff – Case Debate › Solvency › 1NC – Espionage Turn

increased integration makes cyber espionage more likely

Konaev and Chahal 2021 – research fellow and research analys with the Center for Security and Emerging Technology

Margarita Konaev Husanjot Chahal April 2021 “The Path of Least Resistance: Multinational Collaboration on AI for Military Logistics and Sustainment” CSET Issue Brief

Finally, on the technical front, there are numerous challenges to ensuring that hardware and digital systems are interoperable and secure. Creating and maintaining common or interoperable information systems and databases is a massive undertaking considering that in each country, the data resides in repositories lacking standardized formatting or maintained by contractors that keep such information proprietary, especially for data on sensors and weapon systems. Shared information systems and databases are also particularly vulnerable to disruption, manipulation, and data theft in part because of discrepancies in countries’ network security protocols and capabilities.26 These problems are hard to resolve in their own right. But the aforementioned political factors, especially the push toward greater data sovereignty by some of the European allies, only exacerbate these technical challenges for collaborations on AI.

2022 UTNIF Negative
NEG – AI – Neg vs. AI Aff – Case Debate › Solvency › 1NC – No Solvency – Data

No solvency – lack of optimization makes AI military application ineffective

Konaev and Chahal 2021 – research fellow and research analys with the Center for Security and Emerging Technology

Margarita Konaev Husanjot Chahal April 2021 “The Path of Least Resistance: Multinational Collaboration on AI for Military Logistics and Sustainment” CSET Issue Brief

This is not to say that adopting and developing, let alone collaborating on AI-enabled logistics will be an easy task for the U.S. military and allied defense organizations. The ML and deep learning algorithms behind commercial AI-enabled logistics are generally not optimized for military needs.39 And if the experience of the Department of Defense is any indication, there are multiple challenges with regards to the data needed to power AI applications—from lack of data to problems with traceability, access, and interoperability of data collected by different systems.40 Moreover, data security and privacy concerns as well as different legal frameworks for how personal data is collected, handled, processed, and stored remain a critical barrier to international collaboration. Lack of clarity surrounding how to implement the exemptions for research incorporated into the General Data Protection Regulation, for example, has stalled collaboration between the U.S. National Institutes of Health and some European counterparts.41

2022 UTNIF Negative
NEG – AI – Neg vs. AI Aff – Case Debate › Solvency › No Solvency – EU Say No – Chilling Effect

EU tech protectionism creates a chilling effect on the industry – prevents research and development by dissuading start-up participation

Broadbent 2021 - senior adviser (non-resident) with the Scholl Chair in International Business at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.

Meredith Broadbent August 10, 2020 “Internet or Splinternet? The Consequences of European Tech Sovereignty” Center for Strategic and International Studies https://www.csis.org/analysis/internet-or-splinternet-consequences-european-tech-sovereignty

Sitting atop resounding commercial success in the domestic as well as the global marketplace, the CEOs of four U.S. digital behemoths appeared last week before the House of Representatives to respond to public and congressional concerns about market domination.The size and success of these champions, under fire for lack of transparency and anticompetitive practices, have triggered similar, more exaggerated concerns in Europe, which are playing out in a frenzy of proposed rulemaking at both the Commission and member-state level. As Congress probes the market behavior of U.S. digital companies, it is important for U.S. legislators to consider parallel rising pressure for digital and industrial protectionism in Europe, particularly in Germany and France. This flurry of regulatory activity endangers transatlantic data transfers—the lifeblood of many innovative U.S. firms—and will hurt U.S. business success globally while simultaneously distracting both Europe and the United States from the broader threat posed by China’s authoritarian state capitalist system.Many Europeans are deeply worried about the continent’s ability to compete long term in the global digital economy, given its challenges in developing competitors to the U.S. and Chinese tech giants. Yet European economies have tremendous strengths—highly educated workforces, depth in engineering, advanced technologies, and a leadership role in a host of industries that are rapidly digitizing, such as agriculture, infrastructure, transportation, logistics, manufacturing, and knowledge-intensive services, for example, financial, business, environmental, and engineering services. Constructing new European regulations for the digital era should be guided first by the do no harm warning.The United States and Europe share an interest in piloting, investing in, and leveraging disruptive technologies like artificial intelligence (AI), blockchain, and the Internet of Things in these key industries, and liberalizing market access for services in emerging markets. The United States and Europe can also work together to ensure firms and workers in more underserved and remote regions are able to apply technologies, access educational and training opportunities, and increase productivity. But improved transatlantic cooperation in supporting innovation, productivity, consumer welfare, and sustainable job creation in a flourishing transatlantic digital economy, under an open and free internet architecture, seems all the more remote in light of where European regulators say they are headed. The Commission released a series of documents earlier this year outlining Europe’s regulatory future, including a White Paper on Artificial Intelligence, a Communication on European Strategy for Data, and a framing paper related to Shaping Europe’s Digital Future. These documents and many more speak to the European desire to achieve “digital autonomy” and “tech sovereignty” through an array of regulatory and tax changes aimed at nurturing indigenous tech firms, developing independent European data pools, and tamping down on large, innovative foreign firms offering attractive digital services to European consumers.Artificial IntelligenceFollowing the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) model of being the first mover with comprehensive regulation, the Commission is taking aggressive aim at being the preeminent “global standards setter” in AI. The European Union’s heavy-handed preliminary proposal for AI regulation diverges sharply from the U.S. approach. In its white paper on AI, the Commission has proposed ex ante conformity assessments to control access to the EU market for AI applications originating outside of the EU. That would likely require a new framework with criteria, benchmarks, and standards that European authorities will use to determine if an AI product is “trustworthy, secure and in respect of European values and rules” before it is allowed entry into the European market. This approach could include a pre-market review by EU authorities of algorithms, training data, documentation on programming, and how the system was built, as well as accuracy tests and other requirements. Also under consideration are data quality and traceability requirements that would require non-EU firms to train AI applications on GDPR compliant data, an extraterritorial regulation that seemingly would burden U.S. firms with requirements to completely retrain many proprietary algorithms developed in the United States with new data sets as a condition of market access in the European Union.Unlike its inaction in the area of federal privacy regulation, which has allowed Europe to set a de facto global standard, the United States has led an international, cooperative effort through the G7 to reach common standards in the challenging area of AI research and development. A coordinated interagency team in the United States focused on AI regulation and emerging issues makes transatlantic collaboration is this new regulatory space a possibility.New Activist Competition MeasuresIn a February 4, 2020, letter to Commission Executive Vice-President Vestager calling for more activist competition policy, France, Germany, Poland, and Italy describe their two overarching goals: (1) moderating competition emanating from “state-backed and subsidized” foreign competitors (e.g., China); and (2) controlling “emergence of large players in the digital economy relying on the accumulation of data and unparalleled network effects resulting in . . . excessive market power.” (e.g., large U.S. and Chinese tech companies.) The four European governments advocate for policies to tackle the “digital platforms with paramount importance for competition,” saying that these firms should be subject to “specific scrutiny” in Europe and an enhanced regulatory framework.In different EU jurisdictions, competition authorities are increasingly weaving the precautionary principle into regulation of technology markets with the idea that new ex ante rules should be imposed ahead of any actual anticompetitive behavioral violation. Legislation pending in the German Bundestag is in this vein. For its part, the French government has put forward a legislative proposal to regulate “systemic platforms.” Under the French plan, competition regulators would be authorized to surveil and block planned acquisitions of European tech startups of almost any size.

2022 UTNIF Negative
NEG – AI – Neg vs. AI Aff – Case Debate › Solvency › No Solvency – EU Says No – “Tech Sovereignty”

Tech sovereignty prevents cooperation

Konaev and Chahal 2021 – research fellow and research analys with the Center for Security and Emerging Technology

Margarita Konaev Husanjot Chahal April 2021 “The Path of Least Resistance: Multinational Collaboration on AI for Military Logistics and Sustainment” CSET Issue Brief

Another potential barrier to collaboration, particularly with European allies, is the growing momentum around the idea of European digital sovereignty and increasing concerns about continued dependence on U.S. technology companies.17 Part of the push for greater European technology independence stems from Europe being “caught in the crossfire” on a variety of technology issues, including 5G and internet regulation amid the intensifying strategic competition between the United States and China. European nations like France and Germany, among others, are becoming more assertive when it comes to control over their data.18 The experts behind France’s AI strategy, for instance, have advocated for a data policy that is “structured around the goals of sovereignty and strategic autonomy” as a prerequisite for the development of AI in France and in Europe, in an effort to “avoid becoming just ‘digital colonies’ of the Chinese and American giants.”19 Moreover, as Ulrike Franke explains, the EU has taken a stronger stance on protecting individuals’ digital rights through regulations such as the 2014 “right to be forgotten” and the 2018 General Data Protection Regulation.20 Differing views on China, a push toward additional regulations of U.S. technology companies, different approaches toward data privacy, and commercial competition can all hinder transatlantic cooperation on AI.