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2022 MGC Disadvantage

Stashwick 2020

[Steven, independent writer and researcher based in New York City focused on East Asian security and maritime issues, "Chinese Military Told to Prevent Escalation in Interactions With US," The Diplomat, https://thediplomat.com/2020/08/chinese-military-told-to-prevent-escalation-in-interactions-with-us/]

China’s military has reportedly been instructed to deescalate incidents with the U.S. military to prevent potential undesired clashes as tensions rise between the two countries in the Western Pacific. The South China Morning Post Chinese sources claiming that pilots and ship captains have been told “not to fire the first shot” in potential incidents with U.S. ships or planes. The reported order follows several months of increased U.S. naval and air operations in and around the South China Sea and years of dangerous and provocative responses by Chinese ships and planes. The United States conducted prolonged “” in the South China Sea and Western Pacific this summer and for a period three carriers were operating in the region simultaneously following increased Chinese military activity as the world reeled from the coronavirus pandemic in the spring. In June the United States appeared to significantly increase the number of surveillance flights according to private flight tracking services and Chinese think tanks. These apparently private efforts by the Chinese military to prevent unintended escalation with United States contrast with China’s bombastic public narrative about the U.S. Navy’s presence in the region.

2022 MGC Disadvantage

Brands 2020

[Hal, Bloomberg Opinion columnist, the Henry Kissinger Distinguished Professor at Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies, and a scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, “If America and China Go to War, It Won’t Be an Accident,” Bloomberg, https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2020-08-07/war-between-china-and-america-won-t-happen-by-accident]

This isn’t the same thing as saying that a Chinese-American war won't happen. Conflict tends to occur when one party decides that war, or actions risking war, is preferable to living with the status quo or backing down in a crisis. That could happen all too easily. If China concludes that Taiwan is distancing itself too far from the mainland politically, as the balance of power shifts in Beijing's favor militarily, then it might decide that war is better than letting the dream of reunification slip away. If Chinese leaders worry that their domestic legitimacy is slipping, they might behave more belligerently in a crisis, for fear that war is less dangerous than humiliation. Beijing might even gamble that the U.S. would stay out of a short, sharp war with Japan over the Senkaku Islands or the Philippines over Scarborough Shoal, and that gamble might not pay off. But in any of these cases, Beijing would be making a deliberate choice to seek key objectives through the use of coercion or force, with the knowledge that a larger conflict is a real possibility. If a U.S.-China war results from such a choice, it could hardly be called an accident. Why does this matter? Because it bears on the best way of avoiding war in the Pacific. Establishing memorandums of understanding on how military forces operating in close proximity should conduct themselves, creating mechanisms for communication in a crisis, and other steps to encourage de-escalation is helpful. What is critical, however, is maintaining the military balance of power, and the perception of U.S. commitment, that makes it less likely that Chinese leaders could imagine a war in the region going their way. That is a huge and urgent task. It involves not just spending money but devising operational concepts and new capabilities, such as autonomous systems and artificial intelligence, that make it prohibitively difficult for China to project power. It requires strengthening U.S. alliances that have atrophied or been damaged during the administration of President Donald Trump. That agenda may seem daunting, given how badly the situation in the Western Pacific has eroded. Yet Americans shouldn't fool themselves into thinking that just managing crises and mitigating misperception — as important as those objectives are — offer a cheaper way to preserve the peace.

2022 MGC Disadvantage

Brands 2020

[Hal, Henry A. Kissinger Distinguished Professor of Global Affairs at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, “Don’t Let Great Powers Carve Up the World”, Foreign Policy, 4/20/20, ]

What a difference two decades make. In the early years of this century, the world appeared to be moving toward a single, seamless order under U.S. leadership. Today the world is fragmenting, and authoritarian challengers, led by China and Russia, are chipping away at American influence in East Asia, eastern Europe, and the Middle East. In its 2002 National Security Strategy, the George W. Bush administration envisioned the end of great-power rivalries. In 2020, the question is how great powers can navigate their rivalries without stumbling into war. Writing in Foreign Affairs (“The New Spheres of Influence,” March/April 2020), Graham Allison offers a road map for this new environment: the United States should accept the return of “spheres of influence” and effectively let China and Russia dominate swaths of their respective geopolitical neighborhoods. Doing so, Allison contends, is actually in keeping with the United States’ best diplomatic traditions, considering that Washington tolerated a Soviet sphere of influence in eastern Europe during the Cold War. Reviving that tradition is necessary, simply because the United States no longer has the military and economic dominance to deny China and Russia their geopolitical due. And it is desirable, because mutually accepted spheres of influence can promote stability and peace in a more rivalrous world. Allison’s argument is alluring but wrong. In truth, the United States has resisted the creation of rival spheres of influence for most of its history, even as it has worked assiduously to build its own. Ceding ground to China and Russia today would be not a recipe for stability but a blueprint for coercion and conflict, and it would weaken the United States’ geopolitical hand vis-à-vis its rivals. Nor is a return to spheres of influence foreordained—Washington still has the power to prevent Beijing and Moscow from dominating their regions, so long as it rejects Allison’s advice to cut loose its vulnerable frontline allies. A tougher, more competitive world is unavoidable. A far more dangerous world, divided into competing superpower fiefdoms, is not. AN AMERICAN TRADITION Spheres of influence have been common throughout history, but Americans have never been quite comfortable with them. In fact, much of U.S. foreign policy dating back to independence has consisted of efforts to prevent rival powers from establishing such domains. In the nineteenth century, U.S. leaders rejected the idea that any European power should have a sphere of influence in North America or the Western Hemisphere at large. They maneuvered—often quite ruthlessly—to evict European powers from these areas. At the turn of the twentieth century, the United States took this regional policy global. The so-called Open Door policy aimed to dissuade foreign powers from carving up China, and later all of East Asia, into exclusive spheres. Washington joined World War I in part to prevent Germany from becoming the dominant European power. A generation later, the United States fought to deny Japan a sphere of influence in the Pacific and prevent Hitler from establishing primacy over the entire Old World. During and after World War II, Washington also engaged in quieter diplomatic and economic efforts to accelerate the dissolution of the British Empire. Even during the Cold War, Americans never fully accepted Soviet control over eastern Europe. The Truman and Eisenhower administrations sought to roll back the Iron Curtain through ideological warfare and covert action; later administrations expanded trade and diplomatic ties with Warsaw Pact states as a subtler way of undermining Kremlin control. The Reagan administration overtly and covertly supported political movements that were challenging the Kremlin’s authority from within. And when Washington had a chance to peacefully destroy the Soviet sphere of influence after the fall of the Berlin Wall, it did, supporting German unification and the expansion of NATO. Opposition to spheres of influence, in other words, is a part of U.S. diplomatic DNA. The reason for this, Charles Edel and I argued in 2018, is that spheres of influence clash with fundamental tenets of U.S. foreign policy. Among them is the United States’ approach to security, which holds that safeguarding the country’s vital interests and physical well-being requires preventing rival powers from establishing a foothold in the Western Hemisphere or dominating strategically important regions overseas. Likewise, the United States’ emphasis on promoting liberty and free trade translates to a concern that spheres of influence—particularly those dominated by authoritarian powers—would impede the spread of U.S. values and allow hostile powers to block American trade and investment. Finally, spheres of influence do not mesh well with American exceptionalism—the notion that the United States should transcend the old, corrupt ways of balance-of-power diplomacy and establish a more humane, democratic system of international relations. Of course, that intellectual tradition did not stop the United States from building its own sphere of influence in Latin America from the early nineteenth century onward, nor did it prevent it from drawing large chunks of Europe, East Asia, and the Middle East into a global sphere of influence after World War II. Yet the same tradition has led the United States to run its sphere of influence far more progressively than past great powers, which is why far more countries have sought to join that sphere than to leave it. And since hypocrisy is another venerable tradition in global affairs, it is not surprising that Americans would establish their own, relatively enlightened sphere of influence while denying the legitimacy of everyone else’s. That endeavor reached its zenith in the post–Cold War era, when the collapse of the Soviet bloc made it possible to envision a world in which Washington’s sphere of influence—also known as the liberal international order—was the only game in town. The United States maintained a world-beating military that could intervene around the globe; preserved and expanded a global alliance structure as a check on aggression; and sought to integrate potential challengers, namely Beijing and Moscow, into a U.S.-led system. It was a remarkably ambitious project, as Allison rightly notes, but it was the culmination of, rather than a departure from, a diplomatic tradition reaching back two centuries. GIVE THEM AN INCH… The post–Cold War moment is over, and the prospect of a divided world has returned. Russia is projecting power in the Middle East and staking a claim to dominance in its “near abroad.” China is seeking primacy in the western Pacific and Southeast Asia and using its diplomatic and economic influence to draw countries around the world more tightly into its orbit. Both have developed the tools needed to coerce their neighbors and keep U.S. forces at bay. Allison is one of several analysts who have recently advanced the argument that the United States should make a virtue of necessity—that it should accept Russian and Chinese spheres of influence, encompassing some portion of eastern Europe and the western Pacific, as the price of stability and peace. The logic is twofold: first, to create a cleaner separation between contending parties by clearly marking where one’s influence ends and the other’s begins; and second, to reduce the chances of conflict by giving rising or resurgent powers a safe zone along their borders. In theory, this seems like a reasonable way of preventing competition from turning into outright conflict, especially given that countries such as Taiwan and the Baltic states lie thousands of miles from the United States but on the doorsteps of its rivals. Yet in reality, a spheres-of-influence world would bring more peril than safety. Russia’s and China’s spheres of influence would inevitably be domains of coercion and authoritarianism. Both countries are run by illiberal, autocratic regimes; their leaders see democratic values as profoundly threatening to their political survival. If Moscow and Beijing dominated their respective neighborhoods, they would naturally seek to undermine democratic governments that resist their control—as China is already doing in Taiwan and as Russia is doing in Ukraine—or that challenge, through their very existence, the legitimacy of authoritarian rule. The practical consequence of acceding to authoritarian spheres of influence would be to intensify the crisis of democracy that afflicts the world today. The United States would suffer economically, too. China, in particular, is a mercantilist power already working to turn Asian economies toward Beijing and could one day put the United States at a severe disadvantage on the world’s most economically dynamic continent. Washington should not concede a Chinese sphere of influence unless it is also willing to compromise the “Open Door” principles that have animated its statecraft for over a century. Such costs might be acceptable in exchange for peace and security. But spheres of influence during the Cold War did not prevent the Soviets from repeatedly testing American redlines in Berlin, causing high-stakes crises in which nuclear war was a real possibility. Nor did those spheres prevent the two sides from competing sharply, and sometimes violently, throughout the “Third World.” Throughout history, spheres-of-influence settlements, from the Thirty Years’ Peace between Athens and Sparta to the Peace of Amiens between the United Kingdom and Napoleonic France have often ended, sooner or later, in war. The idea that spheres of influence are a formula for peace rests on assumptions that often go unexamined: that revisionist powers are driven primarily by insecurity, that their grievances are limited and can be easily satisfied, that the truly vital interests of competing powers do not conflict, and that creative statecraft can therefore fashion an enduring, mutually acceptable equilibrium. The trouble is that these premises don’t always hold. Ideology and the quest for greatness—not simply insecurity—often drive great powers. Rising states are continually tempted to renegotiate previous bargains once they have the power to do so. Offering concessions to a revisionist state may simply convince it that the existing order is fragile and can be tested further. Conceding a sphere of influence to a great-power challenger might not produce stability but simply give that challenger a better position from which to realize its ambitions. Consider the situation in the western Pacific. The most minimal Chinese sphere of influence would surely include Taiwan. Yet if Taiwan became a platform for Chinese military capabilities, the defense of other U.S. allies in the region, such as Japan and the Philippines, would become vastly more difficult. Nor would such a concession likely satisfy Chinese ambitions. A growing body of literature by scholars such as Toshi Yoshihara, James Holmes, Liza Tobin, and Elizabeth Economy suggests that China desires at the very least to push the United States beyond the chain of islands running from Japan to Taiwan to the Philippines. Even a limited Chinese sphere in the western Pacific would serve as a springboard to this larger objective. Meanwhile, the United States will have sacrificed a number of critical advantages by pulling out. A free Taiwan offers proof that Chinese culture and democracy are not incompatible; subjugating Taiwan would also allow Beijing to remove this ideological threat. Worse still, the United States would lose the edge that comes from being the only great power without significant security hazards near its borders. It was only after the United States achieved dominance in the Western Hemisphere that it could project power globally. Russia and China, by contrast, still have to deal with U.S. allies, partners, and military presences in their own backyards—a circumstance that diverts resources they might otherwise use to pursue more distant ambitions and compete with the United States at a truly global scale. MEASURES OF POWER Fortunately, new spheres of influence are avoidable. Russia is a formidable player because of its willingness to take risks and pursue asymmetric strategies; but Moscow will not rebuild a meaningful sphere of influence so long as the United States opposes that ambition. In Europe, Russia is still dramatically outmatched. Admittedly, on NATO’s eastern flank, geography and the local balance of power favor Moscow; but even there, the alliance has been strengthening its capabilities for several years. Studies by the RAND Corporation show that with the right troop deployments, NATO could establish a credible—and affordable—deterrent to Russian aggression without posing any offensive threat. Russia, meanwhile, has struggled even to pull Ukraine back into its orbit: although Russian-backed separatists are waging a bloody war in the eastern part of the country, and Moscow has annexed Crimea, western Ukraine has gravitated toward Europe and the United States since 2014. And although Russia can wield some influence in the Middle East, it can emerge as the region’s primary outside power only if the United States abandons its role there. The extent of China’s power makes the situation in the western Pacific more difficult. Yet Beijing will have trouble dominating the region in the same way that the United States came to dominate the Caribbean. China’s neighbors are not pushovers. Many have the diplomatic and military support of the United States, and some, such as Japan, are major powers in their own right. What is more, China must project military power across large bodies of water if it is to establish authority in the region, and to do so is inherently difficult. It will be all the more difficult if U.S. regional allies invest in the capabilities needed to inflict high costs on any assault and if Washington refines its capabilities and concepts for countering Chinese aggression. The regional military balance will not ever revert to what it was in 1996, when Washington could face down Beijing’s attempts to intimidate Taiwan by sailing two carrier strike groups into the waters off China’s coast; but with the right investments and strategies, the United States and its allies can lengthen the odds of Chinese regional dominance. Perhaps in recognition of this fact, China is also using information operations, economic blandishments, and other forms of political meddling to weaken the region’s resistance to its power. Yet some countries are already working to reduce their vulnerability to economic and political coercion. Australia has undertaken a major campaign to highlight malign Chinese influence; Japan is actively seeking to limit its dependence on supply chains that run through China. Washington may have done more by itself than China has done to undermine U.S. economic power in the region, through its withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade agreement and its tardiness in developing alternatives, together with its allies, to Chinese technology, investment, and lending. These policy errors are damaging, but they are still within the United States’ power to correct. DON'T GIVE UP YET The prospects for maintaining favorable regional balances of power are far better than the skeptics assume. What is essential, however, is that Washington not erode those balances by severing ties with vulnerable allies and partners on the frontlines. Allison suggests that doing so might be necessary to bring U.S. capabilities in line with commitments and reduce friction with rising powers. Yet the effect of abandoning the Baltic allies or breaking the ambiguous commitment to Taiwan would be to make it impossible for those countries to ward off Chinese or Russian influence and to demoralize other U.S. allies around them. Washington would be paving the way for just the authoritarian spheres of influence it should—and can—avoid. The United States has a distinguished record of breaking down authoritarian spheres of influence, first in its own hemisphere and then beyond. It should not now make the historic blunder of throwing that achievement away for an illusory promise of stability or as a premature concession to a darker future that need not come to pass.

2022 MGC Disadvantage

AP 5/26/2022

[“Blinken says China is greater long-term threat than Russia”, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/blinken-says-china-is-greater-long-term-threat-than-russia/]

While the U.S. sees Russia and Russian President Vladimir Putin's war in Ukraine as the most acute and immediate threat to international stability, Blinken said the administration believes China poses a greater danger. "Even as President Putin's war continues, we will remain focused on the most serious long-term challenge to the international order – and that is the one posed by the People's Republic of China," Blinken said. "China is the only country with both the intent to reshape the international order — and, increasingly, the economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to do it," he said. "Beijing's vision would move us away from the universal values that have sustained so much of the world's progress over the past 75 years." The secretary of state laid out principles for the administration to marshal its resources, friends and allies to push back on increasing Chinese assertiveness around the world. But he made it clear that the U.S. doesn't seek to change China's political system, just offer a tested alternative. "This is not about forcing countries to choose, it's about giving them a choice," he said. However, he also acknowledged that the U.S. has limited ability to directly influence China's intentions and ambitions and will instead focus on shaping the strategic environment around China. "We can't rely on Beijing to change its trajectory," Blinken said in the speech at George Washington University. "So we will shape the strategic environment around Beijing to advance our vision for an open and inclusive international system." And Blinken acknowledged that the fates of U.S. and China "are linked," and the two countries will need to work together on a number of global issues now and in the future, and "that's why this is one of the most complex and consequential relationships of any that we have in the world today." The speech followed President Joe Biden's visits to South Korea and Japan, concluded just this week, where China loomed large in discussions. During the trip, he made the surprising remark that the United States would act militarily to help Taiwan defend itself in the event of an invasion by China, which regards the island as a renegade province. The administration was quick to insist Mr. Biden was not changing American policy, and Blinken on Thursday restated that the U.S. has not changed its position. Washington, he said, still holds to its "One China" policy, which recognizes Beijing but allows for unofficial links with and arms sales to Taipei. Blinken argued that the global response to Putin's invasion of Ukraine is a template for confronting China's efforts to mold a new and unpredictable world order to replace the rules and institutions that have guided relations between states since the end of World War II. China, Blinken suggested, has benefited greatly from that international order but is now trying to subvert it under the leadership of President Xi Jinping and the Chinese Communist Party. "Rather than using its power to reinforce and revitalize the laws, agreements, principles, and institutions that enabled its success, so other countries can benefit from them, too, Beijing is undermining it," Blinken said. "Under President Xi, the ruling Chinese Communist Party has become more repressive at home and more aggressive abroad." Investment in domestic U.S. infrastructure and technology along with stepping up diplomatic outreach to potentially vulnerable countries are other elements of the policy are key to the U.S. approach, Blinken said. In the latest manifestation of China's push to expand its reach that has drawn concern from the U.S. and other democracies, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi on Thursday began an eight-nation tour of Pacific islands during which Beijing hopes to strike a sweeping agreement that covers everything from security to fisheries. Wang opened his tour in the Solomon Islands, which last month signed a security cooperation pact with China that some fear could lead to a Chinese military presence there. The agreement was finalized shortly after the Biden administration announced it would open a U.S. embassy in the Solomons as part of its efforts to engage in the greater Indo-Pacific region. The Biden administration has largely kept in place confrontational policies toward China adopted by its predecessor in response to Chinese actions in its western Xinjiang region, Hong Kong, Tibet and the South China Sea.

2022 MGC Disadvantage

Szayna et al 2004

[Thomas S. Szayna, Adam Grissom, Jefferson P. Marquis, Thomas-Durell Young, Brian Rosen, Yuna Huh, RAND, “U.S. Army Security Cooperation Toward Improved Planning and Management, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA426628.pdf]

A review of the resourcing processes and trends in recent (since fiscal year 1995) Army expenditures on AIA shows that the Army's budgeting system is not well structured to account for basic AIA expenditures. We were able to arrive at an aggregate level of the direct Army costs associated with AIA for the period 1995-2001 (and make estimates until 2005). Since 1995, the direct costs have fluctuated largely in the $400-$5 00 million range annually. The AIA resource management problem is compounded by the lack of both a definitive list of activities and a mechanism that links unofficial AIA categories with official Army and DoD resourcing categories. In addition, the Army is not properly accounting for many personnel costs related to security cooperation and, in some cases, is missing an opportunity to increase the amount of administrative costs charged directly to the customer. As a result of the disjointed nature of AIA programming and budgeting, HQDA is currently incapable of capturing the many hidden costs associated with AIA. The situation precludes HQDA from making fully informed policy and resource decisions with regard to security cooperation programs. In an overall sense, the existing security cooperation planning process is exceedingly complex, involving a multitude of actors, problematic incentive systems, incomplete information exchange, and no reliable measures of effectiveness. Virtually all of the stakeholders understand only certain aspects of the process and/or have only partial visibility into the process. The drivers and demanders of AIA tend to have an incomplete understanding of the resourcing problems and the tradeoffs involved in making AIA choices. In turn, HQDA (the supplier of AIA resources) has an incomplete understanding of the benefits of AIA, and the Army's own resourcing tools are not easily amenable to an in-depth understanding of the resources it commits to AIA. Fundamentally, demand for AIA is predicated upon the amount of AIA supply provided by the Department of the Army, as opposed to the latter being the product of policy, strategy, and resource guidance. Indeed, incrementalism and continuity, rather than policy and strategy, have been the principal driving agents in the development of AIA resource priorities

2022 MGC Disadvantage

Quinn 2019

[Major Jason A., Judge Advocate, United States Army, “Other Security Forces Too:

Traditional Combatant Commander Activities Between U.S. Special Operations Forces and Foreign Non-Military Forces”, https://tjaglcs.army.mil/other-security-forces-too-traditional-combatant-commander-activities-between-u.s.-special-operations-forces-and-foreign-non-military-forces]

Under this definition, “security sector assistance” includes the relevant policies, programs, or activities of any executive agency. Complicating matters, though, Congress has considered a proposed definition for “security sector assistance” that, in contrast to the presidential policy definition, 130 encompasses DoS programs, but not DoD or other executive agency programs. 131 In addition, Congress has defined “security cooperation” as DoD specific, 132 but it has not defined “security assistance.” The DoD adheres to the presidential policy definition and further defines “security cooperation” as all its relationship building and foreign partner development activities, including “security assistance,” which the DoD defines as a subset of security cooperation that is funded and authorized by the DoS and administered by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency. 133 The DoS, on the other hand, uses the term “security assistance” in a manner that contradicts the DoD’s definition, employing it to describe any DoS or DoD assistance to foreign military or other security forces. 134

2022 MGC Disadvantage

Rue 2013

[W. Jonathan, senior policy analyst at a small consulting firm where he specializes in defense policy and budget issues. A former Marine captain, he served in Iraq as an intelligence advisor, “FORCE MODERNIZATION AND READINESS: A ZERO SUM GAME?”, https://warontherocks.com/2013/07/force-modernization-and-readiness-a-zero-sum-game/]

Having made the decision not to size the military for large-scale, protracted ground combat, policymakers are attempting to prioritize modernization and readiness at the expense of personnel. There are, however, worrying signs that readiness is being sacrificed, and that budgetary pressure will result in the very thing we wish to avoid: a hollow military, which will make it impossible to project real power. There is an inherent tension between three pillars of defense spending: personnel, modernization and readiness. Finite resources make it impossible to avoid tradeoffs among the three. Thus, planners must balance between the competing needs of each. By reducing Army and Marine ground forces by 108,000, policymakers have decided not to size the force for long-term, protracted ground combat operations. Not only do policymakers appear to have lost their appetite for such campaigns, planners have justified the decision with the not unreasonable assertion that raising manpower will be easier and faster than, say, designing and building an aircraft carrier, tank or fighter. Moreover, a decade of combat operations has left the force with used and abused equipment that badly needs refitting and replacing. But even as the Department reduces active duty end strength, personnel costs continue to rise. Personnel costs mostly appear in two different accounts within DoD’s budget: personnel and operations and maintenance (O&M). The personnel account is basically military compensation and consists of active duty pay and other cash benefits such as housing and food allowances, special pay and bonuses. O&M includes the many non-cash benefits like healthcare, childcare services, subsidized food and clothing (commissaries and exchanges), and fitness and recreation. Then, there are the deferred benefits for pensions and healthcare for retirees. For 2013, DoD requested $346 billion for operations and support (O&S), which is simply the sum of personnel and O&M. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates that despite end strength reductions of five percent, O&S costs will rise to $373 billion in 2017. Since 2001, personnel costs in the base budget have increased by nearly 90 percent or about 30 percent above inflation, while the number of military personnel has increased by only about three percent. Additionally, the O&M costs per service member increased from $55,000 to $105,000 between 1980 and 2001. The CBO projects it will be $161,000 in 2016. The main drivers of this cost growth are military compensation and health care. Military healthcare costs rose over 170 percent from 2001-2012, from $19 billion to $53 billion. The Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments estimates that if DoD spending continues to rise at roughly the rate of inflation, personnel costs will consume the entire DoD budget by 2039. These costs are crowding out the ability to invest in modernization and readiness of the force, hollowing the budget from within and weakening the defense dollar. The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) projects that even though the defense topline in 2021 will be $100 billion larger than previous drawdowns, it will only buy an active force that is 34 percent smaller than the force in 1978. CSIS also estimates that in order to maintain the traditional budget figure of 32 percent for modernization, an additional 455,000 active duty troops will need to be cut. The nature of sequestration in the early years prioritizes modernization over readiness. Major acquisition programs such as the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, littoral combat ship, Virginia-class submarine, the SSBN(X) and other programs take their ten percent lumps, but such cuts are minor hiccups for these multi-year programs. After all, what difference does one less F-35 mean in 2012? On the other hand, a ten percent cut to the services’ operations accounts has immediate and real impacts. The Air Force is cutting 44,000 flying hours and grounding C-17 squadrons and the Navy is delaying critical refueling and maintenance for the USS Abraham Lincoln aircraft carrier. Army brigades will fail to meet readiness standards for deployment. Modernization and readiness appear to be locked in a zero sum game. What good is maximum readiness if the force is using broken and obsolete equipment? Conversely, how will the force use the next generation of weapons to their maximum potential if there’s not enough money to train with them? In order to relieve some of the downward pressure on both, personnel must enter the equation; however, reducing end strength will only work up to a certain point. Policymakers must confront the rising costs of the All Volunteer Force if they’re to have a military capable of answering their frequent phone calls.

2022 MGC Disadvantage

Wolff 3/2/2022

[Josephine, associate professor of cybersecurity policy at The Fletcher School at Tufts University, “Why Russia Hasn't Launched Major Cyber Attacks Since the Invasion of Ukraine”, https://time.com/6153902/russia-major-cyber-attacks-invasion-ukraine/]

It’s likely that the combined efforts of Microsoft, the U.S., and many other countries and companies to ramp up cyber defenses both in and outside of Ukraine has undoubtedly helped curb the damage caused by these efforts. But if Russia really had on hand a stockpile of previously undetected vulnerabilities and sophisticated malware designed to exploit them, these lines of defense simply would not be enough to prevent some significant damage and disruption. Updating critical infrastructure networks and systems is slow, expensive, complicated work and it’s impossible that every potential target has been hardened to the point where it is no longer vulnerable to Russian cyberattacks—unless those cyberattacks were never all that impressive to begin with.

2022 MGC Disadvantage

Sanger 2016,

[David, White House and national security correspondent, “As Russian Hackers Probe, NATO Has No Clear Cyberwar Strategy”, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/17/world/europe/nato-russia-cyberwarfare.html]

It has built up a vast early warning network, placing tens of thousands of “implants” — sensors that can also be used to insert malware — into networks around the world. But NATO is only beginning to explore what it delicately calls “active defense,” and says it is not focused on offensive cyberweapons. The Russians have no such compunctions. But it is unclear what Russian hackers hope to achieve here in the Baltics, other than to make the point, as they did in 2007 when they brought Estonia to an electronic halt, that they can get into any system, anytime. “Whatever the Russians have in mind — mostly intimidation — it usually fails,” said Estonia’s president, Toomas Hendrik Ilves, who grew up in New Jersey before coming here to turn this small NATO country into a pioneer in introducing new web-based technology for governing a nation. The 2007 attacks backfired, he noted, because they drove Estonians far more solidly into the European and NATO camps. In Sweden and Finland, neutral nations in the Cold War, the politics are more complex. As the NATO exercise began in Finland last week, the Finnish foreign minister was in Moscow, meeting his Russian counterpart, Sergey V. Lavrov. The more Sweden and Finland turn to NATO, the more their networks, their news sites and their government ministries come under cyberattack. As Adm. John Richardson, the chief of United States naval operations, said at an event at the Council on Foreign Relations in May, “The fact is it’s a pretty hot war in the cyber domain going on right now.” A hot war, but a kind that suits Russia well: It is part of what military strategists call “gray zone” combat. For Mr. Putin, cyberespionage and cyberattacks keep NATO and its partners off balance. They are enormously difficult and expensive to defend against, and, at least for now, they have operated below the line that is likely to prompt a military or economic response. “It stays below the radar,” Martin Libicki of the RAND Corporation told a conference sponsored this month by the NATO cyber center here, officially known as the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense Center of Excellence. For the Russians, Mr. Libicki said, cyberespionage and weaponry are part of a larger strategy of information warfare and a blitz of propaganda that makes sorting out fact from fiction — say, the causes of the Malaysia Airlines crash in Ukraine — all the more difficult. But the attacks also remind the smaller nations here of their vulnerability, even if Russia’s troops stay on their side of the border. So far, NATO has found few effective means of deterring attacks. “The biggest problem in cyber remains deterrence,” said Mr. Ilves, the Estonian president, who has made the issue of avoiding cyber conflict one of the main themes of his time in office. “We have been talking about the need to deal with it within NATO for years now.”

2022 MGC Disadvantage

Nurkin and Konaev 5/25/2022

[Tate, Nonresident Senior Fellow, Forward Defense, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, and Margarita, Nonresident Senior Fellow, Forward Defense, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, “Eye to eye in AI: Developing artificial intelligence for national security and defense”, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/eye-to-eye-in-ai/]

AI is essential to this effort, and the DoD is exploring how best to safely integrate it into the JADC2 program.48 In December 2021, reports emerged that the JADC2 cross-functional team (CTF) would start up an “AI for C2” working group, which will examine how to leverage responsible AI to enhance and accelerate command and control, reinforcing the centrality of responsible AI to the project.49 In March 2022, the DoD released an unclassified version of its JADC2 Implementation Plan, a move that represented, in the words of General Mark Milley, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, “irreversible momentum toward implementing” JADC2.50 However, observers have highlighted several persistent challenges to implementing JADC2 along the urgent timelines required to maintain (or regain) advantage in perception, processing, and cognition, especially vis-à-vis China. Data security and cybersecurity, data-governance and sharing issues, interoperability with allies, and issues associated with integrating the service’s networks have all been cited as challenges with recognizing the ambitious promise of JADC2’s approach. Some have also highlighted that all- encompassing ambition as a challenge as well. The Hudson Institute’s Bryan Clark and Dan Patt argue that “the urgency of today’s threats and the opportunities emerging from new technologies demand that Pentagon leaders flip JADC2’s focus from what the US military services want to what warfighters need.”51 To be sure, grand ambition is not necessarily something to be avoided in AI development and integration programs. However, pathways to adoption will need to balance difficult-to-achieve, bureaucratically entrenched, time-consuming, and expensive objectives with developing systems that can deliver capability and advantage along the more immediate threat timelines facing US forces.

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Wertheim 3/3/2022

[Stephen, senior fellow in the American Statecraft Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, “Europe is showing that it could lead its own defense”, https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2022/03/03/europe-defense-nato-ukraine-war/]

Providing temporary reinforcements is the right decision today in the face of Russia’s bald aggression. But the United States should resist the inclination to revive its role as the military protector of Europe, especially since Europe is awakening to its responsibilities. Britain is sending troops to the Baltic states and Poland. France is pushing “strategic autonomy” for the European Union. And days after halting the Nord Stream 2 pipeline supplying natural gas from Russia, Germany reversed a long-standing ban on providing military assistance and sent weapons to Ukraine. Germany also vowed to spend more than 2 percent of its economy on defense, finally committing to meet NATO’s target. German Chancellor Olaf Scholz declared his country, and Europe, to have reached a “historic turning point.” Both Americans and Europeans would benefit if Scholz’s words prove true. In the coming years, European states should move to take the lead in their collective defense, and the United States should do everything possible to encourage them. To stake the defense of Europe on the United States, over the next decade and beyond, would be to answer Putin’s rash gamble with a slow-moving gamble of our own. It might seem as though the United States will remain able and willing to protect all of NATO’s 28 European countries far into the future. After all, America has orchestrated Europe’s defense for the past eight decades. Yet it did so under two markedly different conditions. During World War II and the Cold War, the United States sought to stop totalitarian powers from conquering the region. An Axis or Soviet takeover of Europe would have closed off the entire continent to liberal, American-style interaction and influence, and put the Western Hemisphere on the defensive. After the Cold War, however, as the Soviet threat collapsed, the United States recommitted to Europe not because the stakes were high but arguably because they were low. Threats were so negligible that it seemed U.S. leadership could keep things that way through modest exertion — and spread democracy to boot. Expanding NATO eastward, American officials convinced themselves that what had been a military alliance was more comparable to a political club, one that need not become an adversary of Russia. Russia’s assault on Ukraine ends that chapter and begins a new one. The prospect of further Russian aggression in Eastern Europe cannot be dismissed as negligible, as it was in the 1990s or 2000s. At the same time, Russia poses far less a threat to overrun Europe and threaten American security or prosperity than the Soviet Union did. After all, the Russian economy is roughly one-fifth the size of that of the European Union, and that was before the severe sanctions of the past week. Although Russia has built a formidable military, one that enables it to launch wars like that in Ukraine, NATO’s European members collectively outspend Russia on defense. During the Cold War, by contrast, the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact boasted land forces superior in number to those of NATO (including the U.S. share), and the gap between its economic output and that of Western Europe was several times smaller than Russia’s shortfall today. In the security environment now emerging, with Russia menacing Eastern Europe, the United States is set to face major costs and the ultimate risk: great-power war between nuclear peers. Yet the threat Russia poses remains one that Europeans could handle themselves, with America acting as a supporter rather than the leader. The United States remains a superpower. Why shouldn’t it be the main counterweight in Europe to Moscow? There are two reasons both the United States and Europe would be better off if it declined this role. One lies in Beijing, and the other in Washington. The United States has already identified China as its primary rival, embarking on “strategic competition” with the world’s number-two power. Taking on China and Russia at once would be unwise and likely impossible. True, the Pentagon has previously planned to fight two wars at once, but those wars were envisioned as “regional” conflicts against small states like Iran, Iraq or North Korea. In practice, the United States had difficulty prosecuting wars in Iraq and Afghanistan simultaneously. China and Russia represent challenges of a far greater magnitude, which explains why the Pentagon abandoned its two-war standard in 2018, even as its budget has grown. If the United States doubles down on European security while leading the charge in Asia, it may either fall short in both places or default on its commitments in Europe just when they come due.

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Galic et al 6/9/2022

[Mirna Galic, Senior Policy Analyst, China and Ease Asia, Brian Harding, Senior Expert, Southeast Asia, Tamanna Salikuddin, Director, Southeast Asia Programs, and Vikram J. Singh, Senior Advisor, Asia Center, “Amid Ukraine War, U.S. Signals the Indo-Pacific is a Vital Priority”, https://www.usip.org/publications/2022/06/amid-ukraine-war-us-signals-indo-pacific-vital-priority]

While the Ukraine war continues to dominate policymakers’ attention, the Biden administration has engaged in a series of diplomatic initiatives with allies and partners across the Indo-Pacific region over the course of the last two months. The message is clear: Washington sees the Indo-Pacific as the world’s principal geostrategic region, with a host of challenges to meet — like competition with China and climate change — and opportunities to seize, particularly related to technology and the economy. USIP’s Mirna Galic, Brian Harding, Tamanna Salikuddin and Vikram Singh analyze Washington’s Indo-Pacific diplomacy, U.S.-India relations amid differences over the Russia-Ukraine war, China’s engagement in the Pacific Islands region and the role of economics in the administration’s regional strategy. In the last two months alone, the Biden administration has held ministerial talks with India and a summit of ASEAN leaders in Washington, and President Biden went to South Korea and Japan and participated in a summit of "Quad" leaders, among other high-level meetings. What is the administration seeking to accomplish through these talks and meetings, and how is it balancing this focus on Asia with the ongoing conflict in eastern Europe? Galic: The president’s visit to the region and the recent regional diplomacy both there and in Washington are all in support of the administration’s desire to reorient U.S. foreign policy to the reality that the Indo-Pacific is the emerging center of gravity of the international system. Not only is it home to a great power competitor, China, which the administration sees as the “most serious, long-term” challenger to the international order, but it is also expected to be the driver of global economic and technological growth in the decades to come. The war in Ukraine has hampered the administration’s desire to focus full throttle on the Indo-Pacific region, but it has also reaffirmed the importance of the region beyond its borders. This was demonstrated not only by Chinese support for Russia, but also by the assistance of regional partners like Australia, Japan and South Korea, among others, in the imposition of punishing sanctions on Russia and the provision of support to Ukraine. It is precisely a focus on these and other partners in the region that forms the core of the Biden administration's Indo-Pacific Strategy and its efforts to “more firmly anchor the United States in the Indo-Pacific.” Perhaps more remarkably than that the United States remains focused on the Indo-Pacific even with the danger posed by Russia, is that Europe too is not far behind, despite bearing the brunt of the current conflict. Australia, Japan, New Zealand and South Korea have been invited to attend the NATO Summit in Madrid later this month, where the alliance will reveal its new Strategic Concept, which is expected to address China in addition to Russia.

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Solís 5/24/2022

[Mireya, Director - Center for East Asia Policy Studies Senior Fellow - Foreign Policy, Center for East Asia Policy Studies, “Will Biden’s Asia trip help the US meet its strategic objectives?”, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2022/05/24/will-bidens-asia-trip-help-the-u-s-meet-its-strategic-objectives/]

U.S. President Joe Biden’s inaugural trip to Asia provides an important milestone to assess the direction and effectiveness of American policy in the Indo-Pacific — a region identified by Republican and Democratic administrations alike as holding a key to American prosperity and security. The Asia tour came on the heels of the president hosting Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) leaders in Washington and comprised stops in Seoul and Tokyo for bilateral meetings and participation in the second Quad leaders’ meeting. This full-court diplomatic engagement was crucial, given the importance of the objectives at stake: buttressing the rules-based order across Eurasia; deepening strategic relations with and between the United States’ Asian allies; and launching the economic track of the administration’s Indo-Pacific strategy. Mission critical for the presidential visit was to reassure the region that the United States will remain committed to its Indo-Pacific tilt, even as it weathers the worst crisis Europe has suffered in seven decades in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. In visiting two Asian democratic allies — Japan and South Korea — that have proactively partaken in the economic sanctions campaign to deter and punish Russian aggression, the Biden administration has sent an eloquent message about the indivisibility of the rules-based order. In other words, unchecked military aggression and economic coercion weaken peace and stability everywhere, and the United States is uniquely placed to mobilize allies across Europe and Asia to meet the challenge. BILATERALS AND MINILATERALS Biden’s trip was timely as both South Korea and Japan are each expanding their strategic horizons in ways that complement U.S. interests in the region. South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol, only 11 days in office when he hosted Biden, has vowed to move from the narrower focus of the previous Moon administration on inter-Korean relations to embrace a broader regional and global role for South Korea in technology and supply chains, climate, and health security, and other fields. Yoon’s more skeptical view of China is behind his desire to step up cooperation with the Quad and to coordinate with the United States on economic security measures (investment screening and export controls, among others). Hence, the joint leaders’ announcement highlighted the promise of a comprehensive strategic alliance that leverages the U.S.-South Koreapartnership beyond the Korean Peninsula.

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Wong and Schmitt 5/24/2022

[Edward, diplomatic correspondent for The New York Times who reports on foreign policy from Washington, D.C, and Eric, senior correspondent covering national security for The New York Times, “U.S. Speeds Up Reshaping of Taiwan’s Defenses to Deter China”, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/05/24/us/politics/china-taiwan-military.html]

WASHINGTON — The Biden administration has accelerated its efforts to reshape Taiwan’s defense systems as it projects a more robust American military presence in the region to try to deter a potential attack by the Chinese military, current and former U.S. officials say. Russia’s war in Ukraine has made American and Taiwanese officials acutely aware that an autocrat can order an invasion of a neighboring territory at any moment. But it has also shown how a small military can hold out against a seemingly powerful foe. U.S. officials are taking lessons learned from arming Ukraine to work with Taiwan in molding a stronger force that could repel a seaborne invasion by China, which has one of the world’s largest militaries. The aim is to turn Taiwan into what some officials call a “porcupine”— a territory bristling with armaments and other forms of U.S.-led support that appears too painful to attack. Taiwan has long had missiles that can hit China. But the American-made weapons that it has recently bought — mobile rocket platforms, F-16 fighter jets and antiship projectiles — are better suited for repelling an invading force. Some military analysts say Taiwan might buy sea mines and armed drones later. And as it has in Ukraine, the U.S. government could also supply intelligence to enhance the lethality of the weapons, even if it refrains from sending troops. American officials have been quietly pressing their Taiwanese counterparts to buy weapons suitable for asymmetric warfare, a conflict in which a smaller military uses mobile systems to conduct lethal strikes on a much bigger force, U.S. and Taiwanese officials say. Washington increasingly uses the presence of its military and those of allies as deterrence. The Pentagon has begun divulging more details about the sailings of American warships through the Taiwan Strait — 30 since the start of 2020. And U.S. officials praise partner nations like Australia, Britain, Canada and France when their warships transit through the strait.

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Kapila 2019

[Dr Subhash Kapila is a graduate of the Royal British Army Staff College, with a Masters in Defence Science (Madras University) and a PhD in Strategic Studies (Allahabad University) Combines a rich experience of Army (Brigadier) and diplomatic assignments in major countries."United States’ Potent Existential Crisis: The China Threat – Analysis." ]

The ‘China Threat ‘emerging in 2018 in comprehensive and diverse manifestations poses an existential crisis challenging not only the continuance of United States as the global unipolar Superpower but also targeted with intended consequences of prompting the United States to retreat into isolation within its continental confines. The United States has long ignored the China Threat to the detriment of United States own national security but also to the security of US Allies and strategic partners. The acid test of a nations’ strategic greatness lies not only in checkmating a threat in existence to its national security but also being vigilant to a ‘Threat in the Making’, as I would put it. The United States is guilty of the latter in relation to China. China has reached this stage of posing a potent existential challenge to the United States mainly due to United States own acts of strategic omission and commission. United States misreading of China’s long range intentions has not only facilitated the emergence of a China Threat to United States but also United States permissive attitudes on China facilitated to create two ‘rogue nuclear weapons state’ of Pakistan and North Korea as its proxy cats-paws against US Allies and strategic partners. China is unlikely to succeed in achieving ‘strategic equivalence’ that it seeks with the United States in the foreseeable future nor are the Major Powers of the world, including Japan and India, likely to accede ‘American Exceptionalism’ to China despite its burgeoning military power. This for the simple reason that I have been stressing in my writings for two decades and that is China has no Natural Allies like the United States. For detailed analysis on the subject, kindly read my Book, “China-India Military Confrontation: 21st Century Perspectives” (2015) Chapter 13 ‘China’s Giant Leap for Superpower Status in 21st Century: Geopolitical Implications’. However, China will in the 21st Century with great persistence, and unmindful of the prevailing reality, that China is besieged today from both within and without, China will continue to challenge United States global predominance and specifically Indo Pacific predominance with greater potency. The United States has belatedly woken upto the reality that what they attempted to market globally for decades that China can be co-opted as a responsible stakeholder in global security and stability was a mirage. Long years of United States ‘China Hedging Strategy’ and ‘Risk Aversion Strategy’ made China only more recalcitrant and fed Chinese misperceptions that United States global power is on the decline. United States policy formulations of this decade of a ‘Strategic Pivot to Asia Pacific’ and the recent emphasis on Indo Pacific Security Blueprint are seemingly belated but welcome steps to checkmate China’s unrestrained flexing of its military muscle as evident in the South China Sea. Chinese President Xi Jinping’s call on Chinese Armed Forces to prepare for an all- out war are not defensive calls by a besieged nation but like Hitlerian Germany, these are offensive calls of a revisionist power. Annexation of Taiwan by use of military force seems to be China’s aim today. This has a larger aim of challenging United States resolve and determination to maintain its Superpower status. China has placed the United States on the horns of a strategic dilemma where the United States will be damned if it does not militarily intervene to defend Taiwan and if it does so it risks a full-fledged war with China. China is gambling on the United States shying away from the latter option. Right from the turnover of the 19th Century till today no major power, not even Nazi Germany, has dared to challenge the United States predominance, geopolitically and strategically, as China is now engaged in doing so. Even at the height of the Cold War 1945-91 when the United States and the Former Soviet Union were involved in a bitter ideological struggle one did not witness the unfolding of the type of China’s ‘Grand Strategy Blueprint’ decades in the making and operationalising, to initially unravel United States security architecture in Asia Pacific, and graduated now to a more vividly clear reality in 2019 that China is on the avowed path of emerging as the ‘sole challenger ‘of United States predominance and exceptionalism. That China could geopolitically and strategically engage in the execution of such a blueprint unchallenged arose fundamentally from United States flawed policy decisions spread over many US Administrations. Such flawed US policy decisions sprung from misconceived American readings of China’s long range strategic intentions and short-term American geopolitical expediency subjugating and distorting United States strategic vision of the ‘China Threat’ to United States national security. The United States ‘original sin’ in relation to the latent China Threat to US national security can be placed on shoulders of US President Truman who ignored General MacArthur’s dire warnings on China and petulantly dismissed General MacArthur from the command of UN Forces in Korea. If Japan today after decades since 1945 continues as the United States most enduring and steadfast Ally, it has a lot to do with General MacArthur’s visionary zeal. The second most serious sin in relation to flawed US policy decisions was inflicted by US President Richard Nixon in 1972 egged by his Sinophiles Secretary of States Henry Kissinger. To spite the Former USSR the United States in 1972 endowed an unwarranted international legitimacy on China despite its disruptive credentials and thereafter followed as to what could be termed as a China Appeasement policy. The third sin was committed at the turn of the Millennium when US President Bush in his messianic zeal to tame President Saddam’s Iraq left untended both Afghanistan and more significantly Asia Pacific security. China made full use of the decade ending 2010 for its exponential military power expansion and with emphasis on a well-calibrated buildup of Chinese naval power for ‘naval operations in distant seas’. China’s latest strategic-economic enterprises of One Belt One Road and Maritime Silk Route are nothing but an attempt to control maritime chokepoints along the global commons to United States disadvantage and as strategic pressure points against regional peer competitors.

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Colby 3/28/2022

[Elbridge A., principal at The Marathon Initiative. He is the author of The Strategy of Denial: American Defense in an Age of Great Power Conflict from Yale University Press, “More Spending Alone Won’t Fix the Pentagon’s Biggest Problem”, https://time.com/6161573/us-defense-budget-strategy/]

Fourth, we need to spend a higher fraction of our defense budget on dealing with China in Asia, limiting our ability to pursue dominance in other theaters. This is because we should spend more than merely a bare plausible minimum on China, particularly ensuring our forces are able to prevail in the Pentagon’s “pacing scenario”—Taiwan. The stakes of a war in the world’s most important region between the globe’s two superpowers are too great and the uncertainty of how such a great power war would unfold too profound. Accordingly, we should spend enough on dealing with China to be very confident we could successfully deny Beijing the ability to subordinate a U.S. ally or Taiwan. In practical terms, this means we should hedge by constructing both long-range strike capabilities less vulnerable to Chinese preemption and resilient forward-deployed forces, not only to build redundancy into our plans but also to impose dilemmas on Beijing’s planning and galvanize allied efforts. The upshot of this is that a greater portion of any defense spending increases should go to Asia than many realize, constraining our ability to pursue multi-theater dominance. Fifth, we also need to acknowledge that there are no easy routes to restoring global military dominance. The reality is that military investments in today’s environment are less multipurpose or fungible than some contend. Fundamentally, we are not preparing for, say, simultaneous wars against 1990s Iraq and North Korea, over whom our armed forces would dominate, swinging forces such as bombers, tankers, and carriers as needed between the conflicts to address whatever deficiencies might arise. Rather, we are dealing with great powers. In this context, our military investments are much more often zero-sum—they do trade off against each other. This is partially because of probable attrition. If we are to be prudent in planning for a war with China or Russia, we must assume that our forces would take significant losses, including in the key war-winning capabilities needed to prevail and where our scarcity is most acute. Vital systems like B-2 stealth bombers, attack submarines, satellites, and possibly even aircraft carriers would be lost and critical munitions like long-range anti-ship missiles and land-attack air-launched missiles expended in considerable numbers. Such losses would, if we did not have adequate stocks of replacements, make us highly vulnerable in a second—let alone third—theater, possibly for years given the timelines required for replenishing these forces. It is also because even those forces that do survive are more likely to be fixed in a given region or for a particular conflict, limiting their flexibility. This is at root because a war with a China or Russia would be a much different affair than, say, defeating the Iraqi military in 2003. Fighting a great power would almost certainly be much tougher and take a considerably longer time in its critical phases—much more a matter of a hard slog simply to prevail in the conventional military contest than a quick shock and awe campaign. In such a context, we would not want to have to remove critical forces from one unfinished fight to go to deal with another conflict. This is a very real dynamic: Germany decided to pull forces from the Western Front in summer 1914 to deal with Russia, and this may have made the difference between victory and stalemate—indeed, ultimately Germany’s defeat. Furthermore, forces like attack submarines and surface vessels may not be physically able to transition between theaters in the relevant timeframes. If critical fights happen in concurrent timeframes, as was the case in 1914 and again in the Second World War, key systems may not be able to move fast enough between theaters. And the transit of any forces might well be inhibited by the actions of our opponents, further limiting our ability to swing them between theaters. The upshot of this is that, in order to be able to fight two concurrent major power wars, we would need to buy much more than just one set of major war-winning capabilities. This means a much greater expense is required to deal with the potential for concurrent conflicts with both China and Russia, let alone other threats like Iran and North Korea.

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Menendez and Graham 6/17/2022

[U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Bob Menendez (D-N.J.) and Senator Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.), “MENENDEZ, GRAHAM INTRODUCE COMPREHENSIVE LEGISLATION TO OVERHAUL U.S.-TAIWAN POLICY”, https://www.foreign.senate.gov/press/chair/release/menendez-graham-introduce-comprehensive_legislation-to-overhaul-us-taiwan-policy]

WASHINGTON – U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Bob Menendez (D-N.J.) and Senator Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.) announced they have introduced the bipartisan Taiwan Policy Act of 2022. The new legislation, which comes in the wake of last week’s threats by Chinese Defense Minister Wei Fenghe’s that China will “not hesitate to start a war” and “smash to smithereens” Taiwan, represents the most comprehensive restructuring of U.S. policy towards Taiwan since the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979. The bipartisan proposal expands U.S. efforts to promote the security of Taiwan, ensures regional stability, and deters further People’s Republic of China (PRC) aggression against Taiwan. The legislation also imposes steep costs on the PRC for hostile action against Taiwan by setting up a broad economic sanctions regime. Specifically, the Taiwan Policy Act of 2022 creates a new initiative to bolster Taiwan’s defense capabilities, providing almost $4.5 billion in security assistance over the next four years. The bill also bolsters support for Taiwan’s democratic government; provides additional support for Taiwan’s participation in international organizations and in multilateral trade architecture; takes concrete steps to counter PRC’s aggressive coercion and influence campaigns; creates a Taiwan Fellowship Program; and designates Taiwan as a Major Non-NATO Ally. Under U.S. law, a Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA) status designation is a powerful symbol that provides our closest global partners with additional benefits in the areas of defense trade and security cooperation. “As Beijing continues to seek to coerce and isolate Taiwan there should be no doubt or ambiguity about the depth and strength of our determination to stand with the people of Taiwan and their democracy,” said Chairman Menendez. “The Taiwan Policy Act of 2022 represents a seminal statement of the United States’ absolute commitment to stand with Taiwan and all those who share our interests and our values in the Indo-Pacific in the face of Beijing’s military, economic, and diplomatic threats and bullying. The United States and our partners have a critical window of opportunity to reinvigorate our diplomatic strategy to assure cross-Strait stability and security and to work with Taipei to modernize their military; embed them in the region’s economic architecture; combat Beijing’s political influence and misinformation campaigns; and develop deeper ties between our two peoples. I thank Senator Graham for working with me on this landmark legislation to send a clear message to Beijing not to make the same mistakes with Taiwan that Vladimir Putin has made in Ukraine.” “I’m very pleased to be working with Senator Menendez to strengthen the U.S.-Taiwan relationship. Our bill is the largest expansion of the military and economic relationship between our two countries in decades,” said Senator Graham. “When it comes to Taiwan, our response should be that we are for democracy and against communist aggression. We live in dangerous times. China is sizing up America and our commitment to Taiwan. The danger will only grow worse if we show weakness in the face of Chinese threats and aggression toward Taiwan. I’m hopeful we will receive large bipartisan support for our legislation and that the Biden Administration will sign on in support.”

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Aff › No impact

AI won’t undermine nuclear stability

Sankaran 19

(Jaganath, assistant professor at the Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs at the University of Texas at Austin, “A DIFFERENT USE FOR ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE IN NUCLEAR WEAPONS COMMAND AND CONTROL”, War on the Rocks, 4/25, ) DB

Decision-makers who stand guard at the various levels of the nuclear weapons chain of command face two different forms of stress. The first form of stress is information overload, shortage of time, and chaos in the moment of a crisis. The second is more general, emerging from moral tradeoffs and the fear of causing loss of life on an immense scale. AI and big data analysis techniques have already been applied to address the first kind of stress. The current U.S. nuclear early warning system employs a “dual phenomenology” mechanism designed to ensure speed in detecting a threat and in streamlining information involved in the decision-making process. The early warning system employs advanced satellites and radars to confirm and track an enemy missile almost immediately after launch. In an actual nuclear attack, the various military and political personnel in the chain of command would be informed progressively as the threat is analyzed, until finally the president is notified. This structure substantially reduces information overload and chaos for decision-makers in a crisis. However, as Richard Garwin writes, the system also reduces the role of the decision-maker “simply to endorse the claim of the sensors and the communication systems that a massive raid is indeed in progress.” While the advanced technologies and data processing techniques used in the early warning system reduces the occurrence of false alerts, it does not completely eliminate the chances of one occurring. In order to address decision-makers’ fear of inadvertently starting a nuclear war, future applications of AI to nuclear command and control should aspire to create an algorithm that could argue in the face of overwhelming fear of an impending attack that a nuclear launch isn’t happening. Such an algorithm could verify the authenticity of an alert from other diverse perspectives, in addition to a purely technological analysis. Incorporating this element into the nuclear warning process could help to address the second form of stress, reassuring decision-makers that they are sanctioning a valid and justified course of action. Command and Control During the Cold War: The Importance of Big Data In the world of nuclear command and control, the pursuit of speed and analysis of big data is old news. In the early 1950s, before the advent of nuclear intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), the United States began developing the SAGE supercomputer. SAGE, which was built at approximately three times the cost of the Manhattan Project, was the quintessential big data processing machine. It used the fastest and most expensive computers at the time – the Whirlwind II (AN/FSQ-7) IBM mainframe computers – at each of 24 command centers to receive, sort, and process data from the many radars and sensors dedicated to identifying incoming Soviet bombers. The SAGE supercomputer then coordinated U.S. and Canadian aircraft and missiles to intercept those bombers. Its goal was to supplement “the fallible, comparatively slow-reacting mind and hand of man” in anticipating and defending against a nuclear bomber campaign. The proliferation of ICBMs in the 1960s, however, made the SAGE command centers “extraordinarily vulnerable.” The U.S. Air Force concluded that Soviet ICBMs could destroy “the SAGE system long before the first of their bombers crossed the Arctic Circle.” In 1966, speaking at a congressional hearing, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara argued that “the elaborate defenses which we erected during the 1960s no longer retain their original importance. Today with no defense against the major threat, Soviet ICBMs, our anti-bomber defense alone would contribute very little…” The SAGE command centers were shut down. McNamara formed a National Command and Control Task Force, informally referred to as the Partridge Commission, to study the problem of nuclear command and control in the early days of the ICBM era. The commission concluded “that the capabilities of US [nuclear] weapon systems had outstripped the ability to command and control them” using a decentralized military command and control structure. The commission recommended streamlining and centralizing command and control with much stronger civilian oversight. The commission also advocated the formation of the modern-day North American Aerospace Defense Command, better known as NORAD, with its advanced computer and communication systems, early warning satellites, and forward-placed radars designed to track any missile launch on the planet before it could reach the continental United States. NORAD and its computer and communication systems were designed to resolve the stress from information overload by compartmentalizing and automating the process of evaluating a threat. Depending on its particular trajectory, an enemy nuclear missile may take anywhere between 35 minutes to just eight minutes to reach its target. When the launch of an enemy missile occurs, it is first picked up by early warning satellite sensors within seconds. The satellites track these missiles while the engines are still ignited. Once the missile comes over the horizon, forward-deployed radars independently track them. The data from the two systems is then assessed in the context of the prevailing geostrategic intelligence by NORAD. NORAD would then pass the assessment up the military and political chain of command. This sequence of steps ensures that senior decision-makers are not overwhelmed with information. By the time decision-makers are notified, the decision to retaliate to an apparent attack “must be made in minutes.” Future advances in AI might only add incremental improvements to the speed and quality of information processing to this already advanced nuclear early warning system. Using AI to Prevent Inadvertent Nuclear War These advances in nuclear command and control still do not directly address the second form of stress, one that emerges from the fear of a nuclear war and the accompanying moral tradeoffs. How can AI mitigate this problem? History reminds us that technological sophistication cannot be relied upon to avert accidental nuclear confrontations. Rather, these confrontations have been prevented by individuals who, despite having state-of-the-art technology at their disposal, proffered alternate explanations for a nuclear warning alert. Operating under the most demanding conditions, they insisted on a “gut feeling” that evidence of an impending nuclear war alert was misleading. They chose to disregard established protocol, fearing that a wrong choice would lead to accidental nuclear war. Consider for example a declassified President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board report investigating the decision by Leonard Perroots, a U.S. Air Force lieutenant general, not to respond to incoming nuclear alerts. The incident occurred in 1983 when NATO was conducting a large simulated nuclear war exercise code-named Able Archer. The report notes that Perroots’ “recommendation, made in ignorance, not to raise US readiness in response” was “a fortuitous, if ill-informed, decision given the changed political environment at the time.” The report also states: the military officers in charge of the Able Archer exercise minimized this risk by doing nothing in the face of evidence that parts of the Soviet armed forces were moving to an unusual level of [nuclear] alert. But these officers acted correctly out of instinct, not informed guidance. Perroots later complained in 1989, just before retiring as head of the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, “that the U.S. intelligence community did not give adequate credence to the possibility that the United States and Soviet Union came unacceptably close to [accidental] nuclear war.” In the same year, Stanislav Petrov, a commanding officer involved in Soviet nuclear operations, also dismissed a nuclear alert from his country’s early warning system. In the face of data and analysis that confirmed an incoming American missile salvo, Petrov decided the system was wrong. Petrov later said, “that day the satellites told us with the highest degree of certainty these rockets were on the way.” Still, he decided to report the warning as a false alert. His decision was informed by fears that he “didn’t want to be the one responsible for starting a third world war.” Later recalling the incident, he said: “I had a funny feeling in my gut. I didn’t want to make a mistake. I made a decision, and that was it. When people start a war, they don’t start it with only five missiles.” Both, Perroots and Petrov feared the moral consequences of a nuclear war, particularly one initiated accidentally. They distrusted the data and challenged protocol. Conclusion Fred Iklé once remarked, “if any witness should come here and tell you that a totally reliable and safe launch on warning posture can be designed and implemented that man is a fool.” If that is true, how close can AI get us to reliable and safe nuclear command and control? AI-enabled systems may aspire to reduce some of the mechanical and human errors that have occurred in nuclear command and control. Prior instances of false alerts and failures in early warning systems should be used as a training dataset for an AI algorithm to develop benchmarks to quickly test the accuracy of an early warning alert. The goal of integrating AI into military systems should not be speed and accuracy alone. It should also be to help decision-makers exercise judgment and prudence to prevent inadvertent catastrophes.

2022 MGC Disadvantage
Aff › No impact

No emerging tech impact.

Sechser et al. 19, *Todd S., Pamela Feinour Edmonds and Franklin S. Edmonds, Jr. Discovery Professor of Politics and Public Policy at the University of Virginia and Senior Fellow at the Miller Center of Public Affairs, **Neil Narang, Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of California, Santa Barbara, ***Caitlin Talmadge, Associate Professor of Security Studies in the School of Foreign at Georgetown University. ( “Emerging technologies and strategic stability in peacetime, crisis, and war”, Journal of Strategic Studies, 42:6, pg. 728-729)

Yet the history of technological revolutions counsels against alarmism. Extrapolating from current technological trends is problematic, both because technologies often do not live up to their promise, and because technologies often have countervailing or conditional effects that can temper their negative consequences. Thus, the fear that emerging technologies will necessarily cause sudden and spectacular changes to international politics should be treated with caution. There are at least two reasons to be circumspect. First, very few technologies fundamentally reshape the dynamics of international conflict. Historically, most technological innovations have amounted to incremental advancements, and some have disappeared into irrelevance despite widespread hype about their promise. For example, the introduction of chemical weapons was widely expected to immediately change the nature of warfare and deterrence after the British army first used poison gas on the battlefield during World War I. Yet chemical weapons quickly turned out to be less practical, easier to counter, and less effective than conventional high-explosives in inflicting damage and disrupting enemy operations.6 Other technologies have become important only after advancements in other areas allowed them to reach their full potential: until armies developed tactics for effectively employing firearms, for instance, these weapons had little effect on the balance of power. And even when technologies do have significant strategic consequences, they often take decades to emerge, as the invention of airplanes and tanks illustrates. In short, it is easy to exaggerate the strategic effects of nascent technologies.7 Second, even if today’s emerging technologies are poised to drive important changes in the international system, they are likely to have variegated and even contradictory effects. Technologies may be destabilising under some conditions, but stabilising in others. Furthermore, other factors are likely to mediate the effects of new technologies on the international system, including geography, the distribution of material power, military strategy, domestic and organisational politics, and social and cultural variables, to name only a few.8 Consequently, the strategic effects of new technologies often defy simple classification. Indeed, more than 70 years after nuclear weapons emerged as a new technology, their consequences for stability continue to be debated.9