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2022 UTNIF Affirmative
UTNIF – AI Aff › EXT – NATO Advantage › 2AC – AI Coop Key to NATO

AI cooperation key to NATO effectiveness

Lin-Greenberg 2020 – postdoctoral fellow at the University of Pennsylvania’s Perry World House

Erik Lin-Greenberg, National Security Review, Vol 3, Iss 2. Spring. "Allies and Artificial Intelligence: Obstacles to Operations and Decision-Making" https://tnsr.org/2020/03/allies-and-artificial-intelligence-obstacles-to-operations-and-decision-making/

Second, incorporating AI-enabled capabilities into alliance planning exercises and wargames will help prepare policymakers and commanders to better employ AI.132 Wargames, for instance, might ask leaders to employ AI-enabled capabilities or respond to a rival’s use of AI-enabled weapons. These events allow leaders to test and refine institutional processes in a low-risk environment, while also socializing practitioners to the potential uses, limitations, and risks of AI-enabled warfare.

2022 UTNIF Affirmative
UTNIF – AI Aff › EXT – NATO Advantage › Tech Leadership Key to Readiness

US proactive leadership is key – it's the only way to effectively counter China

Gude 2022 – Executive Director of the think tank Trusted Future

Ken Gude May 31, 2022 “The U.S. Must Lead a New Transatlantic Alliance on Tech Policy” https://www.realclearpolicy.com/articles/2022/05/31/the_us_must_lead_a_new_transatlantic_alliance_on_tech_policy_834883.html

The United States and Europe have reinvigorated the transatlantic security alliance in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The galvanizing event of a major war in Europe has spurred greater action on security cooperation than at any point in decades. More importantly, it has accelerated the discussion about the importance of a common strategic vision for the United States and Europe to work together to counter autocratic adversaries. Despite the emerging consensus on defense needs, disagreements on important issues such as how we deal with increasingly vital emerging technologies continue to frustrate a common path forward on democracy and technology. The NATO security alliance was essential for meeting the challenges of the 20th century, but today's growing challenges, including leading the global technological future, will require even better cooperation in more areas. To ensure that democracies remain at the forefront of economic development through this rapidly changing international environment, the United States should lead a new transatlantic technology alliance with our European allies based on our shared democratic values.Well over half of the economic growth since the end of World War II has been directly attributable to technological innovation. The American people see the importance of innovation with large majorities telling us in a recent survey that they want U.S. technology leadership so that the United States becomes a home for the good paying jobs of the future, and that Congress should promote that leadership through bipartisan investment. In a rare recent feat of that bipartisanship, a conference committee of the House and Senate is now considering bipartisan legislation that will invest billions to expand American innovation, strengthen our cyber workforce, and diversify our STEM pipeline.We need to increase investment in this innovation ecosystem because China is outpacing the U.S. in establishing leadership in the critical emerging technology sectors that will drive the new jobs and industries for decades to come. China’s remarkable growth and investment in its technology sector has caught many around the world by surprise. According to Harvard University’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, China “has displaced the U.S. as the world’s top high-tech manufacturer,” and, “has become a serious competitor in the foundational technologies of the 21st century.” But just as the United States is utilizing a powerful alliance with Europe to assist Ukraine as it fights to counter Russian aggression, we need a strong partnership with our European allies to meet this new challenge of winning the technological future. NATO was established to ensure that the security architecture of Europe was not defined by undemocratic forces. Likewise, the global technology future should be forged through democratic values. As Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo has said, “We, together with our allies, who care about privacy, freedom, individual rights, individual protection, we need to write the rules of the road.”Unfortunately, current proposals in Europe will hinder transatlantic cooperation in this critical sector, undermine American innovators, and potentially strengthen the hand of organized criminals and nation states that want to abuse technologies for malign purposes. For example, the bipartisan leadership of the Senate Finance Committee voiced concerns that the European Digital Markets Act would “unfairly disadvantage U.S. firms to the benefit of not just European companies, but also powerful state-owned and subsidized Chinese and Russian companies, which would have negative impacts on users’ privacy, security, and free speech.” Despite the issues with the European approach expressed by their colleagues, some American legislators are pushing for the United States to follow Europe’s lead. A group of former Cabinet-level national security officials recently warned that these U.S. proposals “would provide an open door for foreign adversaries to gain access to the software and hardware of American technology companies… [which] could result in major cyber threats, misinformation, access to data of U.S. persons, and intellectual property theft.” However well-intentioned these American and European proposals are, this is the wrong framework for a transatlantic technology alliance.

2022 UTNIF Affirmative
UTNIF – AI Aff › EXT – NATO Advantage › AI Key to Readiness

Military Incorporation of AI is key to maintaining supremacy

Gould 2022 - senior Pentagon reporter for Defense News, covering the intersection of national security policy, politics and the defense industry

By Joe Gould June 1 2022 “US military may need innovation overhaul to fight future wars, Milley says” https://www.c4isrnet.com/congress/2022/06/01/us-military-may-need-innovation-overhaul-to-fight-future-wars-milley-says/

The U.S. military may need to reorganize to fight future wars, which will be profoundly changed by artificial intelligence, robotics and other advanced technologies, according to Army Gen. Mark Milley, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.The nation’s top military officer said during a trip to Europe this week that he’s working on recommendations that could lead to a high-level reorganization. After launching Army Futures Command in 2018 to drive modernization when he was that service’s chief of staff, Milley said he’s mulling a similar effort for the joint force.“You’re going to have to do really fundamental changes to our military in order to take advantage of this change in the character of war. In order to do that, you need organizations to drive that,” he told reporters. “You look at what the Army did with Army Futures Command, for example. Can that be done at the joint level, at the DoD level?”How Army Futures Command could be adapted across the services, which have innovation efforts of their own, is unclear, and Milley wasn’t ready to say whether he’d be proposing an umbrella “Joint Futures Command.” Army civilian leaders have moved some of the service’s command’s powers back to its senior civilian acquisitions office, though it shepherded 24 modernization programs since its inception.The comments follow a warning he gave graduating cadets at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point last week that the military’s technological edge is in danger. No longer the unchallenged global power, America is being tested in Europe by Russian aggression and in Asia by China’s dramatic economic and military growth. “We’re going to have to really think hard about fundamental shifts to our military,” Milley said in London. “The country that maximizes development of these technologies with their doctrines and organizations, in the time we have available, could be decisive in the next conflict ... I would suggest, in 10 to 15 years, you have to do these fundamental changes.”The Pentagon has been trumpeting its stepped up investments in emerging technologies and last week made its latest tech-focused organizational move. An Emerging Capabilities Policy Office will help integrate autonomous systems, hypersonic tech, directed-energy weapons, and other innovations into the department strategy, planning guidance and budget processes.The principal military advisor to the president and the secretary of defense, Milley said he is also thinking through the implications of emerging technologies, following the lead of Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin. The military is examining options for operational design and structure of the force ― its brigades, divisions and fleets ― but also its institutions.“The institutions we have today may or may not be optimally designed to leverage these technologies,” he said.Drawing a parallel with the horse bit and stirrups that allowed for mounted warfare some 3,000 years ago, Milley said that the existing technology behind Fitbits and iPhones allow soldiers to sense their environment like never before while accurate, long-range precision munitions let them destroy targets like never before.Coupled with AI’s potential to speed battlefield decision-making and the robotics and the autonomous technologies that are transforming the character of labor, militaries and warfare could be entirely transformed. Trucking, which is already adapting to driverless vehicles, and other industries that lend themselves to robotics will fundamentally change, Milley said.“With respect to the military, that’s no less true. We have a wide variety of tasks that can be and probably will be conducted by some form of robot,” he said. “The unmanned aerial vehicle is an example, but you could see in the future, pilotless air forces ― manned/unmanned teaming where you have one aircraft that’s got a human in it and the rest of the squadron are robots.“You could see tank formations where maybe one armored vehicle is manned and the rest are robotic,” Milley said. “You could see a sailor-less Navy where one or two ships are command-type ships and the rest are all robotic ships.”With the potential to reduce casualties and manpower costs, and revamp logistics, the implications are “almost infinite,” he said, adding that the Pentagon should be investing in those technologies, and changing the concepts of how it fights, its doctrine, organizations, leadership development.“I believe we that we are in a fundamental change in the character of war, and by that I mean how you fight, where you fight, the doctrine, the equipment, the tactics, techniques and procedures, and so on,” Milley said. “We’re in the middle of a real, unbelievable fundamental change, which is probably the biggest fundamental change in the history of warfare.”

2022 UTNIF Affirmative
UTNIF – AI Aff › EXT – NATO Advantage › AI Key to Readiness

Collaboration is key to ensure interoperability of military operations

Konaev and Chahal 2021 – research fellow and research analys with the Center for Security and Emerging Technology

Margarita Konaev Husanjot Chahal April 2021 “The Path of Least Resistance: Multinational Collaboration on AI for Military Logistics and Sustainment” CSET Issue Brief

There is a strong consensus among U.S. national security experts that collaboration with allies on artificial intelligence can promote common security interests and ensure that the future of emerging technologies reflects shared democratic values and ethical principles. The Department of Defense Artificial Intelligence Strategy, for example, calls for engaging with “international allies and partners” as a key step toward harnessing AI.2 Putting the strategy into practice, the Joint Artificial Intelligence Center (JAIC) has launched an AI Partnership for Defense, bringing together representatives of defense organizations from 13 nations to “create new frameworks and tools for data sharing, cooperative development, and strengthened interoperability.”3

2022 UTNIF Affirmative
UTNIF – AI Aff › EXT – NATO Advantage › AI Key to Readiness

AI key to logistical streamlining – that's key to military power

Konaev and Chahal 2021 – research fellow and research analys with the Center for Security and Emerging Technology

Margarita Konaev Husanjot Chahal April 2021 “The Path of Least Resistance: Multinational Collaboration on AI for Military Logistics and Sustainment” CSET Issue Brief

Focusing on AI-enabled Military Logistics and SustainmentIn military affairs, logistics is tasked with managing the global supply chain for the armed services, including “the transfer of personnel and materiel from one location to another, as well as the maintenance of that materiel.”27 Sustainment is a broader term, encompassing logistics as well as financial management, personnel services, and health services which together provide the support necessary to maintain operations until the mission is accomplished.28 The two functions are closely intertwined. NATO’s Allied Joint Doctrine for Logistics, for instance, offers a comprehensive definition of logistics that also entails elements of sustainment, encompassing the aspects of military operations that deal with “design and development, acquisition, storage, movement, distribution, maintenance, evacuation and disposition of materiel; transport of personnel; acquisition, construction, maintenance, operation and disposition of facilities; acquisition or furnishing of services; and medical and health service support.”29Logistics and sustainment are essential to military effectiveness, readiness, survivability, and endurance, and in many ways, constitute the lifeblood of military power.30 The Department of Defense, in turn, sees great promise in leveraging AI/machine learning (ML) technologies for military logistics and sustainment to better maintain equipment, reduce operational costs, and improve readiness. The Department of Defense’s AI strategy, for example, includes efforts related to AI-enabled logistics and sustainment, such as “implementing predictive maintenance and supply, and streamlining business processes,” as part of its strategic approach to “delivering AI-enabled capabilities that address key missions.”31 Joint Logistics, in turn, is one of the JAIC’s key mission initiatives, dedicated to “improving fleet readiness through AI-driven diagnostics, training, process improvements, demand forecasting, and supply chain optimization.”32The discussion below outlines the technological, political, and strategic imperatives and opportunities for multinational collaboration on AI-enabled military logistics and sustainment.Naturally, the principal mission of militaries is national defense and the force (including logistics and sustainment functions) must be prepared for combat at any time. Modern militaries, however, are massive organizations that employ hundreds of thousands of people, if not more. The Department of Defense, for example, employs 2.91 million people, and less than half of them, or 1.3 million, are active duty personnel.33 And unlike military functions such as fires or movement and maneuver of forces and equipment, many of the tasks related to military logistics and other financial, personnel, and health services are administered in noncombat settings.

2022 UTNIF Affirmative
UTNIF – AI Aff › EXT – NATO Advantage › AI Key to Readiness

Cooperation is key – incorporation of AI is key to readiness

Franke 2021 – policy fellow at European Council on Foreign Relations

Ulrike Esther Franke January 2021 “Artificial Divide: How Europe And America Could Clash Over Ai” European Council on Foreign Relations

International competition on technology, such as 5G, has recently attracted significant attention. At the 2020 Munich Security Conference, for example, tech was an important topic – yet the discussion was not really about tech, but about power, as the rivalry over who builds 5G telecommunications infrastructure turned into a US-Chinese competition. This was despite the fact that the leading 5G providers are European and Chinese.

2022 UTNIF Affirmative
UTNIF – AI Aff › EXT – NATO Advantage › UQ – Defense Industrial Base

Ukraine puts the US and NATO Defense Industrial Base on the Brink

Clark and Montoya 2022 - Senior Research Associate, Center for National Defense and Spring 2022 Member of the Young Leaders Program at The Heritage Foundation

Maiya Clark Jacob Montoya, May 5 2022 “The War in Ukraine Continues; Can the U.S. Defense-Industrial Base Keep Up?” Heritage Foundation https://www.heritage.org/defense/commentary/the-war-ukraine-continues-can-the-us-defense-industrial-base-keep

Three months after Russia’s latest invasion of Ukraine, the Ukrainian army continues to fight valiantly. Weapons provided by NATO members have sustained the resistance thus far, but more will be needed if Ukraine is to stand a fighting chance against Russia’s far-larger military. The West clearly intends to keep the arms and munitions flowing, but will its atrophying defense-industrial base be up to the task? Do the U.S. and NATO have enough weapons to supply Ukraine for a prolonged conflict? The U.S. is not the “arsenal of democracy” that it used to be. Indeed, many experts doubt it has the capacity needed to meet its own needs, considering the possibility of conflict with China or perhaps even a two-front war. Supplying Ukraine with weapons, although necessary, will almost certainly exacerbate the issue of an already depleted American arsenal. Even as they push for accelerated deliveries to Ukraine, multiple government officials have stressed the need for the U.S. to replenish its own munitions stockpiles. >>> Biden’s Defense Budget Is Detached From Reality Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment William LaPlante recently said that the Pentagon needs “to have more hot production lines,” even if it means having “redundant production lines” to fix single-point failures. Sen. Jack Reed, Rhode Island Democrat and chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, stated that his panel is pushing the Pentagon to replenish its inventory of weapons sent to Ukraine, but multiple issues stand in the way. These issues include stagnant assembly lines, the scarcity of specialized parts and disrupted international supply chains. Take, for example, the FIM-92 Stinger. A portable, shoulder-fired antiaircraft missile, the Stinger has been vital for Ukraine’s defense against air attacks and troop deployments by Russian helicopters. The problem is that, prior to the invasion, the U.S. had not planned to refresh its stockpile of Stingers until at least the 2030s. The focus, instead, was on gearing up to eventually start production of a more advanced Stinger. Now, the U.S. is scrambling to overcome difficulties, like obsolete parts and workforce issues, in order to produce more 1970s-era Stinger missiles for Ukraine. Raytheon, the manufacturer, said this week that it will take “years” before they can build new Stingers. Meanwhile, our allies have even bigger problems. Multiple NATO allies’ defenses are based on old Soviet systems that need to be replaced or augmented. Poland’s offer to send its entire operational MiG-29 fighter-jet fleet to Ukraine shed light on this fact. Some NATO allies—mainly Poland, Slovakia and Bulgaria—continue to use outdated Soviet-Russian equipment inherited from their predecessor regimes after the 1989-91 collapse of Communism. Slovakia has sent another aging Soviet-era platform, the S-300 anti-aircraft missile system, to Ukraine. The MiG-29 entered service in 1982 and the S-300 system in 1978, and getting spare parts and replacement missiles would be a real challenge even if the source weren’t a hostile Russia. The conflict has, however, given rise to silver linings. Many of our allies are waking up to the need to boost their defense spending. Germany has decided to buy F-35s from the U.S. and pledged an increased defense budget, exceeding NATO’s 2%-of-GDP target. Poland has moved to increase its defense spending as well, with the goal of reaching 3% of GDP by 2023. To some degree, the Russia-Ukraine conflict has served as a stress test for the West’s defense industrial base. From that has come a growing recognition that, for too long, America has underestimated the amount of munitions and platforms required in modern warfare. Due to the complexity and time required to manufacture today’s precision weapons, we must start thinking now, before a war breaks out, about whether America has enough weaponry to sustain a conflict.

2022 UTNIF Affirmative
UTNIF – AI Aff › EXT – NATO Advantage › Solvency – NATO Key

NATO is key – it provides a framework for understanding and integrating AI

Lucarelli et al 2021 - Professor at the University of Bologna, member of the Board of Directors of the Forum on the Problems of Peace and War and of the Institute of International Affairs

Sonia Lucarelli Alessandro Marrone Francesco N. Moro “Executive Summary” Nato Decision-Making In The Age Of Big Data And Artificial Intelligence, Nato Allied Command Transformation Università Di Bologna Istituto Affari Internazionali

The AI Adoption in the Defense Domain and NATO’s Role. In discussing what AI will mean for allied militaries and the Alliance as such, a basic question should be addressed: is AI a technological revolution or is it an instance of technological evolution? Different pieces of evidence can support both interpretations. It would probably be hard for Allies, from a political perspective, to adapt swiftly to a rapid technological revolution. NATO approach, because of the consensus characterising its procedures, will have to be more evolutionary, granular and nuanced. In any case, it is unlikely to see in the next future AI making decisions for the North Atlantic Council (NAC) or the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG). There are psychological, cultural, organizational, political as well as technical reasons for this. The journey to AI is likely to be rather troublesome. Agile software development, for instance, enables the development of superior software but, at the same time, also calls for different procedures, organizational structures and processes, touching upon organizations’ identities, missions and culture.

2022 UTNIF Affirmative
UTNIF – AI Aff › EXT – NATO Advantage › UQ – Hybrid Warfare Now

Adversaries are engaged in hybrid warfare now that compromises decisionmaking – risks escalation

Lucarelli et al 2021 - Professor at the University of Bologna, member of the Board of Directors of the Forum on the Problems of Peace and War and of the Institute of International Affairs

Sonia Lucarelli Alessandro Marrone Francesco N. Moro “Executive Summary” Nato Decision-Making In The Age Of Big Data And Artificial Intelligence, Nato Allied Command Transformation Università Di Bologna Istituto Affari Internazionali

Digital revolution has substantially transformed the world we live in, providing great opportunities but also making societies more vulnerable. Technology makes external interferences cheaper, faster and all- encompassing: citizens can potentially become direct targets of information warfare, all members of a society can be part of conflicts one way or another. From advanced weaponry to command and control, most security-related domains are undergoing deep transformations as data availability and transmission increase exponentially. In this context, three interconnected aspects are explore through this publication with a view to the Alliance’s evolution: Big Data and organizational challenges for NATO; hybrid threats to Allies’ decision- making; the adoption of AI in the defense domain and NATO’s role.Big Data and Organizational Challenges for NATO. Basing decisions on a much larger amount of information than was previously possible could lead to a real revolution in the decision-making processes of complex organizations, especially because this information would concern different dimensions of reality and it would be constantly updated. Beside the huge quantity of information available, the high speed at which the data are generated and need to be processed is another defining factor of Big Data. Also, they will typically be acquired from diverse sources and their trustworthiness has to be carefully evaluated. Finally, any data can have different value in different phases of the decision-making process. All these features impose specific requirements on organizations that aim at using Big Data to reduce the uncertainty in which they operate. For instance, the huge volume of data compels to acquire new data storage technologies, while the high speed demands new processing tools and the variable trustworthiness and value force organizations to elaborate new methods of analysis. Accordingly, any actor that seeks to exploit Big Data should have clear goals and a well-defined strategy to delineate and implement its specific objectives.A key issue with Big Data is providing decision makers with data that are truly relevant for their purposes, and not simply interesting. Chief data officers and senior data-related leadership positions will acquire a crucial importance in the analysis of information and in the actual decision-making process, but these positions require a special mix of talent and tools that are currently scarce in many large organizations, especially in the public sector and even more in the military one.Another key issue lies in the emerging tension between centralization and decentralization of the decision- making process of organizations that are introducing Big Data analysis in their work. Paradoxically, while Big Data should promote widespread responsibility and tactical awareness, at the moment advanced digitalization seems to be linked to clear centripetal forces in large organizations. The centripetal tendency leads towards the de-responsibilization of the lower ranks and to a progressive loss of practice in choosing. Thus, it would be advisable to integrate Big Data in the Alliance’s decision-making favoring diffused ownership and devising different tools for different branches of the organization, based on their specificities. It would also be helpful to create well-designed and reliable evaluation procedures to measure the effectiveness of organizational innovations as well as of the execution of the new decision-making processes. In particular, identifying the initial failures is especially important, to learn from them and avoid structural problems.Hybrid Threats to Allies’ Decision-Making. Hybrid threats is a broad category encompassing a variety of actors, actions and targets. As for actors, due to their actual capabilities, intentions and recent track records, China and Russia can be identified as the most gathering threats.Concerning actions, information is key under several respects. It refers to Big Data and AI taken together, as the latter entails the use of algorithms to learn from the former with a view to exploit the target’s vulnerabilities. Digital connections are the underlying infrastructure used to perpetrate hybrid threats in the information domain. Western societies rely on virtual world platforms that can be targeted by potential attackers. Since global networks defy borders and limit state jurisdiction, they are harder to defend and allow potential attackers to act below the threshold of detection and attribution. Hybrid threats also benefit from the unprecedent speed and scope of information. This is not new in principle, but it has reached game- changing levels. On the one hand, managing this massive flow of information is just prohibitive for NATO and its member states; on the other hand, high speed of circulation translates into increased operational tempo.Hybrid threats may take aim at a variety of targets, yet particularly concerning are offensive actions that might lead to societal polarization, elite disagreement and biased perceptions of foreign actors. These actions have the potential to affect decision-making at different levels, even undermining democratic states’ institutions. Accordingly, these hybrid threats could undermine decision-making process of Allies – and by reflex, NATO’s too. Decision makers face in particular three main set of problems when crafting a response to hybrid threats.1) How to respond in non-escalatory ways? Since hybrid attacks exploit the grey zone to create ambiguity, including by manipulating the threshold of detection and granting plausible deniability, decision makers are faced with the risk of overreaction.2) How to respond in democratic ways? Potential attackers may severely impair the decision-making process of democratic systems, putting under stress, for example, the constraint to abide by domestic and international law.3) How to get public support? Since hybrid threats are usually covered or difficult to attribute, policy makers also have to persuade the public opinion of the very same existence of the threat.

2022 UTNIF Affirmative
UTNIF – AI Aff › 1AC › 1AC Solvency

Key members of NATO will say yes

Konaev and Chahal 2021 – research fellow and research analys with the Center for Security and Emerging Technology

Margarita Konaev Husanjot Chahal April 2021 “The Path of Least Resistance: Multinational Collaboration on AI for Military Logistics and Sustainment” CSET Issue Brief

This is not to say that adopting and developing, let alone collaborating on AI-enabled logistics will be an easy task for the U.S. military and allied defense organizations. The ML and deep learning algorithms behind commercial AI-enabled logistics are generally not optimized for military needs.39 And if the experience of the Department of Defense is any indication, there are multiple challenges with regards to the data needed to power AI applications—from lack of data to problems with traceability, access, and interoperability of data collected by different systems.40 Moreover, data security and privacy concerns as well as different legal frameworks for how personal data is collected, handled, processed, and stored remain a critical barrier to international collaboration. Lack of clarity surrounding how to implement the exemptions for research incorporated into the General Data Protection Regulation, for example, has stalled collaboration between the U.S. National Institutes of Health and some European counterparts.41

2022 UTNIF Affirmative
UTNIF – AI Aff › 1AC › 1AC Solvency

Partnerships through NATO are key – it's the only way to attract investment and direct the private sector towards ethical development

Warrell 2021 – staff writer @ Financial Times

HELEN WARRELL “High-tech warfare will be high on agenda at summit, but most members are playing catch-up with China” Financial Times https://www.ft.com/content/61c1945c-d153-4d58-b9c5-dffd99a6919e

As Russia intensifies cyber hostilities and China weaponises artificial intelligence, joining forces in the field of high-tech warfare will feature high on the list of topics discussed by Nato allies at a summit next week. But the transatlantic alliance’s 30 members will need to move fast if they aim to make up lost ground. Nato is proposing a new tech innovation centre bringing together military personnel with industry to foster digital defence start-ups. Some of these might be financed by a separate initiative, also set to be debated: a venture capital fund for innovation which member states could choose to opt in to.The efforts are belated, as Nato secretary-general Jens Stoltenberg himself acknowledged. “For decades, Nato allies have been leading when it comes to technology, but that’s not obvious any more,” he told the Financial Times in an interview last week. “We see China especially investing heavily in new, disruptive technologies like artificial intelligence, autonomous systems, big data, and they implement them into new advanced weapon systems, drones, submarines, aircraft and so on.”He is not the first to sound the alarm. Eric Schmidt, the former Google chief executive who now chairs the US’s National Security Commission on AI, warned earlier this year that Beijing was planning to undermine conventional military forces by “leapfrogging” to new technologies. The commission’s report, published in March, raised concerns that China would use AI for “reconnaissance, electromagnetic countermeasures and co-ordinated firepower strikes”. Part of the problem is that western defence institutions have been slow to recognise the potential of innovation beyond their own industry.“For decades, a lot of technological development would happen within the defence sector — the internet, nuclear, GPS, all of that was developed by the defence industry and then shared with the civilian sector,” Stoltenberg said. “Now, it goes the other way around. It’s a civilian sector which is leading in the development of artificial intelligence, quantum computing, and many of the new disruptive technologies.”Some NATO members are ahead of others. The US and France have published military AI strategies, while the UK announced this year that it is to establish a centre for defence AI. For the first time, Britain’s intelligence agency, MI6, is recruiting from the private sector for a new head of its “Q” branch — the technical lab made famous in the James Bond films.Establishing a new NATO hub — known as an “accelerator” — in which tech companies and members of the armed forces can experiment with new ideas has advantages, according to Professor Fiona Murray, co-director of MIT’s innovation initiative.Start-ups and investors do not always have the time to tackle defence challenges when solutions are “hard to test, markets are fragmented and procurement is slow”, Murray said.Working together would create a wider market for new products and enhance collective security, she noted. It was “not enough” for countries to be handling this individually, she said.The US has started marshalling allies on the policy implications of using new technology. The Pentagon’s “AI Partnership for Defense”, comprising 13 countries (including Nato members Canada, Denmark, Estonia, the UK, France and Norway) met virtually for the first time last year to agree joint military standards on AI. Schmidt’s commission has called on the Five Eyes intelligence-sharing alliance (the US, UK, Canada, Australia and New Zealand) to work more closely on developing AI systems.Ulrike Franke, an expert in military technology at the European Council on Foreign Relations, argues that NATO’s tech centre will be most effective if it prioritises systems designed to facilitate joint military operations. The alliance should look at areas such as AI-enabled command and control, she said, which could give members a unified picture of the battlefield across multiple regions, using intelligent data analysis to sift information.Franke said that in the vast arena spanning drones to quantum computing, there was a temptation to cover too much. “It makes massive sense for Nato to look more at this [technology]”, she said. “The question is, what exactly are they focusing on? There’s a danger of Nato spreading itself too thin.”

2022 UTNIF Affirmative
UTNIF – AI Aff › 1AC › 1AC Solvency

The plan solves – establishing a cooperative framework for AI applications in military logistics and sustainment ensures interoperability amongst allies, maintains readiness, and encourages feedback models that can quell skepticism

Konaev and Chahal 2021 – research fellow and research analys with the Center for Security and Emerging Technology

Margarita Konaev Husanjot Chahal April 2021 “The Path of Least Resistance: Multinational Collaboration on AI for Military Logistics and Sustainment” CSET Issue Brief

The United States and its allies face powerful technical, political, and strategic reasons to pursue and deepen collaboration on AI applications for logistics and sustainment. Whether working within existing frameworks or building new partnerships, there are multiple pathways for collaboration. The final NSCAI report, for example, offers a comprehensive list of ongoing multilateral efforts on AI and associated technologies as well as security alliances and partnerships, some of which could serve as a forum for allies to work together on AI-enabled logistics.64 Below, we recommend four options for allies to explore depending on their interests and capabilities.

2022 UTNIF Affirmative
UTNIF – AI Aff › 1AC › 1AC Advantage – Democracy

Democracy solves extinction

Cremer and Kemp 2021 – research Scholar at FHI and a Research Affiliate at the Centre for the Study of Existential Risk (University of Cambridge) and research associate at the Centre for the Study of Existential Risk at the University of Cambridge

Carla Zoe Cremer and Luke Kemp "Democratising Risk: In Search of a Methodology to Study Existential Risk" The Future of Humanity Institute, Oxford. Centre for the Study of Existential Risk, Cambridge. https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/2201/2201.11214.pdf

There is an intimate and neglected relationship between existential risk and democracy. Democracy must be central to efforts to prevent and mitigate catastrophic risks. It is also an antidote to many of the problems manifest in the TUA. Do those who study the future of humanity have good grounds to ignore the visions, desires, and values of the very people whose future they are trying to protect? Choosing which risks to take must be a democratic endeavour.

2022 UTNIF Affirmative
UTNIF – AI Aff › 1AC › 1AC Advantage – Democracy

International cooperation key to prevent authoritarian AI from crushing democracy worldwide

Imbrie et al 2020 - Senior Fellow at Georgetown's Center for Security and Emerging Technology

Andrew Imbrie Ryan Fedasiuk Catherine Aiken Tarun Chhabra Husanjot Chahal "Agile Alliances: How the United States and its Allies Can Deliver a Democratic Way of AI" Center for Security and Emerging Technology https://cset.georgetown.edu/publication/agile-alliances/

How can the United States collaborate with allies and partners to shape the trajectory of artificial intelligence in ways that will promote liberal democratic values and protect against efforts to wield AI for authoritarian ends?

2022 UTNIF Affirmative
UTNIF – AI Aff › 1AC › 1AC Advantage – Democracy

The aff is a key first step to creating international standardization around harmonized, democratic governance on AI

Heikkila 2021 – staff writer @ Politico

BY MELISSA HEIKKILÄ March 29, 2021 4:14 pm “NATO wants to set AI standards. If only its members agreed on the basics.” https://www.politico.eu/article/nato-ai-artificial-intelligence-standards-priorities/

On paper, NATO is the ideal organization to go about setting standards for military applications of artificial intelligence. But the widely divergent priorities and budgets of its 30 members could get in the way. The Western military alliance has identified artificial intelligence as a key technology needed to maintain an edge over adversaries, and it wants to lead the way in establishing common ground rules for its use. “We need each other more than ever. No country alone or no continent alone can compete in this era of great power competition,” NATO Deputy Secretary-General Mircea Geoană, the alliance’s second in command, said in an interview with POLITICO.The standard-setting effort comes as China is pressing ahead with AI applications in the military largely free of democratic oversight.David van Weel, NATO’s assistant secretary general for emerging security challenges, said Beijing's lack of concern with the tech's ethical implications has sped along the integration of AI into the military apparatus."I'm ... not sure that they're having the same debates on principles of responsible use or they're definitely not applying our democratic values to these technologies,” he said.Meanwhile, the EU — which has pledged to roll out the world's first binding rules on AI in coming weeks — is seeking closer collaboration with Washington to oversee emerging technologies, including artificial intelligence. But those efforts have been slow in getting off the ground.For Geoană, that collaboration will happen at NATO, which is working closely with the European Union as it prepares AI regulation focusing on “high risk” applications.The pitchNATO does not regulate, but “once NATO sets a standard, it becomes in terms of defensive security the gold standard in that respective field,” Geoană said.The alliance's own AI strategy, to be released before the summer, will identify ways to operate AI systems responsibly, identify military applications for the technology, and provide a “platform for allies to test their AI to see whether it's up to NATO standards,” van Weel said. The strategy will also set ethical guidelines around how to govern AI systems, for example by ensuring systems can be shut down by a human at all times, and to maintain accountability by ensuring a human is responsible for the actions of AI systems.“If an adversary would use autonomous AI powered systems in a way that is not compatible with our values and morals, it would still have defense implications because we would need to defend and deter against those systems,” van Weel said. “We need to be aware of that and we need to flag legislators when we feel that our restrictions are coming into the realm of [being detrimental to] our defense and deterrence,” he continued.Mission impossible?The problem is that NATO's members are at very different stages when it comes to thinking about AI in the military context.The U.S., the world's biggest military spender, has prioritized the use of AI in the defense realm. But in Europe, most countries — France and the Netherlands excepting — barely mention the technology’s defense and military implications in their national AI strategies. “It’s absolutely no surprise that the U.S. had a military AI strategy before it has a national AI strategy," but the Europeans "did it exactly the other way around," said Ulrike Franke, a senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations, said:That echoes familiar transatlantic differences — and previous U.S. President Donald Trump's complaints — over defense spending, but also highlights the different approaches to AI regulation more broadly.The EU's AI strategy takes a cautious line, touting itself as "human-centric," focused on taming corporate excesses and keeping citizens' data safe. The U.S., which tends to be light on regulation and keen on defense, sees things differently.There are also divergences over what technologies the alliance ought to develop, including lethal autonomous weapons systems — often dubbed “killer robots” — programmed to identify and destroy targets without human control. Powerful NATO members including France, the U.K., and the U.S. have developed these technologies and oppose a treaty on these weapons, while others like Belgium and Germany have expressed serious concerns about the technology.These weapons systems have also faced fierce public opposition from civil society and human rights groups, including from United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres, who in 2018 called for a ban. Geoană said the alliance has “retained autonomous weapon systems as part of the interests of NATO.” The group hopes that its upcoming recommendations will allow the ethical use of the technology without “stifling innovation.” Staying relevantThese issues threaten to hamper NATO's standard-setting drive. "I think there’s a certain danger that if NATO doesn’t take this on as a real challenge, that it may be marginalized by other such efforts,” Franke said.She pointed to the U.S.-led AI Partnership for Defense, which consists of 13 countries from Europe and Asia to collaborate on AI use in the military context — a forum which could supplant NATO as the standard-setting body. That could have consequences for human rights, too.“NATO… is a great place to responsibly think about how to harness the good parts of this technology and how to prohibit the parts that would be catastrophic for humanitarian law and human rights law, and people at the end of the day,” said Verity Coyle, a senior adviser at Amnesty International, which is part of the Stop Killer Robots campaign. “Without oversight mechanisms to ensure ethical standards and measures, which would guarantee that this technology will operate under meaningful human control” NATO’s strategy could head into an “ethical vacuum,” Coyle said.Franke said it's better for the alliance to focus on the basics, like increased data sharing to develop and train military AI and cooperating on using artificial intelligence in logistics.“If NATO countries were to cooperate on that, that could create good procedures and set precedents. And I think we should then move on to the more controversial things such as autonomous weapons systems,” she said.

2022 UTNIF Affirmative
UTNIF – AI Aff › 1AC › 1AC Advantage – Democracy

Incorporation of multinational alliances is key to effective integration of artificial intelligence systems in military logistics and support – it's the only way to effectively counter future threats

Cooper 2021 – a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council, former assistant secretary at the US Department of State, a former senior intelligence officer for the US Joint Special Operations Command, and a combat veteran.

R. Clarke Cooper December 23 “A multipolar world requires more adaptive US security thinking” New Atlanticist https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/a-multipolar-world-requires-more-adaptive-us-security-thinking/

While the scale and volume of military interventions by China, Russia, and Iran are reportedly lower now than at the height of Cold War, the increasing risks of disruptive actions by these state actors and their proxies in a multipolar world require deterrence featuring robust technological solutions, which can only emerge from smart, adaptive policy.

2022 UTNIF Affirmative
UTNIF – AI Aff › 1AC › 1AC Advantage - NATO

Unrestrained great power competition causes extinction

Litwak 2021 - Senior Vice President and Director of International Security Studies, Wilson Center

Robert S. Litwak "Geostrategic Competition and Climate Change: Avoiding the Unmanageable" September 15. https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/geostrategic-competition-and-climate-change-avoiding-unmanageable

Humanity faces two catastrophic, indeed existential, threats—climate change and nuclear war. These risks play out before us as if on split screen. On one side are the here-and-now impacts of climate change: wildfires from Siberia to California to southern Europe, scorching “heat domes” over the Pacific Northwest, and “once in a thousand years” flooding in China. On the other, heightened geostrategic competition carrying the greatest risk of war between nuclear powers since the depths of the Cold War: in the month of April 2021 alone, a Russian troop surge on the Ukraine border triggered an “imminent crisis” alert in NATO while Chinese naval vessels and bombers conducted a largescale war-game encircling Taiwan. Though ostensibly discrete, the events playing out on the split screen are linked. This new nexus between geostrategic competition and climate change must be understood and integrated in policy if the twin threats are to be averted. In his landmark book, Hot, Flat, and Crowded, New York Times columnist Thomas L. Friedman stated that the central challenge of climate change to humanity is now “to manage what is already unavoidable and avoid what will truly be unmanageable.” To that compelling formulation can be added a corollary reflecting the new nexus: avoiding unconstrained geostrategic competition is a prerequisite for managing the climate threat. The window for humanity to avoid unmanageable climate change is narrowing. The United Nations’ Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) reports that global temperatures will inexorably rise 1.5 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels by mid-century because of the projected level of atmospheric carbon. The IPCC starkly warns that the dire consequences arising from a temperature increase beyond that point can only be averted through prompt concerted global action to bend the curve and sharply reduce atmospheric carbon. UN Secretary-General António Guterres called the report a “code red for humanity.” China, the United States, and Russia are, respectively, the first, second, and fourth largest carbon emitters. Yet at the precise historical juncture when unprecedented global cooperation is necessary to forestall catastrophe, the world is on the brink of unconstrained geostrategic competition. Indeed, U.S. relations with Russia and China are the worst they have been since the end of the Cold War, with a recent Department of Defense policy document warning of an “increased potential for regional conflicts involving nuclear-armed adversaries … and the potential for adversarial nuclear escalation in crisis or conflict." One could logically argue against a linkage—that if the great powers have a mutual interest in averting a climate catastrophe then cooperation in that area could be compartmentalized from geostrategic tensions. But the onset of unconstrained geostrategic competition negates the possibility of compartmentalization. Contrasting positions on the nexus—the linkage between geopolitical competition and climate change—were evident in an exchange between Chinese Foreign Minister, Wang Yi and former Secretary of State John Kerry, now the Biden administration’s Special Presidential Envoy for Climate during his visit to China in August 2021. Wang warned that cooperation on climate change “cannot possibly be divorced” from other geopolitical tensions, while Kerry countered that climate change is neither “a geostrategic weapon” nor “ideological”….but “a global, not bilateral, challenge.” These contending perspectives divide along political theorist Arnold Wolfers’s classic dichotomy between “possession goals” and “milieu goals.” Possession goals relate to the preservation or enhancement of a state’s narrow national interest—for example, in relation to territory or trade relations. In contrast, milieu goals pursued by a state aim to shape and improve the international political environment beyond parochial national interest—which in this context relate to the fostering of favorable conditions for concerted action on climate change. Applying this framework, the Chinese Foreign Minister’s comment suggests that climate change is viewed within the context of furthering conventional Chinese possession goals—that cooperation on climate change can be leveraged to gain advantage on another issue (such as Taiwan). Kerry’s rejection frames climate change as a milieu goal whose existential stakes transcend any one state’s national interests. Through Kerry, the Biden administration has signaled its aspiration to eschew efforts by other states to relegate climate change to just another issue in transactional diplomacy. Yet on a macro level—elevating climate change to a milieu goal—the linkage between geostrategic competition and climate change is unavoidable. Even if unconstrained geostrategic competition does not lead to conflict that might itself trigger catastrophic global destruction, virulent relations between the United States and its great-power adversaries create a political environment in which close cooperation on climate change becomes difficult, if not impossible. For that reason the avoidance of unconstrained geostrategic competition is a prerequisite for addressing climate change. To be sure, avoidance does not mean the elimination of geostrategic competition, but rather, bounding it to mitigate the risks of conflict through effective management. Avoiding Unconstrained Competition New risk factors have brought the great powers to the verge of unconstrained geostrategic competition. An understanding of those risks provides insight into how they can be mitigated and thereby managed. A New Calculus of Risk Contemporary geopolitics is driven not by Cold War ideology, but by nationalism and expansive assertions of state sovereignty. Nuclear powers are engaged in strategic competition with the United States over the territorial status quo in areas of vital interest—for China, Taiwan and the South China Sea; for Russia, Ukraine and the periphery of the former Soviet Union. This contrasts with the Cold War era in which the superpowers engaged in competition in the regions of what was then called the Third World, which were clearly of peripheral interest. This geostrategic competition runs the risk of war through inadvertent escalation driven by miscalculation and misperception. The territorial dimension, which could be the occasion for great-power conflict, is compounded by key developments affecting the nuclear deterrent relationship between the United States and its great-power adversaries. All the nuclear-weapon states have embarked on ambitious force modernization programs, and they are developing capabilities, such as low-yield nuclear weapons, which critics warn make them more usable in a crisis. The Trump administration’s Nuclear Posture Review claimed that the Russians had adopted an “escalate to deescalate posture” involving the first use of tactical nuclear weapons. Moreover, military escalation has traditionally been conceived as progressing from conventional to nuclear forces. With the advent of new technologies, however, escalation during a crisis would most likely occur in a non-traditional domain—cyber or space. Conflict escalation could plausibly take the form of a cyberattack to interfere with an adversary’s communications with its nuclear systems or an attack on reconnaissance satellites to blind an adversary. These developments could have the destabilizing consequence of creating an incentive for one side or the other to take preemptive action during a crisis. Managed Competition The contemporary pursuit of strategic stability is conditioned by the recasting of the traditional tension between two Cold War dynamics. The first is the so-called “stability-instability paradox,” which captures the dynamic in which a nuclear stalemate between adversaries may embolden lower-level aggression on the regional level. The second is what Cold War strategist Albert Wohlstetter described as the “delicate balance of terror” which emphasized the maintenance of a stable and robust deterrence, thereby removing any incentive for one power or another to strike first in a crisis. As during the Cold War, this tension can be managed, but it cannot be resolved. Key elements—some aspirational, others operational, many surrounded by uncertainty—will affect the prospects for successful management: Resolve/Manage regional flashpoints—The best way to avoid conflict among nuclear-weapon states is to redouble diplomatic efforts to address the territorial disputes that could precipitate it. To be sure, if these territorial issues were easy to resolve, they would have been. In some instances, domestic politics in one or both parties may be an impediment to resolution; in others, the discrete territorial issue may be a proxy for a more deeply rooted source of enmity or grievance. If resolution is not possible, conflict management may be. For example, the Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES), to which both China and the United States are signatories, may be a mechanism for managing maritime tensions between their navies. Maintain the residual arms control architecture—The new START treaty has been extended until 2026 and provides certainty and time for Russia and the United States to agree on a successor arrangement and outstanding issues (such as non-strategic nuclear weapons and engaging or taking Chinese capabilities into account). Do not blur conventional and nuclear operations to prevent inadvertent escalation—Placing conventional warheads on ballistic missiles, such as that envisioned through the “Conventional Prompt Global Strike,” has utility (the ability to reach any target on the globe in under one hour), but runs the risk that Russia may perceive (and respond to) the launch of a ballistic missile that it associates with U.S. nuclear capabilities as the initiation of such an attack. Another potential driver of inadvertent escalation, with implications for both Russia and China, is the targeting of an adversary’s conventional capabilities that are co-located with its nuclear capabilities. Mitigate risks through strategic dialogue—In the absence of an arms control architecture, each nuclear power in the multipolar system will have strategic autonomy to structure its offensive and defensive systems. All of the nuclear-weapon states have long been uncomfortably ambivalent with vulnerability captured in the acronym MAD—mutual assured destruction. But since the Cuban missile crisis, assured retaliation—eliminating incentives for a surprise first strike—has been the sine qua non of strategic stability. The risk now is that an unconstrained arms race (unregulated numbers of offensive and defensive systems, in tandem with new weapons technologies and cross-domain threats to space and cyber assets) could revive those incentives and undermine the deterrent relationships. In the past, arms control negotiations provided a forum for strategic discourse. “On a bilateral or a multilateral basis,” scholars Christopher Chyba and Robert Legvold argue, “the United States, Russia, and China should pursue discussions intended to improve understanding of one another’s strategic concerns and views on which actions by an adversary would be especially concerning or dangerous.” The focus should be on negotiated restraints (e.g., a ban on the deployment of anti-satellite weapons) to enhance stability and reduce incentives for one side or the other to act preemptively during a crisis. Managing the Geopolitics of Climate Change When George Kennan, the diplomatic architect of U.S. containment policy, declared the end of the Cold War, he explained that the Soviet Union under Mikhail Gorbachev had evolved from a revolutionary state into an orthodox great power—the country “should now be regarded essentially as another great power, like other great powers.” Kennan was essentially arguing that Russia’s post-Soviet foreign policy, stripped of ideology, was a renationalized version of traditional Russian foreign policy with strategic priorities starting with the “near abroad” of the former Soviet republics abutting the West. A “risen” China presents an analogous case of an orthodox great power making assertive claims of territorial sovereignty on its periphery. This new superpower is deeply integrated into the global economy and presents a variegated challenge in a way that Russia, a one-dimensional superpower, does not. War between the United States and China is not inevitable, but the world’s two dominant powers could mismanage their way into it. That Russia and China are orthodox great powers, not revolutionary states seeking the overturn of the international order, creates political space for the United States to initiate strategic dialogues with them separately or together to lower tensions and reduce the risks of conflict—thereby fostering a favorable international milieu to address the exigencies of climate change.

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UTNIF – AI Aff › 1AC › 1AC Advantage - NATO

Great power conflict is inevitable absent leadership in the application of artificial intelligence

Matthew Kroenig 18, Deputy Director for Strategy, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security Associate Professor of Government and Foreign Service, Georgetown University, 11/12/18, “Will disruptive technology cause nuclear war?” https://thebulletin.org/2018/11/will-disruptive-technology-cause-nuclear-war/

Recently, analysts have argued that emerging technologies with military applications may undermine nuclear stability (see here, here, and here), but the logic of these arguments is debatable and overlooks a more straightforward reason why new technology might cause nuclear conflict: by upending the existing balance of power among nuclear-armed states. This latter concern is more probable and dangerous and demands an immediate policy response.

For more than 70 years, the world has avoided major power conflict, and many attribute this era of peace to nuclear weapons. In situations of mutually assured destruction (MAD), neither side has an incentive to start a conflict because doing so will only result in its own annihilation. The key to this model of deterrence is the maintenance of secure second-strike capabilities—the ability to absorb an enemy nuclear attack and respond with a devastating counterattack.

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UTNIF – AI Aff › 1AC › 1AC Advantage - NATO

It's the only way to maintain power projection

Futcher et al 2022 - Senior Manager, Business Consulting, Ernst & Young LLP, Executive Director, Ernst & Young LLP, EY-Parthenon Americas Government and Public Sector Leader

John Polowczyk, Robert Lytle, Frank Futcher March 25 2022 “Four actions to modernize military logistics and supply chain security” https://www.ey.com/en_us/strategy/four-actions-to-modernize-military-logistics-and-supply-chain-security

For the US to remain in stride with warfighting demands across vast distances, now is the time to rethink US military logistics and integrate commercial supply chain practices and capabilities. Defense operations can catch up with two decades of rapid advances in technology that have enabled commercial supply chains globally. These Industry 4.0 technologies, including artificial intelligence and machine learning used in predictive analytics, supply chain intelligence and more autonomous functionality, can quickly bridge gaps and increase speed in contested defense scenarios. The result can be greater cargo visibility, smarter warehousing and better transportation utilization. Challenges during the COVID-19 pandemic highlight the need for greater resiliency, responsiveness and military supply chain visibility. The U.S. Navy can get ahead of economic, cyber and other contested scenarios that could disrupt logistics. The Department of Defense (DoD) can make the investment to re-architect a defense supply chain and logistics infrastructure that fosters resilience, velocity and agility at enterprise scale before the next major challenge. History can inform new military supply chain partners Throughout 20th century conflicts, the cornerstones of US military dominance were an agile warfighting force; a defense industrial base that excelled at research-driven manufacturing; and a global logistics capability that set the bar for planning, stockpiling and large-scale transportation. That logistics dominance, however, is eroding as readily available technological tools enable potential adversary abilities to deny access and impede sustainment operations. In addition, new disruptive and asymmetric capabilities in the cyber and space domains have global reach. At the same time, hypersonic weapons put logistics at risk from a great distance. Recent enemy cyber threats to a US low-orbit satellite and to US energy pipeline infrastructure show that attacks can be extremely focused and result in acute domestic risk. The US military can work more closely with commercial partners and allies to identify vulnerabilities and build agility into critical supply chains. In this military supply chain transformation, private partnerships can foster greater diligence by tapping commercial supply chain lessons and big data to ferret out solutions to major issues, such as a lack of supply availability, limited to no end-to-end visibility and a lack of resiliency. 1. Design a more modern and agile IT infrastructure Design a more modern and agile IT infrastructure to operate logistics when communications are compromised. Systems can have multiple nodes and support deep, predictive analytics that function afloat, ashore or at enterprise scale without connectivity. Many companies and federal agencies have created such networks, which can be phased and adaptive when an IT system is degraded. 2. Embrace better end-to-end (E2E) visibility tools Gaining better E2E visibility can start with a supply chain risk management assessment that can expose risks at critical supply points, including energy infrastructure, as well as deep relationships at resupply locations, at ports, and with allied and commercial partners. A vulnerability assessment can expose and remediate weaknesses among DoD partners, especially commercial and foreign partners, and build agility across all supply classes. Another E2E tool is the creation of a supply chain digital twin, a model to generate predictive analysis and visualizations on potential supply chain disruptions across the world. Built on real-time data, simulation, machine learning and reasoning, a digital twin can improve the decision-making process. 3. Predict real-time supply needs and create surge capacity. By knowing what is needed when and where, AI can advance predictive logistics and execute preplanned push logistics. Commercial industrial supply chain resiliency was lacking at the height of the COVID-19 pandemic, which resulted in lessons in U.S. Navy supply chain readiness. During supply surges in conflict, when cybersecurity breaches could disrupt the supply chain, the Navy of the future needs the ability to mobilize supply production at any location, especially in the context of great power competition. The use of Industry 4.0 technology enablers at scale can deliver data-driven insights to commanders and wrench turners alike. In addition to forecasting with AI and machine learning, this can include predictive maintenance and other applications: Predictive logistics: Using machine learning, internet of things data, natural language processing and advanced analytics to help drive and operate the system in a more autonomous mode Process optimization: Business process reengineering and modernization, which can drive fundamental change, rather than applying incremental improvement with new systems There are also lessons to learn from the US government and private industry coordination of medical supply chains and logistics at the height of the COVID-19 pandemic. The problem: critical medical supplies were largely produced outside the United States. After initial medical supply inventories were exhausted, there was no ability to quickly expand production to meet the need. The critical lesson was that you can’t immediately surge what you don’t have, even with the Defense Production Act (DPA). The nation had limited visibility on medical supply production, lacked surge contracts and lacked data infrastructure to augment visibility on everything from raw materials to alternative sources. However, with private commercial supply data combined with government COVID infection statistics, shipments eventually could be distributed quickly and equitably. The lessons showcase that military supply chain leaders can get ahead of the next challenge and collaborate with the private sector, and illustrate the need for greater DoD agility. A contested logistics situation would be even more difficult than the COVID-19 pressures on labor, materials sourcing, production and delivery.

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UTNIF – AI Aff › 1AC › 1AC Advantage - NATO

Incorporating AI into military logistics and sustainment reinvigorates the defense industrial base – that ensures supply chains capable of rapid response

Low 2022 - junior fellow at NDIA

By Thomas Low 3/25/2022 “U.S. Must Ready Defense Industrial Base to Aid NATO” https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2022/3/25/us-must-ready-defense-industrial-base-to-aid-nato

People across the globe have witnessed first-hand Russia’s renewed aggression towards Ukraine, a conflict resulting in the largest land war in Europe since World War II. If the United States and its NATO allies cannot deter such action, it could be possible for similar scenes to occur in other countries bordering Russia. A prime example are the Baltic states: Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Though now tied to the West through economic cooperation, as well as military alliances such as NATO, these nations previously existed as part of the Russian sphere of influence. They have sizable Russian minorities who speak Russian and consume Russian news. Recent events have put paired action to what has up to now been mere verbal antagonism toward NATO’s eastern expansion. While a conflict with NATO members would result in a wholly different set of ramifications, member countries should not fail to take the steps required to deter wider regional conflict. In order to adequately remain vigilant against any possible scenario, the United States in its own right needs to take the steps necessary to prepare its defense industrial base. Yet an important question remains: What is the current state of this vital economic sector? To answer this, one should examine the National Defense Industrial Association’s annual report, “Vital Signs 2022: The Health and Readiness of the Defense Industrial Base.” While the report does not assess individual defense companies, it does analyze the environment in which they are asked to operate. This year’s report assigned the industrial base an overall “unsatisfactory, failing” grade of 69. While this score is obviously disappointing, for the purposes of this analysis, two particular sections are particularly relevant. First, “Production Capacity and Surge Readiness” capabilities dropped a significant 15 points compared to the previous year. This can partly be attributed to the evolving effects of the COVID-19 pandemic but is nonetheless a cause for serious concern. When coupled with the current status of NATO’s Eastern European members, the problems are only compounded. In the Baltic region, for example, NATO lacks a significant military presence. In January of this year alone, there were only 4,000 NATO troops stationed in the Baltic states, without any accompanying tanks or warplanes. It would be difficult and time-consuming to try and surge much-needed personnel into the Baltic region should it prove necessary. The lack of current personnel and infrastructure, coupled with existing capacity challenges in the United States, would place NATO in an unenviable position if an industrial and deployment surge became necessary. A massive effort would be required as the industrial base maneuvers to produce countless weapon systems and munitions. There is also another factor that must be considered when addressing the build-up of deterrence forces in NATO member territories. This is the development of new and evolving technologies. In the “Emerging Technologies” section, the report details several modernization priorities that can deliver technical capabilities needed to cope with an evolving security environment. Of those areas, hypersonics stand out as one technology particularly crucial to keeping pace with other emerging great powers. By definition, hypersonic weapons are those which can travel more than five times the speed of sound, or Mach 5. For numerous nations, including the United States, they represent the next frontier in missile technology. However, for far too long, research and development necessary to cultivate this technology have been lacking. In “Vital Signs 2022,” Congressional interest in these capabilities expressed in committee hearings decreased six percent. This is a troubling trend, especially when considering the significant resources near-peer adversaries are devoting to developing this technology. Hypersonic systems, which could be utilized for a variety of deterrence purposes, remain a crucial element within NATO’s security apparatus. Yet as previously mentioned, efforts have been neglected for far too long. Development has accelerated and then been halted while developmental testing has happened at a painfully slow rate if at all, resulting in years of slow progress allowing other nations to leap ahead. Russia recognizes this, as their Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu recently confirmed hypersonic missiles will make up the core of his nation’s non-nuclear deterrence. Russia’s key strategic partner, China, is also cognizant of these developments, having accelerated its own hypersonic program through extensive investments and testing—over 10 times the rate of U.S. testing. Since the Soviet Union’s collapse, there has been a relative peace in Europe. Gone were thought to be the days of vast European land wars that displaced populaces and reduced cities to rubble. This collective idea has been shattered by the recent actions of Russia in the Ukraine. At the same time, competition continues to heat up in the Western Pacific as China notes the Western response to aggression. When NATO was established in 1949, its purpose was to provide a collective security measure in the event of future conflict with the Soviet Union and later its Warsaw Pact allies. It sought not to conquer or provoke additional tension. The same principles exist today, as NATO members seek to secure their future and establish a peaceful existence. To achieve this goal, especially in more geographically sensitive regions, the U.S. and its NATO allies should closely examine current capabilities in order to deter future costly confrontations. A renewed priority must be placed on industrial capacity and capabilities, investments in emerging technologies, and force posture.