2022
Michigan
Negative
**Neg** › AT: ISIS
Fareed Zakaria, 21, Zakaria is a columnist focusing on foreign affairs. He studied at Yale College and Harvard University, and is the host of CNN’s Fareed Zakaria GPS and contributing editor for the Atlantic; “Ten years later, Islamist terrorism isn’t the threat it used to be”, Washington Post, 4-29-2021, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/global-opinions/ten-years-later-islamist-terrorism-isnt-the-threat-it-used-to-be/2021/04/29/deb88256-a91c-11eb-bca5-048b2759a489_story.html/chuo
===says far-right terrorism is dangerous but if the impact’s just ISIS terrorism then we should be fine
This weekend marks the 10th anniversary of the operation, code-named Neptune Spear, that killed Osama bin Laden. It’s an opportunity to reflect on the state of Islamist terrorism and radical Islam more generally. And the initial diagnosis is clear: The movement is in bad shape. Total deaths caused by terrorism around the world have plummeted by 59 percent since their peak in 2014. In the West, the current threat is less from Islamist violence than far-right terrorism, which has surged by 250 percent in the same period, and now makes up 46 percent of attacks and 82 percent of deaths.
2022
Michigan
Negative
**Neg** › AT: European Populism
Jane Mansbridge and Stephen Macedo 20 – Mansbridge is the professor of political science Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. She is one of the world’s most prominent scholars of democratic theory. Macedo is the Laurance S. Rockefeller Professor of Politics at Princeton University and he focuses on topics related to liberalism and democracy.("Populism and Democratic Theory,"Annual Review of Law and Social Science, 2-25-2020, https://www.princeton.edu/~macedo/Papers/Mansbridge%20Macedo%20Populism%20AnnRevLawSocSci%2019.pdf, Accessed 7-21-2022, LASA-KS)
Commentators routinely describe "populism" as vague. Some argue that the early US populists, who coined the modern usage, were not populists. We disagree and identify this common conceptual core: the "people" in a moral battle against "elites." The core definition fits all cases of populism: those on the left and right, those in the United States, Europe, and elsewhere. In addition to this minimal common core, we identify strongly suggested and frequently correlated non-core characteristics. These include the people's homogeneity and exclusivity, direct rule, and nationalism, as well as a single leader, vilification of vulnerable out-groups, and impatience with deliberation. The US Populist Party and Spain's Podemos Party fit the core definition but have few of the other characteristics. The core can be good for democracy, we argue, while the associated characteristics are often dangerous. Populism in opposition can be good for democracy, while populism in power carries great risks. We further distinguish, with many others (e.g., Judis 2016; Kazin 2017b; Mudde & Kaltwasser 2017; Müller 2016; Urbinati 2014, 2019a), between populism in opposition and populism in power. Populism in opposition often revitalizes democracy when the populist ideals and moral fervor anmating antagonism to entrenched elites crack through a prevailing political and discursive hegemony, bringing concerns that had been ignored or suppressed into the political arena. Yet populism in power poses risks to democracy. The same moral fervor and us/them dichotomy that help disrupt the entrenched political and cultural order when populists are in opposition militates against the mutual respect, tolerance, forbearance, negotiation, compromise, and respect for constitutional institutions necessary for egalitarian and pluralist democratic politics when populists take power. The core elements of populism are not antidemocratic. On the contrary, when a large group has designated itself "the people" and has come to see itself in a moral battle against "the elites," the members of that group have often had significant interests and values that political elites have neglected or even denigrated. At these moments, populism is democracy's way of saying, "Listen harder." Although ordinary citizens are not policy experts, they are in a position to judge how their lives are going, and when they have long-standing grievances that powerful elites have not effectively addressed, organizing in protest is a rationally and emotionally appropriate democratic response. Democracy particularly needs the populist impulse at certain historical moments. Elites often develop interests and values that diverge from those of the less affluent, less educated, and less privileged who live far from centers of political, economic, social, and cultural power. Thev often talk primarily with one another and reinforce one another. Power tends to beget more power. When groups with more power neglect the values and interests of the less powerful for too long, populism is what we want from democracy. the capacity to let the needs and values of the less powerful break through and thrust themselves on the increasingly insulated political, economic, social, and cultural ruling classes.
2022
Michigan
Negative
**Neg** › AT: European Populism
Sheri Berman 19 – Berman teaches political science at Barnard College at Columbia University and writes scholarly articles of the political landscape of Europe. ("Populism is a Symptom Rather than a Cause: Democratic Disconnect, the Decline of the Center-Left, and the Rise of Populism in Western Europe," Polity, 9-26-2019, https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/705378?journalCode=pol, Accessed 7-21-2022, LASA-KS)
How can we understand the rise of populism in Europe? Perhaps the most common approach is to look at the demand side, or the long-term structural changes that are said to have caused growing dissatisfaction with democracy and growing support for populism. This debate is primarily between those who stress economic factors and those who stress social factors. The former camp emphasizes the disruptive effects of globalization, neoliberalism, and technological change. In this view, increasing trade openness, the rise of non-Western economic powers, diminished government regulation, and growing automation have made life more insecure for the working and middle classes, have privileged highly educated and urban dwellers over less-educated and rural ones, and have made capitalism more of a zero-sum game.' These forces have also aggravated divisions within societies and between them. Over the past few decades, the economic winners have been the rising mid die classes in developing countries such as India and China and the wealthy in the West. The losers, meanwhile, have primarily been the lower and middle classes in the West, which explains their resentment of emerging economic powers as well as of elites in their own countries. The impact of these changes was exacerbated by the financial crisis of the late 2000s, which deepened social divisions and economic fears. A different narrative stresses social change as the root cause of populism. Over the past years, the foreign-born share of the population has reached historic heights in most European countries. The impact of this demographic shift was aggravated by the refugee crisis of 2015 and the fear generated by high-profile terrorist incidents, such as the November 2015 Islamist attacks in Paris, which killed over 400 people, and the December 2016 Islamist attack in Berlin that left a dozen people dead. The growth in the number of foreign-born residents, particularly of non-European backgrounds, occurred against the backdrop of an assault on traditional values that began the 1960s. According to this narrative, the cumulative impact of these change is that many citizens, particularly white males, have come to feel like strangers in their own countries. In this view, social change has led to a nativist or even racist backlash, with citizens growing dissatisfied with liberal democracy for allowing the decline of national cultures, traditions, and sovereignty. More recently, scholars have focused on the interaction between social and economic change. Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris argue that, during the postwar period, prosperity prompted a generational shift towards post-materialist values in the advanced industrial world that in turn prompted a reaction among more materialist voters. But this reaction exploded onto the political scene only when rising economic insecurity activated traditionalist and xenophobic attitudes that were already present. In a different analysis, Noam Gidron and Peter Hall stress the intraction of economic and social grievances, arguing that the decline of wellpaying, secure, respected jobs and the growing prominence and mobilization of women and minorities has combined to threaten the dominant status of white males in Western societies, leading to dissatisfaction with the political establishment and growing support for populist parties championing what they claim are"traditional" national identities and romanticizing an earlier status quo.' As real and as consequential as these economic and social changes have been, a focus on them alone can only reveal so much about the problems facing liberal democracy today. Populism is a symptom or reflection of growing dissatisfaction with democracy, and that dissatisfaction emerges when citizens believe that elites, parties, and governments are unwilling or unable to respond to their needs and demands. Change alone, in other words, is not destabilizing--it becomes so only if political institutions do not manage or mitigate it. To understand populism, inshort, one must examine how (or whether) elites, parties, and governments haven responded to the challenges that European societies have confronted over the last few decades. In democracies, unlike in dictatorships, when citizens become dissatisfied, they can express that dissatisfaction by voting to change their leaders and governments. But if citizens believe their votes do not matter-if their leaders and governments do not respond to their needs and demands--then their willingness to vote for parties critical of "the establishment" and of democracy more generally will grow.
2022
Michigan
Negative
**Neg** › AT: European Populism
Bennett Institute of Public Policy Cambridge 22 – The Bennett Institute of Public Policy is an organization at the University of Cambridge that researches public policy and politics. ("Support for populist politics ‘collapsed’ during the pandemic – global report," Bennett Institute for Public Policy, 1-18-2022, https://www.bennettinstitute.cam.ac.uk/blog/great-reset/, Accessed 7-20-2022, LASA-KS)
Support for populist parties and politicians, and agreement with populist sentiment, has diminished during the pandemic, according to a “mega-dataset” taking in attitudes of over half a million people across 109 countries since 2020. A University of Cambridge team say there are clear signs of a turning tide for the “populist wave”, as the mishandling of coronavirus by populist leaders – along with a desire for stability and a decline in “polarising” attitudes resulting from the pandemic – starts to move public opinion. The authors of the new report, from Cambridge’s Centre for the Future of Democracy (CFD), describe the study as the first global overview of how the Covid-19 crisis has affected political beliefs. They say that threats posed by the pandemic saw a “technocratic” shift in political authority worldwide, with increased trust in government, and in experts such as scientists and civil servants. Yet faith in the democratic process has continued to falter. “The story of politics in recent years has been the emergence of anti-establishment politicians who thrive on the growing distrust of experts,” said Dr Roberto Foa, Co-Director of the CFD and the report’s lead author. “From Erdogan and Bolsonaro to the ‘strong men’ of Eastern Europe, the planet has experienced a wave of political populism. Covid-19 may have caused that wave to crest.” “Electoral support for populist parties has collapsed around the world in a way we don’t see for more mainstream politicians. There is strong evidence that the pandemic has severely blunted the rise of populism,” said Foa. The findings are published today by Cambridge’s Bennett Institute for Public Policy. The first months of the pandemic saw many political leaders get a boost in ratings – a classic “rally round the flag” effect in troubled times, say researchers. However, the approval ratings of populist leaders the world over began declining almost as soon as coronavirus hit, and have continued to sink ever since. On average, populist leaders have seen a 10 percentage point drop between the spring of 2020 and the last quarter of 2021, while ratings for non-populists – on average – returned to around pre-pandemic levels. Electoral support also plunged for their parties – seen most clearly in Europe, where the proportion of people intending to vote for a populist party* has fallen by an average of 11 percentage points to 27%. Overall, across Europe, early lockdowns saw voting intention for incumbent parties increase. Yet all the continent’s governing populists – from Italy’s Five Star to Hungary’s Fidezs – bucked the trend with the largest declines in support. Support for Europe’s opposition populist parties also fell over the pandemic – by 5 pp on average to 11% – while it rose for “mainstream” opposition. Researchers suggest several factors for populism’s fading appeal. One is simply the botch job made of the pandemic by populist governments: from Bolsonaro’s mask veto to Trump’s “bleach injection” suggestion. The report’s polling shows the public considered populist leaders to be less trustworthy sources of virus-related information than centrist counterparts. In June 2020, approval of government handling of the crisis was 11 percentage points lower on average in countries with populist leaders than in those with more centrist governance. By the end of 2020, this gap had widened to 16 points. Researchers also found that political “tribalism” – fertile ground for populists – has declined in most countries. The percentage of party supporters expressing a “strong dislike” of those who vote for opposing politicians fell in most nations (although not the US) during the crisis. “The pandemic fostered a sense of shared purpose that may have reduced the political polarisation we’ve seen over the last decade,” said CFD researcher and report co-author Dr Xavier Romero-Vidal. “This could help explain why populist leaders are struggling to mobilise support.” Some of the ideas propagated by populists are losing ground. Levels of agreement with statements such as “corrupt elites” divide our nation or the “will of the people” should be obeyed fell in almost every nation surveyed.
2022
Michigan
Negative
**Neg** › AT: Vaccines
Dennis Thompson, 10-22-2020, "Mask Use by Americans Now Tops 90%, Poll Finds," WebMD,
More than nine in 10 U.S. adults (93%) said they sometimes, often or always wear a mask or face covering when they leave their home and are unable to socially distance, including more than seven in 10 (72%) who said they always do so, the poll revealed. "Compared to when we first asked this question in late August, our latest survey with HealthDay finds that more Americans are now consistently wearing a mask or face covering outside the home," said Kathy Steinberg, vice president of research for public release at The Harris Poll.
2022
Michigan
Negative
**Neg** › AT: Vaccines
Lu He,21, 2021 Apr 24, "Why do people oppose mask wearing? A comprehensive analysis of U.S. tweets during the COVID-19 pandemic," PubMed Central (PMC), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7989302/
Further, some users opposed mask wearing because they believed that it was not an effective measure for preventing the spread of the virus and it was unnecessary for healthy individuals. These stances were indeed supported by authoritative bodies such as the CDC and the U.S. Surgeon General at the early stage of the pandemic. However, many of these tweets were posted in June and July, yet the CDC had reversed its position on public mask wearing in April. This finding indicates that certain segments of the U.S. population might not be aware of, or refuse to believe in, new recommendations from the CDC, and that earlier, contradicting recommendations might have a long-lasting impact. This means that public health experts and officials must clearly communicate about scientific uncertainty, reasons for specific recommendations, and the possibility that recommendations could change as more evidence emerges. In addition, public health experts should continue to engage the public so that new scientific findings, conclusions, and recommendations are immediately delivered to all members of the public.
2022
Michigan
Negative
**Neg** › AT: Vaccines
Chan, HW., Chiu, C.PY., Zuo, S. et al., 5-4-2021, "Not-so-straightforward links between believing in COVID-19-related conspiracy theories and engaging in disease-preventive behaviours," Nature, https://www.nature.com/articles/s41599-021-00781-2#Sec16
Since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic, pertinent conspiracy theories have proliferated online, raising the question: How might believing in those conspiracy theories be linked with engagement in disease-preventive behaviours? To answer this, we conducted a repeated cross-sectional survey of around 1500 respondents to examine the link between conspiracy-theory beliefs and disease-preventive behaviours across six time-points in the United States from early February to late March 2020. The findings reveal that believing in risk-acceptance conspiracy theories (RA-CTs; e.g., “COVID-19 is a man-made bioweapon”) was linked to more preventive behaviours. However, believing in risk-rejection conspiracy theories (RR-CTs; e.g., “COVID-19 is like influenza and was purposefully exaggerated”) was associated with fewer preventive behaviours. These differential links were mediated by risk perception and negative emotions and modulated by the stage of the outbreak—RA-CTs predicted higher risk perception in the mild stage, whereas RR-CTs predicted lower risk perception in the severe stage.
2022
Michigan
Negative
**Neg** › AT: Vaccines
Agley, J., Xiao, Y., 1-7-2021, "Misinformation about COVID-19: evidence for differential latent profiles and a strong association with trust in science," BioMed Central,
For the full sample, believability of the narratives varied, from a low of 1.94 (SD=1.72) for the 5G narrative to a high of 5.56 (SD=1.64) for the zoonotic (scientific consensus) narrative. Four distinct belief profiles emerged, with the preponderance (70%) of the sample falling into Profile 1, which believed the scientifically accepted narrative (zoonotic origin) but not the misinformed or conspiratorial narratives. Other profiles did not disbelieve the zoonotic explanation, but rather believed additional misinformation to varying degrees. Controlling for sociodemographics, political orientation and religious commitment were marginally, and typically non-significantly, associated with COVID-19 belief profile membership. However, trust in science was a strong, significant predictor of profile membership, with lower trust being substantively associated with belonging to Profiles 2 through 4.
2022
Michigan
Negative
**Neg** › EU CP
Daniel Funke, 7-20-2022, "A guide to anti-misinformation actions around the world," Poynter, https://www.poynter.org/ifcn/anti-misinformation-actions/
BRUSSELS — In mid-March 2018, a European Commission high-level group published its final report on misinformation, drawing upon the input of experts from around the world who gathered over several weeks to help the European Union figure out what to do about misinformation. The report created by the high-level group — announced in November 2017 to help the EU craft policies to address growing concern about misinformation in Europe — contains an inclusive, collaborative approach to addressing misinformation around the world (Disclosure: Poynter attended the meetings as one of the experts). The report, while imperfect, explicitly recommends not regulating against misinformation — but the EU is only one of many governing bodies that have sought to stem the flow of online misinformation over the past few months. Spanning from Brazil to South Korea, these efforts raise questions about infringing free speech guarantees and are frequently victims of uncertainty. The muddying of the definition of fake news, the relative reach of which is still being studied, hinders governments’ ability to accomplish anything effective. In the spirit of this confusion, explained in detail in a Council of Europe report, Poynter has created a guide for existing attempts to legislate against what can broadly be referred to as online misinformation. While not every law contained here relates to misinformation specifically, they’ve all often been wrapped into that broader discussion. We have attempted to label different interventions as clearly as possible. Since these efforts seem to be announced weekly, this article will be updated on an ongoing basis.
2022
Michigan
Negative
**Neg** › EU CP
Annina Claesson, April 8, 2019, "Coming Together to Fight Fake News: Lessons from the European Approach to Disinformation," CSIS, https://www.csis.org/coming-together-fight-fake-news-lessons-european-approach-disinformation
There are several positive lessons to draw from these. Perhaps most importantly, the European Commission has appropriately identified the need for a unified, multi-stakeholder response to disinformation, including participation from governments, civil society, and the private sector.4 The commission’s most recent action plan, released in December 2018, sets out important improvements in this regard. The EU budget for tackling disinformation is expected to more than double in 2019, going from €1.9 million in 2018 to €5 million.5 This is not to be disregarded—money matters a great deal, especially when Russia invests over €1 billion each year into their disinformation and propaganda efforts.6
The action plan’s most concrete new step is the creation of a rapid alert system, which provides alerts on new disinformation campaigns as they emerge in real time.7 This mechanism is set to involve NATO and could become a promising tool for intelligence and data sharing across borders. This action plan also strength- ens previously under-resourced tools such as the East Strategic Communication Task Force, an issue which was identified by experts as a significant roadblock to improving anti-disinformation efforts in the European Union.8
2022
Michigan
Negative
**Neg** › EU CP
Annina Claesson, April 8, 2019, "Coming Together to Fight Fake News: Lessons from the European Approach to Disinformation," CSIS, https://www.csis.org/coming-together-fight-fake-news-lessons-european-approach-disinformation
For observers across the pond, Europe has been a testing ground for tactics to counter disinformation in democracies. Over the course of many national elections in the past few years, Europe has tried a variety of measures to counter disinformation efforts from multiple sources. Now, the European Union is aiming to complement national efforts by scaling up its own response through EU-level policies.
In an effort to address what some civil society and media organizations have criticized as an overly disaggregated approach by the European Union, current EU efforts focus on proper coordination with and among the many actors involved in countering disinformation. Specifically, the EU response is focused on three lines of effort: improving interagency and international cooperation; stepping up ambitions in addressing the role of the private sector; and instituting a plan to support media literacy. In addition to helping the European Union tackle disinformation campaigns that seek to disrupt the democratic process, these measures can also serve as a template for the United States and other countries as they design their own anti-disinformation strategies.
2022
Michigan
Kritik
Cybernetic Supplement › AT Cyber Regs
Tiqqun 10, 5-29-2010, "The Cybernetic Hypothesis," Anarchist Library, , GJM
Even if the origins of the Internet device are today well known, it is not uncalled for to highlight once again their political meaning. The Internet is a war machine invented to be like the highway system, which was also designed by the American Army as a decentralized internal mobilization tool. The American military wanted a device which would preserve the command structure in case of a nuclear attack. The response would consist in an electronic network capable of automatically retaking control over information itself if nearly the whole of the communications links were destroyed, thus permitting the surviving authorities to remain in communication with one another and make decisions. With such a device, military authority could be maintained in the face of the worst catastrophes. The Internet is thus the result of a nomadic transformation of military strategy. With that kind of a plan at its roots, one might doubt the supposedly anti-authoritarian characteristics of this device. As is the Internet, which derives from it, cybernetics is an art of war, the objective of which is to save the head of the social body in case of catastrophe. What stands out historically and politically during the period between the great wars, and which the cybernetic hypothesis was a response to, was the metaphysical problem of creating order out of disorder. The whole of the great scientific edifice, in terms of what it had to do with the determinist concepts of Newton’s mechanical physics, fell apart in the first half of the century. The sciences, at that time, were like plots of territory torn between the neo-positivist restoration and the probabilist revolution, and slowly inching its way towards a historical compromise so that the law could be re-established after the chaos, the certain re-established after the probable. Cybernetics passed through this whole movement — which began in Vienna at the turn of the century, and was transported to England and the United States in the 1930s and 1940s, and constructed a Second Empire of Reason where the idea of the Subject, up to that time considered indispensable, was absent. As a kind of knowledge, it brought together an ensemble of heterogeneous discourses all dealing with th e practical problems of mastering uncertainty. Discourses fundamentally expressing, in the various domains of their application, the desire for a restoration of one order, and furthermore the maintenance thereof. Underlying the founding of Cybernetics was a context of total war. It would be in vain to look for some malicious purpose or the traces of a plot: one simply finds a handful of ordinary men mobilized by America during the Second world war. Norbert Wiener, an American savant of Russian origin, was charged with developing, with the aid of a few colleagues, a machine for predicting and monitoring the positions of enemy planes so as to more effectively destroy them. It was at the time only possible at the time to predict with certitude certain correlations between certain airplane positions and certain airplane behaviors/movements. The elaboration of the “Predictor,” the prediction machine ordered from Wiener, thus required a specific method of airplane position handling and a comprehension of how the weapon interacts with its target. The whole history of cybernetics has aimed to do away with the impossibility of determining at the same time the position and behavior of bodies. Wiener’s innovation was to express the problem of uncertainty as an information problem, within a temporal series where certain data is already known, and others not, and to consider the object and the subject of knowledge as a whole, as a “system.” The solution consisted in constantly introducing into the play of the initial data the gap seen between the desired behavior and the effective behavior, so that they coincide when the gap closes, like the mechanism of a thermostat. The discovery goes considerably beyond the frontiers of the experimental sciences: controlling a system would in the end require a circulation of information to be instituted, called feed-back, or retro-action. The wide implications of these results for the natural and social sciences was exposed in 1948 in Paris in a work presented under the foreboding name of Cybernetics, which for Wiener meant the doctrine of “control and communication between animal and machine.” Cybernetics thus emerged as a simple, inoffensive theory of information, a theory for handling information with no precise origin, always potentially present in the environment around any situation. It claims that the control of a system is obtained by establishing an optimum degree of communication between the parties to it. This objective calls above all for the continuous extortion of information — a process of the separation of beings from their qualities, of the production of differences. In other words, as it were, mastery of a uncertainty would arise from the proper representation and memorization of the past. The spectacular image, binary mathematical encoding — invented by Claude Shannon in Mathematical Theory of Communication in the very same year that the cybernetic hypothesis was first expressed — on the one hand they’ve invented memory machines that do not alter information, and put incredible effort into miniaturizing them (this is the determinant strategy behind today’s nanotechnology) and on the other they conspire to create such conditions on the collective level. Thus put into form, information would then be directed towards the world of beings, connecting them to one another in the same way as commodity circulation guarantees they will be put into equivalence. Retro-action, key to the system’s regulation, now calls for communication in the strict sense. Cybernetics is the project of recreating the world within an infinite feedback loop involving these two moments: representation separating, communication connecting, the first bringing death, the second mimicking life.
2022
Michigan
Kritik
Cybernetic Supplement › Impact – War Machine
Tiqqun 10, 5-29-2010, "The Cybernetic Hypothesis," Anarchist Library, , GJM
Like any discourse, the cybernetic hypothesis could only check to verify itself by associating the beings or ideas that reinforce it, by testing itself through contact with them, and folding the world into its laws in a continuous self-validation process. It’s now an ensemble of devices aspiring to take control over all of existence and what exists. The Greek word kubernèsis means “the act of piloting a vessel,” and in the figurative sense, the “act of directing, governing.” In his 1981–1982 classes, Foucault insisted on working out the meaning of this category of “piloting” in the Greek and Roman world, suggesting that it could have a more contemporary scope to it: “the idea of piloting as an art, as a theoretical and practical technology necessary for existence, is an idea that I think is rather important and may eventually merit a closer analysis; one can see at least three types of technology regularly attached to this ‘piloting’ idea: first of all medicine; second of all, political government; third of all self-direction and self-government. These three activities (healing, directing others, and governing oneself) are quite regularly attached to this image of piloting in Greek, Hellenic and Roman literature. And I think that this ‘piloting’ image also paints a good picture of a kind of knowledge and practice that the Greeks and Romans had a certain affinity for, for which they attempted to establish a tekhnè (an art, a planned system of practices connected to general principles, notions, and concepts): the Prince, insofar as he must govern others, govern himself, heal the ills of the city, the ills of the citizens, and his own ills; he who governs himself as if he were governing a city, by healing his own ills; the doctor who must give his advice not only about the ills of the body but about the ills of individuals’ souls. And so you see you have here a whole pack of ideas in the minds of the Greeks and Romans that have to do I think with one and the same kind of knowledge, the same type of activity, the same type of conjectural understanding. And I think that one could dig up the whole history of that metaphor practically all the way up to the 16th century, when a whole new art of governing, centered around Reasons of State, would split apart — in a radical way — self government/medicine/government of others — not without this image of ‘piloting,’ as you well know, remaining linked to this activity, that activity which we call the activity of government.” What Foucault’s listeners are here supposed to know well and which he refrains from pointing out, is that at the end of the 20th century, the image of piloting, that is, management, became the cardinal metaphor for describing not only politics but also all human activity. Cybernetics had become the project of unlimited rationalization. In 1953, when he published The Nerves of Government in the middle of the development of the cybernetic hypothesis in the natural sciences, Karl Deutsch, an American university social sciences academic, took the political possibilities of cybernetics seriously. He recommended abandoning the old concept that power was sovereign, which had too long been the essence of politics. To govern would become a rational coordination of the flows of information and decisions that circulate through the social body. Three conditions would need to be met, he said: an ensemble of capturers would have to be installed so that no information originating from the “subjects” would be lost; information handling by correlation and association; and a proximity to every living community. The cybernetic modernization of power and the expired forms of social authority thus can be seen as the visible production of what Adam Smith called the “invisible hand,” which until then had served as the mystical keystone of liberal experimentation. The communications system would be the nerve system of societies, the source and destination of all power. The cybernetic hypothesis thus expresses no more or less than the politics of the “end of politics.” It represents at the same time both a paradigm and a technique of government. Its study shows that the police is not just an organ of power, but also a way of thinking. Cybernetics is the police-like thinking of the Empire, entirely animated by an offensive concept of politics, both in an historical and metaphysical sense. It is now completing its integration of the techniques of individuation — or separation — and totalization that had been developing separately: normalization, “anatomo-politics,” and regulation, “bio-politics,” as Foucault calls it. I call his “techniques of separation” the police of qualities. And, following Lukács, I call his “techniques of totalization” the social production of society. With cybernetics, the production of singular subjectivities and the production of collective totalities work together like gears to replicate History in the form of a feigned movement of evolution. It acts out the fantasy of a Same that always manages to integrate the Other; as one cybernetician puts it, “all real integration is based on a prior differentiation.” In this regard, doubtless no one could put it better than the “automaton” Abraham Moles, cybernetics’ most zealous French ideologue, who here expresses this unparalleled murder impulse that drives cybernetics: “We envision that one global society, one State, could be managed in such a way that they could be protected against all the accidents of the future: such that eternity changes them into themselves. This is the ideal of a stable society, expressed by objectively controllable social mechanisms.” Cybernetics is war against all that lives and all that is lasting. By studying the formation of the cybernetic hypothesis, I hereby propose a genealogy of imperial governance. I then counterpose other wisdom for the fight, which it erases daily, and by which it will be defeated.
2022
Michigan
Kritik
Cybernetic Supplement › Impact – War Machine
Tiqqun 10, 5-29-2010, "The Cybernetic Hypothesis," Anarchist Library, , GJM
The Cybernetic Hypothesis is thus a political hypothesis, a new fable that after the second world war has definitively supplanted the liberal hypothesis. Contrary to the latter, it proposes to conceive biological, physical, and social behaviors as something integrally programmed and re-programmable. More precisely, it conceives of each individual behavior as something “piloted,” in the last analysis, by the need for the survival of a “system” that makes it possible, and which it must contribute to. It is a way of thinking about balance, born in a crisis context. Whereas 1914 sanctioned the decomposition of the anthropological conditions for the verification of the liberal hypothesis — the emergence of Bloom and the bankruptcy, plain to see in flesh and bone in the trenches, of the idea of the individual and all metaphysics of the subject — and 1917 sanctioned its historical contestation by the Bolshevik “revolution,” 1940 on the other hand marked the extinction of the idea of “society,” so obviously brought about by totalitarian self-destruction. As the limit-experiences of political modernity, Bloom and totalitarianism thus have been the most solid refutations of the liberal hypothesis. What Foucault would later call (in a playful tone) “the death of Mankind,” is none other than the devastation brought about by these two kinds of skepticism, the one directed at individuals, and the other at society, and brought about by the Thirty Years’ War which had so effected the course of Europe and the world in the first half of the last century. The problem posed by the Zeitgeist of those years was once again how to “defend society” against the forces driving it towards decomposition, how to restore the social totality in spite of a general crisis of presence afflicting it in its every atom. The cybernetic hypothesis corresponds, consequently, to a desire for order and certitude, both in the natural and social sciences. The most effective arrangement of a constellation of reactions animated by an active desire for totality — and not just by a nostalgia for it, as it was with the various variants of romanticism — the cybernetic hypothesis is a relative of not only the totalitarian ideologies, but also of all the Holisms, mysticisms, and solidarities, like those of Durkheim, the functionalists, or the Marxists; it merely takes over from them. As an ethical position, the cybernetic hypothesis is the complement, however strictly opposed to it, of the humanist pathos that has been back in vogue since the 1940s and which is nothing more than an attempt to act as if “Man” could still think itself intact after Auschwitz, an attempt to restore the classical metaphysics on the subject in spite of totalitarianism. But whereas the cybernetic hypothesis includes the liberal hypothesis at the same time as it transcends it, humanism’s aim is to extend the liberal hypothesis to the ever more numerous situations that resist it: It’s the “bad faith” of someone like Sartre, to turn one of the author’s most inoperative categories against him. The ambiguity that constitutes modernity, seen superficially either as a disciplinary process or as a liberal process, or as the realization of totalitarianism or as the advent of liberalism, is contained and suppressed in, with and by the new governance mentality emerging now, inspired by the cybernetic hypothesis. This is but the life-sized experimentation protocol of the Empire in formation. Its realization and extension, with the devastating truth-effects it produces, is already corroding all the social institutions and social relations founded by liberalism, and transforming both the nature of capitalism and the possibilities of its contestation. The cybernetic gesture affirms itself in the negation of everything that escapes regulation, all the escape routes that existence might have in the interstices of the norms and apparatuses, all the behavioral fluctuations that do not follow, in fine, from natural laws. Insofar as it has come to produce its own truths, the cybernetic hypothesis is today the most consequential anti-humanism, which pushes to maintain the general order of things, all the while bragging that it has transcended the human.
2022
Michigan
Kritik
Cybernetic Supplement › Impact – War Machine
Tiqqun 10, 5-29-2010, "The Cybernetic Hypothesis," Anarchist Library, , GJM
“They wanted an adventure, and to live it out with you. In the end all that’s all that can be said. They believed resolutely that the future would be modern: different, impassioning, and definitely difficult. Peopled by cyborgs and bare handed entrepreneurs, frenzied stock-marketeers and turbine-men. And for those that are willing to see it, the present is already like that. They think the future will be human, feminine even — and plural; so that everyone can really live it, so that everyone participates in it. They are the Enlightenment men we’ve lost, infantrymen of progress, the inhabitants of the 21st century. They fight against ignorance, injustice, poverty, and suffering of all kinds. They go where it’s happening, where things are going on. They don’t want to miss out on a thing. They’re humble and courageous, at the service of interests that are far beyond them, guided by a higher principle. They can pose problems, and they can find solutions. They’ll have us traversing the most perilous of frontiers, they’ll reach out a hand to pull us up onto the shore of the future. They’re History marching forth, at least what’s left of it, because the hardest part is over. They’re the saints and the prophets, true socialists. They’ve known for a long while that May 1968 wasn’t a revolution. The true revolution is the one they’re making. Now it’s just a matter of organization and transparency, intelligence and cooperation. A vast program! Then...” Excuse me? What? What’d you say? What program? The worst nightmares, you know, are often the metamorphoses of a fable, fables PEOPLE tell their kids to put them to sleep and perfect their moral education. The new conquerors, who we’ll call the cyberneticians, do not comprise an organized party — which would have made our work here a lot easier — but rather a diffuse constellation of agents, all driven, possessed, and blinded by the same fable. These are the murderers of Time, the crusaders of Sameness, the lovers of fatality. These are the sectarians of order, the reason-addicts, the go-between people. The Great Legends may indeed be dead, as the post-modern vulgate often claims, but domination is still comprised of master-fictions. Such was the case of the Fable of the Bees published by Bernard de Mandeville in the first years of the 18th century, which contributed so much to the founding of political economy and to justifying the advances made by capitalism. Prosperity, the social order, and politics no longer depended on the catholic virtues of sacrifice but on the pursuit by each individual of his own interests: it declared the “private vices” to be guarantees of the “common good.” Mandeville, the “Devil-Man” as PEOPLE called him at the time, thus founded the liberal hypothesis, as opposed to the religious spirit of his times, a hypothesis which would later have a great influence on Adam Smith. Though it is regularly re-invoked, in a renovated form given it by liberalism, this fable is obsolete today. For critical minds, it follows that it’s not worth it anymore to critique liberalism. A new model has taken its place, the very one that hides behind the names “internet,” “new information and communications technology,” the “new economy,” or genetic engineering. Liberalism is now no longer anything but a residual justification, an alibi for the everyday crimes committed by cybernetics. Rationalist critics of the “economic creed” or of the “neo-technological utopia,” anthropologist critics of utilitarianism in social sciences and the hegemony of commodity exchange, marxist critics of the “cognitive capitalism” that oppose to it the “communism of the masses,” political critics of a communications utopia that resuscitates the worst phantasms of exclusion, critics of the critiques of the “new spirit of capitalism,” or critics of the “prison State” and surveillance hiding behind neo-liberalism — critical minds hardly appear to be very inclined to take into account the emergence of cybernetics as a new technology of government, which federates and associates both discipline and bio-politics, police and advertising, its ancestors in the exercise of domination, all too ineffective today. That is to say, cybernetics is not, as we are supposed to believe, a separate sphere of the production of information and communication, a virtual space superimposed on the real world. No, it is, rather, an autonomous world of apparatuses so blended with the capitalist project that it has become a political project, a gigantic “abstract machine” made of binary machines run by the Empire, a new form of political sovereignty, which must be called an abstract machine that has made itself into a global war machine. Deleuze and Guattari link this rupture to a new kind of appropriation of war machines by Nation-States: “Automation, and then the automation of the war machine, only came truly into effect after the Second World War. The war machine, considering the new antagonisms running through it, no longer had War as its exclusive object, but rather it began to take charge of and make Peace, policy, and world order into its object; in short: such is its goal. Thus we see the inversion of Clausewitz’s formula: politics becomes the continuation of war, and peace will release, technologically, the unlimited material process of total war. War ceases to be the materialization of the war machine, and rather it is the war machine that itself becomes war itself materialized.” That’s why it’s not worth it anymore to critique the cybernetic hypothesis either: it has to be fought and defeated. It’s just a matter of time.
2022
Michigan
Kritik
Cybernetic Supplement › Alt – Shared Reality
Irmgard Emmelhainz 21, 11-1-2021, "Authoritarianism and the Cybernetic Episteme, or the Progressive Disappearance of Everything on Earth," No Publication, GJM
By means of the cybernetic episteme, Silicon Valley has shaped the world we all live in. As we are poisoned equally by microplastics and fake news, losing our grasp of a shared reality, the “Silicon Six”—as Sacha Baron Cohen called the titans of Silicon Valley in a 2019 speech—propagate algorithm-fueled fear, propaganda, lies, and hate in the name of profit. As Baron Cohen pointed out, the major online platforms largely avoid the kind of regulation and accountability that other media companies are subject to. “This is ideological imperialism,” he said. “Six unelected individuals in Silicon Valley impos[e] their vision on the rest of the world, unaccountable to any government, and acting as if they are above the law.”26 He called digital platforms the greatest propaganda machine in history. Democratic institutions have failed to reign in the information chaos and the destruction of the public sphere. As Shoshana Zuboff argues, we inhabit a communications sphere that is no longer a public sphere.27 She describes this situation as an “epistemic coup” that has taken place in four stages: First, by way of companies gathering personal data about us and then claiming it as their own private property. Second, through data inequality, which means that companies know more than we do. Third, through the epistemic chaos created by algorithms. And fourth, through the institutionalization of this new episteme and the erosion of democratic governance.28 Baron Cohen observes that people can take a stand against platforms by recognizing our power to boycott them. (One example is the mass defection from WhatsApp to Telegram when the former announced that would share its user data with Facebook.) But we also need to defend the existence of facts and a shared reality, understanding the world not as something we see but as something we inhabit—treating life not as something we have, but as something we live. Anti-platform strategies might be accused of Luddism, but they are not necessarily opposed to technology—only to certain uses of technology. It is also crucial that we regard the cybernetic episteme as inextricable from a broader malaise: humanity’s relationship to life and the planet is a toxic one. The very technologies that supposedly enable us to read, think, flourish, and desire are destroying the world we inhabit.29 People continue to yearn for commonality, mutuality, and something to share. But the culture we currently share is largely mediated by repressive, profit-driven digital platforms. This is why we need to flee from the invasion of images, to distinguish between image and reality, and to affirm the opacity of the world and the ambiguity of language. We need to resist platform monopoly through presence, embodiment, immediacy, and human memory. We need to find ways to create life as opposed to turning it into data, combine emotional and intellectual knowledge, and regard visceral gut feelings as a form of human consciousness. We need to learn to exist in symbiosis with others and with the environment, not dislocated, uprooted, and detached.
2022
Michigan
Kritik
Cybernetic Supplement › 1NC – Grove Add-on
Irmgard Emmelhainz 21, 11-1-2021, "Authoritarianism and the Cybernetic Episteme, or the Progressive Disappearance of Everything on Earth," No Publication, GJM
Human communication is at the center of the cybernetic global order. The neural system of globalized networked society is digital communication. In a 1975 film called Comment ça va?, Anne-Marie Miéville and Jean-Luc Godard discuss the “illness” of information. They begin with an image of the Carnation Revolution in Portugal, published in the leftist newspaper Libération. At the time, photojournalistic images had begun to proliferate as a form of information, and Godard and Miéville critique Libération (the most left-wing newspaper in Europe in those days) for failing to include the reader in the creation and dissemination of information. They ask: “How is it that things enter and exit the machine?” (Comment ça va de l’entrée à la sortie de la machine?). This question is about how ideas, words, discourses, human interaction, and images become information and then reach readers and viewers. In Comment ça va?, mass media represents an illness that has killed communication and language. Last year, Godard updated his critique of the media in an interview posted to Instagram. He stated: “Plato’s cave has been fixed on paper/screen.” For Godard, the consequence of the becoming-information of communication and language is the loss of ambiguity in communication. Digital technology has infiltrated every aspect of existence, and the margin of error between the transmission and the reception of a message has been eliminated by mediatization and digitization. For Godard, digital communication denies the force of the image or the word because it eliminates redundancy, misunderstanding, the possibility of reading between the lines, and the possibility of alterity. In a more recent film of his—Adieu au language from 2014—Godard suggests that digital media have destroyed face-to-face communication. He asks: What kind of self could emerge in a time when objects and bodies are disfigurable and refigurable through virtual manipulation?20 Godard posits that the origins of today’s totalitarianism can be traced to the interruption of interior experience by the spectacle. In the film, Godard features a lengthy quote from Philippe Sollers explaining that the spectacle “cuts off” the subject from its interior life—a process that is, paradoxically, highly seductive.21 Furthermore, for Godard digital communication creates a new form of isolated solitude where people lack ties to others. In this light, technology has not become an extension of man, as Marshall McLuhan predicted, but has instead attained autonomy from man, since digital media can communicate amongst themselves without human mediation. For Godard, this means that the “face-to-face” encounter—a basic form of human relation that is the foundation of ethics—is no longer possible. Sherry Turkle, a clinical psychologist and sociologist, comes to similar conclusions: daily conversations no longer involve eye contact, and face-to-face discussion has been replaced by words on a screen.22 According to Turkle, texts, tweets, Facebook posts, Instagram messages, and Snapchats split our attention and diminish our capacity for empathy. They have created new codes of etiquette; no longer do we feel restrained from reaching for our phones in the presence of other people. This new etiquette entrenches a culture of individualism and isolation from each other. This isolation cultivates the perfect ground for fascism. The digitization of communication not only has political and communal consequences. It also affects the neuroplastic potential of the living brain. The cybernetic episteme reshapes our working memory by rearranging its contents. As Warren Neidich writes, the new focus of power is not only the false reproduction of the past (the manipulation of the archive), but the manipulation of our working memory—the type of memory that influences our decision-making. Authoritarian neuropower wants nothing less than to shape our future memory, argues Neidich.23 If the nervous system of cybernetics is digital communication, at the center of digital communication is desire. Mark Fisher devoted his last lectures at Goldsmiths in 2017 to this subject. During one lecture, he played for his students a famous Apple TV commercial from 1984, directed by Ridley Scott and originally broadcast during the Superbowl. In an overt reference to George Orwell’s novel 1984, the commercial depicts a dreary, repressive control society. This society is seemingly liberated when a buxom blonde woman tosses a sledgehammer at a large screen broadcasting the image of an authoritarian figure, causing the screen to explode. The commercial ends with these lines crawling across the screen: “On January 24, Apple Computer will introduce Macintosh. And you’ll see why 1984 won’t be like 1984.” Fisher observes that the video counterposes top-down bureaucratic control to upstart entrepreneurialism. The dreary control society depicted in the commercial is an allusion to not only the Soviet Union, but also IBM, the dominant computer maker at the time. Apple posits itself as the dynamic, colorful new company that will liberate society from dreary IBM, ushering in a new, more vibrant world order. This new world order will fulfill our (capitalist) desires in a way that the communist world cannot. As Fisher suggests, we now live in that world of libidinal capitalism.24 Elsewhere Fisher writes that what drives the circulation of information is the user’s desire to make one more connection, to leave one more reply, to keep on clicking. Capitalism persists because cyberspace is already under our skin, writes Fisher; to retreat from it would be like trying to retreat into some nonexistent precapitalist imaginary. In his view, we believe we have as much a chance of escaping capitalism as we do of crawling back inside our mother’s womb.
2022
Michigan
Kritik
Cybernetic Supplement › 1NC – Grove Add-on
Grove 2019 [, Accessed 7/15/22 //jerry]
I am not suggesting that Crutzen and others are part of a vast conspiracy; rather, I want to outline how climate change, species loss, slavery, the elimination of native peoples, and the globalization of extractive capitalism are all part of the same global ordering. That is, all of these crises are geopolitical. The particular geopolitical arrangement of what others have called the longue durée, and what I am calling the Eurocene, is geologically significant but is not universally part of “human activity” despite the false syllogism at the heart of popular ecological thinking that a global threat to humanity must be shared in cause and crisis by all of humanity.11 Departing from Sloterdijk, I am hesitant to so easily locate modernity or explication as the root or cause of the global catastrophe. No single strategy, war, act of colonization, technological breakthrough, or worldview fully explains the apocalypse before us. However, there is something like what Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari call a refrain that holds the vast assemblage together, a geopolitical melody hummed along with the global expansion of a form of life characterized by homogenization rather than diversification. Accordingly, if we are to make some sense of such a vast world that is, even for Crutzen and Birks, “quite complex and difficult to model,” I think we must consider the particular refrain of geopolitics that is capable of, by scientific as well as more humbly embodied standards, destroying worlds along with the world.12 To eschew geopolitics simply because, as a refrain, it is too big, too grand, or too universal would ignore the conditions of possibility for nuclear weapons, power politics, and carbon-based globalization, and would greatly impoverish the explanatory capability of even the best climate models. So maybe it is not so strange that Crutzen and others’ attention to the nuclear threat of great powers has all but disappeared despite the fact that Russia and the United States still possess thousands of nuclear weapons, and as of late have been all too vocal about using them. Instead, the Anthropocene, as envisioned by Crutzen as a universal concern, requires with it a depoliticization of the causes of that concern. Therefore, Crutzen’s fascination with nuclear winter is geopolitical not because it is about nuclear weapons—although that does not hurt. Rather, Crutzen’s attention to nuclear winter is geopolitical because it is an image of the Earth system as a system with particular beneficiaries animating that interest. Sloterdijk’s diagnosis of what I am terming the Eurocene, or the space of what he calls European “earth-users,” is present in the very cybernetic understanding of the planet as a spatial and substantive whole.13 In the cases of both nuclear winter and climate change, the atmosphere is a model, or more accurately, the last model. The whole Earth becomes a single integer in a larger set of planet systems rather than a set of habitats, zones, or locales. The Earth is merely another system isomorphic as a unit of analysis with Mars or the exoplanet trappist-1f. The shift in scale from place to the planetary is much more than a pulling back from the ground upward. The integrated Earth as the representation of a system and as an actual material system is aided by a process of integration, proceeded by a few hundred years of Sloterdijk’s conception of explication where each part of each environment is disaggregated, described, and then reassembled to explain the whole. The process of integration is not merely a metaphoric or metaphysical geopolitics. It is the condition of possibility to understand the planetary as being political, as well as the condition of possibility for its charting as an economic and military cartography. Unlike the weltanschauung of Heidegger’s world image, the planetary “user space” requires five hundred years of conquest, fossil fuel extraction and exploitation, settlement, hundreds of expert fields from geography to chemistry to ecology, and the normative consolidation of cosmopolitanism as a right to the freedom of movement at least for those capable of the feat.14 The worldview or world image alone is a necessary but insufficient cause. The practices that habituated, expanded, and intensified that worldview are what is critical to its emergence. In this sense, the Anthropocene, like Crutzen’s award-winning models of climate change and nuclear winter, is much more than an explanatory model. These models are the outcome of five centuries of integration and homogenization such that the infrastructure capable of making the Earth as a system knowable could be built, and the circulation of knowledge and data could be amassed to even make the diagnosis of a geological epoch in the first place.15 Properly accounting for the origins of our ecological crisis is vital. No political project oriented toward the many possible futures stretching out before us can consider the questions of ecology and justice on a global, much less geological, scale unless we first take on the unfortunate historical generality of the Anthropocene. The continuing project of Europeanization, now led by U.S. imperial power (although perhaps not for much longer), is central to how the planet got to this point. Understanding this is essential for how any “we” worthy of the plurality of the planet can invent something less nasty and brutish than what currently counts as global order. A consideration of the Eurocene, a geological history and name that foregrounds the geopolitical confrontation that stands in the way of any such future, is required in order to take the scale of our predicament seriously, while also confronting the power politics that made that scale possible.
2022
Michigan
Kritik
Cybernetic Supplement › 1NC – Extinction/Cybernetics Shell
Irmgard Emmelhainz 21, 11-1-2021, "Authoritarianism and the Cybernetic Episteme, or the Progressive Disappearance of Everything on Earth," No Publication, GJM
In the pre-cybernetic era—that is to say, before the 1940s—machines were intended to emulate humans; their actions resembled human behavior, but ostensibly without intent or emotions. This is why Donna Haraway describes pre-cybernetic machines as “haunted.”13 They seemed animated by ghosts, reminiscent of Walter Benjamin’s automaton that was inhabited by a hunchbacked dwarf. Machines were not self-moving, self-designing, or autonomous. They could not achieve human dreams, only mock them. In turn, humans related to machines by using or acting upon them: switching them on or off, using them as tools to achieve an end. Today, the relationship between human and machine is based on internal, mutual communication in a feedback loop. Early machines were led; today, machines lead us.14 This does not mean that machines have simply become humanized through the proliferation of androids. Rather, humans have surrendered consciousness to AI, becoming obedient and predictable. In the twenty-first century, machines have blurred the distinction between the artificial and human mind, not only because machines can imitate human functions, but because humans have become increasingly passive, since we are now subject to neuropower. Within the cybernetic episteme, it is no longer enough to talk about a “control society”; we must talk instead about a composite of interlinked forms of oppression (exploitation, alienation, and domination), in tandem with extreme securitarianism. Another way to see the cybernetic episteme is as the reconceptualization of social worlds into information-processing systems. Practices of computation are used to produce new organizational and infrastructural apparatuses, which in turn create value and profit by exploiting and disposing of human life. Social worlds are subsumed into technologies through techniques such as statistical forecasting and data modeling. The cybernetic episteme stems from a world brought into being by Europeans; this world began with the discovery of the “new world” and the creation of empires and colonies (which coincided with the scientific revolution). In this sense, the cybernetic episteme is inseparable from the Western civilizing project for the whole world, which connected disparate places through technologies like the telegraph and steam shipping, often powered by the extraction of fossil fuels like coal. This project has culminated in globalization as the deregulation and financialization of world economies.15 The Western civilization project, based on Enlightenment values including equality, peaceful public life, access to modern science, the rule of law, democracy, and technological progress, involved the creation of infrastructure to unify nations and the world.16 We can call this infrastructure the “technosphere.” The technosphere comprises not only digital technology but all machines, factories, computers, cars, buildings, railways, and mobility infrastructure, as well as systems of food production, resource extraction, and energy distribution. Today, the infrastructure of the world—the technosphere—is shaped by information, which means that the world we inhabit is designed by data.17 The technosphere is a supplement humans have created to help overcome the limits of “human nature” insofar as humans cannot live independently from structures geared towards sustaining life. The technosphere has promised to enable us to increase production and reproduction with less human effort. Moreover, is also regarded as the main tool humans have to fight decay, entropy, and death, since it comprises all the structures humans have built to keep themselves alive on the planet. The total mass of the technosphere amounts to fifty kilos for every square meter of earth’s surface—a total of thirty trillion tons, which coexists with the diminishing hydrosphere (water, the frozen polar regions) and the biosphere (all of earth’s living organisms).18 The ultimate price of the technosphere is global warming and environmental devastation. Like humans, the technosphere needs external energy input, which is not sustainable as long as it comes from fossil fuels that will eventually be depleted. From this standpoint, the cybernetic episteme represents the gradual merging of human activity into the activity of what we have built and surrounded ourselves with. Much of this built environment is invisible.19 Infrastructure and data are partially occult because we are alienated from them, even as we are produced and managed by them. The invisible infrastructure that sustains our lives is what matters politically right now. And insofar as the technosphere is cybernetic, it is inextricable from capitalism and politics.
2022
Michigan
Kritik
Cybernetic Supplement › 1NC – Extinction/Cybernetics Shell
Irmgard Emmelhainz 21, 11-1-2021, "Authoritarianism and the Cybernetic Episteme, or the Progressive Disappearance of Everything on Earth," No Publication, GJM
Our dependency on platforms provides the ground for technofeudalism. Historically, feudalism was characterized by a fundamental inequality that enabled the direct exploitation of peasants by lords. The lord was both the manager and master not only of the process of production, but of the entire process of social life. In today’s technofeudalism, platform owners are the digital lords and users are the serfs. Rather than commodity production, these platforms are geared towards accumulation through rent, debt, and the privatization of the basic infrastructure that sustains our lives. What is at stake is no longer “true” or “fake” information but the cybernetic episteme upon which our lives and subjectivities have been built. The cybernetic episteme is premised upon modernity’s enclosure of experience. In modern epistemology, which is the precondition of the cybernetic episteme, the self is externalized and experienced at a remove from the body. Perception is centered on the brain and eyes instead of the whole body, separating sensation from reason. The self’s relationship with the world is mediated through mirrors, camera lenses, the canvas, the microscope, and mathematical models.9 The cybernetic episteme, moreover, is inextricable from colonialism, which entails dispossession, dislocation, dissociation, and appropriation. Ariella Azoulay has called the logic underpinning these processes “the shutter”; this logic is materialized in photographic technology that separates humans from objects, self from the world, and people from their lands. The shutter is the principle of imperialism by which campaigns of plunder have left people both worldless and objectless. For Azoulay, the logic of the shutter was invented centuries before photography gave it a technological apparatus, and it enabled the dispossession of non-Western peoples in tandem with the accumulation of visual and material wealth in archives and museums in the West.10 The cybernetic episteme is likewise conceptually constituted by this shutter, since it relies on capturing, naming, moving, and archiving subjects—as does imperialism. In this regard, the cybernetic episteme naturalizes the mediation of the self; it creates not only the condition of detachment from the world, but allows the appropriation of the cultures of others, as well as the dissolution of collective being. The shutter is akin to Heidegger’s Gestell or “representation,” which goes hand in hand with Eurocentrism and Anthropocentrism. The Gestell and the shutter both imply that the world and experience have become representation, through an aesthetic order in which what is produced as artifice becomes the reality of experience. In a 2017 Facebook promo video for a new virtual reality technology, Mark Zuckerberg and his colleague Rachel Frank tele-transported themselves to Puerto Rico after a devastating flood. They intended to showcase the potential of the new technology, but instead revealed its inherent violence. The ability to transport oneself to faraway places “as if” one’s body were present gives the illusion that one we can make a difference in the world through technology.11 Another example, in a different register of colonial modernity is that way Western museums allow visitors to "transport" themselves by observing objects looted from elsewhere, like the Pergamon Museum in Berlin where museumgoers can roam around the Ishtar Gate, which has been on display in the museum since 1930. In a section of Ariella Azoulay’s video Undocumented: Unlearning Imperial Plunder (2020), she films actual visitors to the Pergamon while noting that dislocation is the essence of (imperial) modernity. The VR museum visitor is at the center of a world, but they are not really there (an effect similar to the dispositive of perspective in painting). For globalized Western culture, the ground for vision, enlightenment, culture, and even social change is the dislocation and disappearance of bodies.12 Disembodiment and dislocation are also fundamental epistemological premises of transhumanist Silicon Valley ideology. In this ideology, the teleology of secular modern individualism culminates in the uploading of a person’s mind to a new biological, artificial, or biological-artificial body. The utopian goal of expanding and preserving human consciousness is physically and spiritually achieved. Transhumanism is the dream of enhancing the human body through technology, and ultimately escaping human suffering by transcending the “errors” of death and aging. Posthumanism takes things a step further: its goal is to immortalize consciousness by uploading it to a robotic or synthetic body. Posthumanism does away with the biological dimension of the self, fundamentally altering what it means to be “human.” In both trans- and posthumanism, technology promises to give us the divine attributes of omnipresence, omnipotence, and omniscience, making humans into “pure consciousness,” achieving a kind of individual and secular transcendence. In the first episode of the British TV series Years and Years (2019), Bethany, an adolescent whose face is hidden behind a 3D emoji mask, announces to her parents that she is “transhuman.” She declares: “I don’t want to be flesh. I want to escape this thing and become digital, I want to live forever as information.” Eventually Bethany becomes a hero with transhuman superpowers: her mechanized eyes and brain, which are connected to all the data in the world, allow her to make visible the horrors that the British government have perpetrated in a refugee camp. This techno-utopian narrative implies a democratic ideology, insofar as one political goal of democracy is to make visible the ordeals of oppressed minorities—in this case through virtual disembodiment. In contrast to this techno-utopian narrative, science fiction—especially cyberpunk literature— generally portrays transhumanism as a nightmarish apocalyptic scenario of social control and individual subjection. Several episodes of Black Mirror do this, for example. But what Black Mirror and Years and Years have in common is that technological advances and the increasing symbiosis between humans and machines are associated with political, economic, and social instability. In reality, “mind uploading” has attracted millions of dollars of investment from the billionaires of Silicon Valley and beyond. In a mixture of engineering and enlightenment, consciousness is now being hacked through biofeedback techniques, meditation practices, and microdosing drugs. Many critics have observed that the utopian ideology of transhumanism underpins the Valley’s culture of “move fast, break things, and make as much money as possible.” Technologies aiming to expand human consciousness are rooted in purely extractivist, capitalist values. In this sense, cybernetics is a political project on a planetary scale. As described by Tiqqun, cybernetics is a gigantic “abstract machine” made up of binary machines deployed by empire, and a form of political sovereignty that has merged with the capitalist extractivist project.