2022
Michigan
Disadvantage
Neg › AT: No War
Seth Cropsey, Opinion Contributor, 6-23-2022, "Diversionary war: Turkey’s actions against Greece are a growing threat to NATO," Hill, https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/3534155-diversionary-war-turkeys-actions-against-greece-are-a-growing-threat-to-nato/
Turkish obstructionism against Swedish and Finnish NATO membership, its limited offensive in Iraq, and its prospective offensive in Syria have grabbed international attention. But more significant is Turkey’s growing diplomatic tension with Greece, an ever-festering lesion that threatens to burst. Considering Turkey’s domestic situation and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the United States must be wary. Turkish President Recip Tayyip Erdogan could capitalize on international distraction and wage a diversionary war to boost his popularity, a conflict that would disrupt NATO’s cohesion and threaten the alliance. Washington should act now to resolve the current incarnation of this long-standing Mediterranean dispute. Recep Tayyip Erdogan has dominated Turkish politics since 2001, when his AKP party first won a two-thirds parliamentary majority. Although Erdogan was banned from Turkish politics for anti-secular incitement, his prime ministerial — and, later, presidential — predecessor, Abdullah Gül, until the mid-2010s at least, was functionally a stand-in for him. Erdogan may have restricted his Islamist proclivities and international assertiveness until he consolidated power in 2014-2016. However, Turkey’s break with the United States over the latter’s invasion of Iraq, and Turkey’s growing hostility towards Israel, indicated a deeper rift between Washington and Ankara. Erdogan consistently sought a greater regional role; through diplomatic pressure against Israel culminating with the Gaza Flotilla — a bald-faced attempt to prompt a confrontation with Israel — Erdogan hoped to position himself as the spiritual leader of the Islamic world. The Arab Spring, however, transformed the regional balance. No power could pretend that the “Palestine Question” still defined regional politics. The Libyan and Syrian civil wars, and the subsequent rise of ISIS, thrust Islamism to the fore once again, while Iranian expansion in Iraq, Syria and Lebanon demonstrated the relevance of traditional coalition competition, rather than religious rivalry. Turkey’s response has been to sharpen its shift away from the United States by alternating between Russophilic and Russophobic policies. The Levantine maelstrom that began in Syria and exploded in Iraq stoked Turkish fears of Kurdish revanchism. Even before that, Russian presence in Syria prompted Turkey to pursue a more aggressive policy, supporting Islamist elements in the Syrian opposition and destroying a Russian Su-24 that briefly violated Turkish airspace. Two years later, Turkey agreed to purchase S-400 anti-air systems from Russia that, in 2019, prompted its ejection from the West’s F-35 fighter-jet program and U.S. sanctions. More generally, Turkey asserted itself militarily since 2016, intervening directly in Syria and Libya. In the latter conflict, Turkey aligned with the Tripoli-based Government of National Accord, opposing the Tobruk-based French-, Russian-, Emirati- and Egyptian-supported House of Representatives. Although fighting there has subsided, tensions may again explode — and by striking a territorial deal in Libya, Turkey can lay claims to the Eastern Mediterranean’s natural gas deposits, threatening Israel, Egypt and Greece.
2022
Michigan
Disadvantage
Neg › AT: Diversionary War False
and , 3/17/21, Marius Mehrl Postdoctoral Researcher at the Geschwister Scholl Institute of Political Science, Ioannis Choulis Assistant Lecturer Department of Government, University of Munich, “Diversionary Politics and Territorial Disputes: Evidence from Turkish Airspace Incursions,” Foreign Policy Analysis, Volume 17, Issue 3, July 2021, orab007, ,
We present our empirical results in table 2. Model 1 includes only Approvalm−1, the independent variable of main theoretical interest, and term-fixed effects in addition to the AR(1) and May terms, while model 2 adds the dummy variables indicating pre-election months and the gas dispute. Model 3 then adds the variable measuring Turkish citizens’ perceptions of the economy, while model 4 instead includes GDP per capita as well as Greek and Turkish defense spending. Econ. perceptionsm−1 is only available from 2015 onward, leading to reduced temporal coverage of the time series and hence our sample size. We thus omit this variable from the most complete specification, model 4. The results in models 1–4 are in line with our hypothesis as Approvalm−1 exhibits a coefficient that is consistently negative and statistically distinguishable from zero at the 99 percent level. Since the dependent variable in these models is the transformed number of airspace violations while the unit of Approvalm−1 is percent, we can interpret its coefficient as the percent change in airspace incursions for a 1 percent increase in approval. Based on model 4, a 1 percent increase in public approval for Recep Tayyip Erdogan leads to a 0.0319 percent decrease in airspace ˘ violations. In contrast, the control variables do not assert a statically significant effect on airspace incursions. To examine the substantive effect of approval ratings on airspace violations in more detail, we present a plot of the predicted number of Turkish incursions into Greek-claimed airspace over the range of observed approval values in figure 2. The figure underlines that approval rate has a substantive, if moderate, effect on airspace violations as it shows that model 4 predicts 141 such incursions if Erdogan’s approval was 37.5 percent in the previous month, whereas ˘ this number decreases to almost 100 if 50 percent of respondents approved of his leadership. Next, we test the robustness of our results to several alternative specifications. Most importantly, we follow earlier studies (e.g., DeRouen and Peake 2002; Pickering and Kisangani 2010) by using VAR to model the effect of approval ratings on airspace violations and vice versa as an endogenous relationship. This allows us to examine whether approval drives airspace violations and/or the other way around. For identification purposes, it is necessary to restrict the contemporaneous effect of one of the endogenous variables to zero (Enders 2015). Approval data take time to collect with the Metropoll survey data only being collected toward the end Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/fpa/article/17/3/orab007/6204770 by University of Michigan user on 22 July 2022 8 Diversionary Politics and Territorial Disputes Table 2. Approval ratings and airspace violations Dependent variable: ln Airspace violations. The Effect of Approval Ratings on Airspace Incursions Note: Predicted Value of ln Airspace Violations across different values of Approval Rate, based on model four. Italicized numbers indicate corresponding non-logged number of violations. Dotted lines indicate 90%-Confidence Intervals. The Effect of Approval Ratings on Airspace Incursions - VAR results Note: Impulse Reaction Functions. Grey areas indicate 90%-Confidence Intervals. of the month, meaning that they only become available after some time has passed. In contrast, reporting on airspace violations is more imminent as they are mentioned in the news and on social media. We thus allow airspace violations to have a contemporaneous effect on approval ratings, while only past approval values can affect airspace violations.7 Following standard practice, we present impulse response function plots in figure 3, showing how one endogenous variable is affected by a shock in the other endogenous variable, as well as results from Granger causality tests to interpret the VAR results instead of relying on regression coefficients. In line with our expectations, figure 3 indicates that positive shocks to approval ratings result in less airspace violations. In contrast, positive shocks to the number of airspace incursions are found to have no statistically significant effect on leader approval. Accordingly, Granger causality tests suggest that approval ratings drive airspace violations but not the other way around. These results provide additional support to our expectation that low approval ratings lead to diversionary action. However, they also raise the question why this is the case if such diversionary acts do not result in higher approval. One possible answer is that these diversionary actions do not target a wider domestic audience but instead key players within the governmental coalition (Morgan and Bickers 1992; Nicholls, Huth, and Appel 2010). Turkish territorial incursions may thus be designed to garner support from ultranationalist elements within the AKP and MHP by showing that the government is not afraid to confront Greece over the contested territory, even if such a policy may not find support, and hence boost approval, among more centrist or opposition voters. We present further specifications examining the robustness of our results in the online appendix, but the result that lower approval ratings increase airspace incursions persists. Conclusion Diversionary foreign policies have been the topic of a large literature that, however, reports mixed findings on whether domestic problems result in interstate conflict. 7 The VAR models include the control variables from model 4 and, based on information criteria, a lag order of 1. This paper adds to this debate by arguing that while leaders may be hesitant to start an outright war to boost their approval, they will pursue smaller scale aggressive actions within existing disputes to gain domestic support. Results from tests using monthly data on leader approval and airspace violations in the territorial dispute between Greece and Turkey offer support for this argument: low approval ratings for Turkey’s leader result in more Turkish incursions into contested airspace. This result most directly contributes to the literature on diversionary conflict. First, we introduce Turkey as a new case for quantitatively testing the theory, whereas most applications focus on the United States. Second, we add to a nascent literature studying diversionary acts below the crisis or militarized dispute level. Third and most importantly, we show that when facing domestic disapproval, leaders resort to material acts of aggressive foreign policy that are less costly than a new conflict but also more than cheap talk to increase support. This is an important result as such aggressive acts, the intensification of an existing territorial dispute in the case of Turkey, can lead to actual armed conflict further down the line. Our research thus also provides insights into the escalatory processes leading up to armed confrontations between neighbors such as those on the Indian–Chinese border in early summer 2020. This study suggests several avenues of further research. First, future research should investigate whether territorial incursions or provocations are used in a similar, diversionary manner in cases other than Turkey. Second, they should examine whether domestic problems generally give rise to aggressive foreign policy behaviors below armed conflict or whether this requires the previous existence of a dispute whose salience leaders can tap into. Third, our research produced the surprising finding that airspace incursions do not actually succeed in boosting support from the Turkish public. As such, future research should further examine to what extent such diversionary policies target the general public or more specific, strategically important audiences such as coalition partners
2022
Michigan
Disadvantage
Neg › AT: No Nuclear War/Escalation
Efstathiou & Kappis 21 (Poltical office at the EU delegation to the united Arab emirates & Deputy director and lecturer at the centre for suite and intelligence studies in BUCSIS “Weapons of Mass Debate - Greece: a Key Security Player for both Europe and NATO”) //ca
During the Cold War and until 2001, Greece hosted US nuclear weapons on its territory, as part of a NATO nuclear-sharing agreement. Yet, recent geopolitical developments - the US’s progressive military disengagement from the Middle East, its "pivot to Asia", debate around removing nuclear weapons from Turkey - highlight Greece’s potential to become a nuclear base again. Greece is sold to the idea of greater European strategic autonomy and is not suspicious of France, unlike other member states. However, Athen’s lack of reaction following French President Emmanuel Macron’s February 2020 speech is due to the country’s other internal priorities and its commitment to NATO as the only actor capable of offering nuclear deterrence at the moment. In this fifth episode of our series Weapons of Mass Debate, Yvonni Efstathiou, Programme Coordinator and Research Analyst for Defense and Military Analysis at IISS, and Bill Kappis, Lecturer at the Centre for Security and Intelligence Studies in the University of Buckingham, analyze Greece’s position on the future of European security. There is hardly any evidence of a debate concerning nuclear weapons within the Greek military and political apparatus, mainly due to concerns regarding the sensitivity of the issue in international affairs, but also due to the political cost associated with the topic. Despite the fact that from 1978 to 2001, the Hellenic Airforce Araxos Air Base hosted the NATO 345 Air Munitions Company under the NATO nuclear sharing arrangements, the Greeks are sceptical about nuclear deployments, with most critics, unsurprisingly, hailing from the left of the political spectrum. In any case, the fact remains that Greece has been one of just seven nations to have hosted US nuclear bombs on their territory, as part of NATO nuclear-sharing agreements. Yet, the country’s decision not to retain its nuclear strike capability by scrapping its A-7E warplanes, meant that Athens curtailed its capacity to participate in the US nuclear deployment programme. This reportedly resulted in the withdrawal of 20 US thermonuclear gravity bombs (B61) in 2001, following years of discussions around the subject. Nevertheless, Greece continues to support the Alliance’s nuclear deterrence doctrine, as indicated by the country’s endorsement of relevant Alliance statements. Recent geopolitical developments suggest there should be a renewed interest in bolstering conventional and nuclear deterrence within NATO and, more specifically, within the European operational theatre. The reduction of US troop numbers in the continent has continued unabated since the first steps of American disengagement from Europe and the Middle East, during the Obama administration. The so-called US "pivot to Asia," meanwhile, suggests that future American deployments will be aimed at bolstering power projection in the Asia-Pacific, bearing an adverse impact on the only superpower’s capacity to face concurrent security crises across the globe. This major geopolitical shift will undoubtedly "test" the credibility of American deterrence in Europe. Extended deterrence (preventing an armed attack against another allied state or group of states) is, in theory, much more demanding to maintain in a credible manner, as the deterrer should, in principle, be perceived as both capable and willing to deliver an appropriate response to the perceived challenger. Providing a robust extended deterrence umbrella to both European and Asia-Pacific allies is conceivable for the US, but far from straightforward, even for the sole superpower. The need for a renewed debate becomes all the more important as the demise of the INF treaty could further weaken Europe’s nuclear deterrence, as the INF was heavily geared towards intra-European strategic stability. The advent, moreover, of hypersonic missiles and their potential introduction into the European nuclear strategic landscape opens the door to additional pressures on the perceived credibility of the continent’s nuclear deterrence. Finally, the Russian and Iranian nuclear programmes, as well as the nuclear aspirations of other regional powers in Europe’s vicinity, (i.e. Turkey) should mobilize Europe and thereby Greece to revisit and reflect upon this policy domain. Taking into consideration Greece’s desire for a strategically autonomous Europe, Athens should be, at least in theory, in favour of a renewed debate around nuclear weapons both as part of NATO burden-sharing arrangements and as a proponent of French deterrent capabilities within the EU.
2022
Michigan
Disadvantage
Neg › AT: No Nuclear War/Escalation
Baba and Onsoy 16 – Assist. Prof. Dr., Department of International Relations, Social Science University of Ankara & King’s College London, Assist. Prof. Dr., Department of International Relations, Hacettepe University. (Baba, Gürol and Önsoy, Murat, “Between Capability and Foreign Policy: Comparing Turkey’s Small Power and Middle Power Status”, Uluslararası İlişkiler, Volume 13, No. 51, 2016, pp. 9-20.) //RSG🌳
Turkey has boosted its international position since the 1930s. This process hides two major aspects of the small power and middle power comparison: a clear increase in capabilities (GNP, population, military expenditure, number/content/focus of international agreements), and related examples of foreign policy behavior. Turkey’s boost illustrates to what extent and under which circumstances the increase in capabilities complements foreign policy objectives. The increase in Turkey’s tangible capabilities can be seen in Tables below: [table omitted] One indicator of Turkey’s boost can be seen in its international agreements. During the 1930s, Turkey’s international agreements related to friendship, neutrality, mutual security, cooperation, maintaining a good neighborhood and joining sanctions regimes. With the end of the Second World War, the agreements increased in their number and diversity. This illustrates Turkey’s success in engaging in international politics. In this period, several bilateral and multilateral agreements/ conventions were concluded with neighboring and non-neighboring countries within the framework of the UN and its subordinate organizations, as well as the OECD, the EU, NATO, Council of Europe, the OSCE, Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), etc.47 Turkey’s capabilities and attitudes towards foreign policy during the 1930s fall into the small power category. The small powers of the 1930s faced a “dangerous combination of an increasing war threat … the emergence of new and costly military technology, and overall offensive military doctrines”.48 Within this dangerous combination of circumstances, Ankara successfully balanced its vulnerabilities with resilience, which made Turkey a non-negligible element in the strategic calculations of great powers. Turkey’s relations with great powers clearly illustrate this point. Through its relations with Germany, Ankara managed to counterbalance threat perceptions with economic opportunities. Turkey increased its trade volume with Germany until the German threat outweighed the economic benefits. With the “clearing” agreement in 1933,49 Germany became a major exporter of manufactured goods and an importer of raw materials and agricultural products from Turkey.50 Until 1936, this relationship served as a panacea for Turkey’s decreasing export incomes.51 By 1936, Germany made up half of Turkey’s imports and exports, and as Hitler intensified war preparations, Ankara moved to reduce the German influence on the economy by diversifying its trading partners.52 For example, Turkey made an accord with the British construction company Brassert for the construction of the first steel factory in Karabük even though the German company Krupps had offered a better deal.53 Turkey’s pivot towards Britain exemplified a “defensive life”. This also changed Britain’s outlook towards Turkey, which involved no commitment until 1936. Britain first supported Turkey’s claims as the basis of discussions in Montreux. A clearing agreement was signed in September 1936 to increase the trade volume, which distanced Turkey from Germany.54 The shift increased the value of Turkish imports from Great Britain from 6 to 7 million Turkish Lira (TL) and exports from 6 to 9.7 million TL. Meanwhile the German share in Turkish trade decreased in value for the first time from 60,042,000 TL (51%) to 50,412,000 TL (36.5%).55 Turkey’s move to keep its alliances mixed highlights the focus on resilience. Although its relations with Britain deepened in 1938, Turkey did not completely detach from Germany. TurkeyBritain trade did not reach the volume of that with Germany, from which it also received 150 million Reichsmarks (RM) of credit.56 The decision to specialize in certain products is another indicator. Turkey, as the second largest producer of chrome ore in the world, became a major supplier of German industry.57 The chrome trade with Germany rose from a value of 35 thousand RM to 3.5 million RM from 1929 to 1939, which covered almost 60% of Germany’s total demand.58 Chrome sales contributed to Turkey’s budget substantially, and gradually made Germany dependent on Turkey’s supply of chrome.
2022
Michigan
Disadvantage
Neg › AT: No Nuclear War/Escalation
QRIUS, 2019, Does the US Have Nuclear Weapons in Turkey?, h, BradAs
As the Syrian crisis pits Turkish troops against former U.S.-allied Kurdish forces, Pentagon officials have been reviewing plans to .
A congressional directive to the Pentagon to quickly assess alternative homes for U.S. “” currently stationed at Incirlik Air Base is part of a broader bipartisan bill, still being debated, that proposes sanctions against Turkey. President Donald Trump has been forced to issue .
2022
Michigan
Disadvantage
Neg › AT: No Nuclear War/Escalation
Baba and Onsoy 16 – Assist. Prof. Dr., Department of International Relations, Social Science University of Ankara & King’s College London, Assist. Prof. Dr., Department of International Relations, Hacettepe University. (Baba, Gürol and Önsoy, Murat, “Between Capability and Foreign Policy: Comparing Turkey’s Small Power and Middle Power Status”, Uluslararası İlişkiler, Volume 13, No. 51, 2016, pp. 9-20.) //RSG🌳
After the Second World War, Turkey significantly advanced its tangible (as seen in Tables 1-3) and intangible capabilities. During this period Turkey’s modus operandi was clearly different from the 1930s. Two definitive examples of Turkey’s middle power attitude have been selected for elaboration. These are the Cyprus issue and the March 2003 memorandum. In the first example, Turkey objected to the Greek Cypriot threats to the status quo on the island after the British withdrawal in 1960. Turkey believed its legal rights to be acknowledged by the Treaty of Guarantee and unilaterally intervened to rebuild the status quo disrupted by the Greek Cypriots throughout the 1960s and early 1970s.69 In the second example, Turkey’s rejection of the March 2003 memorandum granting American troop’s access to Iraq through Turkish territory was another significant pro-status quo move.70 In both cases, Turkey acted to influence the final outcome of an issue, in the process endangering its position within a Western alliance. It was motivated by regional stability but did not avoid conflict, asserting its position as an autonomous middle power.71 Turkey, as a middle power, also believed in using multilateral schemes to deal with international issues. On the Cyprus Question, particularly during the 1960s, Turkey consistently brought the issue to the guarantor powers72 for consultation, and to the US as well. Yet in the post-Cold War era, it no longer expected help from multilateral schemes, aiming instead to use them to improve its international position. A clear example is Turkey’s role in peacekeeping, observer missions and police operations in the Balkans, Caucasus, and Middle East including Afghanistan,73 and particularly in the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFL).74 In all these operations and missions Turkey strived to increase its individual significance and esteem. As a clear example, Turkey employed the OIC to increase its foreign policy outreach and amplify its voice. Turkey, with the new millennium, began to take more direct roles via creating multilateral schemes in its neighboring regions. The Caucasus Peace and Stability Pact proposal in 2000 – covering Turkey, Armenia, Georgia, Russia and Azerbaijan, and relying on the 1997 Balkan Stability Pact’s main principles – is a clear example.75 Turkey attempted to strengthen the common interests of the Pact’s prospective members in order to foster cooperation for security and development, as well as to cultivate regional and multilateral cooperation projects. Turkey worked with local middle powers to construct bridging alignments. In the mid1950s, Turkey’s efforts to create a defense pact – as a “requirement” of its leading role in the implementation of Northern Tier strategy with Iraq, Iran and Pakistan – is one example. The efforts were initiated as the Baghdad Pact in 1955 and died as the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) in 1979.76 Although CENTO did not really deliver what it originally aimed to do, it provided a foundation for Turkey to build a bridge between its members and NATO.77 In 1985 Turkey, along with Iran and Pakistan, founded the Economic Cooperation Organization, which was later expanded to include Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Ankara aimed to create a synergy to provide sustainable development by making full use of available resources in the region.78 In 1992, Turkey was the key actor in the formation and the implementation of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Scheme for regional economic cooperation and development.79 The Scheme’s integration model was looser and more flexible than that of the EU, which would open up “a formerly closed or semiclosed market of more than 350 million people” to Turkey.80 All these efforts exemplify Turkey’s go-between attitude towards international economic coalition building. Turkey was also a go-between for political/security disputes, although not very successfully. It aimed to play a major role in the dialogue between Armenia and Azerbaijan in the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute. The political constraints exerted by the West – i.e. Turkey’s reliance upon US military aid to fight the PKK in the 1990s, its need to de-escalate the situation with the EU and its priority of maintaining good relations with Moscow regarding private business interests in Russia – constrained Turkey from involving itself too deeply in Karabakh.81 Turkey was also one of the founding members of the non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative in 2010,82 where it came together with similar-sized and like-minded states to advance the nuclear disarmament agenda, as well as greater transparency in the fulfilment of disarmament commitments among nuclear states. How helpful that initiative will be remains to be seen. These examples show the complementarity between capabilities and the foreign policy limits of middle powers. In the economic domain, middle powers have more maneuvering space to take the initiative on collaboration/cooperation. In the political and security domains, they are still restricted by alliance networks and the perceptions and interests of great powers. Therefore, the less their foreign policies conflict with those of the great powers, the more effective the middle state can be – or, in other words, the less ambitious, the more successful. In early 2007, Turkey’s sincere efforts to prevent Iraq from descending into chaos, and from being divided into Shia and Sunni groups,83 is an example of good international citizenship and its pursuit of stability and balance. Another recent example of this is the MIKTA collaboration, an acronym for Mexico, Indonesia, Korea, Turkey and Australia, established in 2013. The five members’ major aim has been to amplify their voice on various platforms, especially the G20, with the particular aim of achieving regional and global peace and stability.84 This also shows that good international citizenship by middle powers is better received and results in greater leverage than adventurist political moves that cause conflict with great powers. Conclusion The ambiguity in IR literature between small powers and middle powers has been the terminus a quo of this article. By focusing on ambiguities in definition and differentiation, the article offers an amalgamated methodology of combining capabilities with foreign policy behavior. This combination assumes not only that there is a relationship, but also a complementarity between capabilities and foreign policy. The rise in national capabilities not only lifts a country’s status but also opens up foreign policy maneuverability. Yet this is not so straightforward. Since national capabilities have intangible elements, i.e. how various countries perceive and value the capabilities of other nation-states, this complementarity may have unexpected results. A small power could be seen as a very valuable asset, which amplifies its own foreign policy outreach, while a middle power might not be able to achieve a seemingly basic objective due to restrictions imposed by great powers. Turkey’s experience since the 1930s exemplifies both straightforward and non-straightforward cases. In the 1930s, Turkey counterbalanced its vulnerabilities with resilience and constantly recalibrated its self-image, and in doing so, Ankara reconciled multiple identities depending on the major power it was tilting towards. A Russia-friendly foreign policy went hand-in-hand with an anti-Communist domestic policy; similarly, a non-pro-Western foreign policy was not an obstacle to a close partnership with Britain, and an anti-fascist stance did not hinder an economic partnership with Germany and Italy. Turkey’s foreign policy “pivots” show that a resilient small power is able to manage the strategic calculations of great powers. Its national capabilities determine its status and its foreign policy outreach, but intangible elements in its capabilities could complement resilient foreign policy objectives. Since the end of the Second World War, Turkey has increased its tangible national capabilities drastically. This has not only elevated its status internationally but has also given it a much larger arena in which to conduct foreign policy. Yet this has not removed all of its constraints, particularly in the security and political spheres. Turkey is still limited by great powers. Therefore even boosted national capabilities do not always complement the ability of middle powers to attain political and securityrelated objectives, especially if they skirmish with great powers.
2022
Michigan
Disadvantage
Neg › AT: Not Running
The Editors of the Los Angeles Times 22 — (“Turkish leader Erdogan says he will run for reelection next year,” June 10th, The Los Angeles Times, Available Online at , Accessed 07-22-2022)
ANKARA, Turkey — Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan confirmed Thursday that he plans to stand for reelection next year.
Erdogan, 68, made the announcement during a speech in the Aegean coastal city of Izmir, where he challenged the main opposition party’s leader, Kemal Kilicdaroglu, to announce the candidate who would run against him on behalf of an alliance of opposition parties.
2022
Michigan
Disadvantage
Neg › AT: Coop Now
Barnes 7/23 (Julian E. Barnes is a national security reporter for The New York Times covering the intelligence agencies. “Turkey’s Leader Remains a Headache for Biden Despite Aiding in Ukraine Deal,” The New York Times, 7-23-2022, )//sz
When Russia and Ukraine reached an agreement on Friday to , Turkey’s president, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, played the role of benevolent statesman.
Seated next to the United Nations secretary general in an Ottoman palace in Istanbul, Mr. Erdogan said the deal, which Turkey helped to broker, would benefit “the whole of humanity.”
2022
Michigan
Disadvantage
Neg › AT: Ukraine Thumper
Gaber 6/22/22, Senior Fellow with Atlantic Council, “Turkey’s wartime bridge to the West is collapsing,” , BradAs
Obviously, skyrocketing in Turkey and a traditional mistrust for the West limit the possibilities for cooperation on Ukraine. Whereas the majority of Turks support Ukraine in this war, more than 48 percent blame the United States or NATO for the conflict while only 34 percent hold Russia responsible. There is a widespread belief in Turkish society that the war in Ukraine is just another regional conflict instigated by Western powers after Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Libya, and others. Russia’s invasions and aggression in in South Ossetia, Abkhazia, Nagorno Karabakh, Transnistria, and more recently in Ukraine and Syria don’t evoke a similar response among Turks.
Populist rhetoric, burgeoning ahead of next year’s elections, as well as massive mostly featuring retired generals, nationalist pundits, and (pro-)Russian experts with a strong Eurasianist agenda, do not help either.
2022
Michigan
Disadvantage
Neg › AT: Swinland Thumper
John Holtiwanger, 7/20/22, Distinguished University Professor in the Department of Economics at the University of Maryland and Reporter for Business Insider, “Right before meeting with Putin in Iran, Turkey's Erdogan threatens to 'freeze' Sweden and Finland's NATO membership,” , BradAs
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan on Monday once again threatened to stand in the way of Finland and Sweden joining NATO — a day before he met with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Iran.
"I would like to remind once again that if these countries do not take the necessary steps to fulfill our conditions, we will freeze the (accession) process," in a televised addressed, per the Associated Press. "Our stance on this issue is very clear. The rest is up to them."
2022
Michigan
Negative
**Neg** › AT: North Korean Cyber
Dr. James Andrew Lewis 17, Senior Vice President at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Director of the Technology Policy Program, PhD from the University of Chicago, “The Likelihood of North Korean Cyber Attacks”, 9/7/2017, https://www.csis.org/analysis/likelihood-north-korean-cyber-attacks
Under what circumstances would it make sense for North Korea’s Kim regime to begin a war with the United States? The primary goal of any state is survival, and this is even more important for politically fragile regimes that provide immense benefit to the ruling family. An upper limit to North Korean activities is that, though it will use threats and coercive acts to pursue its larger policy goals, it will not do so at the expense of its own survival. There is some risk that Kim Jong-un could miscalculate when it comes to coercive acts. Shooting missiles over Guam would provoke a reaction, as would an inadvertent impact on Japanese territory of a missile intended to overfly it. But in general, behind the bluster, the Kim regime has been calculating and careful. This is the lens through which we should measure the risk of North Korea launching a cyber attack against the United States. North Korea is the least capable of our opponents when it comes to cyber attack. It uses cyber techniques for coercive diplomacy, for criminal activities to generate hard currency, and for disruptive actions in the South and against deployed U.S. forces. If war breaks out, the North might also consider cyber attacks against military or symbolic targets in the United States. However, short of armed conflict, disruptive actions here are unlikely. How disruptive a North Korean cyber attack would be depends on the victim’s weaknesses. North Korean successes depend on relatively basic techniques that exploit vulnerabilities in poorly defended systems. Though the North has used cyber attacks several times against South Korean banks and media outlets, and against Sony in the United States, none of those attacks caused physical destruction or casualties. To be fair, no cyber attack has ever caused casualties, and only three or four resulted in physical damage. North Korea, despite progress in developing its cyber-attack capabilities, does not possess the advanced skills needed to cause physical damage. What the North can do with cyber operations is disrupt data and online services. A 2011 cyber attack on a South Korean bank left customers unable to use ATMs or online services for several days. The action deleted customer accounts and tried to erase evidence of the attack from the bank’s computers. Similar attacks took place in 2013 against banks and media outlets in Seoul, with data erased and services disrupted. The 2014 attack on Sony Pictures also disrupted services and data and saw leaks of embarrassing e-mails. The most recent North Korean cyber incident used false credentials to steal $81 million from the Bangladesh Central Bank. While these count as successes, they may have also increased North Korea’s caution. If you think you are invisible and suddenly discover that you are not, it dampens your enthusiasm for crime. The ability of the United States to identify North Korea in the Sony incident probably led the North to revise upward the risk of cyber action against U.S. targets. We can run through one popular scenario to explore how North Korea might think about cyber attacks. Though it is unlikely that North Korea has the ability to cause blackouts in the United States, if it did have the capability and decided to use it, this would not reduce our ability to retaliate militarily. Blackouts do not produce catastrophe or military advantage. A cyber-induced blackout would, however, put the regime’s survival at risk—in diplomatic parlance, this is called poking a bear with a stick. In any event, the notion of cyber catastrophe is wildly exaggerated, reflecting a popular culture prone to exaggerating risk rather than seriously assessing an opponent’s capability and intent. North Korea uses cyber attacks to advance its policy agenda; none of its actions has been capricious or haphazard. Cyber attacks do not come out of the blue. They are not random acts (and they are not launched by groups with funny names) but are calculated to achieve either political or financial goals. A decision to launch a cyber attack would be made by Kim Jong-un, and he would consider this in the context of the larger efforts to manipulate decisionmakers and public opinion in the United States, Japan, and South Korea. An attack on critical infrastructure located in the domestic United States would be extremely provocative, and there are plenty of other provocative things the North can do that do not create existential risk for the Kim regime. Kim and his advisers probably know that China and Russia would look unfavorably on a cyber attack against the United States at this tense juncture, and while the North may be ready to ignore its patrons in some matters, starting an armed conflict with the United States is not one of them. It is commonplace to call Kim crazy, but his decisions are rational in the context of North Korea’s strategic culture. An attack on the United States that the North believes is likely to be detected, that will not produce significant harm, and that could generate a damaging response is unattractive. The goal is to manipulate the United States and its North Asian allies without provoking war, and cyber attacks on the U.S. homeland, catastrophic or otherwise, run counter to this
2022
Michigan
Negative
**Neg** › AT: North Korean Cyber
Heine Sørensen 19, Senior Lecturer at the Institute for Strategy at the Royal Danish Defence College, and Dorthe Bach Nyemann, Senior Lecturer at the Institute for Strategy, Royal Danish Defence College, Represented Denmark in the research Project entitled “Countering Hybrid Warfare I-II” Within the Framework of the Multinational Capability Development Campaign (MCDC), US Joint Forces Command, “Deterrence by Punishment as a Way of Countering Hybrid Threats – Why We Need To Go ‘Beyond Resilience’ in the Gray Zone”, Multinational Capability Development Campaign, March 2019, https://tinyurl.com/y6cko3at
The Flipside of Deterrence by Punishment – the Fear of Escalation One of the greatest reservations against communicating a willingness to take punitive actions concerns the risk of escalation and increased tension due to a more assertive or offensive posture. Yet when looking into possible responses – retaliation in cyberspace, for example – a number of “self-dampening” mechanisms appear to be in place that may be applicable to many types of responses.30 One example is the requirement to establish some level of attribution of aggression on which to base a response. As discussed above, while attribution is rarely impossible, it can be a time-consuming and technically-challenging endeavor. In a high-stakes scenario the time taken to get attribution as right as possible means there will be plenty of time to think twice about actions and consequences, and to lean on diplomatic measures in parallel. An example of a self-dampening mechanism related to the cyber domain is the large investment required to develop credible offensive capabilities. Moreover, an offensive cyber capability is a transitory tool31. The ability to access a computer system or network to cause harm or damage is only temporary and dependent on a very rapid and ongoing patching of vulnerabilities. At the same time, wielding the cyber instrument despite the downside of “burning” the capacity might have a de-escalatory effect by communicating capability and credibility to the opponent with a view to discouraging future hostile attacks. Targeting in any domain – including cyberspace – must also follow relevant rules, law and due-process which will self-limit the range of targets and actions available. A final “escalatory showstopper” is related to the challenge of identifying and developing targets of adequate strategic significance – not too much, not too little – to achieve the desired effect. Responding to hybrid aggression by applying “middle range” punitive actions that are proportionate to the aggression threatened or suffered will also self-limit the escalatory potential. It is unlikely to be in the interest of any hybrid aggressor to pursue an escalatory spiral above and beyond where they were looking to compete in the first place: on the hybrid level. Nevertheless, one way to mitigate the risk of escalation – while enhancing civilian oversight and interagency coordination – would be to establish rules of engagement for punitive actions on the hybrid level32 . This would provide decision-makers with common guidelines to pursue punitive actions that fall below the “use of force threshold”. Moreover, this could actually bolster the credibility of punitive actions by signaling to hybrid aggressors the intent to take pre-prepared punitive actions when deemed necessary: in other words, a “playbook” for countering hybrid threats.
2022
Michigan
Negative
**Neg** › AT: North Korean Cyber
Dr. Samuel Charap 16, Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Oxford, M.Phil. in Russian and East European Studies from the University of Oxford, B.A. in Political Science and Russian from Amherst College, Senior Fellow for Russia and Eurasia at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, “The Ghost of Hybrid War”, Survival, Volume 57, Number 6, December 2015 – January 2016
Analysts in the West tend to think that Russia would choose hybrid tactics in order to sow discord within NATO – using ambiguity to create divisions among allies about what was happening and how to respond – and thus break the Alliance politically, without firing a shot.13 This scenario reflects well-founded doubts about Alliance cohesion and unity. It does not reflect the reality of Russian strategy. An extensive search of Russian military writings produces no evidence of such considerations. Moreover, what we do know about Russian military thought suggests that a hybrid war with NATO would not make strategic sense from Moscow’s perspective. For the Russian military, the most significant threat in the Baltic region, particularly because of the strategically vulnerable Kaliningrad exclave, where the Russian Baltic Fleet is based, is the potential deployment of US forces and high-end capabilities. A Russian hybrid operation would give ample time for the US to do just that. So, in the time it took for Narva, the Russian-speaking Estonian border town, to be occupied by the little green men, the 101st Airborne Division could land in Tallinn and a US carrier group could set sail for the Gulf of Finland. Moreover, Moscow has options to prevent this scenario from materialising. For example, the army, with air support, could rapidly push from the Estonian border to the Baltic Sea, destroying all Estonian forces and denying the US access to the region before anyone in Washington or Brussels had the chance to navel gaze. One Russian analyst noted that it would take 30,000 NATO troops about a month to deploy to the Baltic region, while a Russian force of three times the size could be sent there in just 24 hours. He concluded that ‘while Europe’s top brass discuss and argue how to transit to the theater, and coordinate all of this with [the US], Warsaw, Riga, Tallinn and Vilnius would be transformed into a rubbish heap’.14 Some analysts have gone even further than discerning a doctrine and now claim that Russia is already conducting hybrid warfare on the West. As one recent report claimed, ‘The various diplomatic, economic, military and subversive measures that have been employed by Russia in the Baltic Region and increasingly in the Balkans, Black Sea and Mediterranean regions, could be interpreted as elements of a protracted campaign already underway.’15 The author thus equates hard-nosed – but commonplace – tactics to gain influence with subversion that represents a threat to national security. But there is a major difference between efforts to subvert a population against its government on the one hand, and the use of normal tools of statecraft to gain influence on the other.16 The former would be, of course, a real problem for NATO; fortunately, nothing like the subversion of eastern Ukraine is happening inside member states today. As for all the other unpleasant activities that Russia undertakes inside NATO and EU member states, such as funding political parties or developing media in local languages, these certainly do not merit the label ‘hybrid’, let alone ‘war’. After all, Western countries have been doing many of the same things inside of Russia for years. And no one considered those activities ‘elements of a protracted campaign already underway’. * * * Three parallels between the developing conventional wisdom in Russia and the West on hybrid war emerge from the literature. Firstly, Russian strategists believe that the US is willing to risk conducting a limited, hybrid operation in Russia – that is, on the territory of a nuclear power – just as NATO strategists believe Russia is willing to risk the same on the territory of a nuclear alliance. Secondly, Russian analysts project well-founded fears about their country’s long-term political cohesion onto the West’s intentions. In other words, they know their political system is brittle, so therefore the Americans must be out to undermine it. In the same way, NATO analysts know there are divergences regarding threat perceptions inside the Alliance, so therefore Russia must be planning to take advantage of them. Finally, each side believes that Ukraine represents the other’s successful hybrid operation, and a potential precursor to such an operation being directed against it. Fortunately, on all three counts, the new conventional wisdom in both Russia and the West is wrong.
2022
Michigan
Negative
**Neg** › AT: Iran Cyber
“North Korea's Offensive Cyber Program Might Be Good, but Is It Effective?” Council on Foreign Relations, Council on Foreign Relations, https://www.cfr.org/blog/north-koreas-offensive-cyber-program-might-be-good-it-effective. 10/25/2017
North Korea uses cyber strategies, as it does nuclear posture and ballistic missile tests, to signal resolve and capability in its ongoing crisis with South Korea and the United States. Yet, no North Korea cyber operation has caused a government to back down. Last week in Net Politics, Erica Borghard argued that U.S. signals to North Korea are not sufficiently coercive to compel Pyongyang to change course. So why don’t experts treat North Korea’s cyber-based signals with the same amount of moderation? Most of North Korea’s cyber actions occur against either South Korea or the United States, usually low-level website defacements or DDoS signaling campaigns that do not escalate. Between 2000 and 2014, we count a total of 16 cyber operations launched against North Korea’s rivals. Exactly zero of these operations are coercive successes against opposition governments. North Korea has lots of potential but little actual demonstrated ability to achieve leverage through cyber operations. They might prove the world wrong at some point, as they have on the nuclear front, but there are more pressing issues in the relationship to worry about than North Korea’s ability to achieve coercion in cyberspace.
2022
Michigan
Negative
**Neg** › AT: Iran Cyber
Luigi Scazzieri, 6-15-2022, "Have we passed the high-water mark of European unity on Ukraine?," EUROPP,
EU leaders presented a united response in the immediate aftermath of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Yet as the war continues, this unity is coming under strain. Luigi Scazzieri argues there is now a real risk that rifts sparked by the conflict could become entrenched, undermining European cohesion on issues far beyond the war in Ukraine.
When Vladimir Putin launched his invasion of Ukraine in February this year, EU leaders quickly agreed to impose sweeping sanctions on Russia’s economy and to provide Kyiv with military and financial assistance. But as the conflict enters a new phase, European unity is coming under strain.
2022
Michigan
Negative
**Neg** › AT: Iran Cyber
Jason Healey, 3-9-2022, "Preventing Cyber Escalation in Ukraine and After," War on the Rocks, https://warontherocks.com/2022/03/preventing-cyber-escalation-in-ukraine-and-after/
So far, cyber attacks have not proven particularly escalatory or effective on the battlefield. Even the most provocative incidents that came closest to resembling kinetic attacks, such as Stuxnet or the ransomware attack on Colonial Pipeline, have not led to particularly menacing crises, much less war. If anything, over the past decade cyber capabilities have helped de-escalate crises, acting as a “non-kinetic option for leaders who feel pressure to act in a crisis, but who are wary of using force.”
The U.S. conflict with Iran offers a clear example. After Iran attacked several oil tankers and downed a U.S. drone in June 2019, President Donald Trump canceled punitive U.S. airstrikes at the last minute out of concern that the casualties could prompt further escalation. However, he allowed nonlethal cyber disruption of Iranian computer systems, anticipating Iran would not respond violently. Indeed, Iran’s supreme leader “blocked any large, direct retaliation,” limiting the country’s response to the cyber realm.
2022
Michigan
Negative
**Neg** › AT: Iran Cyber
Ali Hajizade, 20 May ,2020, "Iran’s selective approach to hybrid war," Al Arabiya English, https://english.alarabiya.net/views/news/middle-east/2018/02/23/Iran-s-selective-approach-to-hybrid-war
During the cold war, the world witnessed various proxy wars, involving USSR and the USA, and their official and unofficial allies. Moscow and Washington managed to wage proxy wars in Vietnam, Angola, Afghanistan and other parts of the world.
Now there is no Warsaw block, and proxy wars could seemingly become history. However, it did not happen. In today’s world, certain regional players have adopted the Soviet method of waging proxy wars. Speaking of the Middle East, we should emphasize Iran’s activity.
2022
Michigan
Negative
**Neg** › AT: Iran Cyber
Dr. James Andrew Lewis 18, Senior Vice President at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Ph.D. from the University of Chicago, January 2018, “Rethinking Cybersecurity: Strategy, Mass Effect, and States,” , p. 7-11
The Russians specialize in coercion, financial crime, and creating harmful cognitive effect—the ability to manipulate emotions and decisionmaking. Under their 2010 military doctrine on disruptive information operations (part of what they call "New Generation Warfare"). Russians want confusion, not physical damage. Iran and North Korea use cyber actions against American banks or entertainment companies like Sony or the Sands Casino, but their goal is political coercion, not destruction.
None of these countries talk about death by 1000 cuts or attacking critical infrastructure to produce a cyber Pearl Harbor or any of the other scenarios that dominate the media. The few disruptive attacks on critical infrastructure have focused almost exclusively on the energy sector. Major financial institutions face a high degree of risk but in most cases, the attackers' intent is to extract money. There have been cases of service disruption and data erasure, but these have been limited in scope. Denial-of-service attacks against banks impede services and may be costly to the targeted bank, but do not have a major effect on the national economy. In all of these actions, there is a line that countries have been unwilling to cross.
2022
Michigan
Negative
**Neg** › AT: China
Tirpak 5-11-22 Tirpak , John. A. (2022, May 11). Top intel: China not ready to invade Taiwan; Ukraine War in stalemate. Air Force Magazine. Retrieved July 21, 2022, from https://www.airforcemag.com/top-intel-china-not-ready-to-invade-taiwan-ukraine-war-in-stalemate/ John A. Tirpak is Editorial Director of Air Force Magazine. He has been recognized with awards for journalistic excellence from the Society of Professional Journalists, the Aviation and Space Writer’s Association, the Association of Business Publications International, and was the recipient of the 2018 Gill Robb Wilson Award in Arts and Letters from the Air Force Association.
China isn’t yet prepared to successfully invade Taiwan and probably won’t try it soon in the belief that the U.S. is “distracted” by the Ukraine war, said Avril Haines, Director of National Intelligence, during a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing. She also said that while there’s no clear end in sight to Russia’s invasion, the Intelligence Community doubts Russia will quit, but also doubts Russia will resort to nuclear weapons in the near future. Senators lauded the Intelligence Community for correctly predicting the Ukraine war, but criticized it for its failure to predict Ukraine’s success in resisting the invasion and Russia’s troubles in carrying it out. “Thus far, the IC does not assess that the Russia-Ukraine crisis is likely to accelerate [China’s] plan vis-a-vis Taiwan,” Haines said on May 10. China was “surprised by the degree to which the United States and Europe came together to enact sanctions, and that is something they obviously will be looking at in the context of Taiwan,” Haines said. Also, “one of the issues for them is the confidence they have that they are able to take action in Taiwan over our intervention.” This will “play into their decision-making over time.” Seeing events unfold in Ukraine “may give them less confidence, in some respects, over what is likely to happen” in a Taiwan invasion, Haines said. Haines and Defense Intelligence Agency chief Lt. Gen. Scott D. Berrier said 2027 is the point at which the U.S. thinks China believes it could prevail over a U.S. intervention to pull off a successful Taiwan invasion, noting China may therefore accelerate that date. They also said Taiwan needs to do more to prepare to defend itself, both in equipment and the structure of its military.
2022
Michigan
Negative
**Neg** › AT: ISIS
Orwa Ajjoub, 22, Ajjoub is a senior analyst at COAR global focusing on jihadism and Syria. He previously worked as an affiliated researcher at the Center for Middle Eastern Studies at Lund University; “ISIS has a new leader. It’s important to understand their operational capacity.”, Atlantic Council, 3-18-2022, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/isis-has-a-new-leader-its-important-to-understand-their-operational-capacity-%EF%BF%BC/chuo
There are two types of jihad in the jihadi world that are determined by the reality on the ground and the jihadi groups’ capabilities: jihad al-tamkin, or jihad of empowerment, and jihad al-nikaya, or jihad of vexation and exhaustion. Under the former, the group seeks to control and rule over a geographical area and impose its interpretation of Islam. Under the latter, the goal is to inflict harm on the enemy’s interests with hit and run tactics suited to its lack of territory and manpower. Al-nikaya includes ambushes, suicide bombings, attacking prisons, and assassinations of leading enemy figures and collaborators. In 2014, when ISIS announced the establishment of its so-called caliphate, which stretched between eastern Syria and western Iraq, it shifted from jihad al-nikaya to jihad al-tamkin. However, with its loss of territories and assets, which started in 2016, the group has gradually but systematically returned to jihad al-nikaya.
While al-Qaeda has been largely loyal to al-nikaya—as evidenced by the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks as well as the 2004 Madrid and 2005 London bombings—claiming that it wasn’t yet time to announce the establishment of the caliphate, ISIS hasn’t only alternated between the two based on the reality on the ground but also merged during its heyday between 2010 and 2014, as noted by scholar Hassan Abu Hannyia.