INTRODUCTION The soft power of science has the potential to reshape global diplomacy. (Ahmed Zewail) In recent years the role and place of interna- tional science and technology (S&T) – and of science diplomacy (SD) in particular – have attracted only limited interest on the part of international affairs analysts and diplomatic practitioners alike. In part as a result, progress in addressing ‘wicked’1 global issues such as climate change, diminishing biodiversity, spe- cies extinction, resource scarcity, environmen- tal crises, and a daunting array of other epidemic threats and challenges which now imperil life on the planet, has been disappoint- ing. The capacity to apprehend and manage S&T-driven global issues has not grown suffi- ciently, and without a greater effort by govern- ments, international organizations and other SD actors, insecurity and underdevelopment will flourish. SD has been treated as a mar- ginal practice, and the damaging consequences of doing so can be reversed only through the provision of adequate resources and the eleva- tion of SD to the status of an international policy, institutional and diplomatic priority.2 UNDERSTANDING SCIENCE DIPLOMACY Learn from yesterday, live for today, hope for tomorrow. The important thing is to not stop ques- tioning. (Albert Einstein) Science, diplomacy and international policy are often regarded as uneasy bedfellows. Science is widely perceived as complex and impenetrable. Diplomacy is often viewed as elitist and ineffective.3 International policy is an ambiguous, esoteric term of which the gen- eral public is barely aware. It is little wonder, therefore, that SD remains relatively obscure and is widely ignored. Nevertheless, SD is important and is becoming more so in an increasingly heteropolar4 world order where the vectors of power and influence are charac- terized more by difference than by similarity and S&T based challenges are multiplying. At the highest level of analysis, SD can best be understood as a diplomatic technique by which S&T knowledge is freed from its rigid national and institutional enclosures, thereby releasing its potential to address directly the drivers of underdevelopment and insecurity.5 Unlike its constituent elements of science and diplomacy, the expression ‘science diplo- macy’ is a relatively new and unfamiliar term, and a consensus on its definition has yet to be forged. Nina Fedoroff, the Science Advisor to former US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, describes SD as: ‘the use of scientific collabo- rations among nations to address the common problems facing 21st century humanity and to build constructive international partner- ships’.6 While the phrase science diplomacy implies some sort of unified whole, the term is most commonly presented as consisting of three distinct areas: informing foreign policy objectives with scientific advice (science in diplomacy); facilitating international science cooperation (diplomacy for science); and, using science cooperation to improve interna- tional relations between countries, regions or organizations (science for diplomacy).7 These three categories, while widely accepted and used, tend to overlap and have some weaknesses as heuristic tools. Many international S&T issues cannot easily be pigeon-holed: attempts to manage climate change have involved science advice (both to governments and the UN Secretary-General), science for diplomacy (the reports of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)) and diplomacy for science (the meet- ings of the Conference of the Parties (COP)). Other science-based issues, however, such as weapons inspections or fisheries monitor- ing and surveillance, fall more convincingly under a single heading (science for diplo- macy). For these reasons, as an umbrella term SD must be used with some care. That said, SD usefully combines inter- national political agency with the scientific method of knowledge production, and is an effective emissary of essential values such as evidence-based learning, merit, openness and sharing. As a specialized sub-set of pub- lic diplomacy (PD),8 science diplomacy is also a significant generator of soft power.9 It is this potent, and – through the increas- ing use of social and digital media – often technologically-enabled form of attraction which can intimately connect SD to national image, reputation and brand. In addition to addressing many of the planet’s most urgent challenges, SD can also contribute, through its use of neutral, non- ideological language, to the mitigation of international political differences when regu- lar diplomatic channels are strained, blocked or non-existent.10 Even at the height of the Cold War, for instance during the Cuban Missile Crisis, Soviet and American scien- tists maintained programmes of collaboration in areas such as polar, atmospheric, health and deep sea research, plus radioactive waste disposal. Similarly, Western scientists have sustained or established contact with their Cuban, North Korean and Iranian counterparts despite the existence of formidable political and economic barriers. Most recently, during the conflict over Crimea and eastern Ukraine, USandRussianscientistshavecontinuedto work closely on Arctic issues, in crewing and managing the International Space Station, and on negotiating the multilateral nuclear pact with Iran (2015) and Syrian chemical weapons disarmament (2013). Science diplomacy can also help maintain relations at times of tensions between friends. For example, in 1985 the government of New Zealand formally banned visits by potentially nuclear-armed warships.11 In response, the US government, while leaving the ANZUS treaty in place, withdrew security guarantees from its traditional ally, downgraded its dip- lomatic relations, and excluded New Zealand from the ‘Five Eyes’ intelligence sharing arrangement, which also included the UK, Australia and Canada. It was a surprisingly nasty row, and bilateral relations were not fully normalized until 2014. Still, through it all, the US base in Christchurch, which pro- vides forward supply and logistical support for American scientific research activities in Antarctica, remained fully operational, and cooperation between US and NZ scientists continued without interruption. Science diplomacy is sometimes conflated with international scientific cooperation, a mistake which has given rise to some confu- sion. The distinction, however, is clear. While the latter is sometimes commercially oriented and often occurs without direct state partici- pation, the former is animated by its direct relationship to government interests and objectives. In the case of international scien- tific cooperation, private sector or civil society partners work together to produce, for example, better medications, cleaner water, improved hygiene or more disease-resistant crops. In contrast to international science coop- eration, SD involves state interests. When these interests diverge, the outcomes may be asymmetrical, particularly if broader nego- tiations are involved. In other cases, interests and objectives converge. As regards outcomes beneficial to all parties, many examples can be drawn from a swathe of international scientific programmes and exchanges undertaken dur- ing the second half of the last century. These have included not only the extensive array of Cold War programmes, but also the highly successful US/G-8/ NATO-led efforts12 to employ members of shrinking defense science establishments and to decommission facilities used for the construction of weapons of mass destruction after the collapse of the USSR. Contemporary negotiations on issues such as the terms and conditions of resource access or environmental protection in a North–South context provide another example of success. There, however, the results have sometimes been more one-sided. Not all countries possess the same level of SD capacity. Large, rich, developed states, such as the US, UK and France, can engage in a wide spectrum of activity, but smaller states, such as Switzerland (commercial technological innovation) or New Zealand13 (agricultural greenhouse gas emissions, bio- security and phytosanitation) have wisely chosen to specialize. In general, less devel- oped countries are at a disadvantage due to limitations on S&T capacity.14 Developing countries tend to be consumers of ‘technical cooperation’ programmes, but when it comes to genuine technology transfer, successful examples are harder to come by. Also, the prospects for SD are often contextual, and thus can vary with time and place. For exam- ple, it is difficult to imagine initiating SD activity at this time with the Islamic State, or with the Taliban government of Afghanistan when it was hosting al-Qaeda. Not all science diplomacy is devoted to the achievement of pacific ends, as was illustrated by the programmes of covert collaboration involving, variously, Pakistan, Iran, North Korea, China and Libya on nuclear-explosive and missile-propulsion technologies orches- trated by Pakistani physicist Abdul Qadeer (A.Q.), Khan. Science and technology offer keys to security and development, but are also capable of generating insecurity, environmen- tal devastation and war. Nevertheless, the key assumption underlying scientific thought – that all events are caused, that misery is not fated, that the answers are out there and that all problems can eventually be solved – under- score its positive and transformative potential. Key Points • The world’s most pressing threats and challenges to peace and prosperity are rooted in science, driven by technology and immune to military solution. • Science diplomacy is well-suited to address these issues, and was prominent during the Cold War, but today has become marginal, with armed force entrenched as the international policy instrument of choice. • While science diplomacy offers a preferable way forward towards a more sustainable and resilient future, science and technology may also give rise to heightened insecurity and underde- velopment. HOW HAS SCIENCE DIPLOMACY DEVELOPED HISTORICALLY? If I have seen further it is by standing on the shoul- ders of giants. (Isaac Newton) The term ‘science diplomacy’ emerged during the 1990s. Science and diplomacy, however, may be seen to have played a criti- cal role together in shaping perceptions and dominant world views, and to have contrib- uted to the strength and durability of nations and empires throughout recorded history. Long before the Greco-Roman period initi- ated the rise of the ‘West’, great strides in medicine, astronomy, engineering and math- ematics were made in the ancient Near East, China and in India. Further scientific pro- gress continued in the Mediterranean, where mainly Greek thinkers like Pythagoras, Hippocrates, Plato, Aristotle, Euclid, Archimedes and Ptolemy made the links between science, power and politics more explicit. From the end of the Western Roman Empire, as the Dark Age enveloped Europe, and even more so after the long decline and eventual fall of Byzantium, the centre of sci- entific enquiry and experimentation shifted to the Arab/Islamic world, and remained there through the medieval period until the late Middle Ages.15 At about that time, the pendulum swung back to Europe. With the Renaissance era’s Scientific Revolution (Copernicus, Galileo, Kepler), Age of Enlightenment (Newton, Pascal, Franklin, Descartes), and the great voyages of explora- tion (Cook, Bougainville) science and tech- nology took off and innovation soared to unprecedented heights. Science and diplomacy became more explicitly intertwined when Britain’s Royal Society, founded in 1660, appointed Henry Oldenburg as its first foreign secretary in 1723.16 This preceded by 78 years the appointment of Britain’s first foreign min- ister. Benjamin Franklin, who in addition to being a founding father of the American Revolution was also a scientist and inventor, served as the first US Ambassador to France, 1776–85. Science and technology played central roles in the European imperial and colonial enterprises of the nineteenth cen- tury, and in the two World Wars and the Cold War of the twentieth. During and since those centuries, Europe, the USA, and for a half century the USSR, have dominated the world of international S&T.17 That locus of geographic leadership, as reflected in publi- cations and the pathfinding work of, among many others, Darwin, Pasteur, Mendel, and, later of Einstein, Bohr, Heisenberg and Oppenheimer,18 is gradually being eroded by discoveries originating in other parts of the world. Although by most measures still far behind, countries such as Japan and Korea have made great strides, while India, China and the ASEAN members, as well as Brazil and South Africa, are all beginning develop their capacities for leadership and innovation in S&T.19 Even if not referred to as such until rela- tively recently, SD per se and as practised by international organizations, foreign ministries and science-based agencies can be traced to the middle reaches of of the twentieth century. In 1931, for example, a number of countries decided to launch an umbrella organization for scientific organizations world-wide, the International Council of Scientific Unions (ICSU), known now as the International Council of Science.20 A second early exam- ple is the European Organization for Nuclear Research (CERN)21, which was founded in 1954 and whose work continues today with recent discoveries such as the Higgs Boson ‘God Particle’. Although managed by 20 European member states, scientists from over 600 universities and research institutes around the world are regularly offered access to CERN’s facilities. Another signature suc- cess is the 1959 Antarctic Treaty,22 with 52 signatories and a long record of achievement. In a few instances, SD has also been facilitated by well-resourced individuals, such as the American philanthropist Cyrus Eaton, who in 1957 hosted a meeting of 22 scientists23 in the village of his birth – Pugwash, Nova Scotia, Canada. The impe- tus for the first Pugwash Conference was the publication in 1955 of a manifesto prepared by Bertrand Russell and Albert Einstein, and signed by many of the leading scientists of the day. That document invited scientists of all ideological persuasions to address the threat to civilization posed by thermonuclear weapons. Over time the remit of the Pugwash meetings has broadened to include other weapons of mass destruction, and the confer- ences now attract the attention of a variety of politicians and senior government officials.24 Today, many inter- and non-governmental institutions and agencies engage in SD. The African Scientific Institute25 was cre- ated in 1967 to facilitate pan-African sci- entific cooperation. In 1996, all countries with territory and/or interests in the Arctic agreed to establish the Arctic Council,26 a body dedicated to advancing the goals of environmental protection and sustainable development. Other important – even if not always well-known – examples include: the International Institute of Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA);27 the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA);28 the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR);29CRDF Global;30 UNESCO;31 the International Centre for Theoretical Physics (ICTP);32 The World Academy of Science (TWAS);33 the Inter Academy Council (IAC);34 SciDev.Net;35 Scientists Without Borders;36 the International Network for Government Science Advice,37 and the OECD Global Science Forum.38 Nevertheless, the creation of multilateral scientific organizations does not necessar- ily correlate with solving global problems. Indeed, there have been significant setbacks, and during the past few decades the overall frequency and intensity of science diplomacy has declined markedly. After the Cold War, many of the well-established international pro- grammes that had promoted science (and edu- cation and culture) as part of a broader public diplomacy strategy to positively influence foreign publics were wound down or drasti- cally reduced by Western countries. Post-9/11, there has since been some recovery, but there remains a long way to go to compensate for lost capacity at a time of growing demand. Ironically, compared to present levels of activity, both PD and SD, at least in the senses of science in diplomacy and science for diplomacy outlined above, enjoyed their hey- day during Cold War. During that period, PD and SD were more than anything else about winning hearts and minds in a competitive ideological and territorial context, yet there was an important distinction. While much of the mainstream PD content was highly prop- agandized, SD offered an alternative form of engagement for advancing the vital arms con- trol and non-proliferation agendas. Science was seen as a neutral, non-political milieu which could be used to mitigate ideological differences. In the early 1970s, SD played an early and central part in the restoration of US–China bilateral relations and continues to be used as a reliable way of producing con- crete results from broader negotiations. During the Cold War, SD played an impor- tant role in achieving arms control and dis- armament agreements, for example, the Non-Proliferations Treaty, the Strategic Arms Limitation Agreements, plus conventions on biological and chemical weapons. It also produced important environmental agree- ments, including the Montreal Protocol on SubstancesthatDepletetheOzoneLayerand theCanada–USacidraintreaty.TheLawofthe Sea Convention defined the rights and respon- sibilities of states with respect to their use of the world’s oceans, and established guidelines governing the environment, the management and use of marine resources, and economic exploitation. And just after the Cold War, in 1992 at the UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), delegates agreed on Agenda 21, the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, the Framework Convention on Climate Change, the Convention on Biological Diversity, and the Statement of Forestry Principles.39 As the difficulties with the Kyoto Protocol illustrate, the subsequent record has been far less impres- sive40 (see Chapter 49 in this Handbook). Disappointing and uneven progress in SD since the Cold War notwithstanding, the efforts of some countries do stand apart. US international science policy, for example, has in recent years included the Presidential appointment of Science Envoys; the expan- sion of the State Department’s American Association for the Advancement of Science41 and Jefferson Fellows programmes; enlarge- ment of the network of Science Counsellors and attaches at missions abroad; the estab- lishment of a high level of internal science advice; and the receipt of strong support from specialized, science-based NGOs.42 The UK,43 with its extensive Science and Innovation Network; Switzerland,44 with Swissnex, its public-private partnership; the EU;45 France;46 China;47 Japan;48 and; Korea,49 as well as several other countries, have also moved forward with ambitious SD programmes. Among less developed coun- tries, more could be done by making better use of existing diplomatic infrastructure, for instance by establishing mission-based net- works of international S&T representatives. Many of the principal achievements of SD continue to be in the policy domain of arms control, disarmament and monitoring. And several major states, including Germany, Russia and Canada, have demonstrated sur- prisingly little interest in SD. Key Points • Beginning in the ancient Near East, China, India, through the Greco-Roman period, and later in the Islamic world, Europe and the Americas, the combination of science and diplomacy has been present in global affairs for millennia. • Science diplomacy, and the establishment of international S&T institutions and NGOs, reached its apogee during the Cold War, but activities have diminished in the interim. • Following a striking record of achievement in areas such as arms control, disarmament and environmental conservation and protection, the pace of international progress has slowed, resources have been cut and underperformance has become the dominant theme. WHY ARE SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION IMPORTANT TO CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS? Science knows no country, because knowledge belongs to humanity and is the torch which illumi- nates the world. (Louis Pasteur) The need to strengthen and build SD is now greater than ever and will require a fundamen- tal re-ordering of international policy priori- ties and resources. Science, technology and innovation are now central to all aspects of our lives and are at the heart of the processes asso- ciated with globalization. The abundance of information generated through connectivity and networks is widely believed to be chang- ing everything.50 Nevertheless, at the level of social and political discourse, the profound consequences associated with S&T together with their implications for SD are accorded relatively little attention. The focus of the great powers remains on their armed forces and ‘military diplomacy’ even though there are no military solutions to the ‘wicked’ issues presented by climate change, genomics, bio- technology and the rise of cyberspace. Today, long-term, equitable and sustain- able development, rather than defence, is becoming the basis of security. Anger, resent- ment and recourse to violence and extremism often arise from exploitation, disenfranchise- ment, poverty and exclusion. Achieving secu- rity is bound up with solving these problems, and the solutions depend on SD harnessing S&T to the attainment of development objec- tives. In fields such as urbanization, public health, environmental protection and remedi- ation, agriculture, food and water, population and demographics, hygiene and energy, the impact of science and technology, combined with good governance, greater economic equality and social justice, are key. And good governance results, in part, from adopting values and procedures which enable progress in science – for example, openness, merit and evidence-based decision making. These qualities underpin the advance of democracy and human rights and enjoy a high degree of universal applicability. Through SD and the sense of cooperation, collaboration and soli- darity which its practice almost inevitably engenders, this sense of universal applicabil- ity can be communicated to others, thereby strengthening the prospects for tackling the ‘wicked issues’ identified above.51 S&T and indeed SD, as noted above, are not always on the side of the angels. They can provide tools for those who threaten peace and obstruct justice. Troubling though groups like Al Qaeda and ISIS, as well as some increasingly authoritarian states, may be, however, the threats they pose remain small compared to those which SD aspires to address. Indeed, it is mainly the militarized response presently adopted by the great pow- ers which affords religious extremism and political violence the opening to become major problems. SD, in contrast, offers the prospect of removing the sources of the legit- imate discontent which terrorists and authori- tarian regimes attempt to exploit. As a global enterprise, it is clear that sci- ence, technology and innovation are directly relevant to finding solutions to some of the world’s most pressing problems. There exists, however, a fundamental difficulty: within most international policy institu- tions, S&T issues are almost invisible. With few exceptions, foreign ministries, develop- ment agencies and indeed most multilateral organizations lack sufficient scientific and technological expertise, the cultural pre- disposition, and the R&D network access and links required to understand and man- age S&T issues effectively. And although scientists increasingly work together and share information among themselves, the scientific community seems to cherish their independence from politics and government. On the many occasions when diplomats or politicians gather to discuss international pol- icy, the substance of their discussions rarely includes S&T. When scientists get together to exchange views on topics of shared interest, their discussions rarely touch upon matters of diplomacy or international policy. The skill sets, activities, time frames and cultural ori- entations of the two groups differ markedly. Few people have managed to straddle the worlds of diplomacy and science effectively. These worlds exist almost as two solitudes. Major hurdles would remain even if scien- tists, politicians, diplomats, foreign ministries and multilateral institutions were more favour- ably disposed towards one another. When it comes to S&T, R&D and innovation, the perspectives and interests of the public sec- tor, private sector, NGOs and the academic community are not always aligned or com- plementary. More often they are competitive or contradictory. For the private sector, the over-arching goal is to maintain exclusive ownership and control over essential S&T intellectual property (patents, trademarks and copyrights limit transfer of technology and spread of innovation). For the constituent ele- ments of what President Eisenhower famously described as the Military Industrial Complex,52 the issues are budget protection, public policy advocacy and the influence over the research agenda (many governments are still spend- ing more on defence research than on health research).53 Add to that the militarization of international policy more generally,54 and the size of the problem becomes clear. Absent a shift away from defence research towards public and civic applications (for instance health, transportation, alternative energy, environmental protection, conserva- tion) and a shift in emphasis in international relations from defence to diplomacy and deve- lopment, progress will remain impossible.55 The relationship between S&T, on the one hand, and diplomacy and international pol- icy, on the other, needs to be reconstructed to produce greater areas of shared space and functional overlap. Anxiety over the unknown on the part of the diplomats, and discomfort with politics and diplomacy on the part of the scientific community, must be overcome and give way to a pattern of closer association, cross-fertilization and the habits of regular exchange and interaction. In part through the creation of connections, networks and col- laborative commons, the two solitudes must be brought together. As is happening else- where in the worlds of commerce and pub- lic administration, the lateral and the supple must replace rigid hierarchy and authoritarian interpersonal relations. By way of an instruc- tive model, Silicon Valley style skunkworks56 merit closer examination. As we have seen, science was once more deeply embedded in diplomacy than is the case today. That inti- macy should be re-instated, but on a much larger and more comprehensive scale. S&T capacity in diplomatic and multilat- eral institutions must be broadened, deep- ened and, where it does not exist, built up from scratch. This can in part be achieved through the injection of more and bet- ter expert scientific advice directly into the policy development and decision-making throughout the apparatus of government and the international governance process. Accessible, more easily intelligible sci- ence communications should be developed. Such synergistic outcomes could be further encouraged through career specialization and more purposeful use of the promotion and recruitment processes. Perhaps the fastest way to build capacity would involve the pro- vision of incentives, programmes of training and professional development, plus expanded secondments and exchanges. Unnecessary obstacles and constraints would have to be removed, and replaced by a commitment to information sharing and critical thinking, tolerance for dissent and an openness to the management of risk (as opposed to its aver- sion). After all, the goal is not the creation of failsafe systems, but to engineer a system of bureaucratic process that is safe – and can be learned from – when it fails. High dividends would accrue to the appli- cation of unorthodox thinking about how best to engineer more productive S&T teamwork through SD. Creative use could be made of open source problem solving, collaborative intelligence,57 web-based policy development and global value chains. In order to leverage international S&T cooperation, institutional linkages and public–private partnerships – between governments, corporations, think tanks, universities and NGOs – need to be bet- ter resourced and encouraged. With enhanced planning and closer coordination, interna- tional research institutions, science academies and intergovernmental science networks could play a larger role in pursuing these objectives. To that end, it would be useful to embrace dynamic new actors and forces which would go well beyond the tapping of usual suspects. This could include involving private philan- thropists and foundations, venture capital firms and small and medium sized enterprises. And, as a final element, all measures intended to improve performance in science diplomacy and international S&T would require rigorous benchmarking, monitoring and evaluation. Psychologist Hans Eysenck once remarked that: ‘Tact and diplomacy are fine in interna- tional relations, in politics, perhaps even in business; in science only one thing matters, and that is the facts’. While that may be so, it would nonetheless benefit both the scientific and diplomatic communities to recognize that they share at least some fundamental objectives: each strives to use reason and rational argument to establish norms and to bring order, structure and systemic function to their otherwise disparate and disorderly realms. That is a significant, if in large part unrecognized, commonality and represents a point of departure for strengthening SD and thus the prospects for more peaceful and prosperous international relations. What the world needs now is develop- ment and security. These two sides of the same coin are best achieved through more science, better technology and accelerated innovation internationally. Towards that end, and as a response to the negative attributes of globalization – including the tendency to socialize costs while privatizing benefits, and the abetting of polarization at all levels – SD can make an indispensable contribution. Key Points • A ‘wicked’ issue CUTS all ways; unlike terrorism, political violence or religious extremism, these threats and challenges are imperilling the planet. • In an increasingly heteropolar world order, the capacity to generate, absorb and use S&T will play a critical role in solving problems, reducing inequality, resolving differences and advancing security and development prospects. • Science and technology, on the one hand, and diplomacy and international policy, on the other, exist in floating worlds which rarely intersect. • Performance could be improved by injecting expert scientific advice into the international policy development process, by making greater use of scientific collaboration in pursuit of dip- lomatic objectives, and by better harnessing the activities of foreign ministries and multilateral institutions in support of advancing the scientific agenda.