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2022 UTNIF Affirmative
1AC › 1AC – Disease › Solvency

Disease prevention on a country-by-country basis makes the problem worse – a paradigm of international cooperation is the only effective method

Giovanna De Maio 2020. Was a nonresident fellow in the Center on the United States and Europe at Brookings. She is currently a visiting fellow with George Washington University’s Institute for European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies. “NATO’S RESPONSE TO COVID-19: LESSONS FOR RESILIENCE AND READINESS.” Brookings. October 2020. . IZP)

When COVID-19 hit Europe, most countries in the trans-Atlantic space turned inwards, protecting their own medical resources through bans on the export of medical equipment35 and uncoordinated border closures36 or travel restrictions, such as the one to and from the Schengen area established by Trump.37 These events contributed to spread a sense of distrust toward international solidarity even among NATO member states. Despite Macron’s diagnosis of NATO as brain- dead, the alliance was able to resort to the muscle memory of its military and logistical apparatus and provide a positive response in a moment of deep crisis. NATO officials set aside politics to focus on operations, and drew upon the organization’s exceptional crisis management capabilities, which rely on close coordination between civil and military personnel with both civil and military tools.38 On March 25, Stoltenberg activated the Crisis Management Mechanism to study the progression of the pandemic and plan a comprehensive response ranging from coordination transportation of medical equipment to dispatching NATO military doctors to countries in need to assist in the construction of field hospitals.39 Following these preliminary efforts, in their first virtual meeting on April 2, NATO foreign ministers authorized NATO’s strategic planning military headquarters — Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) in Mons, Belgium — to create a dedicated COVID-19 Task Force, headed by Lieutenant General Olivier Rittimann,40 to operationalize these plans. . The alliance had no prior experience with a global pandemic and had never faced a crisis that hit every member state with the same threat at the same time. Yet its crisis management and disaster relief record — from the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission to Afghanistan41 to disaster relief support to support the United States after Hurricane Katrina42 to the response to the 2010 tsunami in Indonesia43 — was extremely helpful in quickly adapting NATO’s logistical apparatus to non- military purposes. In this regard, the COVID-19 Task Force heavily relied on the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Center.44 After seeing their personnel previously reduced to just three staff members, the EADRCC was supplemented by units from across NATO and other international organizations to reach a staff of 30.45 As of July 2020,46 the EADRCC has functioned as clearinghouse to coordinate assistance requests and offers from seven allied and nine partner nations, as well as from the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA). Examples include Germany sending ventilators to Spain; Spain sending facemasks to Iran; the United Kingdom transporting a field hospital for the World Food Program (WFP) from Britain to Accra, Ghana; Italy receiving help from Albania, the United States,47 and Turkey (among others); and Norway donating a field hospital to North Macedonia. Beyond efficiently pairing supply and demand for medical aid, NATO’s added value in the response to this crisis also relies on the ability to offer efficient logistical solutions at a shared transportation cost. To coordinate logistics, SHAPE relied on NATO’s Support and Procurement Agency (NSPA), which since 1958 has managed procurement for airfield logistics and transport of weapon systems and medical services across the world.48 During the COVID-19 crisis, the NSPA organized rapid cost-effective deliveries of protective medical equipment, like in the case of Luxembourg that received field hospital tents in less than 24 hours,49 through NATO’s airlift capabilities. In this respect and in connection with NSPA, NATO’s initiatives such as the Strategic Airlift International Solution (SALIS) and the Strategic Airlift Capability (SAC), established in 2003 and 2009 respectively,50 have been vital to the prompt delivery of medical aid, given their roots in a durable and reliable link between the alliance and the private sector. SALIS consists of a consortium of nine NATO allies (Belgium, the Czech Republic, France, Germany, Hungary, Norway, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia). It has assured access to up to five special mission- ready aircrafts from the German company Antonov Logistics — two of which, the AN-124-100, can carry up to 120 tons of cargo. Building on experience with Antonov aircrafts to transport aid to Pakistan following the 2005 earthquake and in the airlifting of the African Union peacekeepers in and out of Darfur, countries like Poland, Czech Republic, and Slovakia used SALIS to import urgent medical equipment like facemasks, surgical gloves and protective suits during the COVID-19 pandemic.51 Similar to SALIS, the Strategic Airlift Capability (SAC) initiative allows partners to share flying hours and costs. SAC involves 10 NATO members (Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Romania, Slovenia, and the United States) and two close NATO partners (Finland and Sweden). SAC consists in joint ownership of three C-17 Globemaster heavy cargo aircrafts operated by the Heavy Airlift Wing (HAW) based in Hungary and staffed with personnel from all participating nations. Established in 2009, SAC has supported several operations, including the Unified Protector in Libya and humanitarian relief in Haiti. During the COVID-19 response, the SAC initiative allowed Romania52 and Bulgaria53 to quickly receive several tons of medical supplies. Cooperation with multilateral organizations such as the European Union, the World Health Organization (WHO), and the United Nations also facilitated the achievement of NATO deliverables. NATO’s Rapid Air Mobility initiative, for instance, in cooperation with EUROCONTROL (intergovernmental agency for coordination of air traffic), allowed simplified procedures for military relief flights. Conversely, the EU also resorted to NATO logistics apparatus to deliver aid between and even beyond EU countries. Romania, for example, sent a 17-strong medical team to Italy through the European Civil Protection Mechanism in coordination with NATO’s EADRCC.54 In addition to it, NATO and EU cooperated through sharing information in regular briefing on joint procurement between the EADRCC and the EU’s Emergency Response Coordination Centre (ERCC) and between the NATO COVID-19 Task Force and the one created by the EU’s European External Action Service (EEAS).55 Another area of cooperation was medical resilience, where NATO and EU could count on the experience of two initiatives inaugurated in 2018, the Multinational Medical Coordination Center (MMCC) and European Medical Command (EMC), with the goal of increasing readiness in medical capabilities through cooperation between military medical services and civilian health system of member states.56

2022 UTNIF Affirmative
1AC › 1AC – Disease › Solvency

NATO already has an operational telemedicine framework, but it needs to be applied to disease mitigation – only that enables effective cooperation

David M. Lam 2007. M.D., US Army Telemedicine and Advanced Technology Research Center, Fort Detrick, Maryland USA, and University of Maryland School of Medicine. “Telemedicine in the Context of Force Protection.” Defense Technical Information Center. 3/1/2007. IZP) Figure 1 Omitted

Historically, most NATO medical forces were organized to fight a large-scale Article 5 war. This organization included the requirement for large hospitals to be deployed, containing large numbers of specialists and all their specialized equipment. Thus, within a theatre of operations, most specialty consultations would have been able to be obtained within a national medical system in-theatre. At their height, these deployable military medical facilities rivaled and often surpassed in capabilities civilian hospitals of similar size. But, these large and capable hospitals are increasingly being phased out of military inventories for several reasons. Such capabilities are expensive, difficult to move, and “have a large footprint”. They require extensive site preparation and maintenance, burn up lots of fuel, and are excellent targets. Further, because of their size and relative immobility they are not normally capable of being placed close to the combat zone, but are held more to the rear. Not directly relevant to this issue, but of concern to our military medical planners is that even without farforward-deployed hospitals, Medical Personnel have historically been killed and injured at an extremely high rate during combat operations. The number of medical personnel killed or wounded while trying to rescue or treat casualties has historically been very high—as only one example, a recent review of medically-related Medal of Honor citations (the highest US decoration for valor) showed that nearly 50 % were posthumously given. It appears obvious that if we can reduce the deployment of high-value and scarce medical personnel,while maintaining the quality of care we provide, this will be of great benefit. Thus, taking into account that most wars foreseen at the present time are “small wars”, there is an international tendency to decrease the number of specialized medical personnel in the forward areas of the battlefield, and to rely on smaller less capable facilities (the so-called Role 2+-- Role 2 plus a surgical capability, with early evacuation [and advanced care en-route] rather than the larger and more capable Role 3). This trend within NATO is so marked that the most recent edition of MC 326/2 eliminated the concept of Role 2+ in favor of requiring surgical capabilities at all Role 2 units, both Role 2 E and Role 2 LM. However, during the same period, our military forces have become smaller and more technologically intense, and the types of deployments in which they are involved have greatly increased, to include not only war but peacekeeping, peacemaking, and humanitarian assistance, each of which has different medical requirements. Conscription has been done away with in most countries, leading to an increased reliance on professional and more highly skilled soldiers. It has been proven to be neither practical nor medically possible to provide the previous level of medical deployment to support ever-smaller troop levels, while maintaining the flexibility needed to respond to the varying medical needs of various missions. It has become evident that the specialty skills needed to provide care for combat casualties may be very different from the skill mix needed to provide humanitarian assistance, for example following a flood. The clinical needs of a young healthy soldier with an acute traumatic injury are very different than those of an elderly person with chronic disease who has no access to maintenance medicines following a natural disaster—thus, the specialty requirements vary from mission to mission. At the same time, there has been a demand from our politicians and our civil populaces for maintaining a very high standard of medical care for our deployed personnel. This latter demand is exemplified by NATO document MC 326/2, which demands that every soldier will receive during deployment the same level and quality of care which he or she could receive in the home country. These changes have produced within the NATO military forces a more streamlined organization, an increased role for multinational shared medical resources, and an increased effort to use new technologies to enhance military capabilities. We also see a growing expectation among our civil populations and politicians that our military operations should be casualty-free. In the period of the so-called “CNN effect”, instant transmission of images of combat casualties has significantly raised the expectation for sophisticated casualty care and medical services whenever and wherever casualties may occur. On their face, these requirements would appear to be mutually contradictory. How can we provide homecountry quality of care to our soldiers without deploying large hospitals and extensive teams of specialists to a far-off battle zone? Fortunately, many of our nations have begun development of a relatively new technology which has been proven to be able to satisfy these apparently disparate requirements--- Telemedicine. With the ongoing NATO Transformation, the emphasis is on a reduced medical service footprint, and hospitalization assets may not deploy into the Area of Operations until the theater is mature, if at all. Many of the services previously provided by deployed medical specialists will not be physically available early in a deployment, if at all. In order to ensure that junior providers at Roles 1 and 2 have access to specialist advice, and to preclude unnecessary evacuation of soldiers for “routine” consultations, telecommunications technologies must allow for clinical consultations to occur in the physical absence of specialist providers from the forward areas. The delivery of specialist medical advice utilizing telecommunications and information technologies offers the prospect of this support in austere environments. Thus, as the traditional mechanisms for obtaining specialty consultation in the field have been more and more disrupted, and will no longer be viable without frequent and often prolonged patient travel, with consequent adverse impacts on operational capabilities, there has been a great need for a new mechanism to ensure that only those patients actually requiring evacuation are sent away from their units for medical purposes. Multinational Telemedicine is one mechanism for obtaining specialty consultation while maintaining the desired smaller medical footprint in theatre. Additionally, it can provide increased access to clinical specialists who no longer need to be deployed to the conflict zone in order to allow application of their expertise, and who can thus provide their expertise in many locations simultaneously. This concept of telemedicine serves as the basis for developing doctrine, training, leader development, organizations, and materiel changes focused on the requirements for Telemedicine support to deployed and garrison troops. It further can provide the framework to describe the capabilities required for Telemedicine support to the NATO Reaction Force and other NATO force deployments. Like any other new concept, telemedicine means different things to different people. For that reason, I want to share my definition with you at the outset. The official NATO definition, found in STANAG 2517, is “The use of advanced telecommunication technologies to exchange health information and provide health care services across geographic, time, social and cultural barriers.” What this means is that Telemedicine can allow us to move expertise forward on the battlefield, rather than moving experts to the battlefield. No longer does the expert clinician have to be physically located next to the patient to give advice and comfort. For the purposes of this paper, I use the term “Telemedicine” in a restricted sense. I am not using it in the broadest sense of “e-Health”, with the implications of patient education, scheduling, telesurgery, telementoring, etc. I use the term strictly to mean “Teleconsultation”, “The provision of specialty services (e.g. dental, mental health, cardiology, dermatology, radiology, pathology) by health care specialists to other physicians”. Teleconsultation may employ a wide range of technologies (Figure 2) from simple voice communication through to real-time video tele-conferencing along with the ability to handle medical specialty-specific data streams (e.g. heart and lung sounds, electrocardiograms, video and still images) captured with the use of specialized equipment”, as defined within STANAG 2517, but the basic concept is simple— we are increasingly looking to export expertise, not experts. Two examples of this are currently deployed Telecardiology and Tele-Echography capabilities. The broader sense of the term includes many aspects of healthcare which will remain the responsibility of the individual nations, and which will probably not come under the authority of a NATO Force Commander. Since it is Teleconsultation which can potentially provide the primary benefit within a NATO multinational medical support operation, this is the Telemedicine modality to which I have restricted my comments. Although Teleconsultation has been practiced for many years, its use as a tool to enhance healthcare resulted from the wide availability of personal computers, the Internet and satellite communications. Military use of teleconsultation to support operations, so-called deployable teleconsultation, began in the Gulf War and has continued to be developed and refined to the present day. Many of the concepts and practices developed to meet military operational imperatives have now been adopted and refined to meet the needs of peacetime healthcare around the world. Technically, Teleconsultation may be enabled as shown in figure 2. Figure 2 Omitted These modalities include the transfer of data in several ways: (1) Real-time—through using dedicated two-way voice ( telephones or radio), or by use of Real-time Video teleconferencing (VTC). (2) Store-and-forward data – the ability to exchange medical knowledge asynchronously using: (a) Facsimile. (b) E-mail text only. (c) Email with small size still image attachments. (d) Email with data and with large size image attachments in compressed form, such as motion picture (MPEG), digital pathology (JPEG) or digital radiography (DICOM). (e) Dedicated Internet connectivity, such as with dedicated servers (3) Other advanced technologies (e.g. streaming video, multimedia). While real-time interactions imply that all parties participate simultaneously in a teleconsultation session, store-and-forward interactions involve sending, reviewing, and returning an opinion over a period of time. Streaming is a method of delivery of real-time or stored data such as audio, video, documents, still images, or other data type across networks. With streaming, a receiving system can start displaying data before the entire content arrives. The technological limitations of smaller systems and the lack of availability of adequate bandwidth have until recently limited the majority of deployable teleconsultation systems to providing real-time voice and storeand-forward capability. The use of real-time consultation by VTC is currently supported at Role 3 of the medical care system and above for some countries. However, the rapid development of robust high performance and miniaturized equipment such as handheld computers, small inexpensive high-resolution cameras, miniature satellite telephones and image compression techniques may enable real-time video conferencing to forward Roles of care in the future, if it proves useful (Figure 3). Figure 3 Omitted Teleconsultation, both peacetime and operationally deployable, is being used to enable an ever-increasing range of clinical practices. The most common are: (1) Tele-radiology - Primarily using store and forward techniques. (2) Tele-dermatology - Primarily using store and forward techniques. (3) Tele-pathology - Primarily using store and forward techniques. (4) Tele-psychiatry - Primarily using VTC techniques. (5) Tele-dentistry - Primarily using store and forward techniques. (6) Tele-ophthalmology - Using a combination of VTC and store-and-forward techniques. (7) Tele-ultrasonography - Using a combination of VTC and store-and-forward techniques. Health Service Support Mission. The overall mission of military health service support has remained unchanged for centuries. It comprises four key operational tasks and a supporting logistic function. These are: (1) The promotion of health; (2) The prevention of disease and injury – now described as Force Protection; (3) The evacuation of the sick and wounded; (4) The diagnosis and treatment of the sick and wounded; and (5) The provision of medical materiel and other logistic support to enable these tasks. Teleconsultation may be employed to support each of the above missions. Properly developed as a medical support tool, a national or NATO teleconsultation concept can enable a “collective” health service support environment which will augment and enhance current individual nation support. This will be particularly vital in coalition warfare and operational environments involving limited health care resources and/or short warning and duration operations in which limits on logistic support would severely constrain the medical “footprint”. It is also essential in situations where different nations will provide Role 2 and 3 support to each other, or in which various national Role 3 facilities have different levels of specialist staffing, and could therefore benefit from the exchange of expert patient-related clinical information. Through effective TMED utilization, various nations have been able to develop systems for the following medical functions: (1) Initial urgent evaluation of patients, triage decisions, and transfer arrangements; (2) Medical/surgical follow-up; (3) Supervision and consultation for primary care encounters where a physician is not available; (4) Routine consultations; (5) Transmission of diagnostic images; (6) Extended diagnostic workup or short term management of self-limited conditions; (7) Management of chronic diseases requiring a specialist not available locally; (8) Transmission of medical data; and (9) Public health, preventive medicine, and patient education. To assist nations in identifying and implementing Teleconsultation systems for use in either a national or a NATO multinational setting, NATO has established a Telemedicine Expert Team (TMED ET), which is open to membership from all Allied and Partner countries. Its mission is to facilitate national development of Teleconsultation systems, and to assist in development of interoperability programs which will enable these national systems to interoperate with those systems provided by other nations. Ideally, these will not be standalone Telemedicine or Teleconsultation systems, but will be integrated into a NATO-wide Medical Communications and Information System (MedCIS), such as the MEDICS program currently being developed by Allied Command Transformation (ACT), or its successors. The TMED ET is a subordinate body to the NATO/COMEDS Medical Communications and Information Systems (MedCIS) Panel, and if you are working in the Telemedicine arena, I strongly would recommend that you begin to become involved in the work of this group, which provides access in one place to the primary TMED expertise of the Alliance. A detailed study of NATO air, land, and maritime organizations and formations has been undertaken by the TMED ET to identify the minimum desirable capabilities for teleconsultation systems and technology at each Role of care (Figure 4), and each nation should analyze these requirements as a guide to developing its own desired deployable Teleconsultation capabilities. It must be noted that these are minimum recommendations; if a nation wishes to provide greater Teleconsultation capabilities at a given Role of care, they are certainly encouraged to do so. In accordance with the underpinning NATO principal of developing capability-based organizations, the aim has been to identify and recommend a capability, not a specific system or equipment. Individual nations should attempt to meet a specific capability requirement (for example, the capability to communicate between medical support organizations using standard internationally accepted Information Technology (IT) protocols) with the specific caveat that individual systems must meet NATO interoperability standards, once those are developed. Figure 4 Omitted Within the various national military health services systems, many telemedicine initiatives have moved from the conceptual stage to operational prototypes. These initiatives are under way at all organizational levels within military medicine and across the continuum of our responsibilities. I would like to share with you a few other examples of our experience with telemedicine—the fact that I am speaking primarily of US capabilities does not mean that the US is the only nation with such capabilities—in fact I know that is not the case, as several nations have very extensive TMED capabilities to support their field forces. I am just discussing those systems which I know the best. The US currently has connectivity from our medical facilities in Iraq, Kuwait, and Afghanistan to our medical facilities in Germany and also with several of our medical centers here in the U.S. The capabilities in use include teleconsultation (using an Army-wide Internet-based consultation system), digital X-rays, computer tomography and ultrasound transmissions, clinical e-mail, high-resolution still imagery, teledentistry and medical and patient information systems. In fact, all X-Rays taken in a deployed setting are currently being transmitted electronically and read at our Medical Center in Germany—we no longer need to deploy diagnostic radiologists to the front lines (and as a side benefit, we have eliminated the use of “wet film processing”, with all its logistic requirements and environmental hazards, from the deployed setting). We are routinely making use of teledermatology consultations, and infectious disease/internal medicine consultations played a significant role during a recent deployment to provide humanitarian aid in the Pakistan earthquake zone. In the future, all of these systems will have the capability feed data into our enterprise Electronic Health Record, called the Armed Forces Health Longitudinal Technology Application, or AHLTA. In the military arena, another very important component of this telemedicine capability is medical situational awareness and command and control. This is the age of information, and information superiority will be absolutely essential to the military in future engagements. I predict that appropriate use of Telemedicine and other IT technologies will be of great benefit in ensuring that our medical and line commanders have a vastly improved level of medical situational awareness compared to that they have had in the past. Other nations have their own areas of expertise in TMED, such as the German Telemicrobiology System, and various Teleparasitology and Telepathology programs currently in the field , not to mention both field and shipborne teleconsultation and teleradiology systems. Of note is that all nations having deployed TMED systems have found similar benefits—what I have been discussing is not simply a United States-centric opinion. A major goal of most NATO nations has been the replacement of the old paper medical records, and field medical cards, with an electronic system which would allow more accurate, complete, and readily transmittable medical records. One solution, being investigated by several nations for both civil and military use, is the Battlefield Medical Information System- Tactical, or BMIST (Figure 5). This system allows the first responder to enter immediate treatment data at the site of treatment, and to transmit it appropriately through several means, either by means of a transferable electronic medium such as the EIC or wirelessly to supporting medical organizations. Figure 5 Omitted One item of critical importance which cannot be overlooked is that of disease surveillance, and outbreak early warning systems. As we develop an increased level of multinational operations, an integrated database on infectious disease outbreaks will be critical to force protection. No longer can national outbreak data, often analysed months later, be considered acceptable. As we develop more integrated NATO-wide systems, disease surveillance reporting must be one of the earliest concepts to be integrated. It is amazing to think that we have today the capability to instantly inform the world of what the weather is like anywhere on the globe; we can transmit stock values instantly across the world; and we share transportation schedules which allow worldwide travel, but that we do not have any type of international system which can provide rapid accurate notification of disease outbreaks, validation of a working diagnosis, and direction of a multinational focused response to contain an outbreak or epidemic. The tools for this already exist, yet much more must be accomplished, and telemedicine's capabilities will play the key role. The introduction of new methods, new systems and new ideas always gives rise to apprehension, which in turn leads to resistance to change. We talk about “disruptive technologies” because they disrupt the way in which we have traditionally done our business. As telemedicine and other similar innovations within the military health services system become firmly established, we recognize this adverse response as one of our major obstacles. We simply cannot continue to do business as we have in the past—the days of the old paperbased field medical card and the associated medical records are numbered, and future field medical records will accompany the soldier on some version of “electronic dogtags”. The new ways of doing business must be proven to be clinically acceptable, as well as providing improvements in the care we can offer. We must approach new conditions with new ways of doing business, and I would point out to you that one of the only non-science fiction ways of accomplishing this in the NATO medical environment today is by the effective use of multinational, cross-border, Telemedicine systems. Continuing to do business the same way we always have is simply not an option. For operational military medicine to change the way it functions will take investment of resources and efforts that our people must be ready to make. A second problem area that we have within the NATO military health services system is the eagerness of some nations to fashion an information or telemedicine system which will satisfy their particular location or their particular special interest, without taking into account Alliance needs. We must all work to ensure that the systems we create will operate across the NATO Medical Information networks once they are fielded, that all systems can interact and that what is developed for use in one possible scenario can be transported to any other mission. To assist the nations in developing this kind of system, the TMED ET has published STANAG 2517 on Teleconsultation. It contains basic guidelines for development and use of teleconsultation systems, and contains standardization tools which will ensure that nationally-developed systems can interoperate. I strongly commend it to you. It is very simplistic, and very useful. As this is written, Edition 2 is current, but Edition 3 has recently been submitted for national ratification and processing. As a change agent for the NATO multinational military health system, telemedicine will change the way we conduct operations, regardless of where we happen to be, and regardless of which other nation, partner or ally, is on our flanks. The twin keys to improved combat casualty care are these forward battle area efforts and more medically intensive evacuation capabilities. Telemedicine is critical to them both. Our national deployed clinics and hospitals, using telemedicine, will no longer be remote from one another. Our physicians and other health care providers will work more closely together because distance and time will not be factors. The primary care physicians will still be involved with their patients while specialty care is provided via telemedicine, which will greatly improve the continuity of care for the patient as well as the understanding of the problem for both primary and specialty physicians. Evacuation back to the home country simply for routine consultations will no longer remove soldiers from the theatre for days or weeks, thus allowing more comprehensive use to be made of our deployed personnel as well as more rapid attention to their medical needs. The future of military medical care, and I would submit to you as well that it is the future of civil medical care at least in emergencies and disasters, is that of an integrated system, in which data acquired by one nation can be rapidly and accurately passed to another nation to whom the patient is being transferred. Although we may have a full panoply of capabilities, from Role 1 to Role 4, including the evacuation chain, this whole system is highly unlikely to be provided by a single nation—thus the requirement for standardized data collection and transfer. The phenomenal capabilities made possible because of these new tools can easily grab one's imagination and attention. We must remember that these advances are tools which enable us to accomplish things that previously were not possible. They are tools that expand our own personal abilities, which allow us to provide greater assistance to those who need health care. They cannot replace clinical expertise and capability, but they can help us make the best use of it, wherever located. These technologies, like telemedicine, are agents of change. They carry significant implications for how medicine will be practiced, yet medicine remains a curative art firmly based in science. As an agent of change, telemedicine carries significant implications for how military medicine will operate, yet the mission responsibilities of military medicine to provide care wherever and when ever needed remain the same. The important point here is that telemedicine is a tool to be used to improve the delivery of health care. It is here, and it works—I strongly recommend your consideration of it as an enhancement to your national military healthcare system, and as a viable aspect of your force protection program.

2022 UTNIF Affirmative
1AC › 1AC – Disease › Solvency

The plan sets standards and ensures interoperability.

Soare '21 [Simona R, Jun 11, "Innovation as Adaptation: NATO and Emerging Technologies," https://www.gmfus.org/news/innovation-adaptation-nato-and-emerging-technologies] *EDT: emerging and disruptive technologies

The third driver is to foster the interoperability of military capabilities that are enabled by emerging technologies13 and to incentivize transatlantic defense cooperation on EDTs to avoid or bridge technology gaps between allies. This goes to the core of NATO’s mission to deter and defend against threats, but it is an enduring challenge. Streamlining standardization and testing, evaluation, verification, and validation procedures remains important. However, NATO should also double down on its efforts to ensure greater compliance with interoperability and baseline requirements for the security of critical infrastructure. Recent challenges in relation to national compliance with the 2019 NATO requirements for security of telecommunications infrastructure are a case in point, but there are wider and enduring challenges with hardware and communications interoperability.14 While the plans for the new Defence Innovation Accelerator promise to contribute to maintaining NATO’s technological edge, it also remains to be seen whether they will contribute sufficiently to building technology capacity among some of the smaller and more vulnerable allies. As they establish governance procedures and participation rules, allies need to mitigate the risk that the accelerator could contribute to a two-speed, two-tier alliance, dividing the technology haves from the technology have-nots.

The fourth driver is a desire to lead in setting global, normative EDTs governance. The Advisory Group on Emerging and Disruptive Technologies, for example, has emphasized that NATO “is exceptionally well placed to be a global driver of a values-based innovation agenda.”15 Democratic values are at the core of what defines security for transatlantic allies and the target of adversarial subversive measures. Consequently, embedding democratic values into the development, adoption, and use of EDTs by the allies is key to NATO’s mission. Thus, innovation efforts need to be closer linked to NATO’s democracy-centered tech diplomacy with like-minded global partners, some of whom could be invited to join the Defence Innovation Accelerator.

2022 UTNIF Affirmative
1AC › 1AC – Disease › Solvency

Increased US action in disease mitigation is critical to NATO effectiveness

Giovanna De Maio 2020. Was a nonresident fellow in the Center on the United States and Europe at Brookings. She is currently a visiting fellow with George Washington University’s Institute for European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies. “NATO’S RESPONSE TO COVID-19: LESSONS FOR RESILIENCE AND READINESS.” Brookings. October 2020. . IZP)

COVID-19 has been a systemic wake-up call, exposing vulnerabilities in health, international cooperation, and the global economy. NATO showed reliability and solidarity under the initiative of its civil and military personnel amid COVID-19. Yet, one could only imagine how easier and more efficient NATO’s response would have been if the alliance did not have to overcome tense political issues between member states and if NATO’s stronger member, the United States, had adopted a more cooperative approach78 to the virus response both internationally and domestically, similarly to what had been done for Ebola in 2014.79 This could not only have helped the NATO Public Diplomacy Division’s outreach in pushing back against disinformation, but also used the resources of the organization — constantly targeted in Trump’s complaints because of its financial burden — to share costs and responsibilities and ultimately reassure partners and markets. Instead, from a political perspective, the global pandemic revealed that American leadership can no longer be taken for granted.80 Trump not only denied the gravity of the virus, but also imposed travel bans without coordinating with European allies, abdicated leadership of the G-7 which the United States was chairing,81 withdrew from the World Health Organization,82 and refused to join international efforts to produce a vaccine.83 This behavior will leave significant scars in the trans- Atlantic partnership, of which NATO is the main pillar, and has pushed Europeans to talk more concretely about increasing their own defense capabilities.84 In spite of its respectable performance during COVID-19, one might be tempted to argue that there is not a lot to be optimistic about when it comes to NATO’s future, given widespread fatigue with multilateralism, political tensions within and between member states, and a global economic recession. With GDP plummeting worldwide, policymakers and public opinion may be reluctant to support an increase in defense spending. Because of shrinking economies, the 2% of GDP commitment for NATO members will, ironically, be easier to achieve, in the very short term. However, once GDP recovers to earlier levels there may be significant downward pressure on defense budgets throughout the alliance. Yet, in the short to medium term it is reasonable to worry about defense sector supply chains and how this will impact NATO’s fighting capabilities.85 It is therefore of paramount importance that the alliance rethink the defense spending requirement, adapting it to new technological challenges which entail not only more cost-effective options but also a broader concept of security that encompasses protection of supply chains, infrastructure, and humanitarian operations. Although disruptive, COVID-19 will not be the main factor that influences the future of NATO, which has survived sharper political divergences between its members in the past, like on the U.S.- led Iraq War in 2003. With major challenges ahead, including nuclear deterrence, Chinese and Russian geopolitical ambitions, terrorism, and increased migration flows, it is critical for NATO allies to build a common vision. As Stoltenberg recently remarked,86 the alliance needs to become “more global,” and to do so it is paramount for the U.S. and Europe to develop a common stance towards China, increase efforts to fight terrorism, and make defense more sustainable in the future. While the COVID-19 crisis will hopefully be overcome with a vaccine and NATO will benefit from this experience to increase its resilience towards future challenges, the future of the alliance itself depends on the trust between the allies. In this regard, the outcome of the U.S. election will have a major impact on the alliance itself and on its focus, and will determine either a relaunch of the trans-Atlantic cooperation on strategic infrastructure, environmental security, and deterrence against outside powers, or an historical retrenchment occurs that leaves it up to Europeans to take the lead in one way or another.

2022 UTNIF Affirmative
1AC › 1AC – Disease › Advantage

US involvement in international science collaboration is key to innovation – the alternative is stagnant tech that fails to account for new challenges

Elizabeth E Lyons director of the U.S. National Science Foundation’s Tokyo Regional Office in Tokyo, Japan et al. 2016 “How Collaborating in International Science Helps America” Science & Diplomacy, Vol. 5, No. 2 (June 2016). http://www.sciencediplomacy.org/article/2016/how-collaborating-in-international-science-helps-america IB

[full list of authors and qualifications: Elizabeth E. Lyons is the director of the U.S. National Science Foundation’s Tokyo Regional Office in Tokyo,¶ Japan .¶ E. William Colglazier is the editor-in-chief of Science & Diplomacy.¶ Caroline S. Wagner holds the Ambassador Milton A. and Roslyn Z. Wolf Chair in International Affairs at¶ the John Glenn College of Public Affairs, The Ohio State University.¶ Katy Börner is the Victor H. Yngve Distinguished Professor of Information Science in the Department of¶ Information and Library Science, School of Informatics and Computing, and Founding Director of the¶ Cyberinfrastructure for Network Science Center at Indiana University and Visiting Professor at the Royal¶ Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences (KNAW), The Netherlands.¶ David M. Dooley is the President of the University of Rhode Island.¶ C. D. Mote, Jr. is the President of the U.S. National Academy of Engineering.¶ Mihail C. Roco is the founding chair of the U.S. National Science and Technology Council’s subcommittee¶ on Nanoscale Science, Engineering and Technology and a Senior Advisor for Science and Engineering at¶ the U.S. National Science Foundation.]

International collaborations embed American scientists and students in vibrant, globally collaborative networks that strengthen the U.S. science, technology, and innovation (STI) enterprise, while benefiting both America and the world. Because such benefits have not been systematically explored in the United States, we present a framework for organizing and enumerating them, with national-level examples provided to illustrate scientific, economic, health, national security, educational, societal, and diplomacy and development advantages that can result from international STI collaborations. Our objectives in presenting this organizing structure are threefold. First, the framework can help those in government, academic, and private sectors who make decisions with national impact better understand how and what kinds of positive outcomes can result from international STI cooperation. Second, given the distributed and decentralized nature of the U.S. STI community, the framework can serve as a starting point for subnational decision makers to identify benefits of STI internationalization at their operational scales. Third, this organizing structure and its examples can serve as a call to action for scientists to more clearly articulate to decision makers and the public how working in areas of mutual scientific interest with international colleagues can advance U.S. national, regional, local, or institutional interests. As a group of individuals who have worked across national and global science landscapes for many decades, we were motivated to develop a framework for better understanding and communicating the benefits of international science,1 technology, and innovation collaboration to the United States. The global STI system has seen dramatic change in the last several decades. For example, it is now marked by worldwide growth in investment that is significantly reducing U.S. global scientific market share, e.g., in expenditures, globally mobile students, publications, patents, and technology revenue.”2 3 The construction of advanced STI infrastructure is now more often built outside the United States by other nations or consortia. And the geography of scientific knowledge creation and use has shown new dynamics within and across many world regions.4 5 These changes have kindled a dialogue in the United States about how the nation, facing both a more worldwide distribution of STI excellence and domestic budget constraints, can best adapt to the twenty-first-century environment of international partnerships and globally distributed knowledge networks.6 7 8 9 10 Missing thus far from this dialogue has been a comprehensive and deliberate exploration of how international STI collaboration provides benefits to America at many levels. We undertake such an effort by presenting an organizing structure or framework for such benefits that we hope achieves three objectives. First, given the complexity of the U.S. STI enterprise, this framework can help decision makers (including government officials at all levels, as well as academic and private sector leaders) better understand how and what kinds of positive national impacts can result from international STI cooperation. We do this by providing examples within our framework of who can benefit, in what ways, from which types of activities undertaken by different sets of U.S. and foreign partners working in various policy sectors. Second, the framework can serve as a starting point for subnational decision makers to identify benefits of STI internationalization at their operational scales. Third, this organizing structure and its examples can serve as a call to action for scientists to more clearly articulate the benefits of their international collaborations to decision makers and the public. The Underappreciated Value of International Scientific Collaborations at Home The United States has been slow among developed and emerging economy countries to recognize how increased international collaboration can advance domestic science excellence.11 12 13 This is likely due to America’s historic STI dominance, relative geographic isolation, and critically, to a complex STI community that is large, diverse, and decentralized. Much U.S. scientific activity is of a bottom-up, merit-based nature, driven by scientists working in domestic or international teams to address specific scientific challenges, rather than being dictated by centralized, top-down mandates. The nation distributes federal support for basic scientific research from a number of agencies and across many universities and research institutions. U.S. higher education is a private or state, not a federal, responsibility, so academic STI internationalization is characterized by strong competition among states and institutions, few national policy levers, and little coordination among and within institutions.”14 Likewise, the various U.S. government science agencies operate in a relatively decentralized manner, undertaking international activities to meet their different missions with little policy direction, and with limited central and strategic coordination.”15 16 Congress and State Houses respond to local constituencies, yielding few broad national advocates for international STI collaboration. Finally, because STI results and impacts, especially those that occur in overseas collaborations, are primarily communicated across networks of scientific professionals, little feedback on international STI outcomes is available in forms that are accessible to decision makers or the general public. Given these historical and structural considerations, we chose to focus on benefits derived from federal government and university involvement in international STI activities that advance national objectives such as national security, economic vitality, and diplomacy.17 We focus on Americans going abroad for STI collaboration because this has received less attention than the impact of foreign STI researchers and students working in America. We recognize that the mutual benefit realized by the collaborating foreign partner(s) is essential to this STI cooperation, but we do not address that here. Crafting a Framework to Capture Benefits of International STI Collaborations Our framework organizes benefits into seven sectors (i.e., scientific, economic, health, diplomacy and development, national security, educational, and societal) with distinct (or overlapping) policy drivers and potential policy outcomes (e.g., leading, accelerating, building, safeguarding, sustaining).18 Because our primary objective is to inform those whose decisions have major impacts at a national level, most of the examples in Table 1 focus on how international collaboration in national programs can help the United States. The examples illustrate an overarching benefit of international collaboration, i.e., it yields outcomes that no one nation could achieve alone. For example, international groups can leverage more resources (e.g., funding, expertise, facilities) to accomplish something faster and can combine diverse contributions (e.g., unique expertise, data, phenomena, facilities) to allow specialization and reduce duplication. Such collaborations can also increase collective participation (e.g., comprehensive global or regional monitoring) to yield more rigorous scientific synthesis and shared responsibility for future action. The examples also document how international STI collaboration can strengthen relationships (e.g., with improved networks and collaboration tools, and increased trust, generosity, and cultural understanding) with mutual scientific and diplomatic benefit to all participants. Finally, the examples sampled in Table 1 demonstrate the wide potential scope and complexity of projects, with various types and numbers of international partners, and diverse types of scientific activities undertaken to yield the set of benefits described. Many of the activities cited in Table 1 are part of a rich fabric of cooperation that produces benefits across multiple sectors. For example, in the category of societal benefits, when U.S. engineers work with their Japanese counterparts on building safety, they contribute to society’s resilience to earthquakes by co-designing and sharing data from experiments in Japan on the world’s largest “shake table,” subjecting large, sensor-laden reinforced concrete buildings to different types and severity of shaking. A recent U.S.-Japan workshop on risk communication yielded additional societal benefit by providing cross-cultural insights into how to increase effective engagement with the public in natural disaster preparedness and response. Universities in the earthquake-prone nations of Japan, New Zealand, Chile, and the United States are linked in a virtual network that generates scientific benefit by sharing data on earthquake impacts on various kinds of buildings, as well as educational benefits to the participating countries by engaging their future engineers in jointly taught classes and international collaborative frameworks. The graphic of nanoHUB users around the world (Figure 1, see also Table 1), illustrates another international collaboration that yields multiple types of benefits. In addition to building a community of shared practice around nanotechnology safeguards that spreads the costs of nanotechnology safety across many countries, a main focus of nanoHUB is distributing nanoscience educational materials from around the world and providing access to computing and simulation tools in many areas of nanoscience. The United States benefits from the resultant global knowledge networks and thriving national and international educational and research collaborations in the pre-competitive areas of nanoscience. We highlight direct positive impacts of STI collaboration for the wellbeing of Americans and emphasize how U.S. leadership in solving global STI challenges can benefit the world. We hope that our focus on the benefits of leveraging increased worldwide STI excellence provides a positive counterbalance to concerns that such global STI growth is primarily a threat that diminishes U.S. advantage.19 We recognize that global technology markets are fiercely competitive, that there are ongoing threats to American intellectual property, and that the nation needs to safeguard its technology for national security. But these concerns need not interfere with global engagement—many safeguards exist and are continually reinforced. There are numerous examples of international cooperation in pre-competitive research that are successfully integrated into domestic technology programs and subsequently implemented by U.S. business and government agencies. Many American industries have adopted a strategy of open collaboration to stay competitive.20 Given the breakneck speed at which STI developments emerge and expand across the globe, we endorse the view that “American security and prosperity now depend on maintaining active engagement with worldwide developments in science and technology, and with the global economy.”21 Embedding American scientists and engineers in robust, global STI networks can add value by placing local knowledge in global contexts and by bringing global knowledge back for local use.22 Embedding American scientists and engineers in robust, global STI networks can add value by placing local knowledge in global contexts and by bringing global knowledge back for local use. Our second objective in presenting the information in Table 1 is that it serves as a starting point to help various subnational decision makers and stakeholder groups better understand the potential benefits of international STI collaboration at the levels at which they operate. Each state has a unique set of universities, industries, populations, and political and economic drivers. To paraphrase the late Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis, the states can be America’s “laboratories of STI globalization,” where state policies allow experimentation and local fine-tuning, delivering benefits from each state’s distinctive comparative advantages. We know that the map of innovation has been “spiky,” with a few key regions (e.g., San Francisco and Boston) dominating.23 Looking ahead, America’s challenge is to sustain existing hubs and incubate new ones that can achieve site-specific local-to-global STI integration; this is especially pressing as more emerging economies devise their own recipes for innovation’s “special sauce,” that is, mega-cities that co-locate workforce, intellectual capital, investment in science, and industrial growth.24 Finally, students, researchers, and technologists are embedded within institutional, local, state, and national structures that vary in how their policies on international STI engagement yield benefit within a global context.24 25 26 Because the dynamic global STI landscape offers American institutions, regions, and states the potential to realize tremendous value in a global context, we encourage these groups to freely consider or modify our framework as they develop their international agendas. As an example, one can consider in Table 1 the international science and engineering internships that yield national economic benefit by bringing into the national workforce U.S. students with globally relevant work skills, cultural experience, and professional networks. Such internships can also provide great benefit at subnational scales. For example, at a state level, public university international engagement, private sector strengths, demography, and geography can make certain regions of the world natural partners. Students returning from internships in those foreign regions are more able to work in culturally diverse teams, are more knowledgeable about business approaches, customs, and markets of countries there, and are plugged into border-spanning networks and partnerships in that region. They can help meet local American needs by using the international skills, savvy, and connections they acquired during their internships to bolster focused international ventures of a state’s private sector. Our final objective is that our framework serves as a call to action that stimulates internationally engaged scientists to better document the positive impacts of their international activities at national, state, local, and institutional levels. U.S. scientists and institutions have strong traditions of free scientific inquiry with international colleagues and of training students from around the world. Many are part of global scientific networks and clamor for facilitation of bottom-up international STI collaboration. Better articulation of the positive impacts of such collaboration is needed to inform national priorities, policies (e.g., on visas, intellectual property, data sharing), and funding (e.g., to globally link students, researchers, institutions, databases, and facilities), as well as to build support for and reduce impediments to international STI engagement at subnational levels. Broad support is needed at many levels for those in the American STI community who want to “go global.” Thus there is an urgent need for scientists to help decision makers and especially citizens understand and value not just the scientific benefits of international research, but also how it meets basic human and national needs.28 In the “Public Messaging” column in Table 1, we provide model language, as suggested by Alan Alda at the 2014 AAAS Annual Meeting, which we believe is straightforward, compelling, and linked to the lives of the American people.29 We emphasize outcomes that can motivate domestic action and political consensus and can be conducive to international cooperation (e.g., national pride, economic and social wellbeing, national security, generosity, the value of knowledge, civics). With the language in that column as a guide, we challenge our fellow scientists to describe, in ways that their relatives, neighbors, institutional leaders, and civic leaders can understand, how their collaborating in international science helps America. A Forward-looking, Dynamic Conversation We welcome discussion and further exploration of the benefits of international STI engagement by decision makers at all levels and across all sectors, as well as by scientific professional societies and scientists themselves. We see these activities as an essential part of ongoing consideration of how to develop a broad, comprehensive, globally framed strategy for U.S. STI, as well as the supportive strategies at subnational levels. We hope that our framework will contribute to the nation’s narrative about how the United States can “lead through collaboration” to build and sustain broad and deep partnerships of mutual interest that keep our scientists and students at the forefront of STI, while bolstering synergistic cooperation for the benefit of America and the world.30

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Antibiotic resistant superbugs will cause extinction – traditional impact D doesn’t apply

Adams, 14 – founding editor of NaturalNews.com, the internet's No. 1 natural health news website, reaching 7 million unique readers a month (Mike, “Drug-resistant superbug infections explode across U.S. hospitals: 500% increase foreshadows 'new plague' caused by modern medicine”, July 17th, http://www.naturalnews.com/046041_CRE_superbugs_drug-resistant_infections_modern_plague.html#)

Drug-resistant superbug infections have reached near-epidemic levels across U.S. hospitals, with an alarming 500% increase now documented in a study just published in the August issue of Infection Control and Hospital Epidemiology (the journal of the Society for Healthcare Epidemiology of America). (1) Lead author of the study, Dr. Joshua Thaden, warned "This dangerous bacteria is finding its way into healthcare facilities nationwide... A CRE epidemic is fast approaching... Even this marked increase likely underestimates the true scope of the problem given variations in hospital surveillance practices." The study also found that an astonishing 94 percent of CRE infections were caused by healthcare activities or hospital procedures. CRE superbugs explained CRE (carbapenem-resistant Enterobacteriaceae) is an incredibly dangerous superbug causing nearly a fifty percent fatality rate once a patient is infected. The World Health Organization calls it "one of the three greatest threats to human health," and all known antibiotics are useless in treating it. CRE arose out of the systematic abuse of antibiotics by doctors, who inadvertently created the perfect breeding ground for deadly bacteria by using narrowly-targeted chemical medications that lack the kind of full-spectrum action found in nature (in herbs like garlic, for example). Because of their highly-targeted chemical approach, antibiotics encouraged bacteria to develop molecular defenses that resulted in widespread resistance to Big Pharma's drugs. The situation is so bad today that the entire pharmaceutical industry has no drug, no chemicals and no experimental medicines which can kill CRE superbugs. Even worse, there are virtually no new antibiotics drugs in the research pipelines, either. Drug companies have discovered that it's far more profitable to sell "lifestyle management" drugs like statin drugs and blood pressure drugs than to sell antibiotics which treat acute infections. Antibiotics simply aren't very profitable because relatively few people acquire such infections. Meanwhile, everyone can be convinced they might have high cholesterol and therefore need to take a statin drug for life. Drug companies, in other words, have all but abandoned the industry of treating infections. Instead, they now primarily engage in the promotion of disease symptoms while selling drugs that attempt to alter measurable markers of those symptoms such as cholesterol numbers. Even though drug companies caused the superbug pandemic that's now upon us, in other words, they have deliberately abandoned humanity in defending against those superbugs because it's simply not profitable to do so. The end of antibiotics has arrived: Humanity faces a new plague caused by modern medicine The CDC has admitted that we are now living in a "post-antibiotics era." As Infection Control Today states, "Antibiotic resistance is no longer a prediction for the future. It is happening right now in every region of the world and has the potential to affect anyone." (2) Dr. Arjun Srinivasan, associate director at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, went even further in a PBS interview, stating: (3) We've reached the end of antibiotics, period... We're here. We're in the post-antibiotic era. There are patients for whom we have no therapy, and we are literally in a position of having a patient in a bed who has an infection, something that five years ago even we could have treated, but now we can't. Keep in mind that doctors refuse to use natural substances to treat infections, which is why they believe no defenses against superbugs exist. Their indoctrination into the world of pharmaceuticals is so deeply embedded in their minds, in other words, that they cannot even conceive of the idea that an herb, a food or something from Mother Nature might provide the answer to superbugs. See this Natural News article on natural antibiotics that kill superbugs. The list includes honey. Hospitals are the perfect breeding grounds for superbugs By their very design, hospitals are prefect breeding grounds for superbugs for six very important reasons: 1) They put all the infected people under one roof, creating a high density infectious environment. 2) They allow doctors and medical staff to quickly and easily carry and transmit infectious diseases to new patients. Previous studies have documented how superbugs easily ride on doctors' ties, for example, or their mobile phones. 3) Medical staff still don't wash their hands as frequently as they should. The intense time demands placed on them discourage careful hand washing, causing many to skip this crucial step between patient visits. 4) Hospitals almost universally refuse to use broad-spectrum antibacterial remedies which are not drugs. Natural substances like honey and garlic show extraordinary multi-faceted antibacterial properties, as do certain metals such as silver and copper. Yet because these substances are not developed by pharmaceutical companies which dominate the field of medical practice, they are simply ignored even though they could save many lives. (And a doctor who prescribes "honey" doesn't sound as amazing and all-knowing as a doctor who prescribes "the latest, greatest laboratory breakthrough patented chemical medication.") 5) Hospital practices suppress human immune function to the point of systemic failure. Rather than boosting immune function, conventional medical treatments such as antibiotics and chemotherapy cause immune system failure. Hospitals lack sunlight and hospital food lacks key immune-boosting minerals such as zinc and selenium. On top of that, most of the drugs prescribed to patients by hospitals deplete key nutrients required for healthy immune function, leaving patients even more susceptible to superbug infections. 6) Hospital staff spread infectious diseases to their private homes. After acquiring an infection at work (at the hospital), staffers easily spread those infections to their own family members at home. The antibiotics plague is upon us We are right now living through the early stages of a global plague caused by modern medicine. The industry that created this plague is utterly defenseless against it, leaving humanity to fight for survival in a world that's now far more dangerous than the one that existed before the invention of antibiotics. Antibiotics have indeed saved millions of lives, and they forever have an important place in any medical practice. Yet their careless use -- combined with medicine's willful and foolish abandonment of natural antibiotics that work far better -- has led humanity down the path of its own destruction. Today, a simple scrape of your arm or leg might now be fatal. Infections that occur during routine medical procedures which would have once been considered minor issues are now deadly. And the worst part is that the bacteria continue to evolve more elaborate defenses against drugs while increasing their transmissibility. Human hospitals (and entire cities) are, by design, ideal pandemic hubs that rapidly spread disease. Like it or not, humanity has created the perfect storm for a pandemic decimation of the global population.

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Specifically, the aff boosts data collaboration – that’s critical to mitigate anti-biotic resistance diseases

Greene, 16 (Chief Digital Officer at mClinica, 6/17, The Superbugs are Coming. Data Science Can Help, http://techonomy.com/2016/06/the-superbugs-are-coming-data-science-can-help/)

As concerns mount about the growing risk of drug-resistant microbes, scientists and health professionals are scrambling for solutions. Data science can play a central role in the fight against the looming global threat. Since the dawn of our species, we co-evolved with bacteria, viruses, parasites, and other microbes that inhabit our bodies and environs. Many of these microbes are harmless; some are symbiotic and even essential for our health. Others are dangerous, but thanks to miraculous advances in public health and medical science over the past century, we can prevent and treat many common microbial infections. Yet some in the health industry fear that may be changing. We misuse and overuse antimicrobial drugs on a massive scale, and the bad bugs are beginning to evolve new resistance mechanisms. As the world flattens and gets more connected, drug-resistant pathogens can spread faster than ever. Meanwhile, we are not developing new medicines and upgrading global health systems fast enough to keep up with our microbial foes. The result could be new strains of “superbugs” with devastating impacts. Scientists have long warned about these risks, but a recent study by the Review on Antiomicrobial Resistance (AMR), a UK-based initiative to provide research and policy guidance on AMR, lends a new urgency to the issue. Commissioned by the UK Government and the Wellcome Trust, the study makes some frightening predictions about the scale of the threat. They estimate that drug-resistant strains of tuberculosis, malaria, HIV/AIDS, and other pathogens already kill around 700,000 people per year. By 2050, the annual toll could reach 10 million. The report advocates for an array of economic, political, and social interventions to tackle the problem. It also acknowledges the importance of data science in supporting those interventions. In fact, the report devotes an entire section to ideas for improving AMR surveillance in humans and animals. Fortunately, many organizations are already working to improve the availability and quality of AMR data. The World Healthcare Organization leads one major effort. In 2015, it launched a Global Antimicrobial Resistance Surveillance System that aims to create standards and processes for data collection and sharing. It will initially focus on clinical monitoring of eight high-risk bacterial strains, but may eventually morph into a platform for sharing AMR data of many types. Advances in bioinformatics could supercharge these efforts. Andrew McArthur, a researcher who holds the Cisco Research Chair in Bioinformatics at McMaster University, imagines a future in which clinicians can instantly sequence the DNA of a disease-causing microbe and use that data to determine the best course of treatment for the patient. That data could then be shared with global AMR surveillance networks and analyzed in real time. “We can already sequence bacterial DNA with remarkable speed and affordability,” says McArthur. “The big challenge is creating software and protocols to make all that data useful for AMR surveillance.” Since overuse of antibiotics in humans is one of the biggest AMR risk factors, tracking their consumption is also critically important. Almost everywhere in the world, physicians routinely prescribe antibiotics when they are not needed. In some places, including many emerging markets where the burden of infectious disease is particularly high, antibiotics are sold as over-the-counter medicines and used with virtually no discretion. My own work at mClinica, a Singapore-based health data and technology firm, involves building health data collection and patient engagement platforms in Asia’s emerging markets. Antibiotics are among the most overprescribed medicines in every country we cover, and our data shows that sub-therapeutic dosing is common. While this may be discouraging, we can also use this data to identify hotspots of antibiotic misuse and plan targeted interventions. Pharmaceutical companies, whose R&D pipelines for antibiotics have all dried up in recent years, recognize that they must be part of the solution. At the World Economic Forum in January 2016, many of the world’s top pharmaceutical, biotech, and diagnostics companies signed a declaration that called for efforts to encourage prudent stewardship of currently-available therapies, hasten drug discovery, and undertake other measures to prevent us from slipping into a post-antibiotic era. Achieving these goals will be all but impossible without smart use of lots of data. Enter the data scientists. Armed with an array of technical skills, from statistical methods to data visualization techniques, they can help bring together complex datasets from varying domains, find patterns in the noise, and develop actionable strategies for fighting AMR. Data science can provide insights that help us develop new antimicrobial medicines, prevent overuse of the ones we already have, and reshape health systems to reduce their need in the first place. It is not a silver bullet for the AMR problem, but it can turbocharge efforts to find and implement solutions.

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It's an impact filter – strong science diplomacy solves everything – specifically interregional tensions that spiral to nuclear war

Daryl Copeland 2016. Research fellow at the Canadian Global Affairs Institute and a policy fellow at the University of Montreal's CERIUM (the Montreal Centre for International Studies). “Science Diplomacy” in The SAGE Handbook of Diplomacy, 2016, IZP)

INTRODUCTION The soft power of science has the potential to reshape global diplomacy. (Ahmed Zewail) In recent years the role and place of interna- tional science and technology (S&T) – and of science diplomacy (SD) in particular – have attracted only limited interest on the part of international affairs analysts and diplomatic practitioners alike. In part as a result, progress in addressing ‘wicked’1 global issues such as climate change, diminishing biodiversity, spe- cies extinction, resource scarcity, environmen- tal crises, and a daunting array of other epidemic threats and challenges which now imperil life on the planet, has been disappoint- ing. The capacity to apprehend and manage S&T-driven global issues has not grown suffi- ciently, and without a greater effort by govern- ments, international organizations and other SD actors, insecurity and underdevelopment will flourish. SD has been treated as a mar- ginal practice, and the damaging consequences of doing so can be reversed only through the provision of adequate resources and the eleva- tion of SD to the status of an international policy, institutional and diplomatic priority.2 UNDERSTANDING SCIENCE DIPLOMACY Learn from yesterday, live for today, hope for tomorrow. The important thing is to not stop ques- tioning. (Albert Einstein) Science, diplomacy and international policy are often regarded as uneasy bedfellows. Science is widely perceived as complex and impenetrable. Diplomacy is often viewed as elitist and ineffective.3 International policy is an ambiguous, esoteric term of which the gen- eral public is barely aware. It is little wonder, therefore, that SD remains relatively obscure and is widely ignored. Nevertheless, SD is important and is becoming more so in an increasingly heteropolar4 world order where the vectors of power and influence are charac- terized more by difference than by similarity and S&T based challenges are multiplying. At the highest level of analysis, SD can best be understood as a diplomatic technique by which S&T knowledge is freed from its rigid national and institutional enclosures, thereby releasing its potential to address directly the drivers of underdevelopment and insecurity.5 Unlike its constituent elements of science and diplomacy, the expression ‘science diplo- macy’ is a relatively new and unfamiliar term, and a consensus on its definition has yet to be forged. Nina Fedoroff, the Science Advisor to former US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, describes SD as: ‘the use of scientific collabo- rations among nations to address the common problems facing 21st century humanity and to build constructive international partner- ships’.6 While the phrase science diplomacy implies some sort of unified whole, the term is most commonly presented as consisting of three distinct areas: informing foreign policy objectives with scientific advice (science in diplomacy); facilitating international science cooperation (diplomacy for science); and, using science cooperation to improve interna- tional relations between countries, regions or organizations (science for diplomacy).7 These three categories, while widely accepted and used, tend to overlap and have some weaknesses as heuristic tools. Many international S&T issues cannot easily be pigeon-holed: attempts to manage climate change have involved science advice (both to governments and the UN Secretary-General), science for diplomacy (the reports of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)) and diplomacy for science (the meet- ings of the Conference of the Parties (COP)). Other science-based issues, however, such as weapons inspections or fisheries monitor- ing and surveillance, fall more convincingly under a single heading (science for diplo- macy). For these reasons, as an umbrella term SD must be used with some care. That said, SD usefully combines inter- national political agency with the scientific method of knowledge production, and is an effective emissary of essential values such as evidence-based learning, merit, openness and sharing. As a specialized sub-set of pub- lic diplomacy (PD),8 science diplomacy is also a significant generator of soft power.9 It is this potent, and – through the increas- ing use of social and digital media – often technologically-enabled form of attraction which can intimately connect SD to national image, reputation and brand. In addition to addressing many of the planet’s most urgent challenges, SD can also contribute, through its use of neutral, non- ideological language, to the mitigation of international political differences when regu- lar diplomatic channels are strained, blocked or non-existent.10 Even at the height of the Cold War, for instance during the Cuban Missile Crisis, Soviet and American scien- tists maintained programmes of collaboration in areas such as polar, atmospheric, health and deep sea research, plus radioactive waste disposal. Similarly, Western scientists have sustained or established contact with their Cuban, North Korean and Iranian counterparts despite the existence of formidable political and economic barriers. Most recently, during the conflict over Crimea and eastern Ukraine, USandRussianscientistshavecontinuedto work closely on Arctic issues, in crewing and managing the International Space Station, and on negotiating the multilateral nuclear pact with Iran (2015) and Syrian chemical weapons disarmament (2013). Science diplomacy can also help maintain relations at times of tensions between friends. For example, in 1985 the government of New Zealand formally banned visits by potentially nuclear-armed warships.11 In response, the US government, while leaving the ANZUS treaty in place, withdrew security guarantees from its traditional ally, downgraded its dip- lomatic relations, and excluded New Zealand from the ‘Five Eyes’ intelligence sharing arrangement, which also included the UK, Australia and Canada. It was a surprisingly nasty row, and bilateral relations were not fully normalized until 2014. Still, through it all, the US base in Christchurch, which pro- vides forward supply and logistical support for American scientific research activities in Antarctica, remained fully operational, and cooperation between US and NZ scientists continued without interruption. Science diplomacy is sometimes conflated with international scientific cooperation, a mistake which has given rise to some confu- sion. The distinction, however, is clear. While the latter is sometimes commercially oriented and often occurs without direct state partici- pation, the former is animated by its direct relationship to government interests and objectives. In the case of international scien- tific cooperation, private sector or civil society partners work together to produce, for example, better medications, cleaner water, improved hygiene or more disease-resistant crops. In contrast to international science coop- eration, SD involves state interests. When these interests diverge, the outcomes may be asymmetrical, particularly if broader nego- tiations are involved. In other cases, interests and objectives converge. As regards outcomes beneficial to all parties, many examples can be drawn from a swathe of international scientific programmes and exchanges undertaken dur- ing the second half of the last century. These have included not only the extensive array of Cold War programmes, but also the highly successful US/G-8/ NATO-led efforts12 to employ members of shrinking defense science establishments and to decommission facilities used for the construction of weapons of mass destruction after the collapse of the USSR. Contemporary negotiations on issues such as the terms and conditions of resource access or environmental protection in a North–South context provide another example of success. There, however, the results have sometimes been more one-sided. Not all countries possess the same level of SD capacity. Large, rich, developed states, such as the US, UK and France, can engage in a wide spectrum of activity, but smaller states, such as Switzerland (commercial technological innovation) or New Zealand13 (agricultural greenhouse gas emissions, bio- security and phytosanitation) have wisely chosen to specialize. In general, less devel- oped countries are at a disadvantage due to limitations on S&T capacity.14 Developing countries tend to be consumers of ‘technical cooperation’ programmes, but when it comes to genuine technology transfer, successful examples are harder to come by. Also, the prospects for SD are often contextual, and thus can vary with time and place. For exam- ple, it is difficult to imagine initiating SD activity at this time with the Islamic State, or with the Taliban government of Afghanistan when it was hosting al-Qaeda. Not all science diplomacy is devoted to the achievement of pacific ends, as was illustrated by the programmes of covert collaboration involving, variously, Pakistan, Iran, North Korea, China and Libya on nuclear-explosive and missile-propulsion technologies orches- trated by Pakistani physicist Abdul Qadeer (A.Q.), Khan. Science and technology offer keys to security and development, but are also capable of generating insecurity, environmen- tal devastation and war. Nevertheless, the key assumption underlying scientific thought – that all events are caused, that misery is not fated, that the answers are out there and that all problems can eventually be solved – under- score its positive and transformative potential. Key Points • The world’s most pressing threats and challenges to peace and prosperity are rooted in science, driven by technology and immune to military solution. • Science diplomacy is well-suited to address these issues, and was prominent during the Cold War, but today has become marginal, with armed force entrenched as the international policy instrument of choice. • While science diplomacy offers a preferable way forward towards a more sustainable and resilient future, science and technology may also give rise to heightened insecurity and underde- velopment. HOW HAS SCIENCE DIPLOMACY DEVELOPED HISTORICALLY? If I have seen further it is by standing on the shoul- ders of giants. (Isaac Newton) The term ‘science diplomacy’ emerged during the 1990s. Science and diplomacy, however, may be seen to have played a criti- cal role together in shaping perceptions and dominant world views, and to have contrib- uted to the strength and durability of nations and empires throughout recorded history. Long before the Greco-Roman period initi- ated the rise of the ‘West’, great strides in medicine, astronomy, engineering and math- ematics were made in the ancient Near East, China and in India. Further scientific pro- gress continued in the Mediterranean, where mainly Greek thinkers like Pythagoras, Hippocrates, Plato, Aristotle, Euclid, Archimedes and Ptolemy made the links between science, power and politics more explicit. From the end of the Western Roman Empire, as the Dark Age enveloped Europe, and even more so after the long decline and eventual fall of Byzantium, the centre of sci- entific enquiry and experimentation shifted to the Arab/Islamic world, and remained there through the medieval period until the late Middle Ages.15 At about that time, the pendulum swung back to Europe. With the Renaissance era’s Scientific Revolution (Copernicus, Galileo, Kepler), Age of Enlightenment (Newton, Pascal, Franklin, Descartes), and the great voyages of explora- tion (Cook, Bougainville) science and tech- nology took off and innovation soared to unprecedented heights. Science and diplomacy became more explicitly intertwined when Britain’s Royal Society, founded in 1660, appointed Henry Oldenburg as its first foreign secretary in 1723.16 This preceded by 78 years the appointment of Britain’s first foreign min- ister. Benjamin Franklin, who in addition to being a founding father of the American Revolution was also a scientist and inventor, served as the first US Ambassador to France, 1776–85. Science and technology played central roles in the European imperial and colonial enterprises of the nineteenth cen- tury, and in the two World Wars and the Cold War of the twentieth. During and since those centuries, Europe, the USA, and for a half century the USSR, have dominated the world of international S&T.17 That locus of geographic leadership, as reflected in publi- cations and the pathfinding work of, among many others, Darwin, Pasteur, Mendel, and, later of Einstein, Bohr, Heisenberg and Oppenheimer,18 is gradually being eroded by discoveries originating in other parts of the world. Although by most measures still far behind, countries such as Japan and Korea have made great strides, while India, China and the ASEAN members, as well as Brazil and South Africa, are all beginning develop their capacities for leadership and innovation in S&T.19 Even if not referred to as such until rela- tively recently, SD per se and as practised by international organizations, foreign ministries and science-based agencies can be traced to the middle reaches of of the twentieth century. In 1931, for example, a number of countries decided to launch an umbrella organization for scientific organizations world-wide, the International Council of Scientific Unions (ICSU), known now as the International Council of Science.20 A second early exam- ple is the European Organization for Nuclear Research (CERN)21, which was founded in 1954 and whose work continues today with recent discoveries such as the Higgs Boson ‘God Particle’. Although managed by 20 European member states, scientists from over 600 universities and research institutes around the world are regularly offered access to CERN’s facilities. Another signature suc- cess is the 1959 Antarctic Treaty,22 with 52 signatories and a long record of achievement. In a few instances, SD has also been facilitated by well-resourced individuals, such as the American philanthropist Cyrus Eaton, who in 1957 hosted a meeting of 22 scientists23 in the village of his birth – Pugwash, Nova Scotia, Canada. The impe- tus for the first Pugwash Conference was the publication in 1955 of a manifesto prepared by Bertrand Russell and Albert Einstein, and signed by many of the leading scientists of the day. That document invited scientists of all ideological persuasions to address the threat to civilization posed by thermonuclear weapons. Over time the remit of the Pugwash meetings has broadened to include other weapons of mass destruction, and the confer- ences now attract the attention of a variety of politicians and senior government officials.24 Today, many inter- and non-governmental institutions and agencies engage in SD. The African Scientific Institute25 was cre- ated in 1967 to facilitate pan-African sci- entific cooperation. In 1996, all countries with territory and/or interests in the Arctic agreed to establish the Arctic Council,26 a body dedicated to advancing the goals of environmental protection and sustainable development. Other important – even if not always well-known – examples include: the International Institute of Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA);27 the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA);28 the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR);29CRDF Global;30 UNESCO;31 the International Centre for Theoretical Physics (ICTP);32 The World Academy of Science (TWAS);33 the Inter Academy Council (IAC);34 SciDev.Net;35 Scientists Without Borders;36 the International Network for Government Science Advice,37 and the OECD Global Science Forum.38 Nevertheless, the creation of multilateral scientific organizations does not necessar- ily correlate with solving global problems. Indeed, there have been significant setbacks, and during the past few decades the overall frequency and intensity of science diplomacy has declined markedly. After the Cold War, many of the well-established international pro- grammes that had promoted science (and edu- cation and culture) as part of a broader public diplomacy strategy to positively influence foreign publics were wound down or drasti- cally reduced by Western countries. Post-9/11, there has since been some recovery, but there remains a long way to go to compensate for lost capacity at a time of growing demand. Ironically, compared to present levels of activity, both PD and SD, at least in the senses of science in diplomacy and science for diplomacy outlined above, enjoyed their hey- day during Cold War. During that period, PD and SD were more than anything else about winning hearts and minds in a competitive ideological and territorial context, yet there was an important distinction. While much of the mainstream PD content was highly prop- agandized, SD offered an alternative form of engagement for advancing the vital arms con- trol and non-proliferation agendas. Science was seen as a neutral, non-political milieu which could be used to mitigate ideological differences. In the early 1970s, SD played an early and central part in the restoration of US–China bilateral relations and continues to be used as a reliable way of producing con- crete results from broader negotiations. During the Cold War, SD played an impor- tant role in achieving arms control and dis- armament agreements, for example, the Non-Proliferations Treaty, the Strategic Arms Limitation Agreements, plus conventions on biological and chemical weapons. It also produced important environmental agree- ments, including the Montreal Protocol on SubstancesthatDepletetheOzoneLayerand theCanada–USacidraintreaty.TheLawofthe Sea Convention defined the rights and respon- sibilities of states with respect to their use of the world’s oceans, and established guidelines governing the environment, the management and use of marine resources, and economic exploitation. And just after the Cold War, in 1992 at the UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), delegates agreed on Agenda 21, the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, the Framework Convention on Climate Change, the Convention on Biological Diversity, and the Statement of Forestry Principles.39 As the difficulties with the Kyoto Protocol illustrate, the subsequent record has been far less impres- sive40 (see Chapter 49 in this Handbook). Disappointing and uneven progress in SD since the Cold War notwithstanding, the efforts of some countries do stand apart. US international science policy, for example, has in recent years included the Presidential appointment of Science Envoys; the expan- sion of the State Department’s American Association for the Advancement of Science41 and Jefferson Fellows programmes; enlarge- ment of the network of Science Counsellors and attaches at missions abroad; the estab- lishment of a high level of internal science advice; and the receipt of strong support from specialized, science-based NGOs.42 The UK,43 with its extensive Science and Innovation Network; Switzerland,44 with Swissnex, its public-private partnership; the EU;45 France;46 China;47 Japan;48 and; Korea,49 as well as several other countries, have also moved forward with ambitious SD programmes. Among less developed coun- tries, more could be done by making better use of existing diplomatic infrastructure, for instance by establishing mission-based net- works of international S&T representatives. Many of the principal achievements of SD continue to be in the policy domain of arms control, disarmament and monitoring. And several major states, including Germany, Russia and Canada, have demonstrated sur- prisingly little interest in SD. Key Points • Beginning in the ancient Near East, China, India, through the Greco-Roman period, and later in the Islamic world, Europe and the Americas, the combination of science and diplomacy has been present in global affairs for millennia. • Science diplomacy, and the establishment of international S&T institutions and NGOs, reached its apogee during the Cold War, but activities have diminished in the interim. • Following a striking record of achievement in areas such as arms control, disarmament and environmental conservation and protection, the pace of international progress has slowed, resources have been cut and underperformance has become the dominant theme. WHY ARE SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION IMPORTANT TO CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS? Science knows no country, because knowledge belongs to humanity and is the torch which illumi- nates the world. (Louis Pasteur) The need to strengthen and build SD is now greater than ever and will require a fundamen- tal re-ordering of international policy priori- ties and resources. Science, technology and innovation are now central to all aspects of our lives and are at the heart of the processes asso- ciated with globalization. The abundance of information generated through connectivity and networks is widely believed to be chang- ing everything.50 Nevertheless, at the level of social and political discourse, the profound consequences associated with S&T together with their implications for SD are accorded relatively little attention. The focus of the great powers remains on their armed forces and ‘military diplomacy’ even though there are no military solutions to the ‘wicked’ issues presented by climate change, genomics, bio- technology and the rise of cyberspace. Today, long-term, equitable and sustain- able development, rather than defence, is becoming the basis of security. Anger, resent- ment and recourse to violence and extremism often arise from exploitation, disenfranchise- ment, poverty and exclusion. Achieving secu- rity is bound up with solving these problems, and the solutions depend on SD harnessing S&T to the attainment of development objec- tives. In fields such as urbanization, public health, environmental protection and remedi- ation, agriculture, food and water, population and demographics, hygiene and energy, the impact of science and technology, combined with good governance, greater economic equality and social justice, are key. And good governance results, in part, from adopting values and procedures which enable progress in science – for example, openness, merit and evidence-based decision making. These qualities underpin the advance of democracy and human rights and enjoy a high degree of universal applicability. Through SD and the sense of cooperation, collaboration and soli- darity which its practice almost inevitably engenders, this sense of universal applicabil- ity can be communicated to others, thereby strengthening the prospects for tackling the ‘wicked issues’ identified above.51 S&T and indeed SD, as noted above, are not always on the side of the angels. They can provide tools for those who threaten peace and obstruct justice. Troubling though groups like Al Qaeda and ISIS, as well as some increasingly authoritarian states, may be, however, the threats they pose remain small compared to those which SD aspires to address. Indeed, it is mainly the militarized response presently adopted by the great pow- ers which affords religious extremism and political violence the opening to become major problems. SD, in contrast, offers the prospect of removing the sources of the legit- imate discontent which terrorists and authori- tarian regimes attempt to exploit. As a global enterprise, it is clear that sci- ence, technology and innovation are directly relevant to finding solutions to some of the world’s most pressing problems. There exists, however, a fundamental difficulty: within most international policy institu- tions, S&T issues are almost invisible. With few exceptions, foreign ministries, develop- ment agencies and indeed most multilateral organizations lack sufficient scientific and technological expertise, the cultural pre- disposition, and the R&D network access and links required to understand and man- age S&T issues effectively. And although scientists increasingly work together and share information among themselves, the scientific community seems to cherish their independence from politics and government. On the many occasions when diplomats or politicians gather to discuss international pol- icy, the substance of their discussions rarely includes S&T. When scientists get together to exchange views on topics of shared interest, their discussions rarely touch upon matters of diplomacy or international policy. The skill sets, activities, time frames and cultural ori- entations of the two groups differ markedly. Few people have managed to straddle the worlds of diplomacy and science effectively. These worlds exist almost as two solitudes. Major hurdles would remain even if scien- tists, politicians, diplomats, foreign ministries and multilateral institutions were more favour- ably disposed towards one another. When it comes to S&T, R&D and innovation, the perspectives and interests of the public sec- tor, private sector, NGOs and the academic community are not always aligned or com- plementary. More often they are competitive or contradictory. For the private sector, the over-arching goal is to maintain exclusive ownership and control over essential S&T intellectual property (patents, trademarks and copyrights limit transfer of technology and spread of innovation). For the constituent ele- ments of what President Eisenhower famously described as the Military Industrial Complex,52 the issues are budget protection, public policy advocacy and the influence over the research agenda (many governments are still spend- ing more on defence research than on health research).53 Add to that the militarization of international policy more generally,54 and the size of the problem becomes clear. Absent a shift away from defence research towards public and civic applications (for instance health, transportation, alternative energy, environmental protection, conserva- tion) and a shift in emphasis in international relations from defence to diplomacy and deve- lopment, progress will remain impossible.55 The relationship between S&T, on the one hand, and diplomacy and international pol- icy, on the other, needs to be reconstructed to produce greater areas of shared space and functional overlap. Anxiety over the unknown on the part of the diplomats, and discomfort with politics and diplomacy on the part of the scientific community, must be overcome and give way to a pattern of closer association, cross-fertilization and the habits of regular exchange and interaction. In part through the creation of connections, networks and col- laborative commons, the two solitudes must be brought together. As is happening else- where in the worlds of commerce and pub- lic administration, the lateral and the supple must replace rigid hierarchy and authoritarian interpersonal relations. By way of an instruc- tive model, Silicon Valley style skunkworks56 merit closer examination. As we have seen, science was once more deeply embedded in diplomacy than is the case today. That inti- macy should be re-instated, but on a much larger and more comprehensive scale. S&T capacity in diplomatic and multilat- eral institutions must be broadened, deep- ened and, where it does not exist, built up from scratch. This can in part be achieved through the injection of more and bet- ter expert scientific advice directly into the policy development and decision-making throughout the apparatus of government and the international governance process. Accessible, more easily intelligible sci- ence communications should be developed. Such synergistic outcomes could be further encouraged through career specialization and more purposeful use of the promotion and recruitment processes. Perhaps the fastest way to build capacity would involve the pro- vision of incentives, programmes of training and professional development, plus expanded secondments and exchanges. Unnecessary obstacles and constraints would have to be removed, and replaced by a commitment to information sharing and critical thinking, tolerance for dissent and an openness to the management of risk (as opposed to its aver- sion). After all, the goal is not the creation of failsafe systems, but to engineer a system of bureaucratic process that is safe – and can be learned from – when it fails. High dividends would accrue to the appli- cation of unorthodox thinking about how best to engineer more productive S&T teamwork through SD. Creative use could be made of open source problem solving, collaborative intelligence,57 web-based policy development and global value chains. In order to leverage international S&T cooperation, institutional linkages and public–private partnerships – between governments, corporations, think tanks, universities and NGOs – need to be bet- ter resourced and encouraged. With enhanced planning and closer coordination, interna- tional research institutions, science academies and intergovernmental science networks could play a larger role in pursuing these objectives. To that end, it would be useful to embrace dynamic new actors and forces which would go well beyond the tapping of usual suspects. This could include involving private philan- thropists and foundations, venture capital firms and small and medium sized enterprises. And, as a final element, all measures intended to improve performance in science diplomacy and international S&T would require rigorous benchmarking, monitoring and evaluation. Psychologist Hans Eysenck once remarked that: ‘Tact and diplomacy are fine in interna- tional relations, in politics, perhaps even in business; in science only one thing matters, and that is the facts’. While that may be so, it would nonetheless benefit both the scientific and diplomatic communities to recognize that they share at least some fundamental objectives: each strives to use reason and rational argument to establish norms and to bring order, structure and systemic function to their otherwise disparate and disorderly realms. That is a significant, if in large part unrecognized, commonality and represents a point of departure for strengthening SD and thus the prospects for more peaceful and prosperous international relations. What the world needs now is develop- ment and security. These two sides of the same coin are best achieved through more science, better technology and accelerated innovation internationally. Towards that end, and as a response to the negative attributes of globalization – including the tendency to socialize costs while privatizing benefits, and the abetting of polarization at all levels – SD can make an indispensable contribution. Key Points • A ‘wicked’ issue CUTS all ways; unlike terrorism, political violence or religious extremism, these threats and challenges are imperilling the planet. • In an increasingly heteropolar world order, the capacity to generate, absorb and use S&T will play a critical role in solving problems, reducing inequality, resolving differences and advancing security and development prospects. • Science and technology, on the one hand, and diplomacy and international policy, on the other, exist in floating worlds which rarely intersect. • Performance could be improved by injecting expert scientific advice into the international policy development process, by making greater use of scientific collaboration in pursuit of dip- lomatic objectives, and by better harnessing the activities of foreign ministries and multilateral institutions in support of advancing the scientific agenda.

2022 UTNIF Affirmative
1AC › 1AC – Disease › Advantage

Absent that, bioterrorism causes extinction – that infinitely outweighs

Piers Millett* & Andrew Snyder-Beattie** 2017. *Senior Research Fellow at the Future of Humanity Institute, where he focuses on pandemic and deliberate disease and the implications of biotechnology. **Leads Open Philanthropy’s work on biosecurity and pandemic preparedness. He previously spent five years at the Future of Humanity Institute (University of Oxford), where he worked as a program manager and later as Director of Research, developing programs across the institute including those in biosecurity and systemic risk. “Existential Risk and Cost-Effective Biosecurity.” Health Secur. 2017 Aug 1; 15(4): 373–383. August 1, 2017, IZP)

How worthwhile is it spending resources to study and mitigate the chance of human extinction from biological risks? The risks of such a catastrophe are presumably low, so a skeptic might argue that addressing such risks would be a waste of scarce resources. In this article, we investigate this position using a cost-effectiveness approach and ultimately conclude that the expected value of reducing these risks is large, especially since such risks jeopardize the existence of all future human lives. Historically, disease events have been responsible for the greatest death tolls on humanity. The 1918 flu was responsible for more than 50 million deaths,1 while smallpox killed perhaps 10 times that many in the 20th century alone.2 The Black Death was responsible for killing over 25% of the European population,3 while other pandemics, such as the plague of Justinian, are thought to have killed 25 million in the 6th century—constituting over 10% of the world's population at the time.4 It is an open question whether a future pandemic could result in outright human extinction or the irreversible collapse of civilization. A skeptic would have many good reasons to think that existential risk from disease is unlikely. Such a disease would need to spread worldwide to remote populations, overcome rare genetic resistances, and evade detection, cures, and countermeasures. Even evolution itself may work in humanity's favor: Virulence and transmission is often a trade-off, and so evolutionary pressures could push against maximally lethal wild-type pathogens.5,6 While these arguments point to a very small risk of human extinction, they do not rule the possibility out entirely. Although rare, there are recorded instances of species going extinct due to disease—primarily in amphibians, but also in 1 mammalian species of rat on Christmas Island.7,8 There are also historical examples of large human populations being almost entirely wiped out by disease, especially when multiple diseases were simultaneously introduced into a population without immunity. The most striking examples of total population collapse include native American tribes exposed to European diseases, such as the Massachusett (86% loss of population), Quiripi-Unquachog (95% loss of population), and the Western Abenaki (which suffered a staggering 98% loss of population).9 In the modern context, no single disease currently exists that combines the worst-case levels of transmissibility, lethality, resistance to countermeasures, and global reach. But many diseases are proof of principle that each worst-case attribute can be realized independently. For example, some diseases exhibit nearly a 100% case fatality ratio in the absence of treatment, such as rabies or septicemic plague. Other diseases have a track record of spreading to virtually every human community worldwide, such as the 1918 flu,10 and seroprevalence studies indicate that other pathogens, such as chickenpox and HSV-1, can successfully reach over 95% of a population.11,12 Under optimal virulence theory, natural evolution would be an unlikely source for pathogens with the highest possible levels of transmissibility, virulence, and global reach. But advances in biotechnology might allow the creation of diseases that combine such traits. Recent controversy has already emerged over a number of scientific experiments that resulted in viruses with enhanced transmissibility, lethality, and/or the ability to overcome therapeutics.13-17 Other experiments demonstrated that mousepox could be modified to have a 100% case fatality rate and render a vaccine ineffective.18 In addition to transmissibility and lethality, studies have shown that other disease traits, such as incubation time, environmental survival, and available vectors, could be modified as well.19-21 Although these experiments had scientific merit and were not conducted with malicious intent, their implications are still worrying. This is especially true given that there is also a long historical track record of state-run bioweapon research applying cutting-edge science and technology to design agents not previously seen in nature. The Soviet bioweapons program developed agents with traits such as enhanced virulence, resistance to therapies, greater environmental resilience, increased difficulty to diagnose or treat, and which caused unexpected disease presentations and outcomes.22 Delivery capabilities have also been subject to the cutting edge of technical development, with Canadian, US, and UK bioweapon efforts playing a critical role in developing the discipline of aerobiology.23,24 While there is no evidence of state-run bioweapons programs directly attempting to develop or deploy bioweapons that would pose an existential risk, the logic of deterrence and mutually assured destruction could create such incentives in more unstable political environments or following a breakdown of the Biological Weapons Convention.25 The possibility of a war between great powers could also increase the pressure to use such weapons—during the World Wars, bioweapons were used across multiple continents, with Germany targeting animals in WWI,26 and Japan using plague to cause an epidemic in China during WWII.27 Non-state actors may also pose a risk, especially those with explicitly omnicidal aims. While rare, there are examples. The Aum Shinrikyo cult in Japan sought biological weapons for the express purpose of causing extinction.28 Environmental groups, such as the Gaia Liberation Front, have argued that “we can ensure Gaia's survival only through the extinction of the Humans as a species … we now have the specific technology for doing the job … several different [genetically engineered] viruses could be released”(quoted in ref. 29). Groups such as R.I.S.E. also sought to protect nature by destroying most of humanity with bioweapons.30 Fortunately, to date, non-state actors have lacked the capabilities needed to pose a catastrophic bioweapons threat, but this could change in future decades as biotechnology becomes more accessible and the pool of experienced users grows.31,32 What is the appropriate response to these speculative extinction threats? A balanced biosecurity portfolio might include investments that reduce a mix of proven and speculative risks, but striking this balance is still difficult given the massive uncertainties around the low-probability, high-consequence risks. In this article, we examine the traditional spectrum of biosecurity risks (ie, biocrimes, bioterrorism, and biowarfare) to categorize biothreats by likelihood and impact, expanding the historical analysis to consider even lower-probability, higher-consequence events (catastrophic risks and existential risks). In order to produce reasoned estimates of the likelihood of different categories of biothreats, we bring together relevant data and theory and produce some first-guess estimates of the likelihood of different categories of biothreat, and we use these initial estimates to compare the cost-effectiveness of reducing existential risks with more traditional biosecurity measures. We emphasize that these models are highly uncertain, and their utility lies more in enabling order-of-magnitude comparisons rather than as a precise measure of the true risk. However, even with the most conservative models, we find that reduction of low-probability, high-consequence risks can be more cost-effective, as measured by quality-adjusted life year per dollar, especially when we account for the lives of future generations. This suggests that despite the low probability of such events, society still ought to invest more in preventing the most extreme possible biosecurity catastrophes The Impact Spectrum of Various Biothreats Here, we use historical data to analyze the probability and severity of biothreats. We place biothreats in 6 loose categories: incidents, events, disasters, crises, global catastrophic risk, and existential risk. Together they form an overlapping spectrum of increasing impact and decreasing likelihood (Figure 1). (Figure 1 omitted) The historical use of bioweapons provides useful examples of some categories of biothreats. Biocrimes and bioterrorism provide examples of incidents.† Biological warfare provides examples of events and disasters. These historical examples provide indicative data on likelihood and impact that we can then feed into a cost-effectiveness analysis. We should note that these data are both sparse and sometimes controversial. Where possible, we use multiple datasets to corroborate our numbers, but ultimately the “true rate” of bioweapon attacks is highly uncertain. Biocrimes and Bioterrorism Historically, risks of biocrime‡ and bioterrorism§ have been limited. A 2015 Risk and Benefit Analysis for Gain of Function Research detailed 24 biocrimes between 1990 and 2015 (0.96 per year) and an additional 42 bioterrorism incidents between 1972 and 2014 (1 per year).36 This is consistent with other estimates of biocrimes and bioterrorism frequency, which range from 0.35 to 3.5 per year (see supplementary material, part 1, at http://online.liebertpub.com/doi/suppl/10.1089/hs.2017.0028). Most attacks typically result in no more than a handful of casualties (and many of these events include hoaxes, threats, and attacks that had no casualties at all). For example, the anthrax letter attacks in the United States in 2001, perhaps the most high-profile case in recent years, resulted in only 17 infections with 5 fatalities.37 The 2015 Risk and Benefit Analysis for Gain of Function Research detailed only a single death from the recorded biocrimes.** Only 1 of the bioterrorism incidents in the report had associated deaths (the 2001 anthrax letter attacks).36 Based on this data, for the purposes of this article, we assume that we could expect 1 incident per year resulting in up to tens of deaths. Biological Warfare Academic overviews of biological warfare†† detail 7 programs prior to 1945.38 A further 9 programs are recorded between 1945 and 1994.39 For most of the last century, at least 1 program was active in any given year (Table 1). (Table 1 omitted) The actual use of bioweapons by states is less common: Over the 85 years covered by these histories (1915 to 2000), 18 cases of use (or possible use) were recorded, including outbreaks connected to biological warfare (see supplementary material, part 2, at http://online.liebertpub.com/doi/suppl/10.1089/hs.2017.0028). Extrapolating this out (dividing 18 by 85), we would have about a 20% chance per year of biowarfare. It is worth noting the limitations of these data. Most of these events occurred before the introduction of the Biological Weapons Convention and were conducted by countries that no longer have biological weapons programs. Since many of these incidents occurred during infrequent great power wars, we revise our best guess to around 10% chance per year of biowarfare. We use 2 sets of data to estimate the magnitude of such events. The first dataset was Japanese biological warfare in China,40 where records indicate a series of attacks on towns resulted in a mean of 330 casualties per event and 1 case in which an attack resulted in a regional outbreak causing an estimated 30,000 deaths (see supplementary material, part 3, at http://online.liebertpub.com/doi/suppl/10.1089/hs.2017.0028). The second data set came from disease events that were alleged to have an unnatural origin.41 In one case study, a point source release of anthrax resulted in at least 66 deaths. In a second case study, a regional epidemic of the same disease resulted in more than 17,000 human cases. While these events were not confirmed as having been caused by biological warfare, contemporary or subsequent analysis has suggested that such an origin was at least feasible. Combined, these figures provide an estimated impact of between 66 to 330 and 17,000 to 30,000. For the purposes of this analysis, we are assuming the lower boundary figures from biological warfare are indicative of events, with a likelihood of 10% per year and an impact ranging between tens and thousands of fatalities. The upper boundary figures from biological warfare are indicative of disasters, with a likelihood of 1% per year and an impact range of thousands to tens of thousands of fatalities.‡‡ Go to: Global Catastrophic and Existential Risk Unlike standard biothreats, there is no historical record on which to draw when considering global catastrophic or existential risks. Alternative approaches are required to estimate the likelihood of such an event. Given the high degree of uncertainty, we adopt 3 different approaches to approximate the risk of extinction from bioweapons: utilizing surveys of experts, previous major risk assessments, and simple toy models. These should be taken as initial guesses or rough order-of-magnitude approximations, and not a reliable or precise measure. Model 1: Survey of 2008 Global Catastrophic Risk Conference An informal survey at the 2008 Oxford Global Catastrophic Risk Conference asked participants to estimate the chance that disasters of different types would occur before 2100. Participants had a median risk estimate of 0.05% that a natural pandemic would lead to human extinction by 2100, and a median risk estimate of 2% that an “engineered” pandemic would lead to extinction by 2100.42 The advantage of the survey is that it directly measures the quantity that we are interested in: probability of extinction from bioweapons. The disadvantage is that the estimates were likely highly subjective and unreliable, especially as the survey did not account for response bias, and the respondents were not calibrated beforehand. We therefore also turn to other models that, while indirect, provide more objective measures of risk.§§ Model 2: Potentially Pandemic Pathogens Recent controversial experiments on H5N1 influenza prompted discussions as to the risks of deliberately creating potentially pandemic pathogens. These agents are those that are highly transmissible, capable of uncontrollable spread in human populations, highly virulent, and also possibly able to overcome medical countermeasures.44 Previous work in a comprehensive report done by Gryphon Scientific, Risk and Benefit Analysis of Gain of Function Research,36 has laid out very detailed risk assessments of potentially pandemic pathogen research, suggesting that the annual probability of a global pandemic resulting from an accident with this type of research in the United States is 0.002% to 0.1%. The report also concluded that risks of deliberate misuse were about as serious as the risks of an accidental outbreak, suggesting a 2-fold increase in risk. Assuming that 25% of relevant research is done in the United States as opposed to elsewhere in the world, this gives us a further 4-fold increase in risk. In total, this 8-fold increase in risk gives us a 0.016% to 0.8% chance of a pandemic in the future each year (see supplementary material, part 4, at http://online.liebertpub.com/doi/suppl/10.1089/hs.2017.0028). The analysis in Risk and Benefit Analysis of Gain of Function Research suggested that lab outbreaks from wild-type influenza viruses could result in between 4 million and 80 million deaths,36 but others have suggested that if some of the modified pathogens were to escape from a laboratory, they could cause up to 1 billion fatalities.45 For the purposes of this model, we assume that for any global pandemic arising from this kind of research, each has only a 1 in 10,000*** chance of causing an existential risk. This figure is somewhat arbitrary but serves as an excessively conservative guess that would include worst-case situations in which scientists intentionally cause harm, where civilization permanently collapses following a particularly bad outbreak, or other worst-case scenarios that would result in existential risk. Multiplying the probability of an outbreak with the probability of an existential risk gives us an annual risk probability between 1.6 × 10–8 and 8 × 10–7.††† Model 3: Naive Power Law Extrapolation Previous literature has found that casualty numbers from terrorism and warfare follow a power law distribution, including terrorism from WMDs.46 Power laws have the property of being scale invariant, meaning that the ratio in likelihood between events that cause the deaths of 10 people and 10,000 people will be the same as that between 10,000 people and 10,000,000 people.‡‡‡ This property results in a distribution with an exceptionally heavy tail, so that the vast majority of events will have very low casualty rates, with a couple of extreme outliers. Past studies have estimated this ratio for terrorism using biological and chemical weapons to be about 0.5 for 1 order of magnitude,47 meaning that an attack that kills 10x people is about 3 times less likely (100.5) than an attack that kills 10x–1 people (a concrete example is that attacks with more than 1,000 casualties, such as the Aum Shinrikyo attacks, will be about 30 times less probable than an attack that kills a single individual). Extrapolating the power law out, we find that the probability that an attack kills more than 5 billion will be (5 billion)–0.5 or 0.000014. Assuming 1 attack per year (extrapolated on the current rate of bio-attacks) and assuming that only 10% of such attacks that kill more than 5 billion eventually lead to extinction (due to the breakdown of society, or other knock-on effects), we get an annual existential risk of 0.0000014 (or 1.4 × 10–6). We can also use similar reasoning for warfare, where we have more reliable data (97 wars between 1820 and 1997, although the data are less specific to biological warfare). The parameter for warfare is 0.41,47 suggesting that wars that result in more than 5 billion casualties will comprise (5 billion)–0.41 = 0.0001 of all wars. Our estimate assumes that wars will occur with the same frequency as in 1820 to 1997, with 1 new war arising roughly every 2 years. It also assumes that in these extreme outlier scenarios, nuclear or contagious biological weapons would be the cause of such high casualty numbers, and that bioweapons specifically would be responsible for these enormous casualties about 10% of the time (historically bioweapons were deployed in WWI, WWII, and developed but not deployed in the Cold War—constituting a bioweapons threat in every great power war since 1900). Assuming that 10% of biowarfare escalations resulting in more than 5 billion deaths eventually lead to extinction, we get an annual existential risk from biowarfare of 0.0000005 (or 5 × 10–7). Perhaps the most interesting implication of the fatalities following a power law with a small exponent is that the majority of the expected casualties come from rare, catastrophic events. The data also bear this out for warfare and terrorism. The vast majority of US terrorism deaths occurred during 9/11, and the vast majority of terrorism injuries in Japan over the past decades came from a single Aum Shinrikyo attack. Warfare casualties are dominated by the great power wars. This suggests that a typical individual is far more likely to die from a rare, catastrophic attack as opposed to a smaller scale and more common one. If our goal is to reduce the greatest expected number of fatalities, we may be better off devoting resources to preventing the worst possible attacks. Why Uncertainty Is Not Cause for Reassurance Each of our estimates rely to some extent on guesswork and remain highly uncertain. Technological breakthroughs in areas such as diagnostics, vaccines, and therapeutics, as well as vastly improved surveillance, or even eventual space colonization, could reduce the chance of disease-related extinction by many orders of magnitude. Other breakthroughs such as highly distributed DNA synthesis or improved understanding of how to construct and modify diseases could increase or decrease the risks. Destabilizing political forces, the breakdown of the Biological Weapons Convention, or warfare between major world powers could vastly increase the amount of investment in bioweapons and create the incentives to actively use knowledge and biotechnology in destructive ways. Each of these factors suggests that our wide estimates could still be many orders of magnitude off from the true risk in this century. But uncertainty is not cause for reassurance. In instances where the probability of a catastrophe is thought to be extremely low (eg, human extinction from bioweapons), greater uncertainty around the estimates will typically imply greater risk of the catastrophe, as we have reduced confidence that the risk is actually at a low level.48 §§§ Given that our conservative models are based on historical data, they fail to account for the primary source of future risk: technological development that could radically democratize the ability to build advanced bioweapons. If the cost and required expertise of developing bioweapons falls far enough, the world might enter a phase where offensive capabilities dominate defensive ones. Some scholars, such as Martin Rees, think that humanity has about a 50% chance of going extinct due in large part to such technologies.49 However, incorporating these intuitions and technological conjectures would mean relying on qualitative arguments that would be far more contentious than our conservative estimates. We therefore proceed to assess the cost-effectiveness on the basis of our conservative models, until superior models of the risk emerge. How Bad Would Human Extinction Be? Human extinction would not only end the 7 billion lives in our current generation, but also cause the loss of all future generations to come. To calculate the humanitarian cost associated with such a catastrophe, one must therefore include the welfare of these future generations. While some have argued that future generations ought to be excluded or discounted when considering ethical actions,50 most of the in-depth philosophical work around the topic has concluded that future generations should not be given less inherent value.51-55 Therefore, for our calculations, we include future lives in our cost-effectiveness estimate.**** The large number of future generations at stake mean that reducing existential risk even by a small amount may have very large expected value. The Earth is thought to be habitable for roughly another billion years;56 our closest relative, homo erectus, lasted over 1.6 million years,57 and the typical mammalian species also lasts on the order of 1 to 2 million years.58 Following Matheny,29 if we were to assume that humanity would otherwise maintain a global population of 10 billion for the next 1.6 million years, human extinction would jeopardize on the order of 1.6 × 10^16 life years.

2022 UTNIF Affirmative
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Independently, science diplomacy solves regulation of emerging biotech

K. Ravi Srinivas 2019. Consultant, RIS. He is a doctorate in Intellectual Property Law from National Law School, Bangalore. “Global Governance of Emerging Biotechnologies and Role of Science Diplomacy” In SCIENCE DIPLOMACY REVIEW, Vol. 1 | No. 3 | July 2019, https://www.ris.org.in/sites/default/files/2021-09/SDR%20July%202019%203-min.pdf IZP)

In the early 1970s concern was expressed over threats and impacts of advances in biology, particularly on the impacts of genetic engineering, and Issues related to biosafety and regulations were discussed. As genetic engineering was getting established as a novel technology that had huge potential to benefit and harm, scientists themselves were concerned about biosafety and issues arising out of recombinant DNA research. So in the Asimolar Conference, convened by scientists themselves a Declaration was adopted and scientists decided that they would adopt self-regulation as at that time there was no national level legislation/regulation in the USA. The rules adopted by the scientists laid the foundation stone for modern biotechnology regulation. Over the next few years, it became clear that fears were exaggerated and recombinant DNA research was crucial in biotechnology research. Today about four decades and a half have passed. Still the Asimolar conference is regarded as a pioneering conference, not just for the technical issues discussed there, but also for the decision to adopt self-regulation and minimize potential risk. Scientists thus responded to public concerns and concerns within the scientific community. What was novel once often turns out be routine and an ordinary matter over a period of time. The same has happened to the techniques and technologies discussed in Asimolar Conference, as recombinant DNA research soon became a routine affair in biotechnology. It became clear that fears were exaggerated and technology resulted in applications, many of which were not envisaged then. A criticism of the Conference was that it ignored ethical, legal and social impacts (ELSI) of the technology and focused solely on technical issues and concern for environment and health. Yet the key lessons from Asimolar were that developing consensus was critical and prudent action in light of uncertainty was important.1 Today, we have technologies/ applications such as synthetic biology that confer to scientists far more power than genetic engineering or recombinant DNA technologies did.2 But they have such a wide-ranging impact that discussion on ethical, legal and social implications are part of the debate among scientists, National Academies of Science and regulators. In case of human genome project, a specific percentage of money as allocated for ELSI research and governments and scientists made efforts to reach out to the public and allay their fears as well as to learn from the public about their concerns, values, fears and expectations. But governing human genome mapping was relatively easier as the number of countries was limited and they had come to an understanding among themselves. So, except for a few issues like intellectual property rights and data management models, human genome mapping did not emerge as a challenge for governance at the international level. At the national level, countries had revised their regulations based on regulation of biotechnology/genetic engineering. In case of human reproductive cloning while there was a UN declaration on banning human reproductive cloning, progress could not be made on a binding international treaty on human reproductive cloning. Although efforts were made to build a consensus and move towards a binding treaty it did not go beyond a point, because consensus did not emerge. Thus while. In 2005, the United Nations adopted Declaration on Human Cloning, a binding treaty is nowhere is sight. Still it is suggested that a global governance framework may still be possible. Synthetic biology is not governed by any international treaty or convention. In the last few years it has been discussed in Convention on Biological Diversity and many studies have been done. The forthcoming COP-MOP to be held next year in Kun Ming, China is likely to make some progress on this. But given its implications for biosafety and biosecurity, whether the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) is the right forum is a question. At the same time as it has ramifications for other sectors ranging from health to agriculture, its governance at the global level raises new challenges. These range from whether the precautionary principle is the right principle to govern synthetic biology to whether products of synthetic biology are treated as Genetically Modified Organisms (GMO) / Living Modified Organisms (LMO) or their equivalent. In December 2017 the ad-hoc technical experts group created by Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity , decided that organisms developed or being developed under current methods of synthetic biology , including the ones containing gene drives will fall under the category of LMOs. LMOs are regulated under Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety (CPB). CPB has been ratified by most countries in the world and has 171 Parties to it. CPB has an elaborate mechanism to handle LMOs and invokes the Precautionary Principle. So negotiating further under CBD/CPB seems to be a better option but some of the countries that are innovators in Synthetic Biology and Gene Drives are not Parties to CBD or CPB. For example, USA is not a Party to CBD while Australia, and, Canada are not parties to CPB. Noting that broader shifts in global biodiversity governance are happening, Rabitz points out that a broader package deal with specific provisions on Gene Drive Organisms (GDO) can be arrived at the forth coming COP-MOP (Rabitz, 2019; P.9). But in the case of Synthetic Biology there is a strong and growing Do It Yourself Biology (DIY Bio) movement that has become global and the DIY Bio community is also an important contributor in terms of innovation and events like iGEM incentivize students to work on Synthetic Biology. This diffusion of technology among those who do not work under the typical biosafety regulatory regime and the diversity in their uses and applications is a challenge to governing Synthetic Biology. Most of the DIY Bio groups are aware of biosafety concerns and adopt safety procedures and take precautionary measures. How to regulate and govern DIY Bio is a key issue because DIY Bio promotes citizen science and enables better understanding of science and hence has to be supported but as it raises questions on biosecurity, biosafety and bioterrorism, it cannot be left entirely to DIY Bio groups. Will self- regulation combined with monitoring by a government agency is enough or should this also be regulated as a regular scientific activity? Genome Editing is a novel technology that has emerged since 2012 or so, and is revolutionizing the way scientists handle and manipulate genomes. While human genome mapping enabled scientists to explore and understand the genome better, Genome Editing, offers them tools and protocols to edit the Genome, or, ‘to rewrite the genetic code’. There are some common features among Synthetic Biology, Genome Editing, Gene Drives and GM Mosquitoes from a governance perspective: • There is no clarity on applicability of any convention/treaty for their governance globally • Although nations have been trying to develop frameworks and regulatory norms, there are many unresolved issues ranging from categorization/ classification to identifying appropriate governance principles. For example should Gene Drives be classified as LMOs? Should Genome Edited Crops be treated as similar to crops bred in traditional plant breeding programs or as GMOs for regulatory purposes. • Are principles like precautionary principle adequate to develop regulatory regimes • Traditionalriskassessmentsmaynotbe sufficient to fully understand the long terms environmental impacts of these • Given the gaps in knowledge about impacts, issues on impact assessment methodologies, there are uncertainties on assessing their impacts • They raise concerns about biosafety and biosecurity and some of these are new and arise out of their unique and novel features, and, this includes concerns about DIY bio.3 • Given the wide-ranging applications in different sectors, is it possible to develop coherent governance frameworks, which can adapt in tune with technological developments. The good news is that different stakeholders are aware of these and are trying to understand the implications. Thus, whether it is National Academies of Sciences or WHO or professional bodies representing scientists or Parties to different Conventions/Treaties there are many initiatives on debating about governance issues and to develop a common understanding, if not a consensus. For example WHO has established a “expert advisory committee on Developing global standards for governance and oversight of Human Genome editing” and it has started functioning. Parties to The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) are discussing the implications of advancements in science and technology, including genome editing for BWTC. A paper submitted by Switzerland states (BWTC, 2018): “CRISPR technology can reasonably be expected to surprise us with new twists and turns impossible to predict. This is likely also true for many other areas, including the above discussed nucleic acid origami, but also for synthetic biology or the neurosciences. In this context, it will be important to keep track of scientific and technological advances, and their potential bearings on the Convention. At the upcoming MX2, we should hold a technical discussion on genome editing technologies, and especially CRISPR technology, to then take the next step towards an assessment of their implications for the Convention by putting them into the broader context of the ‘new era of biology’. In doing so, we should broaden our traditional focus of ‘pathogens causing disease’ to the wider prospects and implications that developments in the biosciences as a whole may have. Furthermore, technical discussions should also take into account any intangible aspects (e.g. ‘tacit knowledge’) of advances in science and technology, which may significantly shift initial perceptions about benefits and risks. All of this will allow for a holistic and more realistic understanding of the benefits and risks to the Convention” The figure 1 illustrates some of the concerns on the potential of recent developments in science and technology. (figure 1 omitted) According to Diane DiEuliis and James Giordano (2017): “‘Neurohacking’ will increase, and biotechnology, such as CRISPR/ Cas and novel gene editors, will provide tools to realize production of novel neuroagents with dual-use potential. Simple acknowledgment of these facts, however, is insufficient. It will be essential to pursue and obtain a deeper and fuller understanding of the ways that genetic pathways to human cognitive and behavioral modification can be engaged for dual and direct use as neuroweapons, to formulate policies based on this level of understanding, and to engage surveillance of the use of these technologies in various silos of development and application, so as to afford both preventive and more preparatory capabilities” (Pp. 300-301) For obvious reasons, ‘creating’ babies through genome editing with enhanced traits or similar application have created a mixed feeling, from awe and wonder, to repulsion and shock. Even as nations struggle to regulate genome editing in health sector, the absence of international norms for governance can result in tricky situations and unanticipated turn of events. While giving an example of such a tricky situation, Dounda and Sternberg (2017), suggest that international governance is a better solution, by pointing out: “A cautionary tale on the risks of inaction can already be seen with a related assisted reproductive technology known as mitochondrial replacement therapy, which is being developed but is not yet clinically approved in the US. In a recent case, however, a New York physician exported genetically modified embryos to Mexico for implantation, specifically to evade US restrictions. Imagine the type of industry that might result if the intent were not to produce an embryo free of genetic disease, but an embryo with a genetic enhancement enabled by CRISPR. Robust international governance could discourage this kind of medical tourism, assure equal protection for the citizens of all nations, set international gene editing standards for scientists and companies, and help prevent trade disputes with gene-edited foods. The challenge is determining what mechanism of international convergence is actually possible, given the substantial legal differences that are already in place across the globe on issues like GMOs and genetic modification of human embryos.” Given the challenges in developing governance norms and principles for these emerging technologies is there a role for Science Diplomacy in helping countries to develop governance frameworks and arrive at commonly agreed principles, if not a consensus? The answer is YES. Science Diplomacy can play key role as ‘Science for Diplomacy’ and ‘Diplomacy for Science’ can play a vital role in bringing together scientists, regulators and policy makers by acting as interfaces and help in building bridges. It is not important that countries should start with a common understanding or with shared objectives. But through deliberations, countries can at least find out points they agree fully, points they totally disagree and points they agree and disagree with a give and take attitude. Science diplomacy can help countries in identifying these points and identify how their respective positions are shaped by these points. For example with respect to human genome editing for reproductive purposes, countries can at least agree on what they want to prohibit at all costs and how they will ensure that, In arriving at such a common position, science diplomacy can play a vital role when scientists and diplomats work together towards this. While scientists can rely on positions taken by National Academies and ethical guidelines in vogue in the respective countries, diplomats can negotiate on developing flexible positions and norms that are beyond any bargain or compromise. Mutual interactions among them will enable a better understanding that can be used to arrive at a shared understanding for further deliberations. Through track II diplomacy, other stakeholders can contribute to further progress on developing such an understanding. On the other hand Science Diplomacy can be part of track II diplomacy although it may not be very visible. If we conceptualize that Science Diplomacy is a broad activity that goes beyond closed doors of forums for negotiations, and, activities of scientists and diplomats, then we have to consider the role of, inter alia, non-state actors, and, civil society in activities related to developing norms for governance. Given the importance of public engagement and public participation, Science Diplomacy can facilitate that by engaging with other stakeholders directly or indirectly. For example while in many of the Conference of Parties and Meeting of Parties (COP- MOP) , civil society groups and others that are recognized, can participate as observers , their influence among the public and their role in shaping public opinion also has to be taken into account. Science Diplomacy can be useful in engaging with them as observers as well as interfaces between public on one hand, and, scientists and policy makers, on the other hand. Obviously the tasks are not easy and there are many challenges. Although there can be a consensus translating that into a binding agreement or treaty is not easy. As these technologies have biosafety and biosecurity concerns, it is likely that Parties to BWTC will address those concerns as far as BWTC is concerned. Similarly some of the concerns relating to environmental impacts, long term impacts, and risk assessment can be addressed through deliberations by Parties of CBD/ CPB, which might result in changes/ additions/revisions in CBD/CPB. The WHO’s expert advisory committee can develop guidelines to regulate genome editing for health/population related purposes. Dounda and Sternberg have identified some relevant initiatives in governance of genome editing. Thus there is scope for using health diplomacy, environmental diplomacy and perhaps innovation diplomacy in moving towards governance norms for these technologies. But this will not happen on its own. Until countries realize that Science Diplomacy is essential to address tricky questions in international governance of these technologies and understand that some nudging including persuasion is required through Science Diplomacy and create forums and spaces for diplomats and scientists to interact and work together, Science Diplomacy will not have an effective role in this. As many of the Science Academies are active in addressing issues relating to governance, in each country, a small team from representatives of these Academies, negotiators can be formed to develop a coherent negotiating strategy across different forums, COP-MOPs etc. One hopes that the countries will seize the opportunities for Science Diplomacy to play a positive role and give it the importance it deserves in this challenging task. Having said that, we should not expect that Science Diplomacy will be the saviour or a factor that could override all other factors in moving towards a consensus. Perhaps developments in this year and the next few years will indicate the directions in which the world is moving in governing these technologies.

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The aff would strengthen the NATO Science for Peace and Security Programme – that boosts science diplomacy and international mitigation effectiveness

NATO ESCG 2019. The Emerging Security Challenges Division. “THE NATO SCIENCE FOR PEACE AND SECURITY SPS PROGRAMME.” NATO OTAN. 2019. IZP)

Now in its seventh decade of existence, the NATO Science for Peace and Security (SPS) Programme remains a key vehicle for engaging NATO partners in practical cooperation in the areas of civil science, technology, innovation and capacity building. Based on the Overarching Guidance provided by the North Atlantic Council (NAC), it develops and supports key flagship projects in line with NATO’s Strategic Objectives and fosters regional cooperation among partners. As demonstrated over decades, the Programme is very flexible and versatile in its response to changing security environments and to Allied guidance. SPS top-down flagship activities in particular are demand- driven responding to Allies’ and partners’ priorities for practical cooperation, reflecting NATO’s balanced and 360 degree approach. While SPS staff is monitoring the implementation of its activities on a daily basis, Allies in the Partnerships and Cooperative Security Committee (PCSC) approve applications following review and recommendation from the Independent Scientific Evaluation Group (ISEG). In addition the PCSC is regularly presented with updates on the progress and results of SPS activities. A 2014 audit by the Independent Board of Auditors of NATO (IBAN) confirmed the strong alignment of SPS with the political priorities of the Alliance, and underlined the effective management of the SPS Programme. It also provided a number of recommendations that have been addressed over the last five years to further streamline the Programme, including efforts to systematically analyze the results of SPS activities. In 2019, this included the organization of a SPS cluster workshop on Advanced Technologies. SPS activities bring together experts and scientists from NATO and partner countries through several grant mechanisms, including Multi-Year Projects (MYP), Advanced Research Workshops (ARW), Advanced Training Courses (ATC), and Advanced Study Institutes (ASI) that lead to tangible outputs with a concrete impact and a high public diplomacy value for NATO. This well-established partnership programme is an integral part of NATO’s Emerging Security Challenges Division (ESCD), and, over the years, has helped to forge important international expert networks and build capacity while addressing a wide range of security concerns as identified in the SPS key priorities. These priorities include counter-terrorism, cyber defence, energy security, CBRN defence, the development of advanced technologies with security applications, mine and unexploded ordnance (UXO) detection as well as human and social aspects of security. At the same time, the SPS Programme has grown to include projects that encompass capacity-building, hybrid threats and the implementation of UNSCR1325 on Women, Peace and Security. In order to achieve its goals, SPS works in close coordination with other relevant NATO Divisions and Bodies. STRONG ALIGNMENT WITH NATO’S STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES AND POLITICAL GUIDANCE All SPS activities have a clear link to security and help to address NATO’s Strategic Objectives. The Programme closely follows guidance received from Allies, and has repeatedly demonstrated its flexibility and versatility to adapt to the changing political and security context. The PCSC is directly overseeing the implementation of the SPS Programme by approving SPS activities, the annual SPS Work Programme and the nominations received from Allies for the Independent Scientific Evaluation Group (ISEG). At the same time, SPS follows the strategic and political guidance resulting from NATO Meetings and Summits, such as the July 2018 Brussels Summit and the December 2019 Leaders’ Meeting in London. This has been reflected in the development of SPS activities to support NATO-wide priorities such as the Defence and Related Security Capacity Building (DCB) Initiative, NATO efforts to project stability, the fight against terrorism, and the strong cooperation with partners in the South, the Western Balkans and East. SPS has also continued its strong engagement with Ukraine, including through the 16th annual meeting of the NATO-Ukraine Joint Working Group Scientific and Environmental Cooperation (JWGSEC) in March 2019. WORKING WITH KEY STAKEHOLDERS ACROSS NATO AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY The SPS Programme relies heavily on its close and well-established cooperation and coordination with various NATO stakeholders, including Allied and partner Delegations, NATO Agencies, Divisions, and Offices, such as the Office of the Secretary General’s Special Representative on Women, Peace and Security. The Programme has established longtime coordination and cooperation with the Science and Technology Organization (STO) and the Office of the Chief Scientist, with one expert from each being an ISEG member. The Senior SPS and Partnership Cooperation Advisor is an ex-officio member of the Science and Technology Board (STB) for the ESC Division. Where appropriate, SPS draws on the expertise of the network of NATO Centers of Excellence to deliver specialized, modular training activities, tailored to the needs of partner nations. The SPS Programme is also engaging with other International Organizations, including with the United Nations (UN), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the European Union (EU) and, since 2019, the African Union, to identify synergies, forge networks and avoid duplication. SPS PROGRAMME IMPLEMENTATION FACTS AND FIGURES Over the last year, the SPS Programme received a total of 130 applications in response to three calls for proposals throughout the year. Of these, 112 passed the eligibility screening and were peer-reviewed by the Independent Scientific Evaluation Group (ISEG) during two meetings. 52 proposals were recommended by the ISEG. The NATO Partnerships and Cooperative Security Committee (PCSC) met on eight occasions throughout 2019 to discuss the SPS Programme, and during these meetings approved new SPS activities. Out of these, 25% were top-down activities that had been developed in close cooperation with the NATO and partner countries involved, to respond to their needs and priorities. While SPS activities cover a wide range of security-relevant topics, cyber defence, CBRN defence and the development of advanced technologies were the top three SPS key priority areas addressed by new activities in 2019. 22 partner countries from all NATO partnership frameworks are leading last year’s newly approved SPS activities. Multi-Year Projects and Advanced Research Workshops were the most popular SPS grant mechanisms in 2019. A total of 32 SPS Multi-Year Projects were completed in 2019. They helped to build capacity through the provision of modern equipment and specialized training. They supported young scientists as they began their careers, and resulted in new insights, technologies, prototypes and policy recommendations that can be further developed and applied by end-users. A full list of SPS projects completed in 2019 can be found in Annex 3. In addition, in 2019, 31 advanced training courses and research workshops were carried out, involving approximately 2700 experts, researchers and young scientists. An exhaustive overview of the SPS events organized in 2019 may be found in Annex 2. The SPS Programme fully executed its budget of EUR 11.8 M in 2019, maintaining a linear spending curve. A substantial part of the budget remains allocated for new and ongoing large-scale MYPs. MODERNIZATION The SPS Programme continues to foster the development of scientific and technological innovation by applying specialized know-how to address emerging security challenges. In particular, cluster workshops and special calls for proposals maintain the SPS Programme’s position at the leading edge of innovation and modernization. In this light, the Programme issued two Special Calls for Proposals in 2019. The Special Call for Proposals on Advanced Technologies focused on four clusters of topics: communication systems, advanced materials, sensors and detectors, and unmanned systems, proving the Programme’s dedication to innovating in security-related civil science. This Special Call was developed following a cluster workshop on Advanced Technologies in September, which was in line with the IBAN recommendation to cluster activities in order to increase networking amongst scientists, to stock-take, and to ultimately enhance results. In 2019, the Programme also launched a Special Call for Proposals in the field of Explosives Detection, specifically in the areas of multi-sensor systems, data analysis, new or rapidly developing technologies, preparation for actual field conditions, and dissemination and capacity building. The Programme also continued to support the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda through concrete activities, closely coordinated with the office of the NATO Secretary General’s Special Representative on Women, Peace and Security, and following the guidance provided by the 2018-2020 NATO/EAPC Policy Action Plan on WPS. Notably, in 2019, SPS completed a MYP that conducted the first organizational climate assessment of the Georgian Armed Forces. The MYP addressed the topics of gender equality and discrimination, with the goal of understanding and enhancing the conditions of women and men in the armed forces. PROJECTING STABILITY Projecting Stability with MD and ICI partners continued to be a priority in 2019. This included new initiatives and progress in ongoing activities in support of the DCB initiative with key partners such as Tunisia and Jordan. Highlights included the completion of the SPS tailor- made training package at the NATO-ICI Regional Centre in Kuwait; the launch of a MYP with Morocco and Jordan to study emerging security challenges in NATO’s southern neighborhood; the development of a C-IED project under the DCB package for Tunisia; and the kick-off of a mobile CBRN laboratory (DIMLAB) with Tunisia and Morocco. Building on a recently completed MYP, which established a Computer Emergency Response Team within the Jordanian Armed Forces (JAF), in 2019 SPS delivered tailored intermediary and advanced-level cyber security training for the JAF. In 2019, on the occasion of the 25th anniversary of the Mediterranean Dialogue partnership framework, SPS celebrated its active cooperation with MD partners, which has resulted in 528 activities since 1994. NATO also recognized its engagement with Istanbul Cooperation Initiative partners during the 15th anniversary of the partnership framework in 2019. The ICI anniversary coincided with the completion of a package of ATCs delivered at the NATO-ICI Regional Center in Kuwait. In light of these anniversaries, 2019 was a defining year for NATO’s partnerships in the South, marked by NAC visits to Ankara and Kuwait city to commemorate the occasions. SPS cooperation with partners in the East was also highlighted through a number of flagship activities. For instance, cyber defence remained at the core of SPS contributions to the DCB package for the Republic of Moldova, which addressed the Moldovan Armed Forces Incident Response Capability Centre’s need for adequate hardware and software. SPS also maintained its strong relationship with Ukraine, which remains the largest beneficiary of the Programme. In 2019, Ukraine was involved in 28 ongoing activities, a number of them being flagship projects, such as the DEXTER programme. On November 21, the SPS Programme held an Information Day in Kyiv to reflect upon the achievements of the partnership since 1991, and to invite Ukrainian scientists and experts to continue to contribute to scientific cooperation for peace and security. COOPERATION WITH PARTNERS ACROSS THE GLOBE Aligning with NATO’s 360 degree approach, the SPS Programme remained open to cooperation with all partners in 2019. A number of SPS activities involved NATO’s Partners across the Globe (PaG). 2019 saw the first ever practical activity with NATO’s newest partner nation, Colombia, under the key priority of counter- terrorism. Experts and scientists from the Republic of Korea and Pakistan were also involved in ongoing SPS flagship projects in counter-terrorism, respectively the “Microwave Imaging Curtain” project under the umbrella of the DEXTER programme, and the MYP “Public Safety Communication in Context Related to Terror Attacks”. SPS also furthered NATO’s cooperation with Japan through the Cyber Defence Workshop ‘Assessing Risk and Building Cooperation in Cyber Defence’, which took place in October in Tokyo. SPS ACTIVITIES IN SUPPORT OF THE FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM The SPS Programme has been a platform to engage partners in practical cooperation on counter-terrorism, supporting NATO’s wider efforts in this area. In line with the 2017 Action Plan on Enhancing NATO’s contributions to the International Community’s Fight against Terrorism, SPS continued to address a wide range of CT-related topics throughout 2019. CT capacity building activities were built on existing cooperation and frameworks, particularly the DCB initiative. SPS pursued the implementation of activities that were kicked-off as a result of the Special Call for Proposals on Counter-Terrorism, which closed in 2018. In July, a Consortium Agreement was signed by eight NATO and partner nations, thereby launching the DEXTER (Detection of Explosives and Firearms to Counter Terrorism) programme. This flagship activity aims to develop an integrated system to detect explosives and firearms in a mass-transit environment, without disrupting the flow of pedestrians. Another highlight of the CT agenda in 2019 included the first cooperative activity with the African Union with a focus on counter-terrorism capacity building. Going forward, there is potential for increased cooperation with a number of stakeholders contributing to the international fight against terrorism.

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Without mitigation, disease causes extinction

Dennis Pamlin & Stuart Armstrong 15. *Executive Project Manager Global Risks, Global Challenges Foundation. **James Martin Research Fellow, Future of Humanity Institute, Oxford Martin School, University of Oxford. February 2015, “Global Challenges: 12 Risks that threaten human civilization: The case for a new risk category,” Global Challenges Foundation, p.30-93. https://api.globalchallenges.org/static/wp-content/uploads/12-Risks-with-infinite-impact.pdf

A pandemic (from Greek πᾶν, pan, “all”, and δῆμος demos, “people”) is an epidemic of infectious disease that has spread through human populations across a large region; for instance several continents, or even worldwide. Here only worldwide events are included. A widespread endemic disease that is stable in terms of how many people become sick from it is not a pandemic. 260 84 Global Challenges – Twelve risks that threaten human civilisation – The case for a new category of risks 3.1 Current risks 3.1.4.1 Expected impact disaggregation 3.1.4.2 Probability Influenza subtypes266 Infectious diseases have been one of the greatest causes of mortality in history. Unlike many other global challenges pandemics have happened recently, as we can see where reasonably good data exist. Plotting historic epidemic fatalities on a log scale reveals that these tend to follow a power law with a small exponent: many plagues have been found to follow a power law with exponent 0.26.261 These kinds of power laws are heavy-tailed262 to a significant degree.263 In consequence most of the fatalities are accounted for by the top few events.264 If this law holds for future pandemics as well,265 then the majority of people who will die from epidemics will likely die from the single largest pandemic. Most epidemic fatalities follow a power law, with some extreme events – such as the Black Death and Spanish Flu – being even more deadly.267 There are other grounds for suspecting that such a highimpact epidemic will have a greater probability than usually assumed. All the features of an extremely devastating disease already exist in nature: essentially incurable (Ebola268), nearly always fatal (rabies269), extremely infectious (common cold270), and long incubation periods (HIV271). If a pathogen were to emerge that somehow combined these features (and influenza has demonstrated antigenic shift, the ability to combine features from different viruses272), its death toll would be extreme. Many relevant features of the world have changed considerably, making past comparisons problematic. The modern world has better sanitation and medical research, as well as national and supra-national institutions dedicated to combating diseases. Private insurers are also interested in modelling pandemic risks.273 Set against this is the fact that modern transport and dense human population allow infections to spread much more rapidly274, and there is the potential for urban slums to serve as breeding grounds for disease.275 Unlike events such as nuclear wars, pandemics would not damage the world’s infrastructure, and initial survivors would likely be resistant to the infection. And there would probably be survivors, if only in isolated locations. Hence the risk of a civilisation collapse would come from the ripple effect of the fatalities and the policy responses. These would include political and agricultural disruption as well as economic dislocation and damage to the world’s trade network (including the food trade). Extinction risk is only possible if the aftermath of the epidemic fragments and diminishes human society to the extent that recovery becomes impossible277 before humanity succumbs to other risks (such as climate change or further pandemics). Five important factors in estimating the probabilities and impacts of the challenge: 1. What the true probability distribution for pandemics is, especially at the tail. 2. The capacity of modern international health systems to deal with an extreme pandemic. 3. How fast medical research can proceed in an emergency. 4. How mobility of goods and people, as well as population density, will affect pandemic transmission. 5. Whether humans can develop novel and effective anti-pandemic solutions.

2022 UTNIF Affirmative
1AC › 1AC – Disease › Advantage

Existential disease is imminent – current frameworks fail, but international mitigation efforts are the only hope

Nicholas Studzinski 2020. MA, Visiting International Research Fellow at the Policy Institute of King’s College London. “Managing existential risks of pandemics: a systems approach.” 2-14-20.

The world is generally not prepared for a severe pandemic, whether natural or bio-engineered to evade known variants of vaccines and medical countermeasures. According to the Global Challenges Foundation, pandemics are among the key likely causes of the collapse of human civilisation, defined as a “drastic decrease in human population size and political, economic/social complexity, globally and for an extended time.” A recent estimate by the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation suggests that an outbreak of a magnitude similar to the Great Influenza of 1918, could result in 360 million deaths, despite modern vaccines, antivirals and antibiotics. According to a report by the RAND Corporation, “the spread of infectious disease can be worse than world wars.” The complete costs of a severe pandemic are difficult to estimate, given the potential array of social, political, agricultural, and economic impacts. A World Bank analysis put the minimum cost of the recent Ebola crisis in Liberia, Guinea and Sierra Leone at $2.8 billion in GDP. But a subsequent analysis of the total economic and social costs of the same outbreak was estimated at $53.19 billion. In a new paper, I explore the nature of pandemic risk as a threat to human and civilisational security and discuss the shortcomings of the currently accepted international strategy for pandemic preparedness. In its place, I propose a comprehensive pandemic risk management system (CPRMS), including a practical roadmap for its institutional implementation. The current system Academic and public assessments confirm a lack of global preparedness. In May 2018, the Johns Hopkins Centre for Health Security conducted a pandemic simulation called “Clade X”, in which a bioengineered microbe ended up killing 150 million people within 20 months and producing devastating impacts across the US. The exercise found that many vulnerabilities, including leadership challenges, were “hardwired into the American system.” Established in the wake of the early 21st century crises with avian influenza, SARS and Ebola, the current international pandemic strategy aims to improve preparedness by strengthening the capacity of national public health systems. This is pursued via appeals to compliance with the standards of the International Health Regulations, as part of an emergency framework designed to prevent outbreaks with infectious disease from becoming international health crises. While such efforts are appropriate and necessary, they are centred primarily on the health sector, with less focus on the global multisectoral, multidimensional risks and impacts of pandemics. The current strategy also remains primarily country-focused and reactive, and as such is not cost-effective, allocatively efficient, or sustainable for preventing and managing the large-scale impacts of severe pandemics. A comprehensive pandemic risk management system (CPRMS) A new cost-effective system is needed to manage the spectrum of multisectoral pandemic risk to both national and global security. Such a comprehensive pandemic risk management system (CPRMS) would constitute a genuine global public good. As a complex-systems-based paradigm, the strategy would help prevent and manage both the direct human security risks to health and ensure a critical continuity in the flow of essential services and infrastructure, sustaining interconnected global socio-economy, on which human security depends. Characteristics of an effective CPRMS Human security: The conceptual grounding of the approach includes but transcends the currently dominant, state-oriented framework of global health security, in favour of a multidimensional concept of human security. Full-spectrum risk management: The CPRMS assumes an integrated system of prevention, preparedness, response and mitigation, with universal, pre-emptive vaccine protection against prioritised microbes that threaten the human genome. It must also mitigate the drivers of cross-species contagion within human society and secure the functional continuity of essential services and infrastructure critical to global human security. Principal characteristics: As a strategically coherent system, the CPRMS must be risk-based and grounded in evidence derived through the emerging discipline of complexity science. The approach must be long-term and multisectoral, integrating prevention, preparedness and response in health, essential public services and enabling critical infrastructure. It needs to be financially and politically sustainable to meet 21st century challenges at national and global levels. Organisational framework: Institutionally, a CPRMS would also be structured as an organised operational system whose structure and functions embody the six critical elements of all institutional systems: harmonised leadership and governance; sustainable financing; information systems management; requisite human resources; essential commodities and related logistics; and a capacity for operational interventions and service delivery. Crucially, governance of the CPRMS must be envisioned in the broader, increasingly urgent context of managing a growing complex of existential risks.

2022 UTNIF Affirmative
1AC › 1AC – Disease › Advantage

NATO’s response to COVID-19 was helpful but insufficient – modernization now is key to preventing the next superbug

Giovanna De Maio 2020. Was a nonresident fellow in the Center on the United States and Europe at Brookings. She is currently a visiting fellow with George Washington University’s Institute for European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies. “NATO’S RESPONSE TO COVID-19: LESSONS FOR RESILIENCE AND READINESS.” Brookings. October 2020. . IZP)

COVID-19 took the world by surprise: for the first time in living memory, the entire globe was under attack. Although the pandemic was quickly understood to be a global challenge, international cooperation was initially put under severe stress, with uncoordinated travel bans, competition over acquisition of medical equipment, and authoritarian powers trying to take advantage of the crisis to push forward their geopolitical agendas. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was also impacted by COVID-19: exercises and operations were scaled down and some countries repatriated their militaries to redeploy them at home.1 There were initially few reasons to be optimistic about either the role of the political-military alliance in supporting the fight against COVID-19 or the future of the organization. Less than a year ago, French President Emmanuel Macron had referred to NATO as “brain-dead,” lamenting the lack of shared strategy between its members vis-à-vis the most pressing challenges facing the alliance.2 Furthermore, for the past four years, U.S. President Donald J. Trump has consistently undermined the importance of NATO, treating security as transactional and casting doubts on U.S. commitment to the Article 5 mutual defense clause at the heart of the North Atlantic Treaty.3 Despite this backdrop and amidst negative propaganda from China and Russia, NATO established a dedicated COVID-19 Task Force. Leveraging its experience in crisis management and disaster relief along with its massive logistical apparatus, the alliance was able to offer a decisive response through transporting medical aid and equipment across the globe, fighting against disinformation, and ultimately preventing the public health crisis from leading to a traditional security crisis. The goal of this essay is to provide a critical assessment of NATO’s preparedness and response to COVID-19. By exploring the mechanisms in place, the support offered, and the measures taken by NATO to avert a security crisis, it provides reflections on how lessons learned from this pandemic could help to manage and prevent similar future crises. In conclusion, this report argues that the alliance has proved capable of overcoming political tensions and has given an important sign of resilience and solidarity at a crucial moment for its member states. However, more could have been done with better preparedness in managing health risks and most importantly with better political coordination between member states. Despite the disruptive effect COVID-19 had on global economy and international relations, the virus’s impact on the future of the alliance will be marginal. NATO’s survival and success in responding to global challenges will ultimately be contingent on a relaunch of trans-Atlantic relations.

2022 UTNIF Kritik
AFF – Cap K › Alt › Transition Wars – Alt

Alt fails---transition wars and domestic pressure means the alt abandons fidelity to the environment.

Smith '19 [Noah; 4/5/19; Bloomberg Opinion columnist, former assistant professor of finance at Stony Brook University; "Dumping Capitalism Won’t Save the Planet," https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2019-04-05/capitalism-is-more-likely-to-limit-climate-change-than-socialism]

It has become fashionable on social media and in certain publications to argue that capitalism is killing the planet. Even renowned investor Jeremy Grantham, hardly a radical, made that assertion last year. The basic idea is that the profit motive drives the private sector to spew carbon into the air with reckless abandon. Though many economists and some climate activists believe that the problem is best addressed by modifying market incentives with a carbon tax, many activists believe that the problem can’t be addressed without rebuilding the economy along centrally planned lines.

The climate threat is certainly dire, and carbon taxes are unlikely to be enough to solve the problem. But eco-socialism is probably not going to be an effective method of addressing that threat. Dismantling an entire economic system is never easy, and probably would touch off armed conflict and major asdasd upheaval. In the scramble to win those battles, even the socialists would almost certainly abandon their limitation on fossil-fuel use — either to support military efforts, or to keep the population from turning against them. The precedent here is the Soviet Union, whose multidecade effort to reshape its economy by force amid confrontation with the West led to profound environmental degradation. The world's climate does not have several decades to spare.

2022 UTNIF Kritik
AFF – Cap K › Alt › Environment/Sustainability – Alt

You can’t just wish away the current system.

Andrew SAYER 95, Reader in Social Theory and Political Economy at Lancaster University [Radical Political Economy: A Critique, 1995, p. 33-34]

Any criticism presupposes the possibility of a better way of life; to expose something as illusory or contradictory is to imply the possibility and desirability of a life without those illusions and contradictions. This much has been established by critical theorists such as Habermas and Apel. Yet the notion that critique implies a quest for the good is a highly abstract one. Up to a point, particular critiques do imply something a little more specific than the standpoint of a better life. The critique of capitalism's anarchic and uneven development implies a critical standpoint or contrast space of an imagined society with a rationally ordered and even process of development. The critique of class points to the desirability of a classless society. Naturally, society would be better if its illusions, conflicts and contradictions were reduced, but we naturally want to know how this could be achieved. The desirability of a life without contradictions or illusions does not make it feasible.

Critical social science does not merely identify illusions, irrationality or contradictions but attempts to provide explanations of their sources, locating the 'unwanted determinations' of behaviour, as Bhaskar (1989) puts it. It would be strange, to say the least, if an analysis of the causes of problems such as hunger and exploitation were unable to indicate anything about alternatives which would eliminate them. If a critical theory cannot begin to indicate how to eliminate problems we must inevitably be suspicious of its claims to have identified their causes. If the alternative implied by a critical standpoint is not feasible, then any critique made from that standpoint is thereby seriously weakened. Not to put too fine a point on it, the critique of, say, capitalism's anarchic and uneven development would lose much of its force if all [END PAGE 33] advanced economies were necessarily anarchic and uneven in their development, though one could still criticize advanced economies - not just capitalist ones - from the very different standpoint of a 'deep ecology', calling for a return to small-scale, more primitive economies (Dobson, 1990).

2022 UTNIF Kritik
AFF – Cap K › Alt › Environment/Sustainability – Alt

No transition---degrowth assumes magic!

Branko Milanovic 2/3/21. Visiting Presidential Professor at the Graduate Center City University of New York and Senior Scholar at the Stone Center for Socio-economic Inequality. "Degrowth: Solving the Impasse by Magical Thinking". No Publication. 2-23-2021. https://www.globalpolicyjournal.com/blog/23/02/2021/degrowth-solving-impasse-magical-thinking

The difficulty of discussion with degrowers comes from the fact that they and the rest of us live in two different ideological worlds. Degrowers live in a world of magic, where merely by listing the names of desirable ends they are supposed to somehow happen. In that world, one does not need to bother with numbers or facts, trade-offs, first or second bests; one merely needs to conjure up what he/she desires and it will be there.

Now degrowers are not irrational people. The reason why they are pushed in this magical corner is because when they try to “do the numbers” they are led to an impasse. They do not want to allow for significant increase in world GDP because it will, even if decoupling (of which they are skeptical) happens, drive energy emissions too high. If one wants to keep world GDP more or less as now one must (A) “freeze” today’s global income distributions so that some 10-15% of the world population continue to live below the absolute poverty line, and one-half of the world population below $PPP 7 dollars per day (which is, by the way, significantly below Western poverty lines). This is however unacceptable to the poor people, to the poor countries, and even to degrowers themselves.

2022 UTNIF Kritik
AFF – Cap K › Alt › Environment/Sustainability – Alt

Even if growth is imperfect, the transition away fails.

Hubert Buch-Hansen 18. Associate Professor, Department of Business and Politics, Copenhagen Business School. “The Prerequisites for a Degrowth Paradigm Shift: Insights from Critical Political Economy.” Ecological Economics 146: 157-63. Emory Libraries.

Still, the degrowth project is nowhere near enjoying the degree and type of support it needs if its policies are to be implemented through democratic processes. The number of political parties, labour unions, business associations and international organisations that have so far embraced degrowth is modest to say the least. Economic and political elites, including social democratic parties and most of the trade union movement, are united in the belief that economic growth is necessary and desirable. This consensus finds support in the prevailing type of economic theory and underpins the main contenders in the neoliberal project, such as centre-left and nationalist projects. In spite of the world's multidimensional crisis, a pro-growth discourse in other words continues to be hegemonic: it is widely considered a matter of common sense that continued economic growth is required.

It is also noteworthy that economic and political elites, to a large extent, continue to support the neoliberal project, even in the face of its evident shortcomings. Indeed, the 2008 financial crisis did not result in the weakening of transnational financial capital that could have paved the way for a paradigm shift. Instead of coming to an end, neoliberal capitalism has arguably entered a more authoritarian phase (Bruff, 2014). The main reason the power of the pre-crisis coalition remains intact is that governments stepped in and saved the dominant fraction by means of massive bailouts. It is a foregone conclusion that this fraction and the wider coalition behind the neoliberal paradigm (transnational industrial capital, the middle classes and segments of organized labour) will consider the degrowth paradigm unattractive and that such social forces will vehemently oppose the implementation of degrowth policies (see also Rees, 2014: 97).

2022 UTNIF Kritik
AFF – Cap K › Link Defense/Turns › AT: Artificial Intelligence

AI regulation is good! Positive benefits solve extinction.

Tzimas ’21 [Themistoklis; 2021; Faculty of Law at the Aristotle University of Thessaloniki; Legal and Ethical Challenges of Artificial Intelligence from an International Law Perspective, “Chapter 2: The Expectations and Risks from AI,” p. 9-32]

Therefore, it is only natural to be at least skeptical towards a future with entities possessing equal or superior intelligence and levels of autonomy; the prospect even of existential risk looms as possible.7

AI that will have reached or surpassed our level of intelligence make us wonder why would highly autonomous and intelligent AI want to give up control back to its original creators?8 Why remain contained in pre-defined goals set for it by us, humans?

2022 UTNIF Kritik
AFF – Cap K › Link Defense/Turns › AT: Biotechnology

Biomedical innovation solves all sustainability warrants---that’s a defense of our methodology and a disad to theirs.

Michael Chui 20. Partner at the McKinsey Global Institute (MGI), McKinsey's business and economics research arm. James Irvine Foundation and the Asia Society of Northern California, and a member of the Council on Foreign Relations. “The Bio Revolution Innovations transforming economies, societies, and our lives.” .

New biological capabilities have the potential to bring sweeping change to economies and societies. The effects will be felt across value chains, from how R&D is conducted to the physical inputs in manufacturing to the way medicines and consumer products are delivered and consumed. These capabilities include the following: — Biological means could be used to produce a large share of the global economy’s physical materials, potentially with improved performance and sustainability. Significant potential exists to improve the characteristics of materials, reduce the emissions profile of manufacturing and processing, and shorten value chains. Fermentation, for centuries used to make bread and brew beer, is now being used to create fabrics such as artificial spider silk. Biology is increasingly being used to create novel materials that can raise quality, introduce entirely new capabilities, be biodegradable, and be produced in a way that generates significantly less carbon emissions. Mushroom roots rather than animal hide can be used to make leather.11 Plastics can be made with yeast instead of petrochemicals. — Increased control and precision in methodology is occurring across the value chain, from delivery to development and consumption with more personalization. Advances in biological sciences have made R&D and delivery processes more precise and predictable; the character of R&D is shifting from discovery by accident to rational design. Increasing knowledge of human genomes and the links between certain genes and diseases is enabling the spread of personalized or precision medicine, which can be more effective than the one-size-fits-all therapies of the past.12 Precision also applies to agriculture, where insights from a plant or soil’s microbiome increasingly can be used to optimize yield as well as to offer consumers with, for instance, personalized nutrition plans based on genetic tests.13 — The capability to engineer and reprogram human and nonhuman organisms is increasing. Gene therapies could offer complete cures of some diseases for the first time. The same technical advances that are driving capabilities that improve human health can be used to introduce valuable new traits that, for instance, improve the output or yield of nonhuman organisms like microbes, plants, and animals. Crops can be genetically engineered to produce higher yields and be more heat- or drought-resistant, for instance. By permanently genetically altering the vectors spreading disease (such as mosquitoes), gene drives could be used to prevent vector-borne diseases, including malaria, dengue fever, schistosomiasis, and Lyme disease, although they also come with ecological risks.14 — New methodologies using automation, machine learning, and proliferating biological data are enhancing discovery, throughput, and productivity in R&D. Biology and computing together are accelerating R&D, thereby addressing a productivity challenge. McKinsey analysis in 2017 found that the ratio of revenue to R&D spending in the biopharmaceutical industry hit a low point in productivity between 2008 and 2011.15 An explosion of biological data due to cheaper sequencing can be used by biotech companies and research institutes that increasingly are using robotic automation and sensors in labs that could increase throughput up to ten times.16 Further, advanced analytics, more powerful computational techniques, and AI can be leveraged to provide better insights during the R&D process. — Potential is growing for interfaces between biological systems and computers. A new generation of biomachine interfaces relies on close interaction between humans and computers. Such interfaces include neuroprosthetics that restore lost sensory functions (bionic vision) or enable signals from the brain to control physical movement of prosthetic or paralyzed limbs. Biocomputers that employ biology to mimic silicon, including the use of DNA to store data, are being researched. DNA is about one million times denser than hard-disk storage; technically, one kilogram of DNA could store the entirety of the world’s data (as of 2016).17 While these are early days, the scope and scale of these emerging capabilities could have a broad impact on economies and societies, touching multiple domains both directly and indirectly. These applications may change everything from the food we consume to textiles to the types of health treatments we receive and how we build our physical world. The potential value is vast. As noted, as much as 60 percent of the physical inputs to the global economy could be produced biologically, and even modest progress toward that 60 percent number could be transformative. Beyond the physical world, innovations could transform prevention, diagnostics, and treatment of disease. At least 45 percent of the global disease burden could be addressed with capabilities that are scientifically conceivable today, according to our analysis. Bio innovations, such as high-throughput screening, CRISPR, and machine learning for analyzing large and complex biological data, have also begun to shape R&D. We estimate that roughly 30 percent of private-sector R&D in major economies is in industries where biological data, biological inputs, or biological means of production could be used.18